Vedanta-Parijata-Saurabha
of Nimbarka
&
Vedanta-Kaustubha
of Srinivasa
(Commentaries on the Brahma-Sutras)



Translated and Annotated by

Roma Bose, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon.)

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OF

ŚRĪNIVĀSA

(COMMENTARIES ON THE BRAHMA-SŪTRAS)

(ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS)

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NIMBĀRKA

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SRĪNIVĀSA

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PREFACE

Nimbārka's commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras known as the Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha, and that of his immediate disciple Śrīnivāsa styled the Vedānta-Kaustubha are the chief works of the school of philosophy associated with the name of Nimbārka. The latter is not, however, a mere commentary on the former, as is sometimes wrongly supposed, but a full exposition of the views expressed in the Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha which is very terse and concise and is not always clear. Both the treatises are therefore essential for the proper understanding of the doctrine of Nimbārka.

Hitherto no translation of either of these works was available in the English language, and the task was undertaken by Dr. Roma Bose (Chaudhuri) at the suggestion of Prof. F. W. Thomas, Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford, under whose supervision it was carried out during 1934–1936, as part of the thesis for the Degree of D.Phil. of that University.

This authoritative English Edition of the Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha has been prepared after carefully comparing the manuscripts Nos. E164, 2480, 2481 and 3273 of the India Office Library and the printed Sanskrit texts of the Kāśī, Brindāban and Chowkhāmbā Series. The translation of the Vedānta-Kaustubha was based on the Sanskrit texts of the Kāśī and Brindāban editions. Differences of readings of the various manuscripts and printed texts of both the treatises have been noted in the footnotes.

As is well-known the doctrine of Advaita, as developed by Śaṃkara, was the earliest of the Vedāntic systems, and in the great efflorescence of philosophic thought in India during the 9th–16th centuries, various schools of thought arose, mostly as protests against the extreme views held by the Advaita school. There is no doubt that by reason of its great metaphysical appeal and the rigid application of logical canons, Śaṃkara's Advaita-vāda exercised the most profound influence on Indian thought and marked him out as the greatest philosophical genius born in this country. His insistence, however, on the sole reality of 'Abheda' or non-difference and the unreality of Bheda or difference evoked strong reactions, the foremost of which was the Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda of Rāmānuja, whose importance was only second to that of Śaṃkara. According to him the reality is not an abstract

concept in the Śaṃkarite sense in which the non-difference completely loses its identity, but is a synthetic unity of both—the relation between the two being that of the substance-attribute. That is, the attribute is different from the substance in the sense that it inheres in it though the latter cannot be equated with any particular attribute and is not a mere assemblage of them all, but is something over and above. In other words, the substance and the attribute, or the unity and plurality are both real and form an organic whole, and the relation between them is the relation of non-difference, and not of absolute identity. Rāmānuja's doctrine is hence known as Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda or qualified monism as against the absolutism of Śaṃkara.

Śrīkaṇṭha, who followed Rāmānuja, agreed that the relation between the Brahman and the Universe was that of non-difference, but while the latter identified Brahman with Viṣṇu, according to Śrīkaṇṭha it was Śiva. His theory is therefore called Viśiṣṭa-Śivādvaita-vāda.

The school of Bhāskara holds that both the unity and plurality are real. The relation between the two is one of difference–non-difference during the effected state of Brahman, i.e. during the cosmic existence and creation, but one of complete identity during the causal state of Brahman, i.e. during salvation and dissolution. In other words, the individual Soul or Jīva, during the state of Saṃsāra, is different from Brahman due to the presence of the Upādhis (limiting adjuncts) such as the body, the sense organs, etc., but when these are not present and it is Mūkta, the Jīva becomes absolutely identical with Brahman of which it is only the effect. Similarly, the world is both different and non-different from Brahman during creation, but identical with Him in Pralaya (dissolution). Hence Bhāskara's view is known as 'Aupādhika-Bhedābheda-vāda', i.e. the Bhedābheda relation between Brahman and the Universe is only *Aupādhika* or due to the limiting adjuncts only and therefore lasts as long as these adjuncts last. But when the Saṃsāra is over and the Upādhis are no more, there is no longer any *Bhedābheda* between Brahman and the Universe, the former alone becomes the reality and no separate soul or matter can then exist.

Baladeva's school also admitted the reality of both the unity and plurality. In a sense, both the Jīva and the Jagat are different from Brahman but in another they are non-different as effects of Brahman. This relation of difference–non-difference is transcendental and cannot be comprehended by reason and must be accepted on the authority of the Scriptures (revelation). His doctrine goes, therefore,

under the name of 'Acintya-Bhedābheda-vāda', i.e. the *Bhedābheda* relation of Brahman and the Universe is *Acintya* or incomprehensible by reason.

The doctrine of Nimbārka, which developed in the atmosphere of general reaction against Śaṃkara's Advaitism, shared the views of the above schools in their insistence on the reality of the Many. According to Nimbārka, Brahman and Jīva-Jagat are equally real as was also held by Rāmānuja, but the difference between them is not superseded by non-difference as the latter supposed. In fact, the difference between the two is just as significant as their non-difference. While it is true, as Rāmānuja thought, that the Jīva-Jagat or the entire universe inheres in the unity of Brahman as an organic whole and as such can lay no claim to separate existence, yet as the effect is different from the cause, in the same sense is the Many different from the One, and their difference is as fundamental as their non-difference. Nimbārka's system has therefore been called the *Svābhāvika-Bhedābheda-vāda* in which the relation between Brahman and the Jīva-Jagat is regarded as one of eternal difference–non-difference during Saṃsāra or the cosmic existence as well as Pralaya or dissolution, and not only during the former state as Bhāskara thought. According to his view even the freed Soul (Mūkta-Jīvātman) is both different and non-different from Brahman and even in Pralaya does the Jagat inhere in Brahman as a distinct entity.

In her English rendering of the Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha and Vedānta-Kaustubha, Dr. Bose has not only given Nimbārka's reading and interpretation of each Sūtra, but has compared them with those of Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha, Bhāskara and Baladeva belonging to the antagonistic and allied schools of the Vedānta Philosophy. Differences from the religious and ethical grounds have not either been ignored. The present work therefore is not to be considered as a mere translation, but it gives also reviews of the main tenets of the post-Śaṃkara theistic schools which arose in opposition to Advaita-Vedāntism, though the full philosophical exposition of Nimbārka's doctrine and the comparative study of the development of Indian thought during this period has been discussed by her in a separate work which will form the third and concluding volume of this series.

The work consists of four chapters. In Chapter I (*Samanvayādhyāya*), it is sought to establish that Brahman is the sole subject of all Scriptures. The nature of Brahman, His attributes and

the sources of our knowledge of Him are discussed in this chapter. In Chapter II (*Avirodhādhyāya*), Nimbārka first refutes the rival views of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, Jainism, Śaivaism and Śāktaism, and considers the problems of Jīva and Jagat, their natures and attributes and the manner in which they are related to Brahman. These two chapters are purely metaphysical and supply the philosophical foundations of the doctrine of Nimbārka. The remaining ones are chiefly of devotional and ethical interests. In Chapter III (*Sādhanādhyāya*), for example, the means of attaining Mokṣa (salvation), the nature and importance of meditations as mentioned in the Upanishads are discussed. In Chapter IV (*Phalādhyāya*), Nimbārka gives his views on Mokṣa, the fruit and the conditions of the Mūkta (released) Jīvātman or soul, etc. According to him Mokṣa or salvation implies two conditions, namely, the attainment of qualities and nature similar to Brahman (Brahma-Svarūpa-lābha), and the full development of one's own individuality (Ātma-Svarūpa-lābha). This full development means the complete manifestation of one's real nature as consciousness (Jñāna-Svarūpa) and bliss (Ānanda), untainted and unimpeded by matter which screens it during Saṃsāra, and deceives it into believing that it is self-sufficient and independent of Brahman. When, however, Mokṣa is attained, it is realized that it is dependent on Brahman as His organic part and in that sense non-different from Him. It implies the destruction of narrow egoity, but not the annihilation of individuality as is the goal of the Advaita school. Nimbārka's ideas on Mokṣa or salvation therefore are the logical outcome of his theistic mind which seeks to find a place for the devotional soul without completely merging it in Brahman.

The first two chapters containing the metaphysical portion of the work is now issued as Volume I consisting of 474 pages. Volume II will comprise the remaining two chapters and indexes for both the volumes. The latter is expected also to be published during this year.

B. S. GUHA,

29th February, 1940. *General Secretary,*
Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal.

FIRST CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FIRST QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled 'Enquiry'. (Sūtra 1)

SŪTRA 1

"THEN, THEREFORE, AN ENQUIRY INTO BRAHMAN."
THE EXPLANATION OF THE BRAHMA-SŪTRAS ENTITLED VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA, COMPOSED BY THE REVEREND NIMBĀRKA.

An enquiry is to be instituted, at all times, into the Highest Person,—Ramā's Husband, denoted by the term "Brahman", the greatest of all because of His infinite, inconceivable and innate nature, qualities, powers and so on,—by one who has studied the Veda with its six parts[1]; who has been assailed with doubt, arising from texts which teach[2] that the fruits of works are both transitory and eternal[3]; who has, for that very reason, enquired into the science which is concerned with the consideration of religious duties,[4] and has, thereby, gained the knowledge determined therein[5] regarding works, their kinds and their fruits; in whom, as a consequence, there arisen a disregard (for worldly objects), that is the result of a discrimination between the finitude and eternity of the

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[1] The six parts are:—(*a*) *Śikṣā* or the science of proper articulation and pronunciation, comprising the knowledge of letters, accents, quantity, the use of the organs of pronunciation, and phonetics generally, but especially the laws of euphony peculiar to the Veda; (*b*) *Chandaḥs* or treatises on metre; (*c*) *Vyākaraṇa* or treatises on grammar; (*d*) *Nirukta* or treatises on the explanation of difficult words; (*e*) *Jyotiṣa* or treatises on astronomy; and (*f*) *Kalpa* or treatises on ceremonials. The first and second of these *Vedāṅgas* are said to be intended to secure the correct recitation of the *Veda*, the third and fourth the understanding of it, the fifth and sixth its proper employment at sacrifice. M.W., p. 1016.

[2] *Prakṛṣṭeṇa karoti iti prakaraṇam, tad-vad vākyam.*

[3] I.e. Whose mind is assailed with doubt owing to the contradictory teachings regarding the fruits of works, some texts declaring that the fruits of works are transitory, while others declaring that they are eternal. Cf. V.K., 1.1.1.

[4] I.e. the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*.

[5] I.e. the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*.

fruits of the knowledge of works and Brahman respectively, the former being surpassable, the latter non-surpassable [1]; who wishes for the grace of the Lord; who is covetous of having a vision of Him; to whom the spiritual preceptor is the only God; who has whole-hearted devotion for the holy spiritual teacher; and who is desirous of final release—this is the sense of the introductory text.

The commentary entitled 'Vedānta-kaustubha', composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

Panegyric

1. I worship the holy Swan [2], Sanaka and others [3], the Divine Sage [4], and Nimbabhāskara [5]: May a devotion for Lord Kṛṣṇa arise in us through their grace.
2. I bow down to the feet of Lord Kṛṣṇa, in reference to whom alone the mass of scriptural texts does not come into mutual conflict, whom those who are engaged in meditation and Yoga obtain, and who is to be worshipped constantly by Varuṇa and Indra with mind and speech.

Finding that the people on earth were being deluded by various sorts of false arguments, Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, the Lord of all, and the one identical material and efficient cause of the entire universe, assumed the form of the son of Parāśara [6] and composed the Vedānta-treatise, called the 'Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā' [7], with a

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[1] I.e. in whose mind has arisen a disgust for all worldly pursuits and objects, since he has apprehended the great distinction between the fruits of works, viz. ordinary worldly objects and heaven, and the fruit of the knowledge Brahman, viz. salvation. Even heaven has an end, but not so salvation, and even heaven is not the highest end, but salvation is. See V.K. 1.1.1.

[2] The Swan Incarnation of *Brahmā* is supposed to be the Founder of the sect of *Nimbārka*.

[3] The Four *Kumāras*, Sanaka and others, the second spiritual teachers of the sect.

[4] I.e. *Nārada*, supposed to be the third spiritual teacher of the sect and the immediate *guru* of *Nimbārka*.

[5] I.e. *Nimbārka*.

[6] *Parāśara* is supposed to be the father of *Vyāsa*, the reputed author of the *Brahma-sūtras*.

[7] There is difference of opinion as to why the *Vedānta-sūtras* or the *Brahma-sūtras* are called the '*Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā*'. According to the *Ratna-*

view to augmenting in the people knowledge and devotion regarding Himself and establishing the Highest Brahman in a manner beyond doubt. Then, the supremely merciful reverend Nimbārka, the founder of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra, composed a commentary, very difficult to understand, called the 'Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha' (Fragrance of the Heavenly Flower of the Vedānta), as an explanation of the texts of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā. Then, again, through his command, and with a view to benefiting the wise, the 'Vedānta-kaustubha' (Gem of the Vedānta), which is easy, concise and explains the sense of the 'Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha', is being composed by me, his disciple, following the path recommended by him and wishing to obtain his favour.

If it be argued : our purpose being served through an enquiry into religious duties simply, what is the use of an enquiry into Brahman?—we reply: since religious duties yield non-permanent fruits, an enquiry into Him is to be undertaken for the sake of obtaining unsurpassed and infinite bliss.

Here the word "then" implies 'succession', and not any other sense, there being no previous distinct mention. It cannot be said that in conformity with the statement, viz. ' The word "om" and the word "atha" formerly issued forth from the throat of Brahman, and hence both are auspicious', (the word "atha") here indicates auspiciousness,—because this treatise being auspicious by itself in sound as well as in meaning, does not await any other auspiciousness; because good luck is obtained through the mere hearing of it ; and because in the very same way, the other meanings of the term "then", viz. special prerogative and the rest[1] are not appropriate here. Moreover, a word, pronounced with one particular sense in view, should not be employed in any other sense. Here the intended sense is 'succession', since the word "therefore" refers to something

prabhā commentary on Ś.B., they are so called because they treat of the *Brahman*-hood of the embodied soul. (*'Śārīrako jīvas tasya Brahmatva vicāro mīmāṃsā.'* P. 64, Kāsī ed., Part I.)

According to *Baladeva*, however, *Brahman* is *'śārīra'* or embodied since Scripture declares that the whole universe is the body of the Lord. Hence the *Vedānta-sūtras* are called the *'Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā'*, because they deal with *Brahman*, the *śārīra* (the embodied). G.B. 1.1.12.

[1] For the different meanings of the term *'atha'* vide A.K., p. 311, line 8.

previous. Hence, the word "then" has the sense of 'succession' only; the word "therefore" implies the reason.

The reality which is obtainable by one who is devoted to the sound-Brahman,—in accordance with the following and other scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. 'He who does not know the Veda does not know Him, the Great', 'There are two Brahmans to be known, the sound-Brahman and what is Higher. Those who know the sound-Brahman go to the Higher Brahman'. (Maitrī 6.22),—and which is possessed of the characteristics to be mentioned hereafter, is the object denoted by the term 'Brahman'. The word "enquiry" denotes a desire for the knowledge of the desired Brahman.

Although the supplial of the verb (in the indicative mood, viz. 'arises') is appropriate here thus: "Then", i.e. afterwards, "therefore", i.e. for this reason, an "enquiry into Brahman" *arises*, it being possible for people with insight to have a spontaneous desire for enquiring into a particular object (viz. Brahman) (without being definitely told or enjoined by Scripture to do so), yet in concordance with the text: 'O, the self verily is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated on, it is to be enquired into' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6), we must understand here a grammatical concordance with a word implying injunction, viz. 'should arise'.[1] In accordance with the scriptural text: 'Desiring for release, one should see the self in the self alone' (Bṛh. 4.4.23), the words 'one who desires for release' in the instrumental case, are implied here—such is the construction of the words (in the sūtra)[2].

Here the term "then", implying 'succession', means: *After* the knowledge regarding the nature of religious duties, the means thereto, the mode of performing them and their fruits—which form the subject of the enquiry into religious duties.[3] Thus, having studied the Veda with its parts,[4]—being first properly

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[1] That is, we can of course make the *sūtra* complete thus: 'Then, therefore, an enquiry into *Brahman* (arises)', but it is better to complete it thus: 'Then, therefore, an enquiry into *Brahman* (should arise)', and make the *sūtra* an injunction and not a plain statement.

[2] Thus, the entire *sūtra* really means: '(*Mumukṣuṇā*) *athāto Brahmajijñāsā* (*kartavyā*)', or '(By one who desires salvation) then, therefore, an enquiry into *Brahman* (should be made)'.

[3] I.e. the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*.

[4] See footnote (1), p. 1.

initiated, as enjoined by the text 'One's own scripture should be studied'[1]; having found, in a general way, the texts which are mutually contradictory, some depicting the non-permanence and others the permanence of the fruits of works thus: 'Undecaying, indeed, is the good deed of one who performs the Cātur-māsya[2] sacrifices' (Āp.Ś.S. 8.1.1[3]), 'We have drunk the soma-juice, we have become immortal' (Ṛg. V. 8.48.3[4]), 'Where there would be no heat, no cold, no weakness, no opponents' and so on[5], and, 'Just as here the world, obtained through merit perish' (Chānd. 8.6.1), 'That (work) of his has an end' (Bṛh. 3.8.10), 'The permanent, verily, cannot be obtained through the non-permanent (Kaṭha 1.2.10), 'What is not made is not (obtained) through what is made' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.12), 'Frail, indeed, are these boats of sacrifices' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7), and so on;[6] being thereby assailed with doubt; and unable to determine (the exact nature of the fruits of works) in particular, one, with a view to removing it (viz. the doubt), proceeds to make an enquiry into religious duties, and having, through such an enquiry, determined properly the nature of works, the mode of performing them and their fruits, one comes to have such a knowledge,—*after that*, this is the sense.[7]

The word "therefore" means 'because of the reason'. That is, the enquiry into Brahman should be undertaken, because the fruit of works are ascertained to be finite and surpassable from the scriptural passage: 'Just as here the world acquired by work perishes, so exactly hereafter, the world acquired by merit perishes' (Chānd. 8.1.6), and from the Smṛti passage: '"The worlds beginning with the world of Brahmā come and go, O Arjuna"' (Gītā 8.16); secondly, because

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[1] A similar passage is found in Tait. Ār. 2.15, p. 153.

[2] Name of the three sacrifices performed at the beginning of the three seasons of four months. Vide Ved. In., p. 259, vol. 1.

[3] P. 1, vol. 1.

[4] P. 139, line 3.

[5] These texts denote the permanence of the fruits of work.

[6] These texts denote the non-permanence of the fruits of works.

[7] That is, first a man studies (*a*) the *Veda* and finds mutually contradictory statements about the fruits of works. (*b*) This leads him to study the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*, with a view to learning the real nature of works and their fruits, and he finds that the fruits of works are not everlasting. (*c*) This leads him to study the *Vedānta*, with a view to attaining what is permanent, viz. salvation. Hence the term '*atha*' means that the *Vedānta* is to be studied *after* the study of the *Veda* and the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsa*.

that the knowledge of Brahman has a fruit which is unsurpassed and endless is ascertained from the following scriptural and Smṛti passages: 'Knowing him alone, one surpasses death, there is no other road to salvation' (Śvet. 3.8.), 'When men will roll up the sky like a piece of leather, then there will be an end of misery, (even) without knowing the Deity'[1] (Śvet. 6.20), 'Knowing the Deity, they are free from all fetters' (Śvet. 1.8; 2.15), 'He who, having searched the self, knows it, attains all the worlds and all objects of desires' (Chānd. 8.7.1.3), 'The person, of the size of a thumb only, abides in the self' (Kaṭha 4.12), 'Knowing him one surpasses death, there is no other path to salvation', '"Many people, purified by the penance of knowledge, have come to be of my nature"' (Gītā 4.10), 'He who possesses knowledge attains me' (Gītā 7.19), '"Knowing me one attains peace"' (Gītā 5.20) and so on; and, finally, because we find that one who is unacquainted with the self has been censured in Scripture as a wretched fellow and a self-killer, in the passages: 'Verily he who, O Gārgī, departs from this world, without knowing this Imperishable, is a vile and wretched creature' (Bṛh. 3.18.10); 'Those worlds are said to be sunless, surrounded by blind darkness. To them they go, after death, whosoever are destroyers of the self.' (Īśā. 3) and so on.[2]

Anticipating the question: By whom (is this enquiry to be undertaken)? (we reply): By one, who has grown indifferent to the fruits of works and so on because of those reasons (stated above); who, on hearing that the direct vision of the Lord is the special cause of salvation, has come to be seized with a strong inclination to have such a direct vision, which inclination is generated by proper discrimination, itself generated through it (viz. hearing); who is desirous of the grace of the Highest Person alone; who looks upon the spiritual preceptor as the only God; who has approached the spiritual teacher; who has whole-hearted devotion for the spiritual teacher; and who is desirous of final

[1] I.e. When the impossible will be possible, the sense being that the knowledge of *Brahman* is the only means of putting an end to miseries.

[2] That is, the enquiry into *Brahman* is to be undertaken because of three reasons, viz.: (1) because the fruits of works are not lasting and unsurpassed, (2) because the knowledge of *Brahman* leads to infinite bliss, i.e. salvation, and (3) because those who do not know *Brahman*, their self, are censured as worthless creatures. The word "*ataḥ*" (=therefore) in the *sūtra* implies these three reasons.

release,—such is the construction,—in accordance with the following scriptural passages: viz. 'Having examined the worlds acquired by work, let a Brāhmaṇa be indifferent to them' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.12), 'When the seer sees the golden-coloured Creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahmā, the wise man, having discarded merit and demerit, and stainless, attains supreme identity' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), 'When he sees the other, the Lord who is propitious and His greatness, he comes to be freed from sorrow' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.2; Śvet. 4.7), 'Thinking itself and the Mover as different, then favoured by Him, it goes to immortality' (Śvet. 1.6), 'The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved and his works perish, when He, who is high and low, is seen' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), 'He can be obtained by him alone whom He chooses. To him this self reveals its own form' (Kaṭha 2.23), 'One who has come to be freed from sorrow sees Him who is without active will and His greatness, through the grace of the Lord' (Śvet. 3.20), 'For the sake of this knowledge, let him, with fuel in hand, approach the teacher alone, who is versed in Scripture, and devoted to Brahman. To him, who has approached him, whose mind is completely calm, and who is endowed with tranquillity, the wise teacher truly told that knowledge of Brahman, through which he knows the Imperishable, the Person, the True' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.12-13), 'Be one to whom the preceptor is a God' (Tait. 1.11), 'To one who has the highest devotion for the Lord, as for God so for his teacher, to that great-souled one these matters which have been declared become manifest' (Śvet. 6.23).

The compound "Brahma-jijñāsā" is to be explained as 'The enquiry concerning Brahman'[1] The genitive case: 'concerning Brahman'[2] expresses the object, in accordance with the rule 'The subject and the object (take the genitive case) when they are used along with a word ending with a kṛt-affix' (Pāṇ. 2.3.65, SD.K. 623).[3] 'The enquiry concerning Brahman' is a compound with the object-genitive,[4] in accordance with the rule 'The genitive is compounded, when used along with a word ending with the kṛt-affix (and the compound comes under the category of the Ṣaṣṭhī-tat-puruṣa)' (K.V.S. 1317, quoted in SD.K. 703).[5]

[1] *Brahmaṇo jijñāsā.*
[2] *Brahmaṇaḥ.*
[3] P. 452, vol. 1.
[4] I.e. a genitive denoting an object.
[5] P. 496, vol. 1.

Brahman is none but Lord Kṛṣṇa, the substratum of inconceivable, infinite, unsurpassed, natural and greatest nature and qualities and so on, omniscient, omnipotent, the Lord of all, the cause of all, without an equal or a superior, all-pervading, and the one topic of all the Vedas, as known from the following scriptural and Smṛti passages, viz.: 'He grows and causes to grow, hence He is called the supreme Brahman', 'Who is omniscient, all-knowing' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), 'Supreme is his power, declared to be of various kinds, and natural is the operation of his knowledge and strength' (Śvet. 6.8), 'This is the Lord of all' (Bṛh. 4.4.22), 'Him, the supreme and great Lord among the lords; Him, the great God among the gods' (Śvet. 6.7), 'He has no work or organ, nothing is seen to be equal or superior to Him' (Śvet. 6.8), 'The Lord of matter and soul, the Lord of the attributes' (Śvet. 6.16), 'The One God is hidden in all beings, all-pervading, and the inner soul of all beings' (Śvet. 6.1.1), 'Kṛṣṇa alone alone is the Supreme Deity. Let one meditate on Him' (G.P.T.[1]), '"I am the source of all, everything originates from me"' (Gītā 10.8), '"There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya"' (Gītā 7.7), '"I alone am to be known through all the Vedas"' (Gītā 15.15) and so on. (This explains the term "Brahman".)

(Now, the explanation of the term "jijñāsā":) Knowledge with regard to Him (viz. such Brahman) alone, i.e. the desire with regard to the knowledge of one so desired (viz. Brahman),—this is the sense. Scripture declares this in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka passage: 'O, the self is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated on' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6), as well as in the Chāndogya passage: 'But the Plenty alone is to be enquired into' (Chānd. 7.23.1). In the passage: 'O Maitreyī, the self is to be seen' the suffix 'tavya' has the sense of 'fitness' simply, in accordance with the aphorism 'The suffixes "kṛt" and "tṛc" are used in the sense of fitness' (Pāṇ. 3.3.169; SD.K. 2822[2]), because the direct vision of Brahman is not something to be enjoined,[3] it being established to be the intimate and inner means to salvation by the following texts:—'The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved and his works perish, when the soul,

[1] P. 205. [2] P. 569.

[3] That is, the above quotation simply means that the Self (*Brahman*) is *fit or worthy* to be seen, and not that the Self *should be* seen,—no injunction here with regard to seeing. See p. 9, footnote 4.

the Lord[1] is seen' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), 'Stainless, he attains a supreme identity' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), 'When he sees his glory, he becomes freed from grief' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.2; Śvet. 4.7), '"Then knowing me in truth, he forthwith enters into that"' (Gītā 18.55), and so on. Thus, with a view to having an access to 'seeing',[2]—which is known from another text, which consists in a direct vision of the Lord, and which is the unique means to salvation,—it is 'meditation',[3]—which is an intimate and inner means to it (viz. 'seeing'),—that is enjoined here.[4] By the term 'knowledge', the reverend Bādarāyaṇa designated, in the aphorisms, the very same thing (viz. meditation), which is a synonym for the words 'contemplation', 'knowledge', 'supreme devotion', 'steadfast remembrance', the rule being that the aphorism and the text indicating the subject-matter (viz. the Upaniṣad-texts) must both have the same meaning. Now, here also, the texts denoting the subject-matter are of a greater weight, as they, as the primary object, are authoritative by themselves; and hence, the meaning of the aphorisms is to be interpreted in accordance with them alone, otherwise they cannot stand in a relation of subject-matter and what treats of the subject-matter.[5] In Scripture, 'hearing'[6] and 'thinking'[7] are laid down as means to 'meditation',[8] since these two also are indirect means to the attainment of salvation. Thus, having ascertained that the Vedānta-texts are concerned with demonstrating the nature, attributes and the rest of the Lord, one approaches a preceptor, who has directly intuited the nature and the rest of Brahman, the object to be worshipped demonstrable by the Vedānta-texts, and learns the meaning of those texts from him who has himself realized

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[1] Correct reading '*Tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare*', or when he, who is high and low, is seen. Vide Muṇḍ. 2.2.8, p. 31 ; C.U., p. 528.

[2] *Śravaṇa.* [3] *Nididhyāsana.*

[4] That is, in the above text (Bṛh.), the Lord is not enjoined to be *seen* but to be meditated on, meditation leading to seeing or direct vision which is the immediate cause of salvation.

[5] That is, the *Vedānta-sūtras* lay down what is contained in the *Upaniṣads*. Hence the *Vedānta-sūtras* are the *viṣayin* or what treat of the subject-matter, and the *Upaniṣad*-texts are the *viṣaya*, or the subject treated. Now, the *viṣayin* and the *viṣaya* must, evidently, refer to the same thing. And here, the *viṣaya* being of a greater force, the *viṣayin* must be understood in accordance with the *viṣaya*, or the *sūtras* are to be understood in the light of the *Upaniṣads*. Hence as the latter enjoin meditation, the former must also do so.

[6] *Śravaṇa.* [7] *Manana.* [8] *Nididhyāsana.*

that meaning directly. This is 'hearing'.[1] 'Thinking' is a kind of reflection, by means of arguments which are in conformity with Scripture, with a view to making the meaning of what has been 'heard' and taught, the object of one's own realization.[2] 'Meditating' means a ceaseless contemplation on the object of 'thinking', which (contemplation) is the unique cause of a direct vision (of the Lord). Accordingly, this (viz. the above Bṛhadāraṇyaka-text) is an *apūrva-vidhi*[3] concerning 'meditation', since (salvation is) absolutely unobtainable (without meditation).[4]

The explanation of the (above-quoted Chāndogya) text 'The Plenty', etc., may be seen under the explanation of the aphorism 'The Plenty', etc. (Br. Sū. 1.3.7).

The resulting meaning is that salvation can be obtained by an individual, eternally fettered, and desiring for salvation, who was, by chance, looked upon (with favour) by Madhusūdana at the time of his birth,[5] who has practised the group of means (to salvation), who has worshipped the feet of his preceptor, and who has a direct vision of Brahman, obtained through the hearing of, thinking upon and meditating on Him, knowable through the Vedānta.

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[1] That is, a man first ascertains that the *Vedānta*-texts demonstrate the Lord, and then approaches a teacher and learns the meaning of those texts from him.

[2] That is, for realizing directly for himself what he has so far accepted on the authority of his preceptor.

[3] An '*apūrva-vidhi*' is a *vidhi* which enjoins something that is absolutely necessary and indispensable for the production of the desired result, e.g. when it is enjoined: 'The rice-grains are to be sprinkled over with water', it is meant that without this sprinkling, the desired result, viz. the *saṃskāra* of these rice-grains or making them fit for being used in a sacrifice cannot be attained by any other means. Hence, here the *vidhi* with regard to the sprinkling is an '*apūrva-vidhi*'. In the very same manner, the above *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text: 'The self should be seen, be heard, be thought, be meditated on', lays down an '*apūrva-vidhi*' regarding meditation, since without meditation, the desired result, viz. salvation, cannot be attained by any other means.

For the different kinds of vidhis—viz. *apūrva*, *niyama* and *pari-saṃkhyā*, see V.R.M., pp. 41–43.

[4] This finishes the explanation of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text 'O friend, the self should be seen', etc.

[5] Vide V.R.M., p. 133; also p. 142, where it is said that only one man in a thousand is looked at with favour by *Madhusūdana* at the time of his birth, and that not by chance, but because of the merits accumulated through thousands of previous births.

Salvation means attaining the nature of the Lord, resulting from the cessation of the bondage of matter in its causal [1] and effected forms,[2] as known from the scriptural text: 'Having attained the form of supreme light, he is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.3.4 ; 8.12.2, 3); as well as from the aphorisms: 'Because release is taught of him who takes his stand upon it' (Br. Sū. 1.1.7), 'And (Scripture) teaches in it th' union of this with that' (Br. Sū. 1.1.20) and so on; and from the Smṛti passage, viz.: 'The attainment of the Lord, characterized by a feeling of unsurpassed joy and happiness, exclusive and absolute, is supposed to be an antidote (to the disease of transmigratory existence)', ' "Many people, purified by the penance of knowledge have come to attain my nature" ' (Gītā 4.10) and so on. The word 'nature' [3] has been explained by the Lord Himself in the passage ' "Resorting to this knowledge, they have come to have *similarity* with me" ' (Gītā 14.2). This we shall expound more clearly in the chapter dealing with the fruit.[4]

Then, in answer to the enquiry:—Of what nature is the individual, desiring salvation? Of what nature is his bondage?—the scriptural truth is being considered now, in order that those who desire for salvation may have an easy access to Scripture.

Now, there are three kinds of reality, distinguished as the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman, because in the aphorisms as well, a trinity of reals has been mentioned, viz. the object to be enquired into (i.e. Brahman), the enquirer (i.e. the sentient), and māyā (i.e. the non-sentient) which consists in the three guṇas and is the original cause of his (viz. the enquirer's) nescience, as otherwise the very enquiry will be impossible; and also because of the following scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. 'By knowing the enjoyer, the object enjoyed and the Mover, everything has been said. This is the three-fold Brahman' (Śvet. 1.21). 'Perishable are all beings, the changeless is called the Imperishable' (Gītā 15.16), 'But the Highest Person is another, declared to be the supreme self' (Gītā 15.17) and so on.

Among these, the sentient substance is different from the class of non-sentient substances; is of the nature of knowledge; possessed of the attributes of being a knower, being an agent and so on; of the

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[1] I.e. *pradhāna*, the primal matter.

[2] I.e. the body, an effect of *pradhāna*.

[3] *Bhāva*.

[4] Viz. the fourth chapter.

form of an Ego; has its very nature, existence and activity under the control of the Lord; is atomic in size; different in every body; and subject to bondage and release. As has been said: 'The individual soul is of the nature of knowledge, under the control of the Lord, fit to be associated with and dissociated from a body, atomic, different in every body, possessed of the quality of being a knower and that which they call, endless. But through the grace of the Lord, verily they know it, the form of which is associated with beginningless Māyā.[1] The (ever-) free, the bound and the bound-freed,[2] (such are the three broad classes of souls); and then again it should be known that there is a multitude of divisions (of these, viz. the ever-free, etc.)'. (D.Ś. 1-2).[3] There are scriptural and Smṛti texts, as well as aphorisms to this effect, viz.: 'Verily, different from this (soul) consisting of the mind is another internal soul, consisting of intelligence' (Tait. 2.4), 'Just as a lump of salt is without an inside and an outside, and is entirely a mass of savour simply, so, verily, O! this self is without an inside or an outside, and is entirely a mass of intelligence simply' (Bṛh. 4.5.13), 'Here this person becomes self-illuminating' (Bṛh. 4.3.9.14), 'O! undecaying, verily, is this self, possessing indestructibleness as its attribute' (Bṛh. 4.5.14), 'Now he who knows: "Let me smell this", which self is he?' 'This person who among the senses is made of knowledge, who is the light within the heart' (Bṛh. 4.3.7). 'This, verily, is the person of the essence of intelligence who sees, ... hears, tastes, smells, thinks and knows' (Praśna 4.9),[4] 'There is, verily, no cessation of the seeing of the seer, because it (i.e. the soul) is indestructible; there is, verily, no cessation of the hearing of the hearer, because it is indestructible; there is, verily, no cessation of the thinking of the thinker, because it is indestructible; there is, verily, no cessation of the knowing of the knower, because it is indestructible' (Bṛh. 4.3.23), '"By whom, O! should the knower be known?"' (Bṛh. 2.4.14; 4.5.15), 'This person simply knows', 'The seer does not see death, nor disease, nor, again, suffering'

[1] That is, the real nature of the soul is distorted through its connection with *māyā* or matter and *karma*, yet individuals can know the real nature of their selves through the grace of the Lord. See V.R.M., pp. 20-21.

[2] That is, the souls which were bound once, but are freed now.

[3] For details, see V.R.M.

[4] Quotation incomplete. The correct quotation is '. . . . . who sees, touches, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, knows and acts'. Vide Praśna 4.9, pp. 41-42.

(Chānd. 7. 26. 2). 'He is the best person, . . . not remembering this appendage of the body' (Chānd. 8.12.3), 'So exactly do the seer's sixteen parts, going to the Person, on attaining the Person, merge in (Him)' (Praśna 6.5), '"Just as the one sun manifests the entire world, so O Bhārata, does the owner of the field (viz. the individual soul) manifest the whole field (viz. the body)"' (Gītā 13.34), 'A knower, for that very reason' (Br. Sū. 2.3.19), 'An agent, on account of scripture having a sense (Br. Sū. 2.3.32).[1] 'I am thou, verily, O Deity! he is I, I am Brahman, thus I bow down to the Death of death', 'He shining alone, everything shines after him; through his light all this shines' (Kaṭha 2.2.15), 'He alone makes him, whom he wishes to lead upwards from these worlds, do good deeds. He alone makes him, whom he wishes to lead downwards from these worlds, do evil deeds' (Kauṣ. 3.8), 'Whether He may make him do good or evil, not even thereby is the Lord in fault', 'The individual soul is small in power, not independent and insignificant';[2] 'Atomic, verily, is this soul. These two, merit and demerit, bind it', 'The individual soul should be known as the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundredfold, yet it is capable of infinity' (Śvet. 5.9), 'Verily, (the soul) is perceived to be like the tip of the spoke of a wheel only, and insignificant, through its quality of buddhi, and through its own attributes' (Śvet. 5.8), '(There is the mention, of departing, going and returning' (Br. Sū. 2.3.19), 'If it be said, not atomic, because Scripture declares what is not that, (we reply:) no, because the topic is something else' (Br. Sū. 2.3.21), 'That designation is on account of having that quality for its essence, as in the case of the Intelligent soul' (Br. Sū. 2.3.28);[3] 'The Eternal among the eternal, the Conscious among the conscious, the One among the many, who bestows objects of desire' (Kaṭha 5.13), 'A part, on account of the designation of a plurality' (Br. Sū. 2.3.42),[4] 'There is indeed another different soul, called the elemental soul,—

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[1] These texts and aphorisms set forth the essential nature of the individual soul, viz. that it is knowledge by nature, a knower, an agent and an enjoyer.

[2] These texts also set forth the essential nature of the soul, viz. its dependence on the Lord for its activity and its non-difference from Him in that sense.

[3] These texts and *sūtras* set forth the size of the soul, viz. its atomicity.

[4] These texts and aphorisms set forth the number of the souls, viz. that there is a plurality of souls.

he who being overcome by the white or dark fruits of works, attains a good or bad birth. . . . Because of being deluded, he does not see the Lord, the causer of action and dwelling within the self. He is borne along and defiled by the properties of matter' (Maitrī. 3.2),[1] 'An unborn one, verily, lies by, enjoying. Another unborn one discards her, who has been enjoyed' (Śvet. 4.15), 'Stainless, he attains a supreme identity' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), 'He does not return again' (K.R. 2), 'Non-return, on account of scriptural texts' (Br. Sū. 4.4.22) [2] and so on.

The non-sentient substance is of three kinds, viz., what is derived from matter, what is not derived from matter and time.[3] As has been said:—'What is derived from matter, what is not derived from matter and time,—these are held to be the non-sentient. (The second is) denotable by the term 'māyā', 'pradhāna' and the rest, and there are distinctions of white and the rest in it, although it is the same' (D.Ś. 3.). Among these, the substance which is the substratum of the three guṇas is the prākṛta. It is eternal as well as subject to changes like transformation and so on, as declared by the following scriptural texts:—'A cow she is white, black and red, without beginning and end,[4] the progenitress, and the source of all beings, milking all wishes for the Lord' (Cūl. 5), 'There is an unborn one red, white and black, producing many progeny of the same nature' (Śvet. 4.5) and so on; by the Smṛti passages, viz.: 'This, consisting of the three guṇas, is the source of the world and is without beginning and end' (V.P. 1.2.21a),[5] 'Non-sentient, for the sake of another, ever-changing, consisting of the three guṇas, the field of works—such is said to be the form of prakṛti' and so on; as well as by the following aphorisms: 'It has a sense, on account of its subordination to Him' (Br. Sū. 1.4.3), 'As in the case of the sacrificial ladle, for want of any specification' (Br. Sū. 1.4.8), 'But that which has light for its cause, because thus, in fact, some read' (Br. Sū. 1.4.9) and so on. The

[1] Quotation incorrect. Vide *Maitrī.*, pp. 369, 371. Correct quotation translated.

[2] These texts and aphorisms set forth the liability of the souls to bondage and release.

[3] *Prākṛta, aprākṛta* and *kāla.*

[4] Correct reading '*anāda-vatī*' or without sound. For correct quotation, vide Cūl. 5, p. 230.

[5] P. 14.

guṇas are sattva, rajas and tamas. That very prakṛti, being transformed, through its own guṇas, into the body, the sense-organs, the mind and intelligence of the individual souls, and through being a hindrance to salvation, is said to be the cause of the bondage of the individual soul. It is the cause of the universe, beginning with the mahat and ending with the cosmic egg, and its products are to be known as non-permanent.

Next, the aprākṛta is a non-sentient substance, absolutely different from prakṛti consisting of three guṇas and time, occupies a region different from the sphere of prakṛti, and is denoted by the terms 'eternal manifestation', 'the region of Viṣṇu', 'the supreme void', 'the supreme place', 'the world of Brahman' and so on, as declared by the following scriptural texts and aphorisms:—'Of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness' (Śvet. 3.8; Gītā 8.9), 'He who is its Master in the supreme void', 'That supreme region of Viṣṇu the wise see always' (Nṛ. Pūr. 5.10; Skanda 15; Mukti 2.77; Vāsu 4), 'But the man whose charioteer is intelligence, and the mind, the reins, attains the end of the road, the supreme place of Viṣṇu' (Kaṭha 3.9), 'Having obtained the soul, I become united with the uncreated world of Brahman' (Chānd. 8.13.1), 'He does not return again' (K.R. 2), 'Non-return, on account of scriptural texts' (Br. Sū. 4.4.22) and so on; as well as by the following verses in the Mahā-bhārata—viz.: 'Whom they call prakṛti, the eternal, because He is the original source of all beings—the Divinity, without beginning and end, the Lord Nārāyaṇa, Hari. His supreme place is manifested beyond the abode of Brahmā. That celestial, luminous place which the gods do not see, more brilliant than the sun and fire, is the place of Viṣṇu the Great, and through its own rays, O king! it is difficult to be seen by gods and demons. The ascetics endowed with penance, infused with auspicious deeds, perfected by Yoga, great-souled, and devoid of ignorance and delusion, go there to Lord Nārāyaṇa, Hari, the adorable. Having gone there, they do not, O Bhārata, return to this world again. This place is, O king, eternal and undecaying, for this, O Yudhiṣṭhira, is always the proof of the Lord. Higher than the seat of Brahmā is that supreme place of Viṣṇu, which some people who are endowed with knowledge and intelligence, and want to reach the supreme place, know to be pure, eternal, luminous and the supreme Brahman. That place is immensely holy, full of holy families, going where men do not grieve, do not return, do not feel pain. But those Sattvatas attain

here the place of Brahman'. The same thing is found in the Gītā. Compare, e.g. the statement by the Lord, viz.: '"Through His grace,[1] you shall obtain supreme peace and an eternal place"' (Gītā 18.62). And through the beginningless desire of the Lord, it is manifold in forms, as the objects of His enjoyment and of His ever-free souls, and not liable to any alternations of evolution and the rest; since it is beyond time, in accordance with the text: 'That manifestation, of which time, composed of Kalās[2] and minutes, is not the cause of transformation. Your eight-fold attributes and lordship, O Lord, are natural and supreme'. Next, time is a species of non-sentient substance, different from both the prākṛta and the aprākṛta, eternal and all-pervading, in accordance with the scriptural text; 'Now, eternal, verily, are the soul, matter and time'; and also because in the text: '"Existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), the existence of time, denoted by the term 'beginning', is declared; as well as on account of the Smṛti passage:—'The Lord Time is beginningless, and has, O Brahmin, no end' (V.P. 1.2.26a[3]). 'There can be no apprehension in the world which does not involve time.' It is the special cause of the conventional uses (of such terms) as 'past', 'future', 'present', 'simultaneous', 'lasting', 'quick' and so on; assisting in the creation and the rest; and the special cause of the conventional use (of different measures of time), beginning with the paramāṇu and ending with the parārdha.[4] Since it is well-known from the Purāṇas, no detailed account is given here. All objects derived from prakṛti are dependent on time. But although time is the regulator of everything, it is itself regulated by the Supreme Lord, in accordance with the text: 'Who is a knower, the Time of time, possessor of attributes, omniscient' (Śvet. 6.2).

The meaning of the word "Brahman" has already been expounded above. He is Lord Kṛṣṇa, an abode of groups of qualities like Creatorship of the world and the rest, to be mentioned hereafter, and is denoted by the words 'Supreme Brahman', 'Nārāyaṇa', 'Vāsudeva' and so on. As has been said: 'Let us meditate on Kṛṣṇa, on Hari, with eyes like

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[1] Correct quotation '*tat-prasādāt*' and not '*mat-prasādāt*'.

[2] *Kalā* is a particular division of time. M.W., p. 261.

[3] P. 15.

[4] A *paramāṇu* is the time taken by the sun to traverse past an atom of matter and so on. Vide V.R.M., p. 38, for details.

lotus, on Brahman, supreme and adorable, free by nature from all faults, and one mass of infinite auspicious qualities, and having the vyūhas [1] as His limbs' (D.Ś. 4).

The mutual differences among these (three) substances, viz. the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman are taught by the texts contained respectively in the different chapters (treating of these three) and indicating the respective peculiarities of their qualities and nature. The non-difference of the sentient and the non-sentient is taught in the following texts:—'"Existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second" ' (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only' (Ait. 1.1.1), 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.31; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3), 'This soul is Brahman' (Bṛh. 4.4.5), 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), 'I am you, verily, O reverend Deity', 'Then he knows the self alone: "I am Brahman" '.

In this way, the two kinds of texts being both authoritative in their primary and literal import, the sentient and the non-sentient, though of different natures (from Brahman), yet are non-different from Brahman, because they have their existence and activity under His control,—just as the sense-organs, though of different natures (from the vital-breath) are yet non-different from the vital-breath, because they are under its control, as is well-known from the dialogue between the vital-breath and the sense-organs in the Chāndogya: 'Verily, they are not called speech, eyes, or mind, but called the vital-breath alone' (Chānd. 5.1.15). Hence the view of the author of the aphorisms is that Brahman, the object to be enquired into, is both different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient. For that very reason, there is no necessity for enquiring into the two realities (viz. the sentient and the non-sentient), and the doctrine that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all [2] fits in well. As has been said: 'Hence, all knowledge concerning all objects is true, since they, as declared by Scripture and Smṛti, have Brahman

[1] The *vyūhas* are *Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha*. Vide V.R.M., pp. 47–49, for details.

[2] Vide Chānd. 6.1 ff. The sense is that the *sūtras* recommend an enquiry into *Brahman* alone, and not into the sentient and the non-sentient, not because these two are unreal, but simply because by enquiring into *Brahman*, the Cause, we come to know of the sentient and the non-sentient too, the effects, and hence no separate enquiry is necessary.

for their essence,—this is the view of those who are versed in the Vedas, and the Trinity of Reals too is established by Scripture and aphorisms' (D.Ś.7). The following aphorisms may be referred to: 'A part, on account of the mention of variety, and otherwise, some even read the status of a fisherman, a knave and so on' (Br. Sū. 2.3.42), 'But on account of the mention of both, as in the case of a snake and its coil' (Br. Sū. 3.2.27), 'Or, like the substratum of light, because of being light' (Br. Sū. 3.2.28) and so on. Detailed explanations may be seen further on.

Since this aphorism (Br. Sū. 1.1.1), ascertaining the meaning of Scripture, is of the nature of an introduction, the indispensable factors (in the study of a particular subject) are also mentioned virtually by it, with a view to encouraging people with insight to (the study of) Scripture. These are: the person entitled (to the study), the topic, the relation and the purpose.[1] Among these, one who is desirous of release and possessed of the stated marks [2] is the person entitled (to the study of the Vedānta). The topic is the Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, denoted by the term 'Brahman' and the rest, omniscient, the substratum of natural, inconceivable and infinite attributes and powers persisting as long as He Himself does, the Controller of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra, matter, atoms, time, karma, and Nature, who is absolutely untouched by faults and who is the substratum of a natural difference—non-difference from the sentient and the non-sentient. The relation is that between a topic and what treats of the topic.[3] The purpose here is salvation, characterized by attaining the state of the Lord.

Here ends the section entitled 'The enquiry' (1).

Comparison of Nimbārka's reading and interpretation with the readings and interpretations of Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva.[4]

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different. According to Nimbārka, the term "atha" (=then) signifies: '*after the* study of the Veda and the Pūrva-

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[1] *Adhikārin, viṣaya, sambandha, prayojana.* [2] See above, pp. 11–14.
[3] See above, p. 9 of the book and footnote 5 there.
[4] Only the points of differences will be noted.

mīmāṃsā'. But according to Śaṃkara, this is not the case. He points out that the study of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is by no means an essential pre-requisite to the study of Brahman.[1] There is no essential connection between the enquiry into religious duties and that into Brahman. On the contrary, there is an absolute difference between them as regards the result and the object of enquiry.[2] The result of the former is the attainment of worldly and heavenly enjoyment, which is something to be accomplished; while the result of the latter is salvation, which is not something to be accomplished, being eternal and ever-accomplished. This being so, the essential pre-requisite to the enquiry into Brahman is not the enquiry into religious duties, but the acquisition of the four qualifications [3],—viz. (1) discrimination between eternal and non-eternal objects, (2) aversion to the enjoyment of the objects of sense, here or hereafter, (3) possession of self-restraint, tranquillity and the rest [4] and (4) the desire of emancipation.[5]

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same, only much more elaborate. Rāmānuja points out that the two Mīmāṃsās—viz. the Karma-mīmāṃsā and the Brahma-mīmāṃsā constitute one connected whole, the first naturally leading to the second,[6] and criticises at length, in this connection, the Śaṃkarite view that the enquiry into Brahman does not necessarily presuppose the enquiry into religious duties.[7]

Bhāskara

Literal interpretation same, but *import* different. Bhāskara develops here his peculiar doctrine of jnāna-karma-samuccaya, or

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[1] Ś.B. 1.1.1. '*Dharma-jijñāsāyāḥ prāg api adhīta-Vedāntasya Brahma-jijñāsopapatteḥ*', p. 71.

[2] Ś.B. 1.1.1. '*Dharma-brahma-jijñāsayoḥ phala-jijñāsya-bhedācca*' (p. 74).

[3] *Sādhana-catuṣṭaya.*

[4] I.e. *śama* (control of the internal organ, viz. the mind), *dama* (control of the external sense-organs), *uparati* (indifference to worldly pursuits), *titikṣā* (endurance of the opposite extremes, like heat and cold, pleasure and pain, etc.), *śraddhā* (faith in the scripture and the spiritual teachers), and *samādhāna* (deep concentration).

[5] Ś.B. 1.1.1. '*Nityānitya-vastu-vivekaḥ, ihāmutrārtha-phalabhoga-virāgaḥ, śama-damādi-sādhana-sampat, mumukṣutvaṅ ca*'.

[6] Śrī. B. 1.1.1. '*Vakṣyati ca Karma-brahma-mīmāṃsayor aikaśāstryam*', etc., p. 2, vol. 1 (Madras ed.).

[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 5–13, vol. 1.

combination of knowledge and work. Thus, according to both Nimbārka and Bhāskara, the enquiry into Brahman should be undertaken *after* an enquiry into religious duties, *but for different reasons*. According to Nimbārka, the prior study of the Karma-mīmāṃsā convinces us of the transitory nature of the fruits of karmas, and this naturally leads us to the study of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā, with a view to attaining a permanent fruit therefrom, viz. salvation. For this reason, we study *first* the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, and *then* the Uttara-mimāṃsā or the Vedānta.

But according to Bhāskara, we enquire into Karmas *before* enquiring into Brahman for quite different reasons, viz. (1) We do not enquire into Karmas first and then into Brahman, because the former are transitory, the latter not; but we enquire into both Karmas and Brahman, for the very same reason, viz. because we know that they both play an equal part in the attainment of salvation. Salvation can be obtained through a proper combination of knowledge and works, and unless we *first* know the nature of the works themselves, we cannot possibly decide which kinds of works are to be resorted to and combined with knowledge, and which kinds to be avoided and not to be so combined. It is for this reason, that we *first* study the Karma-mīmāṃsā, and *then* the Brahma-mīmāṃsā, and combine the obligatory works with knowledge, avoiding those that are undertaken for selfish ends.

(2) Further, the Vedānta deals with various kinds of meditations on the subordinate parts of sacrifices—, e.g. the meditation on the udgītha and so on. But unless we are first acquainted with the nature of those sacrifices themselves, such meditations are not possible. It is for this reason also that we first study the Karma-mīmāṃsā, and then the Brahma-mīmāṃsā.[1]

Bhāskara also criticises here the Śāṃkarite interpretation of the term "atha".[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Literal interpretation same, but *import* different. That is, Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha both agree that the Brahma-mīmāṃsā is to be studied after the study of the Karma-mīmāṃsā, but the *reason* for this, as given by Śrīkaṇṭha, is different from that given by Nimbārka. We have already seen the reason given by Nimbārka. But

[1] Bh. B. III, p. 2.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 3–5.

according to Śrīkaṇṭha, we must first study religious duties and then Brahman, because the two stand in a relation of worship (ārādhanā) and the worshipped (ārādhya),[1] cause (hetu) and effect,[2] means (sādhana) and end (sādhya)[3]. The proper performance of Karmas purifies the mind. But unless we first know the nature, etc. of Karmas, we cannot perform them properly, i.e. choose the right ones (nitya and naimittaka ones) and avoid others (kāmya ones), and unless we perform karmas properly, our mind is not purified, and unless our mind is purified, there can be no rise of knowledge in it. It is for this reason that we should first study the Karma-mīmāṃsā and then the Brahma-mīmāṃsā.[4] Like Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha holds that the Karma-mīmāṃsā and the Brahma-mīmāṃsā form one and the same treatise.[5]

Baladeva

Interpretation different. According to Baladeva also, the word "atha" means 'immediate sequence', but he points out that it cannot be said that the study of the Karma-mīmāṃsā is an essential pre-requisite to the study of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā, for it is often found that even one who knows the Karma-mīmāṃsā by heart, but who is deprived of the company of the good, has no desire to enquire into Brahman, while one who does not know the Karma-mīmāṃsā, but is purified by truthfulness, prayer, etc. and associates with the good, has a natural inclination to enquire into Brahman. It cannot be said also that the term "atha" means that the enquiry into Brahman can be undertaken only after the acquisition of the four-fold qualifications, viz. discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal and the rest, as held by Śāṃkara, for these cannot be acquired unless one first associates with the good and the holy.[6]

Hence, what the term "atha" means is as follows:—A man who has properly studied the Veda and has understood its meaning in a general way, who has faithfully performed the duties incumbent on

[1] ŚK.B. 1.1.1, p. 34, Part 1.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 37, 39, Part 1.
[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 39, 43, Part 1.
[4] ŚK.B. 1.1.1, pp. 33, 39, 43, 50, 68, 70, Part 1. Of course *Śrīkaṇṭha* is not a *Jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vādin* like *Bhāskara*.
[5] ŚK.B. 1.1.1, p. 33, Part 1.
[6] G.B. 1.1.1, pp. 24-25, chap. 1.

his own stage of life, who is truthful and so on, whose mind has become purified by the performance of duties in a disinterested spirit and who has come into contact with a knower of truth, should then commence an enquiry into Brahman, for then he is convinced that the fruits of works undertaken with selfish ends in view are but transitory, while Brahman alone is the cause of eternal happiness.[1]

Thus, the five pre-requisites to the enquiry into Brahman are:— (1) Study of the Veda. (2) Proper performance of the duties incumbent on one's own stage of life. (3) Purification of the mind by such performance of works in a disinterested spirit. (4) Association with the good and the holy. (5) The consequent acquirement of the faculty of discriminating between the permanent and the non-permanent, disgust for non-permanent worldly objects and desire to know the permanent in details.

All the commentators agree in holding that the word "atah" means 'because the fruits of Karmas are transitory, while the knowledge of Brahman alone leads to eternal bliss'.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled 'The Origin'. (Sūtra 2)

SŪTRA 2

"(BRAHMAN IS THAT) FROM WHOM (ARISE) THE ORIGIN AND THE REST OF THIS (WORLD)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Now, with regard to the characteristics of Brahman, the author states the correct conclusion:

That very Lord—the substratum of infinite attributes like omniscience, etc. and the ruler of Brahmā, Śiva time and the rest,—from whom arise the origination, subsistence and dissolution "of this", i.e. of the universe,—endowed with manifold combinations, the abode of innumerable peculiarities of names and forms and the like; and the form of which is inconceivable,—is Brahman, the object of the above statement (viz. Sū. 1.1.1)—this is the meaning of the characterizing text.

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[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 19-20, chap. 1.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Brahman, called Lord Kṛṣṇa, great in qualities, powers and nature, has been established in the previous section. Now, with reference to the enquiry: What are His characteristics?—the same Being (viz. Brahman) is being demonstrated, as having the qualities of 'being the agent of the origin and the rest of the world', 'being omniscient', 'being true' and so on.

Here the words "of this" denote the effect, viz. the world; and the words "from whom" denote the cause. The word 'Brahman' is to be supplied here from the previous aphorism. And, there being an universal correlation between the terms 'yat' and 'tat', the term 'tat' too must be supplied here.[1]

(Next the compound "janmādi" is explained:—) 'That of which "origin" is the beginning'—is "janmādi", i.e. creation, subsistence, dissolution and salvation. This is a Bahuvrīhi compound of the tad-guṇa-saṃjñāna type.[2]

That "from whom",—i.e. the Lord, the Highest Person, the Lord of all, omniscient, omnipotent, the supreme cause and the ruler of all,—arise the origination, subsistence, dissolution, and salvation "of this", i.e. of the world, which is manifested by names and forms connected with enjoyers (viz. the souls) divided variously; which is the constant abode of the enjoying of place, time and fruits; and the composition of which is beyond the grasp of reasoning—is Brahman. He alone is to be enquired into by those who desire for salvation,—this is the construction of the words in the aphorism.

[1] Thus the construction of the *sūtra* is:—'*Janmādy asya yataḥ Brahmaṇaḥ tataḥ*'.

[2] There are two kinds of *Bahuvrīhi*, viz. *tad-guṇa-saṃjñāna* and *atad-guṇa-saṃjñāna*. In the former case, the compounds, the noun (*viśeṣya*) has direct connection with and implies the words compounded (*viśeṣaṇas*), e.g. when it is said 'Bring the man with long ears' (*Lamba-karṇam ānaya*), the bringing of the man implies the bringing of his attribute, viz. the ears, as well and the man (*viśeṣya*) and his ears (*viśeṣaṇas*) are directly connected. In the latter case, there is no such direct connection between the compound and the words compounded, e.g. when it is said 'Bring the man who has seen the sea' (*Dṛṣṭa-sāgaram ānaya*), the bringing of the man does not imply the bringing of his attribute, viz. the sea, and there is no direct connection between the two.

Now, '*Janmādi*' is a *Bahuvrīhi* of the first kind and hence it includes in its meaning '*janma*' too.

There are scriptural texts to this effect,—beginning:—'Bhṛgu, the son of Varuṇa approached his father, (with the request) "Sir, teach me Brahman" ' (Tait. 3.1), and continuing:—' "From, whom, verily, all these beings arise, by whom they, so born, live and to whom they go forth and enter,—enquire into that, that is Brahman" ' (Tait. 3.1), 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1) and so on. (The meaning of the first of the above two texts is:—) 'From whom', i.e. from Lord Puruṣottama, 'all these beings', i.e. all objects from the mahat down to a tuft of grass, 'arise',—hereby the origination (of the world from the Lord) is indicated. 'By whom, they, so born, live',—hereby the subsistence (of the world in Brahman) is indicated. 'They enter',—hereby the dissolution (of the world into the Lord) is shown. 'To whom they go forth,'—meaning—'whom they attain after the destruction of all karmas',—hereby salvation (of the souls) is indicated. Here 'origination' means the expansion of the manifold consciousness of the sentient being, due to its connection with a body and the rest; and 'dissolution' means its entrance into the Cause (viz. Brahman), resulting from the contraction of its consciousness. This will be made clear under the explanations of the two aphorisms, viz. 'Dependent on the movable and the immovable' (Br. Sū. 2.3.16) and so on. The distinction (between the sentient and the non-sentient) is that the non-sentient is more primary, having a different form at the beginning of creation.[1]

The meaning of the second text, on the other hand, is that Brahman possesses the attributes of truth, knowledge and infinitude. Here, the word 'truth' distinguishes the Lord from what is not true, the word 'knowledge' from the group of the non-sentient, and the word 'infinite' from the group of the sentient.

And, thus it is established that the characteristic mark of Brahman is that He, being the one non-distinct material and efficient cause of the universe, is possessed of truth and the rest. He is the material cause[2] in the sense of being the manifestor, in a gross form, of His own

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[1] That is, the non-sentient is more primary than the sentient in the sense that it is prior to the sentient in point of time. Right in the beginning of creation, the individual soul does not exist, in the sense that there is nobody with which it may be connected, but *pradhāna* does, though not in the form of particular non-sentient substances like stones and houses, etc., and the body comes to be evolved later on. Cf. *Sāṃkhya* theory of evolution.

[2] *Upādānatva.*

natural powers, denoted by the terms 'higher', 'lower' and so on, and reduced to a subtle state; as well as of the effects, existent and inherent in them respectively. He is the efficient cause [1] in the sense of bringing about a union of the sentient beings,—whose attribute of knowledge is in a state of absolute contraction being under the influence of the past impressions of their own karmas which are beginningless, and is, thereby, unfit for bringing about the recollection (in their minds) of the retributive experiences (to be undergone in the present birth),—with their respective karmas, and the respective instruments for experiencing them, through manifesting (in them) knowledge, enabling them to experience the fruits of karmas.[2]

There is a Smṛti passage too, conformable to the text dealing with the topic in hand, (i.e. the above Taittirīya text, 3.1) in the Mokṣa-dharma.[3] It begins: 'The Scripture which was mentioned by Bhṛgu to Bhāradvāja, who asked' (Mahā. 12.6769b [4]), and continues: '"He, verily, is the Lord Viṣṇu, celebrated to be infinite, abiding as the inner Soul of all beings, and difficult to be known by those who have not obtained the self, who is the creator of the principle of egoity for the production of all beings, from whom arose the universe, about whom I have been asked by you here"' (Mahā. 12.6784b–6786a [5]).

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[1] *Nimittatva.*

[2] The Lord is the material cause of the universe in the sense that creation means the manifestation of His subtle powers of the sentient and the non-sentient into gross effects. That is, during dissolution, the entire universe of the sentient and the non-sentient merges in the Lord and exists in Him in a subtle state as His natural powers. Then, in the beginning of a new creation, the Lord manifests these powers of the sentient and the non-sentient (*cit-śakti* and *acit-śakti*), developing them into grosser effects and producing, thereby, the universe of names and forms.

And the Lord is the efficient cause of the universe in the sense that He unites individual souls with their respective *karmas*, the results of these *karmas*, and the instruments for experiencing them—that is, the Lord is the efficient cause in the sense that He regulates the destinies of individual souls in accordance with strict justice. During dissolution, the beginningless impressions of past karmas get dimmed and confused; and at the time of a new creation, the Lord revives these impressions in particular individuals, thereby making each individual undergo the fruits of his past works. Vide V.R.M., p. 63.

[3] '*Mokṣa-dharma*' is the name of a section of the twelfth book of the *Māhā-bhārata*, from *adhyaya* 174 to the end.

[4] P. 604, line 7, vol. 3.

[5] *Op. cit.*, lines 22–24.

If it be objected:—In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, a multitude of causes is spoken of in the passage: 'Time, nature, destiny, accident, elements and the Person should be known as the Cause' (Śvet. 1.2), so what authority is there for separating specifically Vāsudeva, the Highest Person alone as the cause of the world?—(then we reply:) Listen. A multitude of scriptural and Smṛti passages is our authority for specifying the cause of the world. Compare the following:—'He, the One, who governs all these causes, connected with time and soul' (Śvet. 1.3), 'He who is a knower, the Time of time, possessed of attributes, omniscient' (Śvet. 6.2), 'Of whom there is neither a creator, nor a lord' (Śvet. 6.9), 'Verily, Nārāyaṇa was One' (Mahā. Up. 1.2), 'Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts', 'From Nārāyaṇa is born Brahmā, from Nārāyaṇa is born Rudra' (Nār. 1), 'From the forehead of this being, wrapt up within himself in meditation, was born the Person, with three-eyes, trident in hand' (Mahā. Up. 1.7), 'Kṛṣṇa, the One, the ruler, moving everywhere, is an object of worship, He who, though one, yet appears as many'. "'Ka' is the name of Brahman, I am the 'Īśa', i.e. the Lord, of all beings. We two have sprung up from your body, hence you have the name 'Keśava'", 'I, Brahmā, the primary Lord of people, am born from Him, and you have sprung up from me', 'Kṛṣṇa alone is the source of the worlds, and of their dissolution too', 'Being created by Kṛṣṇa the universe consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient has originated'. 'In the Veda, and in Rāmāyaṇa, verily, in the Bhārata and in the Pañca-rātra, Hari is celebrated everywhere, in the beginning, in the end, and in the middle' (Hari V. 16232[1]). '"I am the origin of the entire world, dissolution similarly"' (Gītā 7.6), '"There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya"' (Gītā 7.7), '"I am the source of everything, everything originates from me"' (Gītā 10.8) and so on. The terms 'Hiraṇyagarbha' and the rest, which we find sometimes in certain texts concerning the origin and so on of the world, should be known to be referring to Brahman. Hence it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, the Soul of all, the Lord of all, the one topic of all the Vedas, is the cause of the world.

Here ends the section entitled 'The Origin' (2).

[1] P. 1002, vol. 4.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading and interpretation same. Of course, consistently with his doctrine, Śaṃkara must hold that here the term 'Brahman' denotes 'Īśvara' or the lower Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'That which has Scripture for its source'. (Sūtra 3)

SŪTRA 3

"BECAUSE (BRAHMAN HAS) SCRIPTURE FOR HIS SOURCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With reference to the enquiry: What is the proof of His existence? The author states the correct conclusion:—

Of Whom "Scripture" alone is "the source", i.e. the cause of knowing,[1]—that very reality, characterized as having the stated marks, is denoted by the term 'Brahman'.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been pointed out by the aphorism concerning enquiry[2] that Brahman is the object to be enquired into, and it has been pointed out by the aphorism concerning characteristic mark[3] that the characteristic mark of Brahman is to be the cause of the origin and the rest of the world and possess truth, etc. Now, with reference to the enquiry: What is the proof with regard to Him—the proof is being stated.

On the doubt, viz. whether Brahman, having the stated marks, is to be arrived at through inference, or has the Veda alone for His proof,—the *prima facie* view being that He is to be arrived at through inference, since we know from the scriptural text: 'From whom speech turns back' (Tait. 2.4; 2.9) that Brahman cannot be known through speech (i.e. texts),—

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[1] This explains the compound '*śāstra-yoni*'.

[2] Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.1.

[3] Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.2.

(We reply:) Brahman cannot be arrived at through inference, but has the Veda for His proof. Why? "Because (Brahman has) Scripture for His source". That means: "Scripture", i.e. the Veda, is the "source", i.e. the cause, the informant, the proof, with regard to whom,—that object is "Śāstra-yoni"; and "Śāstra-yonitva" is the state of being "Śāstra-yoni"—on account of that, i.e. on account of having Scripture for His proof.[1] The correct conclusion is that Brahman has the Veda alone for His proof.

If it be said: For the sake of simplicity, it is well-said that Brahman has Scripture for His source; and thus to say that Brahman has Scripture for His source, i.e. has the Veda for its proof, serves our purpose, (i.e. is not in conflict with our view),—(we reply:) No, Brahman cannot be arrived at through inference, because the phrase: "Because (He has) Scripture for (His) source" indicates a reason which excludes any other proof except Scripture.

If it be said: How is it known that He cannot be arrived at through inference?—(we reply:) There has been some room for the suspicion that Brahman can be arrived at through inference, since the middle term (or the reason), viz. 'the state of being an effect'[2], stated above, proves the world to be due to a creator.[3] With a view to removing it, that significant word[4] is used here (in this sūtra), in accordance with the following scriptural texts:—Viz.: 'The word which all the Vedas declare' (Kaṭha 2.15), 'That with regard to which all the Vedas become one' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1[5]), '"I ask you about Brahman, set forth in the Upaniṣads"' (Bṛh. 3. 9.26[6]), 'He who does not know the Veda, does not know Him, the great' (Tait. Br. 3.12.9.7[7]) and so on, and the following Smṛti passages: '"By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known"' (Gītā 15.15), "'In the Veda, in the Rāmāyaṇa,

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[1] This explains the compound '*śāstra-yonitvāt*'.

[2] *Kāryyatva*.

[3] That is, it has been laid down in *Sūtra* 1.1.2 that the world is an effect. This suggests the inference :—Whatever is an effect has a creator.

The world is an effect.

∴ the world has a creator (viz. *Brahman*).

This suggestion is negatived by *Sūtra* 1.1.3, which explicitly says that the *Brahman* has Scripture alone for His proof, and never inference.

[4] Viz. '*śāstra-yoni*'.

[5] P. 19. Reading '*yatraikaṃ*'.

[6] Correct reading : '*pṛcchāmi*'.

[7] P. 292, vol. 3.

verily, in the Bhārata and in the Pañca-rātra, Hari is celebrated everywhere, in the beginning, in the end and in the middle'" (Hariv. 16232 [1]), 'We bow down to that wherein lies the eternal basis of all speech' and so on.

If it be said: On the ground of the inference: 'All objects having parts, like the earth and the rest, have a cause, because they are effects, like pots and the rest', Brahman is established to be the cause of the world, since none else can be such a cause, and this being so, why trouble about the Veda?—(we reply:) no, because, the very fact that the elements like the ether and the rest have an origin being not known by anyone without the Veda, that they are effects is not established, and hence the reason [2] is itself unestablished.[3]

It cannot be said also that the origin of the elements is to be known through the Veda, and the fact that they are effects being proved through this, the reason [4] is not unestablished—, for, in that case too, Brahman, the cause of the world being known through the Veda alone, the inference becomes futile, and you virtually come to our side. Thus, even in the case of well-known effects like a house or a shoot, Brahman cannot be inferred from the reason 'producibleness', it being possible to suppose the earth, the seed, water, men and so on to be their causes; and unreasonable to imagine an unseen cause (viz. Brahman).

This should be understood here: wherever something is found to be an effect, there it is possible also to arrive, by means of inference, at an individual soul, corresponding to effect, as the agent. But that the entire universe is an effect is not known without the help of the Veda. Hence, the creator of the world, too, can be known through the Veda alone, and never through a thousand inferences. Further, Brahman cannot be known through the evidence of perception, since the ordinary sense-organs are incapable of grasping Him, as declared

[1] P. 1002.

[2] Viz. *Kāryyatva* or state of being an effect.

[3] That is, it has been argued:—

Whatever is an effect has a cause.
The world is an effect.
∴ the world has a cause.

Now, we cannot know that the world is an *effect*, unless we have recourse to Scripture, and hence Scripture is needed even here too.

[4] Viz. *Kāryyatva* or producibleness.

by the scriptural texts: 'Not the sense-organs, nor inference,' '"This knowledge is not attainable through inference, dearest! It leads to proper knowledge only being told by another"' (Kaṭha 2.9). That is, 'Dearest!' 'this knowledge' concerning Brahman, is not to be overthrown by reason, or, is not capable of being attained thereby. 'Told' by 'another', i.e. by an omniscient teacher who is versed in the Veda, it leads to right knowledge, as declared by the aphorism 'On account of reasoning having no ground' (Br. Sū. 2.1.11); by the Manu Smṛti: 'One should not apply reasoning to those conceptions which are verily inconceivable'; and by the Mahā-bhārata: 'One should not arrive at those conceptions which are verily inconceivable through reasoning. There can be no ascertainment of any deep meaning through reasoning which is without a basis'. Moreover, who but a mad man should say that Brahman, the cause of the world, who is not known entirely and in every way even by omniscient mantras and sages, who is difficult to be understood and who is possessed of infinite inconceivable qualities and powers, can be known through inference.

It is not to be apprehended: what then will become of such texts as: 'From whom speech turns back' (Tait. 2.4; 2.9) and so on?—for the meaning of these is that Brahman is not limited as being so much. This the author will state under the aphorism: 'For the so-muchness of the topic mentioned' and so on (Br. Sū. 3.2.22).

(An alternative explanation of the sūtra:) If the compound "Śāstra-yoni" be disjoined as: 'The source of Scripture', then, too, the very same meaning is arrived at.[1] The resulting meaning is that Brahman can be known through the Vedas alone,—breathed forth by Him, the omniscient, and (as such) standing in an intimate and internal relation with Him,—and not through any external inference and the rest, imagined by others. In that case, (i.e. on the second interpretation), the topic of this aphorism will be the scriptural text, viz. 'Breathed forth by this Great Being is the Ṛg-veda, the Yajur-veda and the Sāma-veda' (Bṛh. 2.4.10; Maitrī. 6.32). And, on this interpretation, the eternity of the Vedas are not negatived, for what we admit is the issuing forth only (and not new creation) of what is eternally established, in accordance with the following scriptural

[1] Cf. Ś.B. 1.1.3.

and Smṛti passages, viz.: 'By means of speech, which is devoid of form and eternal' (Ṛg. V. 8.75.6[1]; Tait. Saṃ. 2.6.11.2[2]), 'Speech, without beginning and end, eternal, consisting of the Veda and celestial, was created by the Self-born in the beginning, whence proceeded all activities' (Mahā. 12.8534[3]). Hereby, the eternal and non-derived form of Brahman is indicated, since the Veda, which is prior to all derivative creation, was breathed forth by Him.[4] This we shall explain later on.[5] Hence, it is established that Brahman has the Veda as His sole proof.

Here ends the section entitled 'That which has Scripture for its source' (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'Concordance'. (Sūtra 4)

SŪTRA 4

"BUT THAT (VIZ. THAT BRAHMAN HAS SCRIPTURE AS HIS SOLE PROOF) FOLLOWS FROM THE CONCORDANCE (OF ALL SCRIPTURAL TEXTS WITH REGARD TO BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If an objection be raised, viz.: In as much as the entire Veda is concerned with action (i.e. injunctions and prohibitions), the Vedānta-texts too, which are concerned with a different topic, are solely concerned with injunctions by way of establishing the excellence of the agent, who is a part of sacrifices,—just as the artha-vāda texts[6] are indirectly unanimous with the injunctive-texts, by way of establishing their excellence. Hence, how can Brahman have Scripture as His sole proof?[7]—the correct conclusion is as follows:

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[1] P. 162. [2] P. 241, vol. 1.

[3] P. 666, line 22, vol. 3.

[4] That is, if *Brahman* were to breathe forth the *Vedas*, He must have a body (nose, etc.), but this body is not evidently composed of matter, but is non-material, since when He breathes forth the *Vedas*, there is no matter.

[5] See V.K. 1.3.28–30.

[6] An *artha-vāda* is the explanation of the meaning of a precept, or eulogism.

[7] The sense of the objection is: All *Vedas* set forth injunctions or prohibitions with regard to action. But besides the texts which directly or explicitly set forth the above, there are in the Vedas some texts which are merely *indicative*,

'That', i.e. Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the universe, has Scripture for His proof, and not action and the rest, since the entire Veda is in concordance in proving Him alone. (The word) "samanvayāt" is to be explained thus: "Samanvaya" means concordance in respect of the primary import,—on account of that—"samanvayāt". Or else, because there is concordance among the Vedas in point of proving Him alone,—so much in brief.

It cannot be said that such a concordance exists with regard to actions, since actions fulfil their purpose by simply giving rise to a desire for knowledge.[1] To say that Brahman is a subsidiary factor of sacrifices is a mere childish prattle, since He is an independent Being as the regulator of all works, their agents and so on, and their instruments; and is the giver of fruits. On the contrary, works themselves are in concordance (with regard to Brahman) as assisting indirectly the rise of knowledge—which is a means to attaining Him,—by way of generating a desire for knowledge.[2] This is ascertained from the text concerning the desire for knowledge.[3]

If it be objected: It being established in Scripture that Brahman is not an object of the proof, viz. Word, just as He is not an object of the proofs, viz. perception and the rest,—Brahman has not Scripture as His sole proof,—we reply: Brahman, the object of enquiry, has Scripture alone as His proof and not anything else, on account of the concordance of all the scriptural texts, directly or indirectly, with regard to Him alone. Among these, there is a direct concordance among the texts concerning His characteristic marks, proof and the

and not *injunctive*. And, these latter kind of texts are to be explained, not literally, but as eulogising the direct injunctive texts and thereby indirectly forming a part of injunctions, etc., otherwise the integrity of the *Vedas* cannot be maintained. Hence, the *Vedānta*-texts too must be taken as not establishing *Brahman*, but as simply extolling the sacrificer by identifying him with the Supreme Soul and so on, and as such really concerned with sacrificial acts.

[1] That is, the proper function of *karmas* is simply to purify the mind, and thereby create a desire for knowledge. *Karma*, thus, is a *means* and not an *end*, the way to truth and not truth itself. Hence the *Vedānta*-texts, dealing as they do, with the Supreme Truth, cannot be concerned with mere *karmas*. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.26.

[2] I.e. knowledge is not an *aṅga* of *karma*, on the contrary, *karma* is an *aṅga* of knowledge. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.8.

[3] Viz. Bṛh. 4.4.22.

rest, since they are (directly) concerned with Him; and there is an indirect concordance among the texts concerning the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā,[1] the Pañcāgni-vidyā,[2] the Madhu-vidyā [3] and so on, as well as among those which are symbolic in nature.[4] Or rather, there is a direct concordance alone among all the texts whatsoever, though leading to different procedures,[5] since the topics of all these different texts being equally Brahman in essence, they are all to be understood in their primary and literal sense.[6] It is not to be feared that in that case, the texts which are concerned with the denial of the object (viz. Brahman) will be precluded,[7] since they too, as being concerned with denying any limit with regard to Brahman's nature, attributes and the rest, refer to the very same topic (viz. Brahman).[8]

Moreover, we ask your Worship: Do you or do you not mean that Brahman is the object of the statement: 'Brahman is not an object of knowledge'? If the first, then Brahman is proved to be describable and hence the proposition that He is not describable is set aside. If the second, then Brahman is describable all the more. Hence, the object of enquiry is Lord Vāsudeva alone, omniscient, possessed of all inconceivable powers, the cause of the origin and the rest of the universe, known through the evidence of the Veda alone, different and non-different from all and the soul of all. All Scriptures are in concordance with regard to Him alone—this is the settled conclusion of the followers of the Upaniṣads (viz. the Vedāntins).

[1] Vide Bṛh. 5.6.1; Chānd. 3.14.1–4.

[2] Vide Chānd. 5.5.4–10. Also V.K. 3.1.1.

[3] Vide Bṛh. 2.5.1–19 (whole section); Chānd. 3.1–11.

[4] Vide e.g. Bṛh. 5.7–9, etc.; Chānd. 3.18–21; 7.1–12, etc.

[5] The sense is that the various kinds of texts may impel a man to different procedures. Some may lead a man to meditate on *Brahman* directly as the self, others to meditate on Him as the sun and so on.

[6] That is, even the texts concerning the various meditations and symbols, are to be understood as directly referring to *Brahman*, i.e. to be interpreted literally, and not as referring to *Brahman* indirectly, i.e. to be interpreted figuratively, as suggested before. This modifies the statement made immediately before that *some* texts are direct and primary, *some* indirect and secondary, and takes *all* to be equally direct and primary.

[7] Viz. '*Neti, neti*' (Bṛh. 2.3.6) and so on.

[8] That is, the view that *all* texts are concerned with *Brahman* directly in no way precludes the negative texts, since these negative texts also are concerned with *Brahman* equally.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been said that Lord Kṛṣṇa, the substratum of great qualities and powers and the non-distinct material and efficient cause of the world, has the Veda alone for His proof. Now, with a view to confirming it, the author, by showing the concordance of the entire Veda with regard to that very Brahman, refutes the following objection, viz.; The entire Veda has been associated with action by Jaimini who holds: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1 [1]). Hence, what is not concerned with action being laid down as purportless, the Vedānta-texts, too, all refer to action (otherwise they will all become purportless). Consequently, how can Brahman have the Veda as His sole proof?

The term "but" disposes of the (above) *prima facie* view. "That", i.e. Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the world, has Scripture for His sole proof. Why? "On account of concordance", i.e. because there is concordance among all the Vedas with regard to Him alone. (The word "samanvayāt" is to be explained as follows:) "Samanvaya" means: 'Concordance in point of entirety of statement',—on account of that,—"samanvayāt", i.e. the entire Veda is in concordance with regard to denoting Brahman entirely or Lord Kṛṣṇa, the object to be enquired into by one who desires salvation, the one identical material and efficient cause of the world, having Scripture as His source (i.e. proof), the controller of matter, soul, time and works, having His footstool honoured by the crowns (i.e. the bowed heads) of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra and the rest, having His greatness untouched by any odour of fault, the abode of infinite qualities like omniscience and the rest and to be approached by the freed. The following groups of texts are in concordance with regard to Him alone:—'From whom verily all these beings arise' (Tait. 3.1), 'From bliss alone, verily, do these beings arise' (Tait. 3.6), 'From Him arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), '"The existent alone, my child, was this in the beginning, One only, without a second" (Chānd. 6.2.1). "He thought: May I be many, may I procreate"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'From Nārāyaṇa arises the vital-breath, . . . from Nārāyaṇa arises Brahmā, from

[1] P. 36, vol. 1.

Nārāyaṇa arises Rudra' (Nār. 1), 'There was verily, Nārāyaṇa alone, neither Brahmā nor Īśāna (Mahā. Up. 1.2), 'Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning, one only' (Bṛh. 1.4.10.11). 'Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning; he knew that self alone thus: "I am Brahman"', 'From Him arose all this', 'The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only' (Ait. 1.1.1), 'From this self, verily, the ether originated' (Tait. 2.1), 'The word which all the Vedas record' (Kaṭha 2.15), 'That, in regard to which all the Vedas are unanimous' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1 [1]), 'Entered within, the ruler of man' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1.2 [2]), 'To whom all the gods bow down', 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1), 'Knowing the bliss of Brahman' (Tait. 2.9), 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss' (Bṛh. 3.9.28), 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), 'The self that is free from sins, without decay, without death, without grief, without hunger, without thirst' (Chānd. 8.7.1.3), 'Who is omniscient, all-knowing' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tait. 2.1), 'Brahman, verily, is all this' (Bṛh. 2.5.1–14, 14 times) and so on.

(*Prima facie* view.)

An objection may be raised here:—The entire Veda is but a collection of five kinds of texts, called, injunction, prohibition, explanation or eulogy, sacred formulæ and name.[3] Of these, 'One, who desires heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma [4] sacrifice' and so on, are injunctive texts. 'A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed' and so on, are prohibitive texts. 'The wind, verily, is the quickest deity' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.1.1 [5]), and so on are explanations or eulogisms. 'Oblation to you' (Tait. Saṃ. 1.1.1 [6]), 'O, heavens, having the fire as your head' (Ṛg. V. 8.44.16a; [7] Śat. Br. 2.3.4.11a [8]), and so on are sacred formulæ. 'Jyotiṣṭoma',[9] 'Aśva-medha' [10] and the rest are names,—thus we distinguish them. Thus, in the beginning, in the aphorism: 'Then,

[1] P. 19. Reading: '*Yatraikaṇ*'.
[2] P. 181.
[3] *Vidhi, niṣedha, artha-vāda, mantra, nāmadheya.*
[4] Name of a *Soma-sacrifice*, consisting divisions, *Agniṣṭoma* and the rest. M.W., p. 427.
[5] P. 125, lines 1-2, vol. 1.
[6] P. 1, line 1, vol. 1.
[7] P. 132, line 7.
[8] P. 163, line 16.
[9] See footnote 4, above.
[10] The horse-sacrifice.

therefore, an enquiry into religious duties' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1.1 [1]), it is said that the Veda has meaning as possessing the fruit to be attained through the injunctions regarding conceptions which are instrumental to the Vedic studies. In the second aphorism which is concerned with mark, viz. 'A religious duty has injunction for its mark' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1.2 [2]), it is established, on the ground of the vyāpti: 'Whatever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action', that in the sphere of religious duties, injunction is the authority.[3] Here a doubt arises as to whether the artha-vāda-texts like 'The wind is the swiftest deity' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.1.1 [4]) are authoritative in the sphere of religious duties, or not. With regard to it, the *prima facie* view is as follows: We have a text: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1 [5]). (It means:)—'Scripture, i.e. the Veda, is 'kriyārtha', i.e. has 'action' alone as its 'purport', or subject-matter or topic,—for this reason, the artha-vāda-texts are not authoritative. What then are they?—anticipating this question, the text goes on to say that 'there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it', i.e. let there be simply 'purportlessness' or 'meaninglessness' of that which has not 'action' for its 'purport', viz. of artha-vāda and the rest, and in the very same manner, of the Vedānta-texts as well. Even those (Vedānta-) texts which comprise injunctions regarding study: viz. 'One's own text should be studied', cannot be reasonably said to be authoritative, since they are (really) concerned with Brahman, leading to no fruit.[6] (Here ends the *prima facie* view *within* the original *prima facie* view.) With regard to this, we state the correct conclusion: 'Because of their unanimity with the injunctions, let (them be authoritative) through having the glorification of injunctions as their

[1] P. 1, vol. 1.

[2] P. 3, vol. 1.

[3] That is, the inference is as follows:—
Whatever has the *Veda* for its proof, refers to action.
A religious duty has the *Veda* for its proof.
∴ a religious duty refers to action, i.e. is concerned with injunctions and prohibitions.

[4] P. 125, lines 1-2, vol. 1. [5] P. 39, vol. 1.

[6] That is, there are some *Vedānta*-texts, which do refer to action, i.e. to injunction, yet they are not to be taken as authoritative, since they really refer to *Brahman* who is outside the sphere of actions and fruits.

purport' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.7[1]). That is, since the artha-vādas are unanimous with the injunctive texts, let them be authoritative 'through having glorification as their purport', i.e. by way of glorifying the matters to be enjoined. Similarly, in order to prevent the absolute purportlessness of the Vedānta-texts which are wanting in injunction and prohibition and teach an accomplished object (viz. Brahman), it is reasonable to take them too as indirectly connected with action,—which is something to be accomplished,—as included under the very mantras and artha-vādas, since they (viz. the Vedānta-texts) admit injunctions regarding the study of the Veda. But if they be taken to be independent (of action) they would lead to no fruit, and hence they must be understood to have fulfilled their purpose through establishing the agent, who is a part of a sacrifice (and not to be independent of action). Among these, the texts concerning the 'that' (viz. Brahman) and 'thou' (viz. the individual soul)[2] glorify the deity and the agent of the sacrificial act; and the knowledge concerning it (viz. the 'that') called the 'higher knowledge',[3] glorify the fruit. (Thus, we conclude :) The Vedānta-texts are not concerned with Brahman, but are like the artha-vāda-texts, since they are concerned with proclaiming the excellence of the agent, who is a subordinate factor in a sacrifice. (Here ends the original *prima facie* view.[4])

(Author's conclusion.)

To this we reply:[5] No, because this is a mere imagination, invented by you ; and because (on the contrary), works, being generative of knowledge which is a means to salvation, indirectly refer to Brahman alone, as declared by the scriptural text:—'The Brāhmaṇas desire to know this self through the study of the Veda, through sacrifice, through penance, through fasting' (Bṛh. 4.4.22). Here, if in the statement 'They desire to know through sacrifice', there be a direct connection of the instrument, viz. 'sacrifice', with the meaning of the root,[6] as in the sentence 'He desires to go by the horse', then the sacrificial act should be known to be serving the purpose of knowledge (i.e. helping the rise of knowledge), and thereby referring to Brahman.

[1] P. 42, vol. 1.
[2] Cf. the famous text 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.).
[3] Vide e.g. Muṇḍ. 1.1.4-5.
[4] It began on p. 35.
[5] The correct conclusion begins here.
[6] Viz. '*vid*'=to know.

If, on the other hand, owing to the primacy of the desiderative suffix,[1] there be a connection with the meaning of the suffix, it should be known to be serving the purpose of desire, (i.e. helping the rise of a desire for knowledge), to be a subordinate factor of knowledge through that desire and to be referring to Brahman thereby. And, the fact that action is a part of knowledge will be stated under the aphorism: 'And, there is dependence on all, on account of the text concerning sacrifice, as in the case of a horse' (Br. Sū. 3.4.26).

It cannot be said, also, that the reality to be known from the Vedānta (viz. Brahman) is a subordinate factor of sacrifices,—since He is self-dependent as the controller of all works, their agents and their instruments. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts are subsidiary parts of injunctions like the artha-vādas, since the former have been referred to in a different context and are not in proximity to injunctions. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts lead to no fruit, teaching, as they do, something which is neither an injunction nor a prohibition,—since the knowledge of Brahman, who is to be known from the Vedānta, leads to a supremely excellent fruit, viz. salvation.

If it be said: As we read in texts like 'Undecaying, verily, is the good deed of one who performs the Cātur-māsya[2] sacrifice' (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1.1[3]) that works too have the same fruit like it (viz. knowledge), so there is nothing objectionable (in taking the scriptural texts) to be referring to works,—

(We reply:) No, because the scriptural text: 'Just as here, the world gained through work perishes, so exactly does hereafter the world gained through merit perish' (Chānd. 8.1.6[4]) is of a greater force; is in conformity with the inference, viz. 'The world gained through mere work is non-permanent, because it is gained through work alone, as in the case of tilling and the rest'; and is confirmed by another scriptural text as well, viz. 'Frail, indeed, are these boats of sacrifices' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7); because the text: 'Undecaying, verily' (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) and so on is a weaker one; and because it is improper to (take the scriptural texts) to be referring to works, which form the object of such texts wanting in force. On the other hand, the

[1] Viz. '*san*', implying 'desire'.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 5.

[3] P. 1, vol. 1.

[4] Correct quotation: '*Karma-cita*' and not '*karma-jita*', which is translated here. Vide Chānd. 8.1.6, p. 415.

texts: 'Those who know this, become immortal' (Bṛh. 4.4.14; Kaṭha 6.2.9; Śvet. 3.1.10.13; 4.17.20), 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tait. 2.1), are not contradicted by any scriptural text, and cannot be set aside by a thousand inferences. Further, the text: 'Undecaying, indeed' and so on (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) is not really set aside, since it refers to the relative (permanence of works)[1], and since the holy Bhāgavata-smṛti (i.e. the Bhāgavad-gītā), which is a version of the Veda, is the authority in both the cases (viz. regarding the non-permanence of karma, and the permanence of Brahman) thus:— '"The worlds, beginning from the world of Brahman, come and go, O Arjuna! But, on attaining me, O Son of Kuntī! there is no re-birth"' (Gītā 8.16).

If it be objected: It may be that the Upaniṣadic portion is somehow or other concerned with Brahman, since we see it to be so. But the prior portion (viz. the Karma-kāṇḍa) is known from the texts: 'He performs the Agnihotra[2] as long as he lives', 'One who desires heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice' (Āp. Ś.Ś. 10.2.1) and so on, to fulfil its purpose by enjoining obligatory and optional works and the rest; and hence how can they be concerned with Brahman?—

(We reply:) Not so. The entire Veda is concerned only with Brahman, and although some part of it is found to refer to action somehow, its complete concordance is found in Brahman alone. Among these the Upaniṣadic portion refers directly to Brahman, directly concerned, as it is, with demonstrating His nature, attributes and the rest. Among these, again, the statements of difference refer to Brahman by way of being concerned with the nature of the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman; the statements of non-difference, by being concerned with proving that everything has Brahman for its essence; the statements of creation and the rest, by being concerned with proving attributes like creatorship and the rest; the statements that Brahman is non-qualified, by being concerned with the denial of the qualities due to māyā; the statements that Brahman is qualified, by being concerned with proving the natural qualities of the Lord;

[1] That is, this text simply shows that the deeds of one who performs the *Cātur-māsya* sacrifice are relatively more permanent than the deeds of one who does not, and not that they are absolutely permanent.

[2] Sacrificing to *Agni*. Cf. Athar. V. 6.97.1, p. 130.

and the statements like: 'That which is not manifested through speech' (Kena 1.4), by being concerned with proving that Brahman is not limited by so-muchness.

The texts, concerned with the daily and occasional duties,[1] too, refer to Brahman alone, by way of effecting the purification of the nature of the person entitled (to the study of Brahman) and being thereby co-operative towards the rise of knowledge and so on concerning Brahman; while (the texts) concerned with the optional duties,[2] by way of being an atomic bit of the bliss of Brahman, since the text: 'Other beings subsist on a portion only of His bliss alone' (Bṛh. 4.3.32) declares even worldly pleasure to be an atomic portion of the bliss of Brahman. Moreover, the optional duties are in concordance (with regard to Brahman), since they are concerned with the knowledge of Brahman by way of giving rise to a pure body, like that of a god and the rest, entitled to salvation. Moreover, just as in accordance with the maxim of 'connection and disconnection',[3] curd, used in connection with daily duties (nitya),—as laid down in the passage: 'He performs a sacrifice with curd',—brings about the attainment of objects of sense,—as laid down in the passage: 'One who desires for objects of sense should perform a sacrifice with curd' (Tait. Br. 2.1.5.6[4]),—so the sacrificial acts, though bringing about heaven and the rest, should yet be known to be serving the purpose (i.e. helping the rise) of knowledge.[5] And (finally) texts like: 'Golden right from the tip of His nails' (Chānd. 1.6.6[6]) refer to Brahman as being concerned with His divine body.

Or else, since the entire mass of objects has Brahman for its essence, the mass of texts, denoting them, directly refer to Him.[7]

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[1] The daily or *nitya karmas* are ablution, prayer and so on, to be performed every day; while the occasional or *naimittaka karmas* are the ceremony in honour of the dead and so on, to be performed on special occasions. Both of these kinds are obligatory.

[2] The optional or *kāmya* karmas are sacrifices and the rest, undertaken with special objects in view, viz. heaven and the rest.

[3] A term applied to express the disconnection of what is optional from what is a necessary constituent of anything. Vide Pū. Mī. Sū. 4.3.5, and *Śabara's* commentary, pp. 493 and ff., vol. 1.

[4] P. 180, line 3, vol. 2. [5] Vide V.K. 3.4.26.

[6] Correct quotation '*Apranakhāt sarva eva suvarṇaḥ*'. Vide Chānd. 1.6.6, p. 43.

[7] That is, instead of the labórious explanation given above, it is simpler to accept this alternative explanation.

Hence it is established that the entire Veda is in concordance with regard to Brahman alone or Lord Kṛṣṇa the Highest Person, omniscient, possessing infinite natural and inconceivable powers, the cause of the world, and different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient, as declared by the Lord Himself in the passage: '"By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known"' (Gītā 15.15).

The four aphorisms constituting the basis of Scripture are hereby explained. This treatise (viz. the Vedānta) is but an expounding of these.

Here ends the section entitled 'Concordance' (4).

Here ends the explanation of the four aphorisms in the first quarter of the first chapter in the commentary Vedānta-kaustubha, composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, the incarnation of the Pāñcajanya and dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Lord Nimbāditya, the founder of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra.

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled 'He sees'. (Sūtras 5–12)

SŪTRA 5

"BECAUSE (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD) SEES, (PRADHĀNA IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) (SINCE) IT IS NON-SCRIPTURAL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, is "non-scriptural", i.e. is devoid of scriptural evidence. Hence it is "not" the cause of the world, as in Scripture seeing, which is a characteristic of a sentient being, is predicated of the cause of the world.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been pointed out that Brahman, great in attributes, powers and nature, omniscient, and the one object of all the Vedas, is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Now, the Sāṃkhyas,—who hold that Brahman is not the cause of the world, since He is of a dissimilar form; while the non-sentient pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas, is the cause of the world, since it is of a form

similar to the effect,—also relate the Vedānta-texts like '"The existent, alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1) and so on, to it alone (viz. pradhāna). The reverend author of the aphorisms is now refuting this view.

Pradhāna, which is derived through inference,[1] is not fit to be the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Why? Because it is "non-scriptural", i.e. that with regard to which there is no "word", i.e. Scripture, as authority. This adjective denotes the reason.

If it be objected that in the Chāndogya, pradhāna is meant by the term 'existent' in the passage: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1). Hence, how can it be said that pradhāna is non-scriptural?—we reply: "Because (the creator) sees", i.e. because from the text, beginning: '"Existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), and continuing: 'He thought, "May I be many, may I procreate"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), we find that the creator of the world perceives. The same thing is mentioned in the Aitareya as well in the passage: 'The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only. Nothing else was apparent. He thought: "Let me create worlds". He created these worlds' (Ait. 1.1.1). Here the word "sees", denotative of the root, must be understood, by indirect application, to be referring to 'seeing', which is the meaning of the root. 'Seeing' means deliberating, i.e. determination; and that, being the attribute of a conscious being, is not appropriate on the part of the pradhāna. Hence, pradhāna, devoid of perception, is not mentioned by Scripture. Accordingly, it has been rightly said by his Holiness that it is "non-scriptural". Therefore, it is neither the cause of the world, nor knowable through the Veda.

It cannot be said also that pradhāna possesses the power of knowledge through its attribute of sattva, and as such, perceiving is appropriate on its part,—since it is impossible that a non-sentient substance and a non-sentient attribute can possess knowledge, and be knowledge (respectively). Nor should it be said that this is appropriate through the connection of pradhāna with puruṣa,—because there being (at hand) Brahman, mentioned before and possessed of

[1] That is, we cannot directly perceive the primary matter, but we argue that every effect must have a cause, that cause too another cause and so on, and thus finally, we must admit a primary cause which has no cause. This is the *pradhāna*.

ever-present knowledge, as a simple (explanation of the fact in hand),—it involves unnecessary complications to drag in something which is the substratum of knowledge, only through its conjunction with another, (and not by itself); because such a view is utterly negligible; and, finally because during its state of equilibrium, it does not possess that attribute.[1] So stop labouring the point. Hence, the cause corresponding to the effect, viz. the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, is none but Brahman, who is denoted by the term 'existent' and is capable of perceiving, possessed as He is of natural, inconceivable and infinite powers, as declared by the scriptural text: 'Supreme is His powers, declared to be of various kinds, and natural is the action of His knowledge and power' (Śvet. 6.8.) and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading and interpretation same, but Śaṃkara develops, in this connection, his doctrine of upādhi, or limiting adjunct, viz.—that there is really nothing besides Brahman, the individual soul and the rest being due to the limiting adjuncts of body, and the rest, like the all-pervading ether, limited by pots and the rest. Hence difference is mithyā through and through.[2]

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same, but Rāmānuja also develops his own view, viz. that the universe of the sentient and the non-sentient constitutes the body of the Lord.[3]

Baladeva

Reading same, interpretation different,—viz. 'Because (Brahman is) seen (i.e. designated by Scripture), (He is) not inexpressible'.[4]

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[1] That is, if knowledge arises through the pre-dominance of the *sattva-guṇa*, then prior to creation, all the *guṇas* being in a state of equilibrium, no knowledge can arise in *pradhāna*.

[2] Ś.B. 1.1.5, p. 203.

[3] Śrī. B. 1.1.5, p. 160, Part 1.

[4] G.B. 1.1.5, pp. 46-47, Chap. 1.

SŪTRA 6

"IF IT BE SAID THAT (THE WORD 'SEEING' IN THE ABOVE CHĀNDOGYA-TEXT) IS SECONDARY, (THEN WE REPLY) NO, BECAUSE OF THE TERM 'SELF' (BEING APPLIED TO THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not reasonable to say that the 'seeing' is (only) "secondary". Why? "On account of the term 'self'."

Vedānta-kaustubha

Anticipating the objection, viz.—

As we often find the metaphorical transference of the qualities of a sentient being to non-sentient objects like a bank or tilling, e.g. when referring to a bank about to fall, it is said: 'The bank is about to fall',[1] or when referring to the tilling of dry soil, it is said: 'Tilling is awaiting rain'; and as we read in Scripture about perception on the part of non-sentient objects like water and light, in the passages: 'That light perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'Those waters perceived' (Chand. 6.2.4),—there may very well be a metaphorical perception on the part of pradhāna in the very same manner,—the author disposes of it here.

If it be said that the attribute of perception, belonging to pradhāna is "secondary", (we reply:) "No." Why? "On account of the term 'self'", i.e. on account of the scriptural mention of the term 'self' which establishes the absence of perception on the part of pradhāna. Thus, if by taking the term 'existence' to mean the non-sentient pradhāna, a metaphorical perception be admitted on its part, then in the texts: 'All this has that for its self, that is true, that is the self' (Chānd. 6.7.8; 6.9.4; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3), the term 'self' must refer to the non-sentient substance, which is the meaning of the terms 'existent' and 'perceiver', mentioned before in the texts: '"The existent, alone, my dear!"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'He perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.3). That is, on the view, viz. 'He alone is the existent and the perceiver, the self which is pradhāna',—the identity between the terms 'existent' and the rest denoting the non-sentient and bearing a different sense and the term 'self' denoting the

[1] Here the desiderative suffix does not imply 'wish' but 'imminent danger' (*āśaṃkā*), in accordance with K.V.S. 1707 quoted in SD.K. 2622, pp. 335, vol. 2.

Supreme Self and bearing a different sense, will involve a contradiction, it being impossible for the term 'self' denotative of the Supreme Lord, to refer to pradhāna. Hence, to say that the perception is even metaphorical is unreasonable. And owing to the entering of the Deity (into them), (the perception) on the part of water and light is not metaphorical [1]—this is the sum and substance.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Reading same, interpretation different, viz.—'If it be said (that the creator of the world is) the gauṇa (or the Saguṇa Brahman, connected with the guṇas of prakṛti, possessing the sattva guṇa as his vesture), (then we reply,) No, on account of the term "self"'. That is, the term 'self' has been used in Scripture in connection with the creator of the world, and this term can be applied only to the infinite Nirguṇa Brahman, unconnected with the guṇas of prakṛti.[2]

SŪTRA 7

"(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE MEANT BY THE TERM 'SELF',) BECAUSE SALVATION IS TAUGHT OF ONE WHO RELIES UPON THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As salvation, characterized by the attainment of His (i.e. Brahman's) nature, is taught of a knower, who relies on the cause, the meaning of the terms 'existent', 'perceiver', 'self' and the rest,—so pradhāna cannot be denoted by the terms 'existent' and 'self'.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. in that case, let the term 'self' stand equally for the sentient and the non-sentient, like the term 'light' [3] which

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[1] That is, it is not water or fire that really perceives, but the Lord who has entered into them, as mentioned in the passage: 'That Divinity thought:—"Come, let me enter these three divinities" (i.e, fire, water and food)' and so on. (Chānd. 6.3.2.)

[2] G.B. 1.1.6 (p. 48, Chap. 1.).

[3] *Jyotiṣ*.

denotes equally a sacrifice[1] and fire; hence, no inconsistency is involved here,—the reverend Bādarāyaṇa replies here:

The non-sentient pradhāna is not the object denoted by the term 'self'. Why? "Because salvation is taught of one who relies on Him" i.e. of one who has reliance (or devotion), otherwise called 'meditation', with regard to Him, i.e. with regard to one who is denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, who is a perceiver and who is the creator of fire, water and food.[2] Thus, after having taught an investigation, by one who is desirous of salvation, into the effect as consisting of the Cause (viz. Brahman) in essence, in the text: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3), Scripture goes on to teach salvation, characterized by the attainment of the nature of Brahman, in the text: 'For him there is delay, so long as I am not freed, then I shall attain (Brahman)' (Chānd. 6.14.2). (The meaning of this text is:) So long as a person, who desires for salvation, is not freed from his body and is impeded, being compelled to undergo the fruits of works which have already begun to produce results, there is delay for him; but when the fruits of works will be fully enjoyed, he will attain the nature of Brahman at once, owing to the absence of impediments. The use of the first person in both the cases, viz. 'I shall be free', and 'I shall attain' should be known to be implying the third person in accordance with Vedic use.

If in the text 'He is the Self' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), the term 'self' is to refer to pradhāna, then in the text 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), the very same thing must be referred to by the term 'that'. Hence the text: 'Thou art that' would mean: 'Thou hast pradhāna for thy soul', whereby a great mishap would take place, since through the meditation: 'I have the non-sentient as my soul', one would be obstructed from salvation for ever. In the present case, on the other hand, Brahman, having the stated characteristics, is denoted by the term 'that'; and the meaning of the term 'thou' is the individual soul, His part, otherwise called His power, and possessed of the stated marks. Here, between the part and the whole, there is a relation of difference and non-difference,—well-known everywhere in ordinary life and in the Veda,—as between the attribute and its substratum.

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[1] Viz. *Jyotiṣṭoma*.

[2] This explains the compound: '*tan-niṣṭhasya*'.

Although the individual soul is different from Brahman in nature, it is also non-different from Him, having no existence and activity apart from Him. On account of being enveloped by the beginningless māyā, the individual soul has no knowledge of such a non-difference. Hence it is said 'Thou art that', i.e. you are non-different from the object denoted by the term 'that'. Even during the state of salvation, one who has attained the nature of Brahman is of a different nature (from Brahman), but should yet be known to be non-different from Him, because of having no existence and activity separately from Him; because from the text: 'He attains the highest identity' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3) we learn that Brahman alone is one that is to be approached, while the individual soul only one that approaches; and, finally, because we find the words 'together with' in the text: 'He enjoys all objects of desire together with Brahman, the all-knowing' (Tait. 2.1). Hence, Brahman alone is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Reading same, interpretation different—viz:—'(The creator of the world is not the Saguṇa Brahman, but the Nirguṇa Brahman [1]), for salvation is taught of him who relies on Him (viz. the Nirguṇa Brahman)'.[2]

SŪTRA 8

"AND (PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE DENOTED BY THE TERMS 'EXISTENT', 'SELF' AND THE REST), BECAUSE THERE IS NO (SCRIPTURAL) STATEMENT OF ITS HAVING TO BE ABANDONED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That the non-sentient substance, taught by the terms 'existent' and the rest and to be abandoned in salvation, is to be abandoned, as well as the purpose of the teaching [3] ought to have been pointed out

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[1] For the explanation of the terms *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa*, see G.B.

[2] G.B. 1.1.7, pp. 49-50, Chap. 1.

[3] That is, if *pradhāna* be denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest, then evidently, such a self, etc., cannot serve the purpose of salvation. Hence there must be some other purpose for the teaching of *pradhāna*, since Scripture does not teach anything which does not fulfil an end. But there is no indication in Scripture what this other purpose is.

by Scripture, omniscient and the well-wisher of men. Because of the absence of these two kinds of texts, pradhāna is not denoted by the terms 'existent' and the like.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If the non-sentient pradhāna alone were taught as that which is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'perceiver' and the like, then, in order to prevent reliance upon that, Scripture, omniscient, well-wishing, and intending to instruct Brahman, should have told that it is to be rejected, just as a mother says to her son, about to take something not good, 'Son, this is not good'. But there is no statement that it is to be rejected; on the contrary, an identity with it is taught in the passage: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3). The term "and" is meant for including (another reason, viz.) the absence of statement indicating the purpose of such a teaching.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading same, interpretation same on the whole. Only, while Nimbārka interprets the term "Ca" to mean 'the purpose of such a teaching', Śaṃkara takes it to mean 'the contradiction of the initial proposition', viz. the cause being known, the effects are also known.[1] Evidently, through the knowledge of the non-sentient pradhāna, there can be no knowledge of the sentient souls. Hence pradhāna cannot be the cause of the universe.[2]

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same. He gives no special meaning of the term "ca", but takes it to mean simply 'also', and not a second reason.[3]

Bhāskara

Reading and interpretation same on the whole. Bhāskara interprets this sūtra exactly after Śaṃkara, taking the term "ca" to mean 'contradiction of the initial proposition'.[4]

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[1] Vide Chānd. 6.1.
[2] Ś.B. 1.1.8, p. 209.
[3] Śrī. B. 1.1.8, p. 163, vol. 1.
[4] Bh. B. 1.1.8, p. 23.

Baladeva

Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'And because there is no statement of the rejectibility (of the Saguṇa Brahman)'. That is, Scripture declares the inferiority and worthlessness of all saguṇa objects, or objects connected with the guṇas of prakṛti, viz. all worldly objects. Hence, if the Saguṇa Brahman were the creator of the world, then Scripture would have designated him as inferior and fit to be rejected.[1]

SŪTRA 9

"(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Moreover, "on account of the contradiction of the initial proposition" as well, viz. through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all[2],—the doctrine of the causality of the non-sentient is not right.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Pradhāna is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the contradiction of the initial proposition", viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. Thus, the scriptural text '"Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes known?" "What is that instruction, my reverend Sir?"' (Chānd. 6.1.2-3), introduces the doctrine that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all, and this will be contradicted. Although, through the knowledge of pradhāna, there may be knowledge of its effects, yet the proposition that there is knowledge of all the effects, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is not established, since the sentient not being the effect of pradhāna, its knowledge is not possible (through the knowledge of pradhāna).

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[1] G.B. 1.1.8, pp. 50-51, Chap. 1.
[2] Vide Chānd. 6.1.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This sūtra is not found in their commentaries. The argument contained herein is included by them, as we have seen, in the previous sūtra.

Baladeva

This sūtra is not found in his commentary as well.

SŪTRA 10

"(BRAHMAN ALONE CAN BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL'S) ENTRANCE INTO ITSELF (DURING DEEP SLEEP)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As it is impossible that the object,—mentioned in the passage referring to the cause of the world which is denoted by the term 'existent', viz. 'Understand from me, my dear, the state of deep sleep. When a person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has become united with the Existent' (Chānd. 6.8.1 [1]), can be understood as a non-sentient cause,[2] it is reasonable to hold that Brahman alone is the cause of the world.

Vedānta-kaustubha

On account of the (soul's) "entrance", i.e. dissolution, into "itself",[3] i.e. into its own cause, viz. Brahman, introduced in the text: '"The existent alone, my dear!"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), Brahman alone is denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, and not pradhāna. If it be the cause, then the text concerning dissolution would be contradicted. Thus, there is a scriptural text to this effect, viz.

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[1] Ś.R. Bh. Śk.

[2] A slightly different reading is given in the C.S.S. ed.—which, when translated, is as follows:—As the 'entering', which relates to a sentient being and is mentioned in the passage referring to the cause of the world, denoted by the term 'existent'—viz. 'Understand from me, my dear, . . .' is possible in the case of *Brahman* alone, etc. (P. 3.)

[3] This explains the word '*svāpyayāt*'.

'"When this person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has become united with the Existent, he has entered into his own. Hence they say of him "He sleeps", for he has entered into his own"' (Chānd. 6.8.1). There is also another scriptural text, viz. 'Just as a man, when embraced by his dear wife, knows nothing external or internal, so this person, when embraced by the intelligent soul, knows nothing external or internal' (Bṛh. 4.3.21).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 9 in his commentary. Reading different—viz. 'Svāpyāt'. Interpretation too different, viz. '(The creator of the world is not the Saguṇa Brahman), because the Creator merges into himself, (not so the Saguṇa Brahman, who merges into something other than himself).'[1]

SŪTRA 11

"(BRAHMAN ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF KNOWING (HIM AS THE CAUSE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As a sentient cause is known from all the Vedāntas, the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is untenable.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, pradhāna is not denoted by the term 'existent', viz. on account of the universality of 'knowing', i.e. apprehending. One sentient cause of the world being known from all the Upaniṣads, the sentient Brahman alone is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Nor, again, even the slightest inconsistency is found in the Vedāntas, such as, in some places a sentient cause is taught, in others a non-sentient. The sense is that if here a non-sentient object be understood by the term 'existent', the multitude of texts, speaking of a sentient cause, will come to be contradicted.

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[1] G.B. 1.1.9, pp. 51-52, Chap. 1.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

Reading same. Interpretation too is same, since although according to Rāmānuja, the word ' gati ' means ' pravṛtti ' or primary meaning and not 'avagati' or apprehension as held by Nimbārka, yet the ultimate meaning is the same, viz. the meaning or import of all the scriptural texts is uniform, i.e. from all of them Brahman alone is known and nothing else, and hence Brahman alone is the cause.[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different. He connects this sūtra more particularly with the preceding one, thus: ' On account of the universality of knowing (the term " existent " as denoting the Supreme Lord) '. That is, just as in this Upaniṣad, viz. the Chāndogya, the term 'existent' implies the Lord, and none else, so in all other Upaniṣads as well. Hence it can never stand for pradhāna. According to him also, thus, the word ' gati ' means ' avagati '.[2]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 10 in this commentary. Reading same, interpretation different, viz.—' On account of the universality of knowing (the Nirguṇa Brahman from all Scriptures) '. That is, Scripture uniformly teaches the Nirguṇa Brahman, and never the Saguṇa. Hence the Nirguṇa Brahman alone is the cause of the world. According to him also, the term ' gati ' means ' avagati '.[3]

SŪTRA 12

"(BRAHMAN ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ALSO BECAUSE THIS IS DEFINITELY STATED IN SCRIPTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Hence, the causality of the Universal Lord,—a sentient Being, denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, omniscient, and the

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[1] Śrī. B. 1.1.11, p. 165, vol. 1.
[2] ŚK. B. 1.1.11, p. 202, Part 3.
[3] G.B. 1.1.10, p. 53, Chap. 1.

controller of all,—being definitely stated in Scripture, pradhāna can by no means be accepted as such a cause.

Vedānta-kaustubha

(Brahman alone is the cause of the world), because in this Upaniṣad (viz. Chāndogya) that which is denoted by the term 'existent' "is definitely stated" to be the cause of all as the self of all, in the passage: 'All this, verily, is from the self' (Chānd. 7.26.1); and also because,—as denoted by the term "and",—the same thing is mentioned in other Upaniṣads too. Thus, there is a passage in the mantra-upaniṣad of the Śvetāśvataras: 'Who is a knower, the time of time and omniscient' (Śvet. 6.2.16), 'He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of sense-organs.[1] Of him there is no progenitor, nor lord' (Śvet. 6.9). The Kauṣitakins declare: 'From this self all the vital-breaths depart to their respective places, from the vital-breaths the gods, from the gods the worlds' (Kauṣ. 3.3 ; 4.20). Similarly, in other places too. We stop here for fear of increasing the bulk of the book. Hence, the non-sentient pradhāna, which is an object of inference,[2] is not the cause of the world, since it is unfit to be the cause of collocation without an intelligent ruler; and because if pradhāna be admitted to have the power of being such a ruler, you come over to our side.[3] On the contrary, it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, denoted by the words 'Brahman' and the rest, the one topic of all the Vedas, omniscient, omnipotent, the non-distinct material and efficient cause of the world, and denoted by the term 'existent', is the cause of the world.[4]

Here ends the section entitled 'He sees' (5).

[1] Correct quotation : '*Kāraṇā-dhipādhipaḥ*', which is translated here. Vide Śvet. 6.9.

[2] See footnote 1, p. 42.

[3] That is, then *pradhāna* will become Brahman, and cease to be non-sentient, as held by the *Sāṃkhyas*.

[4] Note the difference between the interpretations of *Nimbārka* and *Śrīnivāsa*. According to Nimbārka, the word '*śrutatvāt*' means: 'because this is mentioned in Scripture', and he attaches no special and separate meaning to the word '*Ca*'. But according to *Śrīnivasa*, the word '*śrutatvāt*' means: 'because this is mentioned in *this Upaniṣad* (viz. *Chāndogya*)', and the word '*Ca*' means: 'because this is mentioned in *other Upaniṣads* (viz. *Śvetāśvatara*, *Kauṣitaki* and the rest)'.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same. Rāmānuja points out in conclusion that this adhikaraṇa is also a refutation of the theory of the Nirguṇa Brahman, since it asserts 'perceiving' or 'willing' on the part of the creator of the world, and 'willing' means being possessed of the *quality* of intelligence.[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 11 in his commentary. Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'And because (the Nirguṇa Brahman) is mentioned in Scripture'. That is, Scripture proves the Nirguṇa Brahman to be the creator, and not the Saguṇa Brahman.[2]

The difference is that while according to Nimbārka (and others too), this section is concerned with the question as to whether Brahman or pradhāna is the creator of the world, according to Baladeva, the question is as to whether the Nirguṇa Brahman or the Saguṇa Brahman is the creator of the world.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled 'That which consists of bliss'. (Sūtras 13–20)

SŪTRA 13

"(BRAHMAN IS) THAT WHICH CONSISTS OF BLISS, ON ACCOUNT OF REPETITION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"That which consists of bliss" is the Supreme Soul alone, but not the individual soul. Why? On account of the repetition (in Scripture) of the word 'bliss' with reference to the Highest Self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, by way of refuting the doctrine of pradhāna, it has been shown that scriptural texts like '"The existent alone, my dear!"'

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[1] Śrī. B. 1.1.12, p. 166, vol. 1.

[2] G.B. 1.1.11, pp. 54-55, Chap. 1.

(Chānd. 6.2.1) and the rest, all refer to Brahman. Now, the author is showing that the texts about that which consists of bliss and the rest also refer to Brahman who, as possessed of unsurpassed bliss, is different in nature from the class of sentient beings also.

In the Taittirīya, four sheaths, viz. that which consists of food, that which consists of the vital-breath, that which consists of mind, and that which consists of understanding, are spoken of in a successive order; and after that it is said: 'Verily, other than and within that which consists of understanding is the self which consists of bliss. By that this is filled' (Tait. 2.5). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether by the words 'consisting of bliss', the individual soul is denoted or the Supreme Soul. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: As in the passage: 'Of him is this very embodied soul which belongs to the previous one' (Tait. 2.5), an embodied soul is mentioned; as in another scriptural text: 'May my (sheaths) consisting of food, consisting of the vital-breath, consisting of the mind, consisting of understanding and consisting of bliss, be purified' (Mahānār. 20.21) it is said that what consists of bliss is something to be purified; and as it is impossible for the ever-pure Supreme Soul to be something to be purified, so that which consists of bliss is the individual soul,—

We reply: "that which consists of bliss" is the Highest self alone, possessed of unsurpassed bliss. Why? 'On account of repetition', i.e. because the word 'bliss' has been repeated many times (in Scripture) in reference to the Highest Self alone, the Highest Person, in texts like: 'If there were not bliss in the ether, for this alone causes bliss' (Tait. 2.7),[1] 'He knows that Brahman is bliss' (Tait. 3.6) and so on; and because, beginning thus: 'This is an investigation into bliss' (Tait. 2.8), the concluding text: 'Knowing the bliss of Brahman, he does not fear from anything' (Tait. 2.8), is found to end by establishing that the bliss of Brahman alone is unsurpassable and illimitable.

If it be said that here there is the repetition of the word 'bliss'[2] only, and not of the words 'consisting of bliss'[3]—(we reply) no, because just as in the passage: 'In spring, he performs the jyoti-sacrifice'

[1] Complete quotation: 'For who indeed would breathe, who would live, if there were not this bliss in the ether' and so on. Vide Tait. 2.7, p. 70.

[2] *Ānanda.*

[3] *Ānanda-maya.*

the word 'jyoti' stands for the word 'jyotiṣṭoma', so here the word 'bliss' stands for the words 'consisting of bliss'.

To your allegation that as an embodied soul is mentioned in Scripture, the Highest Self is not that which consists of bliss,—(we reply:) the designation of the embodiedness of the Supreme Self fits in, since He abides within all, viz. that which consists of food and the rest, as their controller. On the other hand, the text about that which consists of bliss, viz. 'Of him is this very embodied soul which belongs to the previous one' (Tait. 2.5), shows that it (viz. that which consists of bliss) has no other (inner) soul.[1] The expression 'Let them be purified' (in the above Mahānārayaṇa passage) means 'Let them be embellished'.

SŪTRA 14

"IF IT BE SAID THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORD ('ĀNANDA-MAYA') DENOTING MODIFICATION, (THE HIGHEST SELF IS) NOT (DENOTED BY THIS WORD), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF ABUNDANCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be said that on account of the mention of (the suffix) 'mayaṭ' in the sense of 'modification', the Highest Self is not that which consists of bliss,—(we reply:) no. Why? On account of the mention in Smṛti of (the suffix) 'mayaṭ' as having the sense of 'abundance' as well.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: That which consists of bliss cannot be the Highest Self. Why? "On account of the word denoting modification", i.e. on account of the mention of the suffix 'mayaṭ' as having the sense of 'modification',—beginning: 'Mayaṭ is used optionally in the classical language after any base (to indicate "product" and

[1] That is, the soul consisting of food has the soul consisting of the vital breath as its inner soul; this latter again has the soul consisting of mind as its inner soul; this latter again has the soul consisting of understanding as its inner soul; and this latter again has the soul consisting of bliss as its inner soul. But the last one, viz. the soul consisting of bliss, has nothing else as its soul, but is the inmost soul of all.

"part") when food and dress are meant' (Pāṇ. 4.3.143; SD.K. 1523 [1]), Smṛti goes on to designate (the suffix) 'mayaṭ' in the sense of modification thus:—'(The suffix "mayaṭ" is used) invariably after words in which the vowel has been lengthened and after "śara" and the rest' (Pāṇ. 4.3.144; SD.K. 1524 [2]);—and also because the suffix 'mayaṭ' is found used in the sense of 'modification' in ordinary life in expressions like: 'An earthen [3] pot' and so on, as well as in the Veda, in passages like: 'A large branch of the parṇa [4] wood [5] is the sacrificial ladle', and so on,—

(We reply:) "No." Why? "On account of abundance", i.e. because Smṛti depicts (the suffix) 'mayaṭ' in the sense of 'abundance' as well, in the passage: 'Mayaṭ' is added in the sense of 'made thereof' [6] and in the sense of 'having a great portion of' [7] (Pāṇ. 5.4.21; SD.K. 2089 [8]); and because the suffix 'mayaṭ' is found used in the sense of 'abundance', too, in ordinary expressions like 'A sacrifice abounding in food' [9] and so on.

It cannot be said also that since Brahman is admitted to be consisting of bliss, there may be some want of bliss in Him,[10]—because here 'abundance' is but a synonym for 'very muchness'. Thus, among (all the effects of prakṛti) beginning with mahat and ending with the body, the body being a transformation of food,[11] is said to be the person 'consisting of food'. Other than and the supporter of it is 'that which consists of the vital-breath'. Other than and the supporter of these two is 'that which consists of mind'. Other than and the controller of these three is the individual soul, called 'the person consisting of understanding'. That which is of the nature of knowledge and has understanding as its attribute (viz. the individual soul) is the controller of the three non-sentient persons. That this

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[1] P. 786, vol. 1. [2] P. 786, vol. 1. [3] *Mṛn-maya.*

[4] *Parṇa* is a large-leaved sacred tree, whose wood is used for making sacred vessels, later generally called '*palāśa*'. M.W., p. 606.

[5] *Parṇa-mayī.* [6] *Tad-vacana.*

[7] *Prakṛta-vacana*, meaning '*Prācuryyeṇa prastutam prakṛtam, tasya vacanam*'. SD. K. 2089, p. 931, vol. 1.

[8] *Op. cit.* [9] *Anna-maya.*

[10] That is, when it is said: '*Anna-maya yajña*', it is meant that the sacrifice consists *mostly* of food, but not *entirely*. Similarly, it might be thought that the expression: '*Ānanda-maya Brahman*' means that Brahman is *mostly* bliss but not *entirely* bliss, i.e. there is some non-bliss in *Brahman*.

[11] That is, it is food which being assimilated produces and keeps the body.

possessor of the attribute of understanding is of the nature of knowledge, will be made clear in the second chapter.[1] But why, then, has the attribute alone been indicated in the text: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice?' (Tait. 2.5). Listen. The very nature, too, of the knower is self-manifesting, and the use of the term 'understanding' or the nominative case-ending should be understood to be referring to it. The use of the neuter gender[2] is meant for denoting a thing.[3] For this very reason, in the Kāṇva recension, viz. 'Who abiding in understanding' (Bṛh. 3.7.22), and in the Mādhyandina recension, viz. 'Who abiding in the self' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30[4]), in spite of the difference of words, the meaning, viz. the individual soul, is the very same. And for this very reason, the statement: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice, and deeds too' (Tait. 2.5) is perfectly justifiable, it being impossible for the mere attribute of understanding to be an agent. And, it, the individual soul, the knower, should be known to be possessed of bliss, in accordance with the text: 'That is one human bliss' (Tait. 2.8), as well as another scriptural text: 'For verily, on getting this essence, one becomes blissful' (Tait. 2.7). The Supreme Person, an ocean of immense bliss in contrast to its (viz. the individual soul's) little bliss, is the controller of all, referred to in the text: 'Verily, other than and within that which consists of understanding, is the self which consists of bliss' (Tait. 2.5). Moreover, the Supreme Person, the One, is indeed established in all the Vedāntas as free from all faults by nature, so there is not even an odour of slightest non-bliss in Him,—so much in brief.

SŪTRA 15

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF THE CAUSE OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of being the cause of the bliss of the individual soul too, the Highest Self alone is that which consists of bliss.

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[1] Vide V.K. 2.3.18.

[2] Viz. '*vijñānam*' in the text.

[3] That is, the word 'understanding' does not stand for a mere abstract attribute here, but for a concrete thing, viz. the individual soul, possessed of the attribute.

[4] P. 861, line 19.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Scripture designates that He (viz. Brahman) alone is the "cause" of the bliss "of that", viz. the individual soul,—which, according to the *prima facie* view, was suspected to be that which consists of bliss,—thus:—'For, verily, this alone causes bliss' (Tait. 2.7). Here the term "ānandayāti" means 'ānandayati'. The sense is that as he who gives riches and knowledge to others is himself possessed of immense riches and immense knowledge, so the statement that the Highest Self, too, causes bliss to individual souls means that He is possessed of immense bliss. Just as the term 'consisting of light' is applied to Lord Sun, whose very nature is to remove all darkness, so exactly the application of the term 'consisting of bliss' to the Lord, the topic of the present discussion, the cause of all, without an equal or a superior, and devoid of even a tinge of non-bliss of any sort, is perfectly reasonable.

SŪTRA 16

"AND THE MANTRA-DESCRIBED (VIZ. BRAHMAN) IS CELEBRATED (TO BE CONSISTING OF BLISS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That which is stated in the mantra-text: viz. 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1),[1] is "mantra-described".[2] That alone is celebrated by the term "consisting of bliss".

Vedānta-kaustubha

That which is stated in the mantra-text which beginning thus: 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tait. 2.1), continues: 'He who knows Brahman as truth, knowledge and infinite, situated in the cave' (Tait. 2.1) is the "mantra-described", i.e. Brahman alone, the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. He is celebrated in the following Brāhmaṇa-text as well—viz. 'Verily, other than and within that which consists of understanding is the self which consists of bliss' (Tait. 2.5), since the mantra and the Brāhmaṇa,

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. [2] *Mantra-varṇikam.*

the object to be explained and the explanation, refer to the same topic. Hence that which consists of bliss is the Highest Self alone.

SŪTRA 17

"NOT THE OTHER, ON ACCOUNT OF INAPPROPRIATENESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The qualities peculiar to the Lord, which are mentioned in Scripture as relating to that which is signified by the term 'consisting of bliss', being "inappropriate" on the part of anything else, "the other", i.e. the individual soul, is not signified by the term 'consisting of bliss'.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"The other", i.e. the individual, soul is not to be understood here by the term 'consisting of bliss'. Why? "On account of inappropriateness", i.e. the creatorship of the entire world and the like, mentioned as relating to that which consists of bliss in the scriptural text: "He wished: 'May I be many, may I procreate'. He created all this" (Tait. 2.6), are not appropriate on the part of the individual soul. Hence that which consists of bliss is Brahman alone.

Or else, the following construction (of the sūtra) may be understood:—The individual soul, "other than" Brahman, is not "mantra-described", because the qualities which are peculiar to the "mantra-described", viz. being the object to be attained by the wise and so on, are "inappropriate" on the part of anything else.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

Reading same, interpretation different—'The other (viz. the individual) (is) not (the object of the text: "Truth, knowledge and infinite", Tait. 2.1), on account of inappropriateness'. That is, Rāmānuja takes this sūtra as continuing more particularly the theme of the preceding sūtra where it has been shown that Brahman is designated by the text 'Truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1). Here it is shown, he points out, that none else than the Lord, not

even the freed soul, can be the object of the above text, for even the freed soul is not absolute [1] knowledge in the sense the Lord is, as even the freed soul cannot wish to be many and so on. So it is not appropriate that the individual soul can ever be the object of the above text and be identical with Brahman.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'The other (viz. Hiraṇyagarbha) (is) not (the cause of the world), on account of inappropriateness'. According to Srīkaṇṭha a new adhikaraṇa begins with this sūtra (sūtras 17–20), concerned with the question whether the Lord is the cause of the world, or someone else, viz. Hiraṇyagarbha.[3]

SŪTRA 18

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the designation of a difference" between the obtainer and the object obtained in the text: 'For, verily, on obtaining this essence, he becomes blissful' (Tait. 2.7) [4] the individual soul is not that which consists of bliss.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, that which consists of bliss or the 'mantra-described' one is not the individual soul. Why? Because the individual soul and the Supreme Being are designated as different. Thus, the text: 'He is, verily, the essence. For, verily, on attaining the essence, he becomes blissful' (Tait. 2.7), designates a difference between the Highest Self, consisting of bliss and mantra-described, as the object to be obtained, and the individual soul, as the obtainer, since the obtainer cannot be the object obtained. There is a difference of nature between the individual soul and Brahman, otherwise an

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[1] *Nirupādhika.*
[2] Śrī. B. 1.1.17, pp. 193-194, Part 1.
[3] ŚK. B. 1.1.17, pp. 230–237, Part 3.
[4] Ś, Bh.

intermixture of qualities will result,—this is the meaning of the two aphorisms.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 17 in his commentary. Reading and literal interpretation same, quotes the same passage, but in conclusion adds his own view, viz. that really and transcendentally, there is no difference between the soul, the obtainer, and Brahman, the obtained.[1]

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same, but refers to a different passage, viz. Taittirīya-upaniṣad, 2.5.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different, viz.: '(If it be said that Hiraṇyagarbha is identical with the Supreme Lord, then we reply, no), on account of the designation of difference'.[3]

SŪTRA 19

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF DESIRE (THROUGH WHICH SIMPLY THE LORD IS ABLE TO REALIZE HIS PURPOSES), THERE IS NO DEPENDENCE (OF THE LORD) ON (WHAT IS AN OBJECT OF) INFERENCE (VIZ. PRADHĀNA)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If the individual soul be admitted to be the cause, it must depend on a material cause, viz. on pradhāna which is an (object of) "inference", just as a potter has to depend on clay and the rest in creating pots and the like. But the Highest Person, non-material, consisting of bliss and omnipotent, has to depend on nothing. Why? "On account of desire", i.e. on account of intention, as declared by the scriptural text:—'He desired: "May I be many"' (Tait. 2.6).[4]

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[1] Ś.B. 1.1.17, pp. 221-22.
[2] Cf. also Chānd. 6.2.3. '*Sa aikṣata bahu syām*', etc.
[3] ŚK. B. 1.1.19, pp. 237 ff, Part 1.
[4] Ś, R, Bh, B.

Hence that which consists of bliss is different from that (viz. the individual soul).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Pradhāna may very well be denoted by the term 'consisting of bliss', as it contains the quality of sattva which is the cause of bliss, and as it corresponds to the effect [1],—we reply:—

The term 'consisting of bliss' contains no "reference" to "inference", i.e. to that which is inferred, viz. pradhāna. Why? "On account of desire", i.e. because the text, which refers to that which consists of bliss, viz. 'He desired: "May I be many"' (Tait. 2.6), mentions one who desires. The sense is that desire means volition, and that is not possible on the part of the non-sentient pradhāna, but is possible on the part of the omniscient Lord of all. Although pradhāna has already been set aside by the aphorism 'Because (the creator) sees, not, non-scriptural' (Br. Sū. 1.1.5), it is once more set aside here with a view to confirming the 'universality of knowing' [2] and hence there is no fault of repetition.

Or else, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra:)—if the individual soul be denoted by the term 'consisting of bliss', the topic of the present discussion, it must be the cause of the world as well; and in that case, just as potters have to depend on clay and the rest for creating pots, etc. so the individual soul too must depend on pradhāna, which is a synonym for 'inference'.[3] But if the omnipotent Brahman be the cause of the world, no such fault arises,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 18 in their commentaries. Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'And on account of desiring, there is no reference

[1] That is, *pradhāna*, the non-sentient cause, is similar to the effect, the non-sentient world. Vide V.K. 1.1.5.

[2] Vide Br. Sū. 1.1.11, where it has been said that *Brahman* is universally known from all texts to be the cause of the world.

[3] That is, *pradhāna* has been called 'inference' (*anumāna*) in the *sūtra*, because it is an object of inference.

to (what is an object of) inference (viz. pradhāna) (in the term "ānanda-maya")'. That is, Scripture predicates willing on the part of the ānanda-maya, and willing is possible on the part of a conscious being alone.[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different—viz. 'And, (even) on account of desire, (i.e. in spite of the fact that Hiraṇyagarbha is said to have desired to create the world,) (his being the creator) is not dependent on reasoning (i.e. does not stand to reason,) (because it is the Lord Himself who created the world in the character of Hiraṇyagarbha)'.[2]

SŪTRA 20

"AND (SCRIPTURE) TEACHES THE UNION WITH THAT (VIZ. BLISS) OF THIS (VIZ. THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) IN THIS (VIZ. THE LORD)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Scripture "teaches" the "union with that", i.e. the union with bliss, in the passage:—'Verily, he is an essence, for verily, on attaining the essence, he becomes blissful' (Tait. 2.7). Hence it is established that He, on attaining whom the individual soul comes to be united with bliss, is different from it.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also that which consists of bliss is neither the individual soul, nor pradhāna, but Brahman alone, since Scripture "teaches" the "union with that", i.e. the "union" or 'connection', with "that", or the Highest Self,—i.e. salvation, characterized by the attaining of His nature,[3]—'of this', i.e. of the individual soul, relying on Him, "in this", i.e. in the Highest Person, the Highest

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[1] Ś.B. 1.1.18, p. 222; Bh.B. 1.1.18, p. 26. Note that this is adopted as an alternative explanation of the *sūtra* by *Śrīnivāsa*, but not by *Nimbārka*. See above.

[2] ŚK. B. 1.1.19 (pp. 240-241, Part 3).

[3] Note that while according to *Nimbārka*, the word '*tad-yogam*' means 'union with bliss', according to *Śrīnivāsa*, it means 'union with the Highest Self', or salvation, though ultimately these two interpretations come to the same thing.

Self, consisting of bliss and mantra-described. And the scriptural text to this effect is as follows:—'For, truly, when he finds fearlessness as a foundation in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, and unsupported, then he is gone to fearlessness. When, however, he makes the smallest distinction therein, then he comes to have fear' (Tait. 2.7). The meaning of this is as follows: 'When', i.e. when at the time of birth which took place at a time when there was a causeless kindly glance by the Lord, as mentioned in sacred texts, thus: 'But should Madhusūdana glance at a person, when he is born, he should be known to be pure and given to the thought of salvation'. '"Through my grace, he attains an eternal and unchangeable place"' (Gītā 18.56) and so on, 'he', i.e. a knower, devoid of any desire for enjoyments here or hereafter, restoring to the feet of the Lord alone and possessed of the characteristics as stated in Scripture thus: '"I am easily attainable by one, O Pārtha, by the ever-free ascetic, who constantly remembers me, not thinking ever of another"' (Gītā 18.14), 'He who departs, discarding the body, uttering the one syllable "om" and remembering me, goes to a supreme goal', '"Knowing me, he goes to peace"' (Gītā 5.29), 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tait. 2.1), and so on, becomes fearless, he 'finds', i.e. attains, 'a foundation', i.e. unfailing, devotion (or reliance) through His grace alone. 'Then', i.e. immediately after, 'he is gone to fearlessness', on account of the absence of any devotion (on his part) to anyone else, which (alone) is the cause of fear. In whom? 'In the invisible', i.e. in that which is different from the group of the non-sentient which is visible. Again, in whom? 'In the incorporeal', i.e. in the supremely conscious Being, who is different from the group of souls or conscious beings,—that He is the supremely conscious Being is stated in the Kaṭhavallī, thus: 'Conscious among the conscious' (Kaṭha. 5.13; also Śvet. 6.13);—'in the undefined', i.e. in that which is not established as having so-muchness and the nature and qualities of which are to be known from the Vedānta alone; 'in the unsupported', i.e. in that which has no basis, which is possessed of infinite, inconceivable powers,—this is the sense. And 'when', i.e. when during the period of nescience, 'he', i.e. a non-knower, 'makes' even the smallest 'distinction', i.e. relies on something else, viz. one or other of the ends, connected with means (other than a complete resort to the Lord alone), 'then he comes to have fear'. Hence, it is

established that that which consists of bliss is Brahman, different from all the sentient and the non-sentient.[1]

Here ends the section entitled 'That which consists of bliss' (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 19 in his commentary. Reading and interpretation same, quotes the passage quoted by Śrīnivāsa. But here Śaṃkara changes his point of view all of a sudden, and after having given at length the very same interpretation as given by Nimbārka, viz. that the 'ānanda-maya' referred to in the Taittirīya-upaniṣad (Tait. 2.5) is the Highest Self,[2] and not the individual soul or pradhāna, he finally rejects it, at the end of this sūtra, in favour of another, viz. that the word 'Brahman' in the immediately following phrase: 'Brahma puccham pratiṣṭhā' (Tait. 2.5), refers to Brahman principally, and not as a member of the 'ānanda-maya', for the 'ānanda-maya' would refer to the qualified Brahman, and never to the non-qualified Brahman, which is called '*ānanda*', and not '*ānandamaya*'.[3]

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 19 in his commentary too. Reading same, interpretation of the word 'tad-yogam' slightly different—viz. 'union with Him (the Lord)', i.e. salvation.[4] (Cf. Śrīnivāsa.) Quotes a different portion of the same passage (viz. the portion quoted by Śrīnivāsa).

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different—viz. 'Herein (viz. in the Mahā-nārāyaṇa-upaniṣad) (Scripture) teaches his (i.e. Hiraṇya-

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[1] Note that here *Nimbārka* and *Śrīnivāsa* understand the word '*śāsti*' as referring to *two different portions* of the same passage, viz. Tait. 2.7, *Nimbārka* to the first part, *Śrinivāsa* to the last.

[2] Vide Ś.B. 1.1.12, p. 217; '*Para evātmā ānanda-mayo bhavitum arhati*'. In this very *sūtra* also, it is said:—'*Tasmād ānanda-mayaḥ paramātmā iti sthitam*'. Ś.B. 1.1.19, p. 223.

[3] Vide Ś.B. 1.1.19, pp. 225-26.

[4] Bh. B. 1.1.19, p. 26.

garbha's) connection with that (viz. the Supreme Lord)'.[1] While according to Nimbārka, sūtras 13–20 form one section, concerned with the question of the 'ānanda-maya', according to srīkaṇṭha, Śūtras 13–16 form one section, while sūtras 17–20 form another different section, concerned with the question, as noted above, whether Hiraṇya-garbha is the creator of the world, or the Supreme Lord (viz. Śiva).

Baladeva

This is sūtra 19 in his commentary. Reading same, interpretation of the word 'tad-yogam' different, viz. 'union with fearlessness'. Quotes the passage quoted by Śrīnivāsa.[2]

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled 'That which is within'. (Sūtras 21-22)

SŪTRA 21

"THAT WHICH IS WITHIN (THE SUN AND THE EYE) (IS NONE BUT THE HIGHEST SELF), ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF HIS QUALITIES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

He who abides "within" the sun and the eye and is to be worshipped by one desiring salvation, is, truly, the Highest Self alone, and not a particular individual soul. Why? "On account of the teaching of the qualities belonging to Him" alone, viz. qualities like 'freedom from sins', 'being the soul of all' and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In this manner, it has been shown in a general manner in the two sections that the stated texts all refer to Brahman, who is different from pradhāna as well as from the individual soul and is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Now, after having mentioned the peculiar qualities of the Lord, such as, possessing an eternally present, non-celestial body and so on, and then by showing the concordance of those texts (with regard to the Lord), the author denotes, up to the end of the section, the difference

[1] ŚK. B. 1.1.20, pp. 240-241, Part 3.
[2] G.B. 1.1.19, pp. 76–77, Chap. 1.

of Brahman from particular individual souls who have attained eminence by virtue of supreme merit, as well as from particular non-sentient objects, like time and the like.

In the Chāndogya, we read: 'Now, this golden Person, who is seen within the sun, has a golden beard and golden hair, and is golden through and through, right to the finger-nail tips. His eyes are like the full-blown lotus. His name is High, (because) he has risen above all sins. Verily, he who knows thus rises above all sins. His singers are the Ṛc and the Sāman. . . . .[1] So much with reference to the gods' (Chānd. 1.6.6–1.6.8), 'Now, with reference to the self' (Chānd. 1.7.1), 'Now, this person, who is seen within the eye' (Chānd. 1.7.5) and so on.

Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether this Person, mentioned in Scripture as abiding within the sun and the eye, is a particular individual soul, or the Supreme Lord? What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: An individual soul who has attained eminence. Why? Because the person within the sun and the person within the eye are declared by Scripture to be possessed of a form in the passages (respectively): 'Having a golden beard, golden hair' (Chānd. 1.6.6), 'The form of this one is the very same as the form of that one' (Chānd. 1.7.5); because a limit to the lordship of both is declared respectively by the texts:—'He rules these worlds which are beyond that, as well as the desires of gods' (Chānd. 1.6.8), 'He rules these worlds which are under that, as well as the desires of men' (Chānd. 1.7.6); because the dependence of both on something else is declared (respectively) by the texts: 'Within the sun' (Chānd. 1.6.6), 'Within the eye' (Chānd. 1.7.5); and because the Supreme Self is declared to be just the opposite by the texts 'Without sound, without touch, without form' (Kaṭha 3.15), '"On what, my reverend Sir, is it based?" "On its own greatness"' (Chānd. 7.24.1), 'This is the Lord of beings' (Bṛh. 4.4.22), etc.—

We reply: The Person, mentioned in Scripture as "within" the sun and the eye is the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of the teaching of his qualities," i.e. because of the "teaching", in this text, of the qualities "of him", viz. of the Highest Soul alone, such as, being free from sins in every way, being the remover of all the sins

[1] Quotation incomplete—viz.:—'His singers are the *Ṛc* and the *Sāman*. Therefore (they are called) the *udgītha*' and so on. See footnote 1, p. 69.

of His own devotees, and so on, as well as, being the soul of all and the rest, thus: 'He, verily, is the Ṛc, the Sāman, the Uktha, the Yajus, He is Brahman' [1] (Chānd. 1.7.5); because in accordance with the scriptural texts: 'When the seer sees the golden-coloured person' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), 'Of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness' (Śvet. 3.8; Gītā 8.9), 'That on which all these powers are based, O king, is another great form of Hari, different from the form of the world', and so on, like His natural qualities of possessing true desires and the rest, His possessing a form too, involves no contradiction; and because the text: 'Without sound, without touch, without colour' (Kaṭha 3.15) is concerned with denying sound and the like belonging to the material world. Nor is Brahman depicted here as possessed of a limited lordship, since the text setting forth such a limit is concerned with an arrangement of presiding deities. Nor can Brahman be said to be dependent on something else, since He is the support of all, in accordance with the following scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. 'Entered within, the ruler of men' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2 [2]), 'The Inner Soul of all beings' (Kaṭha 5.9, 10, 11; 5.12; Śvet. 6.11; Muṇḍ. 2.1.4), 'Who, abiding within the earth' (Bṛh. 3.7.3), ' "And, I am situated within the hearts of all" ' (Gītā 15.15), '"I abide, supporting the entire universe with a part of mine" ' (Gītā 10.42), and so on. Here, by the Vedic text,—which is omniscient, independent of all proofs and authoritative by itself with regard to its own matter,—viz. 'This golden person who is seen within the sun, having a golden beard' (Chānd. 1.6.6) and so on, the body also of Brahman, the topic of discussion, suitable to Him, is mentioned, on the basis of direct perception alone, as evident from the statement: 'is seen'. From this it is known that the Highest Self is to be meditated on by one who desires salvation as possessed of a body. And, meditation too, to be mentioned hereafter,[3] is possible only if the Highest Self be possessed of a body. The multitude of scriptural and Smṛti texts, referring to the body of the Lord, is not quoted here for fear of prolixity.

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[1] *Ṛc* is a sacred verse, which is *recited* in praise of a deity; *Sāman* is a verse which is *sung*; *Yajus* is a sacred formula which is *muttered*; *Uktha* is a kind of recitation in sacrifices; *Brahman* is a sacred text or mantra, distinct from *Ṛc*, *Sāman* and *Yajus*. M.W., pp. 172, 225, 737.

[2] P. 181.

[3] Vide V.K. 3.3.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 20 in his commentary. Reading and interpretation same, quotes the same passage. In conclusion, he adds that although the Supreme Lord is really arūpa or formless, yet He may assume various māyāmaya-rūpas for favouring His devotees.[1] That is, all these passages, teaching the worship of the Person within the sun and so on, refer to the qualified Brahman only, and not to the highest Brahman, which of course Nimbārka does not admit.

SŪTRA 22

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF DIFFERENCE, (THE HIGHEST SELF IS) OTHER THAN (THE INDIVIDUAL SOULS OF THE SUN AND THE REST)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Highest Self is "other" than the group of individual souls of the sun and the rest.[2] Why? "On account of the designation of difference" in the text 'Abiding in the sun' (Bṛh. 3.7.9[3]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, the Highest Self, is "other" than, i.e. different by nature from, the individual souls of the sun and the rest within which He abides. Why? "On account of the designation of difference" between the individual soul and Brahman, in the text: 'Who abiding within the sun, is other than the sun, whom the sun does not know, of whom the sun is the body, who rules the sun from within, he is your soul, the inner controller, immortal' (Bṛh. 3.7.9). Thus,

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[1] Ś.B. 1.1.20, p. 232; '*Syāt parameśvarasyāpīcchā-vaśān māyāmayaṃ rūpaṃ sādhakānugrahārtham*'.

[2] C.S.S. ed. slightly different—viz. 'The Highest Self is other than the group of the individual souls of the sun and the rest, within which He abides' (p. 5).

[3] Ś, R, Bh, B.

the difference of Brahman from the individual soul, within which He abides, is established.

Here ends the section entitled 'That which is within' (7).

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled 'The ether'. (Sūtra 23)

SŪTRA 23

"(BRAHMAN IS DENOTED BY THE WORD) ETHER, ON ACCOUNT OF HIS CHARACTERISTIC MARKS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: '"What is the final refuge of this world?" "The ether", said he' (Chānd. 1.9.1 [1]), that which is denoted by the term "ether" is the Highest Self. Why? "On account of his characteristic marks," such as, being the creator of all, and the like, mentioned in the text: 'All these things, verily, arise from the ether alone' (Chānd. 1.9.1 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In this manner, it has been shown, on the ground of the peculiar qualities of Brahman, the topic of discussion, that the text: 'Now, this golden person who is seen within the sun' (Chānd. 1.6.8) and so on, refers to Brahman, the topic of discussion. Now, it is being shown that the text: '"What is the final refuge of this world?"' and so on too (Chānd. 1.9.1) refers to Him, on the ground of the characteristic marks of Brahman.

In the Chāndogya, we read the following under the dialogue between Śālāvatya and Jaivali: '"What is the final refuge of this world?"' '"The ether," said he, "All these beings, verily, arise from the ether alone, disappear into the ether; for the ether alone is greater than these, the ether is the supreme refuge"' (Chānd. 1.9.1). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether the elemental ether is meant by the term 'ether', or the Highest Self. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: As it is so well-known in the world and as it is declared also by Scripture to be the cause of the elements beginning with the air,

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

and so on, in the passage: 'From the "ether", the "air"' (Tait. 2.1), the elemental ether (is meant here)—

We reply: In this text "the ether", i.e. the object meant by the term 'ether', is the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of his characteristic marks," i.e. "his", or the Highest Self's, "characteristic marks", viz. being the creator of all beings, being superior, being the supreme refuge, and so on,—on account of that,[1] i.e. on account of the peculiar qualities of the Highest Self. It cannot be said, also, that in accordance with the rule: 'When there is a collocation of scriptural statement, mark, text, topic, place and name, each following one is weaker (than each preceding one), on account of its remoteness from the meaning' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.3.14[2]), the scriptural statement is of a greater force than the mark,—for in accordance with the rule: 'The strength and weakness of those which are spoilt by meaninglessness are in the opposite proportion', the scriptural statement: 'the ether', is set aside by the mark mentioned in the text: 'All these beings, verily, arise from the ether alone' (Chānd. 1.9.1). If the word "ether" were to refer to the elemental ether, then no sense would follow, for such a mark (viz. being the creator of all) is not possible on the part of the elemental ether; on the contrary, the elemental ether is declared by Scripture to be created by the Highest Self, in the passage: 'From this soul, verily, the ether arose' (Tait. 2.1). Further, on the ground of the etymological interpretation too (of the word 'ether' or ākāśa), viz. 'The ether is that which shines everywhere',[3] as well as on the ground of its conventional meaning, given in the passages: 'If there were not this bliss in the ether' (Tait. 2.7), 'The ether, verily, is the revealer of names and forms' (Chānd. 8.14.1) and so on, it is established that by the term "ether", the Supreme Self alone is denoted.

Here ends the section entitled 'The ether' (8).

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[1] This explains the compound '*tal-liṅgāt*'.

[2] P. 284, vol. 1. Vide *Śabara-bhāṣya*.

[3] *Ā samantāt kāśata iti ākāśaḥ*.

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled 'The vital-breath'. (Sūtra 24)

SŪTRA 24

"FOR THIS VERY REASON (BRAHMAN IS DENOTED BY THE WORD) VITAL-BREATH."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text also: 'All these beings, verily, enter into the vital-breath alone, arise from the vital-breath' (Chānd. 1.11.5 [1]), the vital-breath is none but the Highest Self, on account of the characteristic marks of Brahman, viz. entering into and coming out of Him.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In this manner, it has been pointed out that the text referring to the ether denotes Brahman, and not the elemental ether. Now, by declaring that the text about the udgītha,[2] viz. 'O Prastrotṛ!' [3] (Chānd. 1.10.9; 1.11.4) and so on, also refers to Brahman, the author extends here the same principle regarding the ether.

In the Chāndogya we find the following concerning the udgītha [4] under the dialogue between Cākrāyaṇa and the Prastrotṛ: '"O Prastrotṛ! if you shall sing the prastāva [5] without knowing the Deity who is connected with the prastāva, then your head will fall off"' (Chānd. 1.10.9; 1.11.4), '"Which is that Deity?" "The vital-breath," said he, "All these beings, verily, enter into the vital-breath alone, arise from the vital-breath. This is the Deity connected with the prastāva"' (Chānd. 1.11.4–5). Here a doubt arises, viz. As the entire world is found to exist as dependent on the vital-breath, and as it is so well-known in the world, so by the term 'vital-breath' a modification of the air too may be meant; and as in the text: '"For the mind, my dear, has the vital-breath as its fastening"' (Chānd. 6.8.2) and so on, the term 'vital-breath' is applied to Brahman, so Brahman may also be meant. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: Since everything is found to be dependent on the vital-

[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] The word '*udgīthe*' is not included under the quotation.

[3] A *Prastrotṛ* is an assistant of the *Udgātṛ*, and sings the *prastāva* or the introductory eulogy or the prelude of a *sāman*. M.W., p. 699.

[4] The word '*udgītha*' is not included under the quotation.

[5] The *prastāva* is the introductory eulogy or the prelude of a *sāman*. See footnote 3 above.

breath, since popularly the term 'vital-breath' is well-known to be a modification of the air, and since in the text: 'When, verily, a person sleeps, his speech goes to the vital-breath, his eye to the vital-breath, his ear to the vital-breath. When he wakes up, from the vital-breath alone they arise again' (Śat. Br. 10.3.3.6 [1]), the entrance into a modification of the air and so on are mentioned, the chief vital-breath alone, which is a modification of the air and has five modes, is understood here by the term 'vital-breath',—

We reply: "For this very reason", i.e. on account of the very characteristic marks of the Supreme Lord, viz. the entering into and coming out (of Him) of all the great elements, it is reasonable to hold that the object denoted by the term "vital-breath" is the Supreme Lord, the Highest Person alone. The characteristic marks of the Supreme Lord, viz. the entering into and the rising from Him of all the great elements, as mentioned in the text: 'All the elements enter into, i.e. merge into, and arise from, i.e. come out towards, Him', are not possible in the case of a modification of the air. In the text: 'When, verily, a person sleeps' (Śat. Br. 10.3.3.6), there is no mention of the entering and so on of the great elements, but simply of the entering and the rest of the sense-organs. Hence, on account of the marks of the Supreme Lord, as well as on the ground of the etymological interpretation (of the term 'vital-breath' or prāṇa), viz. 'In whom the entire world breathes excellently, i.e. finds a basis', it is established that the Highest Self alone is denoted by the term 'vital-breath'.

Here ends the section entitled "The vital-breath" (9).

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled 'The light'. (Sūtras 25–28)

SŪTRA 25

"(BRAHMAN IS DENOTED BY THE WORD) LIGHT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF FEET."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The light", mentioned in the passage: 'The light (higher) than the heaven' (Chānd. 3.13.7 [2]) is Brahman alone, "on account of the

[1] P. 778, lines 9–11. Cf. a similar passage in Chānd. 4.3.3.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

mention of feet", in the passage: '"One foot of him are all the elements" ' (Chānd. 3.12.6 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In this manner, it has been pointed out that the term 'ether', as well as the term 'vital-breath' refer to Brahman, all-pervading, untouched by any fault and the cause of all life. Now, the author is showing that the term 'light' also refers to Brahman.

In the Chāndogya, it is recorded: 'Now, the light which shines higher than this heaven, on the backs of all, on the backs of everything, in the highest worlds than which there are no higher,—that, verily, is the same light which is within this person' (Chānd. 3.13.7). Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether the term 'light' denotes the well-known light of the sun and so on, or the Highest Self. What is reasonable here? The *prima facie* view is as follows: It denotes the light of the sun and the rest. Why? Because that is well-known to be a remover of darkness, because Scripture mentions a limit in the passage: 'The light which shines higher than this heaven' (Chānd. 3.13.7), because no limit is possible on the part of Brahman, because Scripture speaks of a minor fruit in the passage: 'He who knows this becomes agreeable to the eyes, and renowned' (Chānd. 3.13.8), and, finally, because from the passage: 'That, verily, is the same light, which is within this person' (Chānd. 3.13.7), its identity with the fire within the belly is known.

On this suggestion, we reply: Here the object denoted by the term "light" is the Supreme Brahman alone, possessed of unsurpassed splendour. Why? "On account of the mention of feet." Thus, in the text, which precedes the text about the 'light', viz. 'So much is His greatness, and the Person is higher than this. One foot of him are all beings, three feet of him, the immortal in the heaven' (Ṛg-V. 10.10.3; Chānd. 3.12.6), Brahman is mentioned as having four feet. Thus, all beings constitute His one foot. Having all beings as one foot is possible on the part of the Supreme Brahman alone, and never on the part of any one else. Nor is any contradiction involved in the declaration of His having the heaven as His limit, because, as the word 'higher' in the passage: 'What is higher than this' (Chānd. 3.13.7) denotes superiority, it is not meant to denote non-comprehensiveness;

[1] Ś, R, ŚK, B.

and because from the passage: 'That the gods worship as the Light of lights, as Life' (Bṛh. 4.4.16) the term 'light' is known to be referring to Brahman. Nor is any contradiction involved in the declaration of a minor fruit, because Brahman is the giver of fruits in accordance with the fitness of persons. As it is declared in the 'Mystery of Fire'[1] of the Vājasaneyins: 'As one worships him, so he becomes' (Śat. Br. 10.5.2.10[2]), and by the Lord Himself, in the passage:—'"Whosoever, in whatever way, resorts to me, him, in that same way, do I favour"' (Gītā. 4.11). And, the purpose of the meditation on the identity (of the Lord) with the fire within the belly is to be known from the text: '"I, having become the Vaiśvānara[3], abide within the bodies of living beings, and united with the prāṇa and the apāna,[4] I digest the four kinds of food"' (Gītā 15.14).

SŪTRA 26

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF THE METRE, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (DENOTED), (THEN, WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DECLARATION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE MIND (TO BRAHMAN) THUS, FOR THUS IT IS SEEN (IN OTHER PASSAGES TOO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that "on account of the mention" of the metre called 'Gāyatrī' in the preceding text, the text referring to the feet may refer to that and not to Brahman,—(we reply:) "No, on account of the declaration of the application of the mind" to the Lord, who is denoted by the term 'Gāyatrī' owing to the connection of the latter with certain qualities.[5] Compare the word 'virāj' which illustrates a parallel case.[6]

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[1] *Agni-rahasya* is the title of the tenth book of the *Śatapatha-brāhmāṇa*.

[2] P. 725, line 13. Cf. a very similar passage in Mudg. 3, p. 384, lines 8-9.

[3] That is, the fire of digestion.

[4] The *prāṇa* is one of the five modes of the chief vital-breath, and *apāna* is another. The first goes upwards the nose, the second goes downwards through the anus. Vide V.R.M.

[5] That is, the *Gāyatrī* is said to possess certain qualities, which can belong to the Lord alone. Hence, the Lord is really denoted by the term '*Gāyatrī*'. See V.K. below.

[6] We find that in other passages, too, a word, primarily denoting a metre, may stand for something else, e.g. the word '*virāj*' primarily denotes a kind of

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: As the Gāyatrī metre is referred to in the preceding passage viz.: 'The Gāyatrī, verily, is all this' (Chānd. 3.12.1), the designation of beings as the foot, viz.: 'One foot of him are all beings' (Chānd. 3.12.6), may refer to this very metre. It is not reasonable to hold that this text establishes Brahman,—

(We reply:) "No." Why? "On account of the declaration of the application of the mind thus," i.e. on account of the mention of the fixing of the mind "thus" to Brahman who is denoted by the term 'Gāyatrī', since the latter is predicted to be the soul of all, in the passage: 'The Gāyatrī, verily, is all this' (Chānd. 3.12.1). Here, the term 'Gāyatrī' denotes Brahman who inheres in the metre, it being impossible for a metre, which is a mere collection of letters, to be the soul of all. "For thus it is seen," i.e. in very same manner, a parallel case is mentioned in the Aitarīya-upaniṣad, in the passage:— 'The Bahvṛcas consider Him in the great-hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the Chandogas in the Mahā-vrata ceremony' [1] (Ait. Ār. 3.2.3, 12). The sense is that those who are conversant with the Ṛg-veda, those who are conversant with the Sāma-veda, and those

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metre, yet it denotes the '*kṛta*' or the group of ten substances in Chānd. 4.3.8. Similarly, though the word '*Gāyatrī*' denotes a kind of metre, yet it may denote *Brahman* too. See V.K. below.

C.S.S. ed. reads: '*Kṛta-para*',—meaning comes to the same, viz. the word '*virāj*' stands for the '*kṛta*'.

[1] A *Bahvṛca* is one conversant with the *Ṛg-veda*, a priest of it, or the *Hotṛ* priest who represents it in the sacrificial ceremonies. M.W., p. 726.

An *Adhvaryu* is a priest of a particular class, as distinguished from the *Hotṛ*, the *Udgātṛ* and the *Brāhmaṇa* classes. He has to measure the ground, build the altar and so on, and while engaged in these duties, he has to repeat the hymns of the *Yajurveda*. Vide *op. cit.*, p. 24.

A *Chandoga* is a chanter of the *Sāma-veda*, an *Udgātṛ* priest. Vide *op. cit.*, p. 405.

The *Mahat-uktha* (great hymn) or the *Bṛhat-uktha* forms a series of verses, in three sections, each containing eighty *Tṛcas* or triple verses, recited at the end of the *Agni-cayana*. An *Uktha* is a verse which is *recited*, as distinguished from the *Sāman* verse which is *sung*, and the *Yajus* or sacred formula which is *muttered*. It forms a subdivision of the *Śastras*. Vide *op. cit.*, p. 172. See footnote 1, p. 78.

Mahā-vrata is the name of a great religious observance. It is also the name of a *Sāman* or *Stotra*, appointed to be sung on the last day but one of the *Gavāmayana*. Vide M.W., p. 800.

who are conversant with the Yajur-veda consider, respectively in the chief Śāstra [1], sacrificial fire, and the Mahā-vrata, Brahman who inheres in them severally; like this, Brahman inheres in the (Gāyatrī) metre.

Or, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra,) just as the Gāyatrī is a class of metre which consists of four feet, each consisting of six syllables [2], so Brahman, too, has four feet in accordance with the text: 'One foot of him are all beings, three feet, the immortal in the heaven' (Chānd. 3.12.6). Accordingly, on account of the mention of the fixing of the mind to Brahman who is metaphorically denoted by the word 'Gāyatrī' in virtue of the fact that both possess the quality of having four feet, the Gāyatrī is not recognized here, but Brahman alone. "For thus it is seen," i.e. in the very same manner, a term denoting a metre is found applied,—in a literal (as opposed to a metaphorical) sense,[3]—even to a different object in virtue of the fact that both possess a common quality. Thus, beginning: 'These five and the other five make ten, and that is the kṛta' [4] (Chānd. 4.3.8), the text goes on to say: 'That is the Virāj, the eater of food' (Chānd. 4.3.8). Here under the saṃvargavidyā [5], the term 'Virāj',

[1] A *Śastra* is a verse *recited* by the *Hotṛ* and his assistants. Vide M.W., p. 1044.

[2] Vide the verse: '*Indraś śacī-patiḥ / Balena pīḍitaḥ / duscyavano vṛṣā / samitsu sāsahiḥ*' / Śrī. B. 1.1.26, p. 216, Part 1.

[3] See end of footnote 5 below.

[4] *Kṛta* is the name of the die marked with four points.

[5] The *Saṃvarga-vidyā* or the knowledge concerning the snatcher-unto-itself, taught by *Raikva* to *Jānaśruti*. Vide Chānd. 4.3. The wind is the snatcher-unto-itself among the gods, the vital-breath is the snatcher-unto-itself among the sense-organs. The wind absorbs fire, the sun, the moon and water. The vital-breath absorbs speech, the eye, the ear and the mind. And, the wind, together with its four kinds of food, viz. fire, the sun, the moon and water—these five, and the vital-breath, together with its four kinds of food, viz. speech, the eye, the ear and the mind—these five, make ten or the '*kṛta*', which is called the '*Virāj*'. Here, the *Kṛta* has *actually* ten constituent parts, just as the *Virāj* metre has *actually* ten syllables. Hence these two are said to resemble each other *in a literal sense*, and not in a figurative one, as opposed to the case of *Brahman* and *Gāyatrī*, since when it is said that *Brahman* has four feet, it is not meant that He has *actually* four feet, but only *metaphorically*, while *Gāyatrī* has *actually* four feet or parts. Hence, here the term '*gauṇa*' has been used in connection with the latter case, and the term '*śakya*' in connection with the former. Vide V.K. above.

which is a class of metre of ten syllables, is found applied to a collection of ten objects or the kṛta.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Reading same. He gives two alternative explanations of the sūtra. Under the first, he points out that the passage 'The Gāyatrī, verily, is all this' (Chānd. 3.12.1) intimates that by means of the metre Gāyatrī, the mind is to be directed to Brahman who is connected with the Gāyatrī as its cause, just as devout meditation on Brahman under the form of certain effects of Brahman is mentioned in other passages, viz. Aitereya-āraṇyaka. (See Śrīnivāsa above.) Under the second, he points out that according to some, the term Gāyatrī directly denotes Brahman, since both possess four feet, and quotes a Chāndogya passage as an example. (See Śrīnivāsa above.)[1]

Rāmānuja

Reading slightly different—viz. 'nigmāt' in place of 'nigadāt'. Interpretation same.[2]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary too. Reading and interpretation same, only the interpretation of the phrase 'Tathā hi darśanam' different. He does not take it as referring to one specific parallel instance as Nimbārka does but understands 'darśanam' in the sense of 'consistency', and the phrase means, according to him, 'for by such an explanation alone the above passage gives a consistent meaning'.[3]

SŪTRA 27

"AND BECAUSE THE DESIGNATION OF THE BEINGS AND SO ON AS THE FEET IS APPROPRIATE (ONLY IF BRAHMAN BE DENOTED BY THE TERM "GĀYATRĪ"), THIS IS SO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

We hold that the Gāyatrī is Brahman not only 'on account of the declaration of the application of the mind thus' (last part of Br.

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[1] S.B. 1.1.25.
[2] Śrī. B. 1.1.26, p. 215, vol. 1.
[3] G.B. 1.1.25, pp. 91-92, Chap. 1.

Sū. 1.1.26), but "this is so also because" (the four feet, viz.) beings, earth, body and heart,[1] are "appropriate" on the part of Brahman, the Lord (alone).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason "also", in the text: 'The Gāyatrī, verily, is all this' (Chānd. 3.12.1), the object denoted by the term 'Gāyatrī' is Brahman. For what reason? "Because the designation of beings and so on as the feet is appropriate", i.e. also because the designation, viz. that the Gāyatrī has four feet,—called beings, earth, body and heart,—is appropriate on the part of Brahman alone, and not on the part of the Gāyatrī metre which is but a collection of letters.

SŪTRA 28

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE OF TEACHING, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (RECOGNIZED), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING NO CONTRADICTION EVEN IN BOTH CASES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that first the heaven is referred to as a 'locus', and then again, as a 'limit', and there being such "a difference of teaching", Brahman is "not" recognized,—

(We reply:) "no". Why? "Because there is no contradiction," in both the cases, with regard to the oneness of Brahman (i.e. in point of proving the very same Brahman).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected:—The heaven is referred to as a 'locus', by the locative case-ending, in the previous case, viz.: 'The three feet of him are the immortal in the heaven (divi)' (Chānd. 3.12.6), but as a 'limit', by the ablative case-ending, in the text 'Now, the light that shines higher than the heaven (divaḥ)' (Chānd. 3.13.7). Thus, "on account of the difference of teaching", resulting from the difference of the case-endings, Brahman is not recognized in the text concerning the light (viz. Chānd. 3.13.7)—

[1] Vide Chānd. 3.12.1–4.

(We reply:) Such an objection cannot be raised. Why? "In both the cases", i.e. in the case of the locative as well as in the case of the ablative, the oneness of the root-meaning, which is the main thing, is not set aside by the meaning of the case-endings, which is subsidiary only; just as the expressions: 'A hawk on the top of the tree', 'A hawk above the tree' (mean the same thing). Hence, it is established that the object denoted by the term "light" is the Supreme Brahman alone, possessed of unsurpassed splendour.

Here ends the section entitled 'The light' (10).

Adhikaraṇa 11: The section entitled 'Indra and the vital-breath'. (Sūtras 29–32)

SŪTRA 29

"(BRAHMAN IS DENOTED BY THE WORD) VITAL-BREATH, ON ACCOUNT OF INTELLIGIBILITY IN THAT WAY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: 'I am the vital-breath' (Kauṣ. 3.2[1]) and so on, the object denoted by the term 'vital-breath' and the rest, is the Highest Self, because the qualities of highest auspiciousness, endlessness and so on are intelligible only if the Highest Self be understood.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, by showing, in the following four aphorisms, that the Kauṣītaki-texts all refer to Brahman, the author refutes the view that words like 'vital-breath', 'Indra' and so on mean the individual soul.

In the Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa-upaniṣad, the Pratardana-vidyā is recorded, beginning: 'Pratardana, verily, the son of Divodāsa, arrived by fighting and valour at the beloved abode of Indra' (Kauṣ. 3.1). It is said here: Being told by Indra: '"I will give you a boon"' (Kauṣ. 3.1), Pratardana said: '"Do you yourself choose (a boon) for me,[2] what you consider to be the most beneficial for mankind"' (Kauṣ.

[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] The word '*varam*' is not included in the original text.

3.1), i.e. having considered the boon 'yourself', 'choose', i.e. give that 'to me'. Thus told by Pratardana, Indra said: '"I am the vital-breath, the intelligent Self. Worship me, as life, as immortality"' (Kauṣ. 3.2); and again, later on: '"The vital-breath, verily, is the intelligent self that taking hold of this body, makes it stand up"' (Kauṣ. 3.3), '"Let none desire to enquire after speech, but let him know the speaker"' (Kauṣ. 3.8), and in conclusion also: '"Now, this vital-breath itself, forsooth, is the intelligent self, bliss, ageless and immortal"' (Kauṣ. 3.8). Here, the doubt is, viz. whether a certain individual soul is denoted by the words 'Indra' and 'vital-breath', or the Highest Self? What is reasonable here?

The *prima facie* view is: As the word 'Indra' is well-known to be denoting an individual soul entrusted with a certain office, and as there is a text regarding the object denotable by the term 'Indra', viz. '"I am the vital-breath"' (Kauṣ. 3.2),—the word 'vital-breath' also denotes 'Indra'. From the text: '"Worship me as life, as immortality"' (Kauṣ. 3.2), he alone is known here as the object to be worshipped.

With regard to this, the correct conclusion is as follows: "The vital-breath", i.e. the meaning of the word 'vital-breath' and what is denoted by the words 'Indra' and the rest accompanying it, are the Highest Self alone. Why? '"On account of intelligibility in that way,"' i.e. because qualities like 'highest auspiciousness', 'being the intelligent self', 'bliss', 'agelessness' and the rest are intelligible '"in that way"', i.e. only if the Highest Self be understood. Thus, first, it is said in the beginning: 'The son of Divodāsa went to the beloved abode of Indra'[1] (Kaus. 3.1), where Indra, conceiving the dependence of his own self on Brahman for its existence and activity, did not think: 'I am Indra'; but, being merged in the bliss of Brahman and conceiving that the sentient and the non-sentient objects have Brahman as their self, reflected: 'Brahman, alone, is all this, I am Brahman'; and looked upon even those who had committed sins as his own self. And, the object to be attained by the Self (viz. Indra) and by those who were equal to the Self (viz. all other beings whom Indra looked upon as his self) was Brahman alone; the means thereto being simply the worship of His feet. Indra told to Pratardana, who had arrived there, i.e. at his so-beloved place: 'Choose a boon'. And, thus

[1] The word '*tāvat*' is not included in the quotation.

requested, Pratardana too, wishing for the highest goal of men, said to him, who was very modest, free from pride, and desirous of intimating the means to the highest goal of men, '"Do you yourself choose a boon for me"' and so on. Thereupon, the vital-breath was taught to Pratardana as the object to be worshipped, in the passage: '"I am the vital-breath"' (Kauṣ. 3.2) and so on. How can the vital-breath, taught thus as the highest goal of men, be an individual soul? How can the text: '"Worship me"' (Kauṣ. 3.2) be intelligible except as designating the worship of the Supreme Brahman? The individual soul, the witness of the three states [1], being a part and not fit to be attained by another individual soul, is not attainable through the intuition of a knower. And (the adjective) 'most beneficial' (in the text: '"What you consider to be the most beneficial for mankind"') does not apply to anything else except to the attainment of Brahman. (The qualities like) 'being the intelligent self', 'bliss', 'agelessness', and 'immortality', mentioned in the passages: '"Worship me as life, as immortality"' [2] (Kauṣ. 2.3), 'This alone, verily, is the intelligent self, bliss, ageless, immortal' (Kauṣ. 3.8), fit in only if Brahman be understood, and not otherwise. Hence, the words 'Indra', 'vital-breath' and so on were used by the celebrated Indra with a view to designating Brahman, and not his own self.

SŪTRA 30

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (DENOTED), ON ACCOUNT OF THE SELF OF THE SPEAKER BEING TAUGHT, (WE REPLY:) BECAUSE THERE IS A MULTITUDE OF REFERENCES TO THE SELF IN IT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: The object denoted by the words 'vital-breath' and the rest cannot be Brahman. Why? Because in the text: '"Know me alone"' (Kauṣ. 3.1 [3]), the very self of the speaker is taught,—

[1] Viz. waking, dream, deep sleep.
[2] Correct quotation translated: '*taṃ mām*'.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

(We reply:) '"In this"' chapter, there is a multitude of references to the Highest Self. Hence, the object denoted by the words 'vital-breath', 'Indra' and the rest is the Highest Self alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: In the aphorism: 'The vital-breath, on account of intelligibility in that way' (Br. Sū. 1.1.29), it has been said that the object denoted by the words 'vital-breath', 'Indra' and so on, is Brahman. That is not the case. Why? '"On account of the self of the speaker being taught,"' i.e. because the very self of the speaker, viz. Indra, who says at first: '"Know me alone"' (Kauṣ. 3.1), and later on: '"I am the vital-breath, the intelligent self"' (Kauṣ. 3.2),—his very individual character, well-known from the passage: '"I killed the three-headed son of Tvaṣṭṛ, I delivered the Arunmukhas, the ascetics, to the wolves"' (Kauṣ. 3.1),—is taught as the object to be worshipped. Thus, the introductory text here refers to the individual soul. This being so, the concluding text too, viz. 'Bliss, ageless, immortal' (Kauṣ. 3.8), should refer to it,—

We reply: '"Because there is a multitude of references to the self in it"', i.e. "because", i.e. certainly, "in it", viz. in this chapter, there is "a multitude of references to the self", i.e. numerous references to that which is above the (individual) self, viz. the Highest Self; that means, in this chapter there are (mentioned) a great many attributes of the Highest Self. Hence there cannot be any reference to any individual soul like Indra here,—this is the resulting meaning. Thus, the worship of what is the most beneficial, mentioned in the introductory text: '"What you consider to be the most beneficial for mankind"' (Kauṣ. 3.1), is nothing but the worship of the Highest Self, because He alone is the most auspicious Being, as declared by another scriptural text: 'By knowing Him alone, one surpasses death; there is no other way to salvation' (Śvet. 6.15). Similarly, making one do good or evil deeds as declared by the text: 'He alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, perform good action. He alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead downwards from these worlds, perform evil action'[1] (Kauṣ. 3.8), is a quality of the Highest Self alone. Likewise, being the support of all sentient and non-sentient

[1] Correct quotation translated: '*Eṣa hi eva enam . . . . . , eṣa u eva enam asādhu karma kārayati taṃ yam adho niniṣate*'. Vide Kauṣ. 3.8, p. 130.

objects,—depicted by the term 'elements of intelligence' in the text which, beginning thus: 'The vital-breath alone is the intelligent self that, taking hold of the body, makes it stand up' (Kauṣ. 3.3), goes on: 'As of a chariot the rim of the wheel is fixed on the spokes, and the spokes are fixed on the nave, even so these elements of being are fixed on the elements of intelligence, and the elements of intelligence are fixed on the vital-breath' (Kauṣ. 3.8);—as well as bliss and the rest, mentioned in the text: 'Now, this vital-breath, forsooth, is the intelligent self, bliss, ageless, immortal' (Kauṣ. 3.8), are qualities of the Highest Self alone. 'Being the Self' and 'being the object to be known', mentioned in conclusion in the text: '"Let one know: "He is my self"' (Kauṣ. 3.8), are also qualities of the Highest Self. Hence, a great many attributes of the Highest Self being mentioned here, the Highest Self alone is denoted by the terms 'Indra', 'vital-breath' and the rest.

SŪTRA 31

"BUT THE INSTRUCTION (GIVEN BY INDRA ABOUT HIMSELF) (IS JUSTIFIABLE) THROUGH SCRIPTURAL INSIGHT, AS IN THE CASE OF VĀMADEVA."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Realizing that everything had Brahman for its soul, Indra properly said "through scriptural insight": '"Know me alone"' (Kauṣ. 3.1 [1])—the scriptural text to this effect is: 'What sorrow, what delusion is there of him who perceives the unity' (Īśā. 7 [2])—, just as Vāmadeva said: '"I was Manu and the sun"' (Bṛh. 1.4.10; Ṛg. V. 4.26. 1*a* [3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: Why then did Indra being one, (viz. an individual soul) taught himself as another (viz. Brahman) in the passage: '"Worship me"' (Kauṣ. 3.2)?—it is replied here:—

No such objection can be raised. Just as a highly favoured royal servant says to the subjects, even like the king himself, 'I am your

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
[3] P. 285, line 8. Not quoted by others.

ruler to be worshipped by you', so is the case here. "But through scriptural insight." That is, in the passages, '"Know me alone"' (Kauṣ. 3.1), '"Worship me"' (Kauṣ. 3.2), and so on, Indra, who is only an individual soul, taught the Highest Self as his own self, consequent of knowing, "through scriptural insight", i.e. from scriptural texts, that the Supreme Brahman is the inner controller and the soul of all. The scriptural texts are the following:—'All this has that for its self, that is true, that is the self, Brahman'[1] (Chānd. 6.7.8; 6.9.4; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3), 'All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from him, disappearing into him, breathing in him' (Chānd. 3.1.4.), '"You have, truly, attained freedom from fear, O Janaka"!' (Bṛh. 4.2.4), 'Who knows himself: "I am Brahman"'[2] (Bṛh. 1.4.10), 'Entered within, the ruler of men, the soul of all' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.2[3]), 'This is your soul, the inner controller, immortal' (Bṛh. 3.7.3, etc.) and so on. Compare the case of Vāmadeva, who intuiting the Highest Self, the Inner Controller of all, through scriptural insight, spoke of Him alone, when he said: 'Seeing this, the sage Vāmadeva understood: "I was Manu and the sun"' (Bṛh. 1.4.10), 'I am the wise Kakṣivān sage' (Ṛg. V. 4.26.1[4]). Hence the teaching: '"Know me alone"' (Kauṣ. 3.1), etc. is, indeed, proper.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

He gives two alternative explanations, the last of which tallies with the explanation given by Nimbārka.[5]

[1] The word '*Brahman*' is not included in the original texts.

[2] Correct quotation: '*ya evam vedāhaṃ Brahmāsmi*'. Vide Bṛh. 1.4.10, p. 45.

[3] P. 181.

[4] The full quotation in Ṛg.V. is: 'I was *Manu* and the sun, I am the wise *Kakṣivān* sage'—said by *Indra*.

[5] ŚK. 1.1.31 (p. 288, Part 3).

SŪTRA 32

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE CHARACTERISTIC MARKS OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND THE CHIEF VITAL-BREATH, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (MEANT), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE THREEFOLDNESS OF MEDITATION, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING REFERRED TO (ELSEWHERE), ON ACCOUNT OF (ITS) SUITABILITY HERE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: On account of the characteristic marks of the individual soul, mentioned in the passages:—'Let none desire to enquire into speech, but let him desire to know the speaker' (Kauṣ. 3.8 [1]), 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvaṣṭṛ' (Kaus. 3.1 [2]); as well as on account of the characteristic marks of the chief vital-breath, mentioned in the passage—'The vital-breath alone is the intelligent self that taking hold of the body makes it stand up' (Kauṣ. 3.3 [3]), Brahman is not referred to here,—

(We reply:) No, "because of the threefoldness of the meditation" on Brahman, in accordance with the different grades of meditating devotees, viz. (meditation on Brahman) as the Inner Controller of the group of individual souls, as the Inner Controller of the non-sentient objects, and as different from them both; "because it is referred to" (elsewhere); "because it is suitable here" also.

Here ends the first quarter of the first chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Brahman cannot be denoted here by the words 'vital-breath' and the rest. Why? "On account of the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital-breath." First, the characteristic marks of the individual soul are stated in the passages: 'Let none desire to enquire after speech, but let him desire to know the speaker' (Kauṣ. 3.8), '"I delivered the Arunmukhas, the

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, B. [2] R, ŚK, Bh, B. [3] Ś, R, Bh, B.

ascetics, to the wolves"' (Kauṣ. 3.1) and so on; and the characteristic marks of the chief vital-breath are stated in the passage: 'Now, verily, the vital-breath alone is the intelligent soul that taking hold of this body makes it stand up' (Kauṣ. 3.1). Hence it is not possible that Brahman is referred to here,—

(We, reply:) "No." Why? "On account of the threefoldness of meditation, on account of being referred (elsewhere), on account of (its) suitability here." That is, the designation of Brahman by such and such terms (viz. Indra and the vital-breath) is for the sake of teaching the threefoldness of meditation, just as elsewhere three kinds of meditation on Brahman are referred to. There (viz. in the Taittirīya-upaniṣad) Brahman is recommended to be meditated on in His own nature in the passages: 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1), 'Brahman is bliss' (Tait. 3.6); and to be meditated on as the inner soul of the sentient and the non-sentient, as well as the soul of all in the passages: 'Having created that, he entered into that very thing. Having entered it, He became real and that, defined and undefined, based and non-based, knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2.6). In the same manner "on account of its suitability", i.e. on account of the suitability of such a threefoldness, "here", i.e. in the Pratardanavidyā as well, there is no divergence among the texts, the whole group of texts referring to one and the same Brahman. This should be understood here: If a text be ascertained from the introduction and the rest to be referring to Brahman, then if there be marks of anything else therein, those, too, should be referred to Brahman, who is the inner controller of that thing, who possesses it as His power, and who is the object to be meditated on. Hence, it is established that the object indicated by the words 'Indra', 'vital-breath' and the rest is the Highest Self.

Here ends the section entitled 'Indra and the vital-breath' (11).

Here ends the first section of the first chapter in the Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. Reading same. He gives two alternative explanations of the second part of the sūtra, viz. the reply to the objection, thus:—

(1) 'If it be objected . . . . , (then, we reply:)—On account of the threefoldness of meditation, (i.e. your interpretation would involve the assumption of devout meditation of three kinds, viz. on the individual soul, on the chief vital-breath and on Brahman, but one and the same section cannot teach three different kinds of things). (Moreover, the word "vital-breath" must denote Brahman here,) on account of (that meaning) being accepted (elsewhere), on account of connection here (i.e. in the passage itself characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned). (Hence the conclusion is that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.)' This interpretation is different from Nimbārka's interpretation.

Or, 'If it be objected . . . . , (then, we reply:) (the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital-breath are not out of place in a chapter which deals with Brahman) on account of the threefoldness of meditation (i.e. because this chapter aims simply at advocating thereby the three ways of meditating on Brahman, viz. under the aspect of the prāṇa, under the aspect of prajñā, and in itself, according as Brahman is viewed either with reference to the two limiting adjuncts, or in itself); because (in other passages also we find that meditation on Brahman is) made dependant (on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts—cf. Chānd. 3.14.2); because (the hypothesis that Brahman is meditated on under three aspects) is perfectly consistent here (i.e. in the prāṇa chapter[1]). This interpretation too does not tally with Nimbārka's interpretation, for Nimbārka does not hold that the sentient and the non-sentient—under the aspects of which Brahman is meditated on—are limiting adjuncts of Brahman.

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same. According to Rāmānuja, the three kinds of meditation are:— (1) Meditation on Brahman in His own nature as the cause of the world, (2) meditation on Brahman as

[1] Ś.B. 1.1.31, pp. 255 ff.

having the totality of the enjoying souls as His body (i.e. as the inner soul of the sentient), and (3) meditation on Brahman as having the objects and means of enjoyment for His body (i.e. as the inner soul of the non-sentient).[1]

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. Reading different—viz. omits the portion: 'Āśritatvād iha tad-yogāt'. Two alternative interpretations given, the first (the author's own view) exactly like Śaṃkara's first explanation; the second (the view of others: 'apare tu', etc.) like Nimbārka's explanation.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading and interpretation same. He points out, exactly after Rāmānuja, that the three kinds of meditations on the Lord are—svarūpeṇa, bhoktṛ-śarīreṇa and bhogya-rūpeṇa.[3]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 31 in Baladeva. His interpretation is like Śaṃkara's first interpretation.[4]

Résumé

The first quarter of the first chapter contains:—

(1) 32 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
(2) 31 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
(3) 32 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
(4) 31 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
(5) 32 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
(6) 31 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva omit sūtra 9 in Nimbārka's commentary.

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[1] Śrī. B. 1.1.32, p. 224, vol. 1.:—'*Nikhila-kāraṇa-bhūtasya Brahmaṇaḥ svarūpeṇānusandhānam, bhoktṛ-varga-śarīrakatvānusandhānam, bhogya-bhogopakaraṇa-śarīrakatvānusandhānañ ceti trividham anusandhānam upadeṣṭum ity-arthaḥ*'

[2] Bh. B. 1.1.31, pp. 35-36.

[3] ŚK. B. 1.1.32, pp. 291-92, Part 3.

[4] G.B. 1.1.31.

FIRST CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

SECOND QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1 : The section entitled 'Celebrity everywhere'. (Sūtras 1-8)

SŪTRA 1

"(THAT WHICH CONSISTS OF MIND IS BRAHMAN), BECAUSE OF THE TEACHING OF WHAT IS CELEBRATED EVERYWHERE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Beginning: 'All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from him. disappearing into him and breathing in him;—tranquil, let one meditate on him thus' (Chānd. 3.14.1 [1]), Scripture continues: 'Consisting of mind, having the vital breath for his body' (Chānd. 3.14.2 [2]). Here, the object which is to be meditated on as consisting of mind is to be understood as the Highest self, the cause of all, and not as the individual soul. Why? Because the highest self alone, celebrated in all the Vedāntas, is taught in the above passages, viz. 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, in the first section, the concordance of the scriptural texts with regard to the holy Lord Vāsudeva has been shown,—He who is the object of enquiry, the greatest Being, the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, having Scripture for His sole proof, omniscient, without an equal or a superior and the one mass of infinite auspicious qualities. Now, in the following two sections, the reverend teacher of the Veda is showing that those texts,—some of which indistinctly indicate the individual soul and the rest, and some of which distinctly do so,—all refer to Him alone.

The Chandogas record the following: 'All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from him, disappearing into him, and breathing in him;—tranquil, let one meditate (on him) thus. Now, a person consists of

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, B. [2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

determination. According to what his determination is in this world, so does he become on departing hence. Let him form a determination. He who consists of mind, has the vital-breath for his body, is of the form of light' (Chānd. 3.14.1-2 [1]) and so on. Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether the individual soul [2] should be understood as the object to be meditated on, possessed of the attributes of consisting of mind and the rest, or the Highest self. What is reasonable here?

(*Prima facie* view.)

If it be suggested: The individual soul. Why? Because the individual soul is well-known to have the mind and the vital-breath as its instruments; because Scripture declares that Lord Brahman, the Supreme Being, has no connection with mind and the vital-breath, in the passage: 'Without the vital-breath, without mind, pure' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2); and, finally, because having the heart for its abode as well as being atomic, stated in the passage: 'This is the soul [3] within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice, or a barley-corn' (Chānd. 3.14.3), are possible in the case of the limited individual soul alone. If it be objected: of the six proofs, viz. scriptural statement, mark, text, topic, place and name, each succeeding one is weaker than the preceding one. Of these, scriptural statement means an independent statement, and mark means the power of words (to indicate some meaning). Now, here, the scriptural statement, viz.: 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), is of a greater force than the mark of the individual soul, viz. consisting of mind and the rest, it being mentioned first, (the rule being that of these six, each preceding one is of a greater force than each succeeding one). Hence, Brahman alone, mentioned above, is to be construed here as the object to be meditated on,—(we reply:) no, because as that text fulfils its purpose simply by teaching, as a means to the attainment of tranquillity, that everything has Brahman for its soul, thus: 'Tranquil, let one meditate', so it is not concerned with laying down any injunction regarding the meditation on Brahman (here ends the original *Prima facie* view) . . .

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[1] This passage occurs also in Śat. Br. 10.6.3. It forms a part of the famous *Śāṇḍilya-vidyā*, or the Doctrine of *Śāṇḍilya*. For a further account see footnote (5), p. 1078 f.

[2] '*Kṣetrajña*, means 'Knower of the field', or the body, i.e. the soul, the conscious principle in the corporeal frame.

[3] Correct quotation: '*Eṣa ma ātmā* . . .' Vide Chānd. 3.14.3, p. 158.

(Correct conclusion.)

We reply:—The highest soul alone, possessed of the attributes of consisting of mind and the rest, is the object to be meditated on. Why? "Because" the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, "celebrated everywhere", i.e. in all the Vedāntas, "is taught" as the cause of all, as the soul of all, here in the text: 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1). Or, else, "because" the attributes of 'consisting of mind' and the rest, "celebrated" in all the Vedāntas as belonging to the Supreme Brahman, thus: 'Consisting of mind, leader of the vital-breath and the body (Muṇḍ. 2.2.7), 'This ether that is within the heart,—therein is the person, consisting of mind (Tait. 1.6), and so on, "are taught". Of these, 'consisting of mind' means 'capable of being apprehended by a purified mind'; 'having the vital-breath for the body' means 'being the support and the ruler of even the vital-breath'; 'without the vital-breath' means 'abiding independently of the vital-breath'; and 'without mind' means 'having knowledge not dependent on the mind'.

Or, else, the text: 'All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from him, disappearing into him, and breathing in him;—tranquil, let one meditate (on him) thus' (Chānd. 3.14.1) enjoins meditation, thus: 'Let one meditate on Brahman, the soul of all, in a tranquil spirit'. The text: 'Let him form a determination' (Chānd. 3.14.1) is a repetition (of the same injunction), with a view to proving that the attributes of 'consisting of mind' and the rest belong to the very same Being, mentioned above, (viz. Brahman). Let one meditate on Brahman, the soul of all and possessed of the attributes of consisting of mind and the rest,—this is the sense of the text. Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether Brahman, indicated as the soul of all, is the individual soul, or the Highest self. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: The individual soul. Why? Because, it alone can possibly assume the forms of all kinds of beings, Brahmā and so on, due to karmas, based on beginningless nescience; while it is never possible for the Supreme Brahman to assume identity with all sorts of low or vile forms, since He is endowed with (the attributes of) omniscience, omnipotence, freedom from sins, freed on by nature from all faults and so on. The word 'Brahman' too, applies to the individual soul alone, it being endowed with great qualities (like knowledge and the like). And the origin and the rest of the world being due to karmas, it is reasonable to indicate the individual soul as their cause,—

We reply: "Because of the teaching of what is celebrated everywhere", i.e. the meaning of the word 'Brahman,' who is designated as the soul of all and as the cause of the origin and the rest of all, is the Highest Self alone. For this very reason, "everywhere", i.e. in the Vedāntas, he is "taught" to be "celebrated" as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world—because of this; and also because it is impossible that the origin and the rest of the world can be due to the individual soul, since in the passages—"He desired: 'May I be many, may I procreate' . . . He created all this" (Tait. 2.6) and so on, the Supreme Lord alone is celebrated to be the cause of the world. This is stated in the 'Law of salvation'[1]. Beginning: '"Whence has arisen this entire world, consisting of the immovable and the movable, and to whom does it go during universal dissolution? Tell me that, O grandfather! By whom has this world, together with the oceans, the sky, mountains, cloud, lands, fire and air, been made?"' (Mahā. 12.6765-66[2]); having stated: 'The scripture which was related by Bhṛgu to Bhāradvāja, who asked' (Mahā. 12. 6769C[3]); having stated the origin of all beings thus: 'Of him who is called Nārāyaṇa, who is unchangeable, the imperishable soul, who is unmanifest, unknowable, higher than prakṛti;'[4] and having stated: 'Then, a lustrous, celestial lotus was created by the self-born. From that lotus arose Brahmā, the Lord, consisting of the Veda' (Mahā. 12.6779 C–89A[5]),—the text designates Lord Kṛṣṇa, Nārāyaṇa, Brahman, as the cause of all sentient beings and non-sentient objects, thus: 'For he is difficult to be known, undoubtedly inconceivable in nature even by the perfected souls. He, verily, is Lord Viṣṇu, celebrated to be infinite, abiding as the inter controller of all beings, difficult to be known by those who have not obtained the self,—who is the creator of this principle of egoism for the production of all beings, from whom arose the universe, about whom I have been asked by you here' (Mahā. 12.6784–86A[6]). Hence, the Highest Self

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[1] *Mokṣa-dharma* is the name of a section of the 12th book of the *Mahābhārata*, from *Adhyāya* 174 to the end.

[2] P. 604, lines 3-4, vol. 3. [3] *Op. cit.*, line 7.

[4] This is not traceable in any of the three editions, Asiatic Society, *Vaṅgavāsī* and Bombay.

[5] P. 604, lines 17-18 (vol. 3). This verse is not found in the Bombay edition.

[6] P. 604, lines 22–24.

alone is denoted by the word 'Brahman' here, and not the individual soul.[1]

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

Reading same. He gives two alternative interpretations, which tally with the last two explanations of Śrīnivāsa.[2]

SŪTRA 2

"AND BECAUSE OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE ATTRIBUTES INTENDED TO BE STATED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because the attributes, viz. 'consisting of mind,' 'having true resolves' and the rest, "intended to be stated" in the text: 'Consisting of mind, having the vital-breath for the body, of the form of light, having true resolves' (Chānd. 3.14.2[3]) and so on, are 'appropriate' on the part of Brahman alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

As the attributes of 'having true resolves' and the rest, 'intended to be stated' as the peculiar attributes of Brahman in the passage: 'Consisting of mind, having the breath for the body, of the form of light, having true resolves, having the ether as the soul, having all desires, having all odours,[4] . . . having all tastes, pervading all this, unspeaking, indifferent' (Chānd. 3.14.2) and so on, are "appropriate" on the part of Brahman alone,—so Brahman alone is understood in the above text. The adjective 'pervading all this' means that He has accepted 'all this'—i.e. the sentient and the non-sentient objects, ending with 'taste', —as His own; 'unspeaking' means that He abides in silence because of His unsurpassed graveness; 'indifferent' means that 'He has no concern'.

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[1] *Śrīnivāsa* gives altogether three explanations of this *Sūtra*, the first of which tallies with the explanation of *Nimbārka*.

[2] Śrī. B. 1.2.1. Pp. 231 *et seq.* Part 1.

[3] R, B.

[4] The original text reads '*sarva-karma*' after this.

SŪTRA 3

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF INAPPROPRIATENESS, NOT THE EMBODIED (SOUL)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

He who is possessed of the attributes of consisting of mind and the rest is the Supreme Being alone, and not the individual soul, because (the attributes like) 'consisting of mind', 'having true resolves' and so on, are "inappropriate" on its part.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Brahman alone is to be understood as consisting of mind, for the purpose of meditation, and not "the embodied", i.e. the individual soul, possessing a body. Why? Because the attributes of 'having true resolves' and the like are "inappropriate" on the part of the individual soul. Moreover, the attributes of 'consisting of mind' and the rest too, are inappropriate on the part of the individual soul. Thus, the text says: 'Let him form a determination' (Chānd. 3.14.1). Of what kind is he? 'Consisting of mind', again, 'having the vital-breath for his body'. These adjectives are not appropriate on the part of the individual soul, because no such implication is involved here, nor any purpose. But all these are appropriate on the part of the Highest self. Thus, when it is said: Let the worshipper, whether he desires for salvation, or for any particular fruit, 'form a determination', i.e. perform meditation or action, in a 'calm' spirit, the question arises: In reference to whom is he to perform meditation or action? and in reply, the Highest Person, the soul of all, and indicated above in the passage: 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), is pointed out as the object to be meditated on. And, this text: 'Consisting of mind, having the vital-breath for the body' (Chānd. 3.14.2) and so on refers to Brahman. Hence the attributes of 'consisting of mind' and the rest are not appropriate on the part of the individual soul.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different. According to Śrīkaṇṭha, a new adhikaraṇa begins with this sūtra (sūtras 3–8), concerned with

the question whether a passage in the Mahā-nārāyaṇa-upaniṣad (Māhānār. 11.3) refers to Nārāyaṇa or to Śiva. Thus:—'(The passage refers to Śiva, and not (to) the embodied (i.e. Nārāyaṇa), because (the attributes of being the Lord of the universe and the rest) are not appropriate (on the part of Nārāyaṇa)'.[1]

SŪTRA 4

"AND BECAUSE OF THE DESIGNATION OF OBJECT AND AGENT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For this reason too, the object qualified by the adjectives 'consisting of mind' and the rest is not the embodied soul, "because of the designation of object and agent" in the text: 'On departing hence, I shall reach him' (Chānd. 3.14.4[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, that which consists of mind and has breath for its body is not to be understood as the embodied soul. Why? "Because of the designation" of the embodied soul as the "agent", i.e. as the worshipper, and "because of the designation" of the Highest Self as the 'object', i.e. as the object to be meditated on and obtained, in the passage: 'On departing hence, I shall reach him' (Chānd. 3.14.4). That is, 'I', or one desiring for salvation, 'shall reach', i.e. shall obtain, 'him', i.e. Brahman, mentioned before as possessed of the attributes of 'consisting of mind' and the rest, 'hence', i.e. after the fall of the body, after the destruction of the works which have begun to bear fruits. A worshipper who is endowed with such a right insight attains Brahman.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different, viz.: '(The supreme soul, viz. Śiva, the object to be meditated on, is other than Nārāyaṇa), because of the designation of the object and the agent, (i.e. because

[1] ŚK. B. 1.1.3, pp. 318 *et seq.*, Part 4.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, B.

Śiva is designated to be the object to be worshipped, Nārāyaṇa, the worshipper)'.[1]

SŪTRA 5

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE OF WORDS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That which possesses the attributes of 'consisting of mind' and the like is the Highest Self, different from the embodied soul, because in the text: 'This soul of mine within the heart' (Chānd. 3.14.3, 4[2]) the individual soul and the Highest Self are denoted by different words, viz. the genitive and the nominative respectively.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, that which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind and so on, is the highest self, different from the embodied soul. Why? "On account of the difference of words", i.e. because of another scriptural passage of kindred subject-matter, viz. 'Like a grain of rice, or a barley-corn, or a grain of millet, or the kernel of a grain of millet, such is the Golden Person within the self' (Śat. Br. 10.6.3.2), there is "difference of words", viz. the locative 'within the self' denotes the embodied self, while the nominative 'the Golden Person' denotes the Highest self.[3]

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different, viz. ('Brahman, viz. Śiva, is other than and superior to Nārāyaṇa) on account of a particular word (or scriptural passage) (to that effect').[4]

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[1] ŚK. B. 1.2.4, pp. 322–324, Part 4.

[2] R, B.

[3] Note that *Nimbārka* and *Śrīnivāsa* refer to two different passages here.

[4] ŚK. B. 1.2.5. (Pp. 324-25, Part 4.)

SŪTRA 6

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF SMṚTI."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the Smṛti" text:—'The Lord abides, O Arjuna! in the heart-region of all beings' (Gītā 18.61 [1]), there is a difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul.

Vedānta-kaustubha

'"He who sees me everywhere, and sees everything in me, of him I will never lose hold, and he shall never lose hold of me"' (Gītā 6.30), '"He who, established in unity, worships me as abiding within all beings, that ascetic abides in me, under whatever circumstances he may live"' (Gītā 6.31), '"There is nothing higher than me, O Dhanañjaya! All this is strung on me, like gems on a string"' (Gītā 7.7), '"And I abide within the heart of all, and from me memory, knowledge and their absence"' (Gītā 15.15), '"The Lord abides, O Arjuna! in the heart-region of all, causing all beings to revolve by His mysterious power, as if mounted on a machine"' (Gītā 18.61), '"Because I excel the perishable and am superior even to the imperishable, I am celebrated in the world, and in the Veda as the Highest Person"' (Gītā 15.18). The following scriptural texts too are referred to by the term "and" (in the sūtra): [2] 'The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the Lord and the non-Lord' (Śvet. 1.9), 'The Lord of matter and souls, the ruler of the attributes' (Śvet. 6.16), 'The eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious' (Śvet. 6.13; Kaṭha 5.13) and so on. From such Smṛti and scriptural texts, it is to be known that there is a difference between the individual soul and Brahmaṇ. Thus, in this section, the difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul is indicated by the reverend author of the aphorisms in four aphorisms; [3] and this view is most reasonable, since it is established by both Smṛti and Scripture. The Highest Self is ever-free, omniscient, independent, all-pervading

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, B.

[2] Note the different interpretations of the word '*Ca*' in the *sūtra*, as given by *Nimbārka* and *Śrīnivāsa*. According to the former, it simply means 'also', while according to the latter, 'on account of scriptural texts'.

[3] Viz. Br. Sū. 1.2.3–6.

without an equal or a superior, the soul of all and the controller of all. The individual soul, on the other hand, though of the nature of eternal knowledge, has, as is well-known, its attribute of knowledge enveloped by the beginningless māyā, is subject to bondage and release, possessed of little knowledge, a part of Brahman, but through its aversion to the Lord, revolves through many births owing to the works done by itself. Non-difference also, established by the scriptural texts like: 'He is the self, thou art that' (Chānd. 6.9.4, 6.10.3, etc.), 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), 'This soul is Brahman' (Bṛh. 4.4.5) and so on, is most reasonable. Thus, the reverend author of the aphorisms will speak about the nature of difference and non-difference, as held by himself, under the aphorism: 'A part, on account of the designation of variety' (Br. Sū. 2.3.42) and so on. We shall speak of it in detail in the same place.[1]

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading and interpretation same. But in conclusion, he adds his own view, viz. that this difference between the individual soul and Brahman is not real, but due to limiting adjuncts only.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'On account of Smṛti' (viz. Gītā 11.9) Nārāyaṇa is the worshipper—i.e. different from Śiva.[3]

SŪTRA 7

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS OCCUPYING A SMALL ABODE, AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF THAT, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE OBJECT OF MEDITATION), (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE (BRAHMAN) IS TO BE CONCEIVED THUS, AS IN THE CASE OF THE ETHER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that on account of its having a small abode, as mentioned in the text: 'This soul of mine within the heart' (Chānd.

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[1] Vide V.K. 2.3.42.
[2] Ś.B. 1.2.7, p. 265.
[3] ŚK. B. 1.2.7, pp. 325-26, Part 4.

3.14.3); also on account of the designation of its smallness in the text: 'Smaller than a grain of rice, or' (Chānd. 3.14.3; Śat. Br. 10.6.3.2 [1]), (the object of meditation) here is not Brahman,—

(We reply:) "Not so", because Brahman is to be meditated on in that way. Minuteness on the part of a great thing, however, fits in, as in the case of a window and the ether.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected:—Brahman cannot be understood here as the object of meditation. Why? "On account of its occupying a small abode and on account of the designation of that." That is, that which has a small abode, i.e. place, viz. the individual soul which is like the tip of the spoke of a wheel, is 'arbhakaukas', the state of that is 'arbhakaukastvam', on account of that,[2]—the resulting meaning being: 'on account of the characteristic mark of the individual soul'. That is to say, occupying a limited place, viz. the heart, is the attribute of the individual soul only, and not the attribute of Brahman. Moreover, "on account of the designation" of smallness by that very term (viz. 'small'), in the passage: 'Smaller than a grain of rice, or a barley-corn' (Chānd. 3.14.3; Śat. Br. 10.6.3.2), the individual soul alone is to be understood here, and not Brahman,—

(We reply:) "No." Why? It is "because (Brahman) is to be conceived thus",—i.e. "Because (Brahman) is to be conceived", or to be meditated on, "thus", i.e. as abiding within the heart, small in size,—that the Highest Self is designated in that way. And, hereby His omnipresence is not contradicted. For, He is designated to be minute with the object of designating a particular kind of meditation on Him as very subtle. Nor, again, does He become small in size (i.e. small like the heart) hereby, since the text: 'Greater than the earth, greater than the sky' (Chānd. 3.14.3) speaks of the greatness of the Lord. An analogous case is the following: Just as the ether, though all-pervasive, is spoken of as occupying a small place and as small in reference to the eye of a needle, so is Brahman, the topic of discussion,—this is the sense.

[1] P. 806, line 18.

[2] This explains the compound '*arbhakaukastvāt*'.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading and interpretation same. He points out that just as the Lord of the entire universe may be appropriately said to be the Lord of Ayodhyā, so the Supreme Soul, abiding everywhere, may very well be denoted as abiding within the heart.[1]

Rāmānuja

Reading same, interpretation of the word 'vyomavac ca' different, viz:—'(The Lord is described to be) like the ether as well (i.e. all-pervading as well, in that very passage, viz. Chānd. 3.14.3[2])'. Hence the Lord is not really minute by nature, but is simply designated to be so for the purpose of meditation.

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading and literal interpretation same, though this topic is different, as noted above.[3]

Baladeva

Reading same, interpretation of the word 'vyomavac ca' different, viz: '(The Lord though atomic as abiding within the heart of men, is yet all-pervading) like the ether (as declared by the same passage, viz. Chānd. 3.14.3[4])'. And this is possible because the Lord is possessed of inconceivable powers.

SŪTRA 8

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (IF BRAHMAN WERE TO DWELL WITHIN THE HEART, THEN) THERE FOLLOWS EXPERIENCE (OF PLEASURES AND PAINS), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that owing to His connection with all hearts, 'there will follow experience" of pleasure and pain on the part of

[1] Ś.B. 1.2.7, p. 266.
[2] Śrī. B. 1.2.7, p. 237, vol. 1.
[3] ŚK. B. 1.2.7, p. 327, Part 1.
[4] G.B. 1.2.7, p. 114, Chap. 1. Note the difference from *Rāmānuja*.

Brahman, as on the part of the individual soul,—(we reply:) no such objection can be raised, because there is an absolute difference between the individual soul and Brahman, as the soul is an enjoyer of the fruits of the works done by itself, while Brahman is ever-free from sins.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Owing to its connection with a single heart, there results experience of pleasures and pains on the part of the individual soul. Owing to His connection with all hearts simultaneously, there certainly results experience of all pleasures and pains everywhere on the part of the all-pervading Highest Self. If this be so, then the Highest Self, as the enjoyer of pleasures and pains, will inevitably become subject to all sorts of faults, as the individual soul itself is. Hence even the Supreme Being will be subject to karmas,—

(We reply:) "No." "On account of difference (vaiśeṣyāt)". The word "vaiśeṣyāt" is formed by adding the suffix 'ṣyañ' to the word 'viśeṣa' in an identical sense, (viz. difference) or to indicate excessive difference. That the individual soul is an enjoyer of the fruits of works performed by itself and the Supreme Soul is just the opposite is established in Scripture, in accordance with the Smṛti-passage: 'Of these, He who is the Supreme Self is said to be eternal and free from the properties of matter. . . . . .[1] He is not affected even by the fruit, as a lotus-leaf is not touched by water. The active self, on the other hand, is another, who is liable to release and bondage' (Mahā. 12.13754-13755[2]), and the declaration of the Lord Himself: 'Works do not affect me; I have no desire for fruits of works' (Gītā 4.14). Thus, on account of an absolute difference between these two, it follows that the individual soul alone experiences pleasures and pains, and not the Supreme Soul. Hence it is established that that which consists of mind and has the breath for its body, is none but the Highest Self.

Here ends the section entitled 'Celebrity everywhere' (1).

[1] One line omitted, viz. '*Sa hi Nārāyaṇa jñeyah sarvātmā puruṣo hi saḥ*'.
[2] P. 852, lines 9-10, vol. 3.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading and literal interpretation same. Here, too, he is forced to add his usual explanation that the difference between the individual soul and Brahman is not real, but only phenomenal.[1]

Rāmānuja

Interpretation of the word 'vaiśeṣyāt' different. According to Nimbārka, 'vaiśeṣyāt' means 'on account of the difference of nature between the individual soul and Brahman'; while according to Rāmānuja, it means 'on account of the difference of the cause of enjoyment'[2]; i.e. it is not abiding within the body which is the cause of undergoing pleasure and pain, but being subject to karmas, which is never possible in the case of the Lord.[3]

Bhāskara

Reading and interpretation same. The example cited is appropriate—Simply because the Lord abides within the heart, it does not follow that He shares its experiences, for there is no rule that co-existence and the consequent inter-relation imply the sharing of the same attributes. The ether, e.g. though in connection with a burning place, does not burn itself.[4]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading and literal interpretation same, though the topic is different, as noted above.[5]

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[1] Ś.B. 1.2.8, p. 268.
[2] '*Hetu-vaiśeṣyāt.*'
[3] Śrī. B. 1.2.8, p. 238, vol. 1.
[4] Bh. B. 1.2.8, p. 40.
[5] ŚK. B. 1.2.8, pp. 327 *et seq.*, Part 4.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled 'The eater'. (Sūtras 9-10)

SŪTRA 9

"THE EATER (IS BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE COMPREHENSION (OR TAKING, I.E. DEVOURING) OF THE MOVABLE AND THE IMMOVABLE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: 'He to whom both the Brāhmaṇa and the Kṣatriya are the food and death the condiment, who thus knows where He is?' (Kaṭha 2.25[1]), the eater is the Lord, the Highest Person, "on account of the comprehension (or taking, i.e. devouring)"[2] of the food which has death for its condiment, i.e. of the Universe, consisting of the movable and the immovable, implied by the terms 'Brāhmaṇa' and 'Kṣatriya'.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the preceding section, after having shown that the text: 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1) and so on refers to Brahman, the author has shown also the absence of any experience of pleasure and pain due to karma on the part of Brahman. Now, by showing that the text: 'He, of whom the Brāhmaṇa' (Kaṭha 2.25) and so on refers to Him, he removes the suspicion that, as before, He cannot be an eater of the movable and the immovable.[3]

In the Kaṭha-vallī it is recorded: 'He, to whom both the Brāhmaṇa and the Kṣatriya are the food and death the condiment, who thus knows where He is?' (Kaṭha 2.25). Here by the word 'food' edible objects are understood, and by the words 'of whom', indicating connection, an eater is understood. A doubt arises, viz. whether the eater here is fire, or the individual soul, or the Supreme Soul, since here all the three have been referred to before. What is reasonable

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[1] ŚK. B. 1.2.8, pp. 327 *et seq.*, Part 4.

[2] It is not clear what *Nimbārka* means exactly by the term '*grahaṇa*' here. It may mean appropriately both 'understanding' and 'taking or devouring'. Thus, *Brahman* is the eater, because the movable and the immovable are *understood* as the food here; *or* because, the movable and the immovable are *devoured* as the food here.

The same remarks apply to *Śrīnivāsa's* interpretation.

[3] I.e. it may be thought that since Brahman is not an enjoyer, as shown above, He cannot be an eater too.

here? If it be suggested: First, let fire be the eater here, because it is well-known to have the power of burning the Brāhmaṇa and the Kṣatriya; and because the scriptural text:—'Fire is the eater of food' (Bṛh. 1.4.6) declares so. Or, let the individual soul be the eater, because it is well-known to be an enjoyer; because the scriptural text: 'Of the two, the one tastes sweet berry' (Śvet. 4.6; Muṇḍ. 3.1.1) declares so; and, finally, because in the preceding section, (viz. Br. Sū. 1.2.8) it alone has been established to be an enjoyer. In accordance with the negative text: 'Without eating' (Śvet. 4.6; Muṇḍ. 3.1.1), as well as on the ground of the negation of experience in the preceding section (viz. Br. Sū. 1.2.8), the Highest Self cannot be understood as the eater here,—

We reply: Here the eater can possibly be the Highest Self alone. Whence is this known? "On account of the comprehension (or taking, i.e. devouring [1]) of the movable and the immovable," i.e. because here the movable and the immovable are understood to be the food. If it be objected that the words 'movable' and 'immovable' are not found here,—(we reply:) It may be so, (yet that does not falsify our view), because by the terms 'Brāhmaṇa' and 'Kṣatriya', the movable and the immovable are understood metaphorically; and because there being a natural connection between death and the movable and the immovable, that food which has death for its condiment, viz. the movable and the immovable, is understood here. Hence the eater is the Highest Self, the destroyer of the Universe,—this is the resulting meaning, for neither fire, nor the individual soul, can possibly be the eater of the entire world. The text: 'Without eating' (Śvet. 4.6; Muṇḍ. 3.1.1) denies any experience of the fruits of works on the part of the Lord.

SŪTRA 10

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The eater is the Lord, the Highest Person, because He alone is mentioned as the topic of discussion in the text 'The great, the all-pervading' (Kaṭha 2.22 [2]).

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[1] See footnote (2), previous page.

[2] R, ŚK.

Vedānta-kaustubha

As the Highest Self is mentioned as the topic of discussion in the texts: 'Knowing the great, all-pervasive self' (Kaṭha 2.22), 'By him is (He) attainable, whom alone he chooses' (Kaṭha 2.23; Muṇḍ. 3.2.23), and as a peculiar mark of the Lord, viz. unintelligibleness, is mentioned in the passage: 'Who thus knows where He is?' (Kaṭha 2.25), it is established that the eater is the Highest Self alone.

Here ends the section entitled 'The eater' (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'The cave'. (Sūtras 11-12)

SŪTRA 11

"THE SOULS ENTERED INTO THE CAVE (ARE THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND THE SUPREME SOUL), BECAUSE THAT IS SEEN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: 'There are two, drinking of righteousness in the world of good deeds, entered into the cave' (Kaṭha 3.1 [1]), the two souls, entered into the cave, should be known to be two sentient beings, viz. the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. Why? "Because that is seen", i.e. because it is found that this section designates the entering of these two alone,—of the Supreme Soul in the passage: 'Him, who is difficult to see, who has entered into the hidden, who is hidden in the cave' (Kaṭha 2.12 [2]); and of the individual soul in the passage: 'She, who arises with the vital-breath, who is Aditi, who is made of the deities, who, entering into the cave, abides therein, who was manifested through the elements' (Kaṭha 4.7 [3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that the Supreme Soul, the topic of discussion and the object to be meditated on, is the eater of the movable and the immovable, and that He is difficult to be known, as declared by the text: 'Who thus knows' (Kaṭha 2.25). Now, by

[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. [2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. [3] R, B.

teaching the following attributes of the Lord—viz. 'being easily attainable'; 'being easily knowable' and the rest—which result from His close association (with the individual soul [1]),—to one who desires for salvation, who desires to attain His nature, who desires to know Him, and who is submerged in the pit of mundane existence consisting of the movable and the immovable, the author is showing that the text: 'Righteousness' (Kaṭha 3.1) and so on refers to the Lord.

Immediately after the above-quoted text, we find the following in the Kaṭha-vallī: 'There are two, drinking of righteousness in the world of good deeds, entered into the cave, in the highest upper region. Those who know Brahman speak of them as "light" and "shade", as well as those who maintain the five sacred fires,[2] and those too who thrice kindle the Naciketas fire'[3] (Kaṭha 3.1). Here a doubt arises as to whether here buddhi and the individual soul are designated as entered into the cave, or the individual soul and the Supreme Soul? What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: Buddhi and the individual soul,—because in accordance with the statement: 'Entered into the cave' (Kaṭha 3.1), entering into a cave is impossible on the part of the Supreme Soul who is all-pervasive; because it is impossible for the Supreme Being who has all His desires fulfilled to be the enjoyer of the fruits of works, as stated in the passage: 'Drinking of righteousness' (Kaṭha 3.1); because any connection with the 'world of good deeds',—i.e. with the world where one enjoys the fruits of the works done by one's self, viz. the body generated by works,—is impossible on His part; and, finally, because a question is found, seeking to know the individual soul as different from buddhi, viz. '"There is this doubt when a man is dead: some saying, 'He is', others, 'He is not'. This I should know, as taught by you"' (Kaṭha 1.20 [4]). Hence, these two alone (viz. buddhi and individual soul) are established by this text,—

[1] I.e. the Lord abides with the individual soul in the same place, viz. the heart, and as such is easily knowable and attainable by it.

[2] Viz. *Anvādhārya-pacana* or *Dakṣiṇa*, *Gārhapatya*, *Āhavanīya*, *Sabhya*, and *Āvasathya*. M.W., p. 577, Col. 3.

[3] Vide M.W., p. 458, Col. 2.

[4] The sense is: *Naciketā* wants to know here what happens to the soul after death, i.e. he wants to know the self as distinct from the body, buddhi and so on. Hence, in reply, *Yama* must speak of the individual soul and buddhi, and as such the passage in question must deal with these two alone.

We reply: The souls entered into the cave, viz. the heart, are two sentient beings alone. If it be objected: The entering of the individual soul stands to reason, since it is atomic; but entering into a cave is not appropriate on the part of the Supreme Soul who is all-pervasive, and hence the above objection remains in force,—(we reply:) No. "Because that is seen." That is, because in this very Upaniṣad, the text: 'The Person, of the size of merely a thumb, abides within the soul, the Lord of the past and the future' (Kaṭha 4.12) enjoins the Supreme Soul to be looked upon as abiding within the caves (i.e. hearts) of His sincere devotees in accordance with their wishes, though He Himself is all-pervading; because this is found in the texts: 'Hidden in the cave, dwelling in the abyss' (Kaṭha 2.12), 'He who knows him, hidden in the cave' (Tait. 2.1.1); and, lastly, because in the text: 'She, who arises with the vital-breath, who is Aditi, who is made of the deities, who, entering into the cave abides therein, who was manifested through the elements' (Kaṭha 4.7), the individual soul is designated as entering into the cave. Moreover, in the text: 'Drinking of righteousness' (Kaṭha 3.1), one being ascertained to be a sentient being as the enjoyer of the fruits of works, the other too must be understood to be a sentient being alone, because we find that in ordinary life whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same class are meant. When, e.g. it is said 'Look out for a second for this cow', people look out for a cow only, and not for a horse or an ass. This is established in the Mahā-bhāṣya.

To the objection, viz. that a question is found which seeks to know the individual soul as different from buddhi,—(we reply:) the reply to this question is something else, and not this text. It cannot be said also that there is anything inconsistent in the 'drinking of righteousness' (Kaṭha 3.1), since the statement: 'Drinking of righteousness' (Kaṭha 3.1) is justifiable, just like the statement: 'Men with umbrellas are going';[1] since it is possible to say that while the individual soul drinks, the other (viz. the Lord) causes it to drink,

[1] That is, referring to a crowd of hurrying people, we often say: 'Men with umbrellas are going', though really only some of them are carrying umbrellas, and not all. Similarly, here too, when it is said: 'The two drinking', etc. what is really meant is that only one (viz. the individual soul) is drinking, and not the other (viz. *Brahman*).

and is as such the causative agent; [1] and since it is well-known everywhere that the Supreme Lord first experiences the fruits of the works which are performed by one who is whole-heartedly devoted to Him, and are entrusted to Him. Hereby, it is explained also how the Supreme Being can abide in a body generated by works. The sense is that just as 'shade' can be removed by 'light' and not 'light' by 'shade', so the 'light' and the 'shade' (in the above text) are none but Brahman and the individual soul, the independent and the dependent.

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation of the phrase 'tad-darśanāt' different, viz.: 'Because it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same nature)'.[2]

SŪTRA 12

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIFICATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The individual soul and the Supreme Being alone are understood here as entered into the cave, because in this section those two alone are specified as the object to be worshipped and the worshipper, as the object to be known and the knower, and so on, in the texts: 'By knowing the knower of what is born from Brahman,[3] the deity to be worshipped, by revering (him), he goes to everlasting peace' (Kaṭha 1.17 [4]), 'The bridge for sacrificers' (Kaṭha 3.2 [5]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The individual soul and the Supreme Soul are to be understood as entered within the cave "also because of the specification" of those two alone. The sense is that in this treatise (viz. the Kaṭha-upaniṣad), the individual soul and the Supreme Soul alone are specified as that which approaches and the goal approached, as the thinker

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[1] That is, *Brahman* is not really an agent or drinker here, but only instigates the other to drink, He is said to be drinking in this sense alone.

[2] Ś.B. 1.2.12, p. 272, Bh.B. 1.2.12, p. 41.

[3] Correct quotation: '*Brahmaja-jña*'. Vide C.S.S. ed., p. 8. '*Brahmaja-jña*' may be interpreted also as '*Brahmajaś cāsau jñaśceti*'.

[4] R. [5] *Op. cit.*

and the object thought, in the passages: 'Know the soul to be the charioteer, and the body the chariot' (Kaṭha 3.3), 'He reaches the end of the road, that supreme place of Viṣṇu' (Kaṭha 3.9), 'Him, who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the hidden, who is hidden in a cave, who dwells in the abyss, ancient,—by thinking him God, through the study of the Yoga of what relates to the self, the wise man discards joy and sorrow' (Kaṭha 2.12) and so on. Hence, it is established that the individual soul and the Supreme Soul alone are to be understood here as entered into the cave, and not buddhi and the individual soul.

Here ends the section entitled 'The cave' (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'What is within'. (Sūtras 13–18)

SŪTRA 13

"THAT WHICH IS WITHIN (THE EYE IS BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF FITTING IN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the passage: 'That person who is seen within the eye' (Chānd. 4.15.1 [1]), the Person "within" the eye is the Highest Person alone, and not any one else. Why? Because the attributes of 'being the self', 'being fearless', 'being the uniter of all lovely things', and so on,—mentioned in the passages: '"He is the self", said he, "This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman"' (Chānd. 4.15.1[2]), 'They call it the "uniter of lovely things"' (Chand. 4.15.2),—"fit in" in the case of the Highest Person alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, by showing that the text: 'That Person who is seen within the eye' (Chānd. 4.15.1) and so on refers to Brahman, the author removes the doubt, viz:—In the previous passage (viz. Kaṭha 3.1), the individual soul and the Supreme Soul may be understood, since the dual number is found used. But here, since the singular number

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. [2] Ś, R, Bh.

is used, who (viz. the individual soul *or* the Supreme Soul) is to be understood?

We read under the Upakośala-vidyā [1] in the Chāndogya:—" 'That Person who is seen within the eye, he is the soul", said he, "This is the immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman. Hence, even if they pour clarified butter or water on it, it goes away to both sides' " (Chānd. 4.15.1) and so on. Here, a doubt arises as to whether the person, taught as abiding within the eye, is the reflected self (i.e. the image of a person reflected on the eye of another), or the individual soul, or the presiding deity of the sense-organ (viz. the eye), or the Supreme Soul. The *prima facie* view is as follows: In accordance with the statement 'is seen', he may be the reflected self, because the reflected self alone is well-known to be perceivable, while the individual soul and the rest are not perceivable. If it be said that here 'seeing' means scriptural insight (and not actual, physical perceiving),—then the individual soul may be that which is 'within' the eye, since it, as the perceiver of colour and the rest, is in proximity to the eye.[1] Or, the presiding deity of the eye is denoted by the word 'person' in accordance with the scriptural passage: 'Through his rays he is stationed herein' (Bṛh. 5.5.2), and because the all-pervasive Being cannot possibly abide within the eye.

With regard to it, we reply: "That which is within", i.e. the being who is within the eye, is the Supreme Soul alone. Why? "On account of fitting in", i.e. because the attributes of 'being the self', 'fearlessness', and so on, "fit in" in the case of the Supreme Soul alone. Although 'being the Self' and the rest are not incompatible with the real nature of the individual soul, yet when the term 'Brahman' (in the text) can be understood in its primary sense, it is not proper to take it as implying some other sense. Moreover, 'fearlessness', too, is not appropriate in the case of any one, other than Brahman, as known also from the text: 'Through fear of Him the wind blows, through fear of Him the sun rises, through fear of Him fire and Indra, and death as fifth, speed along' (Tait. 2.8.1); and further because the attributes of 'being the uniter of all lovely things' and the

[1] I.e. it is the soul which really perceives colour, etc. and not the eye itself, but the soul perceives them through the eye, and is as such in close proximity to the eye. Hence, as the soul is situated very near to the eye, it is called the person within the eye.

rest, mentioned in the sacred text: 'They call this "the uniter of all lovely things"[1], because all lovely things come together to him' (Chānd. 4.15.2), 'He is also "the leader to all blessing"[2] because he leads to all blessings' (Chānd. 4.15.3), 'He also is "the leader to light"[3], because he shines in all the worlds' (Chānd. 4.15.4), "fit in" in the case of the Supreme Soul alone. 'Saṃyadvāma' implies one from whom the 'vāmas', i.e. the fruits of karmas 'come together', i.e. one who is the cause of the rise of all fruits of karmas. This very thing is stated in the above text thus:—'Because', i.e. since, 'the lovely things' 'come together', i.e. arise from 'this', i.e. the Person within the eye, the cause. In the text 'He is also the 'vāmanī', the 'vāmanī' implies one who 'leads', i.e. causes people, to attain the 'vāmas' or auspicious objects. This very thing is stated in the passage: 'Because he leads to all blessings'. In the text 'He also is the bhāmanī', the 'bhāmanī' implies one who leads to the 'bhāmas', i.e. one who manifests all objects. This very thing is stated in the text: 'Because he shines in all the worlds',—this is the meaning of the text.

SŪTRA 14

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF PLACE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the designation of the place" of the Supreme Soul, in the text: 'He who abiding within the sun' (Bṛh. 3.7.18[4]), the Person within the sun is none but He.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. How can an all-pervading being be designated as occupying a small locality, the reverend author of the aphorisms replies here:

The Person within the eye can be the Supreme Soul alone. Why? "On account of the designation of place", i.e. because of the designation of the abode of the Lord, the Highest Person alone, the cause of all causes, the inner soul of all, and the object to be meditated by all; because one who occupies one part cannot properly dwell in another.

[1] *Saṃyadvāma.*
[2] *Vāmanī.*
[3] *Bhāmanī.*
[4] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

If it be objected: How can an all-pervading being abide in a small locality,—(we reply:) No inconsistency whatsoever is involved here. Just as fire, though all-pervading, becomes visible in clouds and the rest in the form of lightning and so on through its own greatness, so the Lord, though all-pervading, becomes visible in the eye and the rest through His own special powers, for the sake of fulfilling the desire of His devotees. The words "and so on" mean:—On account of the designation of the form of the Supreme Soul, suitable to Him, and fit for abiding in a place,[1] celebrated in the following passages:—'Now, this Golden Person who is seen within the sun, has a golden beard, golden hair' (Chānd. 1.6.6), 'He sees the Person, lying in the city, who is higher than the highest aggregate of souls' (Praśna 5.5). 'The Person, of the size of merely a thumb, smokeless like light' (Kaṭha 4.13) and so on; i.e. on account of the designation of the form of the Lord by the expression 'The Person who is seen'[2] (Chānd. 4.15.1). By the term "and" His power of manifesting Himself in forms, as desired, in the eye, in the heart and the like, is indicated.

SŪTRA 15

"ON ACCOUNT ALSO OF THE MENTION ONLY OF WHAT IS CHARACTERIZED BY PLEASURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That which is within the eye is the Supreme Being alone, "on account also of the mention of what is characterized by pleasure" in the passage: 'Pleasure is Brahman, the ether is Brahman' (Chānd. 4.10.4[3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The Person within the eye is the Highest Person alone, the cause of the world, and not any one else. Why? "On account also of the mention of what is characterized by pleasure." That is, in the

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[1] I.e. unless the Lord has a form, He cannot abide anywhere. Hence, the body of the Lord enables Him to abide in the eye and so on.

[2] I.e. that Person within the sun has a form is evident from the word 'seen', for a bodiless being cannot be seen.

[3] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

introductory text: 'The vital-breath, is Brahman, pleasure is Brahman, the ether is Brahman' (Chānd. 4.10.4), pleasure that is Brahman, i.e. Brahman characterized by pleasure, is mentioned, and that alone is referred to here.

SŪTRA 16

"ALSO FOR THAT VERY REASON, THAT IS BRAHMAN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"That", i.e. pleasure, is "Brahman", i.e. Brahman alone is characterized by pleasure. Why? On account also of the text, establishing their mutual specification [1], viz. 'What, verily, is pleasure, that is the ether; what is the ether, that is pleasure' (Chānd. 4.10.5 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. The word 'pleasure' conventionally denotes wordly pleasure, so how can it be said that Brahman is characterized by pleasure?—the reverend teacher of the Veda replies here:

"That is Brahman." This means that in that introductory text, Brahman alone, characterized by pleasure, is mentioned and not worldly pleasure. Why? "Also for that very reason," i.e. on account also of the text intimating their mutual specification, viz. 'What, verily, is pleasure that is the ether; what is the ether, that is pleasure' (Chānd. 4.10.5), for worldly pleasure cannot consistently refer to an all-pervading substance—denoted by the term 'ether'—as non-different from itself.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, etc.

This Sūtra is omitted by Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva.

Rāmānuja

Reading different, viz. 'Ata-eva ca sa Brahma'. Interpretation too different, viz. 'For that very reason (i.e. because the ether is characterized by pleasure), that (viz. the ether) is Brahman'.[3]

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[1] I.e. *ka* (pleasure) qualifies *kha* (ether) and *vice versa*.

[2] R, ŚK.

[3] Śrī. B. 1.2.6, pp. 252-253, Part 1.

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading different, viz. 'Ata-eva sa Brahma'. Interpretation too different, viz. exactly like Rāmānuja's.[1]

SŪTRA 17

"ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF THE PATH OF ONE WHO HAS HEARD THE UPANIṢAD."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The path", called 'the path of gods', "of one who has heard the Upaniṣad" is celebrated in another scriptural text, viz. 'Now those who seek the soul by austerity, chastity, faith and knowledge, win the sun by the northern path. That, verily, is the abode of the vital-breaths, that is immortal, that is fearless, that is the highest goal. From that they do not return' (Praśna 1.10[2]). "On account also of the mention" of that very "path" here in the text: 'They pass over to light' (Chānd. 4.15.5[3]), the Person within the eye is none but the Highest Person.[4]

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the person within the eye is the Supreme Soul,—so says the reverend author of the aphorisms.

That through which bondage is broken is Upaniṣad, the knowledge of the Supreme Soul; or that which leads one to attain the Supreme Soul is Upaniṣad, the knowledge of the Supreme Soul. The treatise relating to that is also Upaniṣad. "Śrutopaniṣatka" is one by whom the Upaniṣad has been directly heard from a teacher; he is a knower of Brahman, the Mysterious. "The path" which, as celebrated in another Scripture and in the Smṛtis, belongs to him, i.e. is his way to attaining Brahman who is established in the Upaniṣads,—that very path is mentioned here too as belonging to one who knows the person within the eye. For this reason too, i.e. "on account

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[1] ŚK. B. 1.2.16, p. 360, Part 4.

[2] Ś, R, Bh. [3] Ś, R, Bh, B.

[4] That is, the worshipper of the person within the eye follows the same path followed by the worshipper of Brahman. This proves that the person within the eye is Brahman.

of the mention of the path of one who has heard the Upaniṣad", the person within the sun is the Supreme Self,—this is the sense.

Thus, the path, which is said to be followed by a knower,—so that he may attain Brahman,—in another scriptural text, viz. 'Now, those who seek the soul by austerity, chastity, faith and knowledge, win the sun by the northern paṭh. That, verily, is the abode of the vital-breaths, that is immortal, that is fearless, that is the highest goal. From that they do not return' (Praśna 1.10), as well as in the Smṛti passage, viz. 'Fire, light, day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northern progress,—through these do the knowers of Brahman go to Brahman on departing' (Gītā 8.24),—that very path is said to belong to one who knows the person within the eye, in the following passage: 'Now, whether they perform obsequies in the case of such a person, or not, (the dead) pass over to light, from light to the day, from the day to the waxing fortnight, from the waxing fortnight to the six months during which the sun moves northwards, from the months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, from the moon to lightning. Then there is a non-human Person. He leads them to Brahman. This is the path of the gods, the path to Brahman. Those who go by it do not return to this human whirlpool,—they return not' (Chānd. 4.15.5-6). Hence, the person within the sun is none but the Supreme Soul.

The meaning of the text (viz. Praśna 1.10) is as follows:— 'Now', i.e. after the fall of the body, they 'win', i.e. attain the sun, 'by the northern path', i.e. through the path beginning with light and so on. Then, through the moon and the rest, in the order to be designated hereafter,[1] they attain the nature of Brahman. By doing what? Through the three kinds of 'austerity', mentioned by the Lord,[2] or else through the 'austerity' which is the special duty of a Vānaprastha [3] and a Saṃnyāsin,[4] both being primarily given to austerity;

[1] See below, p. 119. Vide also V.K. 4.3.5.

[2] Vide Gītā 17.14–16, where three kinds of austerity (*tapas*) are spoken of, viz. *Śārīra, Vāṅ-maya* and *Mānasa*. These, again, may be of three kinds, viz. *sāttvika, rājasa* and *tāmasa*. Vide 17.16–22.

[3] A Brahmin in the third stage of life, who has passed through the stages of a student and house-holder and has abandoned his life and family for an ascetic life in the forest.

[4] A Brahmin in the fourth stage of life, a religious mendicant, who has given up all earthly concerns.

'through faith', i.e. through vidyā, which is a mental disposition given to the worship of the feet of the teacher, i.e. through meditation, arising from the hearing and the thinking of the Vedānta, and mentioned in the text: 'The self should be meditated on' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6),—one should, seeking the self, meditate on it,—this is the grammatical construction. By the phrase: 'through chastity', the text shows the particular stage of life which is congenial to the hearing, the thinking and the rest of the Vedānta. By chastity and the like, not only the duties, incumbent on special stages of life, are to be understood. That those who are destitute of any devotion for Brahman, but merely belong to one or other of the stages of life and are devoted to the duties, incumbent thereon, return once more and attain the world, is declared by the reverend Parāśara in a passage, which begins: 'The Prājāpatya is for the Brāhmaṇas' and ends: 'The Brāhma is declared in Smṛti to be for the Saṃnyāsins'. That those who, among these, are devoted to the Supreme Brahman, attain His world, is mentioned in the passage: 'Those ascetics who are devoted to Brahman alone, who ever meditate on Brahman, to them belong that supreme place, which, verily, the wise see'. Hence, the Vāna-prastha and the rest should be understood as implying devotion to the Supreme Brahman, (and not as mere duties incumbent on different stages of life). By 'chastity' is meant here the religious duties pursued by the Naiṣṭhikas [1] who lead a life of chastity and are absolutely free from all desires for enjoyment, here or hereafter. The sense is that the search for Brahman should properly be made through such a permanent vow [2] of 'chastity'.

The sacred duty called 'chastity' is stated by the all-knowing 'Law of Salvation' [3] under the section called 'Vārṣṇeya-adhyātma', thus: 'This unbroken chastity which is the form of Brahman is higher than all religious practices. By it, (people) reach the highest goal' (Mahā. 12.7770 [4]). Under the section treating of instruction,

[1] A *Naiṣṭhika* is a perpetual religious student, who observes the vow of chastity. M.W., p. 570, Col. 1.

[2] I.e. '*Brahma-cārya*' (=chastity) in the ordinary sense of the term means *temporary* chastity, which a student has to observe so long as he has not entered the stage of a house-holder. But here the term means *permanent* chastity which a *Naiṣṭhika*, e.g. practises.

[3] *Mokṣa-dharma.*

[4] P. 640, line 40, vol. 3, Asiatic Society ed.

it is said: 'Listen, O Father Yudhiṣṭhira, to the merits of chastity. He who leads a life of chastity from birth to death, and practises the "Great Vow", there is nothing, know, O King, that is unattainable by him. Many millions of Vṛṣis dwell in the world of Brahman, those who are truthful, ever self-controlled, leading a life of chastity. Chastity is a supreme duty, honoured in all stages of life, and if resorted to, chastity burns, O King, all sins', and so on. In accordance with the scriptural text, viz.: 'Desiring which people practice chastity, that word I tell you in brief' (Kaṭha 2.15), as well as in accordance with the statement by the Lord, viz.: '"Desiring which people practise chastity, that word I will tell you in brief"' (Gītā 8.11), chastity alone is the chief means to the supreme region. The repetition of the means, to be mentioned hereafter in the aphorism: 'Repetition, more than once, because of teaching' (Br. Sū. 4.1.1), may also be resorted to by a Naiṣṭhika.

The text 'This verily' (last portion of Praśna 1.10) and so on indicates Brahman, who is to be attained through the path which begins with light, and to be enquired into.

(The meaning of the text—Chānd. 4.15.5-6—is as follows:) 'Now', i.e. when he is dead, whether people perform proper funeral ceremonies or do not perform them, in either case, the wise, unobstructed in their progress, and wishing to attain the nature of the Lord, attain the presiding deity of light, through that the day; after that, they successively attain, the presiding deities of fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, the year, the wind or the world of gods, the sun, the moon, lightning the worlds of the king of water (i.e. Varuṇa) and Indra, then the world of Prajāpati. After that, breaking through the sphere of prakṛti, they attain the Virajā, the best of rivers and forming the boundary of the supreme place. After having crossed that river and having entered the world of Viṣṇu,—called 'supreme void', 'supreme place', 'world of Brahman' and so on, having the stated marks,[1] and unapproachable by those who are averse to the Lord,—they roam about, attaining the nature of Brahman,—this is the resulting meaning. This we shall expound in details in the fourth chapter.[2] 'This is the path of Gods', because it is characterized by having Gods as the conductors. It is the 'path to Brahman', because it is the way to Brahman, the object

[1] Vide V.K. 1.1.1.

[2] Vide V.K. 4.3.5.

to be enquired into and the object to be attained. 'Those who go by it' 'do not return', i.e. do not enter any more, through the influence of karmas, into 'this human whirlpool', i.e. the material world, figuratively implied by the creation of mankind, and subject to recurrence (which is indicated by the term 'whirlpool'), —as declared by the Lord Himself in the passage: '"The worlds, beginning from the world of Brahma, come and go, O Arjuna. But, on attaining me, O son of Kunti, there is no rebirth"' (Gītā 8.16). The difference of the world of Brahman from the sphere of matter is stated in the Mokṣa-dharma under the dialogue between Jaigiṣa and Vyāsita in the passage which begins: '"A man of what nature, of what conduct, of what learning, of what valour does attain the place of Brahman which is higher than prakṛti, and eternal"?', and ends '"He attains the place of Brahman which is higher than prakṛti, and eternal"' (Mahā. 12.9968-9969 [1]).

SŪTRA 18

"ON ACCOUNT OF NON-ABIDING, AS WELL AS ON ACCOUNT OF IMPOSSIBILITY, NOT THE OTHER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That which is within the eye cannot be any one "other" than the Highest Self. Why? Because any one other than Him does not regularly abide therein; and because immortality and the rest are not possible on its part.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"The other", i.e. the reflected self, or the individual soul, or the presiding deity of the eye, in short, any one other than the Supreme Soul,—is not the Person within the eye. Why? "On account of non-abiding", i.e. because any one other than the Supreme Soul, does not regularly abide in the eye, since the presence of the reflected soul in the eye depends on the nearness of another person to the eye, (and hence when the person moves away, there is no reflection any longer); since the individual soul is connected with all the sense-organs (and cannot, therefore, abide within the eye only); and since the

[1] P. 716, lines 22-23, vol. 3. For full quotation see under V.K. 1.3.13.

presiding deity is declared to abide in the eye through the rays, (and hence does not himself abide within the eyes [1]); and finally, because immortality, fearlessness, 'being the uniter of lovely things' and the rest are not possible on the part of any one other than Him. Hence, it is established that the Highest Soul alone is to be worshipped as the person within the eye.

Here ends the section entitled 'That which is within' (4).

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. he takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the Person, of the size of a thumb merely, (Mahānār. 16.3) is the Lord or someone else. Thus: '(The person, of the size of a thumb, is the Lord), because of the instability (i.e. unsuitableness), as well as because of the impossibility (of the attributes of "having the entire world as the body", "being the devourer of the entire world", and so on, on the part of any one else)'.[2]

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled 'The inner controller'. (Sūtras 19–21)

SŪTRA 19

"THE INNER CONTROLLER IN THE PRESIDING DEITIES AND THE REST, AND IN THE WORLDS AND THE REST (IS THE HIGHEST SELF); ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF HIS QUALITIES." [3]

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The inner controller,—mentioned repeatedly in all the versions in reference to the presiding deities of the earth and the rest, in the passage which begins: 'He who, abiding within the earth', and

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[1] Vide Śrī. B. 1.1.18, p. 354, Part 1.

[2] ŚK. B. 1.1.18, pp. 364–66, Part 4.

[3] Cf. the different readings:—K.S.S. ed. and Brindaban ed. read '*adhi-devādi*'. C.S.S. ed. reads '*adhidaivādhi*'.

continues: 'He is your soul, the inner controller' (Bṛh. 3.7.3[1]),—is the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of the designation of His qualities" here, viz. 'being the controller of all' and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the author points out that just as the text about the Person within the eye refers to Brahman, so the text about the inner controller, too, refers to Brahman, and to none else.

The inner controller, i.e. the controller who abides within; who is repeatedly mentioned in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, under the section treating of the inner controller, in all the versions in reference to the presiding deities of the earth, the sky, the ether and the rest, in the passage which beginning: 'Who controls from within this world and the other world and all beings' (Bṛh. 3.7.1), continues: 'He who, dwelling within the earth, is other than the earth, whom the earth does not know, of whom the earth is the body, who controls the earth within—He is your soul, the inner controller, immortal[2]' (Bṛh. 3.7.3), and so on; and who is taught, after that,—in the text which begins: 'He who abiding in all the worlds' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.17[3]) and ends: 'He who abiding within the soul' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30[4]),—by a section, which enjoins him with in reference to the worlds, the Vedas, the sacrifices and the soul[5],—is such an inner controller, a deity, or an individual soul, or the Highest Self, the one topic of all the Vedas? What is reasonable here? He may be a presiding deity, or an individual soul, because these two abide everywhere.

With regard to this, we reply: The inner controller mentioned in all the versions in reference to the presiding deities of the earth, fire, sky, ether, air, sun and the rest, can be the Highest Self alone.

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] This is repeated at the end of each verse from Bṛh. 3.7.3–3.7.23.

[3] P. 1074, line 5.

[4] *Op. cit.*, line 18.

[5] The *Kāṇva* branch designates a being abiding within the earth and the rest (vide Bṛh. 3.7.3–23). The *Mādhyandina* branch, after designating a being abiding within the earth and so on (vide Śat. Br. 14.6.7.7-16), reads three additional texts, viz. 'He who dwells in all the worlds', 'He who dwells in all the Vedas' and 'He who dwells in all the sacrifices,' and in place of 'He who dwells in intelligence' (Bṛh. 3.7.22) a text 'He who dwells in the soul' (Vide Śat. Br. 14.6.7.17–30). Note that *Nimbārka* makes no reference to this *Mādhyandina* addition in his commentary, although it is clearly indicated in the *sūtra* by the word '*lokādiṣu*'.

Wherefore? "On account of the designation of His qualities", i.e. on account of the designation here of the peculiar qualities of the Highest Self, viz. 'being the governor of all worlds, Vedas, sacrifices, beings, vital-breaths, soul and the rest', 'being the inner controller of all', 'being immortal' and so on. Hence a deity cannot be understood, because a deity, too, is but an individual soul and the stated qualities are not appropriate on his part, and because in that case, the statement that the inner controller is unknowable by the earth-god, viz. 'Whom the earth does not know' (Bṛh. 3.7.3), becomes inconsistent. The individual soul, too, is not the inner controller, for the stated qualities are not appropriate on its part as well; and because in the passage: 'He is your soul, the inner controller' (Bṛh. 3.7.3, etc.), it is declared to be different from the inner controller by the use of the genetive case (= 'your'), designating difference.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 18 in Śaṃkara-bhāṣya. Reading different, viz. 'Antaryāmyadhidaivādiṣu . . . . . '[1], i.e. omits 'lokādiṣu'.

Rāmānuja

Reading like the Chowkhamba edition.[2] Interpretation different, viz. exactly like Śrīnivāsa's. Nimbārka reads 'lokādiṣu' in the sūtra, like Rāmānuja, but gives no meaning of the word 'lokādiṣu'.

Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 18 in his commentary. Reading like the Chowkhamba edition.[3]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 18 in his commentary. Reading different, viz. like Śaṃkara's.[4]

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[1] Ś.B. 1.2.18, p. 282.
[2] Śrī. B. 1.2.19, p. 257, vol. 1.
[3] Bh. B. 1.2.18, p. 43. ŚK. B. 1.2.19, p. 368, Part 4.
[4] G.B. 1.2.18 (p. 128, Chap. 1).

SŪTRA 20

"AND (THE INNER CONTROLLER IS) NOT THAT WHICH IS DESIGNATED IN THE SMṚTI, ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF QUALITIES NOT BELONGING TO IT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And, pradhāna is not denoted by the term "inner controller", "on account of the mention" of the qualities of a sentient being, viz. 'being the controller of all', 'being the seer of all' and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Although pradhāna has already been set aside under the aphorism: 'Because (he) sees, not, it is non-scriptural' (Br. Sū. 1.1.5), yet it is being set aside once more apprehending the possibility of the attributes of invisibility the rest (belonging to the inner controller alone) on its part.[1]

"That which is designated in the Smṛti", i.e. pradhāna established by the Śāṃkhya Smṛti, is not denoted by the term "inner controller". Why? "On account of the mention of qualities not belonging to it",—"the qualities not belonging to it" mean the qualities which belong to a sentient being,—"on account of the mention", i.e. declaration, of such qualities, in the concluding text: 'He is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unknown knower' (Bṛh. 3.7.23). On account of the designation of the qualities of a sentient being, viz. 'being the soul of all', 'being the governor of all' and so on, pradhāna cannot be accepted here.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading different, viz. add 'śārīraśca', and extends the same argument to the case of the individual soul as well.[2]

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[1] That is, *pradhāna* is invisible, and the inner controller too is said to be invisible, etc. (Bṛh. 3.7.23). Hence it might be thought that *pradhāna* is the inner controller. This is being refuted here.

[2] Śrī. B. 1.2.20, p. 259, Part 1. ŚK. B. 1.2.20, p. 372, Part 4.

SŪTRA 21

"AND THE EMBODIED ONE (IS NOT THE INNER CONTROLLER), BECAUSE BOTH ALSO DEPICT IT AS DIFFERENT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And" the individual soul is not the inner controller, because "both" the Kaṇvas, 'as well as' the Mādhyandinas depict "it" "as different" from the inner controller, respectively in the passages: 'He who abiding in intelligence' (Bṛh. 3.7.22[1]), 'He who abiding in the soul' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection: Let then the individual soul, and not pradhāna, be denoted by the term "inner controller", since the qualities of being a seer and the rest are appropriate on the soul's part—the author replies here:

The word 'not' is to be supplied here from the preceding aphorism. And the "embodied one", i.e. the soul which has entered into a body, its abode for enjoying the fruits of its own actions, is not denoted by the term "inner controller", on account of the mention of qualities not belonging to it, viz. 'being the soul of all', 'being the governor of all', 'being the seer of all' and so on; 'for both' the Kaṇvas, 'as well as' the Mādhyandinas "depict" 'this', i.e. the embodied one, "as different" from the inner controller, since the embodied self is an abode like the earth and the rest, and is an object to be governed.[3] The Kaṇvas read: 'He who abiding within intelligence' (Bṛh. 3.7.22), the Mādhyandinas read: 'Whom the soul does not know, of whom the soul is the body, who controls the soul from within—He is your soul, the inner controller, immortal' (Śat. Br. 14.5.7.30). There being the denial of any other seer in the passage: 'There is no seer other than Him' (Bṛh. 3.7.23), the seer of everything is the Highest Person alone, the sense being that none other than the Lord is the seer of everything. The individual soul, known from the text: 'The person alone is a seer, a hearer', is the seer of only a few things in

[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK. B. [2] P. 1074, line 18. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK. B.

[3] I.e. the individual soul is the abode, while the inner controller is one who abides therein, just as He abides within the earth and the rest. Again, the individual soul is the object governed, the inner controller, the governor. Hence the two are different.

contrast to Brahman, (the seer of everything),—such is the distinction (between Brahman, and the soul, though both are seers). Here too, the difference of nature between the individual soul and Brahman is established by Scripture and aphorism. This difference should not be understood in the sense the logicians understand it to exist between the individual soul and the Lord, (i.e. as absolute difference), but (it implies that the individual soul) is a part of Brahman who is One alone, as mentioned in the text: 'Brahman,[1] one, without a second' (Chānd. 6.2.1), without an equal or a superior, the governor, possessed of infinite powers and an ocean of auspicious qualities. Although here in the introductory chapter, the individual soul, possessed of the stated marks, is said to be different from the Lord, because of its own peculiar qualities, mentioned in the Veda, viz. 'being an object to be controlled' and so on,—yet just as an attribute is different from its substratum (yet non-different from it), so it is non-different from its own controller, as it is incapable of having an independent existence or activity, and as it does not contradict the attributes, such as, 'being one', 'being without a second' and so on, belonging to the Whole of which it is a part.[2] Thus, the qualities of 'being subject to bondage and release', 'having little knowledge' and the rest, pertain to the part, (viz. the individual soul); while the qualities of 'being ever-free', 'being omniscient', 'being unenveloped (by nescience)', 'being the object to be approached by the freed' and the rest, are peculiar to Brahman. Hence, no fault of an intermixture of qualities arises here. Similarly, 'materiality', 'mutability' and the like are the peculiar qualities of the non-sentient, a power of Brahman; while 'omnipotence', 'omniscience' and the rest, are peculiar to Brahman, the possessor of the power. Although prakṛti is different from Brahman as a power, yet it is non-different from Brahman, as a power has no separate activity, etc. Thus, a relation of difference-non-difference between the three realities is the view of the followers of the Upaniṣads (i.e. Vedāntins).

Here ends the section entitled 'The inner controller' (5).

[1] The word '*Brahman*' not included in the original text.

[2] I.e. if the individual soul were different from *Brahman*, then it would have been a second principle besides *Brahman* and would have thereby contradicted His Oneness. But as it does not do so, it must be non-different from Him.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading different, viz. omits 'śārīraśca' in the beginning, interpretation same.[1]

Thus, according to Nimbārka, Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva:—

'Na ca smārtam atad-dharmābhilāpāt.' (One sūtra.)
'Śārīraścobhaye'pi hi bhedenainam adhīyate.' (One sūtra.)

According to Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha:—

'Na ca smārtam atad-dharmābhilāpāt śārīraś ca.' (One sūtra.)
'Ubhaye'pi hi bhedenainam adhīyate.' (One sūtra.)

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled 'Invisibility'. (Sūtras 22–24)

SŪTRA 22

"THAT WHICH POSSESSES THE QUALITIES OF INVISIBILITY AND SO ON (IS BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF (HIS) QUALITIES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That which is mentioned by the Ātharvaṇikas in the text: 'Invisible' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6[2]) and so on, as 'possessed of the qualities of invisibility and the rest', is the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of the mention" of His "qualities" in the passage 'He who is omniscient' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9[3]), etc.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the preceding section, pradhāna was set aside on the ground of qualities like 'being a seer' and the like which belong to a sentient being only. Now, by showing that the text: 'Now, the higher is that whereby that Imperishable' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5), and so on refers to Brahman, the author is disposing of the objection, viz. Let pradhāna

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[1] Śrī. B. 1.2.22, p. 260, Part I.
ŚK. B. 1.2.22, p. 374, Part 1.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. [3] *Op. cit.*

be understood here (in the above text), owing to the absence of that (i.e. owing to the fact that the above text contains no reference to the qualities of a sentient being).

In the Ātharvaṇa, it is said: 'There are two knowledges to be known' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.4). Among these, the knowledge of works, viz. the Ṛg-veda and the rest, is the lower.[1] With a view to teaching the higher, viz. the knowledge of Brahman, in contrast to it, it is said: 'Now, the higher is that whereby the Imperishable is apprehended, that which is invisible, incapable of being grasped, without family, without caste, without eye, without ear, it is without hands and feet, eternal, all-pervasive, omnipresent, excessively subtle, it is unchangeable, which the wise perceive as the source of beings' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5-6), 'Without the vital-breath, without mind, pure, higher than the high Imperishable' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.12) and so on. Here a doubt arises as to whether here the Imperishable, the source of beings and possessed of the qualities of invisibility and the rest, is pradhāna, or the individual soul, or the Highest Self. The *prima facie* view is as follows:—As invisibility and such other qualities are possible on the part of pradhāna and the individual soul; as pradhāna is established to be the source of beings; and as the individual soul too, the cause of the body and the rest through its own works, can be so,—let one of these two be the Imperishable.

With regard to this, we reply: The Imperishable, the source of beings and possessed of the qualities of invisibility and the rest, is the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of the mention of qualities", i.e. because in the passage: 'He who is all-knowing, omniscient, whose penance consists of knowledge, from Him alone Brahman, name and form, and food arise' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9), the permanent attributes of the Highest Self, viz. omniscience, etc. are stated, with a view to laying down the attributes of the Imperishable, the source of beings.

If it be objected: This view is not reasonable. Having referred to the Imperishable in the passage: 'The Imperishable is apprehended' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5), then again having designated the Imperishable as a limit in the passage: 'Higher than the high Imperishable' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2), the text next goes on to designate the meaning of the word 'higher' as the Highest Self, in the passage: 'He who is all-knowing' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9). If here the Highest Self be understood by the word

[1] Vide Muṇḍ. 1.1.5.

'Imperishable' in the first passage, then how can the text: 'Higher than the Imperishable, the Light' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2) be possible, it being impossible for one to be higher than one's own self, and there being no reality higher than Brahman, the Imperishable, the cause of the world and the topic of discussion, as evident from the declaration by the Lord Himself, viz. '"There is nothing else, higher than me, O Dhanañjaya"!' (Gītā 7.7), as well as from the scriptural text: 'There is nothing higher than the Person' (Kaṭha 3.11)? Hence, let either pradhāna or the individual soul be the meaning of the word 'Imperishable', mentioned first, (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5); and let the Highest Self, higher than that high Imperishable, be omniscient,—

(We reply:) Not so, because the word 'Imperishable', mentioned for the second time, (Muṇḍ. 2.1.5) does not refer to the Highest Self. Thus, from the knowledge, called 'higher',—mentioned in the passage: 'The higher is that whereby that Imperishable is apprehended' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5),—it is gathered that the Imperishable is the Highest Brahman alone, since no other knowledge, except that of Brahman, can be high. Thus, having begun with the Highest Self, denoted by the word 'Imperishable' and celebrated in the texts: 'He teaches in truth that knowledge of Brahman whereby one knows the Imperishable, the Person, the True' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.13), 'As the hairs and the body-hairs arise from a living person, so from the Imperishable arises this Universe' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7), 'As from a well-lit fire thousands of sparks of a similar form emit forth, so do, my dear, manifold existences from the Imperishable' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.1) and so on, and with the Imperishable, possessed of the attributes of invisibility and the rest, in the passage: 'Now, the higher is that whereby that Imperishable is known' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5), Scripture, with a view to demonstrating His qualities and nature, designates Him once more as 'higher' than the 'Imperishable', i.e. than the individual soul which is His own part; as well as than the 'high', i.e. pradhāna which His own power,—i.e. designates Him as their source and controller. Or, else, the 'Imperishable' is that which pervades the mass of its own modifications; 'higher' than that imperishable is pradhāna which is superior to its own modifications; and 'higher' than this pradhāna is the Highest Self. Or, else, the Supreme Person is 'higher' than the Person within the aggregate (or Hiraṇyagarbha) who is higher than the Imperishable, viz. pradhāna,—this is the sense.

SŪTRA 23

"ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF ATTRIBUTES AND DIFFERENCE, NOT THE TWO OTHERS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Pradhāna and the individual soul are not denoted by the words 'Imperishable, the source of beings', "on account of the designation of attributes and difference". The designation of attributes is: 'All-pervading' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6[1]); and the designation of difference is: 'Higher than the high Imperishable' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"The two others", i.e. pradhāna and the soul, are not indicated as the Imperishable, the source of beings, but the Highest Self alone. Why? "Also on account of the designation of attributes and difference." That is, the attribute: 'All-pervading' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6) in the text concerned excludes pradhāna and the individual soul from being the Imperishable, the source of beings,—on account of that; in the text: 'Higher than the high Imperishable' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2), the difference of the Imperishable, the source of beings, from these two is designated,—on account of that as well.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They interpret this sūtra in the same way. The word 'viśeṣaṇa' interpreted differently, viz. 'Because this section distinguishes the Imperishable from pradhāna and the individual soul, since it aims at proving that through the knowledge of one there is the knowledge of all'.[3]

[1] Not quoted by others.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.
[3] Śrī. B. 1.2.23, p. 364, Part 1. ŚK. B. 1.2.23, p. 383, Part 4.

SŪTRA 24

"ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF (HIS) FORM."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Also on account of the mention of the form" of the Highest Self in the passage: 'Fire is his head' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.4[1]) and so on, not the other two.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The very same Being who is this Imperishable, the source of beings, the Cause of all causes and has the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, abides also as the inner controller of the sentient and the non-sentient, the powers, and as His effects; and should be meditated on by one who desires salvation and is free from the faults of envy and malice,—with a view to showing this, the author here states that the universe is the form of the Lord.

The Imperishable, the source of beings, is the Highest Self alone, and not the other two. Why? "On account of the mention of (His) form." In the passage: 'Fire is his head, his eyes, the sun and the moon, the regions his ears, his utterances the Vedas, wind his breath, his heart the Universe, from his feet the earth (arises), truly, he is the Inner Soul of all beings' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.4), the entire expanse of the universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is designated as the form of the Highest Self alone, the inner Controller of all. If pradhāna and the individual soul be understood here, the designation of such a form is not possible. For this reason also, it is established that the Imperishable, who is the source of beings, is the Highest Person.

Here ends the section entitled 'Invisibility' (6).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

After this sūtra he reads a sūtra 'prakaraṇāt', not found in other commentaries.

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled 'Vaiśvānara'. (Sūtras 25–33)

SŪTRA 25

"VAIŚVĀNARA (IS THE LORD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DISTINCTIVE ATTRIBUTES OF THE COMMON TERM."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

'Vaiśvānara' is the Highest Self alone, because that the word 'Vaiśvānara', though a common term, denoting (both) fire and Brahman, is to be understood as implying Brahman here, follows from the fact that we know its "distinctive attributes" through the designation of its parts, such as the heaven as its head and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been pointed out that the Lord is to be meditated on as the Soul of the movable and the immovable. Now, by pointing out that the Lord is to be meditated on, in the very same manner, as Vaiśvānara also, the author shows that the text: '"Who is our soul? What is Brahman"?' (Chānd. 5.11.1) refers to the Lord.

In the Chāndogya, the following passage is found, beginning: '"Who is our soul? What is Brahman"?' (Chānd. 5.11.1), "'You know now that Vaiśvānara Self, tell us about Him alone" ' (Chānd. 5.11.6), and continuing: 'But he who meditates on the Vaiśvānara Self as of the measure of a span only, and as of an unlimited dimension, —he eats food in all the worlds, in all beings, in all selves. Verily, of this Vaiśvānara Self, the head, indeed, is the brightly shining (heaven), the eye the multiform (sun), the breath that which moves in various paths (i.e. the wind), the body the extended (space), the bladder, indeed, wealth (i.e. water), the feet the earth indeed, the breast, indeed, the sacrificial altar, the hairs the sacrificial grass, the heart the Gārhapatya fire, the mind the Anvahāryapacana fire, the mouth the Āhavanīya fire' (Chānd. 5.18.1-2). A doubt arises as to whether here Vaiśvānara is the gastric fire, or the elemental fire, or the presiding deity of fire, or the Highest Self. The *prima facie* view is as follows: The word 'Vaiśvānara' is a common term. Why? Because it is applied to the gastric fire, as in the passage: 'This is the Vaiśvānara fire which is within this person, by means of which

this food that is eaten is digested. Its noise is that which one hears on covering the ears. When one is on the point of departing one does not hear this sound' (Bṛh. 5.9.1); because it is applied also to the elemental fire, as in the passage: 'For the whole world, the gods made Agni Vaiśvānara a sign of the day' (Ṛg. V. 10.88.12 [1]); because it is applied to the fire-god too, as in the passage: 'May we be in the favour of Vaiśvānara, for verily, he is the king of the worlds, bliss, lustrous' (Ṛg. V. 1.98.1 [2]); and because it is applied to the Highest Self, as in the passages: 'He threw it in the self, indeed, in the heart, in Agni Vaiśvānara' (Tait. Br. 3.1.8.7 [3]). 'This Vaiśvānara arises as having all forms, as the vital-breath, as fire' (Praśna 1.7).

With regard to it, we reply: Vaiśvānara is the Highest Person alone. Why? "On account of the distinctive attributes of the common word", i.e. because there are distinctive attributes for taking the common term 'Vaiśvānara',—applied, equally, to the gastric fire, the elemental fire, the fire-god and the Highest Self,—as denoting specifically the Highest Self alone. The sense is that the distinctive attributes by reason of which the Highest Person alone may be taken as the primary meaning of the word 'Vaiśvānara', are present here, as we know them from the text: 'Of this Vaiśvānara Self, the head indeed is the brightly shining (heaven)' (Chānd. 5.18.2) and so on. Hence, the word 'Vaiśvānara', though commonly applicable to all (the four), here denotes the Highest Self (alone), on account of such distinctive attributes. The gastric fire and the rest cannot possibly have limbs, like the heaven, and the rest down to the earth,—since they are not the soul of all, and since in this section, the common term is qualified by the special attributes of the Lord, such as, 'being the soul of all' and the rest, mentioned in the introductory text: "Who is our soul? What is Brahman"?' (Chānd. 5.11.1).

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[1] P. 347, lines 7-8.

[2] P. 81, lines 3-4.

[3] P. 265, lines 3-4, (vol. 3). Correct quotation: '*Tad . . . hṛdaye agnau vaiśvānare prāsyat*'.

SŪTRA 26

"THAT WHICH IS STATED BY SMṚTI MUST BE AN INDICATION, THUS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The form, stated in Smṛti as well, in the passage: 'Of whom, fire is the mouth, the heaven the head' (Mahā. 12.1656.6 [1]), "must" be a decisive factor in proving that Vaiśvānara is the Highest Self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The word "thus" implies the reason. For this reason, too, Vaiśvānara is the Highest Self alone,—because "that which is stated by Smṛti must be an indication" of the fact that the word 'Vaiśvānara' denotes the Highest Self. The phrase "That which is stated by Smṛti" means that the form, characterized by having the heaven for the head and the rest, denoted by the scriptural text: 'The head, indeed, is the brightly shining (heaven)' (Chānd. 5.18.2) and so on, is mentioned also by a Smṛti which follows Scripture. That very thing must be "an indication", i.e. a decisive factor here,—this is the sense. The Smṛti-passages are the following: 'Of whom fire is the mouth, the heaven the head, the sky the navel, the earth the feet, the sun the eye, the regions the ear,—obeisance to Him, the Soul of the world' (Mahā. 12.1656*b*–1657*a* [2]), 'Of whom the heaven is the head, the wise declare, the sky, verily, the navel, the sun and the moon the eyes, the regions the ear, the earth the feet,—He is the inconceivable Soul, the maker of all beings'. For this very reason, it has been said: 'Scripture and Smṛti are celebrated to be the two eyes of the wise. Deprived of one, one is said to be "one-eyed"; deprived of both "blind" '.

Or, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra:) the phrase: "That which is stated by Smṛti" means as follows: (The form) which is recognized in the following manner thus: What is celebrated in another scriptural text, viz. 'Fire is his head, the eyes the sun and the moon' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.4), and so on, as well as in the stated Smṛti-passages as the form of the Highest Self, that alone, is stated here (in Chānd. 5.18.2),—that form must be an indication, i.e. a sign, that Vaiśvānara is the Highest Self.

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[1] Ś. R. [2] P. 424, lines 2-3, vol. 3

SŪTRA 27

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (VAIŚVĀNARA IS THE GASTRIC FIRE) ON ACCOUNT OF WORD AND THE REST, ON ACCOUNT OF ABIDING WITHIN, NOT (THE HIGHEST SELF), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF TEACHING THE VISION (OF THE LORD) THUS, ON ACCOUNT OF IMPOSSIBILITY, AND (BECAUSE) THEY READ HIM ALSO AS A PERSON."[1]

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that since the word 'Vaiśvānara' conventionally denotes the gastric fire, since there is the designation of a triad of fires, since it is mentioned as the abode of the offering to the vital-breaths, and since it is declared by Scripture to be abiding within, Vaiśvānara is not the Highest Self, but the gastric fire,—

(We reply:) "No", "as" the Supreme Lord is "taught to be viewed" "thus", i.e. in the gastric fire; "for" if the Supreme Lord be not understood here, then having the heaven as the head and the rest 'is not possible'; and it is declared by Scripture to be a person,—so Vaiśvānara is none but the Highest Self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The Highest Self cannot be denoted by the word 'Vaiśvānara' here, but the gastric fire. Why? "On account of words and the rest," i.e. the reasons which begin with 'word' are 'reasons beginning with word',[2]—'on account of those'.[3] Those reasons are as follows: First, the 'word' here is 'Vaiśvānara', and that conventionally denotes the gastric fire, and when a literal meaning is possible, it is improper to suppose any other meaning. Secondly, there is the word 'fire', i.e. there is a co-ordination between Vaiśvānara and the word 'fire' in the Vājasaneyaka-text, viz. 'This is the Vaiśvānara fire' (Śat. Br. 10.6.1.11 [4]). Thirdly, a triad of fires is designated in the text; 'The heart is the Gārhapatya fire, the mind the Ānvāhārya' (Chānd. 5.18.2) and so on. Fourthly, Vaiśvānara is declared by Scripture to be the support of the offering to the

[1] The C.S.S. ed. omits '*iti cen na*', p. 11.

[2] *Śabdādayaḥ.*

[3] This explains the compound '*śabdādibhyaḥ*'.

[4] P. 805, line 17.

vital-breaths in the passage: 'Therefore, the first food which one may come across should be offered' (Chānd. 5.19.1). And, finally, Vaiśvānara abides "within", which, more particularly, is a characteristic mark of the gastric fire,—the Vājasaneyins declare that Vaiśvānara abides within in the passage: 'For he who knows this Vaiśvānara fire to be like a man, abiding within a man' (Śat. Br. 10.6.1.11). On account of such reasons like "words and the rest", and "on account of abiding within", the Highest Self cannot be understood,—

(We reply:) "No", "on account of teaching the vision (of the Lord) thus", i.e. since such an object (viz. the gastric fire) is taught to be meditated on under the aspect of the Lord, i.e. since the Supreme Lord is enjoined to be meditated on as qualified by the gastric fire, i.e. since the above-mentioned Supreme Soul, who is Vaiśvānara (or the universal soul) being the soul of all, is taught to be in the gastric fire and the rest as their soul. If it be objected: In that case, let gastric fire itself be Vaiśvānara primarily,—we reply: no, "because that is impossible", i.e. because having the heaven as the head and the rest is impossible on the part of the gastric fire. This means, it is possible on the part of the Highest Self alone, who is the soul of all, and not on the part of any one else. "And also", the Vājasaneyins "read" "him", i.e. Vaiśvānara, "as a person" in the passage: 'That Vaiśvānara fire is the person' (Śat. Br. 10.6.1.11). It is possible for the Highest Self to be a Person, He being the soul of all, but this is not possible if the mere gastric fire be understood here. The word "and" [1] denotes that this is universally known, i.e. that the Highest Self is a Person is well-known from scriptural texts like: 'The Person, verily, is all this' (Śvet. 3.15), 'There is nothing higher than the Person' (Kaṭha 3.11) and so on.

SŪTRA 28

"FOR THAT VERY REASON, NOT THE DEITY, NOR THE ELEMENT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of those "very" reasons stated above, "the deity and the element" are "not" to be understood by the word 'Vaiśvānara'.

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[1] '*Ca*' in the *sūtra*.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"For that very reason", i.e. on account of the very reasons stated above, the presiding "deity" of fire is not to be understood the word 'Vaiśvānara'; and the "element", i.e. the elemental fire, also is not to be understood.

SŪTRA 29

"(THERE IS) NO CONTRADICTION, EVEN (IF THE WORD "VAISVĀNARA" DENOTES THE LORD) DIRECTLY, JAIMINI (THINKS SO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Lord Vaiśvānara is 'all and man', i.e. the soul of all,—to be meditated on "directly" as such;—this, the teacher "Jaimini" thinks, involves "no contradiction".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, the word 'Vaiśvānara' has been proved to be referring to Brahman, first on the ground of the reasons like 'distinctive attributes of a common term' (Br. Sū. 1.2.25) and the rest. Again, there being a doubt,—viz. on account of words and the rest, as well as on account of abiding within, it refers to the gastric fire,—it has been once more proved, for the sake of removing incompatibility, to be referring to Brahman alone, qualified by the gastric fire, on the ground of the reasons like: 'because of teaching the vision (of the Lord) thus' (Br. Sū. 1.2.27) and so on. Now, by showing that the word 'Vaiśvānara' denotes Brahman etymologically too, so that He may be directly worshipped as such, the author shows that another teacher too (viz. Jaimini) confirms his own view.

The teacher "Jaimini" thinks that as the word 'Vaiśvānara', even without being viewed as denoting the Lord, only so far as He is qualified by the gastric fire, refers directly to the Highest Self, intending to designate as it does His special qualities,—so Vaiśvānara is to be meditated on "directly" as the Highest Self indeed. This view involves "no contradiction".[1]

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[1] I.e. it has been said in the previous *sūtra* that *Vaiśvānara* stands for the Lord only so far as the Lord is qualified by the gastric fire. But now it is said that *Vaiśvānara* stands for the Lord directly, without any qualification.

Etymologically, 'Vaiśvānara' implies 'he who is all and man', He being the Universal Soul; or 'one who is the man, i.e. the maker of all', He being the Universal Cause; or 'one by whom all men are to be controlled', He being the Universal Controller. The long vowel (i.e. 'ā' in the word 'Vaiśvānara') follows from the rule 'when "nara" follows "viśva", the "a" in the latter is lengthened to designate a name' (Pāṇ. 6.3.129, SD. K. 1048[1]). The taddhita-suffix (by which the word 'Vaiśvānara' is derived from the word 'Vaiśvanara') is added without changing the meaning, as in the case of 'rākṣasa' (derived from 'rakṣas'), 'vāyasa' (derived from 'vayas') and so on.[2]

The co-ordination of the words 'Agni' and 'Vaiśvānara', too, is appropriate. 'Agni' is 'one who goes, i.e. goes to or manifests himself in the heart-lotus',—the 'na' (in the root 'aṅg') is elided in accordance with the rule: 'And, the "na" of "aṅga" is elided'[3] (Uṇādi-sūtra 490)[4]—; or 'one who causes one to go, i.e. causes the first birth of the Universe.

SŪTRA 30

"ON ACCOUNT OF MANIFESTATION, ĀŚMARATHYA (THINKS SO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With a view to favouring His worshippers who are devoted to Him alone and to none else, the Highest Self though infinite, manifests Himself in accordance with the respective capacities of His devotees. As such, He can fittingly be regarded as of the size of merely a span, —this is so "on account of manifestation", so the sage "Āśmarathya" thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

(The author) explains, in accordance with the approbation of Āśmarathya, the text about that which is of the size of merely a span.

In the text: 'But who meditates on the Vaiśvānara Self as of the measure of a span only and as of an unlimited dimension' (Chānd.

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[1] P. 654, vol. 1.

[2] Vide Pāṇ. 4.1.104, SD. K. 1106, p. 682, vol. 1, and Pāṇ. 5.4.38, SD. K. 2106, p. 936, vol. 1.

[3] And '*ni*' is added, as mentioned in the *sūtra* 488. Thus, *aṅg* = *ag*+*ni* = *agni*.

[4] SD. K., p. 634, vol. 2.

5.18.1), it is perfectly justifiable to hold that even one whose 'measure' or limit, has disappeared 'on all sides' or entirely [1], i.e. even the Highest Person, who is unlimited, can be of the measure of a span merely, i.e. of the extent measured by the thumb and the forefinger. How? "On account of manifestation." That is, with a view to favouring those who are devoted to none else except to Him, the Lord manifests Himself in the heart-lotus in a form, which is eternal, blissful and non-material, which is of the size of a span and is the fulfiller of the desire of His own devotees, just as He manifested Himself in the limited space of a pillar as a man-lion.[2] This is the view of the teacher Āśmarathya.

Or, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra), with a view to favouring the dull-witted devotees (i.e. who can grasp gross objects only), the Lord squeezes Himself, as it were, into gross regions only; though all-pervading, He limits Himself in accordance with their respective intelligence and manifests Himself in those respective places. Thus, "on account of manifestation", He can, very well, be of the measure of merely a span,—so thinks "Āśmarathya",—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation of the word 'abhivyakteḥ' different, viz. 'on account of definiteness', i.e. the texts speaks of the Lord of a definite extent with a view to rendering the thought of the meditating devotee more definite.[3]

SŪTRA 31

"ON ACCOUNT OF REMEMBRANCE, BĀDARI (THINKS SO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The imagination of a body from head to foot is "on account of remembrance", i.e. for the purpose of recollection (or meditation),—so thinks the teacher "Bādari".

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[1] *Abhitaḥ vigataḥ mānaḥ = abhivimānaḥ.*

[2] The reference is to the killing of *Hiraṇyakaśipu* by the Lord in the form of a man-lion. Vide Mahā. 3.15835, etc.

[3] Śrī. B. 1.2.30, p. 274, Part 1. ŚK. B. 1.2.30, p. 392. Part 1.

Vedānta-kaustubha

On the enquiry: What purpose is served by such a manifestation of a Being,—who is of the size of merely a span,—in the heart-lotus of the sharp-witted (i.e. those who are capable of grasping subtle things)? On the enquiry: What purpose is served by such worship of a Being,—who is limited as having limbs like head and the rest in the heaven and so on,—on the part of the dull-witted (i.e. those who are capable of grasping gross things)?—it is said here:

The manifestation, in the heart-lotus, of the Highest Self as of the size of merely a span; similarly the imagination of His body, from head to foot, in the regions of the heaven and the rest, are "on account of remembrance", i.e. serve the purpose of recollection, or meditation in that way, for attaining the Supreme Lord. This is the view of the teacher "Bādari".

SŪTRA 32

"ON ACCOUNT OF IDENTIFICATION, SO JAIMINI THINKS, FOR THUS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The imagination of their[1] breast and the rest as the sacrificial altar and so on is for the purpose of effecting "an identification" of Agni-hotra with the offering to the vital-breaths, which is a subsidiary element of the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, practised by a worshipper of Vaiśvānara,—"so" the teacher "Jaimini" thinks. That very thing the scriptural text: 'Now, he who offers the Agni-hotra, knowing this thus' (Chānd. 5.24.2[2]), 'shows'.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be asked: If the Highest Self, having thus the three worlds as His body, be denoted by the term 'Vaiśvānara', then, what is the purpose of imagining the breast and the rest of the worshipper as the sacrificial altar and so on thus: 'The breast is the sacrificial altar, the hairs the sacrificial grass, the heart the Gārhapatya fire, the mind the Anvāhāryapacana fire' (Chānd. 5.18.2)?—the author replies here:

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[1] I.e. of those who meditate on *Vaiśvānara*.

[2] Ś, R, SK.

The imagining of the worshippers as the sacrificial altar and the rest is for the purpose of effecting an "identification" of Agni-hotra with the offering to the vital-breath, which is a subsidiary element of the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, practised by the worshippers of Vaiśvānara, —"so" the teacher "Jaimini" thinks. "For thus", i.e. this very identification of the offering to the vital-breath and the Agni-hotra, "Scripture shows" in the following passage: 'Now, he who offers the Agni-hotra knowing this thus, his offering is made to all the worlds, to all beings, to all selves' (Chānd. 5.24.2).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

The interpretation of the word 'sampatteḥ' different, viz. 'on account of mysterious power or lordliness'. Hence the sūtra: '(The Lord is said to be of the measure of a span) on account of (His) mysterious power, so Jaimini (thinks), for thus Scripture shows (viz. that the Lord is possessed of such powers)'.[1]

SŪTRA 33

"AND THEY RECORD THIS IN THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And they record" "this", i.e. Vaiśvānara having the heaven as his head and so on, as a Person in the body of the worshipper.

Here ends the second quarter of the first chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts and composed by the Reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

And moreover, the Vājins "record" "this", i.e. the Lord Vaiśvānara, "in that", i.e. in the body of the worshipper, in the passage: 'He who knows this Vaiśvānara fire as a man, abiding within man' (Śat. Br. 10.6.1.11). That is to say, these too, viz. his being a person,

[1] G.B. 1.2.32, p. 142, Chap. 1.

as well as his abiding within, are indicative of the fact that Vaiśvānara is Brahman. The sense is that if the gastric fire be understood here, then the circumstance of abiding within a person will, of course, be possible, but not that of being like a person. Hence, it is established that Vaiśvānara is the Highest Self.

Here ends the section entitled 'Vaiśvānara' (7).

Here ends the second quarter of the first chapter in the commentary, the holy Vedānta-kaustubha.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. 'And they (viz. the Ātharvaṇikas) record this (viz. the existence of such mysterious powers) in that (viz. in the Lord)'.[1]

Résumé

The second quarter of the first chapter contains:—

(1) 33 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka ;
(2) 32 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara ;
(3) 33 sūtras and 6 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja ;
(4) 32 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara ;
(5) 33 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha ;
(6) 33 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara and Baladeva omit the sūtra 16 in Nimbārka's commentary. Nimbārka omits the sūtra 24 in Bhāskara's commentary.

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[1] G.B. 1.2.33, p. 143, Chap. 1.

FIRST CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

THIRD QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled 'The heaven, the earth, and so on'. (Sūtras 1-7)

SŪTRA 1

"THE SUPPORT OF THE HEAVEN, THE EARTH AND THE REST (IS BRAHMAN ALONE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE TERM 'OWN'."

Vedānta-pārijāta saurabha

"The support of the heaven, the earth and the rest", stated in the passage: 'In whom the heaven' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5[1]) and so on, is Brahman, "on account of the term 'own'", i.e. on account of the word 'soul' and the rest which are denotative of Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the reverend author of the aphorisms is showing that to be the support of the three worlds, too, is possible on the part of the Lord alone who has the heaven for His head and so on and is the soul of the three worlds.

In the Muṇḍaka, we read: 'He in whom the heaven, the earth and the sky are woven, and the mind together with all the vital-breaths,—Him alone know as the one soul; give up other worlds. He is the bridge to immortality' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5). Here a doubt arises—viz. whether that which is indicated as the support of the heaven and the rest by the locative 'in whom' is pradhāna or the individual soul, or the Supreme Soul, the cause of the birth and the rest of the world. What is suggested here to begin with? The *prima facie* view is as follows: Let pradhāna be the support. As it is found that an effect arises from and dissolves into its own cause, it is reasonable to hold that it has its own cause as its support. (This is so), also on account of the scriptural mention of 'bridge'. To be a bridge means to be limited; but Brahman is not limited as declared

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

by the text: 'Infinite, boundless' (Bṛh. 2.4.12). The term 'self' too may be applied to pradhāna thus:—

Pradhāna is the self, because of being the benefactor of the soul. Whoever is the benefactor of some one else is his self; just as (when it is said:) 'Verily, Bhadrasena is my self'. Or, else, let the individual soul be the support, as there is the mention of the word 'soul' in the text,—the word 'soul' denotes the individual soul primarily, since it is a sentient being;—as the soul is mentioned in Scripture as the support of sense-organs like mind and the rest; as the soul is said to be connected with the vein, as well as to be born, in the passage: 'Where the veins have congregated together like the spokes in the nave of a wheel, he moves about within, becoming manifold' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.6); and, finally, to be the support of the entire universe, the object to be enjoyed, fits in on the soul's part, it being an enjoyer.

We reply: "The support of the heaven, and the earth and the rest" is none but the Supreme Brahman. That is, 'dyau' and 'bhu' (make) 'dyubhuvau', that which begins with 'dyu-bhuvau' is 'dyu-bhuvāu ādi', i.e. all the things beginning with the heaven, and ending with the vital-breath,—their support is the Highest Self. Why? "On account of the term 'own'", i.e. on account of the term 'soul', denotative of itself, viz. of the Supreme Soul, the topic of discussion, and characterized by an adjective as stated in the passage: 'Him alone know as the *one soul*; give up other worlds' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5),—here, from the adjective 'one' which denotes the Lord, the soul of all, it is known that the 'soul' is the Supreme Soul;—also on account of the word 'bridge', mentioned in the passage: 'The bridge to immortality' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5); i.e. the 'bridge' or the support meaning the cause of attaining 'immortality' or salvation. In another scriptural text, viz. 'By knowing him thus, one becomes immortal on earth' (Tait. Ār. 3.12 [1]), He alone is celebrated to be the cause of the attainment of immortality. Connection with the artery, too, is possible on the part of the Supreme Soul, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'But surrounded by the veins he hangs like a sheath' (Mahāhār. 11.9). In accordance with the following scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. 'Not born, he is born in many ways' (Vj. S. 31.169 [2]; Tait. Ār. 3.13.1 [3]), 'Though unborn, the unchangeable soul' (Gītā 4.6), it is also possible for Him to be born in many

[1] P. 199. [2] P. 857, line 17. [3] P. 201.

ways. Finally, to be the support of the instruments of the individual soul, too, is possible on the part of the Supreme Soul who is the support of all. The following aphorisms [1], secondary in nature, are but amplifications of this primary aphorism.

SŪTRA 2

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF BRAHMAN) THE OBJECT TO BE APPROACHED BY THE FREED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The support of the heaven, the earth and the rest is Brahman alone. Why? "On account of the designation" of such a support alone as "the object to be approached by the freed", in the passage: 'When the seer sees the golden-coloured Creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahmā, then the knower, having discarded merit and demerit, stainless, attains the highest identity' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.13 [2]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The support of the heaven, the earth and the rest is none but Brahman. Why? "On account of the designation (of Brahman) as the object to be approached by the freed." That which is to be approached, i.e. obtained, by those who are freed from the fetter of mundane existence is "the object to be approached by the freed", on account of the "designation", i.e. indication, of that [3]. The sense is: The reality that is admitted to be the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest, to be one, to be the bridge to immortality, and is celebrated elsewhere also as the object to be approached by the freed,—that very same reality, the one topic of all the Vedas and without an equal or a superior, is designated as the object to be obtained by the freed, in the passages: 'The knot of the heart is undone, all doubts are cut off, and his works perish, when he, who is high and low, is seen' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), 'Just as the flowing rivers disappear into the ocean discarding name and form, so the knower, freed from name and form, goes to the Person, who is Higher than

[1] Viz. Br. Sū. 1.3.2–7. [2] R, ŚK, B.
[3] This explains the compound '*muktopasṛpya-vyapadeśāt*'.

the high' (Muṇḍ. 3.2.8). The phrase 'high and low' means: One to whom the high, i.e. Brahmā, Śiva, and the rest, are inferior. The phrase: 'higher than the high' means: the Person who is higher than the high, i.e. the individual soul or prakṛti.[1]

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading slightly different, viz. adds a 'ca' in the end.[2]

SŪTRA 3

"NOT THE INFERENCE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF TEXTS TO THAT EFFECT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Pradhāna, which is arrived at through inference, is not that support, on account of the absence of texts denoting it.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The support of the heaven, the earth and the rest cannot be "the inference". The non-sentient cause which is without any connection with Brahman, viz. pradhāna, inferred by the Sāṃkhyas on the ground of non-sentient effects, like the elements and the rest [3], is said to be "the inference", and that is not the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest. Why? "On account of the absence of texts to that effect." That is, the "text to that effect" is 'tac-chabda', "absence of text to that effect" is 'atac-chabda', on account of that [4], or on account of the absence, here, of texts denoting the

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[1] Note that *Nimbārka* and *Śrīnivāsa* understand the word '*Vyapadeśāt*' as referring to different passages.

[2] Śrī. B. 1.2.3, p. 283, Part 1. ŚK. B. 1.3.2, p. 401, Part 4.

[3] First, we infer that every effect must have a cause, that cause another cause and so on, and finally there must be an uncaused first cause. Secondly, we infer that this uncaused first cause must be non-sentient, since the effects which we perceive are non-sentient, and the effect and its cause must be similar in nature. It is in this way that the *Sāṃkhyas* arrive at non-sentient first cause or *pradhāna*.

[4] This explains the compound '*atac-chabdāt*'.

inferrible pradhāna. On the contrary, there are texts denoting a sentient being, such as, 'He who is omniscient' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9.; 2.2.7) and so on.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading different, viz. take this sūtra and the next as one sūtra.[1]

SŪTRA 4

"AND THE BEARER OF THE VITAL-BREATH."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The bearer of the vital-breath" also is not the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest. Why? On account of the very same absence of texts to that effect.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The words: 'not, on account of the absence of texts to that effect' are to be supplied from the preceding aphorism. "The bearer of the vital-breath", i.e. the individual soul, too, is not the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest, on account of the absence of texts to that effect;—that means: although the term 'soul' is equally applicable to the individual soul and the Supreme Soul, yet just as in this section there are texts like 'Him alone know as one.—He is the bridge to immortality' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5), 'He who is omniscient' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7) and so on, establishing the peculiar qualities of the Supreme Soul, so there are no texts here, establishing the peculiar qualities of the individual soul;—also because it is impossible for the individual soul, which is atomic by nature, to be the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest. This aphorism is taken separately, because of its association with the following aphorisms.[2]

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[1] Śrī. B. 1.3.3, p. 283, Part 1.
ŚK. B. 1.3.3, p. 403, Part 4.

[2] That is, it would not have been necessary to introduce a special *sūtra* for the individual soul,—which like *pradhāna* is precluded in the preceding *sūtra*, —if it were not for the reasons given in the following three *sūtras*, which apply only to the individual soul, and not to *pradhāna*.

COMPARISON

All others omit the 'ca' in the end.[1]

SŪTRA 5

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Moreover, "on account of the designation of difference" also between the knower and the object to be known, the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest is not the bearer of the vital-breath, (or the individual soul).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The bearer of the vital-breath is not to be understood as the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest. Why? "On account of the designation of difference", i.e. because the difference between the two, viz. between the individual soul—which is possessed of little knowledge and is subject to bondage and release through the Lord's māyā consisting of the three guṇas—and the Omniscient Lord, as the knower and the object to be known, is designated by the holy Scripture itself in the passage: 'Him alone know as one' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5). The purpose of this repeated declarations of difference is to point out that with a view to attaining His nature, one should practise meditation on Him, based on a true knowledge about Him.

SŪTRA 6

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Supreme Self being the topic, the individual soul is not to be understood as the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest.

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[1] Ś.B. 1.3.5, p. 310. Śrī. B. 1.3.4, p. 283, Part 1.
Bh. B. 1.3.5, p. 52. ŚK. B. 1.3.4, p. 404, Part 4.
B.B. 1.3.5.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It is not that the individual soul constitutes the topic so that it may be understood here. None but the Supreme Soul is the topic here, as evident from the introductory passage: '"What, my reverend Sir, being known, all this comes to be known"?' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.3),—all things do not become known when the individual soul is known, since all things have not the individual soul as their soul—and as established by the fact that in the passage: 'Now, the higher is that whereby that Imperishable is apprehended' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5) and so on, the Supreme Soul alone is referred to.

SŪTRA 7

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF ABIDING AND EATING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the abiding" of the Highest Self as a non-eater, as well as 'on account of the eating' of the individual soul, as laid down in the text: 'Two birds' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; cf. also Śvet. 4.6 [1]), the individual soul is not the support of the heaven and the earth.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is once more explaining statements regarding the difference between the individual soul and Brahman.

The individual soul is not the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest. Why? "On account of abiding and eating", "sthiti" and "odana" (make) "sthityodane"—on account of that [2]. "On account of the abiding" of one bird in the tree, i.e. the body, without eating the fruit of work and shining, and "on account of the eating" of the fruit of work by the other as subject to karmas,—as laid down in the text which refers to the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest, viz. 'Of these two, one tastes the sweet berry, the other looks on without eating' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.3),—the difference between the individual soul and Supreme Soul is known. Hence, it is established

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] This explains the compound '*sthityodanābhyām*'.

that the independent and omniscient Supreme Soul alone is the bridge to immortality; and as the soul of all, He is also the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest.

Here ends the section entitled 'The heaven, the earth and the rest' (1).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading and interpretation same, but points out at the end in his usual manner that the distinction between the individual soul and Brahman is no more real than that between the ether within a pot and the universal ether and so on.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled 'The plenty'. (Sūtras 8-9)

SŪTRA 8

"THE PLENTY (IS THE LORD), BECAUSE OF THE TEACHING (OF IT) AS ABOVE SERENITY (VIZ. THE VITAL-BREATH)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Plenty, taught by the highest teacher, the venerable Sanatkumāra, to our preceptor, the reverend Nārada, in the passage: 'But the Plenty alone should be enquired after' (Chānd. 7.22.1 [2]), is not the vital-breath, but the Highest Person. Why? "Because of the teaching" of the Plenty as "above" the vital-breath.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms is showing that the text: 'But the Plenty alone should be enquired after' (Chānd. 7.22.1) and so on, refers to Brahman.

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[1] Ś.B. 1.3.7, p. 31.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

The following is recorded by the Chandogas: '"It has been heard by me from men like you that one who knows the soul crosses over sorrow. I am such a sorrowing one, reverend sir! Cause me, sir, to cross over the sorrow"' (Chānd. 7.1.3), thus asked by Nārada, his preceptor, the reverend Sanatkumāra, the teacher of the doctrine of salvation, taught: 'The name is Brahman' (Chānd. 7.1.5). Again, asked thus: '"Is there, sir, more than name"?' (Chānd. 7.1.5), he taught: '"Speech, verily, is more than name"' (Chānd. 7.2.1). In this way, fifteen objects, beginning with name and ending with the vital-breath, were taught.[1] After having taught the vital-breath, he, without being asked any further question, taught the following: '"But he, verily, speaks superiorly who speaks superiorly through truth"' (Chānd. 7.16.1), '"But the Plenty alone should be enquired after". "I enquire, sir, after the Plenty." "Where one does not see another, does not hear another, does not know another, that is the Plenty. But where one sees another, hears another, knows another, that is the small"' (Chānd. 7.23.1–24.1). Here the term 'plenty' (bhūman) denotes 'muchness'. It is derived in the following manner: The suffix 'imanic' is added to the word 'bahu' (much) in the sense of 'the nature thereof'[2], in accordance with the rule: 'The (suffix) "imanic" is optionally added to the words "pṛthu" and the rest' (Pāṇ. 5.1.122; SD. K. 1784[3]) (in order to indicate the sense 'the nature thereof'.—Pāṇ. 5.1.119; SD. K. 1781). Then the root (viz. bahu) and the suffix (viz. imanic) undergo a change in accordance with the rule: 'After "bahu", the first letters of "iman" and "iyas" affixes are elided, and "bahu" is replaced by the word "bhū"' (Pāṇ. 6.4.154, 158; SD. K. 2017[4]). Here 'muchness' means 'immensity' (i.e. quantitative greatness), and not numerosity (i.e. numerical greatness), because just as the term 'bahu' denotes number, as in the examples: 'In expressing numerosity the plural case affix is used' (Pāṇ. 1.4.21; SD. K. 187[5]), 'Many, purified by the penance of knowledge' (Gītā. 4.10), 'After many births' (Gītā. 7.19) and so on, so it is seen to be applied in the sense of 'immensity' also, in contrast to smallness, as in the example: 'He who renders service, be it great or small, to one who has heard Scripture'. Here, too, the term 'plenty' being used

[1] Vide Chānd. 7.1 *et seq.*
[2] *Tasya bhāvaḥ.*
[3] P. 894, vol. 1. Correct quotation translated: '*Pṛthvādibhya imanic vā*'.
[4] P. 908, vol. 1. That is, *bahu+imanic = bhū+man = bhūman.*
[5] P. 114, vol. 1.

in contrast to smallness in the passage: 'There is no pleasure in the small' (Chānd. 7.23.1), its meaning is nothing but 'immensity'. Thus, there is no pleasure in the small, but the Plenty alone is pleasure. Hence: 'The Plenty alone is to be enquired into' (Chānd. 7.23.1). That is, the Plenty, or the Supreme Soul alone, who is of the form of pleasure characterized by unsurpassed greatness, should be enquired after by one desiring salvation and wishing to attain pleasure characterized by unsurpassed greatness. When the reverend Sanatkumāra said this, the reverend Nārada said: '"I enquire, sir, after the Plenty"' (Chānd. 7.23.1). That is, 'Sir', meaning, O reverend teacher! I desire to know the Plenty alone in particular. Therefore, Sanatkumāra told him the characteristic marks of the Plenty by means of a positive (indicating what it is) and a negative (indicating what it is not) proposition, thus 'where' (Chānd. 7.24.1) and so on,—this is the sense of the text.

Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether the Plenty is the vital-breath or the Supreme Soul. The vital-breath, holds the *prima facie* view, because in the previous passage: 'The vital-breath is more than hope' (Chānd. 7.15.1), the vital-breath alone is indicated, and because after the teaching about the vital-breath, there are no further question and answer (as there were in the previous cases), viz: '"Is there, sir, more than name"?' (Chānd. 7.1.5), '"Speech, verily, is more than name"' (Chānd. 7.2.1). By the term 'vital-breath', the individual soul, endowed with the vital-breath, is to be understood, and not merely a kind of air,—because, from the passage: 'The vital-breath is the father, the vital-breath the mother' (Chānd. 7.15.1), the vital-breath is known to be a sentient being; and because in the introductory text, viz: 'One who knows the soul crosses over sorrow' (Chānd. 7.1.3), as well as in the concluding text: 'To the soul alone belongs all this'[1] (Chānd. 7.25.2), the term 'soul' is found employed. The passage: 'Where one does not see another' (Chānd. 7.24.1) and so on, too, fittingly applies to the individual soul, because all its activities like seeing and the rest cease during its state of deep sleep; and further, because all its practical activities like external perceptions and the rest cease when its own real nature, different from the body, the sense-organs, buddhi and the rest, is known. Hereby, it should be known that texts like: 'Verily, the Plenty is pleasure' (Chānd. 7.23.1),

[1] Correct quotation: '*Ātmaivedam sarvam*'. Vide Chānd. 7.25.2; p. 402.

'Verily, the vital-breath is immortal' (Bṛh. 1.6.3) and so on, are all to be explained as referring to the individual soul, possessing the vital-breath.

With regard to it, we reply: The Plenty is the Supreme Soul alone and not the individual soul, possessing the vital-breath. Why? "Because of the teaching (of it) as above serenity." "Serenity" means one in whom there is complete serenity, i.e. the individual soul, celebrated in the Scriptural text: 'This serenity, having arisen from this body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in its own form' (Chānd. 8.3.4) and so on. (The above phrase means: because of the teaching of it as) "above" that which is denoted by the term: "vital-breath". In the text: 'But he speaks superiorly who speaks through truth' (Chānd. 7.26.1) from the term 'but', the difference between the subsequent teaching about the Plenty and the prior one about the vital-breath is known. The sense is that since the teaching about the Plenty is different from the teaching about the vital-breath, the meaning of the word "plenty" is different from the meaning of the term "vital-breath".

(An alternative explanation of the sūtra.) Or, else, (the phrase means:) because of the teaching of the worshipper of truth as higher than the worshipper of the vital-breath, in the passage: 'But he, verily, speaks superiorly' (Chānd. 7.16.1); i.e. owing to a difference between the worshippers, there is a difference between the objects to be worshipped as well. The sense is this: If it be objected: In accordance with your statement, viz. that the Plenty is that alone, which is denoted by the term truth, demarcated as higher than the individual soul,—just as each of the fifteen objects, beginning with name and ending with speech, is taught as successively higher by the reverend Sanatkumāra, asked by the reverend Nārada,—how do you know that truth is taught as something higher,—(we reply:) Having stated that a knower of the vital-breath is a superior speaker in the passage: 'Verily, by seeing this, by thinking this, by knowing this, one becomes a superior speaker' (Chānd. 7.15.4), and having distinguished the worshipper of truth from the worshipper of the vital-breath by the term 'but' in the passage: 'But he, verily, speaks superiorly, who speaks superiorly through truth' (Chānd. 7.16.1), Scripture teaches truth, the cause of being a superior speaker in this case (Chānd. 7.16.1), as higher than the vital-breath, the cause of being a superior speaker in the previous case (Chānd. 7.15.4).

The instrumental case 'through truth' (satyena) follows the rule: 'The third case-ending is added to a word denoting a mark or an attribute which indicates the existence of a particular state or condition' (Pāṇ. 2.3.21; SD. K. 566[1]). The clause 'who speaks', etc. means: who speaks superiorly through truth which figuratively implies the Supreme Brahman, the object to be worshipped. The word 'truth' is well known to be denoting Brahman, as in the passages: 'Verily, the name of this Brahman is truth' (Chānd. 8.3.4), 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1) and so on. 'Being a superior speaker' means being the speaker of the supremacy of one's own object of worship, and this amounts to declaring the unsurpassedness of the Deity to be worshipped. The suffix 'śatṛ' in 'by seeing this' and the rest follows the rule: 'The present participle is used to denote the manner or the cause of an action' (Pān. 3.2.126; SD. K. 3103[2]). That is, the direct vision of the Deity to be worshipped is the cause of being a superior speaker. The sense is that it becomes possible for one to be such a superior speaker only through the grace of the Deity worshipped by him, and apprehended through direct vision. Moreover, the very permission to speak the truth, giving up being a superior speaker through merely the vital-breath, asked for in the passage: '"May I, sir, speak superiorly through truth"' (Chānd. 7.16.1), indicates the termination of the section of the vital-breath. Here, the term 'soul', too, can have a consistent meaning only if the Supreme Soul be understood, since to be the cause of all, mentioned in the passage: 'To the self alone all this belongs' (Chānd. 7.26.1[3]), is impossible on the part of any one else. His Holiness will speak of this in subsequent aphorisms.[4]

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He gives two alternative explanations of the sūtra the last of which agrees with the explanation given by Nimbārka. The first explanation is: 'The Plenty (is Brahman), because it is immense joy, and because it is taught as the highest'.[5]

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[1] P. 423, vol. 2.
[2] P. 558, vol. 2.
[3] For correct quotation see footnote 1, p. 152.
[4] Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.4–35.
[5] G.B. 1.3.8.

SŪTRA 9

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE ATTRIBUTES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And" because attributes like 'being of the form of unsurpassed pleasure', 'being immortal', 'being established on one's own greatness' and the rest are "appropriate" on the part of the Highest Self alone, the Plenty is none but the Highest Self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The attributes, mentioned in the section of the Plenty, which are not possible on the part of any one else, being "appropriate" in reference to the Highest Self alone, it is known that the Plenty is the Highest Self. Thus, the passage: 'Where one does not see another' (Chānd. 7.24.1), means: 'where' one, immersed in pleasure characterized by unsurpassed greatness, 'does not see', i.e. notice, 'another', i.e. petty worldly pleasure, the contrary of the pleasure which is characterized by greatness,—just as one who has drunk the nectar, does not notice any other drink. Moreover, 'where' one, plunged in pleasure, 'does not see' any sorrow, the contrary of pleasure, i.e. comes to be endowed with every pleasure and delivered from every sorrow. The term 'where' means 'by being attached to whom'. Such attributes of 'being the giver of unsurpassed pleasure', 'being the remover of all sorrow' and the rest are appropriate on the part of the Highest Self alone, and not on that of the individual soul, denoted by the term 'vital-breath'. Further, as the attributes of 'being immortal by nature', 'being established on one's own greatness', 'being the creator of all' and the rest,—mentioned in the passages: "'That which is the Plenty is, verily, the immortal'—'Sir, On what is it established?' 'On its own greatness'" (Chānd. 7.24.1), '"He alone is below"' (Chānd. 7.25.1), 'From the soul the vital-breath' (Chānd. 7.26.1) and so on,—are appropriate on the part of the Highest Self alone, so it is established that the Plenty is none but the Highest Self.

Here ends the section entitled 'The Plenty' (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'The imperishable'. (Sūtras 10–12)

SŪTRA 10

"THE IMPERISHABLE (IS BRAHMAN), BECAUSE OF SUPPORTING THE END OF THE ETHER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Imperishable is Brahman. Why? "Because of its supporting" the ether, indicated as the support of the effects in past, present and future.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms is showing that the Bṛhadāraṇyaka passage: 'He said: "That, verily, is the Imperishable"' (Bṛh. 3.8.8) and so on, refers to Brahman.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka we read: '"In whom is the ether woven, warp and woof?" He said: "That, verily, O Gārgī, the Brāhmaṇas call the Imperishable, non-gross, non-atomic, non-short, non-long, non-red, non-lubricous, without shadow"' (Bṛh. 3.8.8) and so on. A doubt arises, viz. whether here pradhāna is understood by the term 'Imperishable', or the individual soul, or the Supreme Brahman. What is suggested, to begin with? The *prima facie* view is as follows: Let pradhāna be denoted by the term 'Imperishable' because, to be the supporter of its own effects fits in on its part; and because non-grossness and the rest, too, fit in on its part, it being admitted to be without form. Or, let the individual soul be implied by the term 'Imperishable', since it is possible for it to be the supporter of all non-sentient objects, the objects of its own enjoyment.

With regard to it, we reply: The Imperishable is the Supreme Brahman. Why? "On account of supporting (all things) ending with the ether", i.e. on account of supporting that which ends with the ether, viz. the group of effects beginning with the earth, or the group of effects, beginning with the earth and ending with the ether. To the query: '"That, O Yājñavalkya, which is above the heaven, that which is beneath the earth, that which is between these heaven and the earth, that which is past, present and future [1], in whom is all that woven,

[1] Omits '*ācakṣata*', vide Bṛh. 3.8.6, p. 168.

warp and woof?"' (Bṛh. 3.8.6), the answer being given: '"In the ether alone all that is inter-woven, warp and woof"' (Bṛh. 3.8.7), Gārgī asked again: '"In whom, verily, is the ether interwoven, warp and woof"?' (Bṛh. 3.8.7). Then, the answer given was that the support of (all things), beginning with the earth and ending with the ether, is the Imperishable, in the passage: 'He said: "That, verily, is the Imperishable"' (Bṛh. 3.8.8) and so on. Thus, on account of supporting the group of effects, beginning with the earth and ending with the ether, known from the above question and answer, the Imperishable is none but Brahman.

Or else, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra;) "The end", i.e. the limit or the cause, of the "ether", meaning the atmospheric ether [1], is the non-manifest pradhāna,—"on account of supporting it". That is, the Imperishable,—mentioned as the support of that which is indicated as the support of all objects in past, present and future, in the passage beginning: 'That which is above' (Bṛh. 3.7.7); which is denoted by the term 'ether'; and which has the names 'non-manifest', 'subtle', 'pradhāna' and the rest,—is not pradhāna, but Brahman alone.[2]

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation of the term 'ambarānta' different, viz. '(all things) ending with the ether' [3]. Śaṃkara uses the term 'Brahman' here [4], although evidently from his point of view Brahman cannot be such a support, but Īśvara.

[1] I.e. the ether, in the ordinary sense, as distinguished from the ether which denotes *pradhāna*.

[2] Note that the first explanation given by *Śrīnivāsa* tallies with the explanations of *Śaṃkara* and *Bhāskāra*, the second with those of *Rāmānuja* and *Nimbārka* and others.

[3] Ś.B. 1.3.10, p. 318. Bh. B. 1.3.10, p. 55. See *Śrīnivāsa* above.

[4] P. 319, '*Na ca ayam ambarānta-dhṛtiḥ Brahmaṇo'nyatra sambhavati*', etc.

SŪTRA 11

"AND THIS (SUPPORTING) (BELONGS TO THE LORD), ON ACCOUNT OF COMMAND."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And this" supporting belongs to the Highest Person alone. Why? Because (the Imperishable, the supporter) is mentioned by Scripture to be a commander, in the passage: 'Verily, at the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī, the sun and the moon stand held apart' (Bṛh. 3.8.9 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: Very well, let pradhāna be not denoted by the term 'Imperishable'. But, as, to be such a support fits in on the part of the individual soul, the enjoyer of material objects; as, possessing the attributes of non-grossness and the rest too fits in on its part; and, as, finally, if the individual soul be understood, then an etymological meaning (of the term 'Imperishable') is possible, viz.: 'The Imperishable is that which does not perish, i.e. the individual soul,—let the individual soul alone be implied by the term 'Imperishable',—the author replies here:—

The supporting of the body and the rest alone,—the abode where the individual soul experiences the fruits of its own works,—is possible by the individual soul. "And this" supporting is the work of the Highest Self alone, and not of any one else. Why? "On account of command", i.e. because of the mention of command in the passage: 'Verily, at the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī, the sun and the moon stand held apart' (Bṛh. 3.8.9) and so on. 'Prakṛṣṭa', i.e. unrestricted, 'śāsana' is 'praśāsana', i.e. unrestricted commanding.[2]

SŪTRA 12

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXCLUSION OF ANOTHER NATURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Here, by the term 'Imperishable' neither pradhāna or the individual soul can be understood. The Supreme Being alone is the meaning

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] This explains the word '*praśāsanāt*' in the *sūtra*.

of the term 'Imperishable'. Why? "On account of the exclusion of another nature", in the passage: 'Verily, that Imperishable, Gārgī, is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the unknown knower' (Bṛh. 3.8.11 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the Highest Self alone is denoted by the term 'Imperishable'. Why? "On account of the exclusion of other nature", i.e. the "nature" "of another", viz. of pradhāna or the individual soul; or the "nature" "of another two" (make) "another nature",[2] "on account of the exclusion" of that.[3] The concluding passage, viz. '"Verily, that Imperishable, Gārgī, is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the unknown knower. None but it is a seer, . . .[4], none but it is a thinker, none but it is a knower. Verily in this Imperishable, Gārgī, the ether is interwoven, warp and woof"' (Bṛh. 3.8.11), excludes a nature other than Brahman. Thus, pradhāna is excluded on the ground of the attributes of a sentient being, viz. being a seer and the rest; and the individual soul is excluded on the ground of the teaching that the Being who is unseen by all is the seer of all, and so on. Hence, it is established that by the term 'Imperishable' the Highest Self alone is understood.

Here ends the section entitled 'The imperishable' (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'One sees'. (Sūtra 13)

SŪTRA 13

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF HIS QUALITIES), HE IS THE OBJECT WHICH ONE SEES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The object which one sees, mentioned in the passage: 'He sees the Person, lying in the city' (Praśna 5.5 [5]), is not Brahmā, residing

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[1] Ś, B, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] *Anya-bhāva.*

[3] This explains the compound '*anya-bhāva-vyāvṛtteḥ*'.

[4] Omitted portion: 'None else other than it is a hearer'. Vide Bṛh. 3.8.11, p. 171.

[5] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

in the Brahma-world and included within the Brahmāṇḍa.[1] But the Highest Self alone, the topic of discussion, the Lord of His own special and non-material Brahma-world, is "the object which one sees". Why? "On account of the designation" of His qualities in the passage: 'That which is tranquil, ageless, fearless' (Praśna 5.7[2]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been said that prakṛti and the individual soul are not understood by the word 'Imperishable' which denotes Brahman. Now it is being pointed out,—by means of this aphorism, as well as by the text dealing with that topic,—that prakṛti (or the material sphere) is rejectible, while the world of the Highest Self is acceptable; and that the individual soul is the worshipper, one who is approaching (a goal), while the Highest Self is the object to be worshipped and the goal to be resorted to.

We find the following text in the Praśna-upaniṣad of the Ātharvaṇas, introducing the topic of discussion thus: 'Verily, that, O Satyakāma, which is the syllable "om", is the higher and the lower Brahman. Hence a knower, through this very support, reaches one of these two' (Praśna 5.2), and continuing: "Again, he who meditates on the Highest Person with this very syllable 'om' of three elements comes to the light in the sun. As a snake is freed from its skin, so, verily, he is freed from sins. He is led by the Sāman verse to the world of Brahman. He sees the Person, lying in the city, and higher than the highest mass of souls" (Praśna 5.5). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether "the object which one sees",—i.e. the Reality which one sees, in accordance with the declaration, viz. that through the meditation on Him, the worshipper of the three elements, freed from all sins, having come to the sun, and having been led by the Sāman verses to the world of Brahman, sees that very Person, lying in the City,—is the four-faced Brahmā, the presiding deity of all souls, and indicated before as the 'lower Brahman'; or whether the object which one sees is the Highest Person, denoted by the term 'Supreme Brahman', the cause of the whole world and the topic of Scripture. The *prima facie* view is as follows: Let the four-faced Brahmā be the

[1] For the nature and constituent of a *Brahmāṇḍa*, vide V.R.M., pp. 32 *et seq.*
[2] R, ŚK, B.

object which one sees. As[1] it has been stated before that the worshipper of the praṇava (= om) of one element and the worshipper of the praṇava of two elements respectively attain the world of man and the world of the ether as fruits, so the world of Hiraṇyagarbha,—who represents the individual souls in their collective aspect,—higher than the ether, should be understood as designated as the fruit belonging to the worshipper (of the praṇava) of three elements. The object of the perception of a person, who has come to that world, is he (the four-faced) alone, the ruler of that world. It is quite appropriate to hold that the person, residing in that world and representing the individual souls in their collective aspect, is superior to those discrete souls which are embodied beings, yet are superior to the body, the sense-organs, etc. Hence the object which one sees is the four-faced Brahmā.

On this suggestion, we reply: The Highest Self alone, the topic of discussion and the cause of the world, is the object which one sees. Why? "On account of designation", i.e. on account of the designation of the qualities of the Highest Self, such as, 'being the object to be attained by the wise', 'being tranquil', 'being ageless', 'being immortal', 'being fearless' and the rest, mentioned in the passage: 'Through this very syllable "om" as the support, a knower reaches that which is tranquil, ageless, immortal, fearless, the supreme, the supreme goal'[2] (Praśna 5.7). 'A mass of souls' implies one who has connection with the body and the rest, generated by karmas; and that (viz. connection with the body, etc.) is declared by Scripture to be pertaining to the four-faced Brahmā too, in the passage: 'He who first creates Brahmā' (Śvet. 6.18). Nor is the world of the four-faced Brahmā higher than the ether, it being included among the heaven and the rest. The world, mentioned in the passage: 'He sees the Person, lying within the city' (Praśna 5.5), is not the world of Brahmā,—otherwise called the 'world of truth' and an abode for the enjoyment of the fruits of works, but is the world of Brahman,—who is the topic of discussion and the object which one sees,—to be approached by the freed, it being indicated as the sleeping-place of the Person, higher than even the 'mass of souls' which itself is higher than all worlds.

[1] Here the *śatṛ-suffix* implies reason, in accordance with Pān. 3.2.126, SD. K. 3103.

[2] '*Parāyaṇam*' not included under the original text.

This very world of the Supreme Brahman is declared as the object to be attained by the wise by another Upaniṣad of the same Atharvaṇas, beginning: '"The place which all the Vedas record, that which all the austerities declare, wishing what people practise chastity, that place I tell you in brief"' (Kaṭha 2.15), and continuing: 'That is the best support, that is the supreme support. By knowing that support, one rejoices in the world of Brahman' (Kaṭha 2.17). That very Upaniṣad declares the unattainableness of this (world of Brahman) by the non-knower, and its attainableness by the knower; as well as its difference from mundane existence in the passages: 'But he who has not understanding, who is inattentive, and ever impure, does not reach that place, and goes to transmigratory existence. But he who has understanding, who is attentive and ever pure, reaches that place, whence he is not born again. A man, however, who has understanding as his charioteer, the mind as the rein, reaches the end of the journey, that highest place of Viṣṇu' (Kaṭha 3.7–9). In the Śāntiparva, it is said in the beginning of the Hārīta-gītā: 'Yudhiṣṭhira said: "A man of what nature, of what conduct, of what knowledge, of what resort, attains the place of Brahman, that is higher than prakṛti and eternal?" Bhīṣma said: "He who is engaged in the religious duties in connection with salvation, who is abstemious, who has conquered the senses, attains the supreme place that is higher than prakṛti and eternal"' (Mahā. 12.9968-9969).[1] From such question and answer by the wisest men, the superiority of the world of Brahman—the object of enquiry—to prakṛti, its attainableness only through the religious duties in connection with salvation, and its eternity, are established. Hence, it is established that the object which one sees is Brahman, lying in the city, and higher than prakṛti, in its effected and in its causal conditions.

Here ends the section entitled 'One sees' (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different, viz. according to him, the question is whether the higher or the lower Brahman is meant here, and not

[1] P. 716, lines 22-23, vol. 3.

whether Brahman or Brahmā, the four-faced. The conclusion, of course, is that the higher Brahman is meant.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled 'The small'. (Sūtras 14-23)

SŪTRA 14

"THE SMALL (ETHER) IS BRAHMAN, ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT FOLLOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The "small" ether, mentioned in the passage: 'In this city of Brahman is a small lotus, a chamber; small is the ether within it' (Chānd. 8.1.1 [2]), can be the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of what follows", i.e. on account of the peculiar qualities of the Highest Self, which are designated subsequently in the passage: 'As large is this ether, so large is that ether within the space. In it both the heaven and the earth are contained. This soul is free from sins, ageless' (Chānd. 8.1.3 [3]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, on the ground of the text: 'He sees the Person lying in the city' (Praśna 5.5), 'lying within the city', as well as 'being the object which one sees', fit in on the part of the Highest Self as possessing a manifest auspicious form. In the very same manner, smallness, too, fits in on His part as residing in the abode, viz. the heart-lotus. With this in his mind, the reverend author of the aphorisms says now:

We find the following text in the Chāndogya immediately after the doctrine of the Plenty,[4]: 'Now what is within this city of Brahman is a small-lotus, a chamber; small is the ether within it. What is within that should be searched for; that, verily, should be enquired into' (Chānd. 8.1.1). The meaning of the text, according to us, is as follows: 'what is' within 'this city of Brahman',—i.e. within the body which is the abode where the individual soul, a part of Brahman, enjoys the fruit of its karmas and which is the place where it realizes

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[1] S.B, 1.3.13, p. 321: '*Kim asmin vākye paraṃ Brahma abhidhyātavyam upadiśyata ahasvit aparam iti*'.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. [3] *Op. cit.* [4] V.K., 1.3.8.

Brahman,—is a "small", i.e. a tiny 'lotus', viz. the heart, well-known from Scripture; that very thing is a chamber as it were. In that same chamber, there is a "small", i.e. a tiny, or one who has manifested himself in a subtle form in accordance with the wish of his own devotees who are devoted to none else, 'ether', i.e. one who is pervasive by nature. In that heart-lotus, the small Brahman who is denoted by the term 'ether' 'should be searched for', i.e. should be discriminated as different from the enquirer, as well as from the body; and 'should be enquired into', i.e. should be meditated on repeatedly through the 'hearing' of the Vedānta.

Here a doubt arises, viz. whether by the term 'small ether' the elemental ether is to be understood, or the Highest Self. If it be suggested: The elemental ether, because the term 'ether' is well-known to denote the elemental ether, and because the term 'small' too, as implying a subtle object, may be applied to it. It cannot be said that in the text: 'As large is this ether, so large is the ether within the heart' (Chānd. 8.1.3), one and the same thing (viz. the ether) cannot reasonably be both the object compared and the object (upameya and upamāna) with which it is,—because it can appropriately be so on the ground of the distinction of the external and the internal.[1] Or, let the embodied soul, like the point of a spoke only, be the small ether, because it, too, is known from the passage: 'Now this serenity (i.e. serene being) having arisen from this body' (Chānd. 8.3.4). Being atomic by nature, it can be fittingly termed 'small'; and, being undefiled by the body, the sense-organs and the rest, it can be fittingly compared to the ether[2]—

We reply: "The small", i.e. the small ether, is none but the Highest Self. Why? "On account of what follows", i.e. on account of the reasons contained in the concluding text, i.e. on account of the peculiar qualities of the Highest Self, viz. 'being comparable to the ether', 'being the support of all worlds, beginning with the earth', 'being the soul', 'being free from sins'—and the rest. Thus, in the passage: 'As large is this ether, so large is that ether within the

[1] That is, as the external ether it is the *upamāna*, as the internal ether the *upameya*. Hence no contradiction is involved.

[2] That is, as the ether remains aloof from the impurities of the world, though connected with it, so the soul remains aloof from the impurities of the body and the rest, though connected with them. Hence the latter may be compared with the former.

heart' (Chānd. 8.1.3) the small ether, i.e. the Supreme Being alone, is compared to the well-known ether, since when two different things can be reasonably held to be the object with which the thing is compared and the object compared, it is unreasonable to suppose one and the same thing to be both (viz. upamāna and upameya). 'Being the supporter of all effects' too, mentioned in the passage: 'In it both the heaven and the earth are contained' (Chānd. 8.1.3), fits in on the part of the Highest Self alone. The attributes like 'being the soul', 'being free from sins' and the rest, mentioned is the passage: 'This soul is free from sins, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, without hunger, without thirst, possessed of true desires, possessed of true resolves' (Chānd. 8.1.5), fit in only if the Highest Self be understood. Moreover, after having designated the non-permanency of the fruits of works and their incapacity of knowing Him in the passage: 'As here the world won by work perishes, so hereafter the world won by merit perishes' (Chānd. 8.1.6), Scripture concludes: 'Now, those who depart, having known the soul here and those true desires, come to have free movement in all the worlds' (Chānd. 8.1.6). That is, those worshippers who 'depart' to the other world, 'having known', i.e. having realized 'the soul', i.e. the Supreme Lord called 'the small', and 'those', i.e. His qualities, come to have free movement in all the worlds. Accordingly, the small ether is the Highest Self, since then alone free movement is explicable on the part of those who know the nature and qualities of the 'small one'.

SŪTRA 15

"ON ACCOUNT OF GOING AND OF WORD, FOR THUS IT IS SEEN, THERE IS A MARK AS WELL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The "going" is mentioned in the text: 'All beings are going day by day'. (Chānd. 8.3.2 [1]), and the "word" is 'The world of Brahman' (Chānd. 8.3.2 [2]),—on account of these two, the 'small one' is ascertained to be the Supreme Being. The daily going is "seen thus" in another scriptural text too, viz.: '"Then, my dear, he comes to be

[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. [2] *Op. cit.*

united with the Existent"' (Chānd. 6.8.1 [1]). If the karmadhāraya compound be understood,[2] then Brahman alone is 'the mark', i.e. the primary meaning of the word ('Brahma-loka') "as well".

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, says the author, the small ether is the Highest Self.

The subsequent reasons are being amplified now. In the text about the small-ether, viz.: 'Just as those who do not know the place move again and again over a hidden treasure of gold, but do not find it, so these beings are going day by day to that world of Brahman but do not find it, for they are carried away by untruth' (Chānd. 8.3.2), the phrase: 'are going day by day' states the "going"; and the "word" is: 'this world of Brahman', (Brahma-loka)—on account of these two, it is known that the small ether is the Highest Self. The sense is that because of the going of the individual souls, indicated by the term 'beings', to Brahman daily during deep sleep when all the sense-organs are dissolved; and because of the word 'world of Brahman', the small ether is ascertained to be none but the Highest Self, as the individual soul is one who approaches (and hence cannot be the goal approached), and as going is not appropriate on the part of the elemental ether. "For thus it is seen", i.e. the going of all beings to the Highest Self alone day by day during the state of deep sleep, as well as their return therefrom, are found, in the very same manner, in other passages too, viz.: '"So exactly, my dear, all these beings, being united with the Existent, do not know; we have become united with the Existent"' (Chānd. 6.9.2), '"Having come back from the Existent, they do not know: We have come back from the Existent"' (Chānd. 6.10.1). In the very same manner, the term 'world of Brahman', too, is found applied to the Highest Self, as in the passage: '"This is the world of Brahman, O king," said he' (Bṛh. 4.3.32). The phrase 'that' (Chānd. 8.3.2) indicates the going of all beings there (viz. to Brahman). That is, the term 'world of Brahma' (Brahma-loka),—stated to be in apposition with the word 'that' which denotes the 'small one', and explained as a karmadhāraya compound thus: 'the world which is Brahman',—is "a mark", i.e. a convincing proof, that the small ether is the Highest Brahman.

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[1] *Op. cit.* [2] See below V.K.

SŪTRA 16

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF SUPPORTING (THE LORD IS THE SMALL ETHER), BECAUSE THIS GREATNESS IS OBSERVED IN HIM (FROM ANOTHER SCRIPTURAL PASSAGE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The holding apart, mentioned in the passage: 'He is the bridge, a limitary support of these worlds' (Chānd. 8.4.1 [1]), fits in if the small ether be the Highest Self, because "this greatness is observed" "in him", i.e. in the Highest Self alone who is called 'a support' [2] on the authority of another scriptural passage, viz.: 'At the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī, the sun and the moon stand, held apart' (Bṛh. 3.8.9 [3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

On account of the following reason, viz.: "On account of supporting", by the word 'small ether', the Highest Self alone is to be understood here. Compare: 'Now, he who is the soul is the bridge, a limitary support for keeping these worlds apart' (Chānd. 8.4.1). The sense is: (The soul is) 'a bridge',—or, the cause of the non-intermixture,—and a 'limitary support',—or that which separates,—'for keeping apart'—i.e. for preventing the intermixture or splitting asunder 'of these worlds', or of the worlds separated from one another as relating to the soul (i.e. internal), and as relating to the gods (i.e. external). The sense is that as "this greatness", viz. supporting, "is observed" in the Highest Self in another scriptural passage, so here, too, the small ether, the limitary support of all the worlds, is known to be the Highest Self. The other scriptural passage is to the effect: 'At the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī, the sun and the moon stand held apart' (Bṛh. 3.8.9). Similarly, there is a passage: 'He is the Lord of all, he is the Lord of the worlds, he is the bridge, the limitary support for keeping these worlds apart' (Bṛh. 4.4.22 [4]).

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] C.S.S. ed. slightly different, p. 14, viz.: '*Asya ca mahimno dhṛtyākhyasya . . . .*'

[3] Ś, R, Bh.

[4] Correct quotation: '*Eṣa sarveśvara eṣa bhūtādhipatir eṣa bhūta-pālaḥ eṣa setuḥ . . .*'. Vide Bṛh. 4.4.22, p. 246.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 15 in the commentaries of Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha. Resulting meaning same, although the meaning of words different, viz.: 'asya' means 'of the Lord' and 'asmin' means in the small ether. Hence the sūtra: 'Because supporting, which is a greatness of him (viz. the Lord), is observed in it (viz. in the small ether)'.[1]

SŪTRA 17

"AND BECAUSE IT IS WELL-KNOWN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because the word 'ether' is well-known to be denoting the Highest Self as well,—as in the passages: 'The ether, verily, is the revealer of name and form' (Chānd. 8.14.1[2]), 'All these beings, forsooth, arise from the ether alone' (Chānd. 1.9.1[3]),—the small ether is none but the Highest Self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Again, the small ether should be understood to be none but the Highest Self. Why? Because the word 'ether' is well-known to be denoting the Highest Self as well. Where? In the passages: 'The ether, verily, is the revealer of name and form' (Chānd. 8.14.1), 'All these beings, forsooth, arise from the ether alone' (Chānd. 1.9.1).

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz.: 'Because (the Lord) is celebrated (in other Upaniṣads, viz. Mahopaniṣad, Kaivalya-upaniṣad and the rest), to be an object to be worshipped as abiding in the small lotus, (the small ether is the Lord)'[4].

[1] Śrī. B. 1.3.15, pp. 308-9, Part 1.
ŚK. B. 1.3.15, pp. 437-8, Part 5; B.B. 1.3.16.
[2] Ś. [3] Ś, R, Bh.
[4] ŚK., 1.3.16, p. 438, Part 5.

SŪTRA 18

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF A REFERENCE TO THE OTHER, (VIZ. THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL), HE (IS THE SMALL ETHER), (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF IMPOSSIBILITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that "on account of a reference" to the individual soul as well in the middle of the text about the 'small one', viz. in the passage: 'This serene being having arisen from this body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in its own form. This is the soul, said he' (Chānd. 8.3.4[1]), let the individual soul be the 'small one',—

(We reply:) 'no', "because of the impossibility" of the qualities of freedom from sins and the rest,[2] on the part of the individual soul.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected that "on account of a reference" to the individual soul by the term 'serene being' in the middle of the text about the small ether, viz. in the passage: 'This serene being, having arisen from this body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in its own form. This is the soul, said he. This is immortal, fearless' (Chānd. 8.3.4), let "him" alone be the small ether,—

(We reply:) 'No'. Why? "Because of impossibility", i.e. because the above-mentioned qualities of freedom from sins and the rest are impossible on the part of the individual soul.

SŪTRA 19

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT FROM WHAT IS SUBSEQUENT, (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL MAY BE MEANT HERE), (WE REPLY:) BUT (THAT SUBSEQUENT PASSAGE REFERS TO THE SOUL SO FAR ONLY) IT HAS ITS REAL NATURE MANIFEST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that "from what is subsequent", i.e. from Prajāpati's statement referring to the individual soul, the eight-fold

[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. [2] Vide Chānd. 8.1.5.

qualities of freedom from sins and the rest are known to belong to the individual soul as well, hence let it alone be the small ether,—

We reply: The Highest Self, endowed with the above-mentioned qualities and having His real nature ever manifest, is the 'small one'; but not the individual soul, having its real nature manifest,[1] (not always, but only during release).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Here the word 'small' is to be supplied from the main aphorism,[2] and the words 'he, no' from the preceding one.[3] If it be objected: This is impossible. "From what is subsequent" to the doctrine of the 'small', i.e. from the statement of Prajāpati, the individual soul should be known as endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest. Hence, here too let it alone be the 'small one', endowed with the qualities of freedom from sins and the rest,—

(We reply:) "No". There, viz. in the passage: 'Having attained the form of Highest light, it is completed in its own form' (Chānd. 8.3.4), the individual soul which has its real nature manifest, is intended to be designated. The word "but" (in the sūtra) clearly indicates the great difference between that which has its real nature manifest and the 'small one' the real nature of which is ever unveiled and which is ever beyond the conventional distinctions of bondage and release. Thus the statement of Prajāpati (Chānd. 8.7.1) teaches the individual soul as possessing the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest,—the soul which has its real attributes concealed by the states of waking and the rest, rooted on karmas, meritorious or non-meritorious, and existent from all eternity; and which has its real nature manifest through the attainment of the Highest Self, caused by meditation on Him. But the text about the 'small one' (Chānd. 8.1.5) teaches the Highest Self as possessing the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest,—the Self who has His nature and attributes ever manifest, and who is denoted by the term 'small ether'.[3]

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[1] The contrast is between the *nityāvirbhūta-svarūpa Paramātman* and the *āvirbhūta-svarūpa jīvātman*. See V.K. below.

[2] Viz. Br. Sū. 1.3.14. [3] Viz. Br. Sū. 1.3.18.

[3] That is, the Highest Self is *always* possessed of the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest, while the individual soul is *not always* possessed of them, but only when its real nature comes to be manifested. Hence the 'small one', which is *always* possessed of these attributes cannot be the individual soul.

The meaning of the scriptural text (Chānd. 8.3.4) is as follows: Just as the eye,—enveloped in deep darkness and hence unable to perform its own special function of making known objects like clothes, ornaments and the rest,—having attained the ever-unenveloped sun, is completed in its own form and able to perform its own special function of manifesting its own objects,—so the individual soul, 'having attained', i.e. having completely attained, near itself, the 'highest', i.e. the Being different from the sentient individual soul and the non-sentient, 'light', i.e. the real nature of the Whole the revealer of all, is 'completed' in its real nature as knowledge, different from the body, the sense-organs and the rest and endowed with its own bliss,—as such it is said to have its real nature manifest (āvir-bhūta-svarūpa). The word 'āvirbhūta-svarūpa' is to be explained as 'one whose real nature has become manifest'. Moreover, as 'being a bridge', 'being the limitary support of all worlds', and 'being the controller of the sentient and the non-sentient' are not possible even on the part of the individual soul which has its real nature manifest, so the small ether can never be supposed to be the individual soul. In the doctrine of the 'small' (Chānd. 8.1.5), the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest, which are special to one who has this real nature *ever* manifest, are mentioned; while in the doctrine taught by Prajāpati (Chānd. 8.7.1), only those that are special to that which has its nature manifest (and not *ever* manifest). Hence, the reason 'because of impossibility' (mentioned in Br. Sū. 1.3.18) remains in force.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different, viz.: 'If it be said . . . . . , (then we reply) No, but (the passage in question refers to the soul only so far) as its real nature has become manifest (i.e. so far it has become Brahman).[1] Thus, according to Śaṃkara, the statement of Prajāpati (Chānd. 8.7.1) does not really refer to the individual soul, but to Brahman. According to Nimbārka, however, as we have seen, it refers to the freed soul, which too is different from Brahman.

[1] Ś.B. 1.3.19, pp. 333 *et seq.*

Bhāskara

He, too, points out that the statement of Prajāpati does not refer to the individual soul *as such*, but to the soul which has become the Supreme Soul in nature.[1]

SŪTRA 20

"AND THE REFERENCE HAS A DIFFERENT PURPOSE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The reference" to the individual soul is for showing that the Supreme Soul is the cause of the manifestation of the real nature of the individual soul.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: If the small ether be the Supreme Soul having His real nature ever-manifest, then the reference to the individual soul in the text about the 'small one', viz. in the passage: 'Now, this serene being, having arisen from this body' (Chānd. 8.3.4), must have a purport,—the author replies here:

The word "and" (in the sūtra) implies possibility. Just as on attaining the sun, the eye, overpowered so long by darkness, is completed in its real form, so on attaining the highest light, i.e. the small ether, the individual soul, having so long its real nature and qualities like freedom from sins and the rest hidden by the beginningless māyā, is completed in its own special form. Thus, the reference to the individual soul in the statement of Prajāpati is simply for showing that the small ether is the cause of the manifestation of the real form of the individual soul, and not for proving that the small ether is the individual soul itself.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz.: 'And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different purpose (viz. the determining of the nature of Brahman)'[2]. According to Nimbārka, however, as we have seen,

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[1] Bh. B. 1.3.19, p. 58.

[2] Ś.B. 1.3.20, p. 339; Bh. B. 1.3.20, p. 58.

the purpose is to show that Brahman is the cause of the manifestation of the real nature of the soul.

SŪTRA 21

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL DECLARATION OF WHAT IS SMALL (THE LORD IS NOT THE SMALL ETHER), (WE REPLY:) THAT HAS BEEN SAID."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"If it be objected that on account of the scriptural declaration of what is small", the all-pervasive Being cannot be understood here,—(we reply:) the answer to this has already been given.[1]

Vedānta-kaustubha

"If it be objected that on account of the scriptural declaration of what is small" in the passage: 'Small is the ether within it' (Chānd. 8.1.1), let the individual soul alone, which is atomic in size, be the 'small one',—

(We reply:) The answer to this has been given under the aphorism: 'Because (Brahman) is to be conceived thus, as in the case of the ether' (Br. Sū. 1.2.7).

SŪTRA 22

"AND BECAUSE OF THE IMITATION OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And because of the imitation" "of that", i.e. of that which has its real nature ever manifest, in accordance with the passage: 'He alone shining, everything shines' (Kaṭha 5.15; Muṇḍ. 2.2.10; Śvet. 6.14[2]), the individual soul, the imitator, cannot be the 'small one', having its real nature ever-manifest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author says that for this reason, too, the individual soul is not the small ether.

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[1] Vide Br. Sū. 1.2.7.

[2] Ś, Bh.

Because of the imitation "of that", i.e. of the small ether having the eight-fold attributes ever manifest, by that which has its attributes of freedom from sins and the rest manifest (and not *ever* manifest) the 'small one' is none but the Highest Self. Just as in the Muṇḍaka, declaring the imitation of the Lord by all in the passage: 'He alone shining, everything shines' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.10); and declaring further that everything is to be manifested by the Lord in the passage: 'Through his light all this shines' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.10), all things which are imitators and objects to be manifested cannot be the object which is imitated and the object which manifests,—so the individual soul, mentioned by Prajāpati, and an imitator, cannot be Brahman, denoted by the term 'small', and object to be imitated.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. according to them, the sūtras 22-23 form a new adhikaraṇa, designating that the passage Muṇḍaka 2.2.10 refers not to a luminous substance, but to the Supreme Soul.[1] But according to Nimbārka, they form parts of the preceding adhikaraṇa, setting forth additional arguments as to why the 'small ether' is none but the Supreme Soul.

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

According to all, the word 'anukṛteḥ' means 'because of similarity'. That is, the individual soul is not the 'small one' or Brahman, because it is only similar to Him.[2]

SŪTRA 23

"MOREOVER (THIS IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI."[3]

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Also Smṛti declares: 'They have come to attain equality of attributes with me' (Gītā 14.2[4]).

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[1] Ś.B. 1.3.22, pp. 340 ff.; Bh. B. 1.3.22, pp. 58 *et seq.*

[2] Śrī. B. 1.3.21, p. 313, Part 1, '*Tad-anukāras tat-sāmyam*'.
ŚK. B. 1.3.21, pp. 444-5, Part 5; G.B. 1.3.22.

[3] C.S.S. ed., p. 15, reads '*Api smaryyate*'.

[4] R, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Smṛti declares the equality of the individual soul, freed from all bondage, with the Supreme Soul, in the passage: 'They have come to attain equality of attributes with me' (Gītā 14.2). Hence, it is established that the small ether is none but the Supreme Soul.

Here ends the section entitled 'The small' (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. 'Api ca smaryyate'. Interpretation different, viz.—'Further, Smṛti (viz. Gītā 15.12, etc.) declares (the Soul to be the cause of the manifestation of all)'.[1]

Rāmānuja and Baladeva

Reading: 'Api smaryyate'.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading: 'Api ca smaryyate', i.e. 'Moreover Smṛti declares (that the Lord is to be meditated on as abiding in the heart-lotus [3])'.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled 'What is measured'. (Sūtras 24-25)

SŪTRA 24

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEXT ONLY, WHAT IS MEASURED (IS THE LORD)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"What is measured", i.e. what is of the size of a thumb, is none but the Highest Person, "on account of the text": 'The Lord of past and future' (Kaṭha 4.13 [4]).

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[1] Ś, B. 1.3.23, p. 343; Bh. B. 1.3.23, p. 59.
[2] Śrī. B. 1.3.23, p. 313, Part 1; G.B. 1.3.23.
[3] ŚK. B. 1.3.23, p. 445, Part 5.
[4] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been established that Brahman is to be meditated on as the 'small one'. Now, the author points out that Brahman is to be meditated on as of the size of merely a thumb.

In the Kaṭha-vallī, we read: 'The Person, of the size of merely a thumb, dwells in the midst of the soul' (Kaṭha 4.12); again: 'The Person, of the size of merely a thumb, smokeless like light' (Kaṭha 4.13); again: 'The Person, of the size of merely a thumb, the inner soul, is ever seated in the heart of beings' (Kaṭha 6.17). Here, a doubt arises as to whether the Person of the size of merely a thumb is the individual soul or the Highest Person. The *prima facie* view is as follows: The Person of the size of merely a thumb is the individual soul in accordance with the Śvetāśvatara-text, viz. : 'The lord of the vital-breaths, who is of the size of merely a thumb and of a form like the sun, moves about through his own works' (Śvet. 5.7*d*–8*a*); as well as in accordance with the Smṛti passage, viz.: 'Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of Satyavāna, the person, of the size of merely a thumb, tied to the noose and brought under his control' (Mahā. 3.16763 [1]).

With regard to this, we reply: "What is measured", i.e. the Person of the size of merely a thumb, mentioned in the Kaṭha-vallī, is none but the Supreme Soul. Why? "On account of the text", i.e. on account of the text: 'The lord of past and future' (Kaṭha 4.13). The sense is this: Although 'being of the size of merely a thumb', mentioned in the above Scripture and Smṛti texts, is here perceived to be a characteristic mark of the individual soul, yet that mark is set aside,[2]—this is the sense.

If it be objected: It being impossible for the individual soul, which is by nature atomic in size, to be of the size of a thumb, and there being the mark: 'tied to the noose', the individual soul can be of the size of merely a thumb only if its subtle body be meant.[3] But it

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[1] P. 806, line 5, vol. 1.

[2] That is, although in the above scriptural and Smṛti texts, the individual soul has been designated as of the size of a *thumb*, yet in other numerous passages, it is designated as of the size of an *atom* merely. Hence, the above description is set aside.

[3] That is, since the individual soul cannot be of the size of a *thumb*, being declared to be *atomic* in size, the designation of it as of the size of a thumb merely means that its subtle body is so, and not that it itself is so.

is impossible for Brahman, the topic of discussion, to be of the size of merely a thumb, even though repeatedly taught by Scripture,—

(We reply:) No, it being possible for Brahman to be so, in accordance with the wish of His devotees, and on account of His connection with place (viz. the heart). With regard to this point, a preceding aphorism (viz. Br. Sū. 1.2.7) may be consulted. Moreover, on account also of a text referring to the Person of the size of merely a thumb, viz.: 'Let one draw him forth from his own body with firmness, as a pith from a reed. Let one know him' (Kaṭha 6.17), the Supreme Soul alone is of the size of merely a thumb. Thus, the meaning of the text is as follows: The individual soul, entitled to know Brahman, the agent, endowed with a right discrimination between the soul and the non-soul,—implied by the phrase: 'from his own body',—'should draw forth', i.e. should lift up or put outside,—through intense prayer again,—'him', i.e. the Person of the size of a thumb, the object and known first through meditation to be within the heart, 'from his own body', i.e. from the body known as his own, 'as the pith from a reed'; then 'he should know him with firmness'. If this be so, the Person of the size of merely a thumb, the object to be worshipped, must be other than the worshipper himself.

SŪTRA 25

"BUT (THE LORD IS SAID TO BE OF THE SIZE OF MERELY A THUMB) IN REFERENCE TO THE HEART (OF MEN), BECAUSE MEN (ALONE) ARE ENTITLED (TO SCRIPTURE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Lord can very well be of the size of merely a thumb, "in reference to the heart" of the worshippers. To the objection, viz. The size of the heart in animals being not fixed, how can Brahman be of the size of a thumb in reference to the heart?—the author replies: "Because men (alone) are entitled (to Scripture)".

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is justifying the contention that Brahman can be of the size of merely a thumb.

Even an all-pervasive Being can be of the size of merely a thumb, "with reference to the heart", i.e. with reference to the heart, or the heart-lotus which is of the size of merely a thumb, of His own devotees, devoted to Him alone and to none else. The sense is that this designation is indeed proper like the designation of the Lord as 'one who makes three strides' (Trivikrama), in reference to the three worlds.[1]

Or else, (an alternative explanation of the word "hṛdyapekṣayā"):

As from the word "heart" ("hṛd") alone the size of that which is within it (viz. the Lord) is known, the words "in reference to" ("apekṣayā") are to be understood as: 'in reference to the worshippers', i.e. in accordance with their wish.[2]

To the objection, viz. As the size of the heart differs in accordance with the difference of living creatures, the text about (the Person of the size of merely) a thumb cannot be explained in reference to the heart,—we reply: "Because men (alone) are entitled" to Scripture. This is the meaning:[3] 'That to which men are entitled' (make 'manuṣyādhikāra'), 'the state of that' (make 'manuṣyādhikāratva'), on account of that (make 'manuṣyādhikāratvāt'). The meaning of the scriptural text concerning (the Person of the size of merely) a thumb is explicable in reference to the heart of men. Although Scripture is of a universal application,[4] yet as men alone can be worshippers and seekers, they alone are entitled to it. Hence, no contradiction arises here even if the hearts of elephants and lice be not of the size of merely a thumb, as they are not entitled to works enjoined in Scripture and Smṛti, as established in the sixth chapter, determining the conditions of being entitled to sacrifices and so on.[5] Thus, it is

[1] '*Trivikrama*' is an epithet of *Viṣṇu*, who paced the three worlds in three steps in His *Vāmana* or Dwarf incarnation. The sense is, that just as the all-pervading Lord is said to have three strides only, so He may be said to be of the size of a thumb only.

[2] I.e. the Lord manifests Himself as of the size of a thumb to please his devotees.

[3] The compound '*manuṣyādhikāratvāt*' is to be explained as follows.

[4] That is, scriptural mandates are to be followed by all.

[5] Vide Pū. MI. Sū. 6.1.4-5, pp. 504–7, Part 1.

established that the Supreme Soul alone is the Person of the size of merely a thumb.

Here ends the section entitled 'What is measured' [1] (3).

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled 'The deity'. (Sūtras 26–30)

SŪTRA 26

"EVEN THOSE WHO ARE ABOVE THEM (I.E. MEN) (ARE ENTITLED TO THE WORSHIP OF BRAHMAN), (SO) BĀDARĀYAṆA (HOLDS), BECAUSE OF POSSIBILITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The gods and the rest also, who are above men, are entitled to such a worship of Brahman,—so thinks the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa."

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said in the last section that the text about the Person of the size of merely a thumb is explicable in reference to the heart of men, as men are entitled to Scripture. Now, incidentally, the question as to whether or not gods too are entitled to the worship of Brahman is being considered.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, we read: 'Whoever among the gods was awakened to this, he alone became that; likewise among the sages' (Bṛh. 1.4.10). (The sense is:) Whoever among the gods, and similarly among the sages 'was awakened', i.e. directly perceived Brahman, 'he alone' attained the nature of Brahman. Here, on the doubt, viz. whether or not the gods are entitled to the worship of Brahman, which is a means to attaining His nature, if the suggestion be: As men are entitled to Scripture; and as Indra and the rest are incapable of practising meditation,—seeing that they, whose bodies consist of sacred texts, are not possessed of physical bodies,[2]—the worship of Brahman is not possible on the part of the gods,—we reply: Such a worship of Brahman is possible on the part of gods as well, who are "above" men,—so the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks. Why?

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[1] The section entitled 'What is measured' is resumed in sūtra 1.3.40.

[2] That is, in order that one might carry on meditation, one must have a physical body, which a god lacks. Hence a god cannot practise meditation.

"On account of possibility," i.e. because the worship and the like of Brahman, leading to salvation which is characterized by the attainment of Brahman and is preceded by the cessation of all retributive experience due to their own works, is possible on their part as well. Thus, although they have supermundane and celestial enjoyment, yet since such an enjoyment is subject to the faults of non-permanency, surpassability and the rest, its cessation, one day or other, is possible; hence, a desire for salvation, too, is possible on their part, by reason of their learning the unsurpassability, supreme blissfulness and permanency of the attainment of the nature of Brahman; and finally through this desire for salvation, a worship of Brahman, too, is possible on their part [1] there being proofs establishing their right to the worship of Brahman, viz. the texts: 'For one hundred and one years, forsooth Indra dwelt with Prajāpati, practising chastity' (Chānd. 8.11.3), 'Verily, Bhṛgu, the son of Varuṇa, approached his father Varuṇa, (with the request) "Sir, teach me Brahman"' (Tait. 3.1.1) and so on. Similarly, corporality, too, is possible on their part in accordance with text about the evolution of name and form,[2] as well as in accordance with sacred formulæ, explanatory and glorificatory passages and tradition.[3] Thus it is declared by Scripture: 'When about to say "vaṣat", he should meditate on that deity for whom the offering is taken' (Ait. Br. 11.8 [4]). Here, no meaning of the text being possible unless the god referred to, be possessed of a body,[5] the god must be understood to have a body. In tradition too, the sun, the moon, Vasu and the rest are well-known to have bodies. The sons of Kuntī were born from gods like Dharma and the rest, possessed of bodies.[6]

[1] That is, just as in the case of a man, the non-permanency of the earthly enjoyment leads him to seek for salvation, which yields a permanent fruit, and that, again, leads him to worship the Lord as a means thereto, so exactly the non-permanency of the heavenly enjoyment leads a god to seek for salvation, which leads him to worship the Lord.

[2] Vide Chānd. 6.3.2–4. [3] *Mantras, artha-vāda* and *itihāsa*.

[4] *Ānandāśrama* ed., p. 305.
These are *mantra* and *artha-vāda*.

[5] Because, we cannot meditate on the deity, unless he possesses a body. To meditate is to meditate on a certain definite form. Cf. Śrī. B. 1.3.25. '*Na hi nirviśeṣa-devatā dhiyam adhirohati.*'

[6] *Kuntī*, the wife of *Pāṇḍu*, had, with his approval, three sons, *Yudhiṣṭhira*, *Bhīma* and *Arjuna*, by the three deities, *Dharma*, *Vāyu* and *Indra* respectively. Vide Mahā. 1.4760 *et seq.* (chap. 123), pp. 174 *et seq.*, vol. 1.

In the Purāṇas, too, there is a multitude of legends of various kinds about them, possessing bodies. The verses from those chapters are not quoted here for fear of increasing the bulk of the book.

SŪTRA 27

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (IF THE GODS BE POSSESSED OF BODIES) A CONTRADICTION WITH REGARD TO WORKS (WILL RESULT), (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF THE OBSERVATION OF THE ASSUMPTION OF MANY (BODIES BY THE GODS, ETC.)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: Since the worship of Brahman is not possible without a body, their corporality must surely be admitted. But if that be so, it will give rise to a "contradiction with regard to works",—

(We reply:) "no" such objection can arise. Why? "Because of the observation of the assumption" simultaneously of many bodies even by one and the same deity.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Although the corporality of the gods, as of us, is an inevitable conclusion, as the activities in connection with the repeated practice of 'hearing', 'thinking' and 'meditating' are possible only on the part of one who is endowed with a body, sense-organs and mind, and as in that way alone it is possible for them to be the benefactors of sacrifices, through their actual presence, like sacrificing priests and the rest,[1]—yet if they be possessed of bodies, there will be "a contradiction with regard to works", viz. sacrifices and the rest, since the simultaneous presence of one body (i.e. of one god) in many sacrifices is impossible,[2]—

(We reply:) "No". Why? "Because of the observation of many worships."[3] "Many", i.e. of various forms, "worship", "on account

[1] That is, if gods be possessed of bodies, then they may themselves be present at sacrifices, like the priests, and conduce to their proper performance, etc.

[2] That is, one and the same god is simultaneously invoked in many sacrifices, but evidently, he cannot be simultaneously present in many places.

[3] The compound '*aneka-pratipatter darśanāt*' is explained as follows.

of the observation of that". Thus, just as one and the same teacher is found to be saluted simultaneously by many saluting disciples, just as one and the same sun is found to be worshipped simultaneously by many worshipping men, so there is no inconsistency in supposing that different sacrificers offer their own objects to one and the same corporal deity who abides in his own place. Hence no harm is done to sacrifices.

Or else, there may be another construction of the phrase "anekapratipatter darśanāt". If it be objected that there will be "a contradiction with regard to works" in the stated way,—(we reply:) "No". Why? "On account of the assumption of many", i.e. on account of the assumption of many forms, or on account of the attainment of many bodies, by one and the same person who is perfected by Yoga. Why? "Because of the observation" of it in Scripture. Thus, in the Mokṣa-dharma,[1] a question being put forth concerning the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga thus: '"Reverend father, it behoves you to tell me in particular about the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga. Everything, O knower of sacred duties, is known to you, O best among the Kurus"!' (Mahā. 12.11037[2]), the text, having set forth an eulogy of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, goes on: '"Those who are endowed with the power of the Yoga and are self-controlled and majestic, enter, O Pārtha, through Yoga into Prajāpatis, sages, gods and the great elements. Neither Yama, nor the angry Antaka,[3] nor the supremely mighty Mṛtyu lords it, O king, over the Yoga of unmeasured might. A yogin, O mightiest of the Bhāratas, can, by reason of attaining strength,[4] create many bodies for himself, and move about the world by them all. By some he may attain (i.e. enjoy) objects, by others, he may practise a severe penance, and he may again contract them, as the sun does the multitude of its rays' (Mahā. 12.11060–64[5]).

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[1] Name of a section of the twelfth book of the *Mahābhārata*, from chap. 174 to the end.

[2] P. 754, line 27, vol. 3.

[3] Name of *Yama*, the god of Death.

[4] Here the *śatṛ*-suffix implies reason.

[5] P. 755, lines 20–23, vol. 3.

SŪTRA 28

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (A CONTRADICTION WILL RESULT) WITH REGARD TO WORD, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN (OF EVERYTHING) FROM IT, ON ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION (I.E. SCRIPTURE) AND INFERENCE (I.E. SMṚTI)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that if the corporality of the gods be admitted, a contradiction will result with regard to the Vedic words denoting them, as these words will become meaningless prior to the origin of the objects (viz. the gods) denoted by them and subsequent to their destruction,—

(We reply:) No such contradiction results, "on account of the origin" of the objects (viz. the gods and the rest) "from it", i.e. from the words alone, denoting eternal prototypes or forms, and serving as reminders to the thought of Prajāpati, in accordance with the following scriptural and Smṛti texts: 'He evolved name and form by means of the Veda' (Tait. Br. 2.6.2.3 [1]), 'A celestial word, without beginning and end, eternal, and composed of the Vedas was omitted by the self-born in the beginning, whence proceeded all activities' (Mahā. 12.8534 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Here, the word 'contradiction' is to be supplied from the preceding aphorism. If it be objected: Very well, there may not be any contradiction with regard to works if the gods be possessed of bodies, still there may be contradiction "with regard to the words" denoting gods and the rest, i.e. with regard to the Vedic forms. That is, on account of the non-eternity of the bodies of the gods,—they being due to karmas—as well as on account of the eternity of the Vedic texts, the eternal relation between a word and its meaning will be

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[1] P. 275, line 9, vol. 2. Reading '. . . . . *rūpe* . . . . .'. R, ŚK.

[2] P. 666, line 22, vol. 3.
Ś, R, Bh.
Reading: '*Anādi-nidhanā vidyā* . . .' *Vaṅgavāsī* ed. reads: '*Anādi-nidhanā vidyā* . . . *Ādau deva-mayī vidyā* . . .' P. 1635, vol. 2. *Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja* and *Bhāskara* too read '*Anādi-nidhanā nityā* . . .' like Nimbārka.

impossible, and hence a contradiction will result between the object which is limited in time and the word which is true for all times. If it be said that owing to the force of the word, the object too is eternal,—then a contradiction will result with regard to the texts which prove its non-eternity: if it be said that for the sake of the object, the word is non-eternal,—then there will arise a contradiction with regard to the texts which prove its eternity.—

(We reply:) "No". There is no contradiction with regard to the word as well. Why? "On account of the origin from it", i.e. on account of the origin, or the rise, of the gods and the rest from this, i.e. from the Vedic words, denoting the eternal prototypes of gods, etc. and serving as a reminder to the thought of the creator regarding the forms of gods, etc. to be created at the time of each particular creation. Thus, when a certain great personality, who has accumulated a mass of merit and desires to become Prajāpati, comes to attain lordship through the grace of the Lord, he is called 'Prajāpati'. At the time of creation when individuals like the former gods and the rest are no more, Prajāpati, having learnt the Veda in a manner to be designated hereafter,[1] and having apprehended, like a man arisen from sleep,[2] the particular prototypes of the gods and the rest by means of the lamp-like Veda, i.e. from the Vedic words alone which denote those particular prototypes, creates the later gods, etc. in accordance with those prototypes. Hence there is no room for the alleged contradiction.

If it be objected: What proof is there that Prajāpati creates objects after having known their particular forms from the Vedic words?—we reply: "On account of perception and inference". "Perception" means Scripture, since it is independent of any other proof. "Inference" means Smṛti, since it demonstrates the meaning of Scripture,—on account of these two, i.e. on account of Scripture and Smṛti. First, the scriptural passage is the following; viz.: 'Prajāpati evolved name[3] and form the existent and the non-existent, by means of the Veda' (Tait. Br. 2.6.2.3), likewise: 'He uttered "bhūr", he

[1] Vide Br. Sū. 1.3.30.

[2] That is, when a man arises from sleep at night he can see nothing until he lights a lamp. Similarly, at the beginning of creation, the creator knows particular objects from the lamp-like light of the *Veda*, i.e. knows the forms of those objects and creates them anew accordingly.

[3] The text omits '*nāma*'.

created the earth' (Tait. 2.2.4.2 [1]), 'He uttered "bhuva", he created the ether' (Tait. Br. 2.2.4.2-3 [2]) and so on. The Smṛti passage is contained in the Mokṣadharma [3], and beginning: 'The sages read the Vedas day and night by penance' (Mahā. 12.8533*b* [4]), continues: 'A celestial word, without beginning and end, eternal and composed of the Vedas, was emitted by the self-born in the beginning, whence proceeded all activities.[5] The Lord created the names of the sages and the creations which are in the Vedas, as well as the various forms of beings and the procedure of acts, from the Vedic words alone in the beginning. At the end of the night, the Unborn One bestowed the names of sages and the creations which are in the Vedas to others. The things that are celebrated in the world, namely, difference of names, austerity, work and sacrifice'.[6]

Similarly, there are other passages, viz. 'In the beginning the Supreme Lord created the names and forms of beings, as well as the procedures of actions, from the Vedic word alone' [7] (V.P. 1.5.62), 'In the beginning, he created the names and actions of all as separate, as well as the different established orders,[8] from the Vedic word alone' (Manu. 1.21 [9]) and so on.[10]

[1] P. 195, lines 7-8, vol. 2.
[2] *Op. cit.*, lines 9-10.
[3] See footnote 1, p. 182.
[4] P. 663, line 22, vol. 3.
[5] For correct quotation, see footnote 2, p. 183.
[6] P. 666, lines 23–26, vol. 3.
Reading: '*Nama rūpaṅ ca bhūtānāṃ karmāṇāṅ ca pravartayan . . . . śārvaryy-ante sujātānām . . . .*'
Vaṅgavāsī ed. reads: ' . . . . *pravartanam . . . . sujātānām*'. P. 1635, vol. 2.
[7] P. 50
Variant readings: '*Devādīnāṃ cakāra saḥ*'.
[8] Cf. *Kulluka-bhaṭṭa's* Commentary on the *Manu-Smṛti* (p. 10): '*Pṛthak-saṃsthāś ca iti. Laukikīś ca vyavasthāḥ, kulālasya ghaṭa-nirmāṇam, kuvindasya paṭa-nirmāṇam ityādika-vibhāgena nirmitavān.*'
[9] P. 9.
[10] The sum and substance of the argument is as follows: The *prima facie* view is that if the gods be possessed of bodies, then, since these bodies, are non-eternal, the gods must be so. But the Vedic words which denote the gods are eternal. Hence there cannot be any eternal connection between the non-eternal gods and the eternal Vedic words, i.e. these Vedic words cannot denote gods and the rest, and must be meaningless.
The answer to this objection is as follows: The individual gods are indeed non-eternal, but this does not prove that the eternal Vedic words are meaningless, for what they denote is not the *individual* (*vyakti*) which is non-eternal, but the

SŪTRA 29

"FOR THIS VERY REASON, THE ETERNITY (OF THE VEDAS FOLLOWS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The creation by Prajāpati is preceded by the (Vedic) word. "For this" reason the "eternity" of the Veda is established.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having apprehended the objection, viz.: In spite of the eternity of the Veda,—it not being mentioned as something created,—the Vedic words, denoting the forms of gods and the rest, are concerned with non-eternal objects; and having removed the consequent false notion regarding the non-eternity of these as well,[1] the author is confirming, incidentally, the eternity of the Veda.

"The eternity" of the word, i.e. of the Veda, follows "for this very reason", i.e. also because of its priority to the creation by Prajāpati. Words like 'Vaiśvāmitra', 'Kāṭhaka' and so on etymologically mean simply what has been uttered by them. Thus 'what has been said by Viśvāmitra is Vaiśvāmitra', 'what has been said by Kaṭha is Kāṭhaka', and so on. At the end of the universal dissolution, Prajāpati, having conceived the forms, powers and the rest of Viśvāmitra and others from the Vedic words 'Viśvāmitra', etc. mentioned in texts like: 'He chooses the maker of sacred formula', 'This is a hymn of Viśvāmitra' (Tait. Saṃ. 5.2.3 [2]) and so on; and having created them as endowed with those particular forms and those particular powers, appoints them to the task of revealing those particular sacred formulæ (mantras).

Thus given the powers by him, they too, having practised suitable penances, read the sacred formulæ,—which form portions of the Veda, which are eternally existent, and which were revealed by Viśvāmitra and others of former ages,—perfect in their sounds and accents without having read them or learnt them from the recitation of a teacher.

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type (*ākṛti*) which is eternal. It is in accordance with these eternal types, denoted by the eternal Vedic words, that the non-eternal individuals are created anew at the beginning of each creation.

[1] That is, since the Vedic words denote non-eternal objects, it might be thought that these words themselves are non-eternal.

[2] P. 24, lines 21-22, vol. 2.

As such, though they are makers of the sacred formulæ, the eternity of the Veda is perfectly justifiable.[1]

SŪTRA 30

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF HAVING THE SAME NAME AND FORM, (THERE IS) NO CONTRADICTION EVEN WITH REGARD TO THE RECURRENCE (OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION (I.E. SCRIPTURE) AND ON ACCOUNT OF SMṚTI."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Thus, there is "no contradiction even with regard to the recurrence", or the creation and destruction of the material world. Why? Because the objects which are to be created in the beginning of each age have the same names and forms as those in the past ages, "on account of perception" (i.e. scriptural text), viz. 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before' (Ṛg. V. 10.190.3 [2]), and 'on account of Smṛti', viz. 'Just as the various signs of the seasons are seen to be the very same in their regular recurrence, so are the beings in the successive ages' (V.P. 1.5.64 [3]).

[1] That is, the Vedic *mantras* are said to be composed by different sages like *Viśvāmitra* and so on; and hence it may be thought that these sages being non-eternal, the *mantras* composed by them must also be so, i.e. the *Veda* must be non-eternal. But the fact is that the sages are not really the *composers* of the *mantras*, which are really eternal; but when they are said to be the composers of those *mantras*, it is simply meant that they utter, i.e. *reveal* the eternally existent *mantra* in different ages. Thus, e.g. *Viśvāmitra* in one particular age utters a *mantra* which is then said to be *Vaiśvāmitra*. Then, in course of time, *Viśvāmitra* perishes, but the *mantra* remains intact; and in the next age, a new *Viśvāmitra* is deputed to utter and reveal the very same *mantra* and so on. Thus, the *mantra* itself remains unchanged from all eternity, only its revealers change from age to age. Hence the Vedic *mantras* are really eternal and so is the *Veda*.

[2] Pp. 143-4.
Ś, Bh. ŚK, B.

[3] P. 50.
Ś, Bh. Cf. a very similar passage in Mahā. 12.8550, p. 667, lines 9-10, vol. 3, which is the same as the above passage, only reads '*Tathā Brahmaharādiṣu*' in place of '*Tathā bhāvā yugādiṣu*'.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: The view that Prajāpati, having known the particular forms of object by means of the Veda,—in accordance with the maxim of a person arisen from sleep,—[1] creates them as he did before, fits in the case of the periodical dissolution.[2] But since in the case of the total dissolution [3] there is destruction of everything, how can the priority of the Veda to creation be possible? How can also its eternity be possible? How can again the world be preceded by it? The author replies here:

The word "and" (in the sūtra) is meant for removing the doubt. The word "even" implies possibility. That is to say, there is no contradiction whatsoever "even with regard to the recurrence" consisting in a continuous stream of creation and dissolution of the material world, i.e. with regard to the first creation at the end a great dissolution. Why? "On account of having the same name and form." Thus, during the total dissolution, the Lord Vāsudeva, the one mass of a multitude of attributes which are special to Him, eternal, infinite and natural, and possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, having drawn in all the effects, consisting in His own powers (śakti) of the sentient and the non-sentient, as a tortoise draws in its limbs; and having placed them in Himself in a successive order, opposed to that of creation, abides in silence, like a boy who has gathered up his toys. At that time, the Vedas, the objects denoted by them, as well as the forms of the latter, exist in Him, all blended together with Him. Thus, the entire Universe always exists in its cause, viz. Vāsudeva or Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers. There is no such thing as absolute destruction, in accordance with the scriptural text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1). That is, 'My child!' 'this', i.e. the Universe, 'was existent alone', i.e. was non-different from its cause, 'in the beginning',

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[1] See footnote 2, p. 184.

[2] *Naimittika-pralaya.*

[3] *Prākṛta-pralaya.*

Naimittika pralaya means the dissolution of the three worlds when one day of the *Kāryya-brahman* or *Hiraṇyagarbha* comes to an end; while *prākṛta pralaya* means the dissolution of all objects together with the *Kāryya-brahman* himself. Vide Ved. Pari., 7th chap. for the four kinds of *pralayas: nitya, naimittika, prākṛta* and *ātyantika.*

i.e. prior to creation; and that, viz. the cause, denoted by the term 'existent', is 'one only, without a second'. He is without an equal or a superior, indicated respectively by the words 'only' and 'without a second'; and He is to be known also as manifold by nature indeed, since He is the substratum of the sentient and the non-sentient which are His powers. Dissolution means the existence of the effect in the cause in a subtle form; while creation means simply the manifestation of such an effect. At the end of dissolution, the omniscient and all-knowing Lord, having wished first '"May I be many"' (Chānd. 6.2.3; Tait. 2.6.1); having then separated the mass of enjoying souls and the objects of enjoyment, so long merged in Him as His subtle powers; having created all objects from the mahat down to the four-faced Brahmā as He did before; having manifested the eternally existent Vedas; having taught them mentally to Brahmā; and having deputed him to the creation of the Universe, consisting of gods, men and the rest, as it was before, Himself exists as his (Brahmā's) inner soul, as declared by the text: 'Having created it, he entered into that very thing' (Tait. 2.6.1). Brahmā too, who has attained lordship through His grace, having apprehended their forms from the Vedic words, creates gods and the rest. As such, there is no contradiction even with regard to the recurrence,—this is the sense. Just in this consists the non-human origin of the Veda, it having an eternally existent form like the Supreme Brahman. And its eternity means that one, having remembered a particular order of succession, through the impressions generated in his mind by his prior recitations of the Veda in a fixed order, should recite the Veda in that very order.[1]

If it be asked: Whence is this known: We reply: "From perception and from Smṛti". "Perception" means that which destroys the darkness of the heart, i.e. Scripture, viz. 'He who first creates Brahmā and he who, forsooth, delivers the Vedas to him, to that Deity, who is the light of self-knowledge, I, desirous of release, take shelter', (Śvet. 6.18); similarly: 'The creator fashioned, as he did before, the sun and the moon, the heaven, the earth and the ether, and then the sky' (Ṛg. V. 10.190.3). There is a Smṛti passage as well, viz. 'Then

[1] That is, the *Veda* is said to be *apauruṣeya* or of non-human origin, and *nitya* or eternal. Now, the first means that the *Veda* is eternally existent, and is simply revealed, and not created, at the time of each new creation. The second means that it is recited in exactly the same order of succession in different ages all throughout.

a lotus sprang forth from the navel of the sleeping Deity. In that lotus, O holy one, Brahmā was born, fully versed in the Vedas and their parts. He was told by Him "Create beings, O highly learned one"!' 'Just as the various signs of the seasons are seen to be the very same in their regular recurrence, so are the beings in the successive stages' (V.P. 1.5.64), 'Whatever were the names of the sages and (their) knowledge of the Vedas, the same the Unborn One gives to them when they are born at the end of the night. Similarly, the past individual gods are equal to the present gods in names and forms', and so on. Hence, since the gods too may be seekers, there is nothing contradictory in their being entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. Therefore it is established that the gods are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled 'The deity' (7).

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled 'The honey and the rest'. (Sūtras 31-33)

OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtras 31-32)

SŪTRA 31

"ON ACCOUNT OF IMPOSSIBILITY, (THE SUN AND THE REST HAVE) NO RIGHT TO THE (MEDITATIONS ON) THE HONEY AND THE REST, (SO) JAIMINI (THINKS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It being impossible that the object worshipped can be the worshipper himself, the sun and the rest are not entitled to the meditations on the honey, etc.—so "Jaimini" thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been said that the gods are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. Now, the question is being considered whether or not they are entitled to meditations on the honey and the rest.

The meditation on the honey is mentioned in the Chāndogya: 'This sun, verily, is the honey of the gods' (Chānd. 3.1.1) and so on. By the phrase "and so on" (in the sūtra) other meditations in which the gods are the objects worshipped are to be understood. Here a

doubt arises, viz. Whether or not the gods are entitled to the meditations on the honey and the rest. What is reasonable here? Gods like the sun, Vasu and others have "no right" to the meditation on the "honey and the rest",—so the teacher "Jaimini" thinks. Why? "On account of impossibility," i.e. because it is impossible that the sun and the rest which are accepted as the objects to be worshipped in those meditations, can be themselves worshippers.

OPPONENT'S VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 32

"AND BECAUSE OF (THEIR) BEING (WORSHIPPERS) WITH REGARD TO THE LIGHT (I.E. BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And because of (their) being" worshippers "with regard to" Brahman, they are not entitled to the honey-meditation and the rest,—this is the *prima facie* view.

Vedānta-kaustubha

But it is not to be thought that this being the case the gods are without a Lord, because then they, being all of a mutually equal status, will come to be annihilated through vying with one another, and also because the text: 'Through fear the sun arises' (Tait. 2.8.1) will come to be contradicted. The fact is that they are the worshippers of the Highest Self and are themselves worshipped by others. So, the opponent points out here: The gods and the rest, who are the objects to be worshipped in the honey-meditation and the like, being worshippers "with regard to the light", i.e. of the Supreme Brahman, are not to be taken as the worshippers in the honey-meditation, etc.—this is the sense; as declared by the passage: 'That the gods worship as the Light of lights, as life, as immortal' (Bṛh. 4.4.16).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation of the word 'jyotiṣi' different. The sūtra means, according to them: And because (the words 'sun', 'moon', and the

rest) refer to the Light. That is, the sun and the rest are not sentient deities, possessed of bodies, but are mere non-sentient spheres of light; and what is non-sentient cannot be, evidently, entitled to any meditation.[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 33)

SŪTRA 33

"BUT BĀDARĀYAṆA (MAINTAINS) THE EXISTENCE (OF RIGHT ON THE PART OF THE GODS), FOR THERE IS (POSSIBLE LONGING FOR BRAHMAN ON THEIR PART)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it, the author states the correct conclusion. "Bādarāyaṇa" maintains "the existence" of right on the part of the sun, Vasu and the rest, to the honey-meditation and the like as well, "because" a longing for Brahman "is" possible on their parts, consequent on the attainment by them of their respective offices in a future age as well, through the worship of Brahman, their Inner Controller.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having thus set forth the view of Jaimini, his Holiness, wishing to refute it, is stating his own view.

The word "but" precludes the *prima facie* view. The reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" maintains "the existence", i.e. the existence of right on the part of the sun, Vasu and others, to the honey-meditation and the like as well, "because" a longing for Brahman is possible on the part of even the sun and Vasu and the rest in the present age, consequent on their attainment of sun-hood, Vasu-hood and the rest in a future age as well, through the worship of Brahman, their Inner Controller. Thus, here the worship of Brahman being enjoined both in His effected and causal states, the words 'sun' and the rest, imply Brahman, their Inner Controller; and hence it is possible for the very same Vasu and others to be the objects to be worshipped and attained; since the concluding text: 'He who knows this Brahma-Upaniṣad' (Chānd. 3.11.3) proves that the words 'sun' and the rest, imply

[1] Ś.B. 1.3.32, pp. 336-67; Bh. B. 1.3.32, p. 66.

Brahman. Thus, Brahman alone being the object to be worshipped even in the honey-meditation and the like, the text: 'That the gods worship as the light of lights, as life, as immortality' (Bṛh. 4.4.6) is perfectly consistent. It cannot be said also that as the fruit of the honey-meditation is the attainment of Vasu-hood and the rest, and as Vasu and the rest have already attained that, they cannot be seekers, or wish for these again,—because in ordinary experience, a desire for wealth in a future life is found on the part of those who are rich in the present life. Hence, it is established that the gods are entitled to the honey-meditation and the like.[1]

Here ends the section entitled 'The honey and the rest' (8).

[1] The *Madhu-vidyā*, or the representation of the sun as the honey extracted from all the *Vedas*, as taught first to *Prajāpati* by *Brahmā*, then to *Manu* by *Prajāpati*, and then to his descendants by Manu, and to *Uddālaka Āruṇi* by his father (Vide Chānd. 3.11.4) is given in Chand 3.1.3.11. It begins: 'Verily, the sun is the honey of the gods. Its cross-beam is the heaven. The ether is the honey-comb. The rays are the sons (i.e. the sons of bees)' (Chānd. 3.1.1), and goes on to represent the eastern rays of the sun, its red form, as extracted from the *Ṛg-veda*; the southern rays of the sun, its white form, from the *Yajur-veda*; the western rays of the sun, its dark form, from the *Sāma-veda*; the northern rays of the sun, its exceedingly dark form, from the *Atharva-veda*; and the upwards rays of the sun, its centre, from the *Upaniṣads* (Chānd. 3.1–3.5). After that the different forms of the sun are designated as the objects of enjoyment for *Vasus*, *Rudras*, *Ādityas*, *Maruts* and *Sādhyas* who respectively enter into and arise from those forms (Chānd. 3.6–3.10). Finally, in the concluding section the sun is represented as standing in the middle, without rising or setting, and as neither rising nor setting for one knows this *Brahma-upaniṣad* (= secret of *Brahman*) (Chānd. 3.11).

(1) Here the opponent's view is that *Vasus* and the rest are enjoined here as the objects of worship (Chānd. 3.6–3.10) and hence they themselves cannot be the worshippers.

The answer to this objection is that the *Madhu-vidyā* has two sections. The first section (viz. Chānd. 3.6–3.10) designates *Brahman* in His effected state, i.e. as appearing in the forms of *Vasus* and the rest. The second section (viz. Chānd. 3.11) designates *Brahman* in His causal state, i.e. as abiding in the sun as its Inner Self. And the concluding designation of the *Madhu-vidyā* as a '*Brahma-upaniṣad*', proves that the meditations on the *Vasus* and the rest too are really meditations on Brahman as abiding within them. Hence Brahman is really the object to be meditated throughout in the *Madhu-vidyā*, and as such *Vasus* and the rest can be worshippers here, i.e. can practise the *Madhu-vidyā*.

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different, viz. 'Bādarāyaṇa (maintains) the existence (of right on the part of the gods), for (although the gods have no right to the Madhu-vidyā and the rest, in which they themselves are implicated, yet there is (their right to the pure knowledge of Brahman').[1] Thus, Śaṃkara does not admit that the gods are entitled to the Madhu-vidyā as Nimbārka does. The view of the latter as we have seen, is that the gods are entitled not only to the knowledge of Brahman in general, but also to those vidyās in which they themselves are implicated.

Bhāskara

Interpretation of 'asti hi' different, viz. ' . . . for there is (scriptural evidence that the gods are entitled to the Madhu-vidyā and the rest)'.[2]

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled 'The exclusion of the Śūdras'. (Sūtras 34–41)

SŪTRA 34

"HIS GRIEF (AROSE) ON ACCOUNT OF HEARING ITS DISRESPECT, ON ACCOUNT OF HASTENING AT THAT TIME, FOR THIS IS WHAT IS INDICATED (BY THE TERM "ŚŪDRA")."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not to be supposed, on the ground [3] that in the Chāndogya the term 'Śūdra' is applied by a preceptor to one desirous of salvation,

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(2) The opponent resumes: Even if Brahman and none else, be the object of meditation here, yet *Vasus* cannot be held to be practising the *Madhu-vidyā*, since the fruit of *Madhu-vidyā* is the attainment of *Vasu-hood*, etc. and why should those who are already *Vasus*, etc. strive to be so again.

The answer is that they may be Vasus and so on in the present age, but at the same time be desirous of holding the same position in a future age also, and of finally attaining Brahman. It is this desire of attaining *Vasu*-hood, etc. first and then Brahman which leads them to practise the *Madhu-vidyā*.

[1] '*Yady-api madhv-ādi-vidyāsu devatādi-vya-miśrāsu asambhavo' dhikārasya, tathāpi asti hi śuddhāyāṃ Brahmavidyāyāṃ sambhavaḥ*'.
Ś.B. 1.3.33, p. 367.

[2] Bh. B. 1.3.33, p. 66.

[3] Here the *śatṛ*-suffix implies reason.

that a Śūdra [1] is entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. Because of "his",[2] i.e. of Jānaśruti's, desire for salvation, on hearing the disrespectful words used by the swan; and because of his hastening towards, for that reason, to the preceptor at that very moment,—"it is indicated" that his grief had arisen and that was what was meant by the address 'Śūdra'.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the following question is being considered: Just as it has been said that the gods are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, as the term 'God' is mentioned in the text: 'Then, whosoever among the gods is awakened' (Bṛh. 1.4.10), so whether or not a Śūdra too is entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, seeing that in the Chāndogya, the word 'śūdra' is mentioned in reference to Jānaśruti who desired for salvation.

If it be suggested: The word 'śūdra' being mentioned in the Chāndogya under the Saṁvarga-vidyā in the passages: '"Oh! the necklace and the carriage be yours, O Śūdra, together with the cows"' (Chānd. 4.2.3), '"You have brought these, O Śūdra"!' (Chānd. 4.2.3); a Śūdra too must be entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, it being possible for him also to be a seeker [3]. And, he may gain the knowledge of the nature, etc. of Brahman through the hearing of tradition and the rest, in accordance with the statement of the ancient ones: 'He should make the four castes hear, beginning with the Brāhmaṇa' (Mahā. 12.12360*a* [4]), and, the statement of Hari-Vaṁśa: 'One who is Śūdra by birth should attain a good end through hearing', which lays down an injunction with regard to the hearing of Brahman by him also. The prohibition contained in the passage: 'Hence, a Śūdra is not to be initiated to a sacrifice' (Tait. Saṃ. 7.1.1 [5]), is concerned simply with his disqualification with regard to acts like sacrifices to be performed by means of fire, but is not a cause of his

[1] The fourth and the lowest caste.

[2] Here the genitive case implies an agent (*kartṛ*) in accordance with Pāṇ. 2.3.65, SD. K. 623.

[3] That is, just as it has been shown that gods are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, since they desire (arthins) for salvation, so the Śūdras too desire for salvation and are as such entitled to the same knowledge.

[4] P. 81, line 4, vol. 3. [5] P. 241, line 21, vol. 2.

disqualification for knowledge, as knowledge is mental, and as Vidura [1] and the rest, as well as women like Sulabhā [2] and so on are found to possess the knowledge of Brahman,—

We reply: A Śūdra is not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman for the following reasons: First, he lacks the requisite fitness, not having the knowledge of the nature of Brahman and the method of worshipping Him. Secondly, although the worship of Brahman may be accomplished mentally, yet the knowledge of the nature, etc. of Brahman is generated by the study of the Veda, preceded by the investiture with the holy thread. Finally, a Śūdra being excluded from investiture, is not fit for knowing Brahman and as such his seeking is of no great value. As the injunctions regarding work hold good in the case of the first three classes, the prohibition holds good equally with regard to knowledge as with regard to work. Also, as in accordance with the statement: 'The Veda is to be confirmed by tradition and Purāṇa' (Mahā. 1.260 [3]), tradition and Purāṇa, too, confirm the knowledge established by the Veda, a Śūdra cannot attain knowledge from that too. The injunction about the 'hearing', on the other hand, simply means that such a 'hearing' has the effect of destroying a Śūdra's sins and securing prosperity for him, here or hereafter; and not that he is entitled to meditation or knowledge. The possession of knowledge by Vidura and the rest should be known to be due to the non-destruction of the knowledge which they attained in another birth, and their such low births should be known to be due to their works which had begun to bear fruits. Hence a Śūdra is not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

On the other hand, the term 'Śūdra', mentioned in Scripture, is to be explained thus: This the reverend author of the aphorisms states in the words: " grief ", and so on. " For " implies the reason, and " his ", means Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇas. That is, on hearing the disrespectful words used by the swan for his want of knowledge of Brahman, thus: '"O, who is that man of whom you speak, as if he were Raikva, with the cart"?' (Chānd. 4.1.3), Jānaśruti at once

[1] *Vidura* was the younger brother of *Dhṛtarāṣṭra* and *Pāṇḍu*. He was the son of *Vyāsa* and a slave-girl, who was dressed as one of the widows of *Vicitra-vīryya*, and mistaken by *Vyāsa* as such. Vide Mahā. *1.4301*, etc.

[2] *Sulabhā* was female mendicant who entered into a highly learned discourse with *Janaka*. Vide Mahā. 12.11854 *et seq.* (Chap. 321).

[3] P. 10, line 11, vol. I.

hastened to Raikva, the man with the cart and a knower of Brahman. From this, it is "indicated" that his "grief" had arisen. Hence, the address 'Śūdra' was applied by the sage to a non-Śūdra, with a view to intimating his own omniscience, thinking: 'This Jānaśruti has come to learn the knowledge of Brahman from me, tempting me with the offering of riches. He does not know me, that I have performed all my duties and am omniscient'. Thus, (the whole story goes:), Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa was a royal saint, versed in religious duties. Certain divine sages, pleased with his multitude of qualities, and intending that having heard their conversation, and having thereupon approached Raikva, the knower of Brahman, Jānaśruti, too, would become a knower of Brahman, assumed the forms of swans and began to fly in a circle over the king who was lying on the roof of his palace in summer. Then, the swan which was following said with surprise to the one which was leading: 'O Bhallākṣa, Bhallākṣa, do you not see the light of the king Jānaśruti which has pervaded the region of the heaven? That light will burn you, so do not cross it'. On hearing these words of the one following it, the leading swan replied: '"O, who is that man of him you speak as if he were Raikva, with the cart"?' (Chānd. 4.1.3), i.e. you speak of this Jānaśruti as if he were Raikva with the cart, meaning, the reverend Raikva who has a 'yugva' or a cart and is a knower of Brahman. By the adjective 'with a cart', Raikva's mark was indicated, in order that he might be easily found out and approached. Then, on hearing the disrespectful words used by the swan, Jānaśruti too, ascertained, in the morning, the whereabout of Raikva through his man, and repaired to the sage Raikva, taking with him six hundred cows, a necklace and a chariot yoked with horses; and having approached him, said: 'O Raikva! Take all these cows and the rest, and teach me, O reverend sir'. Raikva replied: '"O, the necklace"' (Chānd. 4.2.3) and so on, i.e. 'O Śūdra, the heap of wealth, like the chariot and the rest, together with the cows be yours'. And he addressed him as 'O Śūdra' more than once (viz. again in Chānd. 4.2.5). A 'Śūdra' is one who grieves (śocati), and the word is formed in accordance with the rule:

'When the root "śuc" is followed by the suffix "ra", the "ca" is replaced by "da"' (SD. K. Uṇādi-sūtra 176[1]), and the vowel 'u' is lengthened (with the uṇādi-sūtra 175[2]). Hence "his",

[1] P. 599, vol. 2.

[2] Thus, *śuc+ra = śūd+ra = śūdra.*

i.e. Jānaśruti's grief alone "was indicated" by Raikva, with a view to pointing out Jānaśruti's fitness for receiving instruction, and not his connection with any caste,—this is the sense.[1]

SŪTRA 35

"(JĀNAŚRUTI WAS NOT A ŚŪDRA) ALSO BECAUSE WE KNOW OF (HIS) KṢATRIYAHOOD FROM THE INDICATION, (VIZ. THE FACT OF HIS BEING MENTIONED) LATER ON WITH CAITRARATHA."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Because we know of the Kṣatriyahood" of Jānaśruti "from the indication" viz. that 'later on' he was mentioned together with Caitraratha Abhipratārin, Kṣatriya, in the passage: 'Now, when Śaunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kākṣaseni were being served food, a religious student begged of them' (Chānd. 4.3.5 [2]), Jānaśruti was not a Śūdra.

Vedānta-kaustubha

From this reason also, the author, points out, the Kṣatriyahood of Jānaśruti is known.

His grief alone has arisen; hence he was called a 'Śūdra' by the sage; this being so, the Śūdrahood of Jānaśruti was not due to this caste. Why? "Because we know of (his) Kṣatriyahood"; i.e. also because we know of his Kṣatriyahood from the fact that in the introductory passage, viz. 'A plentiful giver, one preparing many food' (Chānd. 4.1.1), he is known to be a lord of gifts and a giver of much well-cooked food, from the fact of his sending the door-keeper, known from the passage: 'He said to the door-keeper' (Chānd. 4.1.5) and from the fact of his giving golden ornaments, chariot and daughter to Raikva. Having, thus, stated the marks contained in the introductory text and proving the Kṣatriyahood of Jānaśruti, the author goes on to show the mark, contained in the concluding text of the saṃvargavidyā, according to the maxim of the 'crow's eye',[3]—the term "and"

[1] Vide Chānd. 4.1–4.2.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[3] The maxim of the 'crow's eye' means as follows: Crows are supposed to have only one eye, which as occasion requires, moves from the cavity on one side into that of another. The maxim is used of a word which appears only once

(in the sūtra) referring to both—, in the words: "And from the indication, (viz. the fact of his being mentioned) later on with Caitraratha"; i.e. "from the indication", viz. that Jānaśruti was mentioned together with Caitraratha who is ascertained to be a Kṣatriya from the fact of his association with a well-known priest of Kṣatriyas. Thus, in the concluding text, viz.: 'Now, when Śaunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratarin Kākṣaseni were being served food by a cook,[1] a religious student begged of them' (Chānd. 4.3.5), Caitraratha, named Abhipratārin is mentioned. This is the sense: On the enquiry: 'who were the two that were being served' 'by the cook', i.e. by one who superintends over the oven?—the text says: Śunaka's descendant, the priest of the Kapi clan, and Kakṣasena's descendant, named Abhipratārin, the king. When these two sat down to eat, they were asked for alms.

If it be asked: Whence do you know that Abhipratārin was a Caitraratha? (a descendant of Citraratha),—we reply: He was so, because of his connection with Kāpeya, (i.e. descendant of Kapi), the priest of Citraratha. From the text: 'The Kāpeyas made Citraratha perform sacrifice by this' (Tāṇḍ. Br. 20.12.5 [2]), it is well-known that the Kāpeyas were the priests of Citraratha. The term 'by this' means 'by the Dvi-rātra'.

If it be objected: Very well, let Abhipratārin be Caitraratha because of his connection with a priest of Citra; but what proof is there of his Kṣatriyahood?—(we reply): The text: 'From him was born a king of Kṣatriyas, named Caitraratha', is the proof. The words 'from him' mean 'from Citraratha'.

A Kṣatriya being referred to in the end, Jānaśruti, mentioned in the beginning, too, must be a Kṣatriya, since in one and the same vidyā there is the mention, as a rule, of persons of the same class,—this is the meaning of the aphorism. Moreover, the Kṣatriyahood of Abhipratārin being ascertained in the end on the ground of his

in a sentence, but which applies to two portions of it, or to two persons or things, fulfilling a double purpose. The maxim may be said to approximate to the English one of 'killing two birds with one stone'. Vide L.N., Part I, pp. 12-13. Likewise, here the phrase: '*Kṣatriyatvāvagateḥ*' fulfils a double purpose, meaning both 'on account of knowing the *Kṣatriyahood* of *Caitraratha Abhipratārin*', and 'on account of knowing the *Kṣatriyahood* of *Jānaśruti*'. See p. 200, n. 1.

[1] The word '*sūdena*' not found in the original text. Vide Chānd. 4.3.5, p. 189.

[2] P. 561, vol. 2.

association with Kāpeya, a Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriyahood of Jānaśruti, too, is ascertained in the beginning on the ground of his association with Raikva,—this is the sense.[1]

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading different, viz. They break it into two different sūtras: 'Kṣatriyatvā gateś ca' (sūtra 34), and 'uttaratra-liṅgāt' (sūtra 35[2]).

Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. 'Kṣatriyatvā-gateś ca . . . . . '[3] instead of 'Kṣatriyatva-avagateś ca . . . . '.

SŪTRA 36

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE REFERENCE TO PURIFICATORY RITES, AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DECLARATION OF THEIR ABSENCE (IN THE CASE OF A ŚŪDRA), (A ŚŪDRA IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the reference to the purificatory rites" of investiture with the holy thread in the section concerned with knowledge,

[1] Thus, altogether three reasons are advanced—why *Jānaśruti* is to be taken as a *Kṣatriya*:—

(*a*) In the beginning, *Jānaśruti* is said to be practising charity, feeding people on a large scale, which proves him to be a *Kṣatriya*.

(*b*) In the end, *Abhipratārin* is mentioned, and *Abhipratārin* being a *Kṣatriya*, *Jānaśruti* must be so, since persons of the class are entitled to the same *Vidyā*.

(*c*) *Abhipratārin*, mentioned in the end, is said to be a *Kṣatriya*, because of his connection with a *Brāhmaṇa* (viz. *Kāpeya*), and hence *Jānaśruti*, mentioned in the beginning must be so, because of his connection with a *Brāhmaṇa* (viz. *Raikva*).

[2] Śrī. B. 1.3.34-35, pp. 337-338, Part 1, Madras ed. Some editions read '*Kṣatriyatva-avagateśca*'. Vide Bombay ed., p. 326.

The Benares of V.D., reads '*Kṣatriyatva-gateś ca*' (p. 60); but the Brindavan ed. of V.S., reads '*Kṣatriyatva-avagateś ca*' (p. 46).

Śk. 1.3.34-35, pp. 438, 480, Part 5.

[3] Bh. B. 1.3.34, p. 67.

thus: 'He invested him, forsooth, with the holy thread' (Śat. Br. 11.5.3.13 [1]) and so on; "and on account of the declaration of their absence" thus: 'A Śūdra, belongs to the fourth caste and is once-born (G.D.S. 10.50 [2]), 'And he is not fit for a purificatory rite' (Manu 10.126 [3]),—a Śūdra is not entitled to knowledge.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the previous aphorism, the disqualification of a Śūdra for the knowledge of Brahman has been established on the ground of reason. Now, his disqualification is being proved on the ground of Scripture, etc. as well.

A Śūdra is not entitled to knowledge. Why? "On account of the reference to purificatory rites," i.e. on account of the reference to the purificatory rites of investiture with the holy thread in sections concerned with knowledge, thus 'He invested him, forsooth, with the holy thread' (Śat. Br. 11.5.3.13). But, then, is it to be supposed that a Śūdra, too, is entitled to investiture? To this it is replied: "On account of the declaration of their absence", i.e. on account of the depiction of the absence, in the case of a Śūdra, of purificatory rites like investiture with the holy thread and the rest, in the passages: 'In a Śūdra there is no sin and he is not fit for a purificatory rite' (Manu. 10.126). 'A Śūdra belongs to the fourth caste and is once-born' (G.D.S. 10.50) and so on. The investiture with the holy thread is designated in the case of others in the passage: 'Let one invest a Brāhmaṇa with the holy thread at the age of eight, a Kṣatriya at eleven, and a Vaiśya at twelve' (Āś. G.S. 17.1.3-4 [4]).

Hence, the reference to investiture with the holy thread fits in in the sections concerned with knowledge.

[1] P. 861, line 19.
Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] P. 14, line 8.
Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

[3] P. 419.
Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

[4] P. 72.

SŪTRA 37

"AND BECAUSE OF (GAUTAMA'S) PROCEEDING (TO INITIATE JĀBĀLA) ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF THE ABSENCE OF THAT (VIZ. HIS ŚŪDRAHOOD), (A ŚŪDRA IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Moreover, "because of" Gautama's "proceeding" to invest Jābāla with the holy thread and to teach him, only "on the ascertainment of the absence" of his Śūdrahood,—here, too, a Śūdra is not indeed entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, says the author, a Śūdra is not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

Fatherless Jābāla, desirous of salvation, and about to approach a preceptor, asked his mother with a view to learning his lineage. 'Of what lineage am I?' She too, unaware of his lineage, replied: 'I do not know'. Jābāla too, having approached Gautama, said: 'Reverend Sir! I wish to stay in your place as a student of sacred knowledge'. Then, being asked by him: 'Of what lineage are you?' Jābāla said: 'Sir, I do not know of what lineage I am,' and so on. Thus, when Jābāla had spoken the truth, and when, thereby, the absence of Jābāla's Śūdrahood had been ascertained thus: '"A non-Brāhmaṇa cannot speak thus"' (Chānd. 4.4.5 [1]), then only Gautama proceeded to invest Jābāla with the holy thread and teach him with the words: '"Fetch the fuel, my child. I shall invest you with the holy thread. You have not deviated from truth"' (Chānd. 4.4.5 [2]). Hence, a Śūdra is not entitled to knowledge.

[1] Correct quotation: ' . . . . *vivaktum arhati*'. Vide Chānd. 4.4.5, p. 196.

[2] Vide Chānd. 4.4 for the whole story.

SŪTRA 38

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE PROHIBITION OF HEARING, STUDYING, AND (LEARNING) THE MEANING (OF THE VEDA), (A ŚŪDRA IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

A Śūdra is not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, "on account of the prohibition of the hearing" and so on of the Veda on his part, in the text: 'One should not study (the Veda) in the vicinity of a Śūdra' (V.Sm. 18.9 [1]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, a Śūdra is not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. For what reason? "On account of the prohibition of hearing" and the rest on the part of a Śūdra, in the passage 'A cemetery, endowed with feet, is, verily, a Śūdra.[2] Hence one should not study (the Veda) in the vicinity of a Śūdra' (V.Sm. 18.9), 'Hence a Śūdra is a beast,[3] not fit for sacrifices' and on so. The sense (of the first passage) is: A 'cemetery' that is 'endowed with feet', i.e. capable of moving, 'is a Śūdra', in whose presence one should not even study the Vedas. The sense is that the hearing of the Veda, the study of it, the performance of the religious duties mentioned therein, are prohibited, all the more, to a Śūdra.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They treat this sūtra and the next as one sūtra.[4]

[1] P. 216, line 20. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
[2] Reading slightly differs, viz. '*Eka vai tac-chmaśānam . . .* ' (p. 216).
[3] '*Bahu-paśuḥ paśu sadṛśa iti arthaḥ.*' Śrī. B. 1.3.38, p. 339, Part I.
[4] Ś.B. 1.3.38, p. 376; Bh. B. 1.3.38, p. 68; G.B. 1.3.38.

SŪTRA 39

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF SMṚTI."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the Smṛti", viz. 'One should not teach him sacred duties' (Manu 4.806[1]; V.Sm. 18.12[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And on account of the Smṛti", viz. 'One should not teach him sacred duties, nor sacred vows' (Manu 4.806; V.Sm. 18.12), 'One should not impart knowledge to a śūdra' (Manu 4.80*a*; V.Sm. 18.12) and so on.

Here ends the section entitled 'The exclusion of Śūdras' (9).

Adhikaraṇa 6 resumed: The section entitled 'What is measured' resumed. (Sūtras 40-41)

SŪTRA 40

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE SHAKING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

What is measured, is to be known as the Supreme Person, He being the shaker of the entire universe, and because the words 'great' and the rest are found used.

Vedānta-kaustubha

After having completed the incidental discussion about qualification (adhikāra) in connection with the discussion about the Person, measured as the size of merely a thumb, begun in the aphorism 'On account of the text only, what is measured (is the Lord)' (Br. Sū. 1.3.24), the author is finishing the original discussion.

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[1] P. 146.
[2] P. 217, line 1.
R.

The words 'what is measured' are to be supplied. In the Kaṭha-vallī, we find the following in the section of the Person, of the size of merely a thumb: 'Whatever there is, the whole world, emanated (from the vital-breath),. trembles in the vital-breath alone, the great fear, a thunderbolt about to be hurled. Those who know that become immortal' (Kaṭha 6.2). Here, what is measured as of the size of a thumb and is denoted by the term 'vital-breath' is none but the Supreme Being. Why? For the following reasons: First, "on account of the shaking", i.e. the Lord alone is the cause of the shaking of the entire universe, emanated from Himself. Secondly, the term 'great', which is a synonym for Brahman, has been used. Thirdly, the term 'fear' proves that the vital-breath is Brahman, for He alone is the cause of the fear of all, as declared by the text: 'Through fear of him the fire burns, through fear the sun shines, through fear Indra, Wind and Death, the fifth, speed on' (Kaṭha 6.3); and finally, the Lord alone is the cause of the immortality of one who possesses knowledge of Him.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. they take this sūtra as forming a new adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the term 'prāṇa' in Kaṭha-upaniṣad (6.2) denotes Brahman or not. But according to Nimbārka, this sūtra does not begin a new adhikaraṇa, but only resumes adhikaraṇa 6.

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. he also begins a new adhikaraṇa here, concerned with the question whether the term 'vajra' in Kaṭha-upaniṣad (6.2) denotes Brahman or not.

SŪTRA 41

"BECAUSE OF PERCEIVING LIGHT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because in the text: 'Through his light' (Kaṭha 5.15[1]), 'light' is mentioned, the measured Person is the Supreme Being.

[1] R, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the very same Kaṭha-vallī, in the section of the Person measured as of the size of a thumb, it is declared, prior to the text about the vital-breath, (viz. Kaṭha 6.2): 'The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor do these lightnings shine, much less this fire. He shining, everything else shines after him. All this shines through his light' (Kaṭha 6.2). "Because" in this text, light, belonging exclusively to the Supreme Soul who is denoted by the term 'light', "is seen" (i.e. declared), it is established that what is of the size of merely a thumb is none but the Supreme Soul.

Here ends the section entitled 'What is measured' (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. they take this sūtra as forming a new adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the term 'light' in the Chāndogyopaniṣad (8.12.6) denotes Brahman or not.[1]

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. '(The word "vajra" in the Kaṭhopaniṣad must mean the Lord), because it is seen (that in a preceding passage He is called) light'.[2]

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled 'Something different'. (Sūtras 42–44)

SŪTRA 42

"THE ETHER (IS BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF IT) AS SOMETHING DIFFERENT, AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the passage: 'The ether, verily, is the producer of name and form' (Chānd. 8.14.1[3]), the object denoted by the term 'ether' is the

[1] S.B. 1.3.40, pp. 380 *et seq.*; Bh. B. 1.3.40, p. 69; SK. B. 1.3.41, pp. 498 *et seq.* Part 5.

[2] G.B. 1.3.40.

[3] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

Highest Person. Why? "On account of the designation" of the Supreme Soul "as something different" from even the freed souls,—He being the producer of all objects possessing names and forms implied by the term 'name and form',—as well as on account of the designation of Brahmanhood, immortality and the rest on its part.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, by means of the aphorism: 'On account of the text only, what is measured (is the Lord)' (Br. Sū. 1.3.24), the text regarding the Person of the size of merely a thumb has been shown to be referring to Brahman, and this has been confirmed once more immediately after the end of the incidental sections. Now, with a view to designating the non-attachment and the omnipresence of the Supreme Self, it is being shown that the text about the ether, too, refers to Him.

In the Chāndogya, we read: 'The ether, verily, is the producer of name and form. That within which they are is Brahman, that is immortal, that is the soul' (Chānd. 8.14.1). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether by the term 'ether' the elemental ether is to be understood here, or the soul freed from the bondage of mundane existence, or the Supreme Soul. If it be said that the elemental ether is to be understood, since the term 'ether' is well-known to denote that alone,—(we reply:) no, on account of the term 'soul'. What then should be understood? If it be suggested: the freed soul, Why? For the following reasons: First, the freed soul alone has been mentioned previously as the topic of discussion, in the passage: 'Shaking off (evils) as a horse shakes off his hairs' (Chānd. 8.13.1),—the phrase: 'That within which they are' means: That soul, freed from mundane existence, from which 'they', i.e. name and form 'are different' (antara), i.e. outside. Further, the discarding of the well-known name and form is possible on the part of the soul in its state of release, as declared by the passage: 'Just as the flowing rivers, discarding name and form' (Muṇḍ. 3.2.8). And, finally, the term 'ether', too, is appropriate with regard to the freed soul, it being possessed of fully manifest knowledge. The phrase: 'That is Brahman, that is *immortal*' denotes the state of salvation.

(Author's conclusion.)

We reply: The meaning of the term 'ether' here can fittingly be the Supreme Soul alone. Why? "On account of the designation

(of it) as something different", i.e. on account of the designation of the object denoted by the term 'ether',—which is untouched by name and form, as evident from the phrase: 'That within which they are'; and is the producer of name and form, as evident from the phrase: 'The producer of name and form',—as different from the object which is devoid of the power of being a producer, since during its state of bondage, the soul, partaking of name and form as subject to karmas, is not itself capable of producing, i.e. revealing, name and form;—to do so being all the more impossible on its part during its state of release. That the activities in connection with (the creation and the rest) of the Universe, are impossible on its part, will be expressly stated later on.[1] On the other hand, that the Supreme Soul, an adept in the creation of the entire Universe, is such a producer, is well-established by Scripture itself, thus: '"Having entered with this living soul, let me evolve name and form"' (Chānd. 6.3.2), 'From him arose—[2] this name, form and food' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9) 'The Wise One, who abides conceiving all forms, giving names, and declaring (them)' (Tait. Ār. 3.12.7 [3]). The 'ether' is Brahman also on account of the designation, in the text, of the exclusive qualities of the Lord, such as, being eternally manifest, greatness, immortality and the rest, implied by the term "and so on" (in the sūtra). Nor has the freed soul been mentioned before as the topic of discussion, the Supreme Soul alone being the topic, as evident from the passage: 'I attain the world of Brahman' (Chānd. 8.13.1), and the term 'ether', too, being well-known to denote the Supreme Soul alone, it being all-pervasive and non-attached.

SŪTRA 43

"(AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF BRAHMAN) AS DIFFERENT (FROM THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) IN DEEP SLEEP AND DEPARTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the designation of the omniscient "as different" from the non-knower "in deep sleep and departing".

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[1] Vide Br. Sū. 4.4.17.

[2] Correct quotation: '*Tasmād etat Brahma . . .* '. Vide Muṇḍ. 1.1.9, p. 10.

[3] P. 199.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Since it is found from a consideration of the meaning of the text 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.[1]) that there cannot possibly be anything different from Brahman, how can it be said: "On account of the designation (of Brahman) as something different and so on"? (Br. Sū. 1.3.42)—

(We reply): True. In spite of there being non-difference between the individual soul, which is a part of Brahman, and Brahman, owing to the fact that the individual soul has no existence, activity and the rest apart from Brahman,—its difference from Him, too, is inevitable, possessing as it does its own peculiar qualities,—so says the reverend author of the aphorisms.

The words "on account of the designation" are to be supplied. (The individual soul and Brahman are different from each other,) on account of the designation of the Supreme Soul, the omniscient, as "different" from the individual soul, the non-knower, "in deep sleep", in the passage: 'Embraced by the Intelligent Soul, he does not know anything external, nor anything internal' (Bṛh. 4.3.21), and "in departure", in the passage: 'Mounted by the Intelligent Soul, it goes groaning' (Bṛh. 4.3.35). 'Mounted' means superintended, 'groaning' means making frightful sounds, or sounds of hiccough. It is not possible that the non-knowing soul, sleeping or departing, can at the same time, becoming intelligent, embrace or mount itself, or that another individual soul can do so, omniscience being impossible on the latter's part as well.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. according to them, this adhikaraṇa is concerned with the question whether the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text 4.3.7 refers to the Supreme Soul, or not.[2]

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[1] Also occurs in Chānd. 6.9.4, 6.10.3, 6.11.3, 6.12.3, 6.13.3, 6.14.3, 6.15.3, 6.16.3.

[2] Ś.B. 1.3.42, pp. 382; Bh. B. 1.3.42, p. 70.

SŪTRA 44

"On account of words like 'lord' and the rest."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of the designation of the Supreme Soul as different from the individual soul by the texts: 'The Lord of all' (Bṛh. 4.4.22, 5.6.1 [1]), 'The ruler of all' (Bṛh. 4.4.22 [2]), it is established that He alone is the ether.

Here ends the third section of the first chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-texts composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author dwells on the difference between the individual soul and Brahman.

There is indeed a difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. Why? "On account of words like 'lord' and the rest", i.e. on account of texts like: 'The Lord of all' (Bṛh. 4.4.22, 5.6.1), 'The controller of all' (Bṛh. 4.4.22), 'The ruler of all' (Bṛh. 4.4.22), 'He rules all this' (Bṛh. 5.6.1), 'He is the Lord of all' (Bṛh. 4.4.22) and so on.

Though already shown above, we shall speak of this difference-non-difference in detail later on.[3] Hence, it is established that on account of the designation of the Lord as something different and so on, the meaning of the term 'ether' is none but the Supreme Lord.

Here ends the section entitled 'Something different' (10).

Here ends the third section of the first chapter in the Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] *Op. cit.*

[3] Vide e.g. V.K. 1.4.9, 1.4.20, 1.4.21, 2.1.13, 2.1.21, etc.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. the same topic continued.[1]

Résumé

The third section of the first chapter contains:

(1) 44 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka.
(2) 43 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara.
(3) 44 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja.
(4) 43 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara.
(5) 44 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha.
(6) 43 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva read the sūtras 38 and 39 in Nimbārka's commentary as one sūtra.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha read the sūtras 2 and 3 in Nimbārka's commentary as one sūtra, while breaking the sūtra 35 in the same as two different sūtras.

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[1] Ś.B. 1.3.43, p. 385; Bh. B. 1.3.43, p. 70.

FIRST CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FOURTH QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled 'What is derived from inference'. (Sūtras 1–7)

SŪTRA 1

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT WHAT IS DERIVED FROM INFERENCE (VIZ. PRADHĀNA), TOO, (IS MENTIONED IN THE TEXTS) OF SOME (BRANCHES), (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF UNDERSTANDING WHAT IS PUT DOWN IN THE SIMILE OF THE BODY, AND (THE TEXT) SHOWS (THIS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that in a text of the Kaṭha-branch, viz. 'Higher than the great (mahat) is the unmanifest (avyakta), higher than the unmanifest is the Person (puruṣa)' (Kaṭha 3.11 [1]), "What is derived from inference" [2], i.e. pradhāna, "too", is found mentioned,[3]—

(We reply:) "No", because in accordance with the text: 'Know the soul to be the lord of the chariot and the body to be the chariot' (Kaṭha 3.3 [4]), the body, which is put down in the simile of the chariot, is understood by the term 'unmanifest'. "And" having demonstrated the mode of subduing the sense-organs, the text "shows", in the concluding portion [5], that what had been previously contrived through the simile [6] (viz. the body), is understood here, thus: 'A wise man should restrain speech in the mind, that he should restrain in the intelligent soul, the intelligent soul in the great (mahat), that he should restrain in the tranquil soul' (Kaṭha 3.13 [7]).

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] For, why pradhāna is called 'ānumānika', see footnote 1, p. 42.

[3] Cf. Br. Sū. 1.1.5, which contends that pradhāna is 'aśabda' or not mentioned in Scripture.

[4] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[5] C.S.S. ed. reads 'vākya-śeṣaḥ' (p. 19).

[6] '*Rūpaka-parikalpitaṃ grahaṇam*' is evidently a misprint. All other editions read '*rūpaka-parikalpita-grahaṇam*', meaning '*rūpaka-parikalpitasya grahaṇam*'. Vide e.g. C.S.S. ed. (p. 19).

[7] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In this manner, it has been shown above, under three sections, that the scriptural texts all refer to Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, an ocean of natural, infinite and inconceivable auspicious qualities, untouched by any material qualities and the cause of the world. Now again, in the fourth section, by showing [1] that those texts too which apparently seem to establish pradhāna—which is demonstrated by the doctrine of Kapila and is independent of Brahman,—all refer really to Brahman, and by establishing [2] that pradhāna is acceptable only as dependent on Brahman, —the reverend author of the aphorisms is removing the false belief, viz. that certain words like 'Unmanifest' and the rest, which denote pradhāna, being mentioned in Scripture, pradhāna, admitted by the Saṃkhyas, is neither non-scriptural, nor derived from inference merely.

In the Kaṭha-vallī, we find the following: 'Higher than the great (mahat) is the unmanifest (avyakta), higher than the unmanifest is the Person (puruṣa)' (Kaṭha 3.11). Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether the object denoted by the word 'unmanifest' is pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, or the body. The *prima facie* view is as follows: Let it be pradhāna, because here we recognize the very same order, beginning with the great (mahat) and ending with the Person (puruṣa), which is well-known in the Kapila-smṛti. If it be objected: The concordance of the entire Veda with regard to Brahman, the cause of the world, has been established duly; hence it is not possible to establish its connection with anything else, (the reply is:) Very well, let then pradhāna, "derived from inference", (mentioned in the texts) "of some" schools, be the cause of the world. So here in the school of the Kāṭhakas pradhāna is understood by the term 'unmanifest'. (Here ends the original *prima facie* view.)

(Author's conclusion:) "No". Wherefore? "Because of understanding what is put down in the simile of the body", i.e. because by the term 'unmanifest' in this text, the body, mentioned in the preceding text and put down as a simile, is to be understood. A simile means the imagination of one object as another on the ground of a certain similarity. Thus, compare the passages: 'Know the soul to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot; know intellect

[1] Here the *śatṛ*-suffix implies reason.
[2] See footnote 1, above.

to be the charioteer, and the mind to be the reins. The sense-organs, they say, are the horses, the objects of the senses their roads; the self, connected with the sense-organs and the mind, is the enjoyer, so the wise say. He who is devoid of understanding and ever inattentive, his sense-organs are uncontrollable, like the wicked horses of a charioteer. But he who is possessed of intelligence and ever attentive, his sense-organs are controllable, like the good horses of a charioteer. He, however, who is devoid of understanding, is inattentive and ever impure, does not attain that place, and attains mundane existence. But he who is possessed of understanding, is attentive and ever pure, attains that place whence he is not born again. A man, however, who has understanding as his charioteer and the mind as his reins, attains the end of the road, that supreme place of Viṣṇu' (Kaṭha 3.3; 3.9). In these passages, a man—who is desirous of the place of Viṣṇu, the end of the road of transmigratory existence, and who being the enjoyer is the principal agent—is first metaphorically represented as the lord of a chariot; his body,—which is subordinate to him as the abode of his enjoyment,—as the chariot; and the sense-organs, intellect and the rest, as the charioteer and the rest, as far as possible,—which shows that just as it is possible for a potter to be the creator of pots, etc. only when he is connected with the wheel, the stick and the rest, so the attributes of the soul, viz. 'being an agent', 'being an enjoyer' and the rest, are found to belong to it, only when it is connected with the body, the sense-organs, etc. and not when it is devoid of attributes, since it is impossible for it then to be the realizing agent,—one who is approaching a goal. After that, the qualities of a sentient being, like: 'being an agent', 'being a realizing agent who is approaching towards a goal' and so on, implied by its quality of 'being an enjoyer' are stated. Immediately after, the liability of a non-knower, whose sense-organs are unrestrained, to transmigratory existence, and the fitness of a knower, whose sense-organs are restrained, for the place of Viṣṇu are designated; and then the place of Viṣṇu is pointed out as the object to be reached. Immediately after this, Scripture goes on to declare those objects which have superiority to others, in so far as these latter are to be controlled, in the passage: 'Higher than the sense-organs are the objects of senses, higher than the objects is the mind, higher than the mind is intellect, higher than intellect is the great soul. Higher than the great (mahat) is the unmanifest (avyakta), higher than the unmanifest is the Person (puruṣa), nothing is higher

than the Person, He is the goal, the highest course' (Kaṭha 3.10; 3.11). Here, the objects, designated before as the lord of the chariot and the rest, are mentioned irrespective of the simile [1] for the sake of making the intended meaning clear [2]. And the soul and the rest, metaphorically represented as the lord of the chariot and so on, are here referred to by those very terms ('soul' and so on) respectively; and the body, metaphorically represented as the chariot, being left over, is denoted by the term 'unmanifest' [3]. Thus, the objects of senses, metaphorically represented as the roads, are 'higher than', i.e. superior to, the sense-organs, metaphorically represented as the horses, in so far as these latter are to be controlled, since when in proximity to objects of senses, the sense-organs of even a self-controlled man are found to incline to them once more. Higher than those even is the mind, metaphorically represented as the reins, since the proximity to objects of sense too is of little avail if the mind be not inclined to them. Higher than that even is intellect, metaphorically represented as the charioteer, since the mind, too, is of little avail in the absence of apprehension. Higher than that even is the soul, metaphorically represented as the lord of the chariot, because of its superiority as an agent. Since all these depend upon its will, it alone is specified as the 'great'. Higher than that even is the body, metaphorically represented as the chariot, since all the activities of the individual soul in connection with all the means to salvation depend on the body. Higher than that even is the Person, the soul of all and the end of the road of transmigratory existence, since everything else, mentioned previously, are under His control. When He is won by

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[1] A *krama* is a kind of simile in which the comparisons exhibited correspond to each other in regular succession. M.W., p. 319, Col. 2.

[2] That is, in order that the intended meaning may be clearly conveyed to the reader, the metaphorical way of representation, resorted to above, is given up here, and the actual objects, the sense-organs and the rest, are directly and plainly stated.

[3] The argument is as follows: In Kaṭha 3.3–3.9 the soul, the body and the rest, are successively compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot and so on; while in Kaṭha 3.10–3.11 the same objects, viz. the soul and so on, are mentioned once more, not metaphorically, but directly and plainly. Now in these latter verses, the soul, etc. are denoted by those very words, only there is no actual mention of the body. Hence, when everything else fits in, the body, the only remaining one on this side, must be denoted by the term 'unmanifest', the only remaining one on that side.

means of meditation, as directed, all the ends of a man are accomplished, as declared by the passage: 'Whatever verily, be the means resorted to for the sake of the four ends of a man, a man, who has taken refuge in Nārāyaṇa, attains them without it'. Hence, here the mahat, an effect of pradhāna, is not understood by the term 'great'; nor pradhāna, its cause, by the term 'unmanifest'; nor puruṣa, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, the twenty-fifth principle in contrast to the twenty-four material ones, by the term 'Person'. The entire Veda is in concordance with regard to this very Person, the object which one should desire to enquire into, and an ocean of infinite, auspicious attributes, there being nothing higher than Him, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'There is nothing higher than the Person' (Kaṭha 3.11), the Smṛti passage: 'There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya' (Gītā 7.7). The Person alone is the object to be attained, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'That is the goal, that is the highest course' (Kaṭha 3.11), as well as with the declaration by the interpreter of the texts (viz. Nimbārka): 'There is no other goal except the lotus-feet of Kṛṣṇa' (D.Ś. 8*a*).

Having shown that the Supreme Person is difficult to be attained by one who is not self-controlled, while easy to be attained by one who is self-controlled, and having shown the mode of subduing the sense-organs, the text "shows", in the concluding portion, that what had appeared previously in the simile is understood here, (and not the Sāṃkhya pradhāna), thus: 'This soul, hidden in all beings, is not manifest, but is perceived by subtle seers through highest, subtle intellect. A wise man should restrain speech in the mind, that he should restrain in the intelligent soul, the intelligent soul in the great, that he should restrain in the tranquil soul' (Kaṭha 3.12-3.13). (The text means:) 'This', i.e. Vāsudeva,—omniscient, to be approached by the freed souls, and without an equal or a superior, as stated in the text: 'There is nothing higher than the Person, that is the goal, that is the highest course' (Kaṭha 3.11),—though present in all beings, 'is not manifest', i.e. is not perceived by all, since they are not entitled to perceive Him. For this very reason, He is 'hidden',—the compound (viz. 'gūḍho' tmā') is in accordance with Vedic use,—as declared by the Lord Himself: '"I am not manifest to all"' (Gītā 7.25). If one is entitled to perceive the Lord, then alone He comes to be perceived; hence it is said 'is perceived' and so on. All the sense-organs, implied by the term 'speech', should be restrained in the

mind,—the long vowel (ī in 'manasī') is in accordance with Vedic use; the mind in the intelligent soul, i.e. in intellect, since 'being intelligent' and 'being the soul' are possible on the part of intellect, owing to its connection with the individual soul; intelligence in the great soul, i.e. in the individual soul; and that in the tranquil, i.e. in Brahman, the Universal Cause. The sense is that if in the previous case (viz. Kaṭha 3.11), because of understanding[1] the principle 'mahat' by the term 'great', we understand its cause,—viz. pradhāna which is derived from inference,—by the term 'unmanifest' on the ground of its immediate proximity to it, then, here, too, that may be understood by the term 'great', and hence (the injunction:) 'One should restrain the great in the tranquil' should lead to undesired conclusions[2]. Hence the concluding text, too, shows that what had previously appeared in the simile of the body is understood here.

SŪTRA 2

"BUT THE SUBTLE (BODY IS DENOTED BY THE TERM 'UNMANIFEST') BECAUSE OF ITS FITNESS (TO BE DENOTED SO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be said that the word "unmanifest" denotes something subtle,—(we reply: it may denote the body too,) since the body too, the meaning (of the term "unmanifest"), is a grosser state of something subtle indeed.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Although the subtle body is fit to be denoted by the term "unmanifest" since in the simile of the chariot the parts of the subtle body (viz. the sense-organs, the mind, etc.)[3] are understood as the parts of the chariot (viz. the horses, the reins, etc.), yet it cannot be said to be the chariot, On the contrary, it is the gross body which has been put down as the chariot. But how can it be understood by the term "unmanifest", it being something manifest?

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[1] Here the *śatṛ*-suffix implies reason.

[2] That is, in that case the *mahat* would be dependent on *Brahman*, a conclusion which is contrary to the *Sāṃkhya* view itself.

[3] The constituents of the subtle body are the five *tan-mātras*, the ten sense-organs, the mind, and the vital-breath. Vide V.R.M.P. 30.

We reply: The word "but" implies emphasis. The body is the gross effect, pradhāna is the subtle cause, and that alone is to be understood; so the term "unmanifest" may very well refer to it. Why? "Because of its fitness", i.e. because of the fitness of the subtle pradhāna to assume the form of the effect, or because of the fitness of the effect to assume the form of the cause. Just as in the text: 'All this verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him' (Chānd. 3.14.1), the universe, though different from Brahman as His effect, having been emanated from Him, is yet declared to be non-different from Him, so is this body, which is non-different from pradhāna.

Or else, (an alternative explanation;) because of the fitness of that word "unmanifest", denoting the cause, to denote the effect too[1], as in the example: 'Mix the soma with cows' (Ṛg. V. 9.46.4[2]).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

Interpretation of 'tad arhatvāt' different, viz. because the unmanifest matter alone, when it has assumed the form of the effect (viz. body), is fit to undertake activities, promoting the end of men, like a chariot.[3]

SŪTRA 3

"(PRADHĀNA) HAS A MEANING ON ACCOUNT OF (ITS) DEPENDENCE ON HIM."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Pradhāna, taught in the Upaniṣads, "has a meaning on account of its dependence" on the Supreme Cause; while that admitted by others is meaningless, such is the distinction (between our pradhāna and that of others, viz. of the Sāṃkhyas).

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[1] The argument is that the cause and the effect being non-different, a term denoting the one, can very well denote the other. Hence the term 'unmanifest', denoting *pradhāna*, the cause, can denote the body, its effect as well.

[2] P. 203, line 16. That is, the *Soma* is to be mixed, not with the cow, the cause, but with the milk, its effect. Here a word, denoting the cause, really stands for the effect.

[3] Śrī. B. 1.4.2, p. 357, Chap. 1.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. In that case, be happy by falling in with the Sāṃkhyas, since you admit the doctrine of the causality of pradhāna,—the author replies here:

In ordinary experience, a non-sentient object, having no connection with a sentient principle, can have no meaning, incapable as it is of giving rise to an effect. Never does a lump of clay assume the form of a pot by itself. Similarly, pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, having no connection with a sentient principle and itself non-sentient, is not able to give rise to effects; hence, it is simply meaningless. Pradhāna, taught in the Upaniṣads, on the other hand, "has a meaning". That has a meaning which serves the 'meaning', or the purpose, of giving rise to all effects, beginning with the mahat and ending with a tuft of grass. Why? "On account of (its) dependence on Him".[1] That which is dependent on Him, i.e. on Brahman or Lord Vāsudeva, sentient and the Supreme Cause, is 'tad-adhīna', viz. pradhāna, the state of being that (tad-adhīnatva), on account of that (tad-adhīnatvāt).

But the dependence of pradhāna on Brahman is not like the dependence of atoms on Īśvara, as held by the logicians, but is due to the relation between a power and the possessor of the power,[2] as established by the scriptural text like: 'The own power of the Deity, hidden by his own qualities' (Śvet. 1.3) and so on. The scriptural texts, establishing pradhāna as taught in the Upaniṣads, have been quoted above.[3]

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

He gives two alternative explanations of the sūtra, the first of which tallies with the explanation given by Nimbārka. The second is as follows: 'But (the subtle causal body is designated as) subtle (in reference to the gross body), because of the fitness (of the word "unmanifest" to denote it)' (Sūtra 2). ('Bondage and release) have meaning as dependent on it (viz. the subtle body)' (Sūtra 3) [4].

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[1] The compound '*tad-adhīnatvāt*' is to be explained as follows.

[2] That is, not an external and accidental relation, but an internal and essential one.

[3] Vide e.g. V.K. 1.1.1.

[4] Bh. B. 1.4.3, p. 73.

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. '(The soul, the body and the rest) have a meaning as dependent on Him (viz. the Lord)'.[1]

SŪTRA 4

"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF ANY STATEMENT OF (ITS) BEING AN OBJECT TO BE KNOWN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The word 'unmanifest' does not denote pradhāna of the Tāntrikas (i.e. the Sāṃkhyas), "also because of the absence of any statement of its being an object to be known".

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also pradhāna is not denoted by the term 'unmanifest' here. Why? "Because of the absence of any statement of its being an object to be known." The Sāṃkhyas, incoherently prattling that salvation arises from a right discrimination between prakṛti (= matter) and puruṣa (= soul), say that with a view to the attainment of salvation, prakṛti, too, should be known by one desiring for salvation. But pradhāna is not mentioned by the Kaṭhas as an object to be known, there being the mention of the word 'unmanifest' simply.

SŪTRA 5

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (SCRIPTURE) SPEAKS (OF PRADHĀNA AS AN OBJECT TO BE KNOWN), (WE REPLY:) NO, FOR THE INTELLIGENT SOUL (IS THE OBJECT TO BE KNOWN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that the text: 'By discerning him, who is without beginning, without end, higher than the great (mahat) eternal, one is delivered from the jaws of death' (Kaṭha 3.15[2]), "speaks" of pradhāna as an object to be known,—

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[1] ŚK. B. 1.1.3., p. 514, Part 6.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

(We reply:) 'No'. "The intelligent soul", i.e. the Supreme Soul, is here indicated as the object to be known, He being the "topic".

Vedānta-kaustubha

It may be objected: The following text "speaks" of pradhāna as an object to be known, viz.: 'What is without sound, without touch, without form, unchangeable, likewise without taste, constant, and without odour, without beginning, without end, higher than the great (mahat), eternal, by discerning that, one is delivered from the jaws of death' (Kaṭha 3.15). It means that 'by discerning', i.e. by knowing, pradhāna,—the cause of and higher than 'the great', i.e. than the principle mahat, the second principle called buddhi, and an effect of pradhāna,—one is delivered from the jaws of death, i.e. from the jaws of mundane existence.

(We reply:) "No", "for the intelligent soul" alone is indicated here as the object to be discerned. Why? "On account of the topic", i.e. because the Supreme Soul is the topic here, as evident from the texts: 'That supreme place of Viṣṇu' (Kaṭha 3.9), 'Nothing is higher than the Person' (Kaṭha 3.11), 'The soul, hidden in all beings, is not manifest' (Kaṭha 3.12) and so on. And by the phrase: 'Higher than the great (mahat)', the superiority of the Supreme Soul to the individual soul,—mentioned previously in the passage: 'Higher than buddhi is the great soul' (Kaṭha 3.10),—is denoted.

SŪTRA 6

"AND THUS THERE ARE STATEMENT AS WELL AS QUESTION ABOUT THREE ALONE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That in this Upaniṣad, "there are statement as well as question about three",—viz. the means, the end, and the realizing agent,—is known from a consideration of the meaning of the prior and later texts. Here, there is no room for determining a principle which is derived from inference (viz. pradhāna).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Here pradhāna cannot be understood by the term 'unmanifest', since here in the Kaṭha-vallī, "there is statement about three alone",—viz. the Supreme Soul, the worship of Him, and the worshipper,—as the objects to be designated; "as well as question" about them as the objects to be known, but not about pradhāna and the rest, established by the Sāṃkhya-tantra. Thus, when three boons were promised to Naciketas by Death with the words: '"Since you have passed three days in my house without eating, O Brāhmaṇa, a guest to be saluted, salute to you, O Brāhmaṇa, may it be well with me; therefore choose three boons for each (night)" ' (Kaṭha 1.9), the former asked for the propitiation of his father as the first boon thus: '"May Gautama be tranquil-minded, well-disposed, with anger appeased towards me, O Death! May he cheerfully greet me, when dismissed by you,—this I choose as the first boon among the three"' (Kaṭha 1.10). Then, being granted the propitiation of his father with the words: '"Auddālaka Āruṇi, dismissed by me [1], will be cheerful as before, he will sleep happily at nights, with his anger appeased"' (Kaṭha 1.11) and so on, he asked for the knowledge of fire, called Naciketas, and a means to salvation, thus: '"You know, O Death, the heavenly fire; tell it to me, who has faith. Those who live in the heaven-world partake of immortality—this I ask as the second boon"' (Kaṭha 1.13). The construction of the above text is as follows: 'O Death!' 'You know', i.e. remember and know, the 'heavenly fire', i.e. the fire which leads to salvation. So 'tell that to me', desirous as I am of salvation. I choose as the second boon that knowledge of the fire, whereby 'those who live in the heaven-world', i.e. those to whom belong the heaven-world, viz. the world to be approached by the freed souls through the path beginning with light as stated in the fourth chapter [2], or the Vedāntins, 'partake of', i.e. attain, 'immortality' or salvation. Here the word 'heaven' applies to salvation equally, this being well-known from other texts as well, such as, 'The world of heaven is a golden sheath, covered with light', 'The knowers of Brahman go to Brahman, to the world of heaven' (Bṛh. 4.4.8 [3])

[1] That is, commanded by me. Vide Ś.B. on Kaṭha: '*Matpraṣṛṣṭaḥ mayā anujñātaḥ san*'.

[2] Vide Br. Sū. 4.3.1 *et seq.*

[3] Correct quotation: '*Tena dhīrāḥ apiyanti brahma-vidaḥ svargaṃ lokam*'. Vide Bṛh. 4.4.8, p. 237.

and so on. Then, having obtained the knowledge of the fire, taught thus: '"I tell it to you, learn it from me, knowing the heavenly fire, O Naciketas! The attainment of the infinite world, and the support"' (Kaṭha 1.14) and so on, he,—by means of a question regarding the real nature of salvation, characterized by the attainment of the Supreme Soul, the highest end of men,—asked, as the third boon, about the real nature of the object to be attained, the real nature of the attainer and the real nature of meditation, the means, thus: '"When a man is dead there is this doubt, some saying that he is, others that he is not. This may I know, taught by you, this is the third among the boons"' (Kaṭha 1.20). Thus, when the real nature of salvation was asked thus, the reply given by Yama, preceded by an examination of Naciketa's fitness for that teaching, was as follows: '"Him, who is difficult to be seen, who is hidden, who has entered within, who is hidden in the cave and who dwells in the abyss, by knowing Him as God through the knowledge of the Yoga relating to the soul, a wise man discards joy and sorrow"' (Kaṭha 2.12).

Having been thus taught, in a general manner, Naciketas with a view to understanding clearly the real nature of the object to be attained, indicated by the word 'God', the real nature of the means, viz. knowledge, demonstrated by the phrase 'by knowing', and the real nature of the attainer, demonstrated by the words 'wise man', once more asked about meditation, different from means like merit and demerit, thus: '"Different from the right, different from the non-right"' (Kaṭha 2.14); about the object to be approached, not limited by time, thus '"Different from what has been done and what has not been done, different from what has been and what will be"' (Kaṭha 2.14); and also about the attainer, as this latter question is a question about the attainer, the sentient being as well, the latter, too, being eternal and included among the objects to be attained.[1]

Or else, this text is concerned with a question about the object to be approached. Like the co-ordination of the two words 'different', mentioned in the text '"Different from the right, different from non-right"' (Kaṭha 2.14), there is also a co-ordination between the two words 'different', mentioned subsequently, and so in this question

[1] That is, the last portion of Kaṭha 2.14 is a question about both *Brahman*, the object to be attained, and the individual soul, the attainer, since the latter, too, is eternal and an object to be attained like the former.

about the object to be approached, the approaching agent and of the means too have been included; and hence really no less than three questions were asked.[1]

Then, having praised the praṇava by way of demonstrating Brahman; having depicted the real nature of the attainer, denoted by the praṇava, and the real nature of the means, denoting the praṇava; and having taught the praṇava once more, Yama taught the real nature of the attainer, in the passage: '"A wise man is neither born, nor dies. He has not arisen from anything, has not become anything. Unborn, eternal, constant is this ancient one, who is not killed when the body is killed"' (Kaṭha 2.25); the real nature of the object to be attained, in the passage beginning: '"Smaller than the small, greater than the great is the soul placed in the cave (i.e. heart) of this creature. Him one who is free from active will sees, freed from sorrow, through the grace of the Creator, (and) the glory of the soul"' (Kaṭha 2.20), and ending: '"Who knows thus"?' (Kaṭha 2.25); and meditation that is of the form of devotion, in the middle in the passage: '"This soul is not attainable by the study of the Veda"' (Kaṭha 2.23) and so on. Then, having stated that the Supreme Soul is easily attainable

[1] The entire passage is:

'*Anyatra dharmād anyatra adharmād anyatra asmāt kṛtākṛtāt.*
Anyatra bhūtād bhavyāc ca yat tat paśyasi tad vada' (Kaṭha 2.14).

The author is here trying to show that this is not a question about a single thing, but about three different things, viz. *Brahman*, the individual soul, and the means to salvation.

He offers two explanations:

(*a*) The portion: 'Different from the right and different from the non-right' refers to the means, viz. knowledge, different from ordinary merit and demerit. And, the portion: 'Different from what has been done and what has not been done, different from what has been and what will be' refers equally to *Brahman* and the individual soul, to both of whom, who are eternal, the above description fittingly applies. Hence the above question means: Tell me about (1) the means, (2) the individual soul and (3) *Brahman*.

(*b*) The whole text is really a question about *Brahman*, but *includes* questions about the *other two* as well. Thus, the portion 'different from the right . . ' means 'who is different from the means'; and the portion 'different from what has been done . . . ' means, 'who is different from the individual soul'. Hence the above question means: Tell me about (1) *Brahman*, who is different from (2) the means and (3) the individual soul. As such it is really a question about the last two as well.

by the individual soul,—since the Person worshipped and the worshipper have entered into the same cave (Kaṭha 3.1 [1]),—and the mode of worship, as well as the attainment of the place of Viṣṇu by the worshipper, in the passage which begins: '"Know the soul to be a lord of chariot"' (Kaṭha 3.3), and ends: '"This the wise declare"' (Kaṭha 3.14), he concluded with the words: '"Invisible"' (Kaṭha 3.15) and so on. Hence, this Upaniṣad contains a statement about the three alone as the objects to be known, as well as a question about them; there is no reference to pradhāna, established by the Tantra, (viz. the Sāṃkhyas).

SŪTRA 7

"AND AS IN THE CASE OF THE GREAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as, although the word 'great' (mahat) has been applied by the Sāṃkhyas to the second principle called 'buddhi', yet it is found applied elsewhere as well in Vedic texts like, 'I know this great Person' (Vj. S. 18.12 [2]; Śvet. 3.8),—so the word 'unmanifest' (avyakta) may refer to the body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Just as the word 'great', mentioned in the Veda, is applied to the individual soul and to Brahman,—as in the passages: 'Higher than intellect is the great soul' (Kaṭha 3.10), 'The soul which is great and all-pervading' (Kaṭha 2.22 ; 4.4) and so on,—and not to the second principle, called buddhi, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, and cannot be applied elsewhere even by a hundred Sāṃkhyas, so it is established that the word 'unmanifest' as well, being mentioned in the Veda, does not apply to pradhāna, but denotes the body.

Here ends the section entitled 'What is derived from inference' (1).

[1] Vide Br. Sū. 1.2.11-12.
[2] P. 857, line 10.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled 'The cup'. (Sūtras 8–10)

SŪTRA 8

"(THE WORD 'UNBORN' DOES NOT DENOTE THE SĀṂKHYA PRAKṚTI) ON ACCOUNT OF NON-SPECIFICATION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE CUP."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the *prima facie* view, viz. Let prakṛti, mentioned in the sacred text: 'One unborn female (ajā)' (Śvet. 4.5[1]), be the one established in (the Sāṃkhya) Smṛti, the author indicates the right conclusion. The unborn one, mentioned in the sacred text, must have Brahman for its soul[2], because there is no specification guaranteeing the *prima facie* view[3], as in the case of the cup, mentioned in the sacred text: 'There is a cup with its mouth below' (Bṛh. 2.2.3[4]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been shown that in the Kaṭha-vallī pradhāna, which is not mentioned in the Veda, is not denoted by the term 'unmanifest', as it, through denoting the cause, viz. pradhāna which is mentioned in the Veda, denotes its effect, viz. the body. It has also been shown that as pradhāna has Brahman for its soul, the text, thereby, refers to Brahman. In a like manner, it is being shown now that the text about the unborn one, too, refers to Brahman alone.

In the Mantropaniṣad of the Śvetāśvataras, we find the following: 'By an unborn female (ajā),[5] red, black and white, bringing forth manifold offspring of a like nature, there lies an unborn male (aja)[6], enjoying. Another unborn male (aja) leaves her who has been enjoyed' (Śvet. 4.5). A doubt arises, viz. whether in this sacred text prakṛti, established by the Sāṃkhya-smṛti, is recognized by the term 'unborn one' (ajā), or whether the meaning of the sacred text

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] I.e. be dependent on *Brahman*.

[3] I.e. There is nothing here to guarantee us in selecting *pradhāna* of the opponents as the unborn one.

[4] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[5] '*Ajā*' means a she-goat, too, cf. Ś.B. 1.4.10, p. 404.

[6] '*Aja*' means a he-goat also.

is prakṛti, having Brahman for its soul. On the *prima facie* view, viz. The 'unborn one', etymologically derived as 'one who is not born'; self-supporting; independently bringing forth, by nature, offspring of a like nature; consisting in the three guṇas; the cause of the distinction between bondage and release; and admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, should be understood to be mentioned by the sacred text as well.

We reply: The 'unborn one', which has Brahman for its soul, is mentioned by the sacred text. Why? "On account of non-specification", i.e. because there is no special circumstance for understanding pradhāna which is derived from inference. Our (i.e. Upaniṣadic) (prakṛti), too, is unborn. Since a scriptural text is authoritative only in reference to its own explicit meaning, i.e. only in reference to what it actually states, a self-supporting one is not recognized here, because the word 'self-supporting' is found nowhere, and also because it is impossible for a non-sentient object to have an independent existence. An example illustrating the absence of any specification, such as: 'This is *so*', with regard to a common term, is given in the words: "As in the case of a cup". In the text: 'There is a cup with its mouth below, and bottom above' (Bṛh. 2.2.3), the word 'cup' (camasa) conveys only the idea of an implement used in eating, in accordance with the etymology: (A 'camasa' is that) whereby one drinks (camyate anena); and so no accurate specific determination, that a cup (camasa) is such, is possible, on account of non-specification, —(the marks of) having the mouth below and the rest being possible elsewhere too.[1] Similarly, in the sacred text under discussion also, there can be no specifying out that this prakṛti, simply because it is unborn, is the one established by the Sāṃkhya-smṛti.

[1] I.e. in the above text about the '*ajā*', there are no special marks which justify us in selecting out the *Sāṃkhya prakṛti* here out of other possible meanings of the term '*ajā*', just as in the text about the 'camasa', there are no special marks for fixing what exactly a camasa denotes here, until we are told specifically in the complementary passage that it denotes the head.

SŪTRA 9

"BUT (THE UNBORN ONE IS) THAT WHICH HAS LIGHT (I.E. BRAHMAN) FOR ITS BEGINNING (I.E. CAUSE), FOR THUS SOME READ."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that in the sacred text about the cup (camasa), it is known from the complementary text: 'It is the head' (Bṛh. 2.2.3) that the cup is the head; now what is the convincing reason for understanding a particular meaning in the sacred text about the unborn one?—

We reply: That of which "light", i.e. Brahman, is the "beginning", i.e. cause, is here denoted by the sacred text about the unborn one, for "thus" alone "some read", viz. 'From him arose Brahma, name, form and food' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Just as from the complementary passage: 'This is the head, for there is a cup with its mouth below' (Bṛh. 2.2.3), it is known that nothing but the head is the cup, so there is no ground here for specifying out the unborn one, established by the Sāṃkhyas. On the contrary, that unborn one which has Brahman for its soul is to be understood in the sacred text about the unborn one (Śvet. 4.5), on the ground of prior and later texts,—so holds the author.

The term "but" implies certainty. Prakṛti, "which has light for its beginning", is to be understood definitely in the sacred text about the unborn one. The compound: "which has light for its beginning" means: That of which the 'beginning', i.e. the instituting cause, is 'light', i.e. Brahman, celebrated in scriptural texts like: 'That the gods worship as the light of lights' (Bṛh. 4.4.16), 'Now the light which shines higher than this heaven' (Chānd. 3.13.7) and so on,—i.e. it should be understood to be that which has Brahman for its soul. In the Veda, the peculiar nature, qualities and the rest of Brahman alone being specially determined, no other topic has been dealt with; and hence, that alone which has Brahman for its cause is to be understood. The sense is: Beginning: 'The speakers of Brahman say: "what is the cause"?' (Śvet. 1.1) and so on, and rejecting the views of those who take time to be the first cause, of the Bauddhas, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jains and the logicians, suggested in the passage:

'Time, nature, destiny, accident' (Śvet. 1.2), the text goes on: 'Those, following meditation and concentration, saw God's self-power, hidden by His own qualities' (Śvet. 1.3). On account of this introductory text, in the sacred text about the unborn one (Śvet. 4.5), that unborn one alone which has been established by the Veda and which a power of Brahman,—the cause of the Universe and denoted by words like 'light' and the rest,—is to be understood, since subsequently also in the passages: 'From this, the Māyin creates this universe, and in it the other is bound up with Māyā' (Śvet. 4.9), 'But let one know prakṛti to be Māyā, and the Great Lord to be the Māyin' (Śvet. 4.10), 'The One, who rules over every source' (Śvet. 4.11) and so on, that alone which has Brahman for its soul is established. For that very reason, it is declared in the same Upaniṣad that although this, as a power, is different from the possessor of powers, yet it is non-different from Brahman, because of having no existence and activity apart from the possessor of powers, thus: 'On knowing the enjoyer, the object enjoyed and the Mover, all has been said, this is the three-fold Brahman' (Śvet. 1.12). Here, the enjoyer is the individual soul, denoted by the term 'higher prakṛti'; the object enjoyed is the non-sentient in its causal and effected states, denoted by the term 'lower prakṛti'; and the Mover is the Highest Person, possessing the two prakṛtis, and denoted by the term 'Brahman'. Thus, the phrase: 'All is this Brahman' establishes the non-difference of Brahman and the two prakṛtis, the objects to be controlled,—since the existence and activity of the latter two depend on their Controller, —in spite of there being a difference of nature between them and the Lord.

With a view to confirming that unborn one which is mentioned in the Veda, by that very Veda, the author establishes this once more in the words: "For thus some read"; that means, because thus some schools, i.e. the Ātharvaṇikas, "read" in the Muṇḍakopaniṣad that this unborn one has Brahman for its soul: 'From him arose Brahmā, name, form and food' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9); and because it is declared by the Lord Himself, in the passage: '"My womb is the great Brahman. In it I place the germ"' (Gītā 14.3). In the Taittirīyaka, too, having introduced Brahman in the passage: 'Smaller than the small' (Mahānār. 6.3 [1]), having, then, designated the origin of the entire universe,

[1] This verse occurs also in Kaṭha 2.20 and Śvet. 3.20.

implied by the vital-breath, in the passage: 'Seven vital breaths arise from him' (Mahānār. 8.4), the text goes on to read after that: 'By an unborn female, red, white and black, bringing forth manifold offspring of a like nature, lies an unborn male, enjoying. Another unborn male discards her, who has been enjoyed' (Mahānār. 9.2). And since this sacred text is to be taken as referring to prakṛti, which has Brahman for its soul, and since here, too, the same must inevitably be the case, that prakṛti alone which has Brahman for its soul is the object to be established by the sacred text about the unborn one.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

The interpretation of 'jyotir-upakramā' different, viz. '(The unborn one is) the beginning (i.e. the material cause) of light (i.e. of the four kinds of material objects, consisting in light, i.e. fire, water, and so on)'.[1]

SŪTRA 10

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF THE FASHIONING (OF THE UNIVERSE), THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE HONEY (-MEDITATION)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

No contradiction is involved in taking one and the same substratum of qualities as unborn and having, at the same time, Brahman for its material cause. On account of the teaching of the creation of the universe from Brahman, the cause of the world and possessing subtle powers, both fit in, "as in the case of the honey-meditation".

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. How can an unborn one be something generated, the author replies:

The word "and" is for disposing of the objection. There is no contradiction in taking an unborn one as something generated. Why? "On account of the teaching of fashioning." The word "fashioning"

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[1] Ś.B. 1.4.9, p. 402.

means making or creation, on account of the teaching of that [1], i.e. on account of the teaching of the creation of the universe from Brahman, possessing subtle powers, in the passage: 'From this, the Māyin creates this universe' (Śvet. 4.9). The unmanifest prakṛti, subtle in form and a power of Brahman, is said to be unborn because of being non-different from Brahman as His power. That very same prakṛti, emanated from the possessor of powers or Brahman and abiding in the form of effects, is said to have Brahman for its beginning or cause, and hence there is no contradiction. Here the author states a parallel case in the words: "As in the case of the honey-meditation". In the honey-meditation,[2] which begins: 'Verily, this sun is the honey of the gods' (Chānd. 3.1.1), in the concluding text: 'Then, having risen up from thence, it will neither rise nor set, it will remain alone in the middle' (Chānd. 3.11.1), the very same thing, which in its causal state abides in a subtle form and is not, as such, designable as honey, is, in its effected state, imagined to be the honey, enjoyable by gods like Vasu and the rest, and to be possessed of rising and setting, without giving rise to any contradiction. Similarly, the very same eternally existent prakṛti is designated by the sacred text in its causal form in relation to the bondage and release of the eternally existent individual soul. Here, the individual soul, indicated by the term: 'unborn one' (aja),—eternal by nature, carried away by the current of beginningless karmas, and hence devoid of a true knowledge of the real nature of itself or of the Supreme Being,—having identified itself through nescience with the bodies, such as of men, gods and the rest which are the evolutes of prakṛti, lies by, enjoying sounds and the rest, the parts of prakṛti; such a one, devoid of the bliss of Brahman, is said to be 'bound'. But one, who having attained by chance the grace of the Lord through humbleness and the like, and having attained the bliss of Brahman by means of the repetition of the means,—'hearing' (śravaṇa) and the rest of the Vedānta,—learnt from a holy spiritual preceptor, discards prakṛti, is said to be 'freed'. If in accordance with the etymology: 'An unborn one (ajā) is one that is not born', it is said that the unborn one is not prakṛti, eternally existent and having Brahman for its soul, then the conventional distinction between the bondage and release of the created souls cannot

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[1] This explains the compound: '*kalpanopadeśāt*'.

[2] Vide V.K. 1.3.31–33. See footnote 1, p. 193.

be explained by the non-sentient pradhāna, devoid of any connection with Brahman. Hence it is established that the unborn one, mentioned in the sacred text, has Brahman for its soul.

Here ends the section entitled 'The cup' (2).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different: viz. 'On account of the teaching of an imagination (i.e. a metaphor); there is no contradiction'. That is, the word 'ajā' here does not stand for one who is literally unborn, but simply metaphorically represents prakṛti, the source of all things, as a she-goat, just as the sun, though not really honey, is metaphorically represented as such in the Chāndogya.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'The collection of number'. (Sūtras 11–13)

SŪTRA 11

"NOT ON ACCOUNT OF THE COLLECTION OF NUMBER EVEN, ON ACCOUNT OF DIVERSITY, AND ON ACCOUNT OF EXCESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Even on account of the collection of number" in the text 'In whom the five people and the ether are based' (Bṛh. 4.4.17 ; Śat. Br. 14.7.2.19[2]), it is not to be said that the twenty-five principles, beginning with pradhāna, are based on Scripture, so what dispute can there be regarding the knowability of one pradhāna from Scripture?[3] Why? "On account of diversity," i.e. because the objects which are based on Brahman, established in Scripture and denoted by the

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[1] Ś.B. 1.1.10, pp. 404-5. Bh. B. 1.1.10, p. 75. Cf. *Rāmānuja's* criticism of this interpretation.

[2] P. 1090, line 3. Ś. R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[3] That is, all the twenty-five principles of the *Sāṁkhyas* can be known from Scripture, not to speak of *pradhāna* alone.

term 'in whom', are different from the objects established in the Tantra (i.e. the Sāṃkhya-smṛti), since the former are found to have Brahman for their soul; "and on account of the excess" of Brahman, the support, and likewise of the ether.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the previous aphorism, it has been shown that the text about the unborn one, not referable to pradhāna, as admitted by the Sāṃkhyas on the ground of texts like: 'The self-power of the Deity' (Śvet. 1.3), refers to Brahman on the ground that it refers to His power, viz. pradhāna, as admitted by the Vedāntins. In the very same manner, by showing that [1] the text about the 'five five-people' refers to the vital-breath and the rest, based on Brahman, on the ground of the pronoun ('in whom') and so on, leading to the nullification of the number admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, (viz. twenty-five), the reverend author of the aphorisms is confirming his contention that pradhāna has never been mentioned in Scripture.

In the sixth chapter [2] of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, immediately after the introduction: 'That the gods worship as the light of lights, as life, as immortality' (Bṛh. 4.4.16; Śat. Br. 14.7.2.20 [3]), we read the following: 'In whom the five five-people and the ether are based, him alone I, the knower, the immortal, know as the soul, the immortal Brahman' (Bṛh. 4.4.17; Śat. Br. 14.7.2.19). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether by the phrase; 'five five-people', meaning five groups of five, the twenty-five principles, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, are denoted, or the vital-breath and the rest, five in number and called 'five-people' (pañca-jana). The *prima facie* view is as follows: We get here the twenty-five principles, mentioned in Scripture and determined more specially in the Sāmkhya-smṛti. In the Ṣaṣṭī-saṃhitā [4], we read the following,—beginning: 'Being struck [5] by the three kinds of sorrow, (one undertakes) an enquiry into the cause of their removal' (Sāṃ. Kā. 1), and continuing: 'The primal cause prakṛti is not an effect; the seven objects beginning with the mahat are causes as well as

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[1] Here the *śatṛ*-suffix implies reason.

[2] Ought to be fourth chapter. [3] P. 1090, line 5.

[4] That is a *Sāṃkhya* treatise or a saṃhitā or treatise dealing with the sixty ideas peculiar to the *Sāṃkhyas*.

[5] Correct quotation: '*abhighātāt*' which is translated here. Vide Sāṃ. Kā. 1, p. 1.

effects; sixteen objects are effects (only); puruṣa is neither a cause nor an effect' (Sāṃ. Kā. 3[1]).

With regard to it, we reply: "Not even on account of the collection of number"; The word "even" implies possibility.[2] In spite of the fact that the number twenty-five is found in this text, prakṛti and the rest have not Scripture as their authority. Why? "On account of diversity", i.e. because the twenty-five principles, mentioned in Smṛti, cannot be arranged in five groups of five each, they being of various kinds. There can be numeration or grouping of objects only with reference to a class, a common quality and so on, e.g. when we say: 'A group of five cows', 'a group of five learned men'. But here we find no common cause for grouping five objects under each pentad. In such cases as: 'seven are causes as well as effects', 'sixteen are effects (only)' and so on, on the other hand, there do exist causes for such groupings.[3]

Or, else (an alternative explanation of the word 'nānābhāvāt'), 'on account of the absence of plurality'. That is, all the objects mentioned in the Vedānta having Brahman for their soul, there is no absolute plurality, in accordance with the statement: 'All this has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.4; 6.10.3–6.16.3), and also in accordance with the teaching contained here, viz. 'In whom the five five-people and the ether are based' (Bṛh. 4.4.17). The sense is that if the twenty-five principles, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, be accepted here, then, they not having Brahman for their soul, plurality will result, contradicting Scripture.

Or, rather, the principles, admitted by our opponents and independent of Brahman, being distinct from those that are based on Brahman, in accordance with the text: 'In whom the five five-people' (Bṛh. 4.4.17), "and on account of excess", there is not even the number twenty-five here. On the contrary, "on account of the excess", i.e. surplus, viz. the Supreme Soul, the support of all, indicated

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[1] P. 4.

[2] I.e. *even if* it be possible to understand here the number intended by the *Sāṃkhyas, still then* the *Sāṃkhya* view cannot be said to be referred to here. It will be shown later that it is not really even possible to understand here the number twenty-five intended by the *Saṃkhyas*.

[3] I.e. A group consists of a certain number of *similar* objects. But here it is impossible to divide the twenty-five *Sāṃkhya* principles into five groups, each containing five *similar* principles. Hence it cannot be said that 'five five-people' means $5 \times 5 = 25$ principles of the *Sāṃkhyas*.

by the pronoun 'in whom', and the ether, twenty-five principles are not denoted.

The meaning of the text is as follows: 'The gods worship that', viz. Brahman. What is that? 'That which is the light of lights', i.e. of sun and the rest; 'life', i.e. the cause of the longevity of its own devotees; 'immortal', i.e. the object to be attained during the state of release, this is the sense of the introductory text (Bṛh. 4.4.16, etc.). 'In whom', i.e. in Brahman, 'the five five-people are based'. The compound 'five-people' (pañca-jana) is to be explained in accordance with the rule: 'Words indicating a quarter or a number are compounded (with words in the same case [1]) to designate a name (and the compound is a tat-puruṣa)' (Pāṇ. 2.1.50; SD. K. 727 [2]). The word 'five-people' is here understood as a name, since the meaning of the component parts (i.e. the number five) is not intended to be designated. Just as by the expression 'seven sages' each of the seven sages is denoted, so by the word 'five-people' as well. On the enquiry: How many five-people are there? the adjective 'five' is added.[3] As Yājñavalkya says: 'In whom the ether is based that alone is Brahman, the support of all and immortal. He who knows the Highest Self, to be approached by the freed, the soul, the cause of all existence and activity, becomes immortal, so I think. He who does not know Him does not become free'.

SŪTRA 12

"(THE 'FIVE-PEOPLE' ARE) THE VITAL-BREATH AND THE REST, ON ACCOUNT OF THE COMPLEMENTARY PASSAGE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the complementary passage", viz. 'Those who know the breath of breath, the eye of eye, the ear of ear, the food of

[1] In accordance with the previous Pāṇ.-sūtra 2.1.49.

[2] P. 509, vol. 1.

[3] I.e. the expression 'five-people' denotes the name of a certain class of beings, and the expression 'five five-people' denotes that there are *five* classes of such beings, just as the expression 'seven sages' denotes a certain class of sages, (i.e. stars) and the expression 'seven seven-sages' denotes that there are seven classes of such beings. What these classes of beings called 'five-people' are is indicated in the next sūtra.

food, the mind of mind' (Śat. Br. 14.7.2.21 [1]), these "five-people" (pañca-jana) are to be known as the vital-breath and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the question: Who, then, are the five-people, the author replies here.

"On account of the complementary passage", viz. 'Those who know the breath of breath, the eye of eye, the ear of ear, the mind of mind' (Śat. Br. 14.7.2.21), the vital-breath and the rest, five in number, having Brahman as their soul, and denoted by the term "five-people", are meant by the sacred text.

SŪTRA 13

"(THE NUMBER FIVE IS TO BE COMPLETED) BY LIGHT, FOOD BEING NON-PRESENT (I.E. NOT MENTIONED) (IN THE TEXT) OF SOME."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Food being non-present (i.e. non-mentioned)", on the other hand, in the complementary passage of the Kāṇvas [2], the number five is to be completed "by light", mentioned in the beginning.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz. Let the vital-breath and the rest, five in number, be the 'five-people' on the ground of the complementary passage, subsequent to the sacred text about the 'five-people' in the Mādhyandina branch. In the Kāṇva branch, too, there is a text about the 'five-people'. There the word 'food' is not found in the complementary passage. Hence, how can the number five be completed here?—the author replies here.

It has been said that the Mādhyandinas complete the number five by means of food. But "there being the absence or non-mention of food" in the reading "of some", i.e. of the Kāṇvas, the number five is completed "by light", mentioned in the introductory passage: 'That the gods worship as the light of lights' (Bṛh. 4.4.16),—this

[1] P. 1090, lines 5-6. Ś. R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] Viz. Bṛh. 4.4.18, which omits '*annasya annam*'.

is the sense. Hence, it is established that pradhāna, devoid of any connection with Brahman, is not an object to be known from Scripture.

Here ends the section entitled 'The collection of number' (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'Being the cause'. (Sūtras 14-15)

SŪTRA 14

"AND (THE LORD ALONE IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD) AS THE CAUSE WITH REGARD TO THE ETHER AND THE REST, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DECLARATION OF (BRAHMAN) AS DESIGNATED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Omniscient and omnipotent Brahman alone is to be understood everywhere in the texts about the creation of the ether and the rest, because the very same Brahman, "as designated" in the characterizing aphorism [1] and the following, is demonstrated "as the cause" of the ether and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

An objection may be raised here: That view, too, which rejecting pradhāna, established by Smṛti, as the cause of the world, takes the universe to have Brahman as its sole cause, is, indeed, a doubtful one, since in the Vedānta texts, demonstrating the cause, creation is stated to be due to manifold causes. Thus, in a certain text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), creation is said to be due to the existent; in a certain other text: 'From this soul the ether has arisen' (Tait. 2.1), to be due to the soul alone; again in another text, on the other hand: 'The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning, from that, forsooth, the existent arose' (Tait. 2.7), likewise in the text: 'The non-existent alone was this in the beginning, it was existent' (Chānd. 3.19.1), to be due to the non-existent; in another text: '"What is its final goal?" "The ether" said he' (Chānd. 1.9.1), to be due to the ether; in a certain other text again: '"All these beings, verily, enter into the vital-breath"'

[1] Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.2, etc.

(Chānd. 1.11.5), to be due to the vital-breath; and in some passages in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka: 'The soul alone was this in the beginning' (Bṛh. 1.4.17), 'Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning' (Bṛh. 1.4.10), to be due to the soul and to Brahman. Such being our knowledge of the cause of the universe, it is not possible to ascertain definitely that Brahman alone is the cause of the universe. But it is possible to ascertain definitely that pradhāna, independent of Brahman, is the cause of the universe. Thus, in the text: 'Verily, at that time this was unmanifest (avyākṛta), it became manifest simply by name and form' (Bṛh. 1.4.7), by the word 'unmanifest' pradhāna, independent of a sentient principle, is declared to be the cause of the universe. The meaning of the text is that 'this', i.e. the manifest world, was 'at that time', i.e. prior to creation, 'unmanifest' and 'it', viz. pradhāna, 'became manifest by name and form'. The mass of texts demonstrating the cause of the universe should be taken to be referring to pradhāna alone.

With a view to disposing of the above view, his Holiness is showing that the mass of texts designating the cause of the universe all refer to Brahman.

The word "and" is for disposing of the objection. The word "as" implies the kind. It is possible to ascertain definitely that the Highest Person alone, omnipotent, endowed with the attributes of omniscience and the rest and the Lord of all, is the Cause of the Universe. How? "On account of the declaration" of the very same Brahman, "designated" in the characterizing aphorism and the rest, "as the cause" of effects like the ether and the rest. Thus, Brahman alone, mentioned previously in the passage: 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1), is designated as the cause in the passage: 'From him, verily' (Tait. 2.1) and so on. Likewise, Brahman alone, indicated by the passages, '"The existent alone, my dear"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'He thought: "May I be many"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), is designated in the passage: 'He created light' (Chānd. 6.2.3). The same is to be understood with regard to other Upaniṣad texts too.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

General import same, literal interpretation different, viz. '(Although there may be a conflict among the Vedānta texts) with regard

to (the order of the things created, like) the ether and the rest, (there is no conflict among them with regard to the creator,) because as (Brahman) is designated as the cause (in one Vedānta) so (He) is mentioned (in other Vedāntas too)[1].

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different. He does not begin a new adhikaraṇa here, but continues the same topic. Hence the sūtra: 'And just as on account of the declaration (i.e. understanding) (of Brahman) as the cause (in all the Vedānta texts) with regard to (all the effects like) the ether and the rest, (as well as in all other general texts), (pradhāna of the Sāṃkhyas is not understood, so the Sāṃkhya principles are not understood here)'. That is, just as we interpret the vague and general text 'verily, at that time, it was unmanifest' (Bṛh. 1.4.7) in the light of the specific text: 'The soul alone was this in the beginning' (Bṛh. 1.4.1), and understand thereby the first text as denoting Brahman and not the Sāṃkhya unmanifest or pradhāna, so exactly, here we should interpret the vague and general text about the 'five five-people' (Bṛh. 4.4.17, etc.) in the light of the specific passage about the vital-breath and the rest (Bṛh. 4.4.18, etc.), and understand, thereby, the 'five five-people' as the vital-breath and the rest, and not as the Sāṃkhya principles.[2]

SŪTRA 15

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE DRAWING IN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the drawing in" of Brahman. That is, the very same Brahman, mentioned previously in the passage: 'He wished' (Tait. 2.6[3]), is referred to in the passage: 'The non-existent, verily' (Tait. 2.7[4]) too. Similarly the very same Brahman, mentioned previously in the passage: 'The sun is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.19.1[5]), is also referred to in the passage: 'The non-existent alone was this' (Chānd. 3.19.1[6]). Hence, Brahman alone, who is ever existent, is denoted

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[1] Ś.B. 1.4.14, p. 414.
[2] ŚK. B. 1.1.14, p. 530, Part 6.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
[4] *Op. cit.*
[5] Not quoted by others.
[6] Ś, R, Bh, B.

by the word 'non-existent', since there being no distinction of names and forms prior to creation, He has then no existence in so far as connected with these names and forms. In the same manner, what is denoted by the term 'unmanifest' in the passage: 'Verily, at that time, this was unmanifest, it became manifest simply by name and form' (Bṛh. 1.4.7 [1]), is referred to in the subsequent passage as well: 'He is entered here as far as the finger-nail tips' (Bṛh. 1.4.7 [2]) and so on. It is also impossible for the non-sentient pradhāna to be a controller by entering within. Hence, the unmanifest, its controller, is said to be Brahman. The sense is that in the texts, demonstrating the cause of the universe, Brahman alone, established by the defining aphorism and the rest, is to be understood,—there is not even the slightest possibility of pradhāna being so understood.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"On account of the drawing in" of Brahman. That is, the very same Brahman, omniscient, and creating the universe subsequent to His resolution to be many, as mentioned previously in the passage: 'He wished' (Tait. 2.6), is also referred to in the passage: 'The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning, from that the existent arose' (Tait. 2.7). Here, Brahman as possessed of subtle powers in His causal state is denoted by the term 'non-existent',—which is but a synonym for the word 'subtle',—in contrast to Brahman as possessed of manifested powers in His effected state, fit to be denoted by the term 'existent',—which is but a synonym for the word 'gross'. In the very same manner indeed, it should be known that Brahman, mentioned previously in the passage: 'The sun is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.19.1), is referred to in the passage too: 'The non-existent alone was this in the beginning, it was existent' (Chānd. 3.19.1). In the very same manner, in the text about the unmanifest as well, it is the inner controller of the unmanifest that is denoted by the word 'unmanifest', as here the pronoun 'he' refers to Brahman, denoted by the term 'unmanifest', in the passage: 'He is entered here as far as the finger-nail tips. When seeing, the eye; when hearing, the ear; when thinking, the mind. Let one worship (Him) as the soul' (Bṛh. 1.4.7). In spite of there being a separate agent of manifestation, the expression 'It became manifest (vyākriyata)' should be understood as denoting

[1] Ś, R, Bh, B. [2] Ś, R, ŚK, B.

an 'object-agent' (i.e. the reflexive passive form). Or else, the present indicative should be understood simply in the passive[1]. Hence, everywhere the cause is one and the same indeed. The objections with regard to the cause are refuted in this section. We shall dispose of the objections with regard to the effects, on the other hand, in the third quarter of the second chapter, under the aphorisms: 'Not the ether, because of being non-scriptural' (Br. Sū. 2.3.1) and the following. Hence, it is established everywhere that the cause of the universe is Brahman alone, a sentient Being and possessed of omniscience and the rest.

Here ends the section entitled 'Being the cause' (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

The general purport (of the sūtras 14-15) same, but while Nimbārka connects this adhikaraṇa more directly with the topic of the preceding part of the pāda, viz. with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view[2], Śaṃkara and Bhāskara do not do so, but take it to be concerned with the general question of the concordance of all texts with regard to Brahman.[3]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different. The same topic continued: 'On account of the drawing in'. That is, just as the very same Brahman, mentioned in the prior passage: 'He wished' (Tait. 2.6) is understood in the subsequent passage too: 'The non-existent alone was this in the beginning' (Tait. 2.7), because the two passages involve each other, so exactly, the 'five five-people', mentioned in the prior passage (Bṛh. 4.4.17, etc.) are understood as the vital-breath and the rest,

[1] I.e. as having reference to a necessarily implied agent, as in the expression: 'The village is being approached'. Vide Ś.B. 1.4.15, p. 417.

[2] This is evident from the concluding sentence of his explanation of the sūtra 15: "*Na pradhāna-śaṅkā-gandho' pīti bhāvaḥ*". V.P.S. 1.4.15, p. 131, K.S.S.

[3] This is evident from the beginning of the *adhikaraṇa* : '*Tatra idam aparam āśaṅkate : Na janmā-di-karaṇatvaṃ Brahmaṇo, Brahma-viṣayaṃ vā gati-sāmānyaṃ vedānta-vākyānāṃ pratipattum śakyam*', etc. Vide Ś.B. 1.1.14, pp. 412-13; Bh. B. 1.1.14, pp. 76-77.

mentioned in the subsequent passage (Bṛh. 4.4.18, etc.), because the two passages involve each other.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled 'Denoting the world'. (Sūtras 16–18)

SŪTRA 16

"BECAUSE OF DENOTING THE WORLD."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not to be supposed that in the text: '"He verily, O Bālāki, who is the maker of these persons, of whom this is the work"' (Kauṣ. 3.9 [2]), the object to be known is the person, mentioned in the Tantra (viz. in the Sāṃkhya doctrine) and the enjoyer of the fruits of merit and demerit. None but the Supreme Soul is here indicated as the object to be known. Why? Because Brahman is the topic, as known from the text: '"Let me declare Brahman to you"' (Kauṣ. 4.1 [3]); because the word 'work', meaning 'something that is done', denotes the world which is an effect; because by the pronoun 'this' the world, established by the evidence of perception and the rest, is suggested; and, lastly, because the person, mentioned in the Tantra, is not the topic here.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The Sāṃkhyas hold that prakṛti is the agent and puruṣa the enjoyer. The impossibility of prakṛti to be the cause has been shown in various ways. Now, although it has been shown in the section regarding Pratardana [4] that the Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa texts refer to Brahman, yet by showing that the text '"Of whom this is the work"' (Kauṣ. 4.19), too, refers to Brahman, the author is now disposing of the objection, viz.: the person (puruṣa), admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, is accepted by the Vedānta, on the ground of its being an enjoyer; and prakṛti, superintended by it, is the cause of the world.

We read of a dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru in the Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa. There, a sage, called Bālāki Gārgya having

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[1] Śk. B. 1.1.14, pp. 532-33, Part 6.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[3] Ś, R, Bh, B.

[4] Vide '*Indra-prāṇādhikaraṇa*', *sūtras* 1.1.29–32.

promised the king Ajātaśatru: '"Let me declare Brahman to you"' (Kauṣ. 4.1), having then designated various persons as Brahman, thus '"He who is the person within the sun"' (Kauṣ. 4.3), '"The person within the moon"' (Kauṣ. 4.4) and so on [1], became silent. Then, Ajātaśatru, who knew Brahman [2], having condemned him with the words: '"In vain, did you tell me"' [3] (Kauṣ. 4.19), said: '"He who, verily, O Bālāki, is the maker of these persons, and [4] of whom this is the work, he, verily, is to be known"' (Kauṣ. 4.19). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether puruṣa, established in the Sāṃkhya-tantra, the superintendent of prakṛti and the enjoyer, is taught here as the object to be known, or the Supreme Soul. The *prima facie* view is as follows: It was puruṣa, unconnected with prakṛti, as established in the Tantra, that was indicated, by the royal sage, as the object to be known, because of the mention of a connection with works in the phrase: '"and of whom this is the work"' (Kauṣ. 4.19); because works, consisting in merit and demerit, are possible on the part of the individual soul alone, entitled to works; because a connection with work is not admitted on the part of the Supreme Soul; and, because the origin of the world is due to the works of the respective enjoyers. Moreover, here in accordance with the text: 'They two went to a sleeping person' (Kauṣ. 4.19), it was the enjoying soul alone which was demonstrated by Ajātaśatru to Bālāki. Likewise, in the passage: 'Just as a merchant enjoys with his own people, and as his own people enjoy him, so exactly this intelligent self enjoys with these selves, so exactly these selves enjoy it' (Kauṣ. 4.20), the characteristic mark of the enjoying soul alone is found. The meaning of the text is as follows: 'Just as a merchant', i.e. a lord who is the chief, enjoys 'with his own people', i.e. with implements like servants and the rest; and 'his own people', i.e. the servants and the rest, 'enjoy' the merchant, i.e. depend on him for food and clothing, 'so

[1] The sage wanted to teach the king about the person within the sun, that within the moon, that within the lightning, that within the cloud and so on, altogether about sixteen persons, but in each case, the king begged to be spared of the teaching, as he was already acquainted with the person in question. Finally, the king himself taught the sage about Brahman. Vide Kauṣ. 4.

[2] The word '*Brahmajña*' is not really included in the text.

[3] Correct quotation: '*Mṛṣā vai khalu mā saṃvādayiṣṭhā*', in which case it would mean 'in vain, verily, did you make me talk'. Vide Kauṣ. 4.19, p. 138.

[4] Correct quotation '*vā*' and not '*ca*'.

exactly this intelligent self 'enjoys with these', i.e. with the persons within the sun and the rest. And it cannot be said that since the word 'work', mentioned in the concluding text: '"Of whom this is the work"' (Kauṣ. 4.19) denotes action, the vital-breath, possessing the activity of motion as his substratum, mentioned in the concluding text: 'In this vital-breath alone, he becomes one' (Kauṣ. 4.20), is to be understood; but puruṣa, established in the Tantra and the enjoyer of the fruits of works, is not to be accepted here as the object to be known,—for the term 'vital-breath' refers to the bearer of the vital-breath or the individual soul, such a construction, viz. 'in this vital-breath', meaning 'in puruṣa, the bearer of the vital-breath', being possible. If, in accordance with the explanation 'In the vital-breath which is present in this, i.e. in the soul', the two locatives (viz. 'in this' and 'in the vital-breath') are to refer to different objects [1], then although the word 'vital-breath' will refer to the chief vital-breath, yet as it is naturally an implement of the individual soul, none but the individual soul is the object to be established here. And hence the meaning is: 'He who is the maker', i.e. the cause, 'of these persons', i.e. of the persons dwelling in the orb of the sun and the rest, and implements of the enjoyment of the individual soul, 'and of whom this is the work', i.e. merit and demerit, the cause of its being the cause [2], is to be known as unconnected with prakṛti. And hence Brahman, introduced as the object to be depicted in the text: '"Let me declare Brahman to you"' (Kauṣ. 4.1), is none but puruṣa, there being no proof of any God other than it. As the qualities of perceiving and the rest, belonging to the cause, are possible on its part, possessing as it does the quality of consciousness, prakṛti alone, superintended by the puruṣa, the enjoyer, is the cause of the world. (Here ends the *prima facie* view.)

(Author's conclusion.)

With regard to it, we reply: Here, the Highest Person alone, the maker of the persons, is the object to be known. Why? For the following reasons: First, the term 'work' denotes the world; and the

[1] I.e. standing in a *vyadhikaraṇa* relation and not in a *samānādhikaraṇa* relation, or in a relation of a noun and an adjective referring to the same locus, as the first explanation takes them to be.

[2] I.e. the works (*karmas*) of the soul lead to the creation of the world the sun and the rest.

creatorship of the world is not possible on the part of any one other than the Supreme Soul. A 'work' is what is done, i.e. the world, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient. Secondly, the creatorship of the world is not possible on the part of the sentient individual soul which has entered into the world as an enjoyer, and which is never admitted to be a creator. Thirdly, the creatorship of the world is impossible also on the part of prakṛti, superintended by the individual soul of little knowledge and little power. In ordinary life, what little is done by non-sentient objects, like chariots and the rest superintended by sentient beings, is due to the sentient beings alone. And, there being no purpose in rejecting the primary agent, the primary agent is none but the Supreme Being, celebrated in a mass of scriptural texts. The world, known through perception and the rest, is referred to by the pronoun 'this'. Work consisting in merit and demerit simply is not denoted by the term 'work' here. Since the sixteen persons, indicated as Brahman by Bālāki who had promised: '"Let me declare Brahman to you"' (Kauṣ. 4.1), were not really Brahman, Ajātaśatru, having condemned him who could not tell him about Brahman, thus: '"In vain, verily, did you tell me[1]"' (Kauṣ. 4.19), taught the Supreme Soul,—not known by the sage, and the maker of the persons indicated by him,—as the object to be known, with the words: '"He who, verily, O Bālāki"' (Kauṣ. 4.19). Otherwise, the persons connected with works, i.e. merit or demerit, being already known to Bālāki, the teaching of them as the objects to be known would be meaningless. Hence, the word 'work' simply denotes that the universe consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient is an effect; and does not denote mere merit and demerit, or mere action. This being so, the word 'this', too, has a purpose, since, referring as it does to the entire world, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient and known through the evidence of perception and the rest, it serves to preclude the supposition of its being due to a mere person. Thus, the meaning of the text: '"He who, verily, O Bālāki, is the maker of these persons"' (Kauṣ. 4.19) is as follows: O Bālāki, he who is the maker of the persons within the sun and the rest, designated by you as Brahman, and who is not the maker of the persons only, but of whom this entire universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is an effect,—that Supreme Soul, the soul of

[1] For correct quotation see footnote 3, p. 243.

all, the Lord of all, is the object to be known. Here, although the persons, being included within the world, are proved to have the Supreme Soul as their cause, their separate mention is to be known for the purpose of rejecting their Brahman-hood, claimed by Bālāki.[1]

SŪTRA 17

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE CHARACTERISTIC MARK OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND THE CHIEF VITAL-BREATH, (THE LORD IS NOT DENOTED HERE), (WE REPLY:) THAT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that on account of the characteristic mark of the individual soul, contained in the passage: 'This intelligent self enjoys with these selves' (Kauṣ. 4.20 [2]); as well as on account of the characteristic mark of the chief vital-breath, contained in the passage: 'Now, in this vital-breath alone he becomes one' (Kauṣ. 3.3; 4.20 [3]), one of these two is to be understood, and not Brahman,—

(We reply:) "that has been explained" in the section treating of Pratardana [4]. The sense is that the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the rest have been explained there as referring to Brahman, and should be known to be so here as well.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: On account of the characteristic mark of an individual soul, contained in the passage: 'Just as a merchant enjoys with his own people, and as his own people enjoy him, so exactly this intelligent self enjoys with these selves, so exactly do these selves enjoy it' (Kauṣ. 4.20); as well as on account of the characteristic mark of the chief vital-breath, contained in the passages: 'Then in

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[1] I.e. in the text: 'He who is the creator of these persons, of whom this is the work', the phrase 'of whom this is the work' implies that the entire universe—including the sun and the rest—is the effect of *Brahman*. In spite of this the persons within the sun and the rest are mentioned separately once more as the effects of *Brahman*, because the king wants to point out particularly that they are not *Brahman*, as previously alleged.

[2] Ś, R, ŚK.

[3] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

[4] Vide Br. Sū. 1.1.29–32.

this vital-breath alone he becomes one' (Kauṣ. 3.3; 4.20), one of these two is to be understood, and not the Supreme Soul,—

(We reply:) "that has been explained" in the sub-section, beginning with the aphorism: 'The vital-breath, on account of intelligibility in that way' (Br. Sū. 1.1.29). There, the text being ascertained to have Brahman for its object on the ground of the beginning and the end, the marks of the individual soul and the rest, too, have been described as referring to Him alone. In the very same manner, here, too, in the beginning, in the passage: '"Let me declare Brahman to you"' (Kauṣ. 4.1), Brahman is mentioned as the object. In the middle, too, in the text: '"Of whom this is the work"' (Kauṣ. 4.19), Brahman is mentioned as the agent of the 'work' or the entire universe. The end as well refers to none but Brahman, since the text: 'He who knows thus, having overcome all evils, attains supremacy, independent rule and lordship among all beings' (Kauṣ. 4.20), declares that excellent results pertain to His worshippers. Thus, this text being ascertained to be referring to Brahman, the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the rest, too, are to be taken as referring to Him. And, it is not to be said that there is any repetition here (of what has already been said under Br. Sū. 1.1.29–32), since that section about Pratardana does not determine the meaning of the text: 'Of whom this is the work' (Kauṣ. 4.19), which the present section does.

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. he reads this sūtra and the next one as one sūtra.[1]

SŪTRA 18

"BUT JAIMINI (THINKS THAT THE MENTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) HAS A DIFFERENT PURPOSE, ON ACCOUNT OF QUESTION AND EXPLANATION, AND THUS SOME (READ)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Jaimini thinks that the mention of the individual soul in this section has the purpose of suggesting Brahman, other than the

[1] Bh. B. 1.1.17, p. 78.

individual soul, on account of the question: '"Where, O Bālāki, did this person lie? What did he become? Whence did he come back?"' (Kauṣ. 4.19 [1]); and on account of the reply: '"When the sleeping person sees no dreams whatsoever, then in this vital-breath alone he becomes one"' (Kauṣ. 4.19 [2]). The Vājasaneyins, too, thus record the Supreme Soul as other than the individual soul. There too, there are question and answer. The question is: '"What did he then become? Whence did he return"?' (Bṛh. 2.1.16 [3]), and the answer is: '"That which is this ether within the heart, in that he lies"' (Bṛh. 2.1.17 [4]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: since in the text: 'In this vital-breath alone he becomes one' (Kauṣ. 4.19), entering by the individual soul is mentioned, and since the term 'vital-breath' is applied to Brahman, who alone is fit to be the substratum of the individual soul's entering, let the characteristic marks of the vital-breath refer to Brahman. But it seems very difficult to take the characteristic marks of the individual soul as referring to Brahman, since here in the passage: 'They two went to a sleeping person' (Kauṣ. 4.19), the exclusive mark of an individual soul is found,—the author replies here.

The teacher Jaimini thinks that the mention of the individual soul in this section "has a different purpose", viz. the purpose of demonstrating that the Supreme Soul,—possessed of the qualities of being a support and the rest,—is different from the individual soul, possessed of the qualities of 'being the object to be supported', etc. Why? "On account of question and explanation." Thus, Ajātaśatru, a knower of Brahman, approached a sleeping person with Bālāki, desirous of enquiring into Brahman; and called that person thus: '"O Soma, the king"' (Kauṣ. 4.19). But when the sleeper did not hear him, Ajātaśatru thereby demonstrated the fact that enjoyer is different from the vital-breath and the rest which are not enjoyers. After that, when the sentient soul, different from those non-sentient, was awakened by the push of the stick, Ajātaśatru himself asked the following questions with a view to demonstrating Brahman once more as different from the sentient and the non-sentient:

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
[2] *Op. cit.*
[3] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
[4] *Op. cit.*

'"Where, O Bālāki, did this person lie? What, verily, did he become? Whence did he return"?' (Kauṣ. 4.19). As Bālāki was unable to answer the question, Ajātaśatru himself replied: '"When the sleeping person sees no dream whatsoever, then in this vital-breath alone he becomes one; . . . . when he wakes up, ... then from this soul all the vital-breaths proceed, each towards its place, from the vital-breaths the gods, from the gods the worlds"' (Kauṣ. 4.20). On account of such question and answer the Supreme Soul, different from the individual soul, is to be understood here. The sense is this: During the period of deep sleep, the soul, having drawn forth the whole group sense-organs, and having entered into the Supreme Soul,—denoted by the term 'vital-breath' which stands in apposition with the pronoun 'this' in the text: 'In this vital-breath' (Kauṣ. 4.19),—becomes self-abiding and tranquil. Then, when time comes, it goes out from that very vital-breath for undergoing retributive experiences. This Supreme Soul, celebrated to be the substratum of deep sleep [1] and the rest, and different from the individual soul, is the object to be known,—such is the view of Jaimini as well. The mention of Jaimini is for the purpose of clearly indicating that the meaning stated above by us is highly commendable.

"And thus some", i.e. the Vājasaneyins designate the Supreme Soul as different from the individual soul, consisting of intelligence. There, too, a dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru has been introduced, containing a question and an answer. The question is: '"He who consists of intelligence, what did he become then? Whence did he come?"' (Bṛh. 2.1.16); and the answer is: '"That which is the ether within the heart, in that he lies"' (Bṛh. 2.1.17 [2]). That the ether is the Supreme Soul has been established under the section, concerned with the text: 'Small is the ether within that' (Chānd. 8.1.1 [3]). This difference between the individual soul and the Lord has been demonstrated before by the author of the aphorisms in many aphorisms like: 'And on account of the designation of difference' (Br. Sū. 1.1.18 [4]), etc. Incidentally it is confirmed here too as being

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[1] Vide Br. Sū. 3.2.7.

[2] The *Bālāki Ajātaśatru-saṃvāda* in Bṛh. 2.1 is exactly similar to that in Kauṣ. 4, only the latter makes no mention of the ether.

[3] Vide *Dahara-adhikaraṇa*, Br. Sū. 1.3.14–24.

[4] Vide also Br. Sū. 1.1.22, 1.2.4, 1.2.21, 1.2.23, 1.3.5, etc. (The numbering is Nimbārka's.)

held by Jaimini as well, with the words: "But Jaimini (thinks that the mention of the individual soul has a different purpose". With a view to showing that it is confirmed all the more strongly as being based on the Veda, it is said: "On account of question and explanation", and for suggesting that it is celebrated in all the Upaniṣads, it is said "and thus some". The non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman, too, has been mentioned before,[1] and we shall speak of it carefully later on.[2] Hence, none but the Supreme Soul is taught as the object to be known. It is established that He alone is the cause of the origin and the rest of the universe, and not puruṣa, established in the Tantra, or pradhāna, superintended by it.

Here ends the section entitled 'Denoting the world' (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

General import same, only while Nimbārka, as before, connects this adhikaraṇa more directly with the topic of the preceding part of the pāda, viz. refutation of the Sāṃkhya view, Śaṃkara and Bhāskara do not do so, but take it to be concerned with the general question of the concordance of all texts with regard to Brahman.[3]

Śrīkaṇṭha

General import same, but he too does not take this adhikaraṇa as concerned with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, but with the question of the difference between the individual soul and Brahman.[4] Hence according to him, the problem here is whether the

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[1] Vide V.K. 1.1.1, p. 11, 1.1.7, p. 25, 1.2.6, p. 52, etc. (Page references are to the K.S.S. ed.)

[2] Vide e.g. V.K. 1.4.20, p. 139, 1.4.21, p. 140, 2.1.16, p. 151, etc. (K.S.S. ed.)

[3] This is evident from the fact that while according to *Nimbārka* the question is whether in Kauṣ. 4.19 the object to be known is the *Sāṃkhya puruṣa* or the Supreme Soul (vide V.P.S. 1.3.16), according to *Śaṃkara* and *Bhāskara*, the question is whether in the same text the object to be known is the vital-breath or the Supreme Soul. Vide Ś.B. 1.4.16, p. 418; Bh. B. 1.4.16, p. 78.

[4] *Punar api jīvāt parameśvarasya anya-bhāvam upapādayati.* ŚK. B. 1.4.16, Intro., p. 535, Part 6.

object to be known in Kauṣītaki text (4.19) is the individual soul or the Supreme Soul, and so on.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled 'The connection of texts'. (Sūtras 19–22)

SŪTRA 19

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION OF TEXTS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: '"O! the self, verily, should be seen"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6[2]), the Supreme Soul should be understood as the object to be seen, "on account of the connection" of the text with Him alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, by showing once more the concordance of the scriptural texts with regard to Brahman, the author is disposing of puruṣa, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas.

We find the following text in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka under the Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa, beginning: 'He said: "O, not for the love of the husband, verily, is a husband dear, but for the love of the soul is a husband dear" ' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6), and continuing: '"O, the self, verily, should be seen, should be heard, should be meditated on" ' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6). Here the doubt is, viz. whether the soul, the twenty-fifth principle of the Sāṃkhyas, is taught as the object to be seen, or the Highest Person, Lord Vāsudeva? What is reasonable here? The *prima facie* objector thinks: The soul, the twenty-fifth principle established by the Tantra, is taught as the object to be seen and so on, as it is possible for it alone to be the object of the acts of perception and the rest; as it is impossible for Brahman, admitted by the defendant, to be properly an object of an act, He being unlimited by so muchness; as the connection of the Self with the dearness of husband, wife, son and the rest, mentioned in the beginning, is possible on the part of only puruṣa, mentioned by the Tantra; as in the middle, too, in the text: '"This great Being, infinite and endless, is but a

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 536 *et seq.*

[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

mass of intelligence. Having risen from those elements, one vanishes into them alone. After death, there is no consciousness" ' (Bṛh. 2.4.12; 4.5.13), puruṣa is laid down as subject to transmigratory existence as connected with origin and destruction—puruṣa, which is mentioned in the Tantra, the very one, which dwells within the body as indicated by the word 'this', which is indicated by the word 'great being' with a view to making its distinction from the material beings clear, which is indicated by the word 'infinite' with a view to making its illimitableness in time clear, which is endless, i.e. innumerable, and which is a mass of intelligence; and as, finally, towards the end as well, the text: ' "O, whereby one should know the knower"?' (Bṛh. 2.4.14; 4.5.15), declares it to be a knower.

With regard to it, we point out the right conclusion: None but the Highest Person is here taught as the object to be seen and so on. Why? Because the text has connection with the Supreme Soul alone, i.e. because from a consideration of the beginning and the end, the connection of the group of texts, intending to convey the same meaning, as referring to the Supreme Soul is known. Thus, when from Yājñavalkya's statement, viz.: ' "Of immortality, however, there is no hope through wealth" ' (Bṛh. 2.4.2; 4.5.3). Maitreyī came to know definitely that work, to be accomplished by means of wealth, is not a means to salvation,—as well-known from other scriptural texts too, viz.: ' Frail indeed are these boats of sacrifices ' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7), ' What is not made is not gained through what is made ' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.12) and so on,—she, desiring for salvation, asked about the means to salvation, thus: ' "What shall I do with that whereby I may not be immortal? Whatever, Sir, you know, tell me that" ' (Bṛh. 2.4.3; 4.5.4). Thus asked, Yājñavalkya taught the Supreme Soul alone, the soul of all, as the object of the acts of seeing and the rest, thus: ' "O, the self, verily, should be seen" ' (Bṛh. 2.4.3; 4.5.4), salvation being possible through the meditation on Him alone. The knowledge of all, too, is possible through the knowledge of Him. In the end, too, the attribute of 'being the self of all', mentioned in the passage: ' " All this is the soul" ' (Bṛh. 2.4.6; 4.5.7), is a characteristic mark of the Supreme Soul alone.

SŪTRA 20

"(THE BEGINNING WITH THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS) A MARK OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, ĀŚMARATHYA (THINKS SO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

To the question: Why, then, is there the beginning with the individual soul? we reply: the fact that the Supreme Soul is designated by a word denoting the individual soul,—the latter being non-different from the former as His effect,—is a convincing proof "of the establishment of the initial proposition", viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. So "Āśmarathya" thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The individual soul alone is apprehended as connected with the dearness of husband and the rest in the beginning, in the passage: '"O, not for the love of the husband, verily, is a husband dear, but for the love of the soul is a husband dear"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6) and so on; as well as connected with origin and destruction in the middle, in the passage: '"Having arisen from these beings, one vanishes into them alone. After death there is no consciousness"' (Bṛh. 2.4.12; 4.5.13),—

(We reply:) True. Still, by the term "individual soul" the Supreme Soul is to be understood here. No such objection can be raised in view of the fact that He, being the cause of all, can be denoted by all words. The author is showing this with the approval of another teacher.

In accordance with the text: 'From whom, verily, all these elements arise' (Tait. 3.1), the individual soul, too, entered into the elements, is reckoned among the effects, and Brahman is the cause. These two being the effect and the cause, there is, undoubtedly, a primary difference between them. Thus the texts designating duality are correct. Since the effect is non-different from the cause, being born from it and so on, non-difference between the two, too, is equally a fact. Thus, the texts designating non-duality, too, are correct. In this way, both the kinds of texts being authoritative in their own senses, there is a natural relation of difference and non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman. Hence, it is possible for words denoting the effects to denote the causes as well, just as in the

case of the pot and the clay, standing in the relation of effect and cause, the word 'pot' refers to the clay as well. This being so, the initial proposition too, viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all, is established,—such is the view of Āśmarathya. The meaning of the words of the aphorism is as follows: This, really, is "a mark" or a convincing proof "of the establishment of the initial proposition", viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. What mark? Listen! The individual soul being non-different from the Supreme Soul as His effect, by the word "individual soul" the Supreme Soul is designated,—so the teacher Āśmarathya thinks.

SŪTRA 21

"ON ACCOUNT OF SUCH A CONDITION OF ONE WHO IS ABOUT TO DEPART, AUḌULOMI (THINKS SO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of the union of the individual soul, about to depart from the body, with Brahman, Brahman is denoted by a word denoting the individual soul,—so Auḍulomi thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"On account of such a condition," i.e. on account of the union of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul,—of the soul which "is about to depart" from the aggregation of the body and the sense-organs, in accordance with the text: 'As the flowing rivers disappear into the sea, leaving names and forms, so a knower, freed from name and form, attains the celestial Person, higher than the high' (Chānd. 8.3.4); which is endowed with the hearing, the thinking, the meditation and the direct vision of Brahman; and which is well-known to be unborn from the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: 'A wise man is neither born, nor dies' (Kaṭha 2.18), 'This is unborn, eternal, constant' (Gītā 2.20), i.e. on account of its attaining the state of Brahman, the Supreme Soul is denoted by a term denoting the individual soul,—so thinks the teacher Auḍulomi. On this view, there is a difference between the individual soul and Brahman during the soul's state of bondage, and non-difference during its state of

release. In this manner, there are both difference and non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman. Thus, the meaning of the text is difference and non-difference,—such is the view of the teacher Auḍulomi. Such difference and non-difference are admitted by the reverend Auḍulomi for the benefit of the dull-witted. But really even during the state of bondage, the individual soul, which is atomic in size and possesses little knowledge, though different from Brahman who is all-pervasive, non-deviating in nature and omniscient, is yet non-different from Him, since it has no separate existence and activity,—just as a leaf is non-different from the tree, the ray from the lamp, the attribute from its substratum and the sense-organs from the vital-breath. Likewise, though in release it is non-different from Him, it having no separate existence and activity, at the same time, it is undoubtedly different from Him, in accordance with the text: 'It is completed in its own form alone' [1] (Chānd. 8.3.4). Otherwise, the imperishableness of the respective natures of both must come to be jeopardized. The view of Āśmarathya, too, should be known to be the same.

COMPARISON

The commentators give different meanings of the word 'evam bhāvāt'. According to Śaṃkara and Bhāskara it means 'on account of attaining identity with the Supreme Soul'; [2] according to Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha, 'on account of attaining the state of the Supreme Soul'; [3] and according to Baladeva, 'on account of becoming dear to all, etc.' [4]

SŪTRA 22

"ON ACCOUNT OF ABIDING, SO KĀŚAKṚTSNA."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the abiding" of the Supreme Lord,—celebrated in the passage: 'Entered within, the ruler of men' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2 [5])

[1] '*Eva*' is not included in the original text. Vide Chānd. 8.3.4, p. 421.

[2] '*Paramātmaikyopapatteḥ.*' Ś.B. 1.4.21, p. 425; Bh. B. 1.4.21, p. 81.

[3] '*Paramātma-bhāvāt.*' Śrī. B. 1.4.21, p. 394, Part 1, Madras ed. Śk. B. 1.4.21, p. 549, Part 6.

[4] G.B. 1.4.21

[5] P. 181. R.

and so on,—in the individual soul as the controller, in the beginning and in what follows, by a term denoting the object to be controlled the controller is understood—so thinks Kāśakṛtsna.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"On account of the abiding" of the Supreme Soul in the individual soul,—an object to be controlled by Him,—as its soul, in accordance with the texts: 'He who abiding in the soul is other than the soul, whom the soul does not know, of whom the soul is the body, who rules the soul within, he is your soul, the inner controller, immortal' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30[1]), 'Entered within, the ruler of men, the soul of all' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.2), by a term denoting the individual soul, the Supreme Soul is denoted,—so thinks the teacher Kāśakṛtsna, a knower of the object controlled, as well as of the controller.

Thus, by means of the views of the three sages, the nature of difference and non-difference has been incidentally shown by his Holiness. And with a view to removing the contradiction among the scriptural texts by his own theory, he will clearly prove the natural relation of difference-non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman in the aphorisms: 'A part, on account of the designation of variety' (Br. Sū. 2.3.42) and so on.

Here, the word 'soul' in the beginning refers to the Supreme Soul alone. The worship of that very Supreme Soul is designated as a means to salvation in the passage: '"O, the soul, verily"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6) and so on. The text: 'Having arisen from these beings, one vanishes into them alone' (Bṛh. 2.4.12; 4.5.13), indicates transmigratory existence pertaining to one who is averse to the Supreme Soul; and the text: 'There is no consciousness after death' (Bṛh. 2.4.12; 4.5.13) indicates salvation pertaining to His worshipper. Hence, it is established that the texts of the Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa all agree in referring to Brahman, different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient, the cause of all, to be approached by the freed and the controller of all.

Here ends the section entitled 'The connection of texts' (6).

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[1] P. 1074, line 18.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

Here too, as before, the general import is the same, but while Nimbārka [1] takes this adhikaraṇa to be connected more directly with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha do not. Further, Śaṃkara and Bhāskara interpret the word 'avasthiteḥ' differently. To them, it means 'because of (Brahman's) abiding as the individual soul' (vijñātmā-bhāvena) [2].

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled 'The material cause'. (Sūtras 23–27)

SŪTRA 23

"(BRAHMAN IS) THE MATERIAL CAUSE, AND (THE EFFICIENT CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF CONFLICT WITH REGARD TO THE INITIAL PROPOSITION AND THE ILLUSTRATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The material cause," as well as the efficient cause,—indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra),—is none but the Supreme Soul, because then alone the initial proposition: '"Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes known?"' (Chānd. 6.1.3 [3]), as well as the illustration: '"Just as, my dear, through a lump of clay, all objects made of clay may be known"' (Chānd. 6.1.4 [4]) are explicable.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having thus refuted the atheistic school of the Sāṃkhyas, now the author, by refuting the theistic school of the Sāṃkhyas, is confirming the view, mentioned above, that the Lord is the non-different material and efficient cause of the world.

It may be objected that, properly, this section ought to have been inserted immediately after the aphorism: 'From whom (arise)

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[1] Vide V.K. 1.4.11, p. 137, Kāsī ed.
[2] Ś.B. 1.4.21, p. 426; Bh. B. 1.4.21, p. 81.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. [4] *Op. cit.*

the origin and the rest of this' (Br. Sū. 1.1.2), demonstrating the characteristic marks of Brahman, establishing the nature of the cause of the world. (To this we reply): No. One sees its appropriateness here indeed. Thus, on the enquiry: viz. Of what mark is Brahman? with regard to the injunction, viz. 'An enquiry into Brahman should be undertaken',—the mark of Brahman was stated in the aphorism 'From whom (arise) the origin and the rest of this' (Br. Sū. 1.1.2). There it was certainly established, on the ground of scriptural and Smṛti texts, that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause. After that, there being no enquiry as to whether He is *only* the material cause, or only the efficient cause, the topic was not further amplified. But there those who take everything to be the transformation of prakṛti (and take Brahman to be the efficient cause *only*) are being refuted separately.

Thus, some theistic Sāṃkhyas hold: In the world of ordinary experience, sentient beings like potters and the rest are found to be the efficient cause alone, and not the material cause. In the passages: 'He thought' (Bṛh. 1.2.5; Ait. 1.1), 'He thought' (Praśna 6.3), creation is said to be preceded by thinking. Hence let the Supreme Lord, the thinker, be, somehow or other, only the efficient cause of the world; but the material cause of mahat and the rest is nothing but pradhāna, superintended by Him, just as clay is the material cause of pots and the like, in accordance with the text: 'He thinks of her who is the mother of all changes, non-knowing, having eight forms, and eternal. Ruled by him she manifests herself; again incited and superintended by him alone [1] she gives birth to the world for the benefit of the soul. She is a cow, without beginning and end, the progenitress, the source of all beings' (Cūl. 3*b*–5*a* [2]).

With regard to it, we reply: Brahman alone is 'prakṛti', i.e. the material cause of the world, as well as its efficient cause, indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra). Why? "On account of the absence of conflict with regard to the initial proposition and illustration," i.e. on account of the non-contradiction or consistency of

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[1] Incorrect, ought to be '*adhyāsitā*, which is translated here.

[2] Reading different, viz.:

'*Vikāra-jananīm māyām aṣṭa-rūpāṃ dhruvām*
Dhyāyate adhyāsitā tena tanyate preritā punaḥ.
Stūyate puruṣārthaṅ ca tenaiwādhiṣṭhitā purā
Gaur anādavatī sā tu janitrī bhūta-bhāvinī'. Vide Cūl. 3–5, p. 230.

the initial proposition and the illustration. The initial proposition, to begin with, is as follows: '"Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known?"' (Chānd. 6.1.3). The meaning of this text is as follows: O son Śvetaketu! Did you ask for that 'instruction', i.e. that instructor, viz. the Supreme Soul, 'whereby', i.e. through hearing of whom from the preceptor, even what is unheard becomes heard, what is unthought becomes thought, what is unknown becomes known? It is known from this initial proposition that the Supreme Soul is the material cause, since the hearing and the rest of the effects is justifiable only through the hearing and the rest of the material cause. The illustration given is as follows: '"Just as, my dear, through a lump of clay, all objects made of clay may be known"' (Chānd. 6.1.4) and so on. It is known from this illustration that the Supreme Soul is the material cause of the object illustrated as well (viz. clay). A potter has not been cited in the illustration; and through a potter being known, a pot cannot be known. But a lump of clay being known, all objects made of clay, like pots and the rest, may, indeed, be known.

To the contention, viz. that in the world of ordinary experience sentient beings like potters and the rest are found to be efficient causes merely,—we reply: We do not arrive at the cause of the world by means of inference and the rest, and so, for us, there is no need for the illustration of a potter. But discarding all evidences contrary to the Veda, we follow what is mentioned by Scripture and the preceptor [1]. Moreover, in the world of ordinary experience, too, we see that a sentient person is the material cause of the effects like hairs, body-hairs and the rest; that a spider is the material cause of the web, and so on. We read in Scripture, too: 'Just as hairs and body-hairs (arise) from a person, just as a spider creates and takes' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7 [2]). If it be objected that in the above cases, the material causes containing elements, suitable for giving rise to the effects,—(we reply:) in the subject of our discussion, too, there is God's self-power, called prakṛti.

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[1] Vide V.K. 1.1.3.

[2] Correct quotation:

'Yathā ūrṇa-nābhiḥ sṛjate gṛhṇate ca
Yathā pṛthivyām oṣadhayaḥ saṃbhavanti.
Yathā sataḥ puruṣāt keśa-lomāni', etc. Vide Muṇḍ. 1.1.7, p. 9.

SŪTRA 24

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF REFLECTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the teaching of reflection" in the text: 'He perceived (i.e. thought): "May I be many"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), the fact that Brahman is the creator (i.e. the efficient cause) and the material cause is established.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"On account of the teaching of reflection," i.e. on account of the teaching of resolution, in the passage: 'He wished' (Tait. 2.6), as well as on account of the teaching of resolution in the passage '"May I be many"' (Tait. 2.6; Chānd. 6.2.3), the Supreme Soul alone can appropriately be the creator (or the efficient cause) and the material cause respectively).

COMPARISON

All others read 'ca' in the end.[1]

SŪTRA 25

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIRECT MENTION OF BOTH IN THE SACRED TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of the direct mention of Brahman as the efficient and material cause in the sacred text: 'Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree from which they carved out the heaven and the earth. O wise men, ask through the mind whereon it stood supporting the worlds'[2] (Tait. Br. 2.8.9.6-7[3]), Brahman alone is of the two-fold forms.

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[1] The reading in the C.S.S. ed. of V.P.S., however, adds '*ca*' at the end, p. 23. But the Brindaban ed. (vol. I) omits the '*ca*', p. 354.

[2] Last line of the quotation incorrect. For the correct quotation see below V.K. The C.S.S. ed. gives the correct quotation, p. 23, which is translated here.

[3] P. 360, lines 5–7, vol. 2.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The particle "and" implies affirmation. Brahman is, indeed, both the material and the efficient cause. Why? "On account of the direct mention of both in the sacred text." Thus, to the question, viz. 'What was the wood, what was the tree from which they carved out the heaven and the earth? O wise men, ask through the mind whereon it stood supporting the worlds' (Tait. Br. 2.8.9.6[1]; Ṛg.V. 10.81.4[2]), the answer: 'Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree from which they carved out the heaven and the earth. O wise men, I tell you through the mind, it stood on Brahman supporting the worlds' (Tait. Br. 2.8.9.6-7), directly records 'both', i.e. the fact that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause.

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

This is Sūtra 24 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. 'On account of the direct mention of both (viz. origin and dissolution) by the sacred text'. That is, in Chāndogya 1.9.1 it is said that all beings arise from and disappear into the ether. Now, here the term 'ether' stands for Brahman (as shown in Br. Sū. 1.1.22). Hence the above passage means that all things arise from and disappear into Brahman. But things disappear into their material cause from which they have arisen. Hence the above passage proves that Brahman is the material cause of everything.[3]

SŪTRA 26

"ON ACCOUNT OF CREATING HIMSELF, ON ACCOUNT OF TRANSFORMATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Brahman alone is the efficient and the material cause of the world. Why? "On account of creating Himself," as known from the passage: 'That itself created itself' (Tait. 2.7[4]). If it be objected: Now can the Creator be Himself the object of creation?—(We reply:) 'On

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[1] P. 360, lines 2–5, vol. 2.
[2] P. 336, lines 8–10.
[3] Bh. B. 1.4.24, p. 85.
[4] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

account of transformation'. The omniscient and omnipotent Brahman, having transformed Himself into the form of the world by the projection of His power, becomes transformed, indeed, through His own nature, undeveloped, and possessing powers like creatorship, etc.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Brahman alone is the efficient and the material cause. Why? "On account of creating himself." That is, in the text: 'That itself created itself' (Tait. 2.7), He Himself is indicated as the creator of Himself, the object of creation,—the word 'kṛti' means creation,—on account of this. If it be objected: How can the fact that the Creator Himself is the object of His own creation be reconcilable?—the author replies: "On account of transformation". The omniscient and omnipotent Supreme Soul, non-deviating in nature, transforms Himself into the form of the world through the projection of His own powers, consisting in His own self and superintended by Him; on account of such a transformation everything is faultless. His powers are infinite and natural, as established by the following scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. 'His supreme power is declared to be of various kinds indeed, and natural is the operation of his knowledge and power' (Śvet. 6.8). 'The ancient Person is possessed of a variety of powers, and the powers of others cannot be like them', 'Hundreds of positive powers, like creation and the rest, which are inconceivable to the comprehension of all beings, may belong to Brahman, O best among the ascetics, as heat to fire' (V.P. 1.3.2[1]). He projects them in the beginning of creation. The best among the sacred texts of the Śvetāśvataras proves His non-dependence on another at the beginning of creation, as well as His being without an equal or a superior, thus: 'His action and organ do not exist, His equal or superior is not seen' (Śvet. 6.8). And the following scriptural and Smṛti texts are evidences with regard to His transformation or the projection of powers: 'Just as a spider creates and takes' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7), 'Having entered into pradhāna (i.e. matter) and puruṣa (i.e. soul) through His own wish, Hari stirred up the mutable (viz. matter) and the immutable (viz. soul) when the time of creation arrived' (V.P. 1.2.29[2]), 'Just as a tortoise, having stretched forth its limbs, draws them in again, so the

[1] P. 22. [2] P. 16.

soul of beings swallows up again the created beings' (Mahā. 12. 7072*b*–7073*a*[1]).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They break the sūtra into two different sūtras, viz. 'Ātmakṛteḥ' and 'Pariṇāmāt'.[2]

SŪTRA 27

"AND BECAUSE (BRAHMAN) IS CELEBRATED TO BE THE SOURCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And in the texts: 'The source of beings which the wise see' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6[3]), 'The creator, the Lord, the person, the source of Brahmā' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3[4]), Brahman "is celebrated" by the word "source". Hence, Brahman alone is the material cause.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Because" in the texts: 'The source of beings which the wise see' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6), 'The creator, the Lord, the person, the source of Brahmā' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), 'This is the source of all' (Māṇḍ. 6), Brahman "is celebrated" by the word "source", denoting the material cause,—the material cause is none but Brahman,—this is the sense. Hence, the doctrine of the Sāṃkhyas is not to be accepted, being opposed as it is to the Veda. It is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa alone, the sole topic of all the Vedas, different and non-different from the universe, the Highest Person, the Lord, and the Lord of all, is to be meditated on by one desirous of salvation as the non-different material and efficient cause of the universe.

Here ends the section entitled 'The material cause' (7).

[1] P. 615, lines 24-25, vol. 3. Reading: '*Harate*' instead of '*grasate*'. Vaṅgavāsī ed. too reads '*harate*', p. 1571.

[2] Śrī. B. p. 404, Part 1; Śk. B., pp. 564-65, Part 6.

[3] Ś, R, Bh, B.

[4] *Op. cit.*

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Śrīkaṇṭha

As before they do not take this adhikaraṇa to be directly connected with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view, as Nimbārka does.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled 'The explanation of all'. (Sūtra 28)

SŪTRA 28

"HEREBY ALL IS EXPLAINED, EXPLAINED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Hereby", i.e. by the totality of the sections, 'all' the Vedāntas 'are explained' as referring to Brahman, "explained".

Here ends the fourth quarter of the first chapter of the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms is showing the concordance of all the Vedāntas with regard to Brahman by means of extended and analogical application.[2] "Hereby", i.e. through the above mode of concordance, "all" Vedāntas, mentioned or non-mentioned, should be known to be "explained" as referring to Brahman. It should be known that the Vedas also are in concordance with regard to Brahman alone, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'The word which all the Vedas record' (Kaṭha 2.15); and in accordance with the Smṛti text: '"I alone am to be known through all the Vedas"' (Gītā 15.15). The repetition shows the end of the chapter. Hence it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, the cause of the origin and the rest of the universe, the sole topic of all the Vedas, and

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[1] Vide V.K. 1.4.23, p. 142 and 1.4.27, p. 145. K.S.S. ed.

[2] *Atideśa*. For the explanation of '*atideśa*' see V.K. 2.1.3.

denoted by the terms 'Brahman', 'Nārāyana' and the rest, is to be worshipped by one, desirous of salvation, through hearing, thinking, meditating and so on.

Here ends the section entitled 'The explanation of all' (8).

Here ends the fourth quarter of the first chapter of the Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the holy lotus-feet of Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the sect of the venerable Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. they connect this adhikaraṇa more directly with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, which Nimbārka does not. Thus, the meaning of the sūtra according to Śaṃkara and Bhāskara is: 'Hereby' (i.e. by the mode of refuting the Sāṃkhya view), all (i.e. other doctrine like Atomism and the rest) are explained (as negated), explained'.[1]

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. 'Hereby (viz. by the method indicated above) all (the words like pradhāna, Śiva and the rest) are explained (as denoting Brahman alone), explained'.[2]

Thus, we find that Nimbārka, Rāmānuja and Baladeva direct the entire pāda, except the last adhikaraṇa, to the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view, but surprisingly enough make no reference to the Sāṃkhya view in the last adhikaraṇa, bringing in different topics. Nimbārka and Rāmānuja speak of the general concordance of the Vedānta texts in the last section, while Baladeva speaks of the significance of all names.

No less surprising is the procedure of Śaṃkara and Bhāskara. Śaṃkara finishes with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine in adhikaraṇa 3, and takes the intervening four adhikaraṇa as concerned, not with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, but with the general concordance of the Vedānta texts, etc. Then, all of a sudden, he refers to the Sāṃkhya doctrine in the last adhikaraṇa.

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[1] Ś.B. 1.4.28, p. 436; Bh. B. 1.4.27, p. 86.

[2] G.B. 1.4.28.

Bhāskara closely follows Śaṃkara. He too finishes with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine in adhikaraṇa 3, takes the intervening three adhikaraṇas as concerned with the general concordance of texts, but takes the last two adhikaraṇas as referring to the Sāṃkhya doctrine.

Śrīkaṇṭha is the most consistent of all. He finishes with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine in adhikaraṇa 3, once for all, and directs the remaining adhikaraṇas to other topics.

Résumé

The fourth section of the first chapter consists of:—

1. 28 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka.
2. 28 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara.
3. 29 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja.
4. 27 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara.
5. 29 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha.
6. 28 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha split sūtra 26 in Nimbārka-bhāṣya into two separate sūtras, while Bhāskara takes the sūtras 17 and 18 in Nimbārka-bhāṣya as one sūtra.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FIRST QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled 'Smṛti'. (Sūtras 1-2)

SŪTRA 1

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT THERE WILL RESULT THE FAULT OF NOT LEAVING A ROOM FOR SMṚTI, (WE REPLY:) NO, FOR THERE WILL RESULT THE FAULT FOR LEAVING NO ROOM FOR (OTHER) SMṚTIS."

The interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras entitled: 'Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha', composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Now, it is being demonstrated in details how the stated concordance is free from all contradictions. If it be objected: There does exist a need for Smṛtis for confirming Scripture. Among these, the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is to be accepted. It is not to be said that it, designating as it does a non-sentient cause, is not to be accepted for that reason—for, then, "there will result the fault of leaving no room for Smṛti"—(we reply:) 'no', for, then, there will result the contradiction of other Smṛtis which deal with a sentient cause mentioned in the Veda—such is the meaning of the text.

The commentary entitled 'Vedānta-kaustubha', composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

With a view to inducing one desiring salvation to the repeated practice of the hearing, thinking and the like of the Vedānta, revealing the qualities, nature and so on of Brahman,—which practice is conducive to the meditation on Brahman, the exclusive cause of a direct vision of Him,—the concordance of the scriptural texts with regard to Brahman,—the Highest Person, different and non-different from all, free by nature from all faults, the one abode of a mass of auspicious qualities and the cause of the world,—has been shown in the previous chapter. Now, in this second chapter, contradictions are being removed. Thus, in the first quarter, the faults found by the opponents with our own view are refuted. In the second quarter, faults are found with the views of the opponents, based on a semblance of reason, (and not on real reason), with a view to inducing people to our own view. In the third quarter, it is shown in details how the scriptural

texts, regarding the origin of the great elements like the ether and the rest, are all free from contradictions; and, further, the order of creation and destruction, and the nature of the individual soul, are determined. In the fourth quarter, again, the contradictions among the texts, demonstrating the organs of the individual soul, are removed. Now, first, it is being demonstrated that our view is consistent with the Smṛtis as well.

It has been stated in the section treating of proof [1] that Brahman, the cause of the world, has the Veda as His sole proof, since He cannot be known through any other source. And in the section, treating of concordance [2], it has been established that there is concordance of all the Vedas with regard to Brahman alone. And, likewise, the meaning of the Veda being very difficult to be grasped without the help of Smṛtis, composed by those who are versed in the Veda, there is a need for Smṛtis as well. It has been declared by Smṛti itself that one, who is without the Smṛti, to be a one-eyed man, thus: 'Scripture and Smṛti are celebrated to be the two eyes of the wise. Deprived of one, one is said to be "one-eyed"; deprived of both, "blind"'. Hence, on the doubt, viz. whether the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti and the rest are to be accepted as true for the sake of making the Veda clear, or the Manu-Smṛti and the like,—if it be argued: The Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is to be accepted for the sake of making the Veda clear, the aim of the Veda being to impart self-knowledge to all. If unable to give rise to self-knowledge, the collected Vedic texts must all be simply fruitless like a cow yielding no milk. So why should a Smṛti, which is concerned with teaching self-knowledge, be disregarded by any seeker after knowledge? The Manu-Smṛti and the rest, on the other hand, aim simply at demonstrating the works which lead to results, here or hereafter. The Śvetāśvataras record the omniscience of Kapila in the passage: 'Who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the sage Kapila, the born, and sees him while being born' (Śvet. 5.2). Hence the Smṛti which is composed by an omniscient person must be accepted for knowing the principle of the soul. That part of Veda which teaches the principle of the soul should be understood in accordance with the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti alone. Thus, as the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti teaches a non-sentient cause, the doctrine of a sentient cause cannot be accepted. Otherwise, "there will result the fault of leaving no room for the Smṛti",

[1] Vide Br. Sū. 1.1.3. [2] Vide Br. Sū. 1.1.4.

i.e. there must result the fault of leaving no room for a Smṛti which designates a non-sentient cause and is composed by an omniscient sage, celebrated in the Veda,—

(We reply:) 'no', such a *prima facie* view is not reasonable. Why? "Because there will result the fault of not leaving room for other Smṛtis", i.e. because there will result the fault of leaving no room for the Smṛtis other than it, viz. the Manu-Smṛti and the rest which establish Brahman to be the sole cause and are based on Scripture. The opponent who is shouting on the ground of Smṛti can be silenced by that very Smṛti itself. Thus, the reverend Manu says: 'He appeared as possessing effective powers, like the great elements and the rest, dispelling darkness' (Manu 1.6[1]), 'He having intended (to be many), and desirous of creating various kinds of beings, created water in the beginning and left his power in it' (Manu 1.8[2]). Āpastamba too says: 'Living beings are the abode of him who dwells in all caves (viz. hearts), who is not killed and who is stainless' (Āp. D.S. 1.22.4[3]), 'From him arise all bodies. He alone is the source, constant, he is eternal' (Āp. D.S. 1.23.2[4]). It is said in the Bhārata (i.e. Mahā-bhārata) in the Rāja-dharma: '"You are its origin and the dissolution, O Kṛṣṇa! You alone create this universe in the beginning. And this universe is under your control, O Source of the Universe! Obeisance to you, O (Lord) with the bow, disc and sword in hands!"' (Mahā. 12.1514[5]). In the Mokṣa-dharma[6], it is said: '"For he is the inner soul of beings, and called the knower of the field[7]. He is Nārāyaṇa, having the universe as his form, infinite, constant[8]. From him arose the unmanifest, having three guṇas, O best among the twice-born!"' (Mahā. 12.12680[9]). In that very section, to the question: '"O reverend Father! O supremely wise one! I wish to hear, in truth,

[1] P. 5. [2] P. 5. [3] P. 39, lines 3-4.
[4] P. 40, line 2. [5] P. 419, line 5, vol. 3.

[6] The name of a section of the 12th book of the *Mahā-bhārata*, from Chap. 174 to the end.

[7] I.e. the knower of the body.

[8] This line is not found either in the Asiatic Society ed., or in the Vaṅgāvasī ed. Both read instead the line: '*Triguṇa-vyatirikto vai puruṣaś ceti kalpitaḥ*'. Vide Asiatic Society ed., p. 812, line 5, vol. 3. Vaṅgavāsī ed., p. 1800, lines 14-15.

[9] P. 812, lines 5-6, vol. 3, Asiatic Society ed.

about Viṣṇu, with eyes like lotus, unchangeable, the creator who is not created, the origin and dissolution of beings, about Nārāyaṇa, Hṛṣīkeśa, Govinda, the unconquered, about Keśava, O best among the Bharatas!"' (Mahā. 12.7518-19 [1]), (the answer given was:) '"The Highest Person, the great-souled one, the soul of beings, fashioned the great elements, the air, the light and likewise the water, and the ether and the sky"' (Mahā. 12.7825 [2]). In the Dāna-dharma, Śiva says: '"Higher than even the reverend Father (i.e. Brahmā) is Hari, the eternal Person, Kṛṣṇa, of a golden appearance and arisen like the sun in the cloudless sky, designated as Śrīvatsa, Hṛṣīkeśa worshipped by all the deities. Brahmā has sprung up from his belly,—likewise I from his forehead, the lights from the hairs on his head, the gods and the demons from his body-hairs, the sages have arisen from his body, likewise, the eternal worlds. He is the veritable abode of the reverend Father (i.e. Brahmā), as well as the abode of all the gods. He is the creator of this entire world, the Lord of all the three worlds, the destroyer of all beings, of the immobile as well as of the mobile. He is directly perceived at all times indeed by one who has conquered his passions. He is the Lord of the gods and higher than the high, omniscient, connected with all, moving everywhere and turned towards all. He is the Supreme Soul, Hṛṣīkeśa, all-pervading, the Supreme Lord"' (Mahā. 13.6507–6512 [3]). In that very section, the omniscient Devavrata, too, says, beginning: '"For I know Kṛṣṇa in truth"' (Mahā. 13.7659 [4]) and continuing: '"Know everything, the movable, as well as the immovable, all souls and the universe as Kṛṣṇa.[5] Whatever is honoured in the worlds as a meritorious act, whatever is auspicious or inauspicious,—all that is Keśava, the inconceivable, everything else is the reverse. Such a Keśava is self-born, He is Nārāyaṇa supreme and unchangeable; the middle, the beginning and the end of the universe which existed; knowable by all; the origin as well as the dissolution of beings"'

[1] P. 631, lines 18-19, vol. 3. [2] *Op. cit.*, line 25.

[3] Pp. 237-238, vol. 4. Reading different in some places, viz. '*Sa hi deva-varaḥ sākṣād deva-nāthaḥ parantapaḥ. Sarvajñaḥ sa hi saṃśliṣṭaḥ . . .*' Vaṅgavāsī ed. reads *sarva-saṃśliṣṭaḥ* otherwise it is the same as the above. P. 2006, vol. 2.

[4] P. 256, line 26, vol. 4.

[5] Reading: '*Sarvaṃ kṛtsnam . . viśvam enam . .* '. P. 258, line 7. Reading in the Vaṅgavāsī ed. exactly similar. P. 2017.

(Mahā. 13.7391 ; 7399–7400 [1]). And the statements by Him whose feet are worshipped by all the composers of Smṛtis are as follows: '"I am the source of all, from me everything arises"' (Gītā 10.8), '"I am the source, likewise, the dissolution of the entire universe"' (Gītā 7.6). Parāśara, too, declares: '"The universe has arisen from Viṣṇu, and in Him alone it is grounded. He is the cause of the subsistence and control of the universe and He is the universe"' (V.P. 1.1.35 [2]). The sense is that if the view of Kapila be accepted as conducive to the Vedānta, then all those above and other texts must be contradicted. But the Manu-Smṛti and others are acceptable, since they establish religious duties, which are meant to the knowledge of Bṛahman, designated in the Veda; since they establish the qualities, nature and the rest of Brahman; and since they are composed by those who know the Veda. And in the Veda the cause of the world is designated to be a sentient principle, in fact, none but Brahman. Because of their opposition to this, the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti and the rest are not acceptable. As the reverend Manu says: 'Whatever Smṛtis are outside the pale of the Veda, whatever heterodox doctrines there are,—all of them are fruitless after death; these Smṛtis are given to ignorance' (Manu 12.95 [3]). Further, the composer, too, of the Smṛti which is opposed to the Veda (viz. the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti) is a certain sage, called Kapila, like Kaṇāda and the rest, but is not the lord Kapila, called Vāsudeva. As is declared by the Padma-purāṇa: 'Kapila, called Vāsudeva, told the principle of the Sāṃkhya, supported by the meaning of all the Vedas, to the gods like Brahmā and the rest, and likewise to Bhṛgu and others, likewise to Āsuri. Another Kapila told the Sāṃkhya, opposed to all the Vedas and supported by false arguments, to another Āsuri'. Kapila, mentioned in the scriptural text, should be known to be Hiraṇyagarbha.

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[1] P. 258, lines 7, 18-19. Reading: '*Etādṛśaḥ, Keśavo'taś ca bhūyo Nārāyaṇaḥ . . sambabhūṣatām . . . . .*'. Vaṅgavāsī ed. exactly similar, only '*bubhūṣatām*' in place of '*sambabhūṣatām*'. P. 2017.

[2] P. 8.

[3] P. 483.

SŪTRA 2

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-PERCEPTION ON THE PART OF OTHERS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the non-perception on the part of others", i.e. on the part of Manu and the rest, that the Veda is concerned with pradhāna, Smṛti which is opposed to the Veda is unauthentic.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And on account of the non-perception on the part of others",—i.e. on the part of men like Manu and the rest, other than Kapila and best among those versed in the Vedas,[1]—that the Veda is concerned with pradhāna, the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is to be disregarded. Hence, it is established that the rejection of the Smṛti which is opposed to the Veda is not in conflict with the stated concordance.

Here ends the section entitled 'Smṛti' (1).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. 'On account of the non-perception (in Scripture and ordinary experience) of others (viz. of the principles of mahat and the rest, other than pradhāna), (the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is not to be accepted)'.[2]

Baladeva

His interpretation too is very similar to the above one; viz. 'On account of the non-perception (in Scripture) of others (viz. of many other doctrines found in the Sāṃkhya system, such as, the doctrine that the souls are pure consciousness and all-pervasive, and so on)'.[3]

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[1] I.e. as men like Manu and others reject pradhāna, pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world.

[2] Ś.B. 2.1.2, p. 443; Bh. B. 2.1.2, p. 88.

[3] G.B. 2.1.2, p. 11, Chap. 1.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled: 'The refutation of the Yoga'. (Sūtra 3)

SŪTRA 3

"HEREBY THE YOGA IS REFUTED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

By the refutation of the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti, the Yoga-Smṛti, too is refuted.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the author points out the unauthenticity of the Yoga-Smṛti.

This aphorism is of the form of a formal extension (atideśa). A formal extension means the intimation of similarity when such a similarity is not known. Thus, at first, the Yoga-Smṛti is taken to be concerned with making the Veda clear, accepting as it does the word 'Yoga', which is accepted by Scripture, too, in the text: 'This they think to be the Yoga, the firm holding back of the senses' (Kaṭha 6.11); and hence its similarity to the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is not known. Therefore, this aphorism intimates the similarity of the Yoga-Smṛti to the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti. "Hereby", i.e. by this very refutation of the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti which establishes a non-sentient cause, the Yoga-Smṛti, too, should be known to be refuted. In the statement: "The Yoga is refuted", by the term "yoga", the Smṛti which establishes it is understood. The purpose of the mention of the term "Yoga" in the statement: 'The Yoga-Smṛti is refuted' is this: Although the Lord is admitted in the Yoga doctrine, yet He is not established primarily, as He is in the aphorism and texts like: 'Then, therefore, an enquiry into Brahman' (Br. Sū. 1.1.1), '"O, the soul, verily, should be seen"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6): The primacy of the Yoga alone is found in the beginning: 'Now, an instruction with regard to the Yoga' (Y.S. 1.1), and in the aphorism, laying down its definition, viz.: 'The Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the mind' (Y.S. 1.2[1]). And, this mere suppression of the functions of the mind, devoid of any connection with the Lord, is, indeed, of no avail in crossing the world, any more than a dog's tail is in crossing the ocean.

[1] P. 4.

So, it is to be rejected, opposed as it is to Scriptural and Smṛti texts like '"O, the soul, verily, should be seen"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6), 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tait. 2.1), '"By knowing me, one attains peace"' (Gītā 5.29), 'The binder with the noose of the world, and the liberator from the noose of the world', 'This one thing is well-established that the object to be worshipped is Nārāyaṇa, Hari' and so on. Salvation being impossible through a mere suppression of the functions of the mind, the Yoga doctrine which deals with the primacy of that only is, indeed, non-acceptable. Its view is that pradhāna, devoid of any connection with Brahman, is the material cause of the world, and the Lord is merely the efficient cause of the world; and this, too, being opposed to the Veda, is certainly unreasonable. There are many other faults in the Yoga doctrine, but they are not quoted here needlessly. And the term 'Yoga' found in Scripture and Smṛti, refers to the meditation and the rest on the Lord. The eulogizing statement in the Mokṣa-dharma, etc., on the contrary, is intended only for referring to that portion of Yoga, etc. which is not opposed to Scripture. Hence, it is established that the stated concordance, indicating the causality of Brahman, is not contradicted by the Yoga-Smṛti.

Here ends the section entitled 'The refutation of the Yoga' (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'Difference' (Sūtras 4–11). Prima facie view (Sūtras 4-5)

SŪTRA 4

"(THERE IS) NO (HAVING BRAHMAN AS THE CAUSE) ON ITS PART, ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE, (ITS) BEING SO (IS KNOWN) FROM THE TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

We object[1] to your view on the ground of reason. The world has not Brahman as its material cause "on account of difference".

[1] Correct reading: '*pratyavatiṣṭhate*' which is translated here. Vide C.S.S. ed., p. 24 and Brindaban ed., p. 378.

And the difference is to be known also "from the text", viz. 'He became knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2.6 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, the objection based on Smṛtis has been disposed of by the preceding two sections. Now, the objection based on reasoning is being disposed of.

It has been stated under the aphorism: 'From whom (arise) its origin and the rest' (Br. Sū. 1.1.2) that it (viz. the world) has Brahman for its material cause. The *prima facie* objector objects to it on the ground of reason thus: 'no'. This world has not Brahman for its material cause. Why? "On account of difference." That is, Brahman possesses the attributes of sentience, non-grossness, infinity, purity, and the rest, while the world possesses just the opposite attributes of non-sentience, grossness and so on,—on account of such a dissimilarity between the two. Whatever is different from something has not that for its material cause, just as the pot, which is different from the other, has not the ether as its material cause; just as the pot, the dish and the rest, which are different from the potter, have not the potter as their material cause.

If it be objected. It is found that the attributes of a material cause recur in its effects as well. Similarly, in the case under discussion, too, Brahman is the material cause; and the universe, His effect, consisting of sentient beings like men, animals and the rest, must be similar to Him. Hence the reason (viz.: "On account of difference") does not hold good,—

(We reply) No, because that there do exist the attributes of non-sentience, grossness and the rest in the effect, viz.: in stones, wood and the rest, is known from the evidence of direct perception.

If it be objected: It is possible to imagine that there is sentience in them, too, though unmanifest; hence there is no difference.

(We reply:) No, because it is unreasonable to take what is known through direct perception to be otherwise on the ground of mere imagination.

The difference is known "from the text" as well,—this is stated by the phrase: "its being so", i.e. "its being so", or its difference, is known "from the text" as well, i.e. from the following texts: 'He

[1] Ś. R, Bh, ŚK.

became Knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2.6), 'On the same tree, a person, immersed, grieves for his impotence, bewildered' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.2; Śvet. 4.7), 'And the soul, which is without the Lord, is bound, because of being an enjoyer' (Śvet. 1.8) and so on.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation absolutely different. He takes this sūtra as forming one adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with demonstrating the eternity and infallibility of the Veda. He thus does not take this sūtra as representing a *prima facie* view. Thus, this sūtra means,—according to him,—'(The Veda is) not (unauthoritative like the Sāṃkhya and the rest), on account of (its) difference (from them), (i.e. because it is a non-human origin unlike the Sāṃkhya and the rest); (its) being so (i.e. its eternity) (is known) from the text'.[1]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 5

"BUT (THERE IS) THE DESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDING (DEITIES) ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIALITY AND FOLLOWING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"But" in the texts: 'The earth spoke' (Tait. Saṃ. 5.5.2, 3[2]), 'These sense-organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahma' (Bṛh. 6.1.7[3]) and so on, there is 'the designation of their presiding'[4] deities, 'on account of the specification', mentioned in the passage: '"Very well, let me enter into these three divinities"' (Chānd. 6.3.2[5]); and 'on account of the following', or entering, mentioned in the passage: 'Fire, becoming speech, entered the mouth' (Ait. 2.4[6]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: From the scriptural texts: 'The earth spoke to him' (Tait. Saṃ. 5.5.2, 3), 'The earth spoke' (Śat. Br.

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[1] G.B. 2.1.4, p. 18, Chap. 2.
[2] P. 76, line 9, vol. 2. [3] Ś, R, B.
[4] C.S.S. ed. reads '*tat-tat*', meaning 'their respective deities', p. 24.
[5] R, ŚK, B. [6] Ś, R, Bh, SK.

6.1.3, 4[1]), 'The waters spoke' (Śat. Br. 6.1.3, 2[2]), 'These sense-organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahmā' (Bṛh. 6.1.7), 'They said to speech: "Do you sing for us"' (Bṛh. 1.3.2) and so on, it is known that of the effects too are sentient; and hence they have no difference from the material cause—

We reply: The word "but" disposes of the stated objection. There is no designation of sentience on the part of the effects, and so they cannot have Brahman for their material cause; but there is the designation of only the presiding deities of earth and the rest in the passages, 'The earth spoke to him' (Tait. Saṃ. 5.5.2, 3) and so on. Why? "On account of speciality and following", i.e. on account of the specification of the earth and the rest by the word 'deity' in the passage: '"Very well, let me enter into these three deities"' (Chānd. 6.3.2), and on account of the specifications of the sense-organs by the word 'deity' in the passages: 'These deities, verily, disputing about self-supremacy' (Kauṣ. 2.14), 'These deities, verily, having known superiority in the vital breath' (Kauṣ. 2.14); as well as 'on account of the following' of fire and the rest as the presiding deities of speech and the rest, i.e. on account of the scriptural mention of following, or entering, in the passage: 'Fire, becoming speech, entered the mouth,—the sun, becoming sight, the eyes' (Ait. 2.4). Hence the world being different from Brahman, Brahman is not its material cause.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Literal interpretation same, but import different, since he takes this Sūtra as an adhikaraṇa by itself, not laying down a *prima facie* view, but the correct conclusion. Thus, the Sūtra means according to him "(If it be objected: How to reconcile the absurd sayings of the Vedas, such as 'Fire willed to be many' and so on?). We reply: (In those passages) there is the designation of the presiding (deities) (of fire and the rest), on account of speciality and following (i.e. entering into)".[3]

[1] P. 505, line 12.
[2] *Op. cit.*, line 9.
[3] G.B. 2.1.5, p. 18, Chap. 2.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sutras 6-7)

SŪTRA 6

"BUT (IT) IS SEEN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it, we reply: "It is seen" that there is the origin of hairs on the head and so on from a person from whom they are different, and of dung-beetles from the cow-dung from which they are different. Hence it is not to be said that the universe, because of being different from Brahman, has not Him as its material cause.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author points out that such a *prima facie* view is based on a fallacious reason (viz. 'on account of difference').

The word "but" is for disposing of the *prima facie* view. The statement that this universe has not Brahman as its material cause on account of being different from Him, is not tenable, since it "is seen" that there is the origin of nails, body-hairs and the rest from a person from whom they are different, and that of the dung-beetles from the cow-dung, from which they are different,—on account of this,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation same, but he takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 7

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (IN THAT CASE THE EFFECT MUST BE) NON-EXISTENT (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING A NEGATION MERELY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: If the effect be different from its material cause, it must be "non-existent" prior to its origination,—(we reply:) No such objection can be raised, "on account of there being a negation

merely", in the previous aphorism, of the rule that there is a similarity between the material cause and its effect in every respect.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Having admitted an absolute similarity between the material cause and its effect in the aphorism: '(There is) no (having Brahman for its cause) on its part, on account of difference' (Br. Sū. 2.1.4), it has been objected by the opponent that the world being different from Brahman, He is not its material cause with a view to disposing of that objection, it has been established in the aphorism: 'But (it) is seen' (Br. Sū. 2.1.6) that there can be a cause-effect relation even between two different objects. With regard to it, the question is whether prior to creation the universe was non-different from its cause, or different. What is your opinion? If you say: Non-different,—then, just as the origin of a different world is admitted, like the origin of hairs on the head and body hairs from a person from whom they are different, so why there may not be the origin of a similar world, like the origin of a gold-bracelet and the rest from gold?

If you say: Different,—then, the world must have a material cause different from Brahman, and hence pradhāna must be the cause of the world. If it be said that this cannot be admitted, as pradhāna has been already refuted,—(we point out) in the texts: 'Brahman[1] is one only, without second' (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'There was, verily, Nārāyaṇa, the one' (Mahā. Up. 1.2), 'Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts',—there is the mention of a single reality; and hence, it follows that there was the absence of anything else prior to creation. Therefore, the world must be non-existent prior to creation.

(Here ends the original *prima facie* view.)

(Author's conclusion.)

(We reply:) 'No'. Why? "On account of there being a negation merely." The aphorism 'But (it) is seen' (Br. Sū. 2.1.6) negates merely,—by way of mentioning the difference between the material cause and its effect,—the rule, admitted by the opponent, viz. that there is similarity between a material cause and its effect in every

[1] The word *'Brahman'* is not included in the original text.

respect; but it never establishes any difference between the two in every respect. Hence, because of having Brahman as its soul, the universe is existent even during its causal state.

Or an alternative explanation of the phrase: "On account of there being a negation merely". The statement, viz. 'The universe is non-existent' is a negation merely, i.e. without any meaning, in accordance with the scriptural text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different, viz.: 'If it be said that (the effect) is non-existent (prior to its actual creation), (we reply) No, since (it) is a mere negation (without an object to be negatived)'. That is, the negation by the opponent, viz. : 'The world is non-existent' has no object, for it certainly cannot have for its object the existence of the effect prior to its actual creation, as the effect always exists in its cause, whether before or after its actual creation.[1]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 8)

SŪTRA 8

"ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING THE CONSEQUENCE OF (BECOMING) LIKE THAT DURING DISSOLUTION, (THE DOCTRINE OF THE CAUSALITY OF BRAHMAN) IS INCONSISTENT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

An objection is raised: As at the time of dissolution, the cause, like the effect, will become non-sentient, the view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe is "inconsistent".

Vedānta-kaustubha

An objection is raised once more.

It is objected: "Inconsistent", indeed, is the view which admits Brahman to be the material cause of the world—Brahman who

[1] Ś.B. 2.1.7, '*Pratiṣedhaṃ hīdaṃ nāsya pratiṣedhasya pratiṣedhyam asti*', p. 453.

possesses the attributes of sentience, infinity, freedom from sins and the rest, and is established by the scriptural texts: "Brahman is truth, intelligence, infinite" (Tait. 2.1), "Free from sins, ageless, deathless" (Chānd. 8.1.5; 8.7.1, 3; Maitrī. 7.7), "Who is omniscient, all-knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7) and so on. Why? "On account of there being the consequence of (becoming) like that during dissolution." That is, because "during dissolution", or during reabsorption, non-sentience, limitedness, impurity and the rest will occur on the part of the material cause as well, "like that", i.e. as on the part of the effect. The sense is that during dissolution, the world, possessing non-sentience and the rest, and merged into its material cause in an order reverse to that of creation, i.e. merged into Brahman, possessing the attribute of sentience and the rest, is sure to defile Him with its own attributes, as does butter-milk dropped in milk.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 9-10)

SŪTRA 9

"BUT NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING PARALLEL INSTANCES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The reply is as follows: There is indeed no "consequence of (becoming) like that". Just as the evolutes of the earth do not defile it when dissolved into it, so the universe, the evolute of Brahman, also does not.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author refutes the objection.

"But no", i.e. no such consequence follows, and hence our view does not involve any inconsistency. Why? An effect does not defile its material cause with its own attributes when dissolved into it, there being parallel instances to this effect. Just as the evolutes like bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, when dissolved, do not defile the lump of gold with their own attributes; and just as the evolutes of the earth, when dissolved into the earth, do not defile the earth with their own attributes, so this universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, when dissolved into Brahman, does not, indeed,

defile Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 10

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF OBJECTION TO HIS OWN VIEW."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Sāṃkhya, maintaining a doctrine opposed to the Veda, cannot raise any objection, since the stated objections apply to his own view as well.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author points out that the Sāṃkhya cannot even object that there is any inconsistency in our view which is based on the Veda.

There is no inconsistency in our view based as it is on Scripture. It has been alleged by the Sāṃkhya, unacquainted as he is with the settled conclusion of the Vedānta, firstly, that a cause-effect relation between Brahman and the world is inappropriate, as there is a difference between the cause and the effect in this case; secondly, that, in our view, the effect becomes non-existent prior to creation, and thirdly, that Brahman becomes like the word during the time of dissolution. All these objections are of equal force against the Sāṃkhya doctrine as well. The sense is: The origin of the effect,—which possesses colour and the rest and possesses parts,—from pradhāna, which is colourless and devoid of parts, is admitted. Hence, a cause-effect relation between pradhāna and its effects is inappropriate, there being here a difference between the cause and the effect. There being nothing gross prior to creation, the effect itself becomes non-existent; and during dissolution, prakṛti, like the world, becomes gross.

COMPARISON

All others, except Baladeva, read: "sapakṣa-doṣāc ca".[1]

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[1] Ś.B. 2.1.10, p. 8.5.7; Śrī. B. 2.1.10, p. 13, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.1.10, p. 91; ŚK. B. 2.1.10, p. 14, Parts 7 and 8.

SŪTRA 11

"IF IT BE SAID THAT ON ACCOUNT ALSO OF REASONING HAVING NO SOLID GROUND, IT IS TO BE INFERRED OTHERWISE, (WE REPLY:) IN THAT WAY, TOO, THERE WILL BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF NON-RELEASE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account also of the instability of reasoning, there is no inconsistency in the stated conclusion; since, if pradhāna and the rest be inferred to be the cause of the world by means of a strong reasoning, then a counter-argument is possible by means of another equally strong reasoning. As there will be the "consequence of non-release thus also", owing to disagreement among the logicians, so, that alone which is mentioned in the Veda is acceptable—this is established.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The word "api" means 'and'. There is no inconsistency in the stated conclusion, which is based on Scripture. There is inconsistency in the Sāṃkhya conclusion itself which is based on reasoning, since the stated objections apply thereto, "on account also of reasoning having no solid ground", i.e. on account of the instability of reasoning. The sense is that the thing inferred by one expert logician is set aside by another, proved to be otherwise by another,—on account of the instability of reasoning in this way. But the thing mentioned in the Vedānta in the beginning and the end cannot be refuted even by hundreds of reasonings.

If it be objected: Even though reasonings like 'on account of difference' [1] be refutable, having no solid ground, yet in order that there may not be any infinite regress, it is perfectly proper to infer, in that way, a non-sentient material cause of the non-sentient effects, like the ether and the rest—

(We reply:) "in that way too", the primacy of reasoning is upheld, and hence the conclusion stated in the Veda is regarded as but of a secondary importance. As a consequence, non-release will result owing to the mutual opposition among Kapila, Kaṇāda and the rest. It cannot be said that if victory be won by one of them at some time or other, there will be no non-release as a consequence,—

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[1] Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.4.

it being impossible for one among many persons to be ever-victorious. If it be said that the Supreme Soul is such, you fall in with our view; so be happy by giving up reasoning which is opposed to the Veda.

Thus the Lord Vāsudeva, the sole topic of all the Vedas, being established to be the material cause of the world, no opposition, based on reasoning which is opposed to the Veda is of any avail—this is established.

Here ends the section entitled "Difference" (3).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He reads: "Vimokṣa-prasaṅga" instead of "Anirmokṣa-prasaṅga".[1]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They break it into two different sūtras—viz.: "Tarkāpratiṣṭhānād api" and "Anyathā . . . . prasaṅgaḥ".[2]

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "The Non-acceptance of the rest". (Sūtra 12)

SŪTRA 12

"HEREBY THE REMAINING (PERSONS) TOO WHO DO NOT ACCEPT (THE VEDA) ARE EXPLAINED (I.E. REFUTED)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Hereby", i.e. by the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view, the remaining ones, i.e. others who maintain a cause which is opposed to the Veda, "too", are refuted.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the author is extending the above refutation to the remaining views.

"Hereby", i.e. by the above refutation of the doctrine of pradhāna as the cause of the world, "the remaining (persons) who do not

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[1] Ś.B. 2.1.11, p. 458.

[2] Śrī. B., p. 13, Part 2; ŚK. B., p. 14, Parts 7 and 8.

accept (the Veda)", too, should be known to be refuted. The word "śiṣṭāḥ" means 'the remaining ones', i.e. persons other than Kapila [1] and Patañjali [2]. The word "parigrahāḥ" means all who do not accept the Veda.[3]

It is thus established that the doctrine of the causality of Brahman is not contradicted by their views as well.

Here ends the section entitled "The Non-acceptance of the rest" (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

According to them the word "śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ" means (the doctrines like Atomism and the rest) which are not accepted by the wise.[4]

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Becoming the enjoyer". (Sūtra 13)

SŪTRA 13

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF (BRAHMAN) BECOMING AN ENJOYER, (THERE WILL BE) NON-DISTINCTION, (BETWEEN BRAHMAN AND THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL), WE REPLY: IT MAY BE AS IN ORDINARY LIFE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that if Brahman be the material cause, then Brahman Himself will become an enjoyer of pleasures and pains in the form of the individual soul, so that there will be no distinction

[1] The founder of the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine.

[2] The founder of the *Yoga* doctrine.

[3] This explains the compound: "*śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ*".

[4] Hence they explain the compound as "*Śiṣṭaiḥ aparigrahaḥ*" and not as *śiṣṭāś ca aparigrahāś ca*", as done by *Nimbārka*, *Śrīnivāsa*, *Rāmānuja* and *Baladeva*. Vide Ś.B. 2.1.11, p. 461; Bh. B. 2.1.12, p. 92; ŚK. B. 2.1.13, p. 18, Parts 7 and 8.

between the enjoyer (viz. the individual soul) and the controller (viz. Brahman) as well-known from the Veda,—

(We reply:) In spite of there being a non-distinction, there is a distinction as well between the two, as between the sea and the wave, and between the sun and its ray.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, having apprehended an objection once more, the author is disposing of that here.

If it be objected: If Brahman who is without an equal or a superior be the material cause of the world, then there must be no distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed. Why? "On account of becoming the enjoyer." That is, all effects whatsoever being non-different from their causes, the enjoyer, i.e. the individual soul, will become the object enjoyed; and the object enjoyed, i.e. the body, the sense-organs and the sense-objects, will become the enjoyer; and hence, the distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, well-known in ordinary life and in the Veda, will not be possible on this doctrine of the causality of Brahman. Moreover, there will not be any distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, because the group of enjoyers being non-different from the controller, the enjoyer will become the controller, and the controller, the Supreme Soul, will become the enjoyer. In ordinary life, to begin with, the distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed is well-known, thus 'The individual soul is the enjoyer, the body and the rest are the objects enjoyed', and in the Veda too, thus: "Eats the sweet berry" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6). Similarly, the distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, too, is well-known in ordinary life, as is evident from the conduct of the good who always regard their pleasures and pains as dependent on the Lord; and in the Veda too, thus: "He alone makes one do good deeds" (Kauṣ. 3.8), "The soul which is without the Lord is bound, because of being an enjoyer" (Śvet. 1.8) and so on. Thus, "on account of becoming an enjoyer, there is non-distinction"; and hence the doctrine of the causality of Brahman cannot be accepted,—

The author states the correct conclusion in the words "It may be, as in ordinary life". That is, on our view, too, there may, indeed, be a distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, as well as between the enjoyer and the controller, "as in ordinary life". In

ordinary life, although pots, dishes and the rest, having the lump of clay as their material cause; bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, having gold as their material cause; foams, waves and the rest, having the sea as their material cause; and leaves, fruits and the rest, having the tree as their material cause, are all non-different from their respective causes, there is still a mutual distinction amongst the particular effects themselves. In exactly the same manner, there may be a mutual distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, although they are non-different from Brahman, having Brahman as their material cause. Similarly, in spite of their non-distinction, there may still be a distinction between the enjoyer and the controller; just as pots, dishes and the rest, though by nature non-different from the clay, as having no existence and activity apart from the clay, are yet by nature different, too, from the clay possessing as they do their own peculiar attributes which the clay lacks. The same should be known to be the case with the gold and bracelets and the rest too. Likewise, there is a natural relation of difference—non-difference between Brahman and the individual soul. There is, indeed, no inconsistency here. Hence it is established that the doctrine of the causality of Brahman is not open to the above objections.[1]

Here ends the section entitled "Becoming the enjoyer" (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. they interpret the sūtra like Śrīnivāsa, although while Śrīnivāsa understands the word "bhoktrāpatteḥ" to mean 'because the enjoyer will become the object enjoyed and vice versa, as well because the enjoyer will become the controller and vice versa', they understand it to mean only 'because the enjoyer will become the object enjoyed and vice versa'. Each develops his own peculiar theory in connection.[2]

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[1] Note the different interpretations given by *Nimbārka* and *Śrīnivāsa*.

[2] Ś.B. 2.1.13, pp. 461 *et seq.*; Bh. B. 2.1.13, p. 92.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "The beginning". (Sūtras 14–19)

SŪTRA 14

"(THERE IS) NON-DIFFERENCE (OF THE EFFECT) FROM THAT (VIZ. THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE TEXTS) BEGINNING WITH THE WORD 'BEGINNING' AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is "non-difference" between the effect and the cause, and not absolute difference. Why? On account of the texts: '"The effect having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4[1]), '"All this has that for its soul. That is true . . . Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, 6.9.4, 6.10.3–6.16.3[2]), "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1[3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the first chapter, Brahman has been described many times as different from the sentient and the non-sentient, in order that there may be a proper discrimination between the peculiar natures of these three realities respectively.[4] Here, on the other hand, the non-difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, resulting from the absence of separate existence, activity and the rest (on the part of the former), has been established under the aphorism: "If it be objected that (in that case the effect must be) non-existent, (we reply:) no, on account of there being a negation merely" (Br. Sū. 2.1.7) and so on. Now, with a view to confirming the stated conclusion, the author is refuting the view of the Vaiśesikas who hold that the effect is not non-different from the cause, but is something which originates (i.e. is an absolutely new creation).[5]

The compound ("tad ananyatvam") is to be explained as follows: There is non-difference between the two, viz. the cause and the effect; or, there is non-difference of that, viz. the world, the effect, from

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. [2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. [3] R.

[4] Vide e.g. V.K. 1.1.1, p. 11; 1.1.18, p. 32; 1.1.22, p. 36; 1.2.3, p. 50, etc. K.S.S.

[5] This is the doctrine of *Asat-kāryya-vāda*.

Brahman, the cause; or, there is non-difference of the effect from that, viz. the cause. That is, the effect, which is of the form of the sentient and the non-sentient, which is limited, has many names and forms, and is dependent, is non-different from Brahman, the Supreme Cause, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, unlimited, denoted by words like 'one', 'without a second' and so on, capable of abiding voluntarily in the causal state and in the effected state, and prior to the entire universe. The author states the proof with regard to it in the words: "on account of (the texts) beginning with the word 'beginning' and the rest". (The compound "ārambhana-śabdādibhyaḥ" is to be explained thus:) The texts of which the beginning is the word 'beginning', on account of them. That is, on account of the texts: '"The effect, having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4), '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), '"He thought, 'May I be many', may I procreate". He created the light' (Chānd. 6.2.3), '"All that has this for its soul. That is true. That is the soul. Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "That was unmanifest then. It became manifest by name and form" (Bṛh. 1.4.7) and so on. There are many texts of such kinds which establish the non-difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, but which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity.

Among these, the meaning of the text beginning with the word 'beginning' (ārambhaṇa) is as follows:

The Chandogas, having made an initial statement to the effect that through the knowledge of the material cause there arises the knowledge of all the effects, in the passage: '"Whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known"' (Chānd. 6.1.3), state a parallel instance to establish it, in the passage: '"Just as, my dear, through one lump of clay, everything made of clay may be known,—the effect, having its beginning in speech is a name, the reality is just the clay"' (Chānd. 6.1.4 [1]). That is, just as 'through one lump of clay' being known as clay, 'everything made of clay', i.e. the group of the evolutes of clay, may be known, since

[1] The passage is: "*Yathā saumya / ekena mṛt-piṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnmayaṃ vijñātaṃ syāt, vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ mṛttikēty eva satyam*".

they are all made of clay;—for such a group of evolutes 'has its beginning in speech', i.e. is designated by speech. Speech is of two kinds: 'effect', i.e. meaning, and 'name', i.e. word. The function of speech rests on these two, viz. meaning and word, e.g. we say: 'Fetch water by the pot'. Hence, 'the truth' is that the evolute, characterized by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly, having the name 'pot', and conducive to the function of fetching water and so on, is 'just clay'. That is, the view that the effect is different from the cause, on account of the difference of individuality and conception, is incorrect, for it is not possible to attribute the individuality or the conception of a pot to the wind and the rest which are different from clay.[1] If the effect is to originate from the non-existent simply, then that would lead to the origin of everything everywhere, as well as to the futility of the activity of the agent. So desist from further arguments.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Each commentator develops his peculiar theory in this connection. Śaṃkara understands the word "Ananyatva" as absolute identity, interprets the word 'vācārambhaṇa' to mean 'that which begins from speech only, but does not exist in reality', and thereby develops his theory of Vivarta at great length.[2]

Rāmānuja

He understands the word "ananyatva" as non-difference, like Nimbārka, but connects it with his peculiar doctrine of the soul-body relation between Brahman and the universe.[3] He interprets the phrase: "vācārambhaṇa" as follows: 'vācā' means: on account of speech, i.e. on account of activity preceded by speech; 'rambhaṇa' means: what is touched. Hence the text means: On account of speech, (i.e. for the sake of certain activities, like the fetching of

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[1] If the effect were absolutely different from its cause, then any and everything, e.g. wind, might very well have been conceived to be a pot. But this is never the case, since clay alone, and nothing else, is conceived to be so.

[2] "*Vācaiva kevalam asti . . . . na tu vastu-vṛtteṇa vikāraḥ kaścid asti*", etc. Ś.B. 2.1.14, p. 464.

[3] Śrī. B. 2.1.15, pp. 39, 42, Part 2.

water and the rest,) there is touched (by the clay) an effect and a name; i.e. clay is transformed into a particular effect having a special name, in order that a certain activity may be accomplished.[1]

Bhāskara

He, too, understands the word "ananyatva" as non-difference. He criticizes the Śaṃkarite view at length and insists on the reality of difference,[2] and interprets the phrase "vācārambhaṇa" like Śrīnivāsa.

Śrīkaṇṭha

He, too, understands the word "ananyatva" as non-difference.[3] He explains the phrase "vācārambhaṇa" in the next sūtra, and gives two alternative explanations, viz. "That which is the beginning, i.e. the cause, of speech, i.e. of speech and practical activity".[4] Hence, the text means that an effect (vikāra) is a name (nāma-dheya) which is the cause of speech and practical activity, i.e. of such expressions 'Fetch water in a pot' and so on. The second explanation is: "That which has speech for its beginning".[5] Hence the text means that an effect (vikāra) is simply the object of such expressions: 'This is a pot', i.e. a special condition the clay has assumed for practical purposes, but is not a separate substance from the clay.

SŪTRA 15

"AND BECAUSE OF THE PERCEPTION (OF THE EFFECT) ON THE EXISTENCE (OF THE CAUSE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is non-difference between the cause and the effect, because the effect is perceived, only when the cause is existent.

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[1] "*Ārabhyate ālabhyate spṛśate,*" etc. Śrī. B. 2.1.15, p. 40, Part 2.

[2] Bh. B. 2.1.14, pp. 93 *et seq.*

[3] ŚK. B. 2.1.15, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8.

[4] "*Vācāyāḥ abhilāpārtha-kriyā-rūpa-vyavahārsya niṣpādakaṃ bhavati.*" *Op. cit.* 2.1.16, p. 23, Parts 7 and 8.

[5] *Vāgārambha-viṣaya-mātram. Op. cit.*

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also, says the author, there is non-difference between the effect and the cause.

Whence is it known that there is non-difference between the effect and the cause? Because the effect is perceived, only when the cause is existent, in accordance with the scriptural text '"These beings, my dear, have the existent as their root"' (Chānd. 6.8.4).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

They interpret the sūtra in just the opposite way, viz. "And because of the perception (of the cause) on the existence (of the effect)". That is, the gold, which is the cause, is perceived when the ear-ring is present. That is, the gold alone is perceived in the ear-ring, and not the clay.[1]

SŪTRA 16

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE POSTERIOR."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the existence" of the effect,—belonging to a posterior time,—in the cause, owing to the designation of their co-inherence in the text: "Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning" (Bṛh. 1.4.10[2]), there is non-difference between the effect and the cause.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, there is non-difference between the effect and the cause.

"On account of the existence" of the effect,—which is "posterior" and denoted by the term 'this',—in the cause, owing to the designation of their co-inherence, in the texts '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), "Brahman, verily, was this

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.1.16, p. 46, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.1.16, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.1.15, p. 45, Chap. 2.

[2] Not quoted by others.

in the beginning" (Bṛh. 1.4.10), the non-difference between the effect and the cause is definitely ascertained.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 17 in both. They read "aparasya" in place of "avarasya" and take it to mean 'an effect'.[1]

SŪTRA 17

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF WHAT IS NON-EXISTENT, (THE EFFECT IS) NOT (EXISTENT PRIOR TO CREATION) (WE REPLY:) NO, (SUCH A DESIGNATION IS) ON ACCOUNT OF A DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTE, THIS IS KNOWN FROM THE COMPLEMENTARY TEXT, FROM REASONING AND FROM ANOTHER TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"If it be objected that on account of the designation of what is non-existent" in the passage: "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19.1 [2]), the effect does not exist prior to creation,—

(We reply:) "no". There is such a designation because of the subtleness (of the world prior to creation). Whence is this known? "From the complementary passage," viz. "That was existent" (Chānd. 3.19.1 [3]); "from the reasoning", viz. if a previously non-existent effect does indeed arise, why is there no origin of a barley-sprout from fire? "and from another text", viz. 'The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning' (Chānd. 6.2.1 [4]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The doctrine of pre-existent effect is not a more reasonable one. Why? On account of the designation of its

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.1.17, p.47, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.1.17, p. 28, Parts 7 and 8.
[2] Ś, R, Bh. Correct quotation: "*Asad eva*". Vide Chānd. 3.19.1, p. 175.
[3] Ś, Bh.
[4] Ś, R, Bh, B.

non-existence prior to creation, in the text: "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19.1),—

(We reply:) "no", why? Because there is "such a designation" "on account of a different attribute". That is, the attribute of having name and form unmanifest is different from the attribute of having name and form manifest; and it is because of this different attribute that the world is designated thus in the text: "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19.1), but is never denoted to be non-existent by nature.

If it be asked: Whence is this known? We reply: 'From the complementary passage.' For the complementary passage: "That was existent" (Chānd. 3.19.1), refers to the topic of our discussion, viz. the world, by the term 'that' and from this it is known that the term 'non-existent' in the beginning denotes the subtle reality with name and form unmanifest.

The author states another reason for the pre-existence of the effect, viz.: "From reasoning". That is, the existence of the effect is ascertained from reason as well. To the question: What is that reason whereby the existence of the effect is ascertained? We reply: On our view, names and forms, knowable by means of the evidence of direct perception and the rest, are all real, on account of being perceived. An agent, viz. a potter, makes a pot out of a lump of clay that is existent. Here, like the lump of clay, the existence of the pot, too, is known from direct perception. Hence, the activity of the agent, too, is not useless. If it be objected that as the pot already exists, like the lump of clay, the activity of the agent has no meaning,— (we reply:) not so, since its purpose is simply manifestation. The pot which was unmanifest before is made manifest; hence the activity of the agent is not useless. The names and forms, mentioned in the Veda, are used just as they were before.[1] It should be known that, on our view, the conventional usage of names and forms is not unprecedented. The origin of a non-existent effect, on the other hand, does not fit in, since the origin of a barley-sprout from fire is never seen. It cannot be said that although fire has no power of producing such an effect, it has, nonetheless, the power of producing sparks,— for, in an effect, produced from gold and the rest of a known weight,

[1] Vide V.K. 1.3.28–30.

a different weight is never found.[1] Likewise, the sparks of fire, which are its evolutes and known through the evidence of direct perception, are perceived by all,—there being no evidence for the imaginary doctrine of a power producing unprecedented objects. Hence the doctrine of a non-existent effect [2] is unreasonable. The activity of the agent, too, is meaningless on this view, since the activities of an agent in connection with the making of a pot,—viz. digging earth, pounding it, placing it and so on,—all relate to the material cause. In the absence of the material cause, with regard to what should the agent act, seeing that the effect, viz. the pot and the rest, are not produced then, and that, in that case, the consequence will be the origin of the pot through more activity, even in the absence of the lump of clay? All this should be considered by the wise.

The manifold controversies with regard to this point are not mentioned here for fear of unduly tiring those who desire for release. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since Brahman possesses infinite powers, everything is unobjectionable.

The author states once more another reason for the existence of the effect, thus: "And from another text". The other text is the text aptly teaching the pre-existence of the effect, viz.: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), which is other than the above quoted text, viz.: "The non-existent, verily, was the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19.1). Because of this too, it is the (pre-) existent effect alone that originates,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They break this sūtra into two different sūtras, viz. "Asadvyapadeśāt . . . . vākya-śeṣāt" and "Yukteḥ śabdāntarāc ca".[3] Interpretation same.

[1] I.e. the weight of the gold ear-ring is the same as that of the gold from which it is made. This shows that the cause and the effect are non-different.

[2] *Asat-kārya-vāda.*

[3] Ś.B. 2.1.17 and 18, p. 475; Bh. B. 2.1.17 and 18. 100, 101; G.B. 2.1.17 and 18.

SŪTRA 18

"AND LIKE A PIECE OF CLOTH."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as a piece of cloth is at first rolled up, and afterwards spread out, so is the universe.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The sense is: Just as a piece of rolled up cloth, although not known to be a piece of cloth, does not, for that reason, become non-existent, but is indeed existent, existing in a different form, and when spread out once more, is known to be a piece of cloth,—so, indeed, prior to creation, the universe remains existent indeed, though not known to be a universe, having its name and form unmanifest; and is clearly known as the universe at the time of creation, having its name and form manifest. Just as the drawn forth limbs of a tortoise are not perceived, even though existent, but do not become non-existent thereby and are known when stretched out again; and just as the banyan tree, existent in the seed at all times indeed in a subtle form, is manifested in a gross form, so it is the pre-existent universe alone which originates, in accordance with the Mahā-bhārata passage: "Just as a tortoise, having stretched out its limbs, draws them in again, so the soul of beings, having created beings, destroys them again" (Mahā. 12.7072*b*-7073*a* [1]) and the Viṣṇu-purāṇa passage: "Just as a gigantic banyan tree is contained in a small seed, so is the entire universe in you, the seed, during (the state of) contraction (viz. dissolution)". (V.P. 1.12.66*b*-67*a* [2].)

SŪTRA 19

"AND JUST LIKE THE VITAL-BREATH AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as the vital-breath, having the prāṇa, apāna and the rest, controlled by breath exercises, etc. remains in its real form; and

[1] P. 615, lines 24-25, vol. 3. Reading: "*sṛṣṭāni harate*". Vaṅgavāsī ed. also, p. 1571.

[2] P. 108.

when the control removed, is instantly known in those respective forms,—so here too.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The sense is: Just as the vital-breath, having modes like the prāṇa, apāna and the rest, controlled by breath exercises, is existent indeed, though not known in the special forms of the prāṇa, apāna and the rest, and when freed from the control is known clearly in those respective forms,—so the effect, with its name and form unmanifest prior to creation, is not known through those respective names and forms. Hence it is established that the world is true like Brahman, having Him for its material cause, and is non-different from Brahman, though different from Him.

Here ends the section entitled "The beginning" (6).

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "The designation of another". (Sūtras 20–22)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 20)

SŪTRA 20

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF ANOTHER, THERE IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF FAULTS LIKE NOT DOING WHAT IS BENEFICIAL AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

An objection is raised: Since on the doctrine of the causality of Brahman the individual soul is established to be Brahman in the passage: "This soul is Brahman" (Bṛh. 2.5.9 [1]), there result "faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest" by reason of Brahman's creating the world, which is an abode of all miseries.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The view that there is an absolute difference between the cause and the effect has been disposed of above. Now, since there can be no

[1] R. ŚK.

suspicion of an absolute non-difference between the Sentient Being and the non-sentient, the author is here refuting only the view of those who suppose that there is an absolute identity between Brahman and the individual soul.[1]

It may be objected: If Brahman be the creator of the world which is the site of the three kinds of miseries, there must be the "consequence of the fault of not doing what is beneficial". By the term "and the rest" (in the sūtra) the fault of doing what is not beneficial is understood. Why? "On account of the designation of another," i.e. on account of the designation of the individual soul as Brahman in the passage: '"Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.4, etc.), "This soul is Brahman" (Bṛh. 2.5.9) and so on. The sense is that the transmigratory soul, performing good and bad deeds and undergoing threefold pains, is not other than Brahman. Hence the stated faults must result on the part of Brahman, not subject to transmigratory existence.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 21 in his commentary. Like Nimbārka, Baladeva too begins a new adhikaraṇa here, but unlike Nimbārka continues it up to sūtra 33 (32 in Nimbārka). He takes this adhikaraṇa as concerned with showing that the Brahman, and not the individual soul, is the cause of the world. Thus, first, he takes this sūtra as setting forth the correct conclusion and not a *prima facie* view (as according to Nimbārka), thus: "There will be the consequences of faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest from the designation of another (i.e. if the individual soul be designated as the creator of the world)".[2] That is, if the individual soul were the creator of the world, it would not have created a world so full of miseries. Hence, Brahman, not the individual soul, must be the creator.

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[1] I.e. the author is not trying to remove the suspicion of an absolute non-difference between Brahman and the material world,—since none is so foolish as to suppose that a Sentient Being and non-sentient object may be absolutely identical—but he is disposing only of the not unnatural belief of an absolute identity between Brahman and the individual soul.

[2] G.B. 2.1.21, pp. 52-53, Chap. 2.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 21-22)

SŪTRA 21

"BUT (BRAHMAN IS) SOMETHING MORE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE INDICATION OF DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The refutation of this is as follows:

We hold that the creator of the world is Brahman, who is "something more" than, i.e. superior to, the embodied soul, the enjoyer of pleasure and pain. "On account of the designation of difference" in the passage: "Who rules the soul within" (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30 [1]), there is no absolute non-difference between the two. Hence there cannot result the fault of not doing what is beneficial.

Vedānta-kaustubha

With regard to this *prima facie* view, the author states the correct conclusion.

The word "but" disposes of the *prima facie* view. Since we hold that Brahman,—omniscient, omnipotent, the Lord of all, without an equal or a superior, and the one identical material and efficient cause of the world,—is "something more", i.e. superior to the embodied soul, the question of not doing what is beneficial does not arise. The reason of His being something more is stated in the phrase: "On account of the indication of difference", i.e. on account of the indication of a difference between Brahman and the individual soul in the passages: '"O, the self, verily, should be seen"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6), "The knower of Brahman attains the highest" (Tait. 2.1), 'Who rules the soul within' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30). The sense is this: Just as in the passage: 'All this, verily is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), it being impossible for the group of the non-sentient to be non-different from Brahman, its difference from Brahman is admitted by the phrase 'emanating from Him' [2] so it being impossible for the

[1] P. 1074, line 18. R.

[2] The passage is: "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1).

individual soul, too, to be by nature non-different from Brahman on the authority of the stated scriptural text designating difference, it is declared to be non-different from Brahman, by such texts like '"Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), only as having no existence and activity independently of Brahman, but not by nature. Thus, on account of the designation of difference, in spite of there being a non-difference between the two, faults like doing what is not beneficial do not arise.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation same, but in conclusion he adds, as usual, the explanation that it is only from the empirical point of view that we can speak of creation of a difference between the individual soul and Brahman; but from the transcendental point of view no question of creation arises at all.[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 22

"AND (THE INDIVIDUAL SOULS ARE) LIKE STONES AND THE REST, THERE IS IMPOSSIBILITY OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Like the diamond, the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest which are the modifications of the earth, the individual soul, though non-different from Brahman, is also different from Him, possessing, as it does, some peculiar qualities of its own. Hence, the allegation by the opponent is an "impossible" one.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Moreover, just as in ordinary life, the stones like the diamond, the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest which are modifications of the earth, though non-different from the earth as consisting in earth, are yet different from the earth, possessing, as they do, their peculiar natures,—so is the case here. By the term "and the rest" the

[1] "*Tatra kuta eva sṛṣṭiḥ, kuto' vā hita-kāraṇādayo doṣāḥ?*" Ś.B. 2.1.22, p. 484.

modifications of the tree, such as the leaf and so on, are to be understood. That is, just as the leaf, though non-different from the tree, is yet not the tree, so is the case here. Or else, by the term "and the rest", the ray of the diamond and the rest is understood, for the ray, though non-different from the diamond, etc., is yet found to be different. Hence, just as the ray, though non-different from its substratum, is yet different from it, so it is appropriate to hold that the embodied soul is by nature different from Brahman, though it is at the same time non-different from Him as having Him for its soul. Hence, the respective difference between what is subject to transmigratory existence (viz. the individual soul) and what is not, (viz. Brahman) being thus established, there is no inconsistency here. Hence "there is impossibility of that", i.e. there is no possibility of faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest, as alleged by the opponent. Thus, it is established that there no contradiction is involved in our view.

Hence ends the section entitled "The designation of another" (7).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 23 in Rāmānuja's commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "Just (as it is impossible for non-sentient objects) like stones and the rest (to be identical with Brahman, so) there is the impossibility of that (viz. of an identity between the individual soul and Brahman)".[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 23 in Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary too. "(Since the individual soul, possessed of little knowledge, is declared to be belonging to an absolutely different category from Brahman, the omniscient), just as (non-sentient objects) like stones and the rest, there is the impossibility of that (viz. of an absolute identity between the individual soul and Brahman)."[2]

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.1.23, p. 53, Part 2.
[2] ŚK. B. 2.1.23, p. 32, Parts 7 and 8.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 23 in his commentary. "(Since the individual soul, though sentient, is dependent) like (non-sentient objects like) stones and the rest, there is the impossibility of that (viz. of the individual souls being the creator of the world)." [1]

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "The Observation of Collection". (Sūtras 23-24)

SŪTRA 23

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE OBSERVATION OF COLLECTION, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD), (WE REPLY:) NO, FOR (HE TRANSFORMS HIMSELF) LIKE MILK."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that "on account of the observation of the collection" of many implements by potters and others, Brahman, who is without any external implement, is not the cause of the world—(we reply:) "no", since Brahman transforms Himself "like milk", possessing, as He does, powers peculiar to Him alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The objection, viz. if the universal Lord, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, the soul of all, and without an equal or a superior, be the creator of the world, there arises the faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest, has been refuted above on the ground that the individual soul, though non-different from Brahman as having Him as its soul, is yet subject to transmigratory existence as subject to beginningless karmas, and thus different from Him by nature. Now, the author is disposing of the following objection, viz. that Brahman is not the creator of the world on account of the absence of the collection of external implements.

The words "and the rest" are to be supplied from the last aphorism. The word "for" denotes the reason.

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[1] G.B. 2.1.23, p. 56, Chap. 2.

If it be objected: In ordinary life, it is always found that external implements like stick and so on are employed for the production of effects like pots, etc. Hence, Brahman who has no helpers, is not the creator of the world. To the question: Whence is this known? We reply: That Brahman is without any helpers is definitely ascertained from the following texts, designating the impossibility of the existence of any kind of agent in the beginning: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'There was, verily, Nārāyaṇa, the one' (Mahā. Up. 1.2), "Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, the absolute",—

(We reply:) "no". Why? "Because" Brahman is "like milk". Just as in ordinary life milk, water and the rest are transformed into the form of effects like sour milk, ice and so on,—there is no external implement here,—so Brahman, possessed of the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, is capable of being the one identical material and efficient cause of the world through His very nature. He has not to depend on the collection of accessories for creating the world, as declared by the text: "Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge and power" (Śvet. 6.8).

Whey, on the other hand, is sometimes mixed with milk, simply for giving a certain flavour to it, and not for making it turn sour,[1] because we find that milk turns sour even when whey is absent from it, and that water and the rest do not turn into sour milk even when whey is present in them.

It is because the potters and others are mere efficient causes that they have to depend on clay, etc. for making pots, etc.; and it is because they lack the requisite power that they have to depend on the stick, the wheel and so on.

Although the facts mentioned in the Veda are ever-established, yet objections are being raised against them again and again for removing the doubts of those who are entitled to the study of it, for silencing the opponent and for making one understand the meaning of the Veda without a vestige of doubt.

[1] This replies to the objection, viz. that the above example of milk is not to the point, since milk is not transformed into sour milk by itself, but has to depend on whey.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 24 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "If it be objected that on account of the observation of the completion (of a piece of work by the individual soul,) (it cannot be likened to inert stones and the rest, but is a free agent), (we reply) no, for (the soul's power of action is) like (the cow's power of producing) milk".[1] That is, although the soul is an agent and can as such bring works to completion, yet it is not an independent agent, but has to depend on the Lord for its activities, just as the cow cannot by herself produce milk, but has to depend on the life-energy.

SŪTRA 24

"AS IN THE CASE OF THE GODS AND THE REST TOO IN (THEIR WORLD."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as the gods and the rest create what they want through a mere wish, so does the Lord too.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Milk and the rest are non-sentient, while Brahman is sentient; as such, the examples cited are not to the point,—the author replies here.

The word "too" suggests the possibility of an analogy with the sentient. The case in hand is analogous not merely to that of non-sentient objects, like milk, etc. as shown above, but is also analogous to that of the sentient, known from Scripture to be the power of the Lord. Just as "in the world", i.e. in the world of the gods and the rest, or in Scripture,—the cause of the beholding of all objects,—the gods, the fathers, the sages, the Nāgas and the rest, celebrated to be possessed of great powers, are found to create the objects which they want, as befitting time and need, through a mere wish; just as a spider acts by itself alone independently of any external implement, so the Highest Person, celebrated in all the worlds and Vedas as possessed of great

[1] G.B. 2.1.4, pp. 56-57, Chap. 1.

powers, omniscient, omnipotent and having true resolves, creates the whole group of effects through a mere wish. Hence, it is established that no contradiction is involved in our view simply because certain well-known implements are found employed in ordinary creations.

Here ends the section entitled "The observation of collection" (8).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.: (The Lord though invisible, is the creator of the world,) just as the gods too (though invisible, are seen to work) in the world, (i.e. to produce rain and so on).[1]

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "The consequence of the entire". (Sūtras 25–30)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 25)

SŪTRA 25

"(IF BRAHMAN BE THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE WORLD, THERE WILL BE) THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ENTIRE (BRAHMAN BEING TRANSFORMED INTO THE WORLD), OR THE VIOLATION OF THE TEXT ABOUT (BRAHMAN'S) HAVING NO PARTS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

An objection is raised:—

If Brahman be the material cause of the world, then if He be admitted to be without parts, there will be the "consequence of the entire" (Brahman being transformed into the world); if possessed of parts, then the scriptural texts about His having no parts will be contradicted.

[1] G.B. 2.1.25.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Anticipating the objection,—viz. If Brahman be transformed into the form of the world absolutely independently of any external implement, then let Him not depend on His own powers as well. But since the view that Brahman is the material cause through His mere nature leads to the horns of a dilemma, He cannot reasonably be the material cause; and hence pradhāna alone must be the material cause,—the author is replying to it by pointing out that in the case of Brahman, external implements cannot be admitted, as they are not mentioned in Scriptures, and as they will make Brahman a dependent creator; and that His own powers, which are non-different from Him, may very well be admitted, as they have Scripture for their authority.

The *prima facie* view is as follows: Is Brahman,—knowable from the scriptural texts like: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'The soul, verily, was this in the beginning, one only' (Bṛh. 1.4.7) and so on, and transformed into the form of the effect,—without parts, or possessed of parts? If it be said: without parts, (we reply:) then the consequence will be that the entire Brahman will become the effect, as in the case of milk; there will not remain a transcendent Brahman, beyond transmigratory existence and to be approached by the freed; the scriptural texts designating Brahman as unintelligible will be contradicted; universal release will result; and Brahman will come to possess the attributes of grossness and the rest. If on the other hand, He be admitted to have parts, then there will not arise faults like the entire Brahman being transformed into the world, but the scriptural texts designating that Brahman, the cause of the world, has no parts will come to be contradicted, viz. the texts: "Without parts, without action, tranquil, faultless, stainless" (Śvet. 6.19), "For He is the celestial, incorporal Person, the outside and the inside, unborn" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2) and so on. So none but pradhāna can be the the cause of the world.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 26 in his commentary. He reads "vyakopa" instead of "Kopa". Interpretation, too, is different, viz.: he takes this sūtra as setting forth the correct conclusion and not a *prima*

facie view, thus: '(If the individual soul be the creator of the world), then there will be the consequence of entire (absorption), or the contradiction of the texts (designating its) being without parts'. That is, if the individual soul be the creator, we must conclude that, in as much as it is without parts, its entire self is present in every act. But this is not really the case, e.g. while lifting a blade of grass, the individual soul does not employ its entire force to the act. Or, else we must conclude that the individual soul must be possessed of parts, which also goes against scriptural authority. Hence, we must conclude that the individual soul cannot be the creator.[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 26–30)

SŪTRA 26

"BUT (THE ABOVE OBJECTION HAS NO FORCE) ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURE, SINCE (THE FACT THAT BRAHMAN IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD IS) BASED ON SCRIPTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The stated objection does not hold good. As the truth mentioned in the texts: 'He wished "May I be many"' (Tait. 2.6[2]), 'He Himself created Himself' (Tait. 2.7[3]), 'He became existent and that' (Tait. 2.6[4]), 'So much is His greatness, higher than that is the Person' (Chānd. 3.12.6[5]), 'Just as a spider creates, so from the Person[6] the Universe originates' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7[7]) and so on, is based on Scripture itself—anything else has no basis to stand upon.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author states the correct conclusion.

The word "but" is for disposing of the *prima facie* view. The entire Brahman is not transformed, nor is there any violation of texts. Why? "On account of Scripture." That is, on account of the mass

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[1] G.B. 2.1.26, pp. 58-59, Chap. 2. [2] Not quoted by others.
[3] *Op. cit.* [4] *Op. cit.* [5] Ś.
[6] Correct quotation: "*Tathā akṣarād bhavati iha viśvam*". Vide Muṇḍ. 1.1.7, p. 9.
[7] Not quoted by others.

of texts which declare that Brahman is the non-different material and efficient cause of the world, different from the world, possessed of powers which are transformed and so on. Such scriptural texts are: 'He wished "May I be many"' (Tait. 2.6), 'He Himself created Himself' (Tait. 2.7), 'He became existent and that' (Tait. 2.6), 'Having created it, he entered into that very thing' (Tait. 2.6), 'That divinity thought: "Very well, let me enter into these three divinities"' (Chānd. 6.3.2), 'Having entered by this living soul' (Chānd. 6.3.2), 'Who abiding within the earth, . . . from the earth does not know' (Bṛh. 3.7.3), 'Entered within the ruler of men' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2[1]), 'So much is His greatness, higher than that is the Person' (Chānd. 3.12.6) and so on. There is a Smṛti text as well, viz.: 'Having voluntarily entered into prakṛti (matter) and puruṣa (soul), Hari shook the mutable and the immutable at the time of dissolution and creation' (V.P. 1.2.29[2]). Like a spider, Brahman is transformed into the form of the world, without waiting for external helpers. Hence there is no violation of the texts designating Him to be without parts. The scriptural text to this effect is as follows: 'Just as a spider creates and takes, just as hairs on the head and body-hairs arise from a person, and medicinal herbs from the earth, so this universe arises from the Imperishable' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7). There is a Smṛti text as well, viz.: 'Just as a tortoise, having stretched out its limbs, again draws them in, so the Soul of beings, having created beings destroys them again' (Mahā. 12.7072*b*–7073*a*[3]). Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, is declared to be without parts and without limbs, because He has no parts and limbs as His material cause, as threads are of a piece of cloth.

If it be objected: If it be admitted that transformation means the projection of power, then there being no transformation of the real nature of the creator, what is the difference of this view from the views of the Sāṃkhyas and the rest?[4]—(we reply:) Listen. The

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[1] P. 191. [2] P. 16.

[3] P. 615, lines 24-25, vol. 3. Reading: "*sṛṣṭāni harate*". Vaṅgavāsī ed., also p. 1571.

[4] I.e. according to the *Sāṃkhyas*, *pradhāna* is transformed into the world, while according to the *Vedāntins* also not *Brahman* Himself, but His power of the non-sentient (*acicchakti*)—which is *pradhāna*—is transformed into the world. Hence the two views come to the same thing.

Sāṃkhyas hold that the material cause of the world is a substance which is different from the puruṣa (or the soul) just as a lump of clay is different from a potter, which does not possess it (viz.: puruṣa) as its soul, and which is possessed of independent existence and activity. But Brahman, as admitted by the Vedāntins, is One alone. He transforms Himself into the form of non-sentient objects like the ether and the rest by projecting His power of the enjoyed (i.e. the acit-śakti); having projected the sentient power of the enjoyer (i.e. the cit-śakti) in the form of gods and the rest, and having entered within as their inner controller, makes them undergo the fruits of their respective works; and contracts them during the time of dissolution, as a tortoise does its limbs, and the sun its rays.

To the objection, viz. even if there be the collection of external helpers by Brahman, no contradiction arises in the case in hand; and hence pradhāna, established by the Tantra may be the external implement, suitable for the production of the world, just as clay is for the production of a pot. What is the use of a transformation consisting in the projection of powers?—the author replies: On this view, there will be contradiction of scriptural texts. This he says in the words: "Because of being based on Scripture". Transformation consisting in the projection of powers is accepted, based as it is on Scripture. If implements like pradhāna and the rest be admitted, that view will have no basis to stand upon; and the consequence will be that Brahman will have to depend on another for His creation. Further, the following texts will come to be contradicted, viz. 'All this has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7 ch.), 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), 'Which being known, all comes to be known' and so on,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 27 in his commentary. Interpretation same, but he adds his usual explanation in conclusion that from the transcendental point of view, no question of creation arises at all and hence no question as to how, Brahman, who is partless is yet not transformed in His entirety.[1]

[1] Ś.B. 2.1.27, p. 491.

Rāmānuja

Interpretation of the word "śabda-mūlatvāt" different,—viz. (The fact that Brahman is possessed of various powers) is based on Scripture.[1] According to Nimbārka, it means, as we have seen, "(The fact that Brahman creates the world, yet remains untransformed) is based on Scripture"[2]; while according to Śrīnivāsa: (The fact that transformation means nothing but projection of powers) is based on Scripture.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 27 in his commentary, viz. "(But the above objection does not apply to the case of the Lord, the real creator) on account of Scripture, because (the knowledge of Brahman) is based on Scripture ".[3]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 27

"AND SINCE THESE VARIOUS (MODIFICATIONS) (ARE SEEN) IN THE SOUL ALSO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

When various modifications are appropriate on the part of individual souls, like gods and the rest, how can they possibly be inappropriate on the part of the omnipotent Lord of all, the cause of the universe ?

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is confirming the stated view on the rule of 'how much more' ?

No wonder that if the creation of the world be due to one who is possessed of true resolves, of inconceivable and infinite powers, and is unchangeable by nature, then faults like entire creator being transformed and so on never result,—"since", i.e. because "in the soul too", i.e. in the individual soul which has come to attain lordship, "this", i.e. without there resulting any faults like entire transformation, "various" creations are seen in accordance with its own power.

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.1.29, p. 60, Part 2.

[2] This is the interpretation of *Saṃkara* as well.

[3] G.B. 2.1.27, p. 60, Chap. 2.

The second "and" ("ca") is indicative of 'how much more'? (i.e. obviousness).[1]

To begin with, the forms of swans and the rest, assumed by individual souls, are well-known in Scripture.[2]

The following Smṛti passages are indicative of the power of the king of gods: 'Now he changes into those particular forms repeatedly. He becomes a bearer of the crest and the thunder-bolt, armed with a bow, and wearing the ear-rings, then in an instant, he comes to look like a Caṇḍāla.[3] Then, again, my son, he comes to be clad in bark, with a tuft of hair on the top of his head and matted hair. Then he comes to have a large body, becomes fine, likewise stout or thin. Again he changes himself as fair, dark, likewise black; ugly or handsome, likewise young or old; learned, dull or ignorant, likewise short or long. Then the performer of a hundred sacrifices becomes a high caste or a low caste. He assumes the forms of a parrot or a crow, man or cuckoo, and again assumes the forms of a lion, a tiger or an elephant', and so on.

The Smṛti passages concerned with power of the sun are as follows: 'The abode of many wonders is the revered Sun, from whom arise all beings, honoured in the three worlds', and so on. Similarly, the creative power of other gods may be known from Scripture itself.

The following Smṛti passage is indicative of the power of gods: 'They may make a non-god god, and a god non-god. When incensed, they may create rulers of worlds and other worlds'.

The following Smṛti passage designates the power Cyavana: 'O, the power of the Brahma-sage Cyavana, the great-soul! The ascetic can create other worlds, simply by wishing, through the power of austerities'.

The following Smṛti texts refer to the power of Vaśiṣṭha's cow, viz. 'The cow, with her head and neck raised, look terrific, her eyes reddened with anger, and lowing repeatedly. Her body, blazing with anger, shone like mid-day sun. The cow created the Palhavas from her tail in great frequency in the form of the piling up of the

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[1] I.e. if individual souls are capable of assuming various forms without themselves undergoing modifications, how much more so this must be the case with the Lord, the omnipotent Being. *Kaimutyaka-nyāya.*

[2] Vide, e.g. Chānd. 4.1.2, where certain divine sages are said to have assumed the form of swans. For fuller account of this story see V.K. 1.3.34.

[3] An outcaste, born from a *Śūdra* father and a *Brāhmana* mother.

charcoal, as it were [1]; the Drāviḍas from her tail; the Śakas from her urine; the Yavanas from her womb; numerous Śabaras from her dung; the Cicukas, the Pulindas, the Cīṇas, the Hūṇas, the Sakelaras from her foam as well as the Mlecchas of various kinds' (Mahā. 1.6679*b*–6680*a*, 6682-6683, 6685) and so on.

Similarly, other individual souls, too, possess the power of various kinds of creations, which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity, and also because they are not suitable here. Even in eminent individual souls, the power of creating object is insignificant, befitting their own powers and only given by the Lord. It is not possible for even the freed soul to be the creator of the enitre universe. This will be made clear in the aphorism: "Devoid of the activity regarding the universe" (Br. Sū. 4.4.17).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 28 in their commentaries. Interpretation different: viz. And thus in the soul (the attributes of the non-sentient are not found), for there are manifold (powers) (in different objects). That is, we find that the sentient individual soul, which is different from non-sentient objects, does not possess their attributes. Similarly, these non-sentient objects themselves, fire, water and the rest, which are different from one another, do not share one another's attributes, but have manifold attributes. In the very same manner Brahman who is different from both the sentient and the non-sentient does not possess their attributes, but numerous others not found in them.[2]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. And thus (there are mysterious powers) in the soul (viz. Brahman), because various (powers) (belong to the tree of all desires, or to the philosopher's stone). That is, we believe, on the ground of Scripture alone, that the tree of all desires and the philosopher's stone possess mysterious powers, capable of giving rise to elephants, horses

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[1] *Aṅgar-vṛṣ+ṇamul.* Here the suffix '*ṇamul*' implies comparison in accordance with the rule Pāṇ. 3.4.45. ŚD. K. 3366, p. 714, vol. 2.

[2] Śrī. B. 2.1.28, pp. 60-61, Part 2; ŚK. B. 1.2.28, p. 39, Parts 7 and 8.

and the rest. So why should we not believe, on the very same ground, that the Lord is possessed of mysterious powers? [1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 28

"AND BECAUSE THERE IS FAULT IN HIS OWN VIEW."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Let our view stand. Since the faults mentioned by you rebound to your own view, it is proper for you to keep silent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The particle "and" ("ca") is meant for disposing of the doctrines which are opposed to the Vedānta. The Sāṃkhyas and the rest, who maintain doctrines opposed to the Vedānta, cannot find fault with our determination of the cause of the world. Why? "Because there is fault in their own views." Thus, the Sāṃkhyas admit that pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas, and without parts, is transformed into mahat and the rest. This being so, the consequence is that faults like entire pradhāna being transformed and so on must pertain to their view as well. Since what is without parts cannot be transformed, pradhāna cannot also be the cause, otherwise there will result transformation on the part of puruṣa as well.

If it be argued: There are parts of pradhāna, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas, and hence the above fault does not result,—(we reply:) In that case, according to your view, pradhāna must be an effect, like a piece of cloth, and sattva and the rest, which are its parts, must be its cause, like threads.

If it be argued again: We do not admit that pradhāna has no form before, but is brought into existence by its parts, sattva and the rest, as a piece of cloth by the threads. What we hold is that pradhāna, already existent in its peculiar form, is the aggregate of sattva and the rest in a state of equilibrium,—(we reply:) This does not stand to reason. If this be so, then too, it must be admitted, according to

[1] G.B. 2.1.28, pp. 63-64, Chap. 2.

your view, that when in a state of equilibrium, sattva and the rest are pradhāna, and when in a state of non-equilibrium, they give rise to the world.

Moreover, if each of these be possessed of parts, there must follow infinite regress; but if they be without parts, there must result the violation of the respective difference between the cause and the effect, since there will be no distinction between the causal and the effected states of the aggregate of the sattva and the rest, which are devoid of parts.

Hereby, the doctrine of Atomism too should be known to be refuted.

COMPARISON

All others, except Baladeva, read "Sapakṣa-doṣāc ca".[1] Interpretation same.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.: he does not take this sūtra to be referring to the Sāṃkhya view, but to the view that the individual soul, and not the Lord, is the creator of the world. Hence the sūtra means, according to him, "And because there is fault in his own view". That is, the objection raised by the opponent to our view, viz. if Brahman be the creator, the question arises whether He creates with His entire energy or a portion of it only, applies equally to the view that the individual soul is the creator; and while we can answer this objection, the opponent cannot.[2]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 29

"AND THAT (DIVINITY) IS ENDOWED WITH ALL (POWERS), BECAUSE IT IS SEEN."[3]

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In accordance with the scriptural text: 'Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge

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[1] G.B. 2.1.29.
[2] G.B. 2.1.28.
[3] C.S.S. ed. leaves out the "*ca*", p. 29.

and power' (Śvet. 6.8 [1]), "that" divinity is "endowed with all powers", i.e. is able to do everything.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is demonstrating the omnipotence of the Highest Person.

The cause of the world, as admitted by the Sāṃkhyas and others, viz.: pradhāna and the rest, devoid of a multitude of powers, suitable for the production of the diverse and multiform world, does not stand to reason. But in the case in hand, the Divinity, worshipped by His own devotees who resort to none else, is "endowed with all", i.e. endowed with all powers; "and", i.e. hence, He alone is capable of being the cause, and not pradhāna and the rest. Why? "Because it is seen,—", i.e. (because) Scripture ("darśana") demonstrates it ("tad"),[2] viz. the divinity who is endowed with all powers;—i.e. because of the scriptural texts like: 'The own power of the divinity, hidden by his own qualities' (Śvet. 1.3), 'Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge and action' (Śvet. 6.8), 'Possessed of true desires, possessed of true resolves' (Chānd. 8.1.5; 8.7.1, 3) and so on; and because of the Smṛti passage: 'Hundreds of positive powers like creation and the rest, which are inconceivable to the comprehension of all beings, may belong to Brahman, O best among the ascetics, as heat to fire' (V.P. 1.3.2 [3]).

COMPARISON

All others read: "Sarvopetā ca tad-darśanāt", omitting "sā". Śaṃkara and Bhāskara begin a new adhikaraṇa here, (ending with the next sūtra).

[1] R, Śk, B.
[2] This explains the compound "*tad-darśanāt*".
[3] P. 22.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 30

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (BRAHMAN IS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF SENSE-ORGANS, (WE REPLY:) THAT HAS BEEN SAID."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that on account of the denial of His sense-organs in the text: 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6.8[1]), it is not possible for one who is endowed with all powers to be the creator of the world—(we reply:) the answer to this has already been given.[2]

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Let Brahman be endowed with all powers; still, like milk, without implements such as basin, pot and the rest; like the seed, without implements, such as earth, water, and so on; and like gods and others without implements befitting particular places and times, He cannot consistently be the creator of effects, though possessed of powers, "because of the absence of sense-organs" on His part, i.e. because He is known to be devoid of sense-organs from the text: 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6.8)—

(We reply:) The reply to this has been given in the aphorism: "Because of being based on Scripture" (Br. Sū. 21.1.26). The meaning of the above scriptural text is as follows: There exist 'no action',—i.e. that which is to be done for the purpose of obtaining bliss,—and 'sense-organ' for the production of desired for action, 'of him', i.e. of the Supreme Lord who is one mass of ever-present bliss, the Lord of all and the Creator of the world.[3] There are scriptural texts to this effect, viz.: 'The soul, which consists of bliss' (Tait. 2.5), 'Filled with His own self alone', 'A flavour, verily, is He' (Tait. 2.7), 'Having all desires, having all odours, having all tasks' (Chānd. 3.14.2, 4), 'Without hands and feet, he is swift and a seizer; without eyes, he sees; without ears he hears' (Śvet. 3.19) and so on. The declaration by the Lord Himself, too, is as follows:

[1] R, ŚK, B. [2] Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.26.

[3] I.e. the Lord, who is ever blissful does not need to act for attaining any further bliss; and He has not to depend on the sense-organs for His action.

"'I have no duties, whatsoever, O Pārtha, in the three world, nor anything unattained to be attained; yet I abide in action"' (Gītā 3.22). Hence it is established that the above-mentioned faults pertain to the opponent's view alone, but not to the conclusion established by the Vedānta.

Here ends the section entitled "The consequence of the entire" (9).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. The interpretation of the phrase "tad uktam" different, viz.: "that has been answered (by Scripture itself)". That is the very same Upaniṣad (viz. Śvetāśvatara) which has been quoted by the opponent in support of his allegation that the Lord, devoid of sense-organs (viz. Śvet. 6.8), cannot act, answers to the objection by pointing out that though devoid of sense-organs, He can yet act (viz. Śvet. 3.19 [1]).

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled "Having a need". (Sūtras 31–35)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 31)

SŪTRA 31

"(BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE ACTIVITY OF AN AGENT) HAVING A NEED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It may be objected: The Supreme Being who has all His desires eternally fulfilled, is not an agent. Why? "On account of the activity of an agent having a need."

[1] G.B. 2.1.31, p. 67, Chap. 2.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, a doubt is raised: Let this be so; yet there being no need on the part of Brahman,—who has His desires eternally fulfilled by themselves,—for creating the world, it is not created by Him.

The *prima facie* view is as follows: Creatorship of the world does not fit in on the part of Brahman. Why? "On account of the activity of the agent having a need", and on account of there being no need on His part for creating the world, as He has His desires eternally fulfilled.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 32–35)

SŪTRA 32

"BUT, AS IN ORDINARY LIFE, (CREATION IS) A MERE SPORT (TO BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it, we reply: Such creation and the rest of the Supreme Being are like the mere sport of kings and so on, well-known in ordinary life.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is stating the correct conclusion.

The particle "but" is for disposing of the *prima facie* view. Just as, in ordinary life, the play of a universal monarch, who has attained lordship, with various kinds of dice, wooden balls and the rest, is a mere sport, without any desire indeed for fruit,—so this is a mere sport on the part of Brahman as well, i.e. a mere play with the creation of the universe and so on.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 33 in his commentary. Interpretation same, but the phrase: "lokavat" explained a little differently, thus: As in ordinary life a man, full of cheerfulness or on awakening from a sound sleep, dances about without any motive or need, but simply from the fulness of spirit, so is the case here.[1] Here Baladeva criticizes the

[1] G.B. 2.1.33, p. 71, Chap. 2.

Viśiṣṭādvaita illustration of a prince engaged in a game of balls (which is the illustration given us by Nimbārka as well as we have seen) by pointing out that such a game is not altogether motiveless, since the prince gets some pleasure from it.[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 33

"(THERE ARE) NO INEQUALITY AND CRUELTY (ON THE PART OF BRAHMAN), BECAUSE OF (HIS) HAVING REGARD (FOR THE WORKS OF SOULS), FOR SO (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Inequality and cruelty, due to unequal creation, destruction and the rest, depend on the works of the individual souls themselves, and so they do not pertain to the creator of the origin and the rest of the world, as in the case of the cloud. "So" exactly the scriptural text: "One becomes good by good action, bad by bad action" (Bṛh. 3.2.13[2]) "shows".

Vedānta-kaustubha

It may be objected: If Brahman creates the universe in mere sport, He must be open to the charges of inequality and cruelty. He must be open to the charge of "inequality", i.e. of creating an unequal world, creating as He does different grades of beings like gods, men, animals and so on. And, He must be open to the charge of "cruelty", i.e. of heartlessness, creating as He does the universe which is an abode of three kinds of sufferings; making the individual souls, not attached to matter, enter into connection with it at the time of dissolution, and thereby causing them sufferings like old age, death, and the rest.

(We reply:) No. There cannot be any inequality and cruelty on the part of Brahman. Why? "On account of (His) having regard", i.e. because in producing different beings like gods and the rest at the beginning of the creation of the universe, Brahman has regard for, i.e. takes into account, their respective works or karmas,

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[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 72. [2] Ś, R.

just as the cloud in producing different kinds of shoots depends on their respective seeds.

If it be asked: Whence is this known? The author replies: "shows", i.e. the holy Scripture shows this thus: 'For he alone makes one, whom he wishes to raise up from these worlds, do good deed; he alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead down, do bad deed' (Kauṣ. 3.8), 'One becomes good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds' (Bṛh. 3.2.13), 'The doer of good deeds becomes good, the doer of bad deeds becomes bad' (Bṛh. 4.4.5).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva begin a new adhikaraṇa here.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 34

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT THIS IS NOT (POSSIBLE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DISTINCTION OF WORKS, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF BEGINNINGLESSNESS, AND (THIS) FITS IN, AND IS OBSERVED ALSO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that since the text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1 [1]) declares the 'non-distinction' of works prior to creation, the Supreme Being's dependence on the works does not fit in,—(we reply:) "no", as works exist even then, the works done by the individual souls in previous births being eternal. And a prior creation "fits in", as a sudden subsequent creation is unreasonable.[2] And this is "observed also" in the text: 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before' (Ṛg. V. 10.190.3 [3]) and so on.

[1] Ś, R, ŚK, B.

[2] I.e. since a subsequent creation cannot arise all on a sudden we have to admit that it arises from a prior creation.

[3] Pp. 413-14.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The reason, viz. 'on account of dependence', does not fit in. Why? "On account of the non-distinction of works." That is, the non-distinction of the entire world prior to creation being ascertained from the text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), the non-distinction of the works of the individual souls, too, is ascertained. Hence, prior to creation, there are no works as the cause of the diversities of the objects to be created, on which Brahman might depend,—

(We reply:) "no". Why? "On account of the beginningless" of all. That is, the works, good and bad, done by the individual souls in a previous creation, become the cause of the diversities in a subsequent creation. "And" the continuity of creation "fits in" in accordance with the maxim of 'the seed and the shoot',[1] and in accordance with the above-mentioned difference between the manifest and unmanifest effect,[2] as well as because a sudden subsequent creation without a prior creation is inexplicable, this last reason being indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra). This is "observed also" in Scripture. That is, since the text: 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before' (Ṛg.V. 10.190.3), teaches the existence of a prior creation, the eternity of the flow of creation is established. And in the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: 'With roots above, branches below is this eternal fig-tree' (Kaṭha 6.1), 'With roots above, branches below, the fig-tree is indestructible, they say' (Gītā 15.1), the reality as well of mundane existence, as having the Existent as its root, and as having the form of a continuous stream, is established. Previously, the effect has indeed been determined to be real.[3] In the texts: 'Without beginning and without end' (Cūl. 5[4]), 'A wise man is not born, nor dies' (Kaṭha 2.18[5]), 'Know prakṛti (matter) and puruṣa (soul) to be both beginningless' (Gītā 13.19), the eternity, too, of the sentient and the non-sentient substances, which are the powers of the Supreme Cause, is established.

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[1] I.e. just as it is impossible to say whether the seed is earlier or the shoot, so it is impossible to say whether *karmas* are the earlier or the *saṃsāra*. Hence they are taken to be beginningless.

[2] Vide V.K. 2.1.17-18.

[3] Vide V.K. 2.1.14 ff.

[4] Correct quotation: "*Anādavatī*". Vide p. 230.

[5] Cf. a very similar passage in Gītā 2.20.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras—thus: "Na . . . . anāditvāt", and "upapadyate . . . . ca".[1]

Bhāskara

He also breaks it into two different sūtras. Further he reads the first portion differently, thus: "Asmād vibhāgād iti cen nānāditvāt", (sūtra 35), "upapadyate . . . ca" (sūtra 36).[2]

Baladeva

He also breaks it into two different sūtras exactly after Śaṃkara. But he takes the first portion only, viz. "Na . . .[*] anāditvāt" as indicated within the previous adhikaraṇa beginning a new adhikaraṇa with the second portion: "upapadyate . . . . ca", concerned with showing that the grace of the Lord is not partial. Hence it means, according to him: And (the special grace shown by the Lord to his devotees) fits in (since it is not arbitrary, but depends on the devotion of the souls themselves), and it is observed also (in Scripture).[3]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 35

"AND BECAUSE OF THE FITTING IN OF ALL ATTRIBUTES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And because of the fitting in of all the attributes" of a cause on the part of Brahman alone, it is established that our view is free from all contradictions.

Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter of the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

[1] Ś.B., pp. 498-499.
[2] Bh. B., p. 107.
[3] G.B. 2.1.36, pp. 76-77, Chap. 2.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And on account of the fitting in." That is, all the attributes, mentioned or not mentioned, befitting the cause of the world and inappropriate on the part of pradhāna and the rest,—fit in on the part of Brahman alone. Hence, it is established that the concordance of Scriptures with regard to Brahman is not contradicted by any means whatsoever.

Here ends the section entitled "Having a need" (10).

Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 37 in both the commentaries. They take this sūtra to be a new adhikaraṇa by itself.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. the same theme continued thus: And on account of the fitting in of all attributes (harmonious in themselves or not) (on the part of the Lord). That is, the Lord is possessed of paradoxical and mysterious powers, and hence it is possible for Him to possess, along with the attributes of perfect justice and impartiality, the attribute of showing special favour and partiality for his devotees as well.[1]

Résumé

The first section of the second chapter contains—

1. 35 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 37 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
3. 36 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 37 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 36 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 37 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

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[1] G.B. 2.1.37, p. 78, Chap. 2.

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva divide each of the sūtras 17 and 35 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras; while Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha divide sūtra 11 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

SECOND QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "the impossibility of arrangement". (Sūtras 1–10)

SŪTRA 1

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ARRANGEMENT ALSO, NOT THE INFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Pradhāna, knowable through inference [1] is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account also of the impossibility" of a varied "arrangement" from it, not acquainted with the arrangement of the objects to be created.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, with a view to inducing those who desire for salvation to the hearing, thinking and the like of the nature, attributes and the rest of the Supreme Person, it has been firmly established above by the reverend author of the aphorisms that Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, omnipotent, the Lord of all, and the Supreme Person, is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world; and that the views of the opponents arise not supported by Scripture has been shown under the aphorism: "Because (the creator of the world) sees, (pradhāna is) not (the creator), (it is) non-scriptural" (Br. Sū. 1.1.5). Now, with a view to establishing the acceptability of the conclusion of the Vedāntins, the reverend author of the aphorisms is exposing, in this section, the fallaciousness of the arguments put forward by the opponents. It is not to be said that those who desire for release being benefitted through a mere exposition of the conclusion of the Vedāntins, what is the use of villifying the views of the opponents? Since just as when a man, giving up the most beneficial food, is about to take injurious poison and the like, people try to induce him to food and to

[1] See footnote 1, p. 42 of the book.

dissuade him from poison, etc. by pointing out the unwholesomeness of the latter, so the villification of the view of the opponents is justifiable for the purpose of preventing people from accepting the views which are opposed to the Veda, and for inducing those desiring for emancipation to our own view.

Now, the Sāṃkhyas, discarding the Highest Person, omnipotent and omniscient, as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, hold prakṛti, devoid of any connection with Him, non-sentient and the equilibrium of the three guṇas, to be the cause of the world. This has been said in the treatise treating of the sixty (categories) [1]: "The primary prakṛti (i.e. matter) is not an effect. There are seven, beginning with mahat, which are (both) causes and effects. There are sixteen which are effects (only). 'Puruṣa (i.e. soul) is neither a cause, nor an effect'. (Sāṃ. Kā. 3 [2]). They state the five reasons for the existence of prakṛti thus: The cause is pradhāna, '(1) on account of the transformation of the divisions [3]; (2) on account of concordance [4]; (3) on account of the activity preceding from power [5]; (4) on account of the distinction between the cause and the effect [6]; (5) on account of the non-distinction of what is possessed of all form' (Sāṃ. Kā. 15 [7]). The word 'Vaiśva-rūpa' means the same as 'Viśva-rūpa' or what is possessed of all forms, i.e. the universe of varied configurations. Whatever is limited is due to a common cause, like pots and the rest.

[1] Peculiar to the *Sāṃkhyas*.

[2] P. 4.

[3] I.e. on account of the limitedness (*pariṇāma*) of the effects (*bheda*) like mahat and the rest. Thus: Whatever is limited has a cause, like the pot.
The effects are limited.
∴ they have a cause, viz. *pradhāna*.

[4] I.e. all the effects possess the common qualities of pleasure (*sattva*), pain (*rajas*) and delusion (*tamas*). Hence they must have a common cause which possesses all these qualities, viz. *pradhāna*.

[4] I.e. the cause can give rise to the effect only if it has the requisite power. Now *pradhāna* alone has the power to give rise to *mahat* and the rest.

[5] The difference of the effect from the cause proves the existence of the cause. Thus, the difference of the pot from a lump of clay, viz. the first can fetch water, the second not—proves that the pot has clay for its common cause. Similarly, from the mahat and the rest we argue to *pradhāna*, different from them.

[6] I.e. the whole universe merges in a common cause during dissolution, and such a cause is *pradhāna*. Vide *Candrikā-vyākhyā* of Sāṃ. Kā., pp. 18-19; also *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* on same, pp. 13-14.

[7] P. 18.

Similarly, a mahat and ahaṃkāra, the five pure essences, the eleven sense-organs, and the five great elements which are limited are 'divisions'; they are due to one cause which is unlimited in space and time and the common substratum of three guṇas.[1] Whatever is observed to be connected with something else, is due to that one cause; as dishes and the rest, connected with the clay, are due to it. Similarly, the external and internal divisions, connected with pleasures (sattva), pain (rajas) and delusion (tamas) should properly be due to a common cause consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion.[2] Similarly, just as there is the origin of pots and the like from the power of the cause, so the origin of the effects like mahat and the rest, too, must be held to be due to the power of the cause. This being so, the cause, possessed of such a power, is pradhāna.[3] Moreover, it is observed that there is a distinction betweeen the effects, like ear-rings and the rest, and the cause, similar to them, such as gold and the rest, as well as a non-distinction. Similarly, there is both distinction and non-distinction on the part of the manifold universe. Through these two, a cause, viz. the unmanifest which is the substratum of all beings and consists of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, is inferred.[4]

On this suggestion, the author replies: "The inference", i.e. what is inferred, viz. pradhāna, not having Brahman as its common cause, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the impossibility of arrangement," i.e. because it is impossible that the arrangement of the world,—variegated by the aggregate of manifold objects of enjoyment, conforming to the diverse works of the souls,—can arise from pradhāna, not having Brahman for its cause, an object of inference, non-sentient and devoid of any knowledge of the objects to be created; as we see in ordinary life that the arrangement of manifold and variegated palaces, chariots, ornaments and the rest is due to one who is possessed of the knowledge of the objects to be created.

The particle "and" (in the sūtra) indicates that the reasons, intended for proving the existence of pradhāna, can very well be set aside by valid opposite arguments, since the following inference

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[1] This explains the first reason.
[2] This explains the second reason.
[3] This explains the third reason.
[4] This explains the fourth and the fifth reasons.

establishes the non-validity of the object established (by the Sāṃkhya, viz. pradhāna):—

Pradhāna as admitted by the Sāṃkhyas and not having Brahman for its soul, is non-existent;

because it is not perceived.

Whatever is this (i.e. not perceived) is that (i.e. non-existent);

like the sky-flower.

Whatever is not this (i.e. not non-perceived) is not that (i.e. not non-existent);

like the sun.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They take this and the next sūtra as one sūtra.

SŪTRA 2

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the impossibility of spontaneous activity (on its part), not the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The phrase beginning with 'on account of impossibility' is to be supplied here. And because activity,—viz. spontaneous falling away from the state of the equilibrium of the three guṇas,—is impossible on the part of pradhāna which is non-sentient and an object of inference. Thus, pradhāna, knowable through inference, is not the cause of the world, since it is observed in ordinary life that non-sentient objects like chariots and the rest, are moved to action only when superintended by conscious beings.

SŪTRA 3

"AND IF IT BE ARGUED THAT (PRADHĀNA ACTS SPONTANEOUSLY) LIKE MILK AND WATER, (WE REPLY:) THERE TOO (LORD IS THE INCITER)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be argued that like milk, etc. pradhāna acts for the origin and the rest of the world by itself, (we reply:) that "there too" the Supreme Being is the inciter is learnt from the scriptural text: "Who abiding within water" (Bṛh. 3.7.4 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued: How can it be said that on account of the impossibility of spontaneous activity on its part the non-sentient pradhāna is not the cause of the world? Just as milk, though non-sentient, is by itself transformed into the form of sour milk, and flows spontaneously for the nourishment of the calf; and just as water discharged from the cloud is transformed into the form of various saps of the earth, as well as into the forms of ice, bubble and the rest, and pours down spontaneously for the growth of plants and the rest, as well as flows on, so exactly pradhāna too, independent of a sentient being, having entered into a state of mutual inequality of the guṇas, is transformed into many forms,—

We reply: "There too". That is, in the case of milk and the rest too, no activity is possible independently of a sentient being. On the contrary, milk and the rest attain the form of sour milk and so on only when superintended by a sentient being. It is the cow herself, fond of her calf, that makes the milk flow out of filial affection, and being liquid the milk oozes out. If it be argued that even when the calf is dead, the presence of the milk is observed, and hence to say that it is the cow that makes the milk flow out of filial affection does not stand to reason,—(we reply:) there is the flow of the milk then by reason of her remembrance of the calf, or else it is explicable on the ground of her love for her master.[2]

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[1] Ś, R, Bh.

[2] I.e. the cow gives milk even when the calf is dead because she still remembers the calf, or because she loves her master and wants to be of benefit to him.

Water, too, comes to have the form of ice, bubble and the rest only when superintended by a conscious being; appears to be of the form of various saps through its contact with the earth; and flows on as dependent on a low ground [1] and on account of being liquid. Everything being superintended by a sentient being, the above examples all fit in, in accordance with the scriptural texts: 'Who abiding within water' (Bṛh. 3.7.4), '"At the command of this Imperishable, Gārgi, some rivers flow to the east"' (Bṛh. 3.8.9) and so on. Hence the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world.

SŪTRA 4

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A SEPARATE (ACCESSORY), (PRADHĀNA IS NOT THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-DEPENDENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Pradhāna, not superintended by an intelligent principle, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the non-existence" of an accessory other than it, since according to you it does not depend on anything else.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the cause of the world is not the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna). Why? "On account of the non-existence of what is different." That is, if pradhāna,—which is not superintended by an intelligent principle, but is independent, non-sentient and an object of inference,—be the cause of the world, there will be activity on its part at all times, and this being so, there would not be, at any time, what is different from activity, i.e. inactivity on its part.[2]

Or (an alternative explanation), the sense is: On account of the absence of an object to be instigated or of an instigator other than pradhāna. The reason for this, again, is: "on account of non-dependence", i.e. according to your view, as the creator of the world,

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[1] I.e. the flowing of the water depends on its being on a sloping ground.

[2] I.e. there would be eternal creation and no dissolution.

pradhāna does not depend on an accessory. It cannot be said also that the variegated works are the instigator of pradhāna,—because works will then become the cause of the world, because the independence of pradhāna in creating the world will be set aside, and, finally, because this is impossible. Works, on the other hand, are not able to give even fruits like merit or demerit, pleasure or pain; their agent, too, does not obtain the fruit by himself. Hence, how can those works, performed by the individual souls who are vitiated by their contact with prakṛti or matter, be able to instigate pradhāna ? The fact is that the works bear fruits through the wish of the Lord, and thus their agent obtains fruits, as declared by the Lord Himself: ' "Pleasure, pain, existence, non-existence, fear and absence of fear, non-violence, equanimity, contentment, penance, charity, fame and absence of fame,—the various states of beings arise from me alone" ' (Gītā 10. 4*a*–5*b*). It is not to be said that pradhāna acts through its proximity to puruṣa,—for its proximity to puruṣa being eternal, its activity, too, must be eternal. This will be made clear in details under the aphorism: "As in the case of a man and stone" (Br. Sū. 2.2.7).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 3 in their commentaries. Their explanation is similar to the first explanation given by Śrīnivāsa, viz.: "Because of the non-existence of what is different (from creation, viz. dissolution), on account of (its) non-dependence (to anything else), (pradhāna is not the cause of the world)".[1]

SŪTRA 5

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE ELSEWHERE, NOT LIKE GRASS AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since there is no transformation of the grass and the rest, eaten by an ox, into the form of milk, it cannot be said that just as the grass

[1] Śrī. B. 2.2.3, p. 74, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.3, pp. 57-58, Parts 7 and 8.

and the rest, eaten by cows, etc. become milk by themselves, so the unmanifest, too, is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Just as grass, water, etc. are transformed into the form of milk, so the unmanifest is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest, independently indeed of another efficient cause, —the author replies: "No". This cannot be said. Why? "On account of the non-existence elsewhere," i.e. because "elsewhere", or in the case of oxen and the rest, other than that of cows, etc. there is no transformation of the grass, water and so on, eaten by them, into the form of milk. The particle "and" implies that since the transformation of the grass, etc., eaten by cows, into the form of milk is admitted to be due to an intelligent principle, likewise pradhāna, too, is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest as superintended by an intelligent principle alone, and not by itself.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They change the order of the sūtras 5–9 which will be noticed at the end of sūtra 9. Interpretation same.

SŪTRA 6

"EVEN IF THERE BE THE ADMISSION (OF ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF PRADHĀNA, STILL THEN IT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF A PURPOSE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Even if there be the admission" of activity on the part of pradhāna somehow or other, still pradhāna cannot be the cause, since a purpose for such an activity is impossible on its part, it being non-sentient.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said under the aphorism: "And on account of activity" (Br. Sū. 2.2.2) that pradhāna has no power of independent activity, and hence is not the cause of the world. Now the author

points out here that "even if there be the admission of activity on its part per force [1], still then pradhāna is not capable of being the cause. Why? "On account of the absence of a purpose," that is, because there is no purpose for the creation of the world, seeing that the souls, merged in their own bliss, prior to creation, have no regard for enjoyment or emancipation; while pradhāna, being non-sentient, is not capable of having enjoyment and the rest. It cannot be said: What purpose can the Highest Person, who has all His desires fulfilled, have in creating the world?—since that has already been pointed out under the aphorism: "But as in ordinary life, a mere sport" (Br. Sū. 2.1.32).

Or (an alternative explanation of the phrase: "arthābhāvāt":) the sense is: On account of the absurdity of the statement, made per force (and not on the ground of reason), viz. 'Pradhāna acts by itself', just like the statement: 'The ether is running'.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They change the order of sūtras, which will be noticed at the end of sūtra 9.

SŪTRA 7

"IF IT BE ARGUED: AS IN THE CASE OF A MAN AND STONE, (WE REPLY:) THEN ALSO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be argued that just as a blind man makes a lame man move, or the stone (i.e. the magnet) the iron, so does puruṣa move pradhāna, —(we reply:) in that case, the assumption of the non-activity (of puruṣa) will be contradicted, and pradhāna being something to be instigated by another will cease to be the primary cause of the world.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued: just as a lame man,—who has the power of vision, but is devoid of the power of motion,—lost accidentally from his caravan

[1] I.e. somehow or other.

and wishing to go to a desired place, on finding a blind man,—who has the power of motion, but is devoid of the power of vision,—makes him move by mounting on him; and just as the magnet makes the iron move, so exactly, though devoid of the power of action, the soul, possessed of the power of vision, makes pradhāna, devoid of the power of vision, move by its mere proximity. Hence, in spite of the non-sentience of pradhāna, the activities of creation and the rest, are possible on its part,—the answer is: "Then also", i.e. even on the ground of such examples, no activity is possible on the part of the object exemplified, viz. pradhāna. Thus, if puruṣa be admitted to be the mover of pradhāna, then the initial proposition, viz. that puruṣa is not an agent, will come to be contradicted. If pradhāna be an object to be moved by puruṣa, then the initial proposition, viz. that pradhāna is by itself the cause of the world, will come to be contradicted. Although the power of motion is not manifest in a lame man, he being without legs, yet he directs the man, who has the power of motion, by means of speech. And the so-directed man, though not having the power of vision manifest because of his blindness, yet being a sentient being, moves in accordance with his (viz. the lame man's) words. The stone (viz. the magnet), on the other hand, moves the iron (only) when brought into connection with it by a man, and the iron does not move by nature. Moreover, it has been said under the aphorism: "If it be argued: like milk and water, there too" (Br. Sū. 2.2.3), that everywhere and at all times the Omnipotent and Omniscient Being abides as the mover of all. Further, the proximity of puruṣa and prakṛti being eternal, there was no absence of such a proximity before. Hence the order of creation and dissolution, as well as the respective difference between bondage and release,—due to the proximity of prakṛti and puruṣa—, are not possible; and there must result eternal activity and absence of dissolution. In the case in hand, on the contrary, there is no defect whatsoever, since it has been said that: "And that (divinity) is endowed with all (powers)" (Br. Sū. 2.1.29).

SŪTRA 8

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEING PREPONDERANT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As it is impossible for the guṇas, which are in a state of equilibrium at the time of dissolution, to enter in a relation of mutual subordination and preponderance, so the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the impossibility of being preponderant." Thus, is pradhāna,—consisting of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, not regulated by an intelligent principle and established by inference as admitted by you,—transformed into the form of the world by means of entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance (of the guṇas), or independently of any such state? If the first, then the preponderance of one among (these three guṇas) sattva, rajas and tamas, which are in a state of equilibrium prior to creation and are mutually independent, being impossible, it is not possible for pradhāna to be the cause of the world. If the second, then pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium and immutable, is not transformed into the form of the world all the more,—there being no state of inequality consisting in a mutual subordination and preponderance (of the guṇas).

It cannot be said also that at the time of creation there is a lapse from the state of equilibrium and the guṇas entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance, thereby the world arises,—for this leads to the horns of a dilemma. Thus, is it admitted by you that the lapse from the state of equilibrium, at that time, is spontaneous; or that it is due to the Omniscient Being? The first alternative is not valid because of the impossibility of a spontaneous lapse without a cause, and also because of the following inference:

Whatever has a cause has lapse,
like seeds and the rest.
Whatever has no cause has no lapse,
like the soul.

The second alternative, too, is not valid, because that is not admitted and because that will be falling in with the view of your opponents.

SŪTRA 9

"AND IF THERE BE AN INFERENCE IN ANOTHER WAY, (PRADHĀNA CANNOT STILL BE THE CAUSE) ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF THE POWER OF BEING A KNOWER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And if there be an inference" with regard to pradhāna "in another way", still then "on account of the absence of the power of being a knower" on the part of pradhāna, the world is not due to it.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Just as there may be the origin of effects, preceded by (pradhāna's) entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance in a way other than the stated, so if an inference be made with regard to pradhāna, still then "on account of the absence of the power of being a knower", i.e. on account of pradhāna being devoid of the power of being a knower, the objections, viz. impossibility of arrangement and the rest, mentioned above, must remain in force. Hence the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation same, but they read sūtras 5–9 in a different order. Thus:—

Nimbārka, etc.	*Rāmānuja, etc.*
"Anyatra-bhāvāc ca . ." (Sū. 5).	"Anyatra-bhāvāc ca . ." (Sū. 4).
"Abhyupagame . ." (Sū. 6).	"Puruṣāśmavat . ." (Sū. 5).
"Puruṣāśmavat . ." (Sū. 7).	"Aṅgitva . ." (Sū. 6).
"Aṅgitva . ." (Sū. 8).	"Anyathānumitau . ." (Sū. 7).
"Anyathānumitau . ." (Sū. 9).	"Abhyupagame . ." (Sū. 8).

SŪTRA 10

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTRADICTION, (THE SĀṂKHYA DOCTRINE IS) INCONSISTENT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The view of Kapila is "inconsistent", because of the opposition between its prior and subsequent (statements).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The view of Kapila is "inconsistent" in every way. Why? Because of its opposition to the Vedānta,—that is, the Vedāntas, independent of all proofs, authoritative by themselves and eternally established, establish the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, and the admission of the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is opposed to this,—because of that;—because of the rejection of a doctrine based on mere reasoning in the passage: 'This knowledge is not attainable through reasoning' (Kaṭha 2.9); and because of the opposition between its prior and subsequent (statements). Thus, they hold that puruṣa (or the soul) is all-pervading, devoid of attributes, mere consciousness, isolated (from prakṛti) by nature, non-attached like a lotus leaf[1] and inactive. Then again, they maintain also that prakṛti is an agent through its mere proximity to puruṣa; and that through the super-imposition of nescience that very same (puruṣa) comes to have the attributes of 'being an agent', 'being an enjoyer' and so on, to be afflicted by the three kinds of miseries,[2] and to be subject to transmigratory existence. Again, they teach that the salvation of puruṣa proceeds from the knowledge of prakṛti and puruṣa. Thus, a multitude of inconsistencies between prior and subsequent (statements) may be found there.

In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since in accordance with the Smṛti passages: ' "The evil-doers, the deluded, and the vilest men do not attain me,—they whose wisdom is destroyed by nescience and who have resorted to demoniacal nature" ' (Gītā 7.15), 'Knowledge is enveloped by non-knowledge; thereby beings are deluded'

[1] I.e. just as a lotus leaf is not wetted by water, so the soul is not attached to anything.

[2] Viz. physical, mental and elemental.

(Gītā 5.15.), '"At the end of many births, one who is possessed of knowledge attains me"' (Gītā 7.19), '"Those who attain me cross over this māyā"' (Gītā 7.14), '"Many, purified by the penance of knowledge come to attain my nature"' (Gītā 4.10), the causes of bondage, as well as of salvation,—liberating the bound soul from its bondage, unprecedented, and characterized by the attainment of His nature,—is well-established, there is not even a shadow of any contradiction among prior and subsequent (statements). Hence it is established that there is no contradiction of the concordance of the scriptural texts (with regard to Brahman) by the view of Kapila, which is opposed to the Veda and is set forward by means of fallacious reasoning.

Here ends the section entitled "The impossibility of arrangement" (1).

COMPARISON

While Nimbārka adduces two reasons as to why the Sāṃkhya doctrine is 'inconsistent', viz. (1) oppositon to the Vedānta, (2) internal contradictions,—others adduce only one, viz. Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva adduce the second,[1] Bhāskara adduces the first.[2] Hence they do not attach any special meaning to the particle "ca" in the sūtra.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "The great and the long". (Sūtras 11–17)

SŪTRA 11

"FOR, JUST AS THE (ORIGIN) OF THE GREAT AND THE LONG FROM THE SHORT AND THE SPHERICAL (IS UNTENABLE) (SO EVERYTHING IS UNTENABLE IN THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since if they be possessed of parts, then there will result an infinite regress; and if without parts, then it will be impossible for them

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[1] Ś.B. 2.2.10, p. 513; Śrī. B. 2.2.9, pp. 78 ff., Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.9, p. 61, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.10, p. 96, Chap. 2.

[2] Bh. B., 2.2.10, p. 112.

to be the producer of other evolutes [1],—there is inconsistency in the origin of the binary compounds from the atoms; and there is all the more inconsistency in the origin of ternary compounds from these (binary compounds). Like this, everything admitted by the maintainers of the atomic view is inconsistent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz. : Let pradhāna, not superintended by an intelligent principle, be not the cause of the world; but let the groups of atoms, under the control of the wish of the Supreme Lord, be the cause of the world,—the author is now pointing out the inconsistencies in the atomic doctrine as well.

The procedure of the atomists is the following: A substance produces another substance, a quality another quality; and the production of the effect proceeds from three causes, viz. the inherent, the non-inherent and efficient [2]; just as an effect, viz. a piece of cloth, is produced by the threads which are the inherent cause, by their mutual conjunction which is the non-inherent cause, and by the shuttle, the loom, the weaver and the rest, which are the efficient cause. Likewise, there are four kinds of atoms, distinguished as earth-atoms, water-atoms, fire-atoms and air-atoms; and they are eternal, without parts, possessed of colour and the rest, and spherical in extension, and remain without producing effects at the time of dissolution. At the time of creation, the atoms become the inherent cause for the production of the effect (viz. the world), their conjunction, the non-inherent cause, and the unseen principle [3] the efficient cause. Thus, through the wish of the Lord, first motion arises in the air-atoms, then a conjunction (between them) and thereby an effect, viz. a binary compound, arises from two atoms; a ternary compound arises from three binary compounds; a quaternary compound arises from four ternary compounds, and so on; and through this process, finally, the great air arises and remains trembling in space. In the very same manner, fire arises from the fire-atoms and remains shining in the form of earthly fire and so on. In the very same manner, the great

[1] C.S.S. ed. reads "*parimāṇa*" instead of "*pariṇāma*", p. 31.

[2] *Samavāyin, asamavāyin, nimitta.*

[3] I.e. the merit or demerit attaching to a man's conduct in one state of existence and the corresponding reward or punishment with which he is visited in another.

ocean arises from the water-atoms and remains flowing. In the very same manner, the great earth arises from the earth-atoms and remains immobile in the form of clay, stones and the rest. Again, the qualities of the effects arise from the qualities of the cause. Just as the qualities of a piece of cloth arise from the qualities of the thread,—a red cloth being found to arise from red threads,—so the qualities of whiteness and the like, inhering in the binary compounds and the rest, arise from the qualities of whiteness, etc. inhering in the atoms. But the combination of two simple atoms, producing a binary compound, produces different measures, viz. minuteness and shortness, in the binary compound, but do not produce sphericity, the measure of the simple atoms themselves,—because, then, there will result an intense fineness (on the part of the binary compound which it has not). Similarly, at the time of dissolution, too, through the wish of the Lord, there is motion in the atoms, thereby the dissolution of their conjunction, thereby the dissolution of the binary compounds and so on, and in this manner, finally, there is the dissolution of the earth and the rest.

This view is being refuted here. The particle "or" in the aphorism is meant for implying the aggregate (of defects in the atomic doctrine) left unsaid. The word 'inconsistent' is to be supplied from above. The phrase: "from the short and the spherical" is to be applied by dividing it in a compatible manner. This being so, like the doctrine of the origin of a short binary compound from two simple spherical atoms, and like the doctrine of the origin of the great and long ternary compounds from the short (binary compounds), everything else too, maintained by them (viz. the atomists), is inconsistent—this is the construction of the words of the aphorism.

The sense is this: The origin of binary compounds from atoms is impossible. That being impossible, the origin of the ternary compounds from the binary compounds is all the more impossible. In exactly the same manner, whatever is maintained by the atomists is simply inconsistent. Thus, it is observed that the parts, viz. the threads and the rest, produce a whole, viz. a piece of cloth, only by being conjoined (with one another) by means of their six sides which are their own parts. An atom, too, is established to have six parts through its connection with the six quarters. As has been said: 'An atom has six parts because of its simultaneous connection with the six (quarters)'. Hence, even the atoms must be productive of effects

as possessed of parts indeed. If they be so, then they themselves will become effects like the binary compounds because of possessing parts. And the parts of the atoms too,—conjoined (with one another) by means of their six sides which are their own parts, and establishing that the atoms have parts,—must have parts; that parts, again, further parts and so on, and thus there must be an infinite regress. If the atoms be admitted to be without parts, then if there be the conjunction of even a hundred atoms which fill no space, there will not be any extension different from that of a single atom, and hence there will never be (different kinds of extensions like) minuteness, shortness and the rest. Thus, the origin of the binary compounds is impossible; in their absence, the origin of the ternary compounds is impossible; and hence the origin of the world must be impossible.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different. They take this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with refuting the Vaiśeṣika objection, viz. that the qualities of the cause must inhere in the effect. Hence if the intelligent Brahman be the cause of the world, then the quality of intelligence must be found in the world. But since this is not the case, He is not its cause.[1] The answer is: Or just as (there is the origin of) big and long (ternary compounds) from minute and short (binary compounds) so there is the origin of the non-intelligent world from the intelligent Brahman.[2]

SŪTRA 12

"EVEN IN BOTH WAYS THERE IS NO ACTION (ON THE PART OF THE ATOMS), HENCE THERE IS THE ABSENCE OF THAT (VIZ. CREATION)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because it is impossible for the unseen principle to inhere in the atoms, as well as because it is impossible for it, connected with the

[1] Note that an exactly similar objection has been put forward and refuted under Br. Sū. 2.1.4–11. Hence there is no sense in repeating it here. As such *Nimbārka's* way of interpreting seems preferable.

[2] Ś.B. 2.2.11, pp. 518-19; Bh. B. 2.2.11, pp. 113-14.

soul, to be the instigator of the motion of the atoms,—thus "even in both ways" the first motion of the atoms is not possible. "Hence there is the absence" of the creation of the world through the successive order of binary compounds and the rest, due to conjunction, which again is due to the motion of the atoms.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is elucidating the statement (made in the last aphorism), viz. Like the (origin of) the great and the long, everything else, too, maintained by them, is inconsistent.

"Even in both ways", no motion is possible in the atoms at the time of creation. "Hence", i.e. for this reason, viz. on account of the impossibility of motion, "there is the absence of that", i.e. of the origin and the rest of the world through the successive order of binary compounds, ternary compounds and so on, due to the conjunction of atoms. The phrase: "in both ways" means: Does the first motion (of the atoms) arise by itself, or through the atoms? The first alternative is not tenable, being impossible. Never does motion, arising by itself, proceed to bring water in a pitcher. It cannot be said also that it arises through a cause, because at that time (i.e. at the time of creation) there exist no human effort, vibration, impact and the rest (which might have been such a cause). The second alternative, too, is not tenable, because then the atoms must become sentient, it being impossible for non-sentient atoms to be the instigator of motion. In the building of a palace and the like, the stones and the rest do not themselves act in conjunction with other works (connected with the building).

Or [1], (if it be said that) the motion which arises in the atoms at that time is caused by the unseen principle, (we reply): There is negation of motion "in either way". Thus, does the unseen principle which causes the motion of the atoms inhere in the atoms, or in the individual soul? The first alternative is not tenable, because the unseen principle, being originated by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls, cannot reside in something non-sentient; because being non-sentient, it is not possible for the unforeseen principle to be the cause of motion; because the performance of good and evil

[1] An alternative explanation of the word "*Ubhayathā*".

deeds being impossible on the part of atoms, the unseen principle must be necessarily admitted to be natural (to them), and in that case there will result the origin of motion at all times. The second alternative, too, is not tenable, because it is all the more impossible for the unseen principle, inhering in the individual soul, to urge the motion of the non-sentient (atoms). Thus, there is no motion "even in both ways".

"Or [1] else no motion is possible, whether it be due to the individual soul, or due to the Lord. Thus, does the individual soul give rise to the first motion through its own destiny (adṛṣṭa), or through its proximity, or through its attribute of consciousness? Not the first, because of the above-mentioned fault. Not through its proximity also, because the proximity of the individual soul to the atoms being eternal, the consequence will be that it will ever give rise to the world. Nor even through consciousness, because of the absence of consciousness then. And motion does not proceed from the Lord as well. Is the Lord, according to your view, designated in the Veda or established by inference and the rest? If it be said: Designated in the Veda, then have faith in the procedure mentioned by Scripture thus: 'Everything has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), 'He became existence and that' (Tait. 2.6), and being overwhelmed with the sentiment of love for Him, be free from affliction,—what is the use of your doctrine of atoms? If it be said: Established through inference and the rest,—(we reply:) that it (viz. inference) is not even established has been proved above.[2]

SŪTRA 13

"(THE VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINE IS UNTENABLE) ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE ADMISSION OF THE RELATION OF INHERENCE, ON ACCOUNT OF AN INFINITE REGRESS (ARISING THEREFROM) BECAUSE OF SAMENESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account also of the admission of the relation of inherence," the doctrine of atoms is not possible, since just as a binary compound is connected with its own cause by the relation of inherence, being

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[1] A third alternative explanation of the word "*Ubhayathā*".

[2] Vide V.K. 1.1.3.

absolutely different therefrom, so the relation of inherence itself, too, is to be connected with the two related objects by another relation of inherence, its absolute difference (from the two related objects) being the same; that, too, by another relation, and so on—thus there will be an infinite regress.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The phrase: 'on account of the absence of that' is to be supplied.

For this reason also, the origin and the rest of the world in the successive order of the creation of binary compounds and the rest, due to the conjunction of the atoms is not possible. Why? "On account of the admission of the relation of inherence." Among separable objects, there is a relation of conjunction,[1] as between a rope and a pot. Among inseparable objects, on the other hand, there is a relation of inherence,[2] just as a piece of cloth exists in the threads by the relation of inherence, a pot in the two pot-sherds, cowness in a cow and whiteness and the rest in a piece of cloth. The relation between objects which are causes and effects is just this relation of inherence; and this relation is proclaimed to be one, eternal, and all-pervading like the ether;—on account of the admission of such a relation of inherence—this is the sense.

If it be asked: What objection is there if such a relation of inherence be admitted?—(the author) replies: "On account of an infinite regress because of sameness". That is, just as a binary compound, absolutely different from its inherent cause (viz. the two simple atoms), necessarily awaits a relation of inherence (for being connected with them), so the relation of inherence itself, being absolutely different from the two related objects, is to be connected with them by means of another relation of inherence,—"because of the sameness" of absolute difference (i.e. because there is absolute difference equally in both the cases, also because what is itself unrelated is never observed to be a relation)—that, too, by another relation of inherence, and that, too, and so on; thus "on account of infinite regress", the atomic theory defeats itself.

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[1] *Saṃyoga.* [2] *Samavāya.*

SŪTRA 14

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE (OF) ETERNAL (ACTIVITY AND INACTIVITY) ALONE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If the atoms be active by nature, there being the existence of (eternal) activity, there will result eternal creation; otherwise there will result eternal dissolution; and hence there is the absence of that (viz. creation).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this, too, the atomic theory is untenable. Why? If the atoms be admitted to be active by nature, then there being eternal activity alone, there cannot be dissolution. If, they be admitted to be inactive by nature, there being eternal inactivity alone, the absence of creation will necessarily result—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 13 in the commentaries of the first two. Interpretation different, viz. "(If the samavāya be admitted to be eternal, the terms related by it, viz. ternary compounds, etc., i.e. the world too must be) eternal indeed, on account of the existence (i.e. eternity of the samavāya)".[1]

SŪTRA 15

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF (THE ATOMS) HAVING COLOUR AND SO ON, THE REVERSE (VIEW WOULD FOLLOW), BECAUSE OF OBSERVATION."

Vedānta-pārijata-saurabha

And on account of the atoms having colour and the rest in accordance with the respective effects, there must be non-eternity, which is the "reverse" of eternity, (on their part), since pots and the rest, possessed of colour and so on, are observed to be non-eternal. Otherwise, the effects must be devoid of colour, etc.

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.2.13, p. 86, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.13, p. 75, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.14, p. 107, Chap. 2.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Since the effects are possessed of colour, etc., the atoms, too, are admitted to be possessed of colour and so on.[1] Thus, since the four kinds of atoms are possessed of colour and so on, i.e. possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch,—non-eternity, the "reverse" of eternity, results, as pots and the rest, possessed of colour and so on, are found to be non-eternal. If they be not admitted to be possessed of colour and the like, then the fact that the effects are possessed of colour and so on will come to be contradicted, and the initial proposition: 'Possessed of parts and eternal' too will come to be contradicted. For this reason too, there is the absence of that (viz. creation),—this is the meaning of the particle "and". The sense is that an unseen object cannot be determined in accordance with what is seen. Hence the cause of the world is to be understood in accordance with Scripture.

SŪTRA 16

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If the atoms be possessed of more numerous qualities,[2] then the earth, water, fire and air will become similar. If they be possessed of less numerous qualities,[3] then, too, all the different kinds of atoms being connected with one quality each, the earth and the rest too, having qualities corresponding to their causes, must be connected with one quality each,—this "on account of fault in both ways", there is indeed the absence of that (viz. creation).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also, the procedure admitted by the atomists is not possible. Why? Because whether the atoms be admitted to be possessed of more numerous qualities, or to be possessed of less numerous qualities, "in both ways", too, there is fault. Since the

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[1] An effect can have no qualities which the cause has not.

[2] I.e. every kind of atoms are possessed of the five qualities of colour and the rest.

[3] I.e. each be possessed of its peculiar qualities.

qualities of the effect are due to the qualities of the cause, all the qualities of the cause, such as colour, taste and the rest, must attach to all the effects. As a result, there must be smell and taste in fire; colour, taste and smell in air; and the grossness on the part of the atoms, since the earth, which has the most numerous qualities, is observed to be gross. If they be possessed of less numerous qualities, then all must have one quality each. If this be so, then there must be touch in fire; colour and touch in water; colour, touch and taste in earth, because, those particular qualities are absent from those particular atoms. Otherwise, there will result everything everywhere.

If it be argued: that the earth is observed to be possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch; water to be endowed with the attributes of colour, taste and touch; the fire to be possessed of colour and touch; and the air is to be possessed of touch. Corresponding to these qualities, some atoms are supposed to be possessed of more numerous qualities, others less numerous. Hence the above objection cannot be raised,—

(We reply:) No; for in that case, too, those that have more numerous qualities will be deprived of their atomicity.[1] In the case in hand, on the other hand, there is no fault whatsoever, since the world has the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all as its material cause.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 15 in the commentaries of the first two.

Interpretation different—viz. an elucidation of the previous sūtra, viz. "Because there is fault in both ways", i.e. either if the atoms be possessed of colour, etc., or if they be not. On the first, they cannot be eternal; on the second, their effects cannot be possessed of colour and the rest.[2]

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[1] Since increase in qualities cannot take place unless there is a simultaneous increase in size.

[2] Śrī. B. 2.2.15, pp. 86-87, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.15, p. 77, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.16, p. 107, Chap. 2.

SŪTRA 17

"AND BECAUSE OF NON-ACCEPTANCE, (THERE MUST BE AN) ABSOLUTE DISREGARD (FOR THE ATOMIC THEORY)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because of the rejection of atomism by the wise, "an absolute disregard" for it is to be shown by those who are desirous of salvation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Certain portions,—such as the doctrine of a pre-existent cause and the rest,—of the doctrine of the causality of pradhāna, though rejected on the ground of its opposition to Scripture and reasoning, has been accepted by those who are versed in the Veda. But "because of the non-acceptance", i.e. rejection, by the wise, in toto, of the doctrine of the causality of the atoms, imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas; because of its opposition to reasoning; and because of its opposition to the Veda, "there is an absolute disregard",—i.e. the doctrine of the causality of atoms is to be disregarded by those who wish for the highest.

Hence it is established that there is no contradiction of the doctrine of the causality of Brahman by the doctrine of the causality of atoms which is to be rejected from a distance.

Here ends the section entitled "The great and the long" (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The aggregate". (Sūtras 18–27)

SŪTRA 18

"EVEN IF THE AGGREGATE HAVING TWO CAUSES (BE ADMITTED), (THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THAT (VIZ. OF THE AGGREGATES)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The author is refuting the view of Sugata.[1]

Even if the aggregates of the element and the elemental, the mind and the mental be admitted, still then, on account of the non-

[1] I.e. of the Buddhists.

sentience of the objects aggregated, as well as on account of non-admission of another cause of the aggregation, the aggregates are not possible.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Kapila, the maintainer of the doctrine of pre-existing effects, holds that pradhāna, not having Brahman for its soul, is the cause of the world. He has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is opposed to the doctrine of the causality of Brahman and the Vedic doctrine. Kaṇāda, inferior even to him in intelligence and the maintainer of the doctrine of non-existing effects, holds the cause of the world to be of various kinds [1]; and hence he has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is opposed to the 'great'.[2] Now, the doctrine of the Buddhists, inferior to that even, is being refuted, on account of its similarity to that.[3]

The doctrine taught by the Buddha being interpreted differently, four views were propounded by his four classes of disciples. These followers are called, (1) Vaibhāṣika, (2) Sautrāntika, (3) Yogācāra, and (4) Mādhyamika. Among these, the first two maintain the reality of external objects. Among them, again, the first maintains that external objects are directly perceivable. According to him, external objects, like pots and the rest, are knowable by the evidence of direct perception. The other maintains that external objects are inferrible through cognitions. According to him, external objects like pots and rest, which are not directly perceived, are inferred through cognitions, produced in the forms of pots and so on and directly perceived. The third maintains the reality of cognitions alone without any substratum. He holds that external objects are like dreams. All of them maintain that the objects admitted by them are momentary. The view of the fourth is that everything is void. He holds that the continuous stream of cognitions, freed from object and subject-forms, persists from moment to moment of the basis of past impressions, like a lamp in a place sheltered from wind. But when past impressions are destroyed, it attains a complete extinction like the lamp itself; this attainment of non-existence is salvation. The others, on the other hand, hold that there is no interruption in the

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[1] Viz. the four kinds of atoms. [2] Vide Br. Sū. 2.2.17.

[3] The Buddhists too admit the aggregation of atoms like the *Vaiśeṣikas*.

continuous stream of cognitions. Among them, the views of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika will be refuted later. But in this section, the views of the realists, viz. the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, are being refuted together.

Thus, they speak of five groups,[1] viz. colour, cognition, feeling, name and impression.[2] Among these, the colour-group consists in the four elements, like the earth and the rest, and the elemental in the form of the body, sense-organs, and sense-objects. Among these, the earth-atoms, possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch, and hard by nature, are aggregated into the form of the earth; the water-atoms, possessed of colour, taste and smell, and viscid by nature, are aggregated into the form of water; the fire-atoms, possessed of colour and touch, and hot by nature, are aggregated into the form of fire; likewise the air-atoms, possessed of touch and mobile by nature, are aggregated into the form of air; and the four elements, like the earth and the rest, are aggregated into the form of body, sense-organs and sense-objects. In this way, these four kinds of momentary atoms are held to be the cause of the aggregation of the elements and the elemental. The colour-group, consisting of the elements and the elemental and due to the atoms, is the external aggregate. The cognition-group consists in a stream of cognitions like the cognition of a pot, cognition of a piece of cloth, and so on, based on the internal cognition of the 'I', and subsisting uninterruptedly. This alone is the agent, the enjoyer and the soul, and from it alone all ordinary practical transactions proceed. The feeling-group consists in pleasurable or painful experiences. The name-group consists in the cognition of secondary marks, e.g. (in the cognition:) 'a cow possessed of auspiciousness', the cow is distinguished by the secondary mark of auspiciousness. The impression-group consists in the mental qualities of attachment, aversion, delusion, pride, malice, fear, grief, depression and so on. These last four kinds of groups are said to be the mind and the mental. Among these, the cognition-group is said to be the mind or the soul, others mental; and thus they are internally aggregated in such a way as to be the substratum of ordinary practical transactions. This is the internal aggregate, due to the four groups, beginning with the cognition-group. The soul and the ether, other than the

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[1] *Skandha.*

[2] *Rūpa, vijñāna, vedanā, saṃjñā and saṃskāra.*

two aggregates, are non-existent by nature. These two aggregates make the course of mundane existence possible, and practical life being thus made possible, there is no need, it is thought, of an eternal soul.

(Correct conclusion.) With regard to it we reply: Even if there be the admission, in the above way, of aggregates, i.e. of groups having two causes, still then "there is the non-establishment of that",—i.e. establishment "of that", viz. of that which has two causes, too, is indeed impossible. The sense is: because the spontaneous aggregation of non-sentient objects, mutually independent, is not possible, and also because of their momentariness, the aggregate of the elements and the elemental, as well as the aggregate of the mind and the mental, are not possible. Further, because of the non-admission of a permanent enjoyer, of a sentient controller—one who brings about the aggregation, of an omniscient and universal Lord; as well as because of the consequence of the world becoming super-sensible by reason of the super-sensibleness of the atoms themselves, the course of mundane existence must disappear. The sense is that this view is faulty, since it rejects Brahman, taught by the beginningless Veda; since it admits the aggregates of atoms, unseen and unheard; and since a cause for the aggregation is impossible.

SŪTRA 19

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (ON ACCOUNT OF THE MUTUAL CAUSALITY (OF NESCIENCE AND THE REST), (THE AGGREGATION) IS POSSIBLE, (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF (THEIR) NOT BEING THE CAUSE OF AGGREGATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It cannot also be that no account of the mutual causality of nescience, past impressions, cognition, name and form, six supports [1] and the rest, the aggregation and the rest, are possible,—for they, too, are not the causes of aggregation.

[1] *Avidyā, saṃskāra, vijñāna, nāma-rūpa, ṣaḍāyatana,* etc. For explanation, see below V.K.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: In spite of the non-admission of a sentient and omniscient being as bringing about the aggregation, no harm is done, since our view admits the mutual causality of nescience and the rest. That which goes towards the effect as its cause is 'pratyaya', i.e. the cause; the state of that, no account of that,[1] all aggregation and the rest become possible. Thus, nescience and the rest, functioning from all eternity, are admitted to be the causes of the continuous stream of cognitions. Among these, the word 'nescience' is denotative of error, such as, taking the non-permanent as permanent, taking what is not the way (to salvation) as the way and so on. Through it past impressions, consisting in attachment and so on to sense-objects like colour and the like, arises. It is through this that activity springs forth when occasion arises. Activity consists in good and bad deeds, in accordance with the declaration by the Buddha: 'There is action, there is result'. Through this alone cognition arises. Thence the four (elements like) the earth and the rest, the cause of the aggregate, viz. the body, arise, and that very thing is said to be name because of being the substratum of name. From them arises the body; from it the six supports, viz. the five organs of knowledge and the mind; from them touch; from it feeling, viz. pleasure, pain and the rest; from it nescience and the rest once more. Thus, the objects revolving unceasingly like water-wheels, aggregation is possible therefrom. Hence, everything in our doctrine is indeed consistent,—

(We reply:) "no". Why? "Because of (their) not being the cause of aggregation," i.e. because nescience and the rest are not the causes of aggregation; for it can by no means be said that nescience, consisting in the error of taking a person at a distance to be a post, is the cause of the aggregation of the already existing person. Likewise, attachment and the rest too, caused by it (viz. nescience), are not the cause of aggregation.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Baladeva

Reading different, viz. "Itaretara-pratyayatvād iti cen notpatti mātra-nimittatvāt". Interpretation different accordingly: viz. "If it be said that because of the mutual causality (of nescience and the

[1] This explains the compound "*pratyayatvāt*".

rest), (aggregation is possible), (we reply:) no, because of (their) being the causes of the origin only (of the immediately subsequent effects, and not of aggregation)".[1]

Bhāskara

Reading slightly different, viz.: "Itaretara-pratyaya-manyatvāt . . . .".[2]

SŪTRA 20

"AND BECAUSE OF THE CESSATION OF THE PRIOR ON THE PRODUCTION OF THE SUBSEQUENT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For this reason, too, this doctrine is not reasonable,—since "on the production of the subsequent", there results the destruction of the prior, it being momentary.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued that as the prior is the cause of the production of the later, so our doctrine is consistent,—(we reply:) no. "Because of the cessation of the prior on the production of the subsequent."

In ordinary life, causality is observed to belong only to an existent lump of clay, the prior, at the time of the production of a pot, the subsequent. But on your view, on account of the momentariness of all existing objects, the prior moment is destroyed and cannot, therefore, be the cause of the subsequent moment. Here a momentary existence is said to be 'moment'. Now, to begin with, does the prior moment of the pot [3] give rise to the subsequent effect which exists at the same time, or as itself unoriginated, or as itself destroyed? The first alternative is not tenable, because that (viz. the effect) also (will give rise to) another effect existing at the same time, that, too, to another and so on, and thus everything will last only for a moment simultaneously; and because the conventional distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. The

[1] S.B. 2.2.19, p. 537; G.B. 2.2.19, pp. 113-114, Chap. 2.
[2] Bh. B. 2.2.19, p. 117.
[3] I.e. the prior momentary existence pot.

second alternative, too, is not tenable, that being impossible. Moreover, to say that (the cause) is unoriginated is to imply nothing but its non-existence; and if it (viz. non-existence) be a cause, then by reason of the absence of obstructions, there may be the origin of everything everywhere. The third alternative, too, is not tenable because the prior being destroyed, there will be again the origin of everything everywhere. It cannot be said that the prior momentary existence persists up to the origin of the subsequent momentary existence, for then, its momentariness will come to be abandoned.

SŪTRA 21

"(IF IT BE ADMITTED THAT THE EFFECT ORIGINATES) WHEN (THE CAUSE IS) NOT EXISTENT, (THEN THERE IS) THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, OTHERWISE THERE IS SIMULTANEOUSNESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is non-existent, there must result the "contradiction of the initial proposition", viz. that there is the origin of cognitions from four causes, viz. sense-organs, light, direction of the mind and sense-objects. On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is existent, there must be the origin of another momentary existence when the prior momentary existence is still present; and thus there must be "simultaneousness" according to your view, the maintainers of the doctrine of momentariness!

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author condemns the causeless origin of effects.

If it be argued that let there be the production of the subsequent (effect) without a cause, and this being so, the above objection cannot be raised—then we reply: If it be admitted that there is the origin of the effect even when the cause is non-existent, then there must be the "contradiction of the initial proposition". Thus, there must be the "contradiction", i.e. abandonment, of your initial proposition that in the production of cognitions, there are four causes, the main cause, viz. the sense-organs like the eyes and the rest; the auxiliary cause, viz. light; the immediate cause, viz. the direction of the mind;

and the supporting cause, viz. the sense-objects.[1] Moreover, even if the causeless origin of effect be admitted, the above-mentioned fault, viz. the origin of everything everywhere, remains unavoidable. If, again, to avoid this difficulty, the case be admitted to be "otherwise", i.e. if it be admitted that the effect originates when the cause is existent, then there must be "simultaneousness", i.e. there must be simultaneous existence of the cause and the effect. That is, the above-mentioned objection remains in force. Thus, does the prior momentary existence pot come to be the cause of another momentary existence pot at the time when it (the prior) itself exists, or does it become the cause of the subsequent moment,—which is being generated,—by lasting till the time of its production? In either case, there is simultaneousness. On the first alternative, all the momentary existences will come to be perceived at the same time, and the conventional distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. On the second alternative, their momentariness will be abolished, and owing to the persistence of two momentary existences, there must follow a simultaneous perception of two momentary existences in the same place.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

The meaning of the phrase "pratijñoparodhaḥ" different, viz. contradiction of the initial proposition (viz. that the world originates from the skandhas).[2]

SŪTRA 22

"(THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS DESTRUCTION [3] ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-INTERRUPTION (OF THE STREAM OF COGNITIONS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no possibility for the causal or causeless destruction,[4] because there is no possibility of an interruption of the continuous series and because there is a recognition of the members of the series.

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[1] *Adhipati, sahakārin, samanantara, ālambana.*

[2] G.B. 2.2.21, pp. 115-16, Chap. 2.

[3] *Prati-saṃkhyā* and *aprati-saṃkhyā.*

[4] For explanation, see below V.K.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, first the (doctrine of) origin, admitted by the opponents, has been disposed of. Now the (doctrine of) destruction too, admitted by them, is being disposed of.

The destruction which is preceded by an act of thought is "conscious destruction"; destruction not so preceded is "unconscious destruction". These two kinds of destruction are admitted by them. Among these, the destruction of existing objects,—which is caused by the blow of a hammer and the rest, which consists of the termination of a series of similar momentary existences, and which is perceivable and gross,—is said to be preceded by an act of thought. The destruction of existent objects,—which is not perceivable, subtle, causeless and takes place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment,—is said to be non-preceded by an act of thought. There is the "non-establishment", i.e. impossibility, of these two kinds of destruction with regard to the continuous series and the single members of the series. Why? "On account of the non-interruption of the series." First, no causal destruction of the series is possible. Thus, it being admitted by you that there is the destruction, at every moment of existing objects with regard to a prior member of the series, it is admitted that in spite of being destroyed, there is the origin from it of a subsequent (member) which is caused by it and is non-existent indeed. The sense is that in spite of a momentary member of the series being destroyed, at that moment, by the blow of a hammer and the rest, the origin of a subsequent member is possible, no account of the absence of impediments, and thereby a subsequent series being possible, the causal destruction of the series is not possible. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, origination and destruction are said to be the different states of clay and the rest that are indeed existent. But, on your view, the interruption of the continuous series is not possible even by the blow of a hundred hammers at all times—this is the sense.

Moreover, if there be the destruction of the last member of the series through a cause, then there cannot be properly the destruction of others, too, without causes, and hence there must result the perception of many pots in the place of one pot. It cannot be said also that they are subject to a causeless destruction, taking place at every moment in a series of similar momentary existences, and as such the

above objection cannot be raised,—for then such a destruction being possible on the part of the last member of the series, a causal destruction becomes meaningless. It cannot be said also that there is the origin of a series of dissimilar momentary existences through (the blow of) a hammer and the rest too, and as such the above objection cannot be raised,—because when the prior member is destroyed by a hammer and so on, too, there resulting the origin of a subsequent one, similar to it, by reason of the absence of contrary circumstances, there is no possibility for a series of dissimilar existences; and because of the absence of any reason for the origination of a series of dissimilar existences.

A causeless destruction of the series, too, is not possible, for then the disappearance of the entire universe will result.

In the same manner, these two (viz. the causeless and causal destructions) are not possible with regard to the single members of the series,—for if here the causeless destruction of particular members be admitted, then the destruction once more of the momentary members by the hammer and the rest will be impossible. A causeless destruction, too, cannot become the annihilator of existent objects, since single members of the series, like pots and the rest, are recognized.[1]

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. "asambhavaḥ" in place of "avicchedāt".[2]

SŪTRA 23

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because the series has no existence beyond the single members of the series, and because single members themselves are momentary,

[1] I.e. there can be no complete destruction of that which is, e.g. when a vessel of clay is smashed to pieces, we still perceive and recognize the material, viz. clay, which continues to exist.

[2] Bh. B. 2.2.22, p. 120.

their view, viz. that salvation is the cessation of nescience, too, is inconsistent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also, the Buddhistic view is inconsistent. Why? Because there is "fault" in their view of salvation even "in both ways". Thus, salvation is held by them to be the cessation of nescience and the rest. Is this (a cessation) of the series or of the single members of the series? Not the first, because as the series has no existence beyond the single members, it (viz. the cessation of the series) is incapable of (bringing about) salvation. Not the second, because the single members are momentary.

Moreover, is salvation, consisting in the cessation of nescience and the rest, due to a cause or not? If the first, i.e. on the view: Salvation arises from the repeated practice of four-fold truths, viz. the truth that there is a cause, the truth that there is cessation, the truth that there is suffering and the truth that there is a path.[1] The truth that there is a cause means the knowledge, i.e. ascertainment, that everything has an origin. The truth that there is cessation means that everything is momentary. The truth that there is suffering means that everything is full of suffering. The truth that there is a path means that everything is void, everything is soulless,—on this view, the cessation of attachment and the rest being admitted to arise from these, the initial proposition, viz. that there is a causeless destruction, is set aside. If the second, the teaching of the means will become futile. And thus there is fault in both the ways.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 22 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.: "Because there is fault in both ways", i.e. the Buddhistic views of origination from nothing and passing away into nothing are both open to objections.[2]

Bhāskara

This sūtra is not found in the commentary of Bhāskara.

[1] *Samudāya, nirodha, duḥkha, mārga.*
[2] Śrī. B. 2.2.22, p. 93.

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 22 in his commentary too. His interpretation is also very similar to that of Rāmānuja, viz. on the Buddhist view, the originated effect is unreal, (since it passes away as soon as it arises); also the effect arises from non-existent cause (since the cause which is momentary is no more, when the effect comes to be). Hence the Buddhist view is untenable.[1]

SŪTRA 24

"AND IN THE ETHER TOO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DISTINCTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And the initial proposition enunciated by them was that there is non-existence "in the ether";[2] and this is not reasonable, "on account of (its) non-distinction" from the earth and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

They maintain that the destruction of existing objects which is preceded by an act of thought, the destruction which is not preceded by an act of thought, and the ether,—these three are non-entities, and as such, non-definable, causeless and unreal. Among these, the two kinds of destruction have been disposed of. Incidentally, salvation, consisting in the cessation of nescience, has been condemned. Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms, maintaining the demonstrated conclusion of Scripture, is condemning the (doctrine of) the non-definableness of the ether, the remaining one.

The initial proposition of the non-substantiality of the ether is not reasonable, "on account of the non-distinction" of the ether, in point of substantiality, from the earth and the rest,—and just as terrestrial animals move on the earth, and the acquatic animals in water, so do the flying animals in the sky;—and also on account of the scriptural declaration of the producibleness of the ether, like other positive entities,—this is indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra),—in the passage: "From him arise the vital-breath, the

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[1] ŚK. B. 2.2.22, p. 86, Parts 7 and 8.

[2] I.e. the ether is a non-entity.

mind, and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, the light, water and the earth, the supporter of all" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3). The substantiality of the ether was approved by the Buddha as well, who said out of compassion: 'As long as there is the existence of the ether, and as long as there is the existence of the world, so long may there be the existence of me, the destroyer of the sufferings of the world'.

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 23 in Bhāskara.[1] Interpretation of the word "aviśeṣāt" different; viz. "from the same (scriptural text, viz. Tait. 2.1)" it is known that the ether like the air and the rest, arises from the soul.[2]

SŪTRA 25

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF REMEMBRANCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the recognition, viz. 'This is that', this doctrine is untrue.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this too the doctrine of momentariness is not reasonable. Why? "On account of remembrance", i.e. on account of the remembrance of an entity, perceived by one. Hence an eternal soul, the experiencer, must of necessity be acknowledged, otherwise the cessation of all practical activities will result.

SŪTRA 26

"(THERE CAN BE NO ORIGINATION) FROM THE NON-EXISTENT, BECAUSE OF NON-OBSERVATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

An entity does not arise from a non-entity, "on account of non-observation".

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[1] Written as sūtra 2.2.24 in conformity with *Saṃkara's* number.

[2] Bh. B. 2.2.23, p. 121.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It is assumed by the Buddhists that there is the origin of an entity from a non-entity. This is not reasonable. Why? Because the origin of pots and the rest from non-existent clay, etc. is never observed,—on the contrary, their origin from existent clay and the rest alone is observed.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 25 in the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here, ending with the next sūtra, concerned with the refutation of the Sautrāntika school of the realist Buddhists. According to him, the preceding sūtras are concerned with the refutation of the Vaibhāṣika school only. But Nimbārka refutes these two schools together.

Baladeva also takes this sūtra as concerned specially with the refutation of the Sautrāntika school, though he does not begin a new adhikaraṇa since he takes the next sūtra to be referring to both the schools equally.

They interpret the sūtra in the same manner, viz. ("There is no origin of things from) the non-existent, on account of non-perception". That is, the Sautrāntika view that an object is inferred from the impressions left on our mind by it is absurd, for a momentary, and as such a non-existent, something cannot produce any impressions.[1]

SŪTRA 27

"AND THUS (THERE WILL BE) ACCOMPLISHMENT ON THE PART OF THE INACTIVE AS WELL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Otherwise, there may be the "accomplishment" of ends like knowledge and the rest on the part of one who has not resorted to any means.

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[1] ŚK. B. 2.2.25, p. 92, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.26, p. 122, Chap. 2.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Moreover, just as it is admitted by you that there is the origin of entity from non-entity, so there will result the "accomplishment" of the desired-for effects, through the more non-existence of implements, even "on the part of the inactive", i.e. on the part of those who have discarded the implements leading to their desired ends. But there is never any attainment of knowledge and the rest by one who is inactive; and a perpetual religious student, leading a life of chastity [1] and unmarried, never gets a son. Hence, it is established that the demonstrated conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the views of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, based on a mere semblance of (and not real) reason.

Here ends the section entitled "The aggregate" (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "Perception". (Sutras 28–31)

SŪTRA 28

"(THERE IS) NO NON-EXISTENCE (OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS), ON ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is "no non-existence" of external objects as held by the maintainers of the reality of consciousness alone; but they are, indeed, existent. Why? "On account of perception."

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the view of the Yogācāra is being disposed of.

The Yogācāra Buddhist, the maintainer of the reality of consciousness alone, holds that those objects which are other than consciousness are all non-existent. Thus, to think that manifold external objects exist is an error. There are only manifold cognitions which are momentary, variegated, perceptible and have definite forms. Only cognitions like 'blue', 'yellow', which have definite forms, are revealed (directly to the mind). It must be admitted certainly even by the maintainers of the reality of external objects that the cognitions arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects

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[1] *Naiṣṭhika.*

have forms of those objects respectively. If this be so, then all practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what is the use of imagining external objects? It (viz. a cognition) being self-manifesting like a lamp, is directly perceived. If what is non-perceived be cognized, then there will be non-distinction between one's own cognitions and the cognitions of others. But there is indeed a distinction (between them). A man acts or refrains from acting on the basis of his own cognitions. This has been declared by Viprabhikṣu as well thus: 'There is no understanding of the meaning of what is non-perceived. The cognitive self, though non-divided, is yet looked upon by men of perverted understanding to be possessed of the differences of object perceived, the perceiver and consciousness'. Thus, the object-form is the object to be known, the perceiver-form is the act of knowledge, and his consciousness is the result, and thus these three are imagined in one and the same process of consciousness. Hence there are no external objects.

For this reason also (there are no external objects—viz.): On account of being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference between 'blue' and its cognition. Whenever there is the cognition of blue, blue, too, is cognized at the very same moment. Hence, there is no difference between these two.

For this reason, too, (there are no external objects, viz.): The cognitions in our waking state are devoid of (i.e. do not correspond to) external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream-cognitions and the rest.

If it be asked: How can there be a variety of cognitions in the absence of external objects? We reply: owing to the variety of the past impressions. The variety (of cognitions) is explicable by reason of the fact that the cognitions and the past impressions stand in the relation of mutual causes and effects, like the seed and the shoot.

(Correct conclusion.) On this suggestion, we reply: The non-existence of external objects is not possible. Why? "On account of perception," i.e. because of the direct perception of external objects, other than cognitions. Although the individual soul, having the stated marks, is eternal knowledge by nature and its attribute of knowledge, too, is indeed eternal like the ray of the sun, yet since it has its knowledge veiled by nescience due to the beginningless māyā,[1]

[1] I.e. *prakṛti* or matter.

it errs in cognizing objects in birth after birth, as well as in one birth even. And it knows once more the sun and the rest, installed by the Highest Self, as well as the objects collected by its father and forefathers, which are all already existent, from the surrounding company of people. The sense is that, hence, there is no non-existence of the objects which are different from knowledge, the sun and the moon, fire, mountain, the earth, water, cow, horse and the rest being established on the ground of direct perception.

The argument,—viz. It is to be admitted certainly even by the maintainers of the reality of external objects that cognitions arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects have the forms of those objects respectively. If this be so, then all practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what is the use of imagining external objects?—is not tenable, since in the absence of objects, the cognitions of the objects cannot have forms similar to them. Thus, an external object is other than knowledge and its knowledge is other than it.

The argument—viz. that owing to their being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference between blue and its perception,—too, is not tenable, for there is an admission of difference through this very admission of a simultaneous perception.[1]

SŪTRA 29

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF DISSIMILARITY, (THE WAKING COGNITIONS ARE) NOT LIKE DREAMS AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state cannot be established on the analogy of the dream-cognitions and the rest, on account of there being no parallelism between the two cases; as well as on account of dream-consciousness too, having a basis.

[1] That is, to say that A and B are perceived together is to say that there is a difference between them. Otherwise there is no sense in saying that A and B are perceived together.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the argument, viz. The cognitions in the waking state do not correspond to external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream-cognitions and the rest, we reply:

It cannot be said that the cognitions in the waking state are without a basis "like dreams and the rest", i.e. like the dream-cognitions and the illusory cognitions. Why? "On account of dissimilarity," i.e. because there is dissimilarity between the cognitions in the waking state and the dream-cognitions, as the former are due to attentive sense-organs, while the latter to inattentive sense-organs; also because—as indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra)—even the dream-cognitions have bases.

SŪTRA 30

"THE EXISTENCE (OF PAST IMPRESSIONS) NOT (POSSIBLE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-PERCEPTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Moreover, the "existence" of past impressions is admitted by you in order that there may be variety in knowledge; this is not possible, since according to your view, external objects are not perceived.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Moreover, if knowledge be without a basis, then its varieties, such as the knowledge of a pot, the knowledge of blue, the knowledge of yellow and so on, are not possible. If it be said that past impressions are the cause of the variety of knowledge,—(we reply): "the existence" of past impressions is not possible on your view. Why? "On account of non-perception", i.e. because of the non-perception of the cause of past impressions, or, because no such cause is possible on your view. The direct perception of external objects is the cause of past impressions, and that is not possible in your case, owing to your non-admission of external objects.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 29 in their commentaries. Interpretation slightly different, viz. "The existence (of cognition devoid of corresponding things) is not (possible), because of non-perception".[1]

SŪTRA 31

"ON ACCOUNT OF MOMENTARINESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no existence of past impressions, "on account of the momentariness" of their substratum on your view.

Vedanta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the existence of past impressions is not possible. Why? "On account of the momentariness" of their substratum, the receptacle-consciousness,[2] viz. the 'I'; as well as of the single members of the uninterrupted series. Hence, the variety of knowledge is due to the variety of objects. Therefore, it is established that the settled conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the Yogācāra view which is but a childish prattle.

Here ends the section entitled "Perception" (4)

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Baladeva

They add a "ca" at the end.[3]

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.2.29, p. 102, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.29, pp. 97-98, Parts 7 and 8.

[2] *Ālaya-vijñāna.* The *Vijñāna-skandha* consists of *vijñānas* or cognitions of two kinds, *ālaya-vijñāna* and *pravṛtti-vijñāna.* The former consists of cognitions which refer to the 'I', the ego; while the latter those that refer to the so-called external objects.

[3] Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 557; G.B. 2.2.31.

Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

This sūtra is not found in their commentaries.

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Inconsistency in every way". (Sūtra 32)

SŪTRA 32

"AND BECAUSE OF THE INCONSISTENCY (OF THE DOCTRINE OF A UNIVERSAL VOID) IN EVERY WAY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The doctrine of void, too, is erroneous, because it is inconsistent "in every way", being opposed to the evidence of direct perception and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the doctrine of universal void, as held by the Mādhyamikas, is being disposed of.

(The view is as follows:) All the objects mentioned in the sacred works composed by the omniscient one (viz. the Buddha), are simply for the sake of suiting the intellectual capacities of his disciples; but are not really existent, owing to the impossibility of the origin and destruction (of things). The origin of entity from non-entity is inappropriate. (And if an entity arises from another entity, the question is:) Is the entity which arises from another entity dissimilar to the latter or similar? If the first, then there will be the origin of everything everywhere. If the second, then fruitlessness would result like the grinding of what has already been ground.[1] Owing to such inexplicability of origin, destruction, too, is inexplicable. Hence, the doctrine of void is to be accepted. Thus, salvation consists in attaining a state of void,—such is the view of the Buddha. And this is perfectly reasonable, since void is not proved by anything else, (but is self-proved). The conventional distinctions of perceiver and the object perceived and so on are mere errors.

[1] I.e. on the first alternative a gold ring may arise from clay; on the second, there is no sense in producing something already existent, gold (ring) from gold.

With regard to it we reply: The doctrine of universal void does not stand to reason. Why? Because if the maintainer of the doctrine of universal void be unreal, then there will result the reality of all; if real, then there will result the abandonment of the initial proposition. "And on account of the inconsistency, in every way," of the doctrine of universal void, the view that everything is void is unreasonable,—because the entire world is perceived to be true both by the disputant and the respondent, because there is no proof of void, and because it is in conflict with the Buddha's doctrine, establishing the *existence* of momentary objects. The sense is that the view of the Mādhyamikas who maintain that everything is void, who are unacquainted with the process of origination and destruction, and who are just like an owl not perceiving the sun by reason of defective eyesight, is erroneous in every way. It is established, thus, that there is not even an odour of contradiction in the view of Scripture.

Here ends the section entitled "Inconsistency in every way" (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different. He takes it as a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine in general, not particularly of the doctrine of universal void. He points out at the end of sūtra 31 that the third school of Buddhism, viz. the doctrine of universal void, is set aside by all evidence, and as such requires no special and separate refutation.[1]

Bhāskara

This sūtra too is not found in his commentary. He points out at the end of sūtra 29 (sūtra 30 according to Nimbārka) that the doctrine of universal void is refuted through the refutation of the doctrine of the sole reality of cognitions.[2]

[1] Vide Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 558.

[2] Bh. B. 2.2.29 (written as 2.2.30 in conformity with *Saṃkara's* number), p. 125.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "Impossible in one". (Sūtras 33–36)

SŪTRA 33

"(THE JAINA DOCTRINE IS) NOT (TENABLE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY (OF CONTRADICTORY ATTRIBUTES) IN ONE (AND THE SAME THING)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Jainas ascribe contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence and so on to all things. This does not stand to reason, because the co-existence of contradictory attributes, like existence and non-existence and the rest, is impossible, like that of shadow and light.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The view of the Buddhists, who leave the hem of their lower garment loose and untucked, has been disposed of. Now the view of the Jainas, the naked, are being disposed of.

They hold that the universe comprises souls and non-souls, and is without a Lord. They maintain also that atoms are the causes of the world. They imagine couples of contradictory attributes, like existence and non-existence, in all the categories. Thus, according to them, there are seven categories, summing up all scriptural teachings, viz. soul, non-soul, influx (of foreign matter into the soul), (its) stoppage, freedom from decay, bondage and release.[1]

Among these, the souls are sentient, and endowed with the attributes of knowledge, perception, happiness and strength. Thus, knowledge means the apprehension of the real nature of objects through the right discrimination between the soul and the non-soul. Perception means cognizing objects, being free from attachment and detachment. The souls in bondage have worldly happiness, while the freed souls have the happiness which inheres in themselves. Likewise strength means proper endurance. These souls are possessed of parts, and are of the size of the body. Among them, some are souls in bondage, some are freed souls, some are ever-perfect. The freed souls are omniscient and possessed of unsurpassed happiness.

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[1] *Jīva, ajīva, āśrava, saṃvara, nirjara, bandha* and *mokṣa.*

The non-soul is the group of objects to be enjoyed by the souls. It is divided into merit, demerit, matter, time and space.[1] Thus, merit is a special kind of substance, inferrible from proper actions. Demerit is the cause of the existence of the non-freed. Matter is a substance possessed of colour, smell, taste and touch. It is of two kinds, viz. atoms, and their aggregates. The atoms are the causes of the earth and the rest; and they are not of four kinds, as held by the logicians, but are identical in nature. The distinctions of the earth and the rest are due to the modifications of these atoms. The four-fold elements beginning with the earth, as well as the body, the worlds and so on, are their aggregates. Time, on the other hand, is a special kind of substance which is the cause of the conventional distinctions of long, quick and fast and so on, and is atomic in form. Space is the absence of covering. It is of two kinds, viz. worldly-space which is mundane, and non-worldly-space,[2] which is the abode of the freed souls.

Influx means the activity of the sense-organs which causes a person to know[3] sense-objects. Or else, influx means karma which complies to,[4] i.e. follows after, pervading the agent (i.e. pertains to him).

Stoppage means that which stops[5] the activities of the sense-organs, i.e. the stoppage of the sense-organs, consisting in a deep meditation.

Freedom from decay means that which destroys[6] the prior-accumulated sins, i.e. austerities known from the teaching of the Arhatas, consisting in not bathing, not speaking, squatting on the thighs with the lower legs crossed over each other,[7] eating what is spit out from the mouth, mounting on heated stone, plucking out the hairs on the head and so on.

Bondage means karma, and is of eight kinds. Among these, there are four destructive-karmas,[8]—viz. relating to the obscuration of knowledge, relating to the mental blindness of perception, relating to delusion, and relating to what hinders[9]—which obstruct the attributes of the souls, viz. knowledge, perception, happiness and strength.

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[1] *Dharma, adharma, pudgala, kāla* and *ākāśa.*
[2] *Lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa.*
[3] *Āśrāvayati iti āśrava.*
[4] *Āśravati iti āśrava.*
[5] *Saṃvṛṇoti iti saṃvara.*
[6] *Nirjarayati iti Nirjara.*
[7] *Vīrāsana.*
[8] *Ghāti-karma.*
[9] *Jñānāvaraṇīya, darśanāvaraṇīya, mohanīya* and *antarīya.*

And, there are four non-destructive karmas,[1]—viz. relating to the knowable, relating to the name, relating to family descent and relating to life,[2]—which are the causes of the body, its sense of egoity, regard and disregard for the happiness and the rest due thereto.

On the cessation of bondage, there is salvation, or the manifestation of the natural and real nature of the soul through the grace of the ever-perfect Arhatas.

They have also a set of different categories, consisting in five ontological categories,[3] viz. the category of the soul, the category of matter, the category of merit, the category of demerit and the category of space.[4] The term ontological category (astikāya) is denotative of conventional objects occupying many places. (The compound 'jīvāstikāya' is to be explained as) a Karma-dhāraya thus: The soul is the category,[5] and so on in all other cases too. To all these, they apply the system of seven paralogisms,[6] viz. May be it is, may be it is not, may be it is not predicable, may be it is and is not, may be it is and is not predicable, may be it is not and is not predicable, may be it is, it is not, and is not predicable.[7] (The compound 'Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya' is to be explained thus:) The aggregate of the seven dialectical formulæ is 'sapta-bhaṅgī,[8] its reasoning' (sapta-bhaṅgī-naya). The word 'may' (syāt) is an indeclinable represented by a verbal ending, and should be understood to have the meaning of 'littleness'. Thus, it is to be construed as—It exists partly and does not exist partly, and so on. The sense is this: The whole mass of object, consisting of substances and modifications [9] is variable. The form of the substance being one, permanent and conceivable as existent, existence, oneness, permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to it. The modifications are the particular states of the substance, having the forms of pots, pieces of cloth and the rest. And they being many,

[1] *Aghāti-karma.*

[2] *Vedanīya, nāmika, gotrika, āyuṣka.* [3] *Astikāya.*

[4] *Jīvāstikāya, pudgalāstikāya, adharmāstikāya, ākāśāstikāya.*

[5] *Jīvaś cāsau astikāyaś ca.* [6] *Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya.*

[7] *Syād asti, syān nāsti, syād avyaktavya, syād asti ca nāsti ca, syād asti cāvyaktavyaś ca, syān nāsti cāvyaktavyaś ca, syād asti ca nāsti cāvyaktavyaś ca.*

[8] Here the ending 'ī' is in accordance with Pāṇ. 2.4.17; SD. K. 821, as modified by the *Vārttika-sūtra* of *Kātyāyana* 1556, "*Akārāntottarapado dviguḥ striyām iṣṭaḥ*". Vide B.M., p. 548, vol. 1.

[9] *Dravya* and *paryyāya.*

non-permanent and conceivable as non-existent, non-existence, non-permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to them.

With regard to it we reply: This cannot be said. Why? Because the seven-fold reasoning, like partly existent, partly non-existent and the rest, is not possible "in one object". The simultaneous co-existence of darkness and light is never seen or heard. In the same manner, couples of contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence and so on are indeed impossible in the same place.

If it be objected: Your own view, too, admits couples of contradictory attributes in one and the same substratum, e.g. in the text "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), Unity is established; while in the texts: "The Lord of matter and soul, the Controller of the guṇas" (Śvet. 6.16), "Two birds" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6), plurality is established,—(we reply:) No, because this view is not based on reasoning,[1] since the real view can be determined, as mutually non-contradictory, through Scripture alone. Thus, it being impossible for the entire universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, to be non-different from Brahman *by nature*, it is non-different from Him only as having its existence and activity under His control (*and not by nature*), as indicated by the phrase 'emanating from Him' and so on.[2] But there is indeed a difference of nature between the categories, viz. the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman, because the texts designating duality, too, are no less authoritative,—just as leaves, flowers and the rest are different by nature from the tree and are non-different from it on account of having no separate existence; and just as in spite of the difference of the sense-organs from the vital-breath by nature, their non-difference from it, as being under its control, is not incompatible. In the same manner, the difference and non-difference between the Universe and Brahman are natural and established in Scripture and Smṛti. What contradiction is there? In the very same manner, the complementary passage confirms the relation of difference-non-difference between the Universe and Brahman. The phrase 'emanating from Him' (tajjātān) is denotative of the reason, (meaning) because it emanates from that

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[1] So that it might be controverted by reason.

[2] The text is: "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1).

Supreme Cause (tajja), disappears in Him (talla) and breathes, i.e. acts in Him (tadana). The elision of the parts is in accordance with Vedic use.

Moreover, a single cause of the world being established by correct evidence, the causality of a plurality of atoms does not stand to reason, because that would involve unnecessary cumbrousness and also because causality is impossible on their parts, owing to their non-sentience.

Further, the one reality, knowable from the Veda, being the giver of salvation, it is difficult for salvation to result from the grace of the perfect souls,[1] that being impossible. Does the grace of the perfect souls depend on meditation or not? If the first, then, salvation cannot arise through the meditation on one perfect soul among many perfect souls of the same nature, for there will be the fault of disregarding many other equally perfect souls. If there be meditation on all, that would involve unnecessary complication. If it be said that there is one great (soul higher than the others), then you fall in with a theistic view. On the second alternative, the consequence would be a universal release. Moreover, there being no evidence of direct perception and the rest for the existence of perfect souls, it is impossible that salvation can result from their grace.

SŪTRA 34

"AND THUS (IF) THE SOUL (BE OF THE SIZE OF THE BODY) THERE IS NON-ENTIRETY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Thus", there must be incompleteness on the part of the soul, assumed to be of the size of the body, when it attains a large body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Just as their view is open to the objection that contradictory attributes are impossible on the part of one and the same substratum, so their view that the soul is of the size of the body, too, is open to

[1] *Siddhas* or semi-divine beings, supposed to be of great purity and holiness and characterized by the eight supernatural attributes.

serious objections. What objection? Listen! When the soul, which is of the size of the body, having left the body of an ant, attains the body of an elephant through the influence of its karmas, then there must be "non-entirety" on its part, i.e. it would not be able to fill up the whole of the elephant's body. And when the soul comes out of the body of the elephant, and enters into a small body, it would fail to be small like it.

SŪTRA 35

"NOR ALSO IS THERE NON-CONTRADICTION ON ACCOUNT OF MODIFICATION, ON ACCOUNT OF CHANGE AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It cannot be said also that the soul is possessed of parts which are subject to increase and decrease and hence there is no contradiction, —for then there will result the faults of change and the rest (on the part of the soul).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be said: The soul, according to us, is possessed of parts. There is an increment of its parts in the body of an elephant, and decrement in a small body. Thus "on account of modification", there is no contradiction",—(we reply:) This cannot be said. Why? "On account of change and the rest," i.e. because there will then result faults like change and the rest. If the soul be possessed of parts, on your view, then it must be mutable like the body and the rest and also non-eternal,—such and other faults would arise.

SŪTRA 36

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE PERMANENCY OF THE TWO (PRECEDING SIZES OF THE SOUL) OWING TO THE FINAL (SIZE), THERE IS NON-DISTINCTION (OF THE SIZE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be said: We admit that the "final" size of the soul is constant, and hence the initial and the intervening sizes too must be so,—(we reply:) then, there must be "non-distinction" everywhere, (and

hence) the doctrine (that the soul is of the) size of the body is set aside.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The size as well as the real nature (which the soul attains) during its state of salvation, after the destruction of the final body, are eternal. At that time there is no assumption of a subtle or gross body (by the soul), so there is no contraction or expansion of it. Thus, "on account of the permanency of the final" size, as well as of the real nature (of the soul), the permanency of both the initial and intervening (sizes) too is meant by the Arhatas; and hence there must be "non-distinction" everywhere,—this is the sense. In short, the soul must have a permanent and constant size in a gross body as well as in a subtle body, in its state of bondage as well as in its state of release; and the doctrine that it is of the size of the body must be but a childish prattle. Hence, it is established that our conclusion is not contradicted by the view of the naked (i.e. the Jainas), based on error.

Here ends the section entitled "Impossible in one" (6).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. "On account of the non-distinction of the final state, (viz. salvation) (from the mundane state), both being permanent". That is, on the Jaina view, there is no difference between the state of release and the mundane state, because the former is, according to them, a constant progress upward, or remaining in the alokākāśa. Now, motion, whether in the world or upward is always mundane; and no one can possibly feel any pleasure in the state of constant motion, or in standing still in a place without any support. Hence there is no difference between release and bondage on this view.[1]

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[1] G.B. 2.2.36, pp. 145-146, Chap. 2.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "Paśupati". (Sūtras 37–41)

SŪTRA 37

"(THE DOCTRINE) OF THE LORD (IS UNTENABLE), ON ACCOUNT OF INCONSISTENCY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Pāśupata doctrine is to be rejected, because it is opposed to the Veda, which establishes a non-distinct efficient and material cause; and because it initiates a false faith.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the Pāśupata doctrine is being disposed of.

The maintainers of doctrines opposed to the Veda have been refuted above. The Māheśvaras, too, are such. They are of four kinds, viz. Kāpālas, Kālāmukhas, Pāśupatas and Śaivas. The basis of their doctrines is the treatise composed by Paśupati. The 'Pañcādhyāyī' [1] is celebrated to be composed by the great Lord Paśupati Himself. Five categories are mentioned there, viz. cause, effect, concentrated meditation, injunction, and end of suffering.[2] The cause is pradhāna and the Lord. Among them, pradhāna is supposed to be the material cause, the Lord the efficient cause. The effect is mahat and the rest. Concentrated meditation is stated in the passage; "Through the meditation on the Oṃ-kāra once, one should hold (one's self)". Injunction consists in secret rituals like three ablutions and the rest. The end of suffering is salvation.

Among these, the Pāśupatas and the Kāpālas hold that during its state of bondage, the soul becomes (non-sentient) like a stone. And the Śaivas hold that the freed soul is consciousness. They have minor treatises of their own, designating their mutual differences.

These Māheśvaras, with their intelligence deluded by the Māyā of the Lord, maintain and practise, just as they like—as the means to the highest end—what is "opposed" to the Veda and not practised by the wise. As the Kāpālas say: "He who knows the six mudrās, he who is versed in the supreme mudrā, he attains nirvāṇa by

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[1] Or having five chapters.

[2] *Kāraṇa, Kāryya, Yoga, Vidhi, Duḥkhānta.*

meditating on himself as in the posture of bhagāsana. The necklace, the gold ornament, the ear-ring, head-jewel, ashes, and the holy thread are said to be the six mudrās. He whose body is marked with (mudrās) is not re-born on earth" and so on. Likewise, the Kālamukhas hold: "Using a skull (as the drinking vessel), besmearing one's self with the ashes of a dead body, eating the flesh of such a body, carrying a heavy stick, setting up a liquor-jar, worshipping the gods placed on it, and the rest, are means to obtaining all desired results in this world, as well as in the next". In the treatise of the Śaivas, too, it is said: "A bracelet made of the Rudrākṣa-beads on the arm, matted hair on the head, a skull, besmearing one's self with ashes", and so on.

Moreover, it is clearly demonstrated in the Mahābhārata in the story of the Mātaṅga, distressed by the sharp words of a she-ass [1] and so on, that it is very difficult for a man of another caste to obtain Brāhmaṇa-hood even by means of penance accumulated through thousands of years. But they hold that it is easily obtainable by a man of a different caste thus: "By merely entering in the initiatory ceremony, one becomes a Brāhmaṇa at once. By understanding the Kāpāla rite, a man becomes an ascetic".

(Correct conclusion:) With regard to this, we reply: "Of the Lord" and so on. The term 'no' is to be supplied. "Of the

[1] The story of *Mātaṅga* and the she-ass is as follows: Once *Mātaṅga*, who was endowed with all qualities and equal to a *Brāhmaṇa* by all means, while travelling on a swift chariot drawn by a young ass and its mother, mercilessly pierced the young ass in the nose again and again. Thereupon its mother, being much grieved, said to him that such an act certainly behoved a person who was born of a *Brāhmaṇa* mother and a *Caṇḍāla* father, but had he been the son of a *Brāhmaṇa* father his act would have been otherwise. Much aggrieved at this painful information, *Mātaṅga* determined to attain *Brāhmaṇa*-hood, left home immediately and engaged himself in a severe penance. Therefore *Indra* being pleased personally appeared before him to offer him a boon. *Mātaṅga* asked for *Brāhmaṇa*-hood, which however, *Indra* declined to grant by reason of the fact that he was the son of a *Caṇḍāla*. In spite of *Indra's* straight denial, *Mātaṅga* went on performing austereties for a hundred years, standing on one leg only. Very much pleased, *Indra* appeared once again only to go back after saying that it was impossible for a *Caṇḍāla* to acquire *Brāhmaṇa*-hood, and that *Mātaṅga* was most unwise to undergo penance for it. This time *Mātaṅga* went on performing penance for a thousand years in the same way. Disappointed once more, he performed the severest penance by standing on one finger only. But in spite of this he was never able to attain his heart's desire, simply because he was a *Caṇḍāla* by birth. Vide Mahā. 13.1870 ff., pp. 85 ff., vol. 4.

Lord," i.e. the view of Paśupati is not justifiable. Why? "On account of inconsistency," i.e. because of the inconsistency in their view by reason of establishing two causes [1] in direct contradiction to the scriptural texts like "He thought: 'May I be many'" (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'He became existent and that' (Tait. 2.6), 'All this has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.). Moreover, since the practices like meditation preceded by the praṇava, besmearing one's self with the ashes of a corpse and so on, are mutually contradictory, their view is indeed inconsistent.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 34 in Bhāskara's Commentary. They do not take this adhikaraṇa as a refutation of the Pāśupata doctrine only, but of the Sāṃkhya-yoga as well, in fact of all the doctrines generally, which maintain the Lord to be the efficient cause only and not the material cause of the world.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He takes this adhikaraṇa to be concerned with the refutation of the doctrine of the Ekadeśī Tāntrikas only or of those Śaivas according to whom the Lord is the efficient cause only, while Māyā is the material cause, śakti the instrument.[3]

SŪTRA 38

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the impossibility of relation" between Paśupati, the instigator who is without a body, and pradhāna and the rest, to be instigated, Paśupati is not the cause of the world.

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[1] I.e. two causes of the world material and efficient, different from each other.

[2] Ś.B. 2.2.37, p. 566; Bh. B. 2.2.34 (written as 2.2.37 in conformity with Śaṃkara's number), p. 127.

[3] ŚK. B. 2.3.37.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the doctrine of Paśupati is not justifiable. Why? A relation between Paśupati, the efficient cause, the instigator and pradhāna and the rest, to be instigated, must be admitted,—and this is impossible. Thus, the Māheśvaras are to be asked the following: Do you, sirs, follow Scripture or follow what is observed? If the first, then the stated conclusion, being opposed to Scripture, must be rejected. If the second, then it is observed that there is a relation between potters and the rest only who are possessed of bodies, and clay and so on. Hence no relation can be established between Paśupati who is without a body and pradhāna and the rest, by you, following what is observed. Hence it being not possible for a bodiless being to have any relation with pradhāna and the rest, to be their instigator and so on, he is not the cause of the world.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

This sūtra is not found in their commentaries.

SŪTRA 39

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SUBSTRATUM (I.E. A BODY) (ON THE PART OF THE LORD)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the impossibility" of an eternal body—since it is opposed to what is observed,—as well as of a non-eternal one—since it arises later—Paśupati is not the cause of the world.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued: Let him then have a body, and hence the above objection cannot be raised—(the author) replies:—

"The substratum" of all practical transactions is the body—on account of the impossibility of that, their view is not justifiable. Thus, the body of Paśupati cannot be eternal, because that is opposed to what is observed. Otherwise the bodies of potters and the rest, too, must become eternal. Again, his body cannot be non-eternal,

because a non-eternal body is not possible on the part of the cause of the world, because all the non-eternal objects arise later as effects, and because Paśupati, the cause, is prior to everything.[1]

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different, viz. "Because rulership (of pradhāna) and the rest is impossible (on the part of the Lord)". That is, pradhāna which is non-perceived and devoid of colour and the rest, cannot be ruled by the Lord, since it is found that clay and the rest alone, which are possessed of colour and so on, are ruled by potters, etc.[2]

Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. "Because rulership (of pradhāna) is not possible (on the part of the Lord)". That is, Paśupati, who is bodiless cannot be the ruler of the pradhāna, for only embodied beings like potters and the rest can be rulers.[3]

SŪTRA 40

"IF IT BE ARGUED: AS IN THE CASE OF SENSE-ORGANS, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF ENJOYMENT AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not possible to suppose that the Lord has sense-organs and body like the individual soul, for there will result enjoyment and the rest (on the part of the Lord).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued: Just as the bodiless individual soul, existing from all eternity, has a relation with subsequent sense-organs and body, due to preceding sense-organs and body, so like it, Paśupati may have a

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[1] I.e. non-eternal objects arise after creation. Hence Paśupati who is present before creation cannot possess a non-eternal body.

[2] Ś.B. 2.2.39, p. 570. See p. 656 under *Śaṃkara*.

[3] Śrī. B. 2.2.36, p. 113, Part 1; Bh. B. 2.2.35 (written as 2.2.38), pp. 127-128; Śk. B. 2.2.36, p. 107, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.39.

relation with a body; and no objection can be raised here,—(we reply:) no. "On account of enjoyment and the rest." The sense is this: If like the individual soul, the Lord, too, has such a relation with a body, then all the faults like experiencing pleasure and pain, and thereby being the agent of good or bad actions and the rest must pertain to Him also.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and others

Interpretation different, viz. "If it be argued: As in the case of sense-organs, (we reply:) no, on account of enjoyment and the rest". That is, if it be argued that the Lord rules over pradhāna in the same way as the individual soul rules over its sense-organs,—we point out: In that case the Lord Himself must undergo pleasure and pain.[1]

At the end of this sūtra, Śaṃkara gives an alternative explanation of this and the immediately preceding sūtras and this explanation tallies with that of Nimbārka.

SŪTRA 41

"(THERE WILL RESULT ON THIS VIEW) FINITUDE OR NON-OMNISCIENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If there be a connection between Him and the unseen principle,[2] consisting in merit and the rest, then there must be "finitude" and "non-omniscience" (on His part).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It cannot be said also: What objection can there be if enjoyment and the rest result on the part of the Lord? What can a snow-flake do when fallen on the sun?—for it is unreasonable. On account of performing good and bad deeds, due to nescience and the cause of transmigratory existence, and of undergoing their consequences, there must of course result "finitude", i.e. liability to being created,

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[1] Ś.B. 2.2.40, p. 570; Śrī. B. 2.2.37, p. 113, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.2.36 (written as 2.2.39), p. 128; Śk. B. 2.2.37, p. 108, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.40.

[2] *Adṛṣṭa.*

as well as "non-omniscience" on the part of the Lord; otherwise the individual soul, too, must cease to be subject to transmigratory existence,—so much in brief. Hence, it is established that the stated conclusion is not contradicted by the doctrine of the Māheśvaras.

Here ends the section entitled "Paśupati" (7).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

According to them, the particle "vā" means 'or' and not 'and' as held by Nimbārka. Interpretation different, viz. "(There must be) either finitude or non-omniscience". That is, the Lord must either define the measure of the individual souls, pradhāna and Himself, or not define them. If He does, then they become finite; if he does not, then the Lord becomes non-omniscient.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "Impossibility of origin". (Sūtras 42–45)

SŪTRA 42

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ORIGIN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since the origin of the world from Śakti without Puruṣa is impossible, the doctrine, too, which maintains it as the cause is not valid.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the author is refuting, incidentally, the erroneous view of the Śāktas, viz. that Śakti alone is the producer of the world.

The particle 'no' is to be supplied.

Śakti is not the cause of the universe. Why? Because the origin of the universe from Śakti, without any connection with Puruṣa, is impossible. The consequence would be that the Śaktis, being independent of Puruṣa, would come to be perceived everywhere.

[1] Ś.B. 2.2.41, pp. 571 ff.; Bh. B. 2.2.37 (written as 2.2.40), p. 128.

Or else,[1] because the origin of the world is impossible, it being eternal, Śakti cannot be its cause, there being no proof that the world is something produced. If it be said that the Veda is the proof—(we reply:) Let then the cause of the world be Brahman who is established by the Veda. The doctrine of the causality of Śakti which is without any basis is to be rejected.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

They take this adhikaraṇa as concerned with the refutation of the Pañca-rātra system. Thus, according to them this sūtra means: "On account of the impossibility of origin". That is, the Pañca-rātra doctrine holds that Saṃkarṣaṇa (the individual soul) springs from Vāsudeva (the Highest self), Pradyumna (the mind) from Saṃkarṣaṇa and Aniruddha (the principle of egoity) from Pradyumna, is not tenable, for the individual soul, which is eternal, cannot spring from the Highest soul.[2]

Rāmānuja

Rāmānuja also takes this adhikaraṇa as dealing with the Pañca-rātra doctrine, but not refuting, but establishing, it. Accordingly, he takes this and the next sūtra as laying down the *prima facie* view, the rest the correct conclusion. Interpretation like Śaṃkara and the rest.

SŪTRA 43

"AND THE SENSE-ORGAN OF THE CREATION (IS) NOT (POSSIBLE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be said, there is a connection (between Śakti and Puruṣa,)—(we reply:) No "sense-organ" is possible on the part of Puruṣa at that time.

[1] An alternative explanation of the *sūtra*.

[2] Ś.B. 2.2.42, pp. 572 ff.; Bh. B. 2.2.38 (written as 2.2.41), p. 128; ŚK. B. 2.2.39, p. 115, Parts 7 and 8.

Vedānta-kaustubha

(If it be argued:) There is a creator helping Śakti; and the fact that the world is something produced, too, is inferred on the analogy of what is directly perceived; hence the above objection cannot be raised,—then (we reply:) No "sense-organ" is possible on the part of the creator, since there is no sense-organ prior to creation. In its absence, it is not possible for Puruṣa to be a helper. Moreover, since there is no similarity of the ether and the rest with pots and so on, the fact that the former are something produced (like the latter) is by no means established. The term "and" (in the sūtra) implies that if there be Puruṣa as the creator, Śakti is no longer the cause.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

Criticism of the Pañca-rātra view continued: "(There can be) no (origin) of the organ (viz. the mind) from the agent (viz. the individual soul)".[1]

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 40 in his commentary. As pointed out above; he takes this sūtra as laying down a *prima facie* view against the Pañca-rātra doctrine. Interpretation like Śaṃkara and others.[2]

SŪTRA 44

"OR IF THERE BE THE EXISTENCE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SO ON, THERE IS NO DENIAL OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If there be the existence of natural intelligence and so on (on the part of Śakti), what contradiction can there be in its being the cause of the world? The doctrine of Śakti is set aside by itself through the admission of Brahman.

[1] Ś.B. 2.2.43, p. 574; Bh. B. 2.2.39 (written as 2.2.43), p. 129; Śk. B. 2.2.40, 116, Parts 7 and 8.

[2] Śrī. B. 2.2.40, p. 115, Part 2.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The term "or" has the meaning 'but'. Śakti is the abode of a mass of natural attributes like knowledge, strength and the rest, independent by nature of anything else, and self-relying. "If there be the existence," i.e. admission, "of knowledge and so on", in this manner, on the other hand, then "there is no denial of that", i.e. its causality is not denied. In this aphorism: "And endowed with all (attributes)" (Br. Sū. 2.1.29), there is designated a Deity, knowable through all the Vedāntas, and it is He that is admitted by you. He is not the power (Śakti) of any one, He is the Highest Deity, denoted by the word 'Brahman' and so on. The sense is that the doctrine of Śakti defeats itself.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

The criticism of the Pañca-rātra doctrine continued: viz. "(Even) if there be the existence of knowledge, there is no setting aside of that (viz. of the above objection)". That is, even if be said that Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest are not the individual soul and so on, but divine beings, endowed with supreme knowledge and the rest, still then the objection stated before, viz. the impossibility of origination, remains in force.[1]

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 41 in his commentary. According to him this sūtra and the next set forth the correct conclusion against the above *prima facie* view, and defend the Pañca-rātra doctrine. Thus, it means: "If (Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest be) of the nature of knowledge and so on (i.e. of the Highest Lord), there is no contradiction of that". That is, the Pañca-rātra doctrine is not that individual soul arises from the Lord, the mind from the individual soul, and so on, but simply that the Highest Lord, viz. Vāsudeva, out of kindness for people, abides in a four-fold form, so that He may be easily accessible to His devotees.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 41 in his commentary as well. He takes it to be a *prima facie* view, viz. "If there be the assumption of intelligence and

[1] Ś.B. 2.2.44, pp. 574 ff.; Bh. B. 2.2.40 (written 2.2.44), p. 129.
[2] Śrī. B. 2.2.41, pp. 116-117, Part 2.

so on (i.e. of the forms of the individual soul and so on), there is no contradiction of that". That is, the opponents point out that they do not hold that there is the origin of the individual soul and the rest, but simply that Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest assume the forms of the individual soul, etc., i.e. rule them. Hence the above objection cannot be raised.[1]

Baladeva

Interpretation different: "If (the body of the Lord be of the) nature of intelligence and the rest, there is no contradiction of that". That is, if the *prima facie* objector points out that although the Lord cannot have a material body, yet He may have a non-material body composed of knowledge and so on, then we reply that if the Lord of the Śāktas be possessed of such a body, then we have no objection to their view, since it becomes identical with our doctrine of Brahman.

SŪTRA 45

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTRADICTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of being opposed to Scripture and Smṛti, the doctrine of Śakti is unauthoritative.

Here ends the second quarter of the second chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

And because of being opposed to the following scriptural and Smṛti texts: 'Person, verily, is all this' (Śvet. 3.15), 'Supreme is His power, declared to be of manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge and strength' (Śvet. 6.8), '"I am the origin of all, everything originates from me" ' (Gītā 10.8), and so on, the doctrine of

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[1] Śk. B. 2.2.41, p. 116, Parts 7 and 8.

the causality of Śakti is not to be accepted by one who is desirous of salvation. Hence, it is established that the concordance of the scriptural texts with regard to Brahman, Lord Kṛṣṇa, the lord of all and the soul of all, is not contradicted by anything whatsoever.

Here ends the section entitled "Impossibility of origin" (8).

Here ends the second quarter of the second chapter in the Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the holy Nimbārka, the teacher and founder of the sect of the venerable Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Criticism of the Pañca-rātra doctrine concluded: "(The Pañca-rātra doctrine is to be rejected), because it is full of (inner) contradictions; and (because it contains passages opposed to the Veda)".[1]

Rāmānuja

Right conclusion, in defence of the Pañca-rātra doctrine, ends here: "(The above objection cannot be raised) on account of the contradiction (i.e. becasue the Pañca-rātra doctrine itself controverts that the individual soul has an origin".[2]

Bhāskara

This sūtra is not found in his commentary.

Śrīkaṇṭha

Criticism of the Pañca-rātra doctrine concluded: "(In reply to the above *prima facie* view, we point out although the contradiction with regard to the origin of the individual soul and the rest set aside by the above view, yet the Pañca-rātra doctrine is not to be accounted) on account of its opposition (to Scripture).[3]

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[1] Ś.B. 2.2.45, pp. 575-76.

[2] Śrī. B. 2.2.42, pp. 117 ff., Part 2.

[3] Śk. B. 2.2.42, pp. 116–119, Parts 7 and 8.

Résumé

The second section of the second chapter contains:—

1. 45 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 45 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
3. 42 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 40 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 42 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 45 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha read sūtras 1 and 2 in Nimbārka's commentary as one sūtra; and omit sūtras 31 and 38 in Nimbārka-bhāṣya.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

THIRD QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "The ether". (Sūtras 1–6)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 1)

SŪTRA 1

"THE ETHER (DOES) NOT (ORIGINATE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-MENTION IN SCRIPTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That there is no contradiction in our own view has been proved by means of the views of the opponents. Now, it is being proved that there is no mutual non-contradiction among the scriptural texts.

"The ether" does "not" originate. Why? Because in the Chāndogya its origin is not mentioned.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, having demonstrated that the views of the opponents are based on a mere semblance of (and not real) reason, now with a view to generating intense reverence for Brahman, the cause of the world, on the part of those who are desirous of salvation, (the author) is demonstrating the origin of the ether and the rest, His effects, as well as the mutual consistency among the scriptural texts (about them).

On the doubt, viz. whether the ether originates or not, the *prima facie* view is as follows: "The ether" does not originate. Why? "On account of non-mention in Scripture." Thus in the Chāndogya, the creation of three only—viz. light, water and food, without the ether and the air, is mentioned in the section concerned about creation in the passage beginning: 'He created that Light' (Chānd. 6.2.3).

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 2)

SŪTRA 2

"BUT (THERE) IS (A TEXT DESIGNATING THE ORIGIN OF THE ETHER)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the Taittirīyaka, there "is" a text designating the origin of the ether, viz. 'From the soul the ether originated' (Tait. 2.1[1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To this we reply:

The term "but" implies the acceptance of the correct conclusion. If it be objected that in the Chāndogya there is no text about the origin of ether, (we reply:) in the Taittirīya there "is" a text designating the origin of the ether, viz. "From this soul, verily, the ether originated (Tait. 2.1).

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 3-4)

SŪTRA 3

"(THE TEXT ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF THE ETHER IS) METAPHORICAL, ON ACCOUNT OF IMPOSSIBILITY, AND ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because the origin of the ether, which is without parts, is impossible, and also because of the scriptural text: 'The air and the atmosphere—this is mortal' (Bṛh. 2.3.3[2])—the text: 'The ether originated' (Tait. 2.1) is "metaphorical".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, intending to remove the apparent contradictions among those scriptural texts which designate the origin of the ether and those which do not, His Holiness here raises a doubt based on the view of those who hold that the ether does not originate.

An objection may be raised: The scriptural text designating the origin of the ether, viz. 'From this soul, verily, the ether originated'. (Tait. 2.1), can be (only) "metaphorical", just as in ordinary life,

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

the statement: 'The ether acts' is metaphorical. The reason for this is: "on account of impossibility", i.e. because the origin of the ether which without parts is impossible, seeing that the earth and the rest alone, which are possessed of parts, can originate from the atoms of the same class. The second reason is: "on account of scriptural text", i.e. on account of the scriptural text: 'The air and the atmosphere—this is immortal' (Bṛh. 2.3.3).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They divide this sūtra into two different sūtras—viz. "Gauṇy asambhavāt" and "Śabdāc ca".[1]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 4

"AND THERE MAY BE (THE USE) OF THE SAME (TERM 'ORIGINATED' IN TWO DIFFERENT SENSES), AS IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'BRAHMAN'."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But the same term 'originated' "may be" used in a metaphorical sense with reference to the ether, and in a literal sense with reference to the subsequent (elements),[2] as in the case of: "Desire to enquire after Brahman by austerity, austerity is Brahman" (Tait. 3.2[3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: How can one and the same word 'originated' be used in a metaphorical sense with reference to the ether, and in a literal sense with reference to what follows, we reply:

Just as in the text: 'Desire to know Brahman by austerity, austerity is Brahman' (Tait. 3.2), the word 'Brahman' is used in a figurative sense in reference to austerity, but in a literal sense as the object to be

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[1] Ś.B., pp. 579-80; Bh. B., p. 130.

[2] Viz. the air, fire, water, earth, etc. mentioned in Tait. 2.1 subsequently to the ether. That is, the expression 'The ether originates' is to be understood metaphorically, while the expressions 'The air originates' and the rest literally.

[3] Ś, Bh, Śk, B.

enquired into; so one and the same word 'originated' may be used in a figurative sense in reference to the ether, and in a literal sense in reference to what follows.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 5)

SŪTRA 5

"(THERE IS) NON-ABANDONMENT OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, ON ACCOUNT OF NON-SEPARATION (KNOWN) FROM SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the non-separation" of the mass of objects, beginning with the ether, from Brahman, there is no contradiction of the "initial proposition", viz. that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one. But if the ether be something non-originated, then it must be outside the sphere of knowable objects, and thereby the initial proposition will be set aside. The non-separation of everything from Brahman is known "from the scriptural text", viz. 'Everything has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7 [1]), and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author states the correct conclusion.

The Taittirīya-text, designating the origin of the ether, is literal and not figurative for the following reason: If the origin of the universe, beginning with the ether, be admitted, then "on account of the non-separation" or non-difference of the effect, or of the entire expanse of the universe beginning with the ether, from the object to be known, the cause, viz. Brahman,—as of the leaf from the tree,—then alone, there will be "non-abandonment" or acceptance of the initial proposition, viz. that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one, stated in the passage 'Whereby the unheard becomes heard, unthought becomes thought' (Chānd. 6.1.3); otherwise, the initial proposition will be abandoned.

The cause of non-separation is: "On account of scriptural text", i.e. on account of the texts: 'The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second' (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'Everything has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), and so on.

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[1] Ś, Bh, B.

The allegation stated under the aphorism: 'Metaphorical, on account of impossibility and on account of scriptural text' (Br. Sū. 2.3.3), viz. that the origin of what is without parts being impossible, the scriptural text designating the origin of the ether is metaphorical,—is not tenable, since reasoning has no scope with regard to matters which are beyond the cognizance of the senses and are determined by Scripture. But how can then the text: 'The air and the atmosphere—this is immortal' (Bṛh. 2.3.3) be accountable? In this passage the permanency of the ether is established on the analogy of the statement 'The gods are immortal', and hence the immortality of the ether fits in.

The allegation made under the aphorism: "And there may be (the use) of the same (term in two different senses), as in the case of the word 'Brahman'" (Br. Sū. 2.3.4), too, is not tenable, since the word 'Brahman' being mentioned twice, the example is not to the point.[1]

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They break this sūtra into two parts—viz. "Pratijñāhānir . . ." and "Śabdebhyaḥ". The meaning of the last portion is different, viz. (That the ether has an origin is known) from scriptural text (also).[2]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 6

"BUT AS FAR AS THERE IS EFFECT, THERE IS DIVISION, AS IN ORDINARY LIFE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The author concludes: It being established by the texts: 'All this has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.[3]) and the rest that the

[1] In Tait. 2.1, the term 'originated' is mentioned only once; while in the analogical passage quoted, the term 'Brahman' is mentioned twice separately. Hence, while it may be said that of the two separately mentioned words 'Brahman', one is literal, the other figurative, it cannot be said that the word 'originated' which is mentioned only once, is simultaneously literal and figurative.

[2] Śrī. B. 125, Part 2; Śk. B., pp. 124-125, Parts 7 and 8.

[3] R, Śk, B.

entire expanse of the universe, beginning with the ether, has Brahman for its soul, it is definitely ascertained that the ether is an effect. Likewise, it is known that "as far as there is effect" there is origin indeed.[1] The non-mention of the ether and the mention of light and the rest as objects to be created in the text: "He created that light" (Chānd. 6.2.3) fit in, "as in ordinary life". In ordinary life, when referring to the group of Devadatta's sons the origin of some of them is mentioned, thereby the origin of all the rest is mentioned.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. since in the Chāndogya there is no indication of the origin of the ether, the scriptural text designating origin is metaphorical,—(the author) replies:

The term "but" is for disposing of the objection. "As far as there is effect", i.e. the entire expanse of the universe, there is "division" indeed. The Chāndogya texts, viz. '"The existent, alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), and '"Whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown known"' (Chānd. 6.1.3) designate (respectively) that everything, beginning with the ether, and denoted by the term 'this' consisted of the cause in essence prior to creation; and is knowable through the knowledge of the cause. Hence, in the Chāndogya the "division", i.e. the origin, of the entire expanse of the universe, beginning with the ether, from the cause, is indeed stated.

To the enquiry: Why then the origin of the light and the rest alone is mentioned, without any mention of the ether and the air?—we reply: "As in ordinary life". Just as in ordinary life, through the mention of the origin of some sons of a person, there may be the mention of the origin of all the rest, so through the statement of the origin of light and the rest, the origin of the ether and so on, too, is indeed mentioned. Hence, it is established that the ether has Brahman for its material cause.

Here ends the section entitled "The ether" (1).

[1] I.e. whatever is an effect has an origin.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 7 in their commentaries. The interpretation of the word "vibhāga" is different. According to them it means 'division', and not "origin" as held by Nimbārka. Thus they argue:—

Whatever is an effect is divided.
The ether is divided (from the earth and so on).
∴ the ether is an effect.[1]

But Nimbārka argues:—

Whatever is an effect has an origin.
The ether is an effect.
∴ the ether has an origin.

Thus, they establish what Nimbārka assumes (viz. that the ether is an effect).

The interpretation of the phrase: "As in ordinary life" too is different, viz. they connect it with the preceding part of the sūtra, meaning—In ordinary life we observe that whatever is an effect is divided.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "The Air". (Sūtra 7)

SŪTRA 7

"HEREBY (THE ORIGIN OF) THE AIR (TOO) IS EXPLAINED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

By this principle of the origin of the ether, the air, too, is explained.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Some may attribute eternity to the air on the ground of the texts: 'The air and the atmosphere—this is immortal' (Bṛh. 2.3.2), 'The divinity which does not set is the air' (Bṛh. 1.5.22) an so on. For disposing of this (view), the author says now:

"Hereby", i.e. by the establishment of the origin of the ether, the origin of the "air", too, should be known to be "explained",

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[1] Ś.B. 2.3.7, p. 586; Bh. B. 2.3.7, p. 131.

the refutation of the *prima facie* view being the same (in both cases). The denial of the dissolution (of the air) by the phrase 'does not set' is (only) relative. Hence, it is established that the air has an origin.

Here ends the section entitled "The Air" (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "Non-origination". (Sūtra 8)

SŪTRA 8

"BUT THERE IS NON-ORIGINATION OF THE EXISTENT BEING, ON ACCOUNT OF IMPOSSIBILITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is indeed "non-origination", i.e. non-production, "of the existent being", i.e. of Brahman, because the origin of the cause of the world is impossible.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author is removing the suspicion, viz. If even the ether and the air, designated by Scripture as immortal, be originated, then there may be the origin of Brahman too.

There is indeed "non-origin", i.e. no birth, of Brahman, the Highest Person. Why? "On account of impossibility," i.e. because the origin of the cause of all is impossible,—otherwise, there must be a cause of that too, a cause of that too and so on, and there must be an infinite regress;—because (He) is declared to be the cause of all by the text: 'He is the cause, the cause of the lord of causes'[1] (Śvet. 6.9); and because any other cause is excluded by the passage: 'Of him there is no producer and lord' (Śvet. 6.9). For this very reason, it is established that there is no origin of the Supreme Person, who is ever-present and unborn indeed, though declared by Scripture to be

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[1] Correct quotation: "*Karṇādhipādhipa*", meaning 'The Lord of the lord of sense-organs, (viz. the individual soul)'. Vide Śvet. 6.9, p. 70.

manifold for the sake of producing effects, thus: 'Being unborn, he appears manifold' (Vj. S. 31.19*b* [1]; Tait. Ār. 3.13.1*b* [2]).

Here ends the section entitled "Non-origination" (3).

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 9 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different, viz.: But (if it be objected that qualities like touch, sound, etc., as well as space, time, number, size, etc., are not declared by Scripture to have an origin, and hence they must all be eternal,—then we reply: The eternity of what is existent (viz. qualities, etc.) is impossible, because of the non-fitting in (i.e. non-utility) (of the scriptural texts to declare their origin). That is, it is not at all necessary for Scripture to designate separately the origin of these *qualities*, etc. since it is quite sufficient to designate the origin of the *objects* alone, that implying the origin of the qualities simultaneously. Similarly, time is nothing but the motion of the sun and hence its origin, though not mentioned separately, is implied by the mention of the origin of the sun. Likewise the other things are to be explained. In conclusion Bhāskara criticizes Śaṃkara's interpretation of the sūtra,—which is identical with Nimbarka's.[3]

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "The light". (Sūtras 9–13)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 9–12)

SŪTRA 9

"HENCE THE LIGHT (ORIGINATES FROM THE AIR), FOR THUS (SCRIPTURE) DECLARES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The light" originates from the air, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'Fire from the air' (Tait. 2.1 [4]).

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[1] P. 857, line 17. Reading "*vijāyate*".
[2] P. 201. Reading *op. cit.*
[3] Bh. B. 2.2.9, pp. 131-32.
[4] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that everything except Brahman has origin, and that Brahman is untouched by the faults of producibleness and the rest. Now, the problem is being considered, viz. whether each preceding object, or Brahman, its inner soul, is the cause of each succeeding object, to be produced successively.

On the doubt, viz. whether the light originates from the air or from Brahman, its (viz. the air's) inner soul,—the *prima facie* view is as follows: The light is an effect. Hence, it originates from the immediate cause air. The *prima facie* objector points out the authority for this thus: The Taittirīya text 'From the air fire' (Tait. 2.1) "declares that" alone.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

This is sūtra 10 in the commentaries of the first two. They do not take this sūtra as laying down a *prima facie* view, but as the correct conclusion. It means, therefore: "The light (does not arise directly from the Lord, but from the air), for thus (Scripture) declares".[1]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 10

"WATER (ORIGINATES FROM THE LIGHT)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Water" originates from light, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'Water from fire' (Tait. 2.1 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The phrase: 'Hence, for thus' is to be supplied here. Hence, i.e. on account of the very proximity, water originates from light. The scriptural text: 'Water from fire' (Tait. 2.1 [3]) declares that very thing.

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[1] Ś.B. 2.3.10, p. 594; Bh. B. 2.3.10, p. 132; G.B. 2.3.9.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[3] *Op. cit.*

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

This is sūtra 11 in the commentaries of the first two. As before they do not take this as a *prima facie* sūtra, but as a siddhānta one, meaning: "Water (originates from light)".[1]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 11

"THE EARTH (ORIGINATES FROM WATER)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The earth originates from water, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'They (viz. waters) created food' (Chānd. 6.2.4[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The earth originates from water. The scriptural text: 'Those waters thought: "May we procreate". They created food' (Chānd. 6.2.4) declares this. Similarly, it should be known that everywhere the origin of the effect takes place from the immediately preceding cause.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

This sūtra is not found in their commentaries.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 12

"(THE WORD 'FOOD' DENOTES) THE EARTH, ON ACCOUNT OF SUBJECT-MATTER, COLOUR AND ANOTHER SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

By the term 'food' "the earth" is denoted, because the subject-matter is the (creation of the) great elements; because its colour is

[1] Ś.B. 2.3.11, p. 596; Bh. B. 2.3.11, p. 132; G.B. 2.3.10.
[2] R, Śk.

declared by the scriptural text: 'What is black is of the food' (Chānd. 6.4.1 [1]); and, finally, because of another scriptural text: 'The earth from water' (Tait. 2.1 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Incidentally, the meaning of the word 'food', mentioned in the scriptural text: 'They created the food' (Chānd. 6.2.4), is being indicated through the *prima facie* objector himself. In accordance with the complementary text, viz. 'Wherever it rains, then there is plenty of food' (Chānd. 6.2.4), rice, barley, and the like are not ment by the word 'food', but the earth alone is the object denoted by the word 'food'. Why? 'On account of subject-matter, colour, and another scriptural text,' that is, because in accordance with the text: 'He created that light, He created that water' (Chānd. 6.2.3), the subject-matter here is the origin of the great element; because in the complementary passage: 'That which is the red colour of fire is the colour of the light; that which is white is of water, that which is black is of the food' (Chānd. 6.4.1) the colour (of the earth is mentioned); and because there are other scriptural texts occurring in connection with the same topic, viz. 'Water from fire, the earth from water' (Tait. 2.1), 'What was the froth of the earth became solidified. That became the earth' (Bṛh. 1.2.2).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

This is sūtra 12 in the commentaries of the first two, and sūtra 11 in the commentary of the last. Interpretation same, though not a *prima facie* view.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 13)

SŪTRA 13

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF HIS DESIRE, ON ACCOUNT OF HIS MARK, HE (IS THE CREATOR)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The author states the correct conclusion. "On account of His desire," viz. '"May I be many"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), as well as on account

[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B. [2] R, Bh, Śk, B.

of the scriptural text teaching Him,—the Supreme Person, their inner soul, is the creator of their effects.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author states the correct conclusion.

The *prima facie* view is rejected by the term "but". "He" alone, i.e. Lord Vāsudeva, the supreme cause and the Lord of all and the inner soul of the air and the rest, is the creator of the effects like light and the rest. Why? "On account of His desire," i.e. on account of the desire, or resolve, of Him, or of the Highest Person, viz.: '"May I be many"' (Chānd. 6.2.3); (and) "On account of His mark", i.e. on account of the group of texts teaching Him, viz.: 'Abiding within the earth' (Bṛh. 3.7.3), 'He who abiding within water' (Bṛh. 3.7.4), 'He who abiding within the light' (Bṛh. 3.7.14), 'He who abiding within the air' (Bṛh. 3.7.7) 'He who abiding within the ether' (Bṛh. 3.7.12), 'That itself created itself' (Tait. 2.7) and so on. Hereby it should be known that in the passages: 'That light thought' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'Those waters perceived' (Chānd. 6.2.4) and so on too, the thinking of the Supreme Being alone (is mentioned). Hence, it is established that no independent creatorship belongs to anything else,—it is the Supreme Soul alone who is the primary creator everywhere.

Here ends the section entitled "The light" (4).

COMPARISON

All others read "Tad-abhidhyānād eva tu", adding an "eva".

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation same, though they do not take this sūtra as answering to a *prima facie* view. This sūtra, according to them, removes the suspicion, that might have arisen from the above designation of the successive production of elements, viz. that the elements give rise to other elements by themselves. The fact is that it is the Lord himself abiding within those elements that gives rise to the next effect.[1]

[1] Ś.B. 2.3.13, pp. 598 ff.; Bh. B. 2.3.13, p. 133; G.B. 2.3.12.

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "The reverse". (Sūtra 14)

SŪTRA 14

"BUT THE ORDER (OF DISSOLUTION) (IS) REVERSE TO THAT, AND (THIS) FITS IN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The order of dissolution is reverse "to that", i.e. to the order of creation", in accordance with the scriptural text: 'The earth merged in water' (Subāla 2.4[1]). "And" this "fits in" on the principle of salt and water.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, the order of the origin of elements has been determined in brief. Now, incidentally, their order of dissolution is being determined.

On the doubt as to whether the order of dissolution is the same as the order of creation, or reverse, the suggestion being: Since even when the prior created object is destroyed, the posterior one is possible, (dissolution takes place) through the same order as that of origination alone.—

(The author) states the correct conclusion: "But the order is reverse to that". The order of dissolution must be understood to be the "reverse" "to that", i.e. to the order of the origination of objects, which is mentioned in Scripture in the text: 'From this soul, verily, the ether originated, from the ether the air, from the air the fire, from the fire water, from water the earth' (Tait. 2.1), '"What was, then, existent?" He said, to them: "Neither being, nor non-being, nor being and non-being. From him darkness arises, from darkness bhūtādi,[2] from bhūtādi the ether, from the ether the air, from the air the fire, from the fire water, from water the earth. That egg arose"' (Subāla 1.1–3); and which is established by a thousand Smṛti passages, viz. 'The divinity is without beginning and without end, likewise, indivisible, ageless, immortal; celebrated to be unmanifest, constant, likewise undecaying, and immortal; sprung up from whom beings are born and die. That divinity first created what is called mahat from name, the great ahaṃkāra as well. Mahat

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[1] P. 465.

[2] Or the *tāmasa ahaṃkāra*. Vide V.R.M., p. 25.

created ahaṃkāra. Then the Lord, the Master, who is the support of all elements, (created) what is celebrated to be the ether. From the ether originated water, from water fire and air, then from the conjunction of fire and air the earth originated', and so on. And this "fits in" on the ground of the scriptural text: 'The earth merges in water, water merges in the fire, the fire merges in the air, the air merges in the ether, the ether into the sense-organs, the sense-organs in the subtle essences, the subtle essences in bhūtādi, bhūtādi in mahat, mahat in the unmanifest' (Subāla 2.4); on the ground of the following Smṛti passage, viz. 'The earth, the support of the world, merges, divine sage, in water, water merges in the fire, the fire merges in the air'; and on the ground of observing salt, ice and the like to be dissolved into water. What is not mentioned, by the text about creation, in the order of the origination of prakṛti, mahat, ahaṃkāra, the ether and so on, is to be supplied from the text about dissolution; i.e. the construction is: 'The ether (merges in) the sense-organs, the sense-organs in the subtle essences, the subtle essences in bhūtādi'. The ether merges in the subtle essences, the subtle essences merge in bhūtādi, i.e. in tāmasa ahaṃkāra, the sense-organs in sense-organs, i.e. in the rājasa ahaṃkāra,—since here by the word 'sense-organ' ahaṃkāra is understood there being non-difference between cause and effect. The plural number, viz. 'subtle essences' is meant for showing that the dissolution of the earth and the rest takes place through the subtle essences of smell and the rest. On account of the three-foldness of ahaṃkāra, the plural number, viz. 'In the sense-organs', has been used. Thus, it is established that dissolution, taking place in the above inverted order, is not contradicted by anything whatsoever.

Here ends the section entitled "The reverse" (5).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Baladeva

This is sūtra 15 in Rāmānuja's commentary. He does not begin a new adhikaraṇa here, concerned with the order of dissolution, but continues the topic of the order of evolution. Thus the sūtra means according to him: And the order (of the origination of the vital-breath and the rest), on the contrary, (stated) in a reverse order (to

the real order of succession) fits in (only if there be the origination of all effects directly) from thence (i.e. Brahman).

That is, in Scripture we have many passages which designate the vital-breath and the rest as rising directly from Brahman, in opposition to the real order of evolution, viz. prakṛti, mahat, and so on; and these texts are explicable only on the supposition that everything really arises from Brahman directly.[1]

This is sūtra 13 in Baladeva's commentary, who follows Rāmānuja exactly with the difference that he takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 15 in his commentary, reading different, viz. substitutes "pāraṃparyeṇa", in place of "viparyyayeṇa". Interpretation too different, viz. he begins a new adhikaraṇa here, ending with the next sūtra, and concerned with the question of the origin of sense-organs, mind and the like,—which according to Nimbārka begins with the next sūtra.[3]

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "Knowledge which intervenes". (Sūtra 15)

SŪTRA 15

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT KNOWLEDGE AND MIND (MUST BE PLACED) BETWEEN (BRAHMAN AND THE ELEMENTS) ON ACCOUNT OF ITS INDICATION (IN SCRIPTURAL TEXT), (AND THAT THE ABOVE ORDER OF CREATION IS SET ASIDE) BY (THIS) ORDER, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF NON-DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: "On account of the indication", viz. 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3[4]), "knowledge and mind" must be between Brahman and the elements; and "by the order" obtained in this way the above-mentioned order is contradicted,—

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.3.15, p. 131, Part 2.
[2] G.B. 2.3.13, p. 177, Chap. 2.
[3] Śk. B. 2.3.15, pp. 135-36, Parts 7 and 8.
[4] Ś, R, B, Śk, B.

(We reply:) "no", because the above text is not concerned with a specific order, and because the text: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3) (is concerned with laying down only) "the non-difference" of the origin of knowledge and mind as well as of the ether and the rest from Brahman alone.[1] In the text under discussion, viz.: 'From this soul, verily, the ether originated' (Tait. 2.1[2]), establishing the order of the creation of elements,—in between the soul and the ether, the categories of the unmanifest, mahat and ahaṃkāra, well-known from texts concerned with the orders of creation and dissolution and figuratively implied by the phrase "knowledge and mind" (in the sūtra), are to be known,—so much in brief.

Vedānta-kaustubha

With a view to encouraging meditation, and generating reverence for Brahman, Lord Vāsudeva, the place from which the world emanates and into which it enters; as well as for generating an aversion to the world, the orders of creation and dissolution have been determined. Now, the order of the origin of knowledge and mind, which promote meditation, is being established in harmony with the order of the origin of elements.

If it be objected: The above-mentioned order of the origin of elements is set aside by the order of the origin of knowledge and mind. Thus, knowledge is that through which a thing is known, i.e. sense-organ. The sense-organs and the mind must be in between Brahman and the elements. Why? "On account of its indication." An indication (liṅga) or a mark is that through which something is painted,[3] i.e. known, an indication of that, i.e. of creation, on account of that;[4] that is, on account of the scriptural text indicating their creation, viz. 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all sense-organs, the ether, the air, the fire, water and the earth, the support of all' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3). Hence the above-mentioned order is set aside by it.—

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[1] I.e. the above Muṇḍ. text simply shows that just as the ether, etc. rise from *Brahman*, so exactly do the sense-organs, the mind, etc. too,—but does not lay down a definite order of creation. See V.K. below.

[2] Not quoted by others in this connection.

[3] Root √liṅg = to paint.

[4] This explains the compound "*tal-liṅgāt*".

(We reply:) "No". Why? "On account of non-difference," i.e. because of the non-difference of the origin of knowledge and mind, as well as of the ether and the rest, from Brahman alone. The text: 'From him arise the vital-breath' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3) and so on simply points out that there is the origin of *all* from Brahman, and is not set aside by the above-mentioned order. In the very same manner, scriptural texts like: 'He created the vital-breath, from the vital-breath reverence, the ether, the air, the fire, water, the earth, the sense-organs, the mind, food' (Praśna 6.4) and so on, designate that everything arises from Brahman, and do not set forth a particular order. The meaning of the word 'vital-breath' in the passage: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3) will become clear later on.[1] And, thus it is established that in the aphorism: "But there is" (Br. Sū. 2.3.2), only a portion (of the real order of creation) has been mentioned by the author of the aphorisms. So, in the abridged texts designating the order of the origination of elements, such as: 'From the soul the ether originated' (Tait. 2.1) and so on, the portions not mentioned, viz. prakṛti, mahat and the rest, established by other texts concerned about creation and dissolution, and figuratively implied by the phrase "knowledge and mind" (in the sūtra), are necessarily understood; but there is no contradiction whatsoever of the texts designating the order of the origination of elements by other texts.

Here ends the section entitled "Knowledge which intervenes" (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

The interpretation of the word "aviśeṣāt" different, viz. "On account of the non-difference (of the organs from the elements)". That is, the organs being of the same nature as the elements, the origination of the former is the same as that of the latter, and not different.[2]

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[1] Vide Br. Sū. 2.4.9.

[2] Ś.B. 2.3.15, p. 602.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "The soul". (Sūtras 16-17)

SŪTRA 16

"BUT THAT DESIGNATION (OF THE SOUL AS BEING BORN OR DYING) MUST DEPEND ON (I.E. REFER TO) THE MOBILE AND IMMOBILE (BODIES), (IT IS) METAPHORICAL (IN REFERENCE TO THE SOUL), BECAUSE (THERE IS) THE EXISTENCE (OF BIRTH AND DEATH) IF THERE BE THE EXISTENCE OF THAT (I.E. THE BODY)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The nature of the individual soul is being determined now. "The designation" like: 'Devadatta is born and dead' is metaphorical, and as such "depends on the mobile and the immobile",—there being the "existence" of birth and death when there is the "existence" of the body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that the ether and the rest originate from Brahman, the unborn, the highest. Now the problem is being considered, viz. whether like them the individual soul, too, is something to be produced or not.

The word 'soul' is to be supplied from the immediately following aphorism. On the doubt, viz. whether the 'soul', i.e. the individual soul, originates or not, the *prima facie* view: viz. In conformity with the designation, viz. 'Devadatta is born and dead', the soul is born and dies,—is disposed of by the term "but". This conventional designation of the origination and dissolution of the soul "must be metaphorical", i.e. is figurative in reference to the individual soul. To the enquiry: In reference to what then is it literal?—(the author) replies: "Dependent on the mobile and the immobile", i.e. it refers to the bodies of the movable and the immovable. Why? "Because (there is) existence, if there be the existence of that," i.e. because there can be origination and dissolution only if there be the existence of that, i.e. the body, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'This person being born and obtaining a body . . . He departing and dying' (Bṛh. 4.3.8).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 17 in his commentary. He does not begin a new adhikaraṇa here, but concludes the topic of the order of evolution.

He reads both "bhākta" and "abhākta" and gives two explanations accordingly. Thus: (1) But the designation which depends on (i.e. refers to) the movable and the immovable must be secondary, because of being permeated by the being of that (viz. Brahman). (Here he reads "bhākta".) That is, all the words denoting movable and immovable objects are only secondary with regard to those objects, but really denote Brahman, since all objects are modes of Brahman, (2) or, all the terms denoting movable and immovable objects are primary with regard to Brahman, because the denotative power of all terms depends on the being of Brahman. (Here he reads "abhākta".) [1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 17 in his commentary as well. He reads "abhākta", takes this sūtra as an adhikaraṇa by itself, and interprets it exactly like Rāmānuja.[2]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 15 in his commentary. He also reads "abhākta", takes it as an adhikaraṇa by itself, and interprets on the whole like Rāmānuja. Only the interpretation of the word "tad-bhāva-bhāvitvāt" is different; viz. "But the designation dependent on (i.e. referring to) the movable and the immovable must be primary (with regard to the Lord), because that fact (tad-bhāva) (viz. the fact that all words really denote the Lord) is something that follows in future (i.e. is not directly known at once, but is a matter which one comes to know after studying Scripture)".[3]

SŪTRA 17

"THE SOUL (DOES) NOT (ORIGINATE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-MENTION IN SCRIPTURE, AND ON ACCOUNT OF ETERNITY (KNOWN) THEREFROM (I.E. FROM SCRIPTURAL TEXTS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The individual "soul" does not originate. Why? Because there is no text about its having origin by nature; and because from

[1] Śrī. B. 2.3.17, pp. 132-33, Part 2.
[2] Śk. B. 2.3.17, pp. 138-39, Parts 7 and 8.
[3] G.B. 2.3.15, pp. 181-82, Chap. 2.

the scriptural texts: 'A wise man is neither born nor dies' (Kaṭha. 2.18[1]), 'Eternal among the eternal' (Kaṭha. 5.13[2]), 'An unborn one, verily, lies by, enjoying' (Śvet. 4.5[3]) and so on, the eternity of the individual soul is known.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued: In conformity with the texts: 'One desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5[4]), etc., which lay down the means to attaining lordship in the next world, let the designation: 'Devadatta is born and dead' refer to the birth and death of the body. But like the ether and the rest, birth and death must pertain to the individual soul as well at the time of creation and dissolution (respectively). Thus there is no conflict whatsoever with any text.—

We reply: "Not, the soul, on account of non-mention in Scripture". The singular number 'soul' implies the class,[5] in accordance with the scriptural text teaching the plurality of souls, viz. 'Eternal among the eternal, conscious among the conscious' (Kaṭha. 5.13; Śvet. 6.13), and in accordance with the aphorism, to be mentioned hereafter, viz. "And on account of non-continuity, there is no confusion" (Br. Sū. 2.3.48). The soul is not born, nor dies. Why? 'On account of non-mention in Scripture', i.e. because there are no scriptural texts designating the birth and death (of the soul) at the time of creation and dissolution; and, because on the contrary, "the eternity" of the soul is known "therefrom", i.e. from the scriptural texts like: '"Imperishable, verily, O! is this soul, possessing the virtue of being indestructible"' (Bṛh. 4.5.14), 'A wise man is neither born, nor dies' (Kaṭha. 2.8), 'Eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious, the one among the many, who bestows objects of desires' (Kaṭha. 5.13; Śvet. 6.13), 'The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord' (Śvet. 1.9), 'One unborn one, verily, lies by, enjoying. Another unborn one leaves her who has been enjoyed' (Śvet. 4.5) and so on; as well as from the following Smṛti passages, viz. '"Nor at any time, verily, was

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[1] Ś, R, Śk, B.
[2] R, Śk, B.
[3] Not quoted by others.
[4] P. 208, line 27, vol. 2.
[5] And not that there is only one soul.

I not, nor you, nor these lords of men; nor, verily, shall we ever not be hereafter"' (Gītā 2.12), '"Unborn, eternal, constant and ancient, he is not killed when the body is killed"' (Gītā 2.20), '"Who knows him to be imperishable, eternal, unborn and immutable, how can that man kill one, O Pārtha, or cause one to be killed?"' (Gītā 2.21) and so on.

If it be objected: There are scriptural texts designating the origin of the world together with the sentient, such as, 'All come forth from this soul', 'Born of whom, the progenitress of the universe let loose the souls with water on the earth' (Mahānār. 1.4), 'The lord of beings created beings' (Tait. Br. 1.1.10, 1 [1]) '"All these beings, my dear, have Being as their root, Being as their abode, Being as their support"' (Chānd. 6.8.4), '"From whom, verily, these beings arise, through whom they live when born, to whom they go and enter"' (Tait. 3.1) and so on. Hence, the denial of birth and death of the individual soul is not reasonable. For this very reason, the initial proposition that through the knowledge of one there is the knowledge of all, is established,—

(We reply:) "No", because the quoted texts teach that individual soul has an origin, which (is not *actual* origin, but simply) consists in the expansion of its knowledge, caused by its connection with the body, subsequent to its giving up its real nature at the time of dissolution. If this be so, then the individual soul too being an effect of Brahman, the above initial proposition is established. And hence, it is established that Brahman, who in His causal state possesses the non-divided names and forms as His powers and is without an equal or a superior,—in accordance with the text: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1),—comes Himself, as possessed of the manifest names and forms as His powers at the time of the production of effects, to abide as three-fold, viz. in the forms of the enjoyer (i.e. the cit), the object enjoyed (i.e. the acit) and the controller (i.e. Brahman). There is no contradiction here by any text whatever.

Here ends the section entitled "The soul" (7).

[1] P. 23, line 16, vol. 1.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

They read "śruteḥ" instead of "aśruteḥ"[1]. Interpretation same.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "The knower". (Sūtra 18)

SŪTRA 18

"(THE SOUL IS) A KNOWER, FOR THAT VERY REASON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The soul, which is an ego, is a knower.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been pointed out that the soul does not originate like the ether and the rest, since it is eternal, as established by Scripture. Now, incidentally, its nature, etc. are being determined.

The word 'soul' is to be supplied from the preceding aphorism. By the phrase "for this reason", the reason mentioned by the term 'therefrom' (in the preceding sūtra) is referred to. On the doubt, viz. whether the soul is non-sentient by nature, but possessed of the attribute of knowledge or mere consciousness, or knowledge by nature yet possessed of (the attribute of) being a knower,—the Vaiśeṣikas[2] and the like hold that it is non-sentient, yet possessed of the attribute of knowledge; while the Sāṃkhyas and the rest hold that the soul is mere consciousness.

With regard to it we reply: "A knower", i.e. the individual soul is nothing but a knower, i.e. nothing but knowledge by nature, yet possessed of (the attribute of) being a knower. Why? On the ground of the following scriptural texts, viz. 'Here this person becomes self-illuminating' (Bṛh. 4.3.9, 14), 'The person who is made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light in the heart' (Bṛh. 4.3.7), 'There is no annihilation of the knowledge of

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.3.18, p. 136, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.18, p. 140, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.16.

[2] Vide V. Sū. 3.1.18, and *Saṃkara Miśra's* commentary, p. 161.

the knower, because of his imperishability' (Bṛh. 4.3.30), ' "Whereby should one know, O! the knower?" ' (Bṛh. 2.4.14; 4.5.15), 'This person simply knows', 'For he is the one who sees, . .[1] hears, smells, . .[2] thinks, conceives, does, the intelligent self ' (Praśna 4.9) and so on.

The doctrine of the non-sentient soul, on the other hand, is to be rejected,—because then the attribute of knowledge by itself, being the effector of all practical transactions, will come to attain primacy; and hence the non-sentient substratum of the attribute (viz. the soul), being non-liable to salvation or bondage, virtue or vice, will come to be non-primary or useless like the nipple on the neck of a goat;[3] and finally, because of its opposition to Scripture.

The doctrine of mere consciousness, too, is to be rejected, because if consciousness be all-pervading, then there will be no perception of the pleasure and the like pertaining to the entire body; but if it be atomic in size, then there will be no experience of the pleasure and the like pertaining to hands, feet and so on.

Hence it is established that this soul, known through self-consciousness, is knowledge by nature and a knower.

Here ends the section entitled "The knower" (8).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different—viz. he interprets the word "jña" as eternal consciousness and not as a knower.[4]

[1] Touches.
[2] Tastes.
[3] An emblem of any useless or worthless object or person.
[4] Ś.B. 2.2.18, p. 609.

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "Departure". (Sūtras 19-31)

SŪTRA 19

"(THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS ATOMIC ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION) OF DEPARTURE, GOING AND RETURNING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The individual soul is atomic, because in the texts: 'By that light this soul departs through the eye, or through the head, or through other parts of the body' (Bṛh. 4.4.2[1]), 'Whoever, verily, depart from this world, all go to the moon alone' (Kauṣ. 1.2[2]), 'Having come back from that world to this world for action' (Bṛh. 4.4.6[3]) and so on, there is the mention "of departure, going and returning".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been proved that the individual soul is eternal and a knower. Now its size is being determined.

On the doubt, viz. whether this soul is of a middle size,[4] or of an all-pervading size, or of an atomic size,—if it be suggested: It must be of a middle size, since pleasure and the rest are experienced all over the body. Or, it must be of an all-pervading size,—

We reply: The individual soul is capable "of departing, going and returning". These three are not possible if it be all-pervading. Moreover, if it be all-pervading, then experiences of pleasure and the like will result everywhere. If, on the other hand, it be of a middle size, then it must be non-eternal. Hence, the atomicity of the soul is the only remaining alternative. In the passage: 'When he departs from this body, he departs together with all these' (Kauṣ. 3.3[5]), its departure is mentioned. In the passage: 'Whoever, verily, depart from this world, all go to the moon alone' (Kauṣ. 1.2), its going is mentioned. And, in the passage: 'Having come back from that world to this world for action' (Bṛh. 4.4.6), its returning is mentioned.

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[1] R, Śk, B.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[3] Ś, R, Śk, B.
[4] I.e. of the size of the body.
[5] Note that *Nimbārka* quotes a different text here.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He takes sūtras 19–27 as laying down the *prima facie* view. Literal interpretation same.

SŪTRA 20

"AND (THERE IS POSSIBILITY) OF THE SUBSEQUENT TWO (VIZ. GOING AND RETURNING) THROUGH ONE'S SELF."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Sometimes departing may be possible on the part of even one who is not moving, as in the case of the cessation of the rulership of a village.[1] But, since there is possibility "of the subsequent two through one's self" alone, the individual soul is atomic.

Vedānta-kaustubha

As in the case of the cessation of the rulership of a village, departing, which consists in the cessation of the rulership of the body, may sometimes be possible on the part of the soul even when it is not moving. But, since there can be the accomplishment "of the subsequent two", viz. going and returning", "through one's self" alone, it is established that the individual soul is atomic.

SŪTRA 21

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE SOUL IS) NOT ATOMIC, BECAUSE OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION OF WHAT IS NOT THAT, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC BEING SOMETHING ELSE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: In accordance with the text, referring to the individual soul and designating "what is not that", viz.: 'He, verily, is the great' (Bṛh. 4.4.22[2]), the individual soul is "not atomic",—

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[1] I.e. when somebody ceases to be the ruler of a village, he may be said to 'go out'.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

(we reply:) "no", because in the middle, the topic is the Supreme Soul.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The individual soul is "not atomic". Why? "Because of the scriptural mention of what is not that,"—"that" means atomicity, "what is not that" means non-atomicity, on account of the scriptural mention of that,[1]—i.e. because in connection with the discourse on the individual soul, viz. 'He who is made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light within the soul' (Bṛh. 4.3.7), there is the mention of greatness in the scriptural text: 'He, verily, is the great, unborn soul' (Bṛh. 4.4.25),—

(We reply:) "No". Why? "On account of the topic being something else," i.e. because the topic is here something other than the individual soul referred to in the beginning, i.e. the Supreme Soul, who is the topic to be established in the middle of the section, in the text: 'By whom the soul has been found and realized' (Bṛh. 4.4.13).

SŪTRA 22

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORD ITSELF AND OF MEASURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the word itself (viz. 'atomic') and of measure," mentioned (respectively) in the texts: 'This atomic soul' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.9[2]), 'An individual soul is a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundredfold' (Śvet. 5.9[3]), the individual soul is atomic.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The phrase: "the word itself" means the word which is denotative of its own atomicity. The word "measure" means the measure which is separated from[4] all gross measures, i.e. an intensely minute measure. On account of these two, the individual soul is atomic. The word itself is mentioned in the text: 'This *atomic* soul in which the five-fold vital-breath has entered is to be known by means of thought' (Muṇḍ.

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[1] This explains the compound "*atacchruteḥ*".
[2] Ś, R, B, Śk, B.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, B.
[4] *Uddhṛtya mānam = Unmānam.*

3.1.9). The measure is mentioned in the text: 'An individual soul is a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundredfold' (Śvet. 5.9) 'For the lower one is seen to be like the point of the spoke of a wheel only' (Śvet. 5.8).

SŪTRA 23

"NON-CONTRADICTION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE SANDAL-PASTE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as a drop of sandal-paste, though occupying one spot of the body, refreshes the entire body, so exactly does the soul illuminate. Hence, the experience of pleasure and the like over the whole body is not inconsistent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: If the soul be atomic in size, then how can pleasure and the like be experienced over the whole body?—we reply: There is no such contradiction. Just as one drop of yellow sandal-paste, occupying one spot of the body, produces, through its own quality, a pleasurable sensation extending over the entire body, so the soul too, occupying one spot of the body, experiences, through its own quality, the pleasure and the like extending over the entire body, in accordance with the Smṛti passage: 'This soul, though only atomic, abides pervading its own body, as does a drop of yellow sandal-paste, pervading the body'. For this very reason it has been said by the Lord too: '"Just as one sun illuminates this entire world, so the field-owner (i.e. the soul) illuminates the entire field (i.e. the body), O Bhārata!"' (Gītā 13.33).

SŪTRA 24

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE TWO CASES ARE NOT PARALLEL) ON ACCOUNT OF THE SPECIALITY OF ABODE, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ADMISSION (OF AN ABODE, VIZ.) IN THE HEART CERTAINLY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: The example of the sandal-paste is not appropriate, "on account of the speciality of abode",—it is directly

observed that the drop of sandal-paste occupies one spot of the body; but it is not known that the individual soul occupies one part of the body, since consciousness is experienced everywhere,—on account of such a difference of abode between the two,—

(We reply:) "No". Why? "On account of the admission," viz. that the soul, atomic in size, abides in one part of the body, i.e. "in the heart", by the scriptural text: 'He who is made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light within the heart' (Bṛh. 4.4.22). The meaning of the term "certainly" is that it is the attribute of knowledge (and not the atomic soul itself) which abides in the whole body.

SŪTRA 25

"OR THROUGH ATTRIBUTE, LIKE LIGHT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The illumination of the body takes place only through the attribute of the soul, like the light of a lamp and the like in a room.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. the doctrine that there is a relation of attribute and substratum (between knowledge and the soul) is not proper, since our purpose is served by the very nature only (of the soul),—(the author) replies:

The term "or" is for disposing of the objection. The sense is that the experience of the pleasure and the like, pertaining to the entire body, by the atomic soul, occupying one part of the body, is possible through its attribute of knowledge which is all-pervading "As in ordinary life." In ordinary life, a gem, the sun, a light and so on, though occupying one place, illuminate many places, as the case may be, through their attribute alone. Or else, (the combination) may be disjoined as: "as in the case of light", i.e. like the light of gems and the rest. The doctrine of an attributeless soul, as admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, has been disposed of above.[1]

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara reads "lokavat", all others "ālokavat".

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[1] Vide V.K. 1.3.18.

SŪTRA 26

"THE EXTENDING BEYOND (OF KNOWLEDGE) IS AS IN THE CASE OF SMELL, FOR THIS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But the "extending beyond" of the attribute of knowledge fits in "as in the case of smell". The scriptural text: 'He has entered here up to the body-hairs and finger nails' (Kauṣ. 4.20[1]) "shows" the individual soul to be the substratum of such an attribute.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"The extending" of the attribute of knowledge beyond the soul, its substratum which is situated within the heart, i.e. its occupying a larger space, is "as in the case of smell", i.e. is just like smell occupying a larger space than the flower which occupies a smaller space. The scriptural text: 'He has entered here up to the body-hairs and finger-nails' (Kauṣ. 4.2.0) "shows" the soul's pervasion over the entire body by means of its attribute of knowledge, extending over a larger space.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhaskara

They break this sūtra into two different ones, viz. "Vyatireko gandhavat" and "Tathā ca darśayati".[2]

Rāmānuja

He too reads "ca" in place of "hi", but does not break it into two sūtras.

SŪTRA 27

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE SEPARATE TEACHING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Although there is no distinction between the soul and its knowledge in respect of being knowledge, yet a relation of substratum and

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[1] Not quoted by others. For correct quotation vide Kauṣ., p. 141.
[2] Ś.B., pp. 615-16; Bh. B., p. 136.

attribute (between them) is indeed proper. Why? "On account of the separate teaching," viz.: "Having mounted the body by means of intelligence" (Kauṣ. 3.6 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz. Let knowledge be the essence of the soul. Hence here the distinction,—viz. the substratum is atomic, the attribute all-pervading,—is not proper,—(the author) replies here.

"On account of the separate teaching" of the attribute from the substratum, the soul, in the passages: 'Having mounted the body by means of intelligence' (Kauṣ. 3.6), 'Having taken by his intelligence the intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.17). That is, in spite of there being no distinction between the two in respect of being knowledge, there can very well be a relation of substratum and attribute between them, since it is mentioned in Scripture. Equality of nature does not necessarily mean identity, since it is found that in spite of there being no distinction between light and its substratum,—both being equally light,—there is still a difference between them.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 26 in his commentary, interpretation different. It answers to the objection that intelligence is not a permanent attribute of the soul. Hence the sūtra: "Intelligence is a permanent attribute of the soul) since there is a separate (i.e. distinct) statement (in Scripture to that effect)".[2]

SŪTRA 28

"BUT THERE IS THAT DESIGNATION ON ACCOUNT OF (THE SOUL'S) HAVING THAT ATTRIBUTE AS ITS ESSENCE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE INTELLIGENT BEING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"As in the case of the intelligent one," i.e. (just as Brahman is said to be great, because He is possessed of great attributes, on the

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[1] Ś.

[2] G.B. 2.3.26, p. 197, Chap. 2.

ground of etymology thus) 'Brahman' is one in whom there are great qualities,[1] so the soul has been designated as "Eternal, all-pervading" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6 [2]), because of possessing great attributes. In the first case, the Intelligent Being, great by Himself, is great by reason of His attributes too. In the second case, on the other hand, the individual soul, atomic in size, is great by reason of its attribute only,—this is the distinction.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. If the individual soul be atomic by nature, then the texts which establish its all-pervasiveness must be contradicted, such as: 'Eternal, all-pervasive, omnipresent, extremely subtle' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6), 'Eternal, all-pervasive, immobile' (Gītā 2.24) and so on,—the author replies: No.

The term "but" is for disposing of the objection. On account of having an all-pervasive attribute as its very essence, "that designation", viz. the designation of the all-pervasiveness of the soul, such as: 'Eternal, all-pervasive' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6), fits in. "As in the case of the intelligent being." Greatness is said to belong to the Intelligent Being through His connection with great attributes as well, in accordance with the saying: 'Brahman' is one in whom there are great attributes. The Intelligent Being being great *by nature* as well, the example holds good only partially.[3] Similarly, there is this designation of the all-pervasiveness (of the soul) on the ground of its all-pervasive attribute only, and not *by nature*. This should be understood here: Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, is without an equal and a superior and all-pervasive, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'Nothing is observed to be either equal to Him or higher than Him' (Śvet. 6.8). The all-pervasiveness of others, such as, prakṛti, time, and the attribute of the individual soul (viz. knowledge), is relative (and not absolute). There are contraction and expansion of even such an attribute which is peculiar to the individual soul, and eternal, in accordance with the declarations by the Lord Himself: '"Knowledge is enveloped by

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[1] *Bṛh+man.*

[2] Not quoted by others.

[3] I.e. the case of *Brahman* and the individual soul are not parallel in all respects, but in some respects only. The former is great by nature, as well as great by attributes; while the latter is atomic by nature yet great by attributes. Hence the two cases are parallel only in respect of the second point, and not of the first as evident.

nescience. Thereby beings are deluded" ' (Gītā 5.15), ' " In whom that nescience has been destroyed by knowledge, in them knowledge shines forth like the sun, O Bhārata !" ' (Gītā 5.16[1]).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. He takes this and the following three sūtras as laying down the correct conclusion, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive, in answer to the *prima facie* view set forth in ten sūtras above. Thus, this sūtra means, according to him: "But there is that designation (of the atomicity of the soul) on account of its having that attribute (viz. buddhi) as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent being". That is, just as Brahman, though all-pervading, is designated to be atomic for the purpose of meditation, so the individual soul, though all-pervading, is designated to be atomic through its limiting adjunct of buddhi.[2]

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 29 in the commentaries of the first two, and sūtra 27 in the commentary of the last. Baladeva leaves out "tu". Interpretation different—viz. "But there is that designation (i.e. the designation of the soul as knowledge) on account of its having that attribute as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent one". That is, just as the Lord, though a knower, is sometimes designated as knowledge, so the individual soul too, though a knower, is sometimes designated as knowledge, since it possesses knowledge as its essential attribute.[3] They continue the same topic in the following four sūtras, although literal interpretation is the same.

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. Here he points out that the atomicity of the soul, considered so long, is not the real form of the soul, but only its transmigratory

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[1] Correct quotation: "*Prakāśayati tatparam*". Vide Gītā, 5.16, p. 303.

[2] Ś.B. 2.3.29, pp. 616 ff.

[3] Śrī. B. 2.3.29, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.29, p. 147, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.27, p. 198, Chap. 2.

form. Here he follows Śaṃkara, and points out that just as the all-pervading Brahman is said to be atomic in reference to His abode, viz. the heart, so the all-pervading soul is said to be atomic through its attributes of passion and the rest.[1]

SŪTRA 29

"ALSO BECAUSE OF LASTING AS LONG AS THE SOUL DOES, THERE IS NO FAULT, BECAUSE IT IS SEEN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness, due to its attribute, is not inconsistent. "Also because of" the attribute lasting as long as the soul does, there is no fault, because it is seen";[2] i.e. because it is found in the passage: '"For there is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperishable, indeed. O! is this soul"' (Bṛh. 4.3.30[3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. The attribute of the soul being sometimes present and sometimes not, its all-pervasiveness due thereto vanishes, and as such the designation of its all-pervasiveness is open to objections —(the author) replies:

The term "also" is meant for disposing of the objection. The soul is indeed eternal. As its attribute too "lasts as long as the soul does", i.e. is an eternal attribute accompanying the soul, so the designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness is not open to objections, because we find that there are texts designating the attribute as lasting as long as the soul does, such as: '"For there is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperishable, verily, O! is this soul"' (Bṛh. 4.3.30).

[1] Bh. B. 2.3.29, p. 137.

[2] C.S.S. ed., p. 440, omits the whole sentence which is but a repetition of the sūtra itself. The other edition retains it.

[3] Not quoted by others.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 30 in his commentary. Interpretation different. Śaṃkara continues the same theme, and points out that the soul's connection with buddhi lasts so long as the transmigratory state does.[1]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 30 in their commentaries as well. The interpretation of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that all cows, hornless and so on, are called 'cow' (since they all possess the generic character of cowness).[2]

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 30 in his commentary too. Interpretation different, viz. like Śaṃkara's.[3]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that the sun and its light are co-eternal, and that the sun is both light and the illuminator.[4]

SŪTRA 30

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MANIFESTATION OF THAT WHICH IS EXISTENT, AS IN THE CASE OF VIRILITY AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

During the waking state there is the "manifestation" "of this", i.e. of knowledge, which is "existent" indeed during the states of deep sleep and so on. Hence, the attribute of knowledge does last so long as the soul itself does; just as in youth there is the manifestation of virility and so on, which are existent indeed during childhood.

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[1] Ś.B. 2.3.30, pp. 619 ff.
[2] Śrī. B. 2.3.30, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.30, p. 147, Parts 7 and 8.
[3] Bh. B. 2.3.30, pp. 137-38.
[4] G.B. 2.3.28.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. if knowledge, the attribute of the soul, be eternal, then why should there be no perception of it during the states of deep sleep and the rest?—(the author) replies:

The term "but" implies emphasis. Knowledge, the attribute of the soul, does last as long as the soul itself does. Why? "On account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that which is existent." That is, the attribute of knowledge, which is "existent indeed", i.e. is present indeed, in a non-manifest form during the states of deep sleep and the rest is manifested during the waking state,—just as in youth there is the manifestation of "virility and so on" which are existent indeed during childhood. By the phrase "and so on" the natural qualities of magnanimity, good conduct and the like are to be understood.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 31 in their commentaries. Interpretation different, they continue the same theme—viz. the soul's connection with buddhi exists potentially in the state of deep sleep, etc. and is manifested in the state of waking.[1]

SŪTRA 31

"OTHERWISE THERE (WILL BE) THE CONSEQUENCE OF ETERNAL PERCEPTION AND NON-PERCEPTION, OR A RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE ONE OR THE OTHER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, the perception and the non-perception, the bondage and the release of the soul must all become eternal. The soul will be either eternally fettered or eternally free,—thus there must be "a restriction with regard to the one or the other".

Vedānta-kaustubha

This aphorism is meant for indicating the defects in the view of those who maintain the all-pervasiveness of the soul which is

[1] Ś.B. 2.3.31, p. 621; Bh. B. 2.3.31, p. 138.

consciousness. "Otherwise," i.e. on any view other than our view, viz. that the soul is possessed of the essential attributes of being a knower, knowledge by nature and atomic in size, i.e. on the doctrine that the soul is consciousness merely and all-pervading, there must be the "consequence of eternal perception and non-perception". On account of the all-pervading soul being ever unenveloped, there will be perception; on account of the existence of mundane existence, non-perception. In this way, there will result simultaneous bondage and release, "or a restriction with regard to the one or the other". On our view, on the other hand, the individual soul being of the size of an atom, going and returning, being enveloped and being unenveloped, the object to be approached and the one approaching, are all possible, and hence the respective difference between bondage and release, too, is possible. But on your view, there will result one or the other only of bondage and release, having the stated marks. There must be eternal bondage alone on the part of the soul which is consciousness merely and immobile; or there must be salvation alone,—such a restriction will result. Hence, it is established that the individual soul is possessed of the attribute of being a knower, is knowledge by nature and atomic in size.

Here ends the section entitled "Departure" (9).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sutra 32 in their commentaries. Interpretation different as before. They adduce here an argument for the existence of buddhi, being connected with which the all-pervading soul becomes atomic. Thus: (The existence of buddhi must be admitted) otherwise there will be the consequence of eternal perception and non-perception . . .[1]

[1] Ś.B. 2.3.32, p. 622; Bh. B. 2.3.32, p. 138.

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled "The agent". (Sūtras 32-39)

SŪTRA 32

"(THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS) AN AGENT, BECAUSE OF SCRIPTURE HAVING A SENSE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The soul indeed is "an agent", because the scriptural texts, informing us about the means to enjoyment and salvation, such as: 'One desiring heaven should perform a sacrifice' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5[1]), 'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman'[2] and so on, have a sense.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now incidentally, the problem whether the soul is an agent is being discussed.

On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul is an agent or not,—if the *prima facie* view be as follows: In the Kaṭha-vallī it is denied that the individual soul is an agent, thus: 'If the killer thinks to kill, if the killed thinks himself killed, both these do not know. This one does not kill, nor is killed' (Kaṭha. 2.19); and it has been declared by the Lord too: '"All actions are done by the guṇas of prakṛti. The soul, deluded by egoism, thinks: 'I am the agent'"' (Gītā 3.27). Hence, the guṇas alone are agents, but never the soul,—

We reply: The soul alone is the agent. Why? "Because of Scripture having a sense", i.e. because the scriptural texts, teaching the means which are dependent on sentient beings, subject to enjoyment and salvation, viz. 'Only doing works here, let one desire to live a hundred years' (Īśā. 2), 'One desiring heaven should perform sacrifices' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5), 'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman', 'Let one worship calmly' (Chānd. 3.14.1) and so on, have a sense. If those non-sentient objects (viz. the guṇas) be the agent, the scriptural texts teaching the means must be senseless.

The (above-quoted) scriptural text, on the other hand, shows that the soul being eternal cannot be killed; but it is not by any means

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[1] R, B, p. 208, line 27, vol. 2.
[2] R, B.

concerned with denying that the soul is an agent. The Smṛti passage, too, shows only that the soul, which is deluded by the guṇas of prakṛti, is an agent of mundane activities through those guṇas. And, this has been stated by the Lord Himself thus: '"Those deluded by the guṇas of prakṛti are attached to the activities of the guṇas"' (Gītā 3.2.9). If the guṇas be the agent and not the soul, then the following statements will be nullified: viz. '"But if you will not carry on this righteous warfare"' (Gītā 2.33), '"For through action alone Janaka and the rest have attained to perfection. Having an eye to the good of the world also, you should perform action"' (Gītā 3.20), '"Whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you offer, whatever you give, whatever you practise as penance,—make that an offering to me"' (Gītā 9.27), '"I am firm, with my doubts removed. I will do according to your word"' (Gītā 18.73) and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 33 in their commentaries. Literal interpretation same, but they hold that the soul's state of being an agent is not natural, but due to limiting adjuncts.[1] The same remarks apply to the following three sūtras also, which will not be noted separately.

SŪTRA 33

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF (THE SOUL'S) MOVING ABOUT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the teaching of (the soul's) moving about," in the passage: He moves around in his own body as desired" (Bṛh. 2.1.18[2]), it is an agent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"On account of the teaching" of the soul's "moving about", i.e. of its roaming around, in the passages: 'He, the immortal, goes

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[1] Ś.B. 2.3.32, p. 623; Bh. B. 2.3.32, p. 138. For the different senses of the word '*upādhi*' in the systems of Śaṃkara and Bhāskara, see Bh. B., etc.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

wherever he wishes' (Bṛh. 4.3.12), 'He moves around in his own body as desired' (Bṛh. 2.1.18), the individual soul is an agent,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They take this sūtra and the next as one sūtra by reversing the order and adding a "ca" thus: "Upādānāt vihāropadeśāc ca".[1]

SŪTRA 34

"ON ACCOUNT OF TAKING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul) thus: 'So exactly he, having taken the senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.18).

Vedānta-kaustubha

On account of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul) in the passage which introduces the topic thus: 'Just as a king', and continues: 'So exactly does he, having taken these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.18), 'Having taken by his intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.17), the individual soul is an agent.

SŪTRA 35

"ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF THE SOUL AS AN AGENT) WITH REGARD TO ACTIONS, OTHERWISE, (THERE WILL BE) REVERSAL OF DESCRIPTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Also on account of the designation (of the soul) as an agent" thus: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice' (Tait. 2.5[2]), the soul is an agent. If by the word 'understanding' buddhi be understood and not the individual soul, the instrumental case would have been used.[3]

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[1] Śrī. B., p. 152, Part 2; Śk, B., p. 153, Parts 7 and 8.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[3] I.e. the instrumental case '*vijñānena*' would have been used.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Also on account of the designation" of the individual soul, denoted by the term 'knowledge', as an agent of ordinary and Vedic "actions" thus: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice, performs actions as well' (Tait. 2.5), the individual soul is an agent.

If it be objected: By the term 'understanding' buddhi is to be understood and not the individual soul,—(the author) replies: "Otherwise, i.e. if by the term 'understanding' the individual soul be not understood, but buddhi is understood, then there must be "reversal of the description", i.e. buddhi being the instrument, there must have been the designation of an instrument thus: 'by understanding'. But there is no such designation. Hence, here is a designation of an agent by the stated case-ending, viz. 'Understanding'. Hence the individual soul is an agent.

SŪTRA 36

"THERE IS NO RESTRICTION AS IN THE CASE OF PERCEPTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"There is no restriction" with regard to the actions based on the perception of their fruits.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. if the individual soul be the agent, then having taken into consideration the good and the evil which are the fruits of good and evil works, and being disgusted with the evil, it, with a view to obtaining the good, ought to do what is conducive to the latter,—(the author) replies:

"As in the case of perception." Just as there is the perception of the good and the evil which are the fruits of good and evil works performed previously, so there is "no restriction" with regard to works, since we find that people are by chance sometimes inclined to what is beneficial and sometimes to what is not beneficial.[1]

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[1] I.e. although a man perceives the good and evil results of his past acts, yet there is no fixed rule that he always afterwards does what is good and avoids what is bad. As he is ruled by external circumstances, he may sometimes be inclined to what is bad, though knowing from his past experiences that such acts lead to harmful consequences.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "As in the case of perception, there is non-restriction (with regard to actions)". That is, just as the soul, though free with regard to perceptions, sometimes perceives what is good, and sometimes what is bad, so the soul, though free to act, sometimes does what is good, and sometimes what is bad.[1]

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 36 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 35 in the commentary of the last. They interpret it as following: (If prakṛti were the agent and not the individual soul, then there would be) non-restriction (of actions) as in the case of perception". That is, just as it has been shown [2] that if the soul be all-pervasive no definite perception will be possible, so if prakṛti be the agent, no definte activity will be possible, since prakṛti being all-pervading and common to all, all activities would produce results in the case of all souls, or produce no results in the case of any one.[3]

SŪTRA 37

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE REVERSAL OF POWER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If buddhi be the agent, then its instrumental power will cease, and it must come to have the power of an agent. Hence the individual soul is the agent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. in the text 'Understanding performs a sacrifice' (Tait. 2.5), by the word 'understanding' buddhi alone is to be understood, and it is the agent. Hence there instrumental case has not been used [4]—(the author) replies:

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[1] Ś, B, 2.3.37, p. 625.

[2] Under Śrī. B. 2.3.32; Śk. B. 2.3.32; G.B. 2.3.30.

[3] Śrī. B. 2.3.36, p. 153, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.36, p. 153, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.35, p. 208, Chap. 2.

[4] Vide V.P.S. 2.3.35 above.

The individual soul alone is the agent. If buddhi be admitted to be the agent, then "on account of the reversal of power", its instrumental power will cease, and it must come to have the power of an agent. Moreover, if buddhi be the agent, then the power of enjoyment, too, must pertain to it alone. This being so, bondage and release must result on the part of buddhi alone.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 37 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 36 in the commentary of the last. Their interpretation is similar to the last portion of Śrīnivāsa's interpretation, viz. that if buddhi or prakṛti be the agent, the power of enjoyment too must belong to it.[1]

SŪTRA 38

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF DEEP CONCENTRATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If the soul be not an agent, then "the absence of deep concentration", due to something which is absolutely different from the non-sentient,[2] will result; and hence the soul is the agent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Deep concentration" means abiding as having Brahman for one's soul, after meditating on one's own form,—distinct from the body, sense-organs, mind and intelligence,—preceded by the stopping of the functions of the mind. As the "absence of such a deep concentration", the means to salvation, will result, if the individual soul be not an agent,—it is known that the individual soul alone is the agent.

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.3.37, p. 153, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.37, p. 154, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.36, pp. 208-9, Chap. 2.

[2] *Acetana-mātrāt*, i.e. from even the slightest portion of the non-sentient.

SŪTRA 39

"AND LIKE A CARPENTER, IN BOTH WAYS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The soul acts or does not act according to its own wish, "like a carpenter", and as such a situation is possible "in both ways". If buddhi be the agent, then there being the absence of desire and the like on its part, there will be the absence of such a situation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The soul,—the nature of which is to act or abstain from acting, and which is possessed of the attributes of 'being an agent' and so on, lasting so long as it itself does,—though connected with a group of instruments like speech and the like, performs action or does not perform action according to its wish, and thus if the soul be an agent a situation is possible "in both ways",—just as a carpenter, though provided with instruments like axe and the rest, constructs chariots, etc., according to his wish. But acting or refraining from action is not possible on the part of buddhi, which is an instrument like the axe, by reason of its non-sentience. On account of the eternity of its proximity to a sentient being, as well as on account of the absence, on its part,—of any desire—the cause of action or inaction,—there must be either eternal activity or eternal non-activity, on its part. Hence, it is established that the soul alone is the agent.

Here ends the section entitled "The agent" (10).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 40 in their commentaries. Interpretation absolutely different. They take it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the individual soul is an agent by nature or as connected with limiting adjuncts, and accept the second alternative. Hence the parallel instance: "i.e. yathā ca takṣā" is interpreted differently by them thus: In ordinary life a carpenter is miserable and so long as he is an agent, i.e. works with his tools,

etc. But when he returns home, lays aside his tools and is no longer an agent, he becomes happy. In the very same manner the soul suffers so long as it is an agent through nescience, but when it returns home, i.e. realizes its real state, frees itself from sense-organs and so on, and ceases to be an agent, it becomes happy.[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 38 in his commentary. He takes it to be an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation different, viz. "And like the carpenter (the soul is active) in two ways". That is, the carpenter is an indirect agent through the medium of its instruments, and also a direct agent in handling those instruments themselves. Similarly, the soul is an indirect agent through its sense-organs, and is also a direct agent in the act of controlling those sense-organs.[2]

Adhikaraṇa 11: The section entitled "Under the control of the Highest". (Sūtras 40-41)

SŪTRA 40

"BUT (THE AGENTSHIP OF THE SOUL PROCEEDS) FROM THE HIGHEST, BECAUSE THAT IS TAUGHT BY SCRIPTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The agentship of that individual soul proceeds "from the Highest" as its cause, in accordance with the scriptural text "Entered within, the ruler of men" (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2 [3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the problem is being discussed whether the individual soul is an agent as controlled by the Highest Soul, or independently.

On the doubt, viz. whether the stated agentship of the individual soul is under its own control or under the control of the Highest Soul, if the *prima facie* view be: Under its own control alone. In ordinary

[1] Ś.B. 2.3.40, pp. 628-29; Bh. B. 2.3.40, p. 139.
[2] G.B. 2.3.38, p. 120, Chap. 2.
[3] R., p. 181.

life, a man engages himself to tilling and the like by himself out of desire for crops, but does not wait for the Highest,—

We reply: The agentship of the individual soul proceeds "from the Highest" as its cause. Why? On the ground of the following scriptural texts: 'For he alone makes one, whom he wishes to raise up from these worlds, do good deeds. He alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds' (Kauṣ. 3.8), 'Entered within, the ruler of men' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2), 'Who rules the soul within' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30 [1]) and so on; as well as on the ground of the Smṛti passages, viz.: ' "And I am situated within the heart of all. From me proceed memory, knowledge and their absence" ' (Gītā 15.15).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Literal interpretation same, although as before they are speaking of the soul's agentship being due to limiting adjuncts. The same remarks apply to their interpretation of the next sūtra.

SŪTRA 41

"BUT (THE LORD MAKES THE SOUL ACT) HAVING REGARD TO THE EFFORTS MADE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE FUTILITY OF WHAT IS ENJOINED AND WHAT IS PROHIBITED AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The term "but" is meant for disposing of the fault of inequality. The Highest Being, who has "regard" for the works done by the individual soul, makes it do good deeds and the rest in another birth too, "on account of the futility of what is enjoined and what is prohibited".

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. if the Supreme Soul be the instigator, then He must be open to the charge of inequality and rest,—the author replies:

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[1] P. 1074, line 18.

The term "but" is meant for disposing of the above objection. The Supreme Soul, who has "regard" for, i.e. takes into account, the efforts made by the individual soul, i.e. for its good and bad deeds, makes it do good deeds and the rest in another birth too, and gives it pleasure and the like accordingly. Hence, He cannot be charged with partiality, etc.

If it be asked: Why should the Supreme Being take into account the efforts made by the individual soul?—the author replies: "On account of the futility of what is enjoined and what is prohibited". If the Highest Person takes into account the efforts made by the soul, then alone, injunctions and prohibitions, such as, 'One who desires for heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice' (Āp. Ś. S. 10.2.1 [1]), "A Brāhmaṇa must not be killed" and so on, do not become futile. The meaning of the phrase, "and so on" is that faults like: suffering arising from good deeds, and happiness arising from bad deeds, and so on, result. Since the Supreme Soul takes into account the works done by souls, He cannot, by any means, be charged with inequality, etc., though He is the instigator of what is enjoined and what is prohibited, and is, thereby, the bestower of favour and disfavour. Under the aphorism: "(There are) no inequality and cruelty (on the part of the Lord), because of (His) having regard (for the works of souls)" (Br. Sū. 2.1.33), it has been said that no inequality and the rest pertain to the Highest in His creation of the variegated world—this is the distinction.[2] Hence, the Highest Person, omnipotent and the Lord of all, is the instigator of good deeds and the rest in accordance with the good and bad deeds performed before, and is the giver of fruits accordingly to them. Thus, it is established that the individual soul is an agent as controlled by the Highest.

Here ends the section entitled "The Highest" (11).

[1] P. 209, vol. 2.

[2] I.e. there is no repetition here, since under Br. Sū. 2.1.33 it has been shown that the Lord is not partial as a *creator*, whereas it is being shown here that He is not partial as an *instigator* to action.

Adhikaraṇa 12: The section entitled "A part". (Sūtras 42-52)

SŪTRA 42

"(THE INDIVIDUAL IS) A PART (OF BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF VARIETY, AND OTHERWISE, ALSO SOME READ (THAT BRAHMAN IS OF) THE NATURE OF FISHERMEN, GAMBLERS AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The individual soul is a part of the Supreme Soul, in accordance with the designation of difference in texts like: 'The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord' (Śvet. 1.9) and so on[1]; and on account of the designation of non-difference in texts like: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.). And "also" the Ātharvaṇikas "read" that Brahman is of "the nature of fishermen, gamblers and the rest", thus: "Brahman are the fishermen, Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these gamblers".[2]

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out that the agentship of the individual soul is under the control of Brahman. Now, the author is pointing out the relation between the two, consistently with the scriptural texts designating both difference and non-difference.

On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul is different from Brahman or non-different from Him, or a part of Brahman and as such both different and non-different from Him,—if it be suggested: The individual soul must be different from Brahman, as a man is from the king, because the texts designating non-difference are figurative and because a non-difference between the non-knowing and the all-knowing is impossible. Or, it must be non-different only (from Brahman), because the scriptural texts designating difference are figurative. There being a mutual opposition between difference and non-difference, of either the texts about difference or the texts about non-difference must certainly be metaphorical,—

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[1] R. [2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

We reply: The individual soul is neither absolutely different from the Highest Person, nor absolutely non-different from Him, but is a part of the Highest Self, in accordance with the scriptural text: "For he is a part of the Highest". A 'part' means a 'power', in accordance with the scriptural text: "This individual soul, a power of the Highest, is small in power and not independent". A 'part' should not be understood here as a portion, actually severed like a portion of wealth and the rest; for if the individual soul be a portion cut off from Brahman, then texts like 'Without part' (Śvet. 6.19) and the like, will be contradicted; and because if it be like a portion of wealth, there will result an absolute difference (between Brahman and the soul) and hence the texts like: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.) will be set aside. (The true view is:) The individual soul is, by nature, different from the Supreme Person, predicated to be the whole, and the ocean of a mass of attributes like omniscience and the rest,—since it is predicated to be a part, and is subject to bondage and release. But it is yet non-different from Him, as its existence and activity are under the control of the whole. Why? "On account of the designation of variety", i.e. on account of the designation of difference; "and otherwise", i.e. and on account of the designation of non-difference. The sense is that the two kinds of texts being of equal force, there is a natural difference—non-difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. The following are designations of difference: 'Who rules the soul within' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30[1]), 'Entered within, the ruler of men' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2[2]), 'The soul, verily, is supreme, self-dependent, possessed of superior qualities', 'The individual soul is possessed of little power, not self-dependent, lowly', 'The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord' (Śvet. 1.9) and so on. The following are designations of non-difference: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.), 'This soul is Brahman' (Bṛh. 2.5.19; 4.4.5), 'I am Brahman' (Bṛh. 1.4.10) and so on. And "also" the followers of one branch, viz. the Ātharvaṇikas, "read" that Brahman is of the "nature of fishermen, gamblers and the like" thus: "Brahman are these fishermen, Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these gamblers".

[1] P. 1074, line 18. [2] P. 181.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Literal interpretation same, although as usual Śaṃkara holds that the soul is not a *real* part of Brahman, but a part *as it were*.[1] The same remarks apply to the following two sūtras.

SŪTRA 43

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORDING OF A SACRED TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the wording of the sacred text," viz. 'A foot of him are all beings' (Ṛg. V. 10.90.3[2]; Chānd. 3.12.6), the individual soul is a part of Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The individual soul is nothing but a part of the Supreme Soul. Why? Also "on account of the wording of the sacred text": 'A foot of him are all beings, three feet of him are immortal in the heaven' (Ṛg. V. 10.90.3; Chānd. 3.12.6). A 'feet' means a '*part*'.

SŪTRA 44

"AND, MOREOVER, (IT IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is declared by Smṛti also that the individual soul is a part of Brahman thus: '"A part of my own self, in the world of men, has become the individual soul, the eternal"' (Gītā 15.7[3]).

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[1] Ś.B. 2.3.43, p. 636.
[2] P. 349, line 19.
Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been declared in a Smṛti passage by the Highest Person Himself that the individual soul is a part of Brahman, thus: '"A part of my own self, in the world of men, has become the individual soul, the eternal"' (Gītā 15.7).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

He omits the "ca".[1]

SŪTRA 45

"BUT LIKE LIGHT AND THE REST, NOT SO THE HIGHEST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Though the individual soul is a part of the Supreme Person, yet the whole (i.e. the Lord) does not experience pleasure and pain, just as "light and the rest" are devoid of the virtue or vice inhering in their parts.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. then the virtue or vice pertaining to the individual soul may belong to the Supreme Soul too, seeing that a part has no separate existence from the whole,—the author replies here:

"The Highest," i.e. the Supreme Soul, does "not" become "so", i.e. does not come to share the virtue and vice pertaining to the individual soul. The author states a parallel instance: "Like light and the rest", i.e. just as "light", i.e. the sun and the rest, are not touched by the attributes of their rays which are their parts, i.e. by their contact and the rest with pure and impure objects. By the phrase: "and the rest", the ether and the like are understood; i.e. just as the ether and the like are not touched by the good qualities found in the sound of conch-shell, cuckoos and so on, nor by the bad qualities found in the sound of crows and the like. The term "but" is suggestive of the absence of an intermixture of the attributes of the part and the whole. The objections, resulting from the apprehension

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.3.44, p. 161, Part 2.

that the Highest Being is subject to karmas by reason of His connection with the hearts of individual souls which are subject to karmas, have been disposed of, on the ground that the Lord is not subject to karmas, under the aphorism: "Enjoyment results" (Br. Sū. 1.2.8). Under the aphorism: "Not even on account of place" (Br. Sū. 3.2.1), we shall dispose of (the objection based on Brahman's being connected with 'places', viz. the hearts) on the ground that the Lord, having the 'places' by nature, is yet not subject to karmas. Here, on the other hand, it should be known that the objections raised on the ground of His own parts are disposed of.[1]

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. The general import of the sūtra, as well as the interpretation of the phrase: i.e. "prakāśādivat" different. He develops his doctrine of upādhi here. Thus, the sūtra means, according to him: Just as the light of the sun and the moon, pervading the entire expanse of the ether, appears to be straight or bent accordingly as the limiting adjunct with which it is in contact, viz. finger, etc. are straight or bent, but does not become so really; or just as the ether, though imagined to move when jars are moving, does not really move; or just as the sun does not really tremble when its images on water tremble, so although the individual soul undergoes pleasure and pain, Brahman does not, since the soul is but a fictitious part of Brahman, due to limiting adjuncts, and not a real part.[2]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They too develop here their peculiar theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Thus, the sūtra means, according to them: "(The individual soul is a part of Brahman) as light and the rest (of the sun, etc. is of the sun and so on), not so the highest (i.e. Brahman is not of the same nature

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[1] I.e. there is no repetition here. Under Br. Sū. 1.2.8, it has been shown that Brahman, though connected with the *hearts* of individual souls is not subject to their pleasures and pain. In this sūtra it is shown that Brahman, though connected with the individual souls as their *whole*, is not yet subject to their pleasure and pain. And under Br. Sū. 3.2.1, it will be shown that Brahman, though the *inner controller*, is not subject to the states and faults of souls.

[2] Ś.B. 2.3.46, pp. 638-639.

as the soul)". That is, the soul is a part of Brahman in the sense of being an attribute (viśeṣaṇa) of Brahman; and just as the attribute and its substratum are not identical, so the soul and Brahman are not.[1] They continue the same topic in the following two sūtras.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 44 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (five sūtras) concerned with the question of the Lord's incarnations. Thus, this sūtra means, according to him: "But supreme (incarnations of the Lord are) not so; (i.e. parts of the Lord as the individual souls are), as in the case of light". That is, just as though the sun and the fire-fly are both called 'light', yet the word has a different meaning when applied to the sun, so though the incarnations and ordinary individual souls are both called 'parts' of the Lord, yet the word has a different meaning when applied to the incarnations, i.e. it means then the entire Lord.[2]

SŪTRA 46

"AND SMṚTIS DECLARE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And Smṛtis declare": 'Of these, He who is the Supreme Soul is declared to be eternal and free from the properties of matter, and He is not touched by the fruits too, just as a lotus-leaf is not touched by water.[3] The active self, on the other hand, is something different, who is subject to bondage and release' (Mahā. 12.13754-13755[4]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The sages also declare that the part alone is subject to the fruits of action done by itself, but not the whole, thus: 'Of these, He who is the Supreme Soul is declared to be eternal and free from the properties of matter, and He is not touched by water.—The active self, on the other hand,

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.3.45, pp. 161-62, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.45, pp. 161-62, Parts 7 and 8.
[2] G.B. 2.3.44, pp. 223-24, Chap. 2.
[3] One line omitted.
[4] P. 852, lines 9-10, vol. 3.

is something different, who is subject to bondage and release. He is subject to seventeen rāśis (Mahā. 12.13754–56*a*). It has been declared by Scripture, too, thus 'Of the two, one eats the sweet berry, the other, without eating looks on' (Śvet. 4.6; Muṇḍ. 3.1.1).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They quote from Smṛti to show that the soul is the attribute of the Lord.[1]

Baladeva

He quotes from Smṛti to show that the incarnations are not parts of the Lord in the same sense the individual souls are.[2]

SŪTRA 47

"INJUNCTION AND PROHIBITION (FIT IN) ON ACCOUNT OF (THE SOULS') CONNECTION WITH BODIES, AS IN THE CASE OF FIRE AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Injunction and prohibition" like 'One who is desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5[3]), 'A Śūdra is not to be initiated to a sacrifice' (Tait. Saṃ. 7.1.1[4]) and so on do indeed fit in, on account of the connection of the individual souls with different bodies, in spite of their being an equality among them as parts of Brahman; just as fire is brought from the house of a Śrotriya,[5] but not from the crematory; or just as water and the like, touched by clean persons, pots and so on are accepted and not others.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If the individual souls be all equal as parts and the rest of Brahman, then to whom can the injunctions and prohibitions refer? Listen! In spite of their sameness, injunctions and prohibitions like: 'One

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[1] Śrī. B. 2.3.46, p. 162, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.46, p. 160, Parts 7 and 8.
[2] G.B. 2.3.45.
[3] P. 208, line 27, vol. 2. Not quoted by others.
[4] P. 241, line 21, vol. 2. Not quoted by others.
[5] A *Brāhmaṇa* versed in the *Veda*.

desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5), 'Hence a Śūdra is not to be initiated to a sacrifice' (Tait. Saṃ. 7.1.1) fit in on account of their connection with different bodies, "as in the case of fire and so on", i.e. just as in spite of being the same, fire is brought from the house of a Śrotriya, but one from crematory and the like is rejected; and just as the urine and excrement of cows and the like are enjoined as holy, but those very things of different animals are rejected.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

He develops in this connection his doctrine of Adhyāsa.[1] Bhāskara too speaks of his peculiar doctrine of Upādhi.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. He continues the same theme,—viz. the distinction between incarnations and ordinary individuals. He interprets the sūtra thus: (In the case of individual souls there are) injunctions and prohibitions, on account of (their) connection with bodies, as in the case of light (i.e. the eye).[2] That is, the individual soul, though a part of the Lord, is yet connected with nescience and a body, and is as such under the control of the Lord for its activity and inactivity and so on. But an incarnation, though a part of the Lord, is not under His control; just as the eye or the power of vision, though a part of the sun, depends upon the permission, i.e. the presence, of the sun for its activity or otherwise, but a ray of the sun, as a part of the sun, is identical with it, and does not depend upon any permission and the like of the sun.

SŪTRA 48

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF NON-EXTENSION THERE IS NO EXTENSION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In spite of the fact that the individual souls are parts of the all-pervasive Being, and in spite of the fact that they themselves are

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[1] Ś.B. 2.3.48, pp. 640 ff.; Bh. B. 2.3.48. p. 142.
[2] G.B. 2.3.46, pp. 226-27, Chap. 2.

all-pervasive by reason of their (all-pervasive) attribute (of knowledge),[1] the individual souls, being atomic by nature, are not all-pervasive; and as such there is no confusion among karmas.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. On your view, too, on account of being parts of the all-pervasive Being, as well as on account of possessing an all-pervasive attribute, all the souls come to experience the pleasures and the like in all the bodies; and as such a confusion among karmas, as well as a confusion among the enjoyments of their fruits will result. Hence, as the view that the soul is a part of the all-pervading Brahman, is atomic by itself and is all-pervasive by reason of its attribute, involves unnecessary complications, so Kapila's doctrine of the soul, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive by itself, is more acceptable,—the author replies here:

"On account of the non-extension," i.e. non-all-pervasiveness of the souls,—mutually distinct by reason of being atomic, and distinct also from the Whole (i.e. the Lord) by being predicated as parts,—"there is no confusion". The term "and" indicates the contraction of the soul's knowledge during its state of bondage.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 47 in his commentary. The same topic continued: "And on account of the non-extension (i.e. incompleteness of the individual soul, there is) no (possibility of) a confusion (between it and an incarnation)". That is, the soul is atomic and not full and perfect like an incarnation, hence different from him.[2]

SŪTRA 49

"AND (THE DOCTRINES OF THE ALL-PERVASIVENESS OF THE SOUL) ARE FALLACIES MERELY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And the doctrines of an all-pervasive soul and the rest of the opponents like Kapila and others are "fallacious merely", since,

[1] Vide V.P.S. 2.3.28.

[2] G.B. 2.3.47, p. 227, Chap. 2.

on those views, there results a confusion (among karmas and so on of the souls).

Vedānta-kaustubha

But the doctrines of an all-pervasive soul and the rest of Kapila, Kaṇāda and so on are "fallacious merely", as they have no (scriptural) basis, and as, on these views, there a confusion among all practical transactions will result. By the term "and" it is indicated that such teachers simply delude people.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 50 in his commentary. He reads "ābhāsaḥ" in place of "ābhāsāḥ". Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "(The individual soul is) only a reflection (of Brahman)". Thus, here he develops his doctrine of Pratibimba.[1]

Rāmānuja

He reads "ābhāsaḥ", and interprets the sūtra thus: "(The view that Brahman is obscured by limiting adjunct or nescience) is simply a fallacy". He accepts the alternative reading "ābhāsāḥ" too and points out that in that case the sūtra will mean: "(The various reasons advanced by the supporters of the above doctrine) are simply fallacies".[2]

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 50 in his commentary. He substitutes "vā" in place of "ca". He, also, like Rāmānuja, directs this sūtra against the Śaṃkarite view, thus: "(Nesciences are) simply fallacies".[3]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He too directs this sūtra against the Śaṃkarite view, interpreting it like Rāmānuja's second interpretation.[4]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 48 in his commentary. He reads "ābhāsaḥ". The same topic continued, viz. "(The reason adduced by the *prima facie*

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[1] Ś.B. 2.3.50, pp. 642.
[2] Śrī. B. 2.3.49, p. 163, Part 2.
[3] Bh. B. 2.3.50, p. 142.
[4] Śk. B. 2.3.49, p. 161, Parts 7 and 8.

objector to prove the similarity of the soul with the incarnation) is a mere fallacy". That is, the argument:

The soul is a part of the Lord.
The incarnation is a part of the Lord.
∴ the soul is equal to the incarnation,

evidently involves the logical fallacy of undistributed middle.[1]

SŪTRA 50

"BECAUSE OF THE NON-RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE UNSEEN PRINCIPLE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, confusion is unavoidable even if recourse be taken to the unseen principle, "because of the non-restriction with regard to the unseen principle".

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the argument, viz. there is no confusion among all practical transactions on our view too, since the unseen principle is the regulator, —the author replies:

Confusion results indeed on the view of the opponents, "because of the non-restriction with regard to the unseen principle", viz. to whom may the unforeseen principle, generated in the vicinity of all the all-pervasive souls, belong and to whom not.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation same, only they direct this and the remaining sūtras to the refutation of the Śaṃkarite view, and not to the view of Kapila and others.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 50 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (three sūtras), concerned with proving the mutual difference among the individual souls. Thus, this sūtra means, according to

[1] G.B. 2.3.48, p. 228, Chap. 2.

him: "(The individual souls, though similar in their essential nature, are yet different from one another) on account of the non-determinateness (i.e. non-similarity) of (their) destinies".[1]

SŪTRA 51

"AND IT IS SO EVEN WITH REGARD TO DETERMINATION AND THE LIKE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no restriction "even with regard to determinations and the like", such as: 'I shall do this and not that'.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the argument, viz. A restriction is possible, viz. the unseen principle belongs to one who has the determination: 'I shall do this and not that',—the author replies here:

"Determination" means resolution. By the phrase "and the like" reverence and so on are understood. There is, indeed, no restriction with regard to the unseen principle even in the case of resolution, reverence and the rest.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 51 in his commentary. He continues the same theme, viz. "And thus (the individual souls are different) with regard to (their) desire and the rest also". That is, adṛṣṭa or the unseen principle is the ultimate cause which determines the difference between the souls, and not their desires, inclinations and the like, which are only the secondary causes.[2]

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[1] G.B. 2.3.49, p. 229, Chap. 2.
[2] G.B. 2.3.50, p. 230, Chap. 2.

SŪTRA 52

"IF IT BE OBJECTED: ON ACCOUNT OF PLACE, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF INCLUSION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be argued that "on account of the place" of the self, situated within its own body, everything is consistent,—(we reply:) "no". "On account of the inclusion" therein of the places of all the souls.

Here ends the third quarter in the second chapter of the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: A definite restriction is possible with regard to determinations and the rest, "on account of place", i.e. it is in the region of the soul, situated within its own body alone, that the conjunction of the mind (with the soul) takes place,—on account of such a place of the soul,—(we reply:) "no", "on account of the inclusion" therein of the places of other souls too. The sense is this: Since all the souls are connected with one and the same mind, the determinations and the rest, due to the conjunction of the mind (with the soul), must be common to all; and hence the unseen principle, due to them, must indeed be common to all. This being so, the confusion among all practical transactions remains as before. Hence, it is established that the individual soul is a part of Brahman, Lord Vāsudeva, is atomic in size, knowledge by nature, possessed of the attributes of 'being an agent', 'being a knower' and so on and different in every body.

Here ends the section entitled "A part" (12).

Here ends the third quarter of the second chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the holy Nimbārka.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 51 in his commentary. The same topic continued: "If it be objected (that the difference among the individual souls is) due to the difference of (their) environments, (we reply:) no, because (the difference of environments, such as heaven, hell, and different lots in the world) are included under (i.e. due to) adṛṣṭa". That is, finally, adṛṣṭa or the unseen principle is the cause of the difference among the souls.[1]

Résumé

The third quarter of the second chapter contains—

1. 52 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 53 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
3. 52 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 53 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 52 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 51 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara break each of the sūtras 3 and 26 in Nimbārka's commentary into two different ones, and omit sūtra 11.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha break sūtra 5 in Nimbārka's commentary into two different sūtras, and take sūtras 33 and 34 in it as one sūtra, reversing the order.

Baladeva omits sūtra 11 in Nimbārka's commentary.

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[1] G.B. 2.3.51, p. 230, Chap. 2.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FOURTH QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "The origin of the sense-organs". (Sūtras 1–4)

SŪTRA 1

"LIKEWISE THE SENSE-ORGANS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The origin of the organs is being considered. The sense-organs originate like the ether and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the preceding quarter, the absence of any contradiction among the scriptural texts regarding the ether and the rest has been shown. Now, the author is showing the non-contradictory nature of the scriptural texts regarding the organs of the individual soul.

On the doubt, viz. whether the sense-organs originate or not, the *prima facie* view is as follows: In the discussions about origin, e.g. in the scriptural text: 'From this soul the ether has originated' (Tait. 2.1), there is no mention of the origin of the sense-organs; and in the scriptural text: '"The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning". Then they said: "What was that non-existent"? "The sages, verily, were the non-existent in the beginning." Then they said: "Who were those sages". "The sense-organs, verily, were the sages"' (Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1[1]), the sense-organs are declared to exist prior to creation; hence they do not originate.

With regard to it, we reply: Just as the elements like the ether and the rest, mentioned in the passage: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, fire' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), originate, "so the sense-organs", too, originate.

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[1] P. 499, lines 1-2.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. he takes it to be setting down the *prima facie* view thus: '(Just as the individual soul is eternal) so are the sense-organs [1] (as declared by Scripture [2])'.

SŪTRA 2

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SECONDARY (ORIGIN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It cannot be said also that in the section concerned with creation, e.g. in the passage: "From the self the ether has originated" (Tait. 2.1), there being no mention of the origin of the organs, the text regarding the origin of the organs is secondary,—"on account of the impossibility of a secondary" (origin). That is, the sense-organs must have origin, as the majority of scriptural texts designate such an origin, and as, otherwise, the initial proposition that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one will come to be contradicted.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having rejected the doubt,—viz. by reason of its opposition to the scriptural text: '"The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning"' (Tait. 2.7), the scriptural text about the origin of the sense-organs is secondary,—the author states the reason for the view that the sense-organs, too, originate.

The compound "gauṇyāsambhava" is to be explained as 'impossibility of a secondary (origin)', i.e. the scriptural text about the origin of the sense-organs cannot be secondary. Hence the sense-organs do originate. If it be asked: Why impossible?—(we reply:) Because the scriptural text about origin can be understood literally, because there are numerous scriptural texts regarding such an origin, and because otherwise the initial proposition will come to be contradicted, i.e. because there are numerous scriptural texts designating origination, such as: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the

[1] Śk. B. 2.4.1, p. 168.
[2] I.e. Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1—quoted by *Śrīnivāsa*.

mind and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), 'Just as small sparks come forth from fire, so exactly do all the sense-organs from this soul' (Bṛh. 2.1.20), 'Seven sense-organs arise' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.7). Having made the initial assertion, viz. that there is the knowledge of one through the knowledge of all thus: '"What being known, sir, all this comes to be known?"' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), the text goes on to declare, in order to prove it, that 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3) and so on. This initial proposition is proved only if all the effects, like the sense-organs and the rest, are admitted to have Him as their material cause. The scriptural text: 'The non-existent alone was this in the beginning' (Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1), on the other hand, is to be explained as referring to the cause. Hence there is no contradiction.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

He takes this and the next sūtra as one sūtra. Interpretation different, viz. "(The plural number in the text [1]) is secondary, because of impossibility", i.e. because prior to creation Brahman alone exists.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He regards this sūtra as answering the *prima facie* objection. He too like Rāmānuja takes this and the next sūtra as forming a single sūtra, and interprets it just like Rāmānuja.

Baladeva

Interpretation just like Rāmānuja's.

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[1] Viz. Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1. See *Śrīnivāsa* above. It has been stated under the previous *sūtra* that the words 'sense-organs' and 'sages' in that passage denote *Brahman*. But how then to account for the plural number?—to this question the present *sūtra* replies.

[2] Śrī. B. 2.4.2, p. 170, Part 2.

SŪTRA 3

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIRECT MENTION (IN) THAT OF WHAT IS PRIOR."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the direct mention," in that text, of the verb,—used in its primary sense in connection with the ether and the rest,—in reference to the sense-organs as well, the origin of the sense-organs is primary.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the origin of the sense-organs is primary,—so says the author.

"On account of the direct mention," in "that", i.e. in the text: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), of the word 'arises',—used in its primary sense with reference to the ether and so on,—with reference to the sense-organs, mentioned even prior to the ether and the rest,—the scriptural text designating the origin of the sense-organs is, indeed, primary. It is not possible that one and the same word 'arises' is used in a secondary sense with reference to the sense-organs, and in a primary sense with reference to the ether and the rest. For this reason too, it is used in a primary sense alone in both the cases.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation exactly like Rāmānuja's second half of the preceding sūtra.[1]

SŪTRA 4

"ON ACCOUNT OF SPEECH BEING PRECEDED BY THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The sense-organs originate like the ether and the rest because of the mention of speech, the vital-breath and the mind as preceded by light, water and food in the passage: '"The mind, my dear, is

[1] G.B. 2.4.3, p. 234. Chap. 2.

composed of food, the vital-breath is composed of water, speech is composed of light"' (Chānd. 6.5.4 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the allegation, viz. that in the section treating of creation, the origin of the sense-organs is not mentioned,—the author replies here:

On account of the mention in the Chāndogya of speech, the vital-breath and the mind as preceded by light, water and food respectively, having Brahman for their material cause, thus: '"The mind, my dear, is composed of food, the vital-breath is composed of water, speech is composed of light"' (Chānd. 6.5.4), there is origin (of the sense-organs). Hence it is established that the sense-organs do originate on the ground of the following reasons, viz. there is the mention of the origin (of the sense-organs) in the section treating of origin too, there are also numerous texts designating the origin of the sense-organs, and, finally, the initial assertion too that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one is established only on this view.

Here ends the section entitled "The origin of the sense-organs" (2).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 3 in his commentary. Interpretation different. He continues the same topic, viz. that the word 'prāṇa' in the above passage does not stand for the sense-organs, but for Brahman. Hence the sūtra: "Because of speech (i.e. names of objects) being preceded by that (viz. the existence of those objects)". That is, names of objects pre-suppose the existence of objects. But prior to creation there were no objects, and hence no speech or organs of speech and so on.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 3 in his commentary too. Interpretation similar to Rāmānuja's, viz. "Because of speech (i.e. names and forms) being preceded by that (i.e. by the creation by the Lord).[3]

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[1] Ś, B.
[2] Śrī. B. 2.4.3, pp. 170-71, Chap. 2.
[3] Śk. B. 2.4.3, p. 167, Parts 7 and 8.

Baladeva

He also continues the same topic thus: "Because of speech (i.e. Brahman) being prior to that (viz. pradhāna and rest)".[1]

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "The going of the seven". (Sūtras 5-6)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 5)

SŪTRA 5

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE GOING OF THE SEVEN, AND ON ACCOUNT OF BEING SPECIFIED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the doubt, viz. whether they are seven or eleven, the *prima facie* view is as follows: Because of the going (of the sense-organs), mentioned in the passage: 'The vital-breath going out all the sense-organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2[2]), and because of their being specified as seven only in that very passage: 'He does not see,—does not smell,—does not taste,—does not speak,—does not hear,—does not think,—does not touch' (Bṛh. 4.4.2[3]), the sense-organs are seven only.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, desirous of determining the number of the sense-organs, the author is stating the *prima facie* view with a view to removing the contradictions among the texts about it.

On the doubt, viz. whether these sense-organs are seven or eleven, (the *prima facie* objector replies:) "Because of the going of seven", mentioned in the passage: 'The vital-breath going out, all the sense-organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2), they are seven only. How is it known that seven alone go out? "Because of (their) being specified," i.e. because in the passage: "When the person in the sun moves about back, then he becomes non-knowing of forms, he becomes one,

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[1] G.B. 2.4.4, p. 235, Chap. 2.

[2] B.

[3] Not quoted by others. The phrase: "*iti āhuḥ ekī-bhavati*" is to be supplied in each dotted portion.

he does not see, does not smell, does not taste, does not speak, does not hear, does not think, does not touch' (Bṛh. 4.4.1-2), only seven, like the eye, etc., are specified.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

According to him "gateḥ" = avagateḥ, i.e. because of understanding.[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 6)

SŪTRA 6

"BUT (THERE ARE) HANDS AND THE REST, (THESE ADDITIONAL SENSE-ORGANS) BEING ESTABLISHED, THEREFORE (THAT) IS NOT SO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The correct conclusion is as follows: It being definitely ascertained from the passage: 'The hand, verily, is an organ of sense' (Bṛh. 3.2.8[2]) and so on, that there are more than seven, it is not to be thought there are only seven sense-organs. In accordance with the scriptural passage: 'There are ten sense-organs in a person, the soul is the eleventh' (Bṛh. 3.9.4[3]), there are eleven sense-organs.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author states the right conclusion.

The term "but" intimates the blindness of the *prima facie* opponent. In the scriptural text: 'The hand, verily, is an organ of sense. It is seized by action as an over-sense-organ, for by the hands one performs action' (Bṛh. 3.2.8), "the hands and the rest", over and above the seven, are mentioned. "Therefore" the hands and the rest, over and above the seven, "being established", and in the passage: 'All the sense-organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2) the going out of all the sense-organs being not specified, it cannot be thought that there are only seven of them. But the fact is that there are eleven sense-organs in accordance with the scriptural and Smṛti texts: 'There

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[1] Ś.B. 2.4.5, p. 653.
[2] Ś, Bh, B.
[3] *Op. cit.*

are ten sense-organs in a person, the soul is the eleventh' (Bṛh. 3.2.8), 'The sense-organs are ten and one' (Gītā 15.5). Among these, five are organs of knowledge, viz. ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. They have five objects, viz. sound and the rest. Five are organs of action, viz. speech, hands, feet, organ of elimination and organ of generation. They have five objects like word and the rest. The internal organ is the mind, the cause of resolution and the rest. In this way it is established that there are altogether eleven sense-organs.

Here ends the section entitled "The going of the seven" (2).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 5 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 6 in the commentary of the last. Interpretation of the word "sthite" different, viz. "because of abiding (in the body and assisting the soul).[1]

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The atomicity of the sense-organs". (Sūtra 7)

SŪTRA 7

"AND ATOMIC."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In accordance with the scriptural text regarding going out, viz.: 'All the sense-organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2[2]), the sense-organs are "atomic".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author is showing the size of the sense-organs.

On the doubt, viz. whether the sense-organs are atomic or all-pervading, the Sāṃkhyas maintain that they are all-pervasive, being effects of the unlimited ahaṃkāra. In accordance with the scriptural

[1] Śrī. B. 2.4.5, p. 173, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.4.5, p. 169, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.4.6.

[2] R, Śk, B.

text also: 'These are equal and infinite' (Bṛh. 1.5.13), they are certainly all-pervading, this is the *prima facie* view.

The correct conclusion is that in conformity with the scriptural text about their-going out, viz.: 'The vital-breath going out, all the sense-organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2), they are atomic. There is no fixed rule that unlimited effects arise from what is unlimited, it being found that a small flower arises from a huge tree and so on. The above-quoted scriptural text, on the other hand, simply lays down that the sense-organs are innumerable, or serves the purpose of meditation, mentioned in the scriptural text: 'Now who, verily, meditates on these, the infinite' (Bṛh. 1.5.13). Hence it is established that the sense-organs are atomic.

Here ends the section entitled "The atomicity of the sense-organs" (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "The origin of the chief vital-breath". (Sūtra 8)

SŪTRA 8

"AND THE BEST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The best," i.e. the chief vital-breath, mentioned in the scriptural text: 'The vital-breath, verily, is the oldest and the best' (Chānd. 5.1.1 [1]), originates like the great elements. Why? In conformity with the same scriptural text, viz. 'From him arise the vital-breath' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, incidentally, the origin of the chief vital-breath is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether the chief vital-breath, the cause of the subsistence of body and mentioned in the scriptural text, viz.: 'The vital-breath, verily, is the oldest and the best' (Chānd. 5.1.1), originates like the great elements,—if it be suggested: It does not originate. Why? Because in the text: 'There was neither death, nor the immortal, nor then a sign of night or day. That one breathed

[1] Ś.

without wind by its self-power. There was, verily, nothing whatsoever other than it, or higher' (Ṛg. V. 10.129.2[1]), by the words 'was breathing', meaning 'He existed breathing', the motion of the vital-breath at the time of the universal dissolution is designated.

We reply: "The chief too", i.e. the chief vital-breath, too, originates like the elements and the rest, since in the scriptural text: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), like the origin of the great elements and the rest, the origin of the chief vital-breath, too, is mentioned; and since it is known that prior to creation there was unity alone and no diversity.

The meaning of the text: 'There was neither death' (Ṛg. V. 10.129.2), on the other hand, is as follows: 'Then', i.e. at the time of the universal dissolution, 'there was no death', the killer. There was 'no immortal with self-power', i.e. there was no food of the gods (amṛta) together with the food of fathers (svadhā). There was neither the moon, the sign of the night, nor the sun, the sign of the day. 'That one,' i.e. Brahman alone, the seed of the universe, 'breathed', i.e. existed. Of what nature was He? 'Breathless,' i.e. without effects like the air and the rest, viz. in His causal state. There was nothing other than Him, i.e. Brahman.

Hence it is established that like the ether and the rest, the chief vital-breath too originates from Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled "The origin of the chief vital-breath" (4).

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "The air and function". (Sūtras 9–12)

SŪTRA 9

"(THE VITAL-BREATH IS) NOT AIR AND FUNCTION, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SEPARATE TEACHING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The vital-breath is "not" mere "air", nor a sense-organ, nor a "function" (of the sense-organs). But we hold that the vital-breath

[1] P. 387, lines 21–23.

is nothing but air that has assumed a different condition, "on account of the separate teaching", viz. 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author is stating the nature of the chief vital-breath.

On the doubt, viz. whether the vital-breath, the oldest, is the air, one of the great elements, or the general function of the sense-organs, or nothing but the great element air that has assumed a different condition, if it be suggested: In accordance with the statement, viz.: "What is the vital-breath that is the air. This air is five-fold, prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna",[1] it is nothing but the air. Or else, the vital-breath is the common function of the sense-organs as held by the Sāṃkhyas [2] and is of five kinds,—

We reply: The vital-breath is "not the air" simply, nor a general mode consisting in the function of the sense-organs. Why? "On account of the separate teaching," i.e. because in the text: 'From him arise the vital breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), the vital-breath is taught as something different from the second great element air and from the sense-organs. If the vital-breath be mere air, then this separate designation would be set aside. And, if it be a mere mode of the sense-organs, then, too, its separate designation from the possessors of the mode (viz. the sense-organs) would be futile, as what arises separately being itself an object, cannot be the function of other objects like the sense-organs. The vital-breath, thus, is nothing but the great element air that has assumed a different condition, this being the only alternative left. Hereby, any conflict with the text 'What is the vital-breath that is the air', too, is avoided.

[1] For the nature and function of these five modes, see V.R.M.

[2] Vide Sāṃ. Sū. 2.31.

SŪTRA 10

"BUT LIKE THE EYES AND THE REST, (THE VITAL-BREATH IS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE SOUL), BECAUSE OF BEING AN OBJECT TO BE TAUGHT TOGETHER WITH THEM AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Though the best, the vital-breath is but a special instrument of the individual soul, "like the eyes and the rest". Why? "On account of being an object to be taught and so on," i.e. on account of the teaching of the vital-breath together with the eyes and the rest in the dialogue among the sense-organs and so on.

The author shows that the vital-breath, being under the control of the individual soul, is serviceable to the soul like the eyes and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The meaning of the term "but" is that in spite of its superiority to the sense-organs, no independence is possible on the part of the vital-breath, as is possible on the part of the individual soul. The vital-breath is "like the eyes and the rest". That is, just as the eyes and the rest are instruments of the individual soul, so the vital-breath is a special instrument of the individual soul. To the question: Whence is it known that it is an instrument of the soul?—We reply: "Because of being an object to be taught together with them", i.e. because of the teaching of the vital-breath together with them, i.e. together with the eyes and the rest, in the dialogue among the sense-organs. By the phrase: "and so on", reasons like non-sentience, incapability of self-dependence and the rest are implied.

SŪTRA 11

"AND (THERE IS) NO FAULT ON THE GROUND OF (ITS) NOT BEING A SENSE-ORGAN, FOR THUS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: If the vital-breath be an instrument of the individual soul, then there being no activity suitable to it, there must be fault "on the ground of (its) not being a sense-organ",—

(We reply:) "no", since the scriptural text: '"I alone, dividing myself five-fold, support and hold the body"' (Praśna 2.3 [1]), "shows" that the holding up of the body is the peculiar function of the vital-breath.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Just as one can be a perceiver only if there be some object to be perceived, so a thing may be an instrument only if there be some function to be accomplished by it; and this is not found. Hence the vital-breath cannot be a sense-organ. Thus, as the vital-breath is not a sense-organ, so if it be an instrument of the individual soul, it is but a futile one,—

We reply: "No". There is no such fault. "For," i.e. since, in order that the vital-breath may be serviceable as an instrument of the individual soul, the holy Scripture "shows", under the dialogue among the sense-organs, that a purpose is served by the vital-breath as well—one that cannot be served by the sense-organs,—viz. the holding up of the body and the sense-organs: 'The chief vital-breath said to them: "Do not fall in delusion. It is I alone who, dividing myself five-fold, support and hold the body"' (Praśna 2.3).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

According to them the word "akaraṇatvāt" answers the *prima facie*, viz. that if the vital-breath be an organ of the soul, then there must be a sense-object for it, like colour for the eyes and so on. The answer is that there need be no sense-object, since the vital-breath is not an organ like the eyes and the rest. Still it is not devoid of a function, the holding of the body being its special function.[2]

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

According to them, the word "akaraṇatvāt" means: "On account of not having a function". That is, no objection can be raised on

[1] Ś.
[2] Ś.B. 2.4.11, pp. 662-63; Bh. B. 2.4.11, p. 148.

the ground that the vital-breath has no special activity, for it does have a special function.[1]

SŪTRA 12

"(THE VITAL-BREATH) HAVING FIVE MODES IS DESIGNATED LIKE THE MIND."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as the mind having many modes serves the individual soul through its own modes like desire and the rest, so the vital-breath, too, "having five modes, is designated" as serving the soul through its modes like apāna and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author points out that the same vital-breath is designated as manifold through the difference of modes, but these latter are not separate entities. The vital-breath does not serve the soul by only holding up the body, but by other functions too.

Just as in conformity with the text: 'Desire, resolution, doubt, faith,—[2], firmness, lack of firmness, bashfulness, meditation, fear,—all these are the mind alone' (Bṛh. 1.5.3), the mind alone, possessed of desire and the rest as its modes, serves the individual soul through its own modes, but desire, resolution and the rest are not special kinds of entities, so by the text: 'The prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna—all these are the vital-breath' (Bṛh. 1.5.3), the vital-breath alone "is designated as having five modes". The apāna and the rest are the modes of the vital-breath itself, but not separate entities, and it serves the soul through its own modes,—this is the sense. This being so, it is established that the vital-breath is the air itself that has assumed a different condition, an instrument of the individual soul, possessed of many modes and is the best.

Here ends the section entitled "The air and function" (5).

[1] Śrī. B. 2.4.10, p. 177, Part 2, Madras ed.; Śk. B. 2.4.10, p. 174, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.4.11.

[2] "Lack of faith."

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "The atomicity of the best". (Sūtra 13)

SŪTRA 13

"AND ATOMIC."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In accordance with the scriptural text designating departure, the vital-breath, too, is "atomic".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the size of the chief vital-breath is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether the chief vital-breath is great in size or atomic,—if the suggestion be: In accordance with the scriptural texts: 'Everything is installed in the vital-breath' (Praśna 2.6), "For all this is covered by the vital-breath", it is great in size,—

We reply: The vital-breath, the best, too, should be known to be "atomic", in accordance with the scriptural text: "He going out, the vital-breath goes out after him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2). The above scriptural texts, on the other hand, refer to the vital-breath in its collective aspect. Hence, it is established that the best (viz. the chief vital-breath) is atomic.

Here ends the section entitled "The atomicity of the best" (6).

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "The superintending of fire and the rest". (Sūtras 14–18)

SŪTRA 14

"BUT THE SUPERINTENDING OF FIRE AND THE REST, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DECLARATION OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The sense-organs proceed to their respective functions as initiated by the divinities like fire and the rest, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'Fire becoming speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. 1.2.4[1]).

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[1] Ś, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the activity of the sense-organs is being discussed.

On the doubt, viz. whether the sense-organs like the eye and the rest proceed to their respective objects through their own power alone, or as initiated by their respective presiding divinities,—the suggestion being: Through their own power, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'For by the eyes one sees colours' (Bṛh. 3.9.20),—

We reply: "Fire and so on". The term "but" is meant for disposing of the *prima facie* view. Speech and the rest function only as superintended by fire and so on, i.e. by the divinities like fire and so on. The word "superintending" means that which is superintended or initiated, i.e. an object to be initiated. Just as chariots and the rest move as superintended by charioteers and others, so is the case here. Why? "On account of the declaration of that", i.e. "on account of the declaration", or mention, in the sacred text, "of that" or of the fact of their being superintended by fire and the rest,[1] thus: 'Fire becoming speech entered into the mouth, the air becoming the vital-breath entered into the nose, the sun becoming sight entered into the eyes' (Ait. 1.2.4). If there be no relation of the initiated and the initiator, the entering of the fire and the rest must become meaningless. The scriptural text: 'For by the eyes' (Bṛh. 3.9.20) and so on should be known to have served its purpose by proving simply that the eyes and the rest are sense-organs.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They read this and the next sūtra as one sūtra, interpreting it differently thus: "But the rule of the fire and the rest with the bearer of the vital-breath (i.e. the individual soul) (over the sense-organs is) on account of the thinking of that (viz. the Lord), in accordance with scriptural text." That is, we learn from Scripture that the fire-god and the rest, as well as the individual soul rule over the sense-organs, but their rule depends on the will of the Lord.[2]

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[1] This explains the compound "*tad-āmanandt*".

[2] Śrī. B. 2.4.14, pp. 181-82, Part 1, Madras ed.; Śk. B. 2.4.14, p. 178, Parts 7 and 8.

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. "But the light (jyotiḥ) is the prime ruler (ādyadhiṣṭhāna), on account of the declaration of that." That is, the Lord is the primary initiator of the sense-organs, while the fire-god and the rest, and the individual soul are secondary initiators.[1]

SŪTRA 15

"WITH THE POSSESSOR OF THE VITAL-BREATH, ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is a servant-master relation between the sense-organs and the individual soul alone. The soul is the enjoyer, "on account of the scriptural text": 'Now where the eye has entered into the ether, that is the seeing person: the eye is for seeing' (Chānd. 8.12.4[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If this be so, then enjoyment, too, may pertain to the gods,—to this the author replies:

The possessor of the vital-breath is one who has the vital-breath, the cause of the holding up of the body and the sense-organs. The sense-organs have a servant-master relation "with the possessor of the vital-breath", i.e. with the individual soul. This being so, the possessor of the vital-breath alone is the enjoyer of objects through the sense-organs,—this is the sense. Why? "On account of scriptural text", i.e. on account of the scriptural text: 'Now, where the eye has entered into the ether, that is the seeing person; the eye is for seeing' (Chānd. 8.12.4).

[1] G.B. 2.4.14, p. 249, Chap. 2.
[2] Ś, B.

SŪTRA 16

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE ETERNITY OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the eternity" of the above relationship with the individual soul alone, but not with the presiding deities.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the enjoyer of the fruits, accomplishable by the sense-organs, is their master, the possessor of the vital-breath alone; but their presiding deities are not such enjoyers, "on account of the eternity of that", i.e. because there is an eternal relation between the sense-organs and the possessor of the vital-breath alone, as proved by the scriptural text: 'He going out the vital-breath goes out after him. The vital-breath going out all the sense-organs go out after it' (Bṛh. 4.4.2). The gods, on the other hand, abide in highest lordship, and not in what is wretched (viz. the body), in accordance with the scriptural text: 'Evil, verily, does not approach the gods' (Bṛh. 1.5.20[1]).

COMPARISON

All others add a "ca" in the middle thus: "Tasya ca nityatvāt".

Śaṃkara

The interpretation of the word "tasya" different, viz.: "Because of the eternity of that (viz. of the individual soul)". That is, the individual soul alone abides permanently in the body as the enjoyer, but the deities cannot do so.[2]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 14 in their commentaries. Interpretation different: On account of the eternity of that (viz. of the attribute of being ruled by the Lord). That is, all objects are eternally ruled by the Lord alone. Hence it follows that the rule of the sense-organs by the deities and the individual soul really depends upon the will of the Lord.[3]

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[1] Reading: "*pāpam*" and not "*anagham*". Vide Bṛh. 1.5.20, p. 70.
[2] Ś.B. 2.4.16, pp. 667-68.
[3] Śrī. B. 2.4.14, p. 182, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.4.14, pp. 178-79, Parts 7 and 8.

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. And on account of the eternity of that, (i.e. of the relationship between the Lord and the gods). That is, there being an eternal relation between the gods and the Lord, the real ruler, the gods rule the sense-organs and so on, through the mere will of the Lord.[1]

SŪTRA 17

"THEY (ARE) SENSE-ORGANS, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF THOSE AS OTHER THAN THE BEST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the designation of those," i.e. of sense-organs, as different from the chief in the passage: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3[2]), "they", i.e. the sense-organs, are different entities called 'sense-organs', but not particular modes of the chief.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz. in conformity with the scriptural text: '"Come, let us all become a form of him." Of him alone, they became a form' (Bṛh. 1.5.21[3]), other sense-organs, like the eye and the rest, are different modes of the chief vital-breath. They are not separate entities and cannot, therefore, have a separate relation with the possessor of the vital-breath (viz. the individual soul), our purpose being served if they have a relation with the vital-breath alone,—the author replies here.

"On account of the designation of those," i.e. of them "as different from the chief" vital-breath in the passage: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), separate entities indeed are designated by the scriptural text: 'Those prāṇas

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[1] G.B. 2.4.16, p. 250, Chap. 2.

[2] Ś. Bh, B.

[3] Vide Bṛh. 1.5.21 for the story. When the different sense-organs were created by *Prajāpati*, death came and overcame them all, with the exception of the vital-breath. Thereupon, the sense-organs decided to assume the form of the vital-breath.

other than the chief, are the sense-organs'. Otherwise, the eye and the rest too being understood—like apāna and so on—simply by the phrase: 'From him arise the vital-breath', the separate mention: 'and all the sense-organs' must be meaningless. Hence the sense-organs being separate entities, their relation with the possessor of the vital-breath or the individual soul must be depicted to be certainly different from their relation with the vital-breath.

It cannot be said also that the mind too, which is separately designated, cannot be a sense-organ,—since in accordance with the Smṛti passages, viz.: "The sense-organs of which the mind is the sixth" (Gītā 15.7), "The sense-organs are ten and one" (Gītā 13.6), as well as in accordance with the scriptural text: 'There are ten sense-organs in a person, the soul is the eleventh' (Bṛh. 3.9.4), the mind as well is admitted to be a sense-organ. The separate designation of the mind, too, is not futile, since the mind being the leader of the sense-organs in conformity with the text: '"And of the sense-organs, I am the mind"' (Gītā 10.22), such a separate mention has a meaning. By the scriptural text: '" Come let us assume all become a form of him alone"' (Bṛh. 1.5.21), on the other hand, it is denoted simply that the activities of the sense-organs are under the control of the vital-breath. The sense-organs, also, being under the vital-breath, are called 'vital-breaths',[1] just as in the text: 'All this verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), the term 'Brahman' has been applied to the world, it being under His control.

SŪTRA 18

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL TEXT REGARDING DIFFERENCE AND ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the scriptural mention of the difference" of the chief vital-breath from speech and the rest at the end of the section treating of speech, etc. thus: 'Then, verily, they said to the breath in the mouth' (Bṛh. 1.3.7[2]); "and on account of the difference" of the sense-organs, the apprehenders of sense-objects, from the best vital-breath, the cause of the subsistence of the body, the sense-organs and the rest,—they are separate entities.

[1] Prāṇa. [2] Ś, Bh.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having begun thus: 'They said to speech' (Bṛh. 1.3.2), and having concluded the section treating of speech and the rest, destroyed by the demons, Scripture goes on to declare the chief vital-breath as different from the sense-organs like speech, etc. in a passage in a different section: 'Then, verily, they said to the breath in the mouth' (Bṛh. 1.3.7). There is also a great difference between them, such as: the best vital-breath is the cause of the holding up of the body, the sense-organs and so on, while the sense-organs have speech and the rest for their objects, and so on. Hence, the sense-organs are different from the chief vital-breath,—this is the sense. Thus it is established that the sense-organs [1],—presided over by the gods, connected with the individual soul, and denoted by the term 'sense-organ',—are different from the best vital-breath.

Here ends the section entitled "The superintending of fire and the rest" (7).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They divide this sūtra into two different sūtras, thus: "Bheda-śruteḥ" and "Vailakṣaṇāc ca".

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "The making of name and form". (Sūtras 19–21)

SŪTRA 19

"BUT THE MAKING OF NAME AND FORM (IS THE FUNCTION) OF HIM WHO RENDERS TRIPARTITE, ON ACCOUNT OF TEACHING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The evolution of names and forms too,—mentioned in the texts: 'That divinity thought: "Come, let me, having entered into these

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[1] Prāṇas.

three deities with this living soul, evolve name and forms"' (Chānd. 6.3.2[1]), '"Let me make each of them tripartite"' (Chānd. 6.3.3[2])—is the work of the Supreme Being alone "who renders tripartite". He alone who made each of the deities tripartite is the creator of names and forms like fire, sun and the rest. Why? Because beginning thus: 'That divinity' (Chānd. 6.3.2), the text goes on to teach that the evolution (of names and forms) is due to the Supreme Deity thus: '"Let me, having entered with this living soul, evolve name and form"'[3] (Chānd. 6.3.2).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, there being an enquiry with regard to the characteristic marks of the object which one should desire to enquire into (viz. Brahman), it has been established in the preceding chapter[4], that He is the cause of the world. Here, on the other hand, with a view to confirming it and demonstrating the cause of the world as held by us, it has been firmly established, after an examination of the cause as designated by others,[5] that the ether and the rest are created by Brahman. Then, the author is, now, removing a doubt as to whether the evolution of name and form is due to the Supreme Brahman—a doubt arising from the word 'individual soul' in the scriptural text to be cited hereafter.

The evolution of name and form is mentioned in the Chāndogya, under the section teaching of the Existent, in the passages: 'That divinity thought: "Come, let me, having entered into these three deities with the living soul (jīvātman), evolve name and form"' (Chānd. 6.3.2), '"Let me make each of them tripartite"' (Chānd. 6.3.3). The question is: Is this evolution due to the individual soul or to the Supreme Soul? If it be suggested: To the individual soul alone, as indicated by the phrase: 'having entered with this living soul',—

We reply: The word "but" is meant for disposing of the *prima facie* view. "The making of name and form," i.e. the evolution of name and form, can be the work "of one who renders tripartite", i.e. of the Supreme Soul alone, omniscient and omnipotent who made

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
[2] *Op. cit.*
[3] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
[4] Vide Br. Śū. 1.1.2.
[5] In the 2nd *pāda* of the 2nd chap.

each of the deities tripartite. Why? Having begun thus: "That divinity thought" (Chānd. 6.3.2), the text goes on to designate,—through the use of the first person: '"Let *me* evolve name and form"' (Chānd. 6.3.2),—the Lord's resolve to evolve names and forms thus: '"Let me make each of them tripartite"' (Chānd. 6.3.3). Then, for fulfilling this desire, having made each of the deities tripartite prior to the creation of the egg, having then created the egg, and having then entered therein, He made names and forms. The scriptural text about tripartition secondarily implies the process of making each element five-fold. Thus, as the Supreme Brahman alone, who renders tripartite, has been designated as the creator of names and forms; and as the individual soul is incapable of creating names and forms, the evolution is due to the former alone. The motive for using the term 'individual soul' (jīvātman) here will be made clear by the aphorism: "For (Brahman is) without form" (Br. Sū. 3.2.14).

SŪTRA 20

"FLESH AND THE REST ARE OF AN EARTHLY NATURE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCRIPTURAL TEXT, AND THE OTHER TOO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That in the body there are the evolutes of fire, water and food, made tripartite, may be ascertained from scriptural text itself, viz. 'From the earth the excreta, flesh and the mind; from water urine, blood and the vital-breath; from fire the bones, marrow and speech'.[1]

Vedānta-kaustubha

With a view to exhibiting the worthlessness of the physical body, the author is demonstrating that the evolutes of the fire, water and earth, made tripartite, pertain to the body.

"Flesh and the rest" should be known, "in accordance with scriptural text", "to be of an earthly nature", i.e. to be arising from, the earth, made tripartite, and of the form of rice, barley and so on consumed by the embodied soul. By the phrase: "and so on", the excreta and the mind are to be understood. The scriptural text is to the effect: 'The food which is consumed becomes three-fold.

[1] Not quoted by others.

That which is its grossest portion becomes the excreta; that which is the medium, the flesh; that which is the finest, the mind' (Chānd. 6.5.1). Similarly, the three evolutes of each "of the other two also", i.e. of water and fire, are to be understood. The urine, blood and the vital-breath,—these are the evolutes of water. The bones, marrow and speech,—these are the evolutes of fire. Here, the vital-breath is taken to be an evolute of water, only because it depends on water for its existence, the vital-breath being really but a special state of the air itself.[1] Likewise, the designation of the earthly nature of the mind is only meant for showing that its well-being depends to the consumption of food.[2] The evolutes of fire, too, are to be understood in a similar manner.

SŪTRA 21

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIALITY, (THERE IS) THAT DESIGNATION, THAT DESIGNATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"But" they are regarded as different is on the ground of the preponderance of parts.

Here ends the fourth quarter of the second chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, the explanation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. What is the ground of distinguishing among the evolutes of these three elements, made tripartite,—the author replies:

The term "but" is meant for disposing of the objection. On account of the preponderance of one element,[3] "the designation", viz. that this is an evolute of this, this of that and so on, is proper.

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[1] Vide Br. Sū. 2.4.9.

[2] Vide the story of *Śvetaketu* who failed to remember and recite the *Ṛg-verses* and so on when he was fasting, but remembered and answered everything when he took food. Vide Chānd. 6.8.7.

[3] This explains the compound "Vaiseṣyāt".

The repetition indicates the conclusion of the chapter. Hence it is established that there is no contradiction whatsoever among the scriptural texts which are in concordance with regard to Brahman, Lord Vāsudeva.

Here ends the section entitled "The making of name and form" (8).

Here ends the fourth quarter of the second chapter of the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the holy Nimbārka, the founder and the teacher of the sect of the venerable Sanatkumāra.

Here ends the second chapter entitled "Non-contradiction".

Résumé

The fourth quarter of the second chapter contains—

1. 21 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 22 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
3. 19 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 22 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 19 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 22 sūtras and 15 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva divide sūtra 18 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras. Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha take sūtras 2 and 3 in Nimbārka's commentary as one sūtra, also sūtras 14 and 15 as one sūtra.

END OF VOLUME I

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OF

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AND

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OF

ŚRĪNIVĀSA

(COMMENTARIES ON THE BRAHMA-SŪTRAS)

(ENGLISH TRANSLATION)

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VOLUME II

THIRD CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FIRST QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "Obtaining what is different from that". (Sūtras 1–7)

SŪTRA 1

"IN OBTAINING (A BODY) DIFFERENT FROM THAT (THE SOUL) HASTENS CLOSELY EMBRACED, FROM QUESTION AND DETERMINATION."

The interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras, entitled the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

The object to be established (viz. Brahman) being definitely ascertained by means of concordance and non-contradiction,[1] now the means (sādhanas) are being determined. Here with a view to generating dispassion, the author is, first, exhibiting the soul's going to and returning from the heaven and the rest. The individual soul, having the stated marks[2] and possessed of the vital-breath, discarding the present body, goes to another body, as "closely embraced" indeed by the subtle elements. This is known "from question to determination", viz.: 'Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man?' (Chānd. 5.3.3[3]) and so on.

THE COMMENTARY ENTITLED VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA, COMPOSED BY THE REVEREND ŚRĪNIVĀSA.

The object to be resorted to, an ocean of all auspicious attributes, free by nature from all faults and the object which one should desire to enquire after—being determined in the two preceding chapters,

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[1] The concordance of all the scriptural texts with regard to Brahman has been demonstrated in the first chapter; and the non-contradiction in the doctrine of the causality of Brahman, in the second.

[2] Vide Br. Sū. 2.3.16 ff.

[3] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

now, on an enquiry into the means of attaining Him, the means are being designated. The first quarter of this first chapter, which explains the meaning of several Vedānta texts and removes a variety of doubts, tries to generate a strong feeling of disgust towards mundane existence by demonstrating the imperfections of the world. The second quarter tries to generate a yearning for Brahman by demonstrating His attributes. In the third quarter, discussions about the difference or non-difference among the meditations on Brahman, as well as the determination of the combination or non-combination of details therein, are undertaken. In the fourth quarter, on the other hand, the doubt being, viz. whether the highest end of men is derived from knowledge or from action, it is established that the highest end of man arises from knowledge, while work, which is without any desire for fruits, is a subsidiary part of knowledge.

To begin: In accordance with the texts: 'Then these vital-breaths gather round him' (Bṛh. 4.4.1), 'It makes another newer . . . [1] form' (Bṛh. 4.4.4) the individual soul, accompanied by the vital-breath, the sense-organs and so on, having discarded the prior body, obtains another body with a view to enjoying the fruits of the works done by itself. Here a doubt arises, viz. whether it goes closely embraced by the subtle elements which are the seeds of the future body, or not so embraced? If the *prima facie* view be: In accordance with the view of the Sāṃkhyas, viz.: 'Wherever, in heaven or in hell, the fruits of work are undergone, there alone the particles of elements, originating the body which is the abode for undergoing the fruits of works, are obtained', the soul is accompanied by these—the author states the correct conclusion.

The individual soul "hastens", i.e. goes, "closely embraced", i.e. surrounded indeed by the subtle elements, the substratum of the vital-breath and the rest and the seeds of the future body, "in obtaining (a body) different from that", i.e. when entering another body. Why? "On account of question and determination." The question, to begin with, is contained under the knowledge of five fires,[2] thus: "'Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man?'" (Chānd. 5.3.3). "Determination" means answer, and it, beginning thus: '"In this fire the gods offer reverence. From

[1] "A more auspicious."

[2] Pañcāgni-vidyā. Vide Chānd. 5.3–5.10.

that offering Soma, the king, arises"' (Chānd. 5.4.2) and so on, establishes that water alone, offered to the heaven-world and so on, becomes denotable by that term thus: '"In the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man"' (Chānd. 5.9.1). The sense is this: 'The gods', i.e. the vital-breaths which are the associates of the individual soul, 'offer', i.e. throw, 'reverence' to the heaven-world, imagined as fire; and that is transformed into an immortal body, called 'Soma, the king'. Those very gods offer that body to the fire of cloud; and that body, offered thereto, becomes rain. The very same gods offer that rain to the fire of earth; and that, offered thereto, assumes the form of food. The very same gods offer that food to the fire of person; and offered thereto, that food assumes the form of semen. The very same gods offer that semen to the fire of woman, and that semen, offered thereto, becomes an embryo and obtains the name of a person. In this way, water comes to attain the name of a person. Although acquainted with all this, the king Pravāhaṇa, having put to Śvetaketu the questions about the goal of workers, asked this too thus: 'Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man?' (Chānd. 5.3.3). Thus asked, Śvetaketu, approaching his father Gautama, said: 'I have been asked thus by the king, I do not know its answer'. Gautama, himself not knowing it, approached the king and said: 'Impart that knowledge to us'. Thereupon the king answered Gautama. From such question and answer, it is definitely ascertained that the individual soul goes to another body as closely embraced indeed by the invisible subtle elements.

SŪTRA 2

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF (WATER) CONSISTING OF THE THREE (ELEMENTS), ON ACCOUNT OF PREPONDERANCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since water consists of the three elements in accordance with the scriptural text about tripartition,[1] the other two are also to be understood here. The mention of water only, on the other hand, fits in on account of its preponderance.

[1] Vide Chānd. 6.3.3. See Br. Sū. 2.4.19–21.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz., since in the question: '"Do you know how in the fifth oblation"' (Chānd. 5.3.3), and likewise in the determination (i.e. answer), there is the mention of the term 'water', it is known that the soul goes surrounded by water. This being so, it cannot be said that it goes surrounded by all the subtle elements,—the author says:

The term "but" is meant for disposing of the objection. Since water consists of the three elements in accordance with the scriptural text: '"Let me make each of them tripartite"' (Chānd. 6.3.3), the other two also are understood, viz. food and fire, the rise of the body from mere water being impossible. Why, then, there is the mention of water only in the question as well as in the answer?—to this the author replies: "On account of preponderance" of water, it alone has been mentioned. Although it appears that in the body there is the preponderance of the earth, since it is observed to be hard, yet on account of there being the preponderance of water in semen and blood, the statement: "On account of preponderance" is perfectly justifiable.

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. "Ātmakāt tu . . .".[1]

SŪTRA 3

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE GOING OF THE SENSE-ORGANS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because of the scriptural declaration of the going of the sense-organs thus "He going out . . . all the sense-organs go out after him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2[2]), the soul goes, closely embraced indeed by the subtle elements.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In accordance with the scriptural text: 'He going out the vital-breath goes out after him. The vital-breath going out, all the sense-

[1] Bh. B. 3.1.2, p. 152.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

organs go out after it' (Bṛh. 4.4.2); in accordance with the Smṛti passages: '"It draws the sense-organs of which the mind is the sixth"' (Gītā 15.7), '"When the lord obtains a body and when he departs from it, he goes taking them, as the wind take fragrances from their abodes"' (Gītā 15.8); as well as on account of this going of the sense-organs like speech and the rest together with the chief (vital-breath), the soul goes closely embraced indeed by the subtle elements, as going is not possible on the part of the sense-organs which are without a substratum,—this is the sense.

SŪTRA 4

"IF IT BE OBJECTED: ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION OF THE GOING (OF SPEECH AND THE REST) TO FIRE AND THE REST, —(WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF METAPHORICAL NATURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: Because of the scriptural mention of the "going", i.e. disappearance, of speech and the rest into fire and so on thus: 'When the speech of this dead man goes into fire, his breath into the air, his eye into the sun' (Bṛh. 3.2.13[1]) and so on, they do not go with the soul,—(we reply:) "No", "on account of the metaphorical nature" of the text about fire and the rest, it being cited together with the text: 'His body-hairs to the medicinal herbs, his hairs on the head to the trees' (Bṛh. 3.12.13[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The going of the sense-organs with the individual soul is not justifiable, since the text: 'When the speech of this dead man goes into fire, his breath into the air, his eye into the sun' (Bṛh. 3.2.13) mentions the "going", i.e. the disappearance at the time of the death of the body, of the sense-organs like speech and the rest, into the deities like fire and so on,—(we reply:) "No". Why? "On account of metaphorical nature". That is, the scriptural

[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B. [2] *Op. cit.*

text about the dissolution of speech and the rest into fire and so on is only figurative, concerned with the passing out of the presiding deities, while the text: 'The vital-breath going out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2) may be interpreted literally. The metaphorical nature of the text: 'When the speech of this dead man' (Bṛh.3.12.13) is known from the fact of its being cited together with the text: 'His body-hairs to the medicinal herbs, his hairs on the head to the trees' (Bṛh. 3.12.13). It is never found that the body-hairs and the rest of a dead man dissolve into the medicinal herbs, etc.

SŪTRA 5

"IF IT BE OBJECTED ON ACCOUNT OF NON-MENTION IN THE FIRST, (WE REPLY :) IT ALONE,[1] ON ACCOUNT OF FITTING IN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: "On account of the non-mention of water "in the first" fire, how can it become a person in the fifth oblation? —(we reply:) "No", since by the term 'reverence' "it alone" is denoted. "on account of the fitting in" of the introduction and the rest (on this view alone).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: In the text: 'In this fire the gods offer reverence' (Chānd. 5.4.2) reverence is mentioned as the object to be offered "in the first" fire, but there is no mention of water, and hence how can water become a person in the fifth oblation; and how, in the absence of its mention at first, can the going of the soul as closely embraced by the subtle elements (i.e. waters) be admitted on the ground of its consisting of the three (elements) ?—

(We reply:) "No". The term "for" implies the reason, i.e. because "the very same" water, mentioned in the question; '"Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man ?"' (Chānd. 5.3.3), is denoted by the word 'reverence'. Why ? "On account of fitting in", i.e. on account of the fitting in of the introduction and the conclusion; otherwise the question and the

[1] The word 'Ap' (=water) is always plural. Hence the plural form "tāḥ" has been used in the sūtra.

answer cannot refer to the same topic. Thus, if in the beginning of the answer, viz. '"In this fire the gods offer reverence"' (Chānd. 5.4.2), given to the question, viz. '"Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of a man?"' (Chānd. 5.3.3), by the term 'reverence' (śraddhā) reverence which is of the form of a special kind of mental mode be understood, then evidently such a reverence, a mere mental mode, cannot be referred to in the subsequent passage: '"Thus, verily, in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of a man"' (Chānd. 5.9.1).

Thus, there must be (on this view) one kind of question, another kind of beginning of answer, and another kind of answer. Moreover, it is impossible for reverence, which is of the form of a mental mode, to be an object that may be offered; and it is also impossible for the moon, rain and the rest to have a mental mode as their material cause. In the text: 'Water indeed produces faith in him for holy works', water is declared to be the cause of reverence and reverence is declared to be its effect. Accordingly, the word 'reverence' should be known to imply water metaphorically.[1] The application of the word 'reverence' to water is found in Scripture itself. Compare the passage: 'Reverence, verily, is water. Beginning with reverence alone he performs a sacrifice' (Tait. Saṃ. 1.6.8.1 [2]). The moon too is declared by Scripture to have reverence for its material cause in the passage: '"(The gods) offer reverence. From that offering Soma, the king, arises"' (Chānd. 5.4.2).

SŪTRA 6

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF NOT BEING MENTIONED, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THOSE WHO PERFORM SACRIFICES AND THE REST BEING KNOWN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that it cannot be said that the individual soul goes, closely embraced by the subtle elements, because there is no

[1] That is, the cause and the effect being non-different, the effect (reverence) may stand for the cause (water).

[2] P. 81, lines 23-24, vol. 1.

mention of the individual soul as there is of water and the rest,—(we reply:) "no". Having established that those who perform sacrifices attain the world of the moon through the path of smoke, thus: 'Those who worship through sacrifice, charitable deeds and alms-giving,—they pass into the smoke' (Chānd. 5.10.3 [1]), the text goes on to establish them alone by the word 'Soma', thus: 'This is Soma, the king' (Chānd. 5.10.4 [2]). As pious workers are referred to in the passage: 'Soma, the king, arises' (Chānd. 5.1.2), the above objection has no force.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: water may be denoted by the term 'person' in the fifth oblation through the successive order of reverence, moon, rain and so on. Other two elements, too, may be understood on account of water consisting of the three elements. But it cannot be said that the individual soul goes, closely embraced by the elements like water and so on. Why? Because in this text there is no mention of the individual soul as there is of water and the rest,—

We reply: "No". Why? "On account of those who perform sacrifices and the rest being known." Having established that those who perform sacrifices and so on attain the world of the moon through the path of smoke thus: 'Those who worship through sacrifices, charitable deeds and alms-giving—they pass into the flame' (Chānd. 5.10.3), the text goes on to denote them alone (viz. those who perform sacrifices, etc.) by the word 'Soma, the king', thus 'This is Soma, the king' (Chānd. 5.10.4). This being so, in the text under discussion too, viz. 'In this fire the gods offer reverence. From that offering Soma, the king, arises' (Chānd. 5.4.2), those who perform sacrifices and the rest are referred to by the words 'Soma, the king'. So there is indeed the mention of the individual soul. The sense is that it goes, closely embraced by the subtle elements like water and the rest. There is no fault whatsoever here.

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, B.

[2] Correct quotation: "Eṣa Soma rājā". Vide Chānd. 5.10.4, p. 261; Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

SŪTRA 7

"OR (THAT DESIGNATION IS) METAPHORICAL, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING NOT ACQUAINTED WITH THE SOUL, FOR THIS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS.

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The mere workers "being not acquainted with the soul", stand in a subordinate relation to the gods, and hence the designation of those who perform sacrifices and the rest as edible, viz. 'That is the food of the gods. The gods eat that' (Chānd. 5.10.4 [1]) is "metaphorical", in accordance with the scriptural text: 'He is like a beast of the gods' (Bṛh. 1.4.10 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. The going of the souls, which perform sacrifices and the rest, to the world of the moon for undergoing the fruits of works appears to be inconsistent, because in the text: 'That is the food of the gods. The gods eat that' (Chānd. 5.10.4), Soma is mentioned as the food of the gods. Hence it cannot be said that the text: 'Soma, the king, arises' (Chānd. 5.4.2) refers to the souls which perform sacrifices and the rest, it being impossible for the souls to be food,—the author replies:

The term "Or" is meant for disposing of the objection. Since those who perform sacrifices and the rest are only implements of enjoyment,—like sons, servants and so on,—to the gods, the statement that they are food is "metaphorical", i.e. figurative, but not literal, in conformity with the denial of chewing (i.e. actual eating) on the part of the gods in the passage: 'The gods, verily, do not eat, do not drink, (but) are satisfied by seeing that very nectar' (Bṛh. 1.4.10).

If it be objected: It is unreasonable to hold that one who has become a god (viz. Soma) too is the implement of another's enjoyment, like sons, servants and the rest,—(We reply:) no, "on account of being not acquainted with the soul". Even then, it is indeed reasonable to hold that the mere workers "on account of not being acquainted with the soul", are the implements of the enjoyment of those who are possessed of knowledge.

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B. [2] *Op. cit.*

With a view to dispelling the notion that the view established by him is based only on what is seen,[1] the author says: "For this (Scripture) shows". The scriptural text: 'He is like a beast of the gods' (Bṛh. 1.4.10) "shows" that the individual soul, because of being not acquainted with the Ātman, is an implement of the enjoyment of gods.

Here ends the section entitled "Obtaining what is different from that" (1).

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

Reading slightly different, viz. he substitutes "Ca" for "Vā".[2]

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "The passing away of works". (Sūtras 8–11)

SŪTRA 8

"ON THE PASSING AWAY OF WORKS, (THE SOUL RE-DESCENDS AS) POSSESSED OF THE REMNANTS OF RESULTS, ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT IS SEEN (I.E. SCRIPTURE) AND SMṚTI, AS (IT) HAD COME AND NOT THUS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the decay of the works, productive of fruits in the next world, the soul, possessed of the works, productive of fruits in this world, re-descends "as (it had) come and not thus", in accordance with the scriptural text: 'Hence those who are of a pleasant conduct here, the prospect is indeed that they will attain a pleasant birth' (Chānd. 5.10.7 [3]), and in accordance with the Smṛti passage: 'Men of (different) castes and stages of life, who are devoted to their own works, having departed and having undergone the fruits of works, attain, through the remnant of that, births in distinguished castes and families,

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[1] Vide the objection above that the soul is never *seen* to be food.

[2] Bh. B. 3.1.7, p. 154.

[3] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

endowed with beauty, longevity, scriptural knowledge, wealth, happiness and intelligence' (G.D.S. 11.2.9 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus it has been established that the workers, while ascending, are closely embraced by water and the rest. Now, if all Karmas be exhausted by enjoyment there, the souls cannot evidently attain again various kinds of bodies,—it is being established now that while descending, they are possessed of the remnants of the consequences of their acts.

In the text: 'Having dwelt there as long as there is a remnant (of their good works) (Sampāta), then they return again by the way they came' (Chānd. 5.10.5) and so on, the descent of those who are in heaven is recorded. Here a doubt arises, viz. whether the soul, which is in heaven, re-descends without any remnants of the results of its acts, or as possessed of the remnants of results. The *prima facie* view is as follows: The word "Sampāta" means whereby one falls down,[2] i.e. work. Hence in accordance with the text: 'Having dwelt as long as there is *sampāta*' (Chānd. 5.10.5), the soul enjoys all the fruits of its works. This being so, after enjoying all works, the soul re-descends without any remnants of the results of its acts.

With regard to it, we reply: "On the passing away", i.e. on the decay, through enjoyment, "of works", i.e. only of works like sacrifices and the rest, performed with the attainment of heaven in view, the individual soul, "possessed of the remnants of consequences", re-descends "as (it had) come", i.e. as it had gone, or in the way of its ascent, "and not thus", i.e. in a different way. By the scripture text: 'As long as there is *sampāta*' (Chānd. 5.10.5) and so on, the group of works, the cause of the attainment of heaven, is denoted. By the term "remnants of results" ("anuśaya") the works, other than the above and the causes of the attainment of the body and the rest, are understood. The sense is that one, who is possessed of these remnants of results, re-descends by the way of its ascent, the order of which is: smoke, night, the other (viz. the dark) fortnight,

[1] P. 15, lines 18–20. Slight variations are found.
S, R, Bh.

[2] Sampatati anena sampātaḥ.

the six months of the northern progress of the sun, the world of fathers, the ether and the moon,[1] i.e. through the order: the moon, the ether, the air, smoke, mist, cloud and rain.[2] Why? "On account of what is seen and Smṛti." 'What is seen' means Scripture, and it declares the descent of the soul as possessed of the remnants of its works thus: 'Then those who are of a pleasant conduct here,—the prospect is indeed that they will attain a pleasant birth, the birth of a Brāhmaṇa, or the birth of Kṣatriya, or the birth of a Vaiśya. Now, who are of a stinking conduct here,—the prospect is indeed that they will attain a stinking birth, the birth of a dog, or the birth of a pig, or the birth of a Caṇḍāla'[3] (Chānd. 5.10.7). The sense is: 'Those who are of a pleasant conduct', i.e. those who perform good deeds, when re-descended here from heaven, attain the births of a Brāhmaṇa and the rest. But 'those who are of a stinking conduct', i.e. those who perform contemptible deeds, having returned here from hell, attain the births of dogs, pigs, and the rest. Smṛti too declares the descent of the soul as possessed of the remnants of its works thus: 'Men of (different) castes and stages of life, who are devoted to their own works, having departed and having undergone the fruits of works, attain, through the remnant of these, births in distinguished castes and families, endowed with beauty, longevity, scriptural knowledge, wealth, happiness and intelligence' (G.D.S. 11.29).

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

Reading slightly different, viz. he leaves out the "Ca".[4]

Baladeva

He divides this sūtra into two separate sūtras,—thus: "Kṛtā'tyaye ....." and "Yathetam . . . ca".[5]

[1] Vide Chānd. 5.10.3-4. This is, the order of ascent.

[2] Vide Chānd. 5.10.5-6. That is, the order of descent is partly similar ("Yathetam") to that of ascent, and partly dissimilar ("anevam") to it. The two journeys are alike, as in both cases the soul passes through the moon, the ether and smoke; but different, as the descending soul passes through the air and does not pass through the world of fathers and the rest of the stages of ascent. Vide also Bṛh. 6.2.16—exactly similar account given.

[3] An outcaste, born of a Brāhmaṇa mother and a Śūdra father.

[4] Bh. B. 3.1.8, p. 154.

[5] G.B. 3.1.8.

SŪTRA 9

"IF IT BE OBJECTED: ON ACCOUNT OF CONDUCT, (WE REPLY:) NO, (THE TEXT IS) MEANT TO CONNOTE THAT (VIZ. WORK) METAPHORICALLY, SO KĀRṢṆĀJINI THINKS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that in the phrase: "of a pleasant conduct" (ramaṇīya-caraṇā) (Chānd. 5.10.7), the word 'caraṇa' means conduct. Our purpose being served therefrom alone, the descent of the soul as possessed of the remnants of its works is not possible,—(We reply:) "No", since the text about 'Caraṇa' "is meant to connote" work, "so Kārṣṇājini" thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: If in the text: 'Those who are of a pleasant conduct attain a pleasant birth. Those who are of a stinking conduct attain a stinking birth' (Chānd. 5.10.7), the word 'Caraṇa' means good and bad deeds, then alone we can assert that the soul descends as possessed of the remnants of its work for attaining good and bad births; but that is not the case. Why? "On account of conduct," i.e. on account of behaviour. As the attainment of good and bad births, is mentioned here the word 'Caraṇa' does not mean work, but only conduct; and this latter has been designated in the Veda by the word 'good conduct' as different indeed from work thus: 'Those works which are irreproachable are to be practised and not others. Those that are our good should be revered by you and not others' (Tait. 1.11). Hence to say that the soul re-descends as possessed of the remnants of its works is inconsistent,—

(We reply:) "No", since the teacher "Kārṣṇājini" thinks that the scriptural text about 'caraṇa', is "meant to connote" work "metaphorically", as in the absence of good and bad deeds, the attainment of good and bad births from mere conduct is impossible.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. omit "tad".[1]

[1] Ś.B. 3.1.9, p. 691; Bh. B. 3.1.9, p. 155.

SŪTRA 10

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THERE IS) FUTILITY, (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF THE DEPENDENCE ON THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that in that case there may be "futility of conduct,—(we reply:) "no", "because of the dependence" of works on conduct.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected that there may be "futility" of conduct called 'caraṇa', if it be admitted that the scriptural text about 'caraṇa' is meant for connoting work,—(we reply:) "no", "because of the dependence" of good and bad works on good and bad conduct, the former being accomplishable by the latter, in accordance with the Smṛti passage: 'The Vedas do not purify one who is devoid of good conduct' (V. Sm. 6.3 [1]).

SŪTRA 11

"BUT (THE WORD 'CARAṆA' MEANS) NOTHING BUT GOOD AND BAD WORKS, SO BĀDARI (THINKS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Good and bad works" are denoted by the word 'caraṇa', "so Bādari" (holds).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the phrase: 'of a pleasant conduct' (ramaṇīya-caraṇā) the word 'caraṇa' means good deed; and in the phrase 'of a stinking conduct' (kapūya-caraṇā), the word 'caraṇa' means bad deed. Thus by the term 'caraṇa' good and bad deeds are denoted. The separate designation has a meaning in accordance with the maxim of a Brāhmaṇa-mendicant,[2]—"but this", the teacher "Bādari" holds.

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[1] P. 197, line 7.
Ś, R, Bh.

[2] I.e. the Brāhmaṇa-parivrājaka-nyāya, which is the same as the Brāhmaṇa-Vaśiṣṭha-nyāya and the Go-balīvarda-nyāya. When it is said: 'The Brāhmaṇas should be fed, the mendicants as well', the separate mention of the latter, who are really included in the former, merely emphasizes their position as a special

Hence it is established that the soul re-descends as possessed of the remnants of its works.

Here ends the section entitled "The passing away of works" (2).

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

Reading slightly different, viz. he omits the word "iti".[1]

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "Those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest". (Sūtras 12–21)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 12–16)

SŪTRA 12

"AND (THE ASCENT) OF EVEN THOSE WHO DO NOT PERFORM SACRIFICES AND THE REST IS DECLARED BY SCRIPTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The going of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest is being considered. Here, first, the *prima facie* view is as follows: The going of even the wicked, who are attached to what is prohibited and averse to what is enjoined, "is declared in Scripture" thus: 'Whoever, verily, depart from this world,—they all go to the moon' (Kauṣ. 1.2[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, the ascent of those, who perform sacrifices, works of public utility and so on, to the moon and their descent therefrom have been considered. Now the question is being considered, viz. whether those also who do not perform sacrifices and the rest go to the region of the moon or not.

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part of the general body. (Vide L.N., p. 28, Part 1.) In the same way, here though 'caraṇa' (= good and bad work) is really included under the general term 'karma' (= work), yet the former is sometimes spoken of separately to bring it out specially.

[1] Bh. B. 3.1.11, p. 155.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

On the doubt, viz. whether those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, too, go to the region of the moon or not,—the *prima facie* view is as follows: The word "aniṣṭha" (in the sūtra) means forbidden deeds, and the word "ādi" means the giving up of what is enjoined. The going of even those who perform what is forbidden and give up what is enjoined "is declared" by a Kauṣitaki-text, viz. 'Whoever, verily, depart from this world,—they all go to the region of the moon' (Kauṣ. 1.2).

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 13

"BUT (THERE ARE) ASCENT AND DESCENT OF OTHERS, HAVING EXPERIENCED (THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR EVIL DEEDS) IN THE ABODE OF YAMA, SUCH A GOING BEING DECLARED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"There are ascent to and descent from" the orb of the moon on the part of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, after they have experienced sufferings in the abode of Yama, "such a going being declared" in texts like: '"He comes under my sway again and again"' (Kaṭha. 2.6[1]), 'The son of Vivasvat, the meeting of place[2] of men' (Ṛg. 10.14.1[3]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. If both the pious and the impious go to the moon, then Scripture, concerned with injunctions and prohibitions, must be futile,—(the *prima facie* objector) replies:

The term "but" is meant for disposing of the above objection. That is, the pious as well as the impious do not go to the moon, and hence the two kinds of scriptural texts are not futile by any means. Then what is the difference between these two cases?—We reply: "On account of such a going being declared", i.e. because the going

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, B.

[2] Correct reading translated, viz. "saṃgama" and not "saṃyamana".

[3] P. 270, line 9.
Ś, R, Bh, Sk.

of the latter to the abode of Yama is declared by texts like: 'The passage from this world into another is not manifest to him who is childish, careless, deluded with the delusion of wealth. Thinking: 'This is the world, there is no other', he comes under my sway again and again' (Kaṭha. 2.6), 'The son of Vivasvat, the meeting-place of men,[1] Yama the king' (Ṛg. V. 10.14.1) and so on. "There are ascent to and descent from" the region of the moon on the part of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, after they have experienced sufferings "in the abode of Yama" in accordance with their own respective works. The sense is that the impious, having undergone various sufferings, and having then ascended to the world of moon, re-descend.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 13 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 14 in the commentary of the last. According to them, it does not continue the *prima facie* view, but lays down the correct conclusion against the preceding *prima facie* sūtra, thus: "But there are ascent (to the world) and descent (to hell) of others, after having experienced in the abode of Yama, such a course being declared". That is, it is not a fact that those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest too go to the moon. They do not do so. But they descend to the hell, experience the consequences of their evil deeds there, and then ascend to the earth once more.[2]

The literal interpretation of the following three sūtras is the same, but while Nimbārka takes them to be stating the *prima facie* view, they take them to be giving the correct conclusion. Thus, while according to Nimbārka, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara four sūtras state the *prima facie* view, according to Śaṃkara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva, only one.

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[1] See footnote 2, p. 492.

[2] Ś.B. 3.1.13, p. 694; Śk. B. 3.1.13, p. 208, Part 9; G.B. 3.1.14, pp. 22-23, Chap. 3.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 14

"AND SMṚTI TEXTS DECLARE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Parāśara and the rest declare that they (viz. the impious) are under the sway of Yama.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Parāśara and others declare that all are under the sway of Yama thus: 'And all these, verily, come under the sway of Yama, reverend sir!' (V.P. 3.7.5 [1]).

SŪTRA 15

"MOREOVER SEVEN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Smṛti texts declare also that there are seven hells, beginning with the Raurava.

Vedānta-kaustubha

And "moreover" Smṛti texts declare that there are seven hells,—beginning with Raurava and the rest,—as the places to be approached by the sinners.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Śrīkaṇṭha

They add a "ca" thus: "Api ca sapta".[2]

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[1] P. 372.

[2] Ś.B. 3.1.15, p. 695: Śk. B. 3.1.15, p. 208, Part 9.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 16

"ON ACCOUNT OF HIS ACTIVITY EVEN THERE, (THERE IS) NO CONTRADICTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the activity" of Yama alone even in the Raurava and the rest, due to the fact that Citragupta and the like, the presiding lords, are under the control of Yama,—to hold that there are other lords too involves "no contradiction".

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Smṛti texts declare that in Raurava and the rest there are other presiding lords like Citragupta and the rest. Hence to say that all come under the sway of Yama seems to be inconsistent,—(the *prima facie* objector) replies:

"On account of his activity," i.e. on account of Yama's activity", "even there too", i.e. in Raurava and the rest too, Citragupta and the rest are under the control of Yama; and hence there is "no contradiction".

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 17–20)

SŪTRA 17

"BUT (THE PATHS) OF KNOWLEDGE AND WORK THUS, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING THE SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Now the correct conclusion:

Scripture shows the non-descent of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, under the knowledge of the five fires[1] thus: 'Now through neither of these two paths these small many-times returning creatures are born. "Be born and die",—thus is this third place. Thereby this world is not filled up' (Chānd. 5.10.8[2]).

By the phrase: 'of the two paths', knowledge and work are designated, these two "being the subjects under discussion". In the

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[1] See pp. 809-10 of the book.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

text: 'So those who know this' (Chānd. 5.10.1), the path of gods, and in the text: 'Sacrifices, works of public utility, alms-giving' (Chānd. 5.10.3), the paths of fathers are mentioned. Those who do not go through either of these two, are these beings who enjoy a third place. The sinners never go to the moon—this is the sense of the text.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author states the right conclusion.

The term "but" is meant for disposing of the *prima facie* view. The going to the region of the moon does not fit in on the part of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, since under the knowledge of five fires, viz. in the passage: 'Now through neither of these two paths these small, many-times returning creatures are born. "Be born and die",—thus is this third place. Thereby this world is not filled up' (Chānd. 5.10.8), Scripture declares the non-descent of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest. By the phrase: 'of these two paths', knowledge and work are designated. This very thing the author of the aphorisms states: "Of knowledge and work thus". The word 'meaning' is implied. Why? On account of these two "being the subjects under discussion", i.e. the words 'these two' in the text: 'of these two' denote what has been referred to before as the topic. The sinners do not become entitled to either of these two 'paths', i.e. the path of knowledge and the path of work, or the path of gods and the path of fathers. The resultant meaning is as follows: Having stated: 'So those who know this, and those who in the forest worship through faith and austerity' (Chānd. 5.10.1), the text goes on to show the true path of gods, the path concerned with knowledge, in the text: 'They pass into light, from light to day' (Chānd. 5.10.1) and so on. And having stated: 'Now, those who in the village worship through sacrifices, works of public utility and alms-giving' (Chānd. 5.10.3), the text goes on to show the path of gods, concerned with meritorious works. Those who do not go through either of these two, are those beings who enjoy a third place. The scriptural text: 'Whoever, verily, depart from this world,—they will go to the moon' (Kauṣ. 1.2) too refers to the journey of those who perform sacrifices and the rest.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

They reach the same conclusion as Nimbārka does, viz. that the sinners do not go to the world of moon. Only while they definitely say that the sinners go to hell, Nimbārka says that they go to a 'third place' and leaves the question there.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 18

"(THERE IS) NO (NEED FOR THE FIFTH OBLATION) IN THE THIRD (PLACE), BECAUSE OF OBSERVATION THUS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"In the third" place, there is no need for the fifth oblation even for the origination of the bodies of those who do not perform sacrifices and so on, "because it is observed" in the passage: '"Be born"' (Chānd. 5.10.8[1]) that their bodies originate even without the fifth oblation which comes in the order of reverence and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It may be objected: The text: "In the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of a man" (Chānd. 5.9.1) declares that the soul depends on the fifth oblation for obtaining a body. And before this oblation, the soul attains the moon. Hence it must be admitted that even those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest ascend to and descend from the moon, in order that they may obtain bodies. To this the author replies here.

The path beginning with light belongs to those who are desirous of salvation; the path called the path of father belongs to those who perform sacrifices and the rest. A third place as distinguished from these two is denoted by the term 'place'. In accordance with Scripture, in the third path of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, there is no need for the fifth oblation in order that the soul may obtain

[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

a body. Why? "Because this is observed, i.e. because it is found in the text: '"Be born and die"',—thus is this third place" (Chānd. 5.10.8) that bodies are attained—even independently of the fifth oblation—by those who have entered into the third place. The sense is that those who perform sacrifices and the rest attain bodies in this world through the successive order, beginning with reverence, moon and so on; and in the case of their attaining bodies, there is a restriction with regard to number, viz. "In the *fifth* oblation water comes to have the speech of man" (Chānd. 5.9.1). But in the case of those who do not perform sacrifices and so on, bodies are generated from water, intermixed with other elements, even without any restriction with regard to the number of oblations,—and not from water which comes in the order of reverence and the rest. By the text: "In the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of a man" (Chānd. 5.9.1), it is proved simply that in the fifth oblation water comes to be denotable by the word 'man', but it is not denied that it cannot come to have the speech of a man in any other way. There is also the absence of any limitation of the kind: 'In the fifth oblation *alone* water comes to have the speech of a man'.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 19

"AND MOREOVER (THIS IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI IN ORDINARY LIFE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is "declared by Smṛti" in the passage: "He was born from fire for the destruction of Droṇa, so it has been heard by us", and so on, that the bodies of even those who performed sacrifices and the rest, like Dhṛṣṭadyumna and so on, originated even without the fifth oblation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the Mahā-bhārata and the rest it is mentioned that the bodies of even pious workers, like Dhṛṣṭadyumna and so on, originated independently of the fifth oblation. It is declared by Smṛti too: "There arose, from that fire, a god-like prince" (Mahā. 1.63936[1]),

[1] P. 232, line 24, vol. 1.

"From the centre of the altar there arose too a princess of the Pāñcālas, well-beloved by her husband, beautiful to look at, with wide, deep black eyes" (Mahā. 1.6398 [1]) and so on.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 20

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF OBSERVATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is found that among the four kinds of beings the moisture-born and the plant-born originate even without the union of the male and the female, so there is no need of the fifth oblation in all cases.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It is directly observed that among the four kinds: womb-born, egg-born, moisture-born and plant-born, the moisture-born and the plant-born originate even without the union between the male and the female, so there is no need of the fifth oblation for the origination of the body in the case of sinners.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 21

"(THERE IS) INCLUSION OF THE MOISTURE-BORN BY THE THIRD TERM."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "The egg-born, the soul-born, the plant-born" (Chānd. 6.3.1 [2]) third term includes the moisture-born as well. Hence there is no setting aside of four classes.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection: The scriptural text: "Of these beings, verily, there are only three origins, the egg-born, the soul-born, the plant-

[1] *Op. cit.*, line 29.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

born" (Chānd. 6.3.1) does not mention the moisture-born. Hence there cannot be four kinds of beings—the author replies:

The term 'plant-born', mentioned in the above text and "third" in order of reading: "The egg-born, the soul-born, the plant-born" "includes the moisture-born", i.e. the heat-born. Literally, the plant-born (udbhijja) are those which are born by bursting through the earth and water, i.e. trees and the rest; as well as lice and the like. Hence there are four kinds of beings. Thus it is established that those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest never ascend to the moon.

Here ends the section entitled "Those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest" (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "Attaining the nature of that". (Sūtra 22)

SŪTRA 22

"(THERE IS) ATTAINING THE NATURE OF THAT,[1] ON ACCOUNT OF FITTING IN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The process of descent is being considered.

The question is as to whether in the text: "Then, by the very path they came they return again, just as they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. After having become the air he becomes smoke; after having become smoke he becomes mist; after having become mist he becomes cloud; after having become cloud, he rains down" (Chānd. 5.10.5-6[2]), it is said that the soul actually becomes the ether and the rest, just as it becomes a god and so on, or merely becomes similar to the ether and so on. If it be suggested that it actually becomes the ether and the rest,—we reply: It becomes similar to them. Why? Because that alone fits in.

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[1] The C.S.S. ed. (p. 49) reads "sābhāvya . . ." instead of "svābhāvya . . .".

[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that those who perform sacrifices and the rest attain the world of the moon, being closely embraced by the subtle elements, and after having undergone the fruits of their works there re-descend with the remnants of the results of their works, just as they had come and not thus. Now, the process of that descent is being considered.

On the doubt whether the scriptural text about descent, viz.: "Then, by the very path they came they return again, just as they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. After having become the air he becomes smoke, after having become smoke he becomes mist, after having become mist he becomes cloud, after having become cloud he rains down" (Chānd. 5.10.5-6), implies that the descending souls, possessed of the remnants of the results of their works, become the ether and the rest, just as they become gods, men and so on; or that they only become similar to the ether and the rest,—the *prima facie* view is: It is implied that they become the ether and the rest, just as they become the moon, there being no distinction between the two cases.

With regard to it, we reply: There is "attaining the nature of that", i.e. the above text means that the descending souls, possessed of the remnants of their works, become similar to the ether and the rest. Why? "On account of fitting in," i.e. because the only reasonable conclusion is that they become similar to the ether and the rest, due to their contact with them. Thus, in ordinary life, milk can become curd, since when there is milk, there is no curd. But the descending soul, possessed of the remnants of its works, cannot properly become the ether and the rest which are already existent, it being impossible for one thing to become another. The fact that it becomes a body, viz. the moon, for enjoying the fruits of its own meritorious works, stands to reason; but its becoming the ether and so on does not fit in, there being no question of enjoyment at that time. Hence the above scriptural text refers to its similarity with the ether and so on. Thus it is established that the soul becomes similar to them.

Here ends the section entitled "Attaining the nature of that" (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He reads "sābhāvya . . ." instead of "svābhāvya . . ."[1].

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "In a not very long time". (Sūtra 23)

SŪTRA 23

"IN A NOT VERY LONG TIME, ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIFICATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The soul remains similar to the objects beginning with the ether and ending with rain only for a short time, and then having entered the earth, it attains the state of rice and the rest, in accordance with the specific statement, viz. "Thence, truly, it is difficult to escape" (Chand. 5.10.6[2]). This text implying that it is more difficult for the soul to emerge out of its states of rice and the rest makes it clear that it remains in the previous state only for a short time.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the duration of the soul's state of similarity to the ether and the rest is being considered.

The doubt is as to whether on attaining the ether, the air, smoke, cloud and rain, the soul, possessed of the remnants of its works, remains similar to them for a long time, or for a short time. On the suggestion: There is no evidence that it remains similar to them for a short time only; so we may reasonably conclude that the soul remains similar to them for a long time,—

We reply: "In a not very long time". That is, the soul, possessed of the remnants of its works, remains similar to the ether and the rest only for a short time, and then after becoming similar to rain, it enters the earth. Why? "On account of specification," i.e. because after entering the earth, the soul becomes rice and so on, and the text

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[1] Ś, B, 3.1.22, p. 698.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

makes a specific statement with regard to its emergence therefrom thus: "Hence, truly, it is difficult to escape" (Chānd. 5.10.6), the sense being that 'thence' or from the state of rice and the rest, the emergence is more difficult, i.e. cannot be effected in a short time. This implies that the soul emerges from the states of the ether and the rest in a short time. The elision of the second 'ta' in the word 'durniṣprapataram' (=more difficult to escape) is Vedic. Our view is correct also because there is no purpose in the soul's remaining in a state of similarity to the ether and the rest for a long time. Hence it is established that the soul remains similar to the ether and the rest for a short while.

Here ends the section entitled "In a not very long time" (5).

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "Occupied by others". (Sūtras 24–27)

SŪTRA 24

"IN (RICE AND SO ON), OCCUPIED BY OTHERS, ON ACCOUNT OF STATEMENT, AS IN THE PREVIOUS CASES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is a text: "They are born here as rice and barley, as herbs and trees, as sesamum and beans (Chānd. 5.10.6[1]). Here the statement that they are born as rice and the rest, already occupied by other souls, really means that they only come to be connected with rice and the like. Why? Because only their connection with rice and the like—as with the ether and the rest—is stated.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If on attaining rice and the rest, the soul remains in them for a long time, then do rice and the rest become bodies of the soul, possessed of the remnants of its work?—The author is solving this problem.

After the souls, possessed of the remnants of their works, have attained the earth, it is said: "They are born here as rice and barley,

[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

as herbs and trees, as sesamum and beans" (Chānd. 5.10.6). Here the doubt is, whether rice and the rest become the bodies of the souls possessed of the remnants of their works, or whether the latter come to have only a connection with rice and the rest, just as they have with the ether and so on. Here, on the suggestion, viz. that on the ground of the statement 'are born', they are born as having rice and the rest as their bodies,—

We reply: They attain only a connection with rice and the rest, already occupied by other souls, entitled to immobile bodies. Why? "On account of statement, as in the previous cases." That is, it has been stated that the descending souls come to be connected only with the objects beginning with the ether and ending with rain and not that they are the souls of those objects, possessing them as their bodies, there being no reference to karmas—where there is participating in pleasure and pain, preceded by the assumption of a body, there is a reference to works, such as: "Those who are of a pleasant conduct attain a pleasant birth" (Chānd. 5.10.7). In the same manner the states of rice and the rest are designated in the text without indeed any reference to works. Hence the text simply means that the souls enter into those rice and so on. Further, the absence of any works, leading to immobile births, on the part of those who perform sacrifices and the rest, also proves that the words 'are born' imply a connection merely,—this is the sense.

SŪTRA 25

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (SACRIFICES AND THE REST ARE) IMPURE, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that their works like Jyotiṣṭoma and the rest are "impure", involving, as they do, the killing of living creatures, and therefore these lead them to immobile births,—we reply: No impurity is involved in Jyotiṣṭoma and the rest, on account of scriptural injunction.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The works of those who perform sacrifices and the rest, viz. Jyotiṣṭoma and the rest, are "impure", involving, as they do, the sacrificing of animals to Agni and Soma and so on. Thus, after having experienced the fruit of the meritorious portion of those sacrifices and so on in heaven, they attain immobile births as rice and so on for experiencing the fruit of that part of their action which is of a harmful nature,—

We reply: No. Why? "On account of scriptural text," i.e. because Jyotiṣṭoma and the rest being acts of righteousness pure and simple "on account of scriptural text", are causes of happiness only. The sense is that the texts forbidding acts of unrighteousness like killing etc., viz. "Let no one harm any creature" (Mahā. 12.9971[1]), are not set aside by the texts enjoining acts of righteousness and indicating happiness as the reward. Such killing of sacrificial animals is indeed beneficial to those animals themselves, in accordance with the sacred text: "Thou dost not die, thou art not hurt, thou goest to the gods through easy paths. Where men of good deeds go and not evil-doers, there may the sun-god lead thee" (Tait. Br. 3.7.7.14[2]). Hence such acts are not impure.

SŪTRA 26

"AFTER THAT (THERE IS) CONJUNCTION WITH ONE WHO PERFORMS THE ACT OF GENERATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The soul becomes rice and the rest just as it becomes one who performs the act of generation, mentioned in the text: "For whoever eats food, who performs the act of generation, that he (viz. the ascending soul) becomes again" (Chānd. 5.10.6[3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"After that", i.e. after the text designating that the soul becomes rice and the rest, there is a text about its connection with one who

[1] P. 716, line 26, vol. 3.
[2] P. 147, lines 6–8, vol. 3. Bibliotheca Indica ed.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

performs the act of generation: "For whosoever eats food, who performs the act of generation, that he (viz. the descending soul) becomes again" (Chānd. 5.10.6). The compound "retaḥ-sig-yoga" is to be explained thus: One who performs the act of generation is 'retaḥ-sic'; the connection of the soul, possessed of the remnants of its works is 'retaḥ-sig-yoga'. Here the word 'that' means the eater, and the phrase: 'that he becomes again' establishes a connection merely. Like that the text about its becoming rice and the like too refers to its connection merely with them. The meaning of the statement: 'That he becomes again' is that the descending soul, entering into a connection with a man or an animal and so on who perform the act of generation, becomes similar to them.

SŪTRA 27

"FROM THE WOMB THE BODY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The body arises from the womb.

Here ends the first quarter of the third chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The soul, possessed of the remnants of its work, and separated from one who performs the act of generation, enters into connection with a womb in the fifth oblation and thereby attains a body. Hence it is established that the texts preceding it, i.e. those designating that the soul becomes the ether and the rest, prove only that it comes to be connected with them respectively.

Here ends the section entitled "Occupied by others" (6).

Here ends the first quarter of the third chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

Résumé

The first section of the third chapter contains 27 sūtras and 6 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka, Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha; and 28 sūtras and 6 adhikaraṇas according to Baladeva, who divides sūtra 8 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras.

THIRD CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

SECOND QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "The intermediate place". (Sūtras 1–6)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 1-2)

SŪTRA 1

"IN THE INTERMEDIATE PLACE, THE CREATION (IS DUE TO THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL), BECAUSE (SCRIPTURE) DEPICTS (SO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Thus, the course of transmigratory existence has been enunciated for the purpose of generating a dispassion for worldly objects on the part of the individual soul in the waking state. Now, the states of dream and the rest are being determined.

Referring to the dream-state, Scripture declares: "Now there are no chariots, no teams, no roads there. Then he creates chariots, teams and roads" (Bṛh. 4.3.10[1]) and so on. The doubt being, whether the creation of the chariots and the rest is due to the individual soul or to Brahman, the *prima facie* view is that in the sphere of dreams, the "creation" of chariots and the rest is due to the individual soul, "because" Scripture "depicts": "He creates. For he is the creator" (Bṛh. 4.3.9 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, in the first quarter, the relation of the soul in the waking state with the elements and the elemental has been elucidated for the purpose of generating a right discrimination between the soul and the non-soul; as well as its relation with heaven and hell for the purpose of generating a feeling of dispassion. Now with a view to making these discrimination and dispassion still stronger, the states of dream and the rest are being discussed; and with a view to promoting

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

the rise of devotion for Brahman, the Highest Person, His attributes are being determined.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, it is declared, referring to the state of dream: "There are no chariots there, no teams, no roads; then he creates chariots, teams and roads. There are no blisses there, no pleasures, no joys; then he creates blisses, pleasures and joys. There are no ponds there, no lakes, no rivers; then he creates ponds, lakes and rivers. For he is the creator" (Bṛh. 5.3.10). Here the doubt is as to whether this creation of chariots and the rest is due to the individual soul or to Brahman. The *prima facie* view is as follows: The scriptural text: "He creates. For he is the creator" (Bṛh. 5.3.10) "depicts" the individual soul alone as the creator of chariots and the rest, "in the intermediate place". "The intermediate place" is the sphere of dream, as declared by the scriptural text: "There is a third, the place of dream" (Bṛh. 4.3.9). Hence the "creation" of chariots and the rest is due to the individual soul.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different. According to them too this sūtra lays down the *prima facie* view, but according to them the problem is not whether the dream-creation is due to the individual soul or to Brahman, but whether it is real or unreal. Thus the *prima facie* view: "In the intermediate place, the creation (is real), because (Scripture) says (so)".[1]

Baladeva

He does not take this sūtra as laying down a *prima facie* view, but the correct conclusion, thus "In the intermediate place, the creation (is due to the Lord and not to the individual soul), for (Scripture) says (so).[2]

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[1] Ś.B. 3.2.1; Bh. B. 3.2.1.

[2] G.B. 3.2.1.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 2

"AND SOME (DESIGNATE) THE MAKER, AND SONS OF THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the passage: "He who is awake in those that are asleep, the person making desire after desire" (Kaṭha. 5.8 [1]) "some" speak of a creator of the desires of the soul,[2] viz. sons and so on, in the state of dream.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Moreover, in the text: "He who is awake in those that are asleep, the person making desire after desire" (Kaṭha. 5.8), the followers of "some" branches speak of the individual soul as a creator, making objects of desire in the state of dream. The author states the objects of desire, referred to in the text, thus "sons and the rest". By the word 'desire', objects that are desired, viz. sons of the rest, are denoted, and not a mere wish, in accordance with the introductory texts: '"Ask for all objects of desire (kāma) just as you wish"' (Kaṭha. 1.25), '"Choose sons and grandsons living a hundred years"' (Katha. 1.23). The statement of Prajāpati [3] clearly establishes that the individual soul has true resolves and so on. Hence it is possible for the soul, endowed as it is with (the attributes) of true resolves and so on, to be the creator of chariots, etc.—this is the *prima facie* view.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different. They too take this sūtra as laying down the *prima facie* view, but as pointed out above, the problem is a different one for them. Thus: "Some (depict the Lord as) the maker (of dream-objects); and sons and the rest". That is, just as, the *prima facie* objector continues, the objects in the waking state are

[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] Other editions, viz. the C.S.S. ed. (p. 51) and the Brindaban ed. (1905) (p. 826) read: "jīvam kāmānām", in which case the meaning would be: "some speak of the soul as the creator of desires". This reading seems preferable. V.K. also follows it.

[3] Vide Chānd. 8.7.1.

created by the Lord, so are the dream-objects. Hence just as the former are real, so must be the latter.[1]

Baladeva

He does not regard this sūtra too as laying down a *prima facie* view, but the correct conclusion. Hence it means: "Some (depict the Lord alone) as the maker (of dream-objects), sons and the rest".[2]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 3–6)

SŪTRA 3

"BUT (THE DREAM-CREATION IS) MERE MĀYĀ, (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS NOT THE CREATOR OF DREAM OBJECTS) ON ACCOUNT OF NOT HAVING (ITS OWN ATTRIBUTES) FULLY MANIFEST IN NATURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it, we reply: In the state of dream, the group of effects like chariots and the rest is made by the supreme Lord alone, possessed of true resolves and omniscient,—since such wonderful objects are not indeed made by the individual soul, its attributes of having true resolves and the rest being not "fully [3] manifest" during its state of bondage.

Vedānta-kaustubha

With regard to this, the author states the correct conclusion.

The word "but" is meant for disposing of the above view. The dream-chariots and the like are "mere māyā", i.e. simply wonderful. Here the word "māyā" means wonderful things. Lord Vāsudeva, an adept in the art of creating and destroying all wonderful objects, creates—through His own powers which are inconceivable—groups of wonderful objects like chariots and the rest, in accordance with the respective deeds of souls in order that they may enjoy these objects. But it is not possible for the dreaming soul itself to be their creator in the absence of appropriate implements and the like,—because its

[1] Ś.B. 3.2.2, pp. 706-7; Bh. B. 3.2.2, p. 161.
[2] G.B. 3.2.2, pp. 41-42, Chap. 3.
[3] The C.S.S. ed. (p. 51) reads "sākalyena" instead of "kārtsnyena".

attributes of having true resolves and the rest "are not fully manifest in nature", i.e. are hidden during its state of bondage.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation absolutely different. They too take this sūtra as beginning the correct conclusion. Thus the sūtra means: "But (the dream-creation is) mere māyā (i.e. unreal), on account of not having its own nature fully manifest." That is, a dream-object is not like an object in the waking state, since it does not possess all the characteristics of the latter. An object in the waking state has a particular place where and a particular time when it exists, it is perceived through a particular sense-organ, and is non-contradicted. Now a dream-object has no place where it can exist. A dream-chariot, e.g. cannot exist in the limited span of the body. It has, further, no fixed time when it exists. To the dreamer a single minute may appear as a century. Also it cannot be grasped by any sense-organ. How can the dreamer see a chariot, e.g. when his eyes are shut? Finally, it is contradicted as soon as the dreamer wakes up. Hence a dream-object cannot be on a par with an object in the waking state and be real like it.[1]

Bhāskara criticizes the view of Śaṃkara in this connection by pointing out that those who hold that objects in the waking state too are māyā misinterpret the author of the sūtra and delude people.[2]

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. "But (the dream-objects are) māyā (i.e. not composed of ordinary materials, but are created by the mysterious will of the Lord), on account of not having (their) real nature fully manifest, (i.e. because they are not objects of perception as gross material objects are)". This also proves that the dream objects are created by the Lord alone and not by the individual soul.[3]

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[1] Ś, B. 3.2.3, pp. 707 ff.; Bh. B. 3.2.3, p. 161.

[2] Bh. B. 3.2.3, p. 161.

[3] G.B. 3.2.3, pp. 42-43, Chap. 3.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 4

"AND BECAUSE (A DREAM IS) INDICATIVE (OF FUTURE GOOD OR EVIL), IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCRIPTURAL TEXT AND THOSE WHO ARE VERSED IN THAT DECLARE (IT)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

From the scriptural texts, viz.: "When during works undertaken for a wish, a man sees a woman in his dreams, let him there conceive of success in that dream-vision" (Chānd. 5.2.9[1]). "Now, when a man sees a black person with black teeth in his dreams, he (i.e. the black person) kills him (i.e. the dreamer)" (Ait. Ār. 3.2.4[2]), it is known that a dream is "indicative" of future good or evil. "Those who are versed" in the results of dreams also "declare" the same thing. Now, we do not always dream dreams that indicate the approach of what is desired; again, we often dream dreams that predict undesirable results. Hence none but the Supreme Soul is the maker of the dream-chariots and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

That the dream-chariots and the rest are created by the Lord is proved further by the following facts: dreams are "indicative" of good and ill, "in accordance with scriptural texts" like: "When during works undertaken for a wish, a man sees a woman in his dreams, let him there conceive of success in that dream-vision" (Chānd. 5.2.9), "Now, when a man sees a black person with black teeth in his dreams, he (i.e. the black person) kills him (i.e. the dreamer)" (Ait. Ār. 3.2.4). Hence, they must be due to another. "Those who are versed" with the science of dreams too "declare" that a dream is indicative of good or evil thus: "Mounting on cows, buffalos and elephants, mounting on palaces, hill-tops and trees, besmearing one's self with feces, weeping, death and coming to an unapproachable place in a dream are lucky. There is death, undoubtedly, for him whom in his dream a woman, dressed in black and smeared with black garlands, embraces" and so on. If the

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] Pp. 136-7. Ś, R, ŚK, B.

individual soul were the creator of dream-objects, then it would have enjoyed happiness alone by creating women and the rest which are indicative of good alone, but it would never have created a black person and the rest for its own destruction.

And the followers of that branch too [1] speak of the Supreme Soul as the maker of objects of desires, thus: "He is awake in those that are asleep, the Person, making desire after desire. That alone is the bright, that is Brahman, that alone is said to be the Immortal. In Him all the worlds rest, no one surpasses Him" (Kaṭha. 5.8), it being impossible for the marks, stated in the scriptural text about dream-creation and referring to the Supreme Lord, to refer to the individual soul.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different, viz. "Because a (dream though unreal) (is yet) indicative (of the future), those who are versed in it also declare (this)". That is, although the dream itself is unreal, yet the thing indicated by it may be real. Further, the dream-objects are created by the individual soul itself, and not by the Supreme Soul, though it is not denied altogether that the Supreme Self is active in dreams, since the Lord of all, the Supreme Soul, is the controller of the soul at all times and in all its states [2]. This view is diametrically opposed to Nimbārka's view, as evident.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They change the order of the sūtras 4–6 which will be noticed at the end of sūtra 6. Interpretation same.

Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. "And (the individual soul and not the Lord is the creator of dream-objects,) (for) (a dream is) indicative (of future good and evil), those who are versed in it (also) declare (so)". That is, it is unreasonable to suppose that what is created by

[1] Viz. Kaṭha., mentioned by the *prima facie* objector.
[2] Ś, B. 3.2.4, pp. 309-10.

the Intelligent Being can be subject to pleasure and pain.[1] Hence the dream-objects which are such cannot be due to the Lord, although, of course, He being the controller of all, is the cause here too in that sense.[2]

Baladeva

Baladeva begins a new topic here, ending with the next sūtra, and concerned with establishing that the dream-objects are real. Hence the sūtra: "And (a dream-object is real) for (it is) indicative (of the future), those who are versed in it (also) declare (so)".[3]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 5

"BUT THROUGH THE WISH OF THE HIGHEST, (THE REAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE SOUL REMAIN) HIDDEN, FOR FROM THAT ITS BONDAGE AND (ITS REVERSE) (VIZ. RELEASE) (RESULT)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If the soul be the maker of the dream-objects, then the attributes of having true resolves and the rest must surely be admitted on its part. But through the wish of the Supreme Lord in accordance with the deeds of the soul, they remain "hidden" during its state of bondage. From Him alone the soul's bondage and release arise, as declared by the scriptural text: "The cause of transmigration, bondage, subsistence, salvation" (Śvet. 6.16[4]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Why should the soul's attributes of having true resolves and the rest remain hidden during its state of bondage?—the author replies:

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[1] "Na hi prajñā-jasya sukha-duḥkha-yogyatayāvakalpate." It is difficult to see the point of this argument; and it is difficult to see how Bhāskara would have answered Nimbārka's objection to this view.

[2] Bh. B. 3.2.4, p. 161.

[3] G.B. 3.2.4, p. 43, Chap. 3.

[4] Correct quotation: "Saṃsāra-mokṣa-sthiti-bandha-hetuḥ". Vide Śvet. 6.16, p. 72.

The word "but" is meant for disposing of the above objection. Though the attributes of having true resolves and the rest are natural to the individual soul,—which is a part of Brahman, which is deluded by nescience consisting in beginningless karmas, and which, for that very reason, has its face turned away from the Lord,—yet they become "hidden" during its state of bondage. Why? "Through the wish of the Highest," i.e. 'through the wish' or the resolution in accordance with the deeds of the soul, "of the Highest" or of the Supreme Person. The word "for" implies emphasis. "From that" resolution alone "its" "bondage and (its) reverse" arise, as declared by the scriptural texts: "The cause of transmigration, bondage, subsistence and salvation" (Śvet. 6.16). "For, truly, when he finds fearlessness as a foundation in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined and unsupported, then he is gone to fearlessness. When, however, he makes the smallest distinction therein, then he comes to have fear" (Tait. 2.7) and so on; and in accordance with the Smṛti passages: "The binder with the noose of the world and the liberator from the noose of the world" and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "But through the meditation on the Highest, the hidden (attributes of the soul become manifest), for from that its bondage and (its) reverse (arise)". That is, if it be said that the soul being a part of Īśvara is possessed of the power of realizing all its wishes; and hence it creates real dream-objects,—the answer is that the real attributes of the soul, viz. its power of realizing all wishes and so on, remain hidden through nescience and become manifest only through the meditation on the Lord.[1] Thus their interpretation of the first portion of the sūtra is diametrically opposed to Nimbārka's.

Nimbārka	Śaṃkara and Bhāskara
Through the wish of the Highest (the real attributes of the soul become) hidden.	Through the meditation on the Highest the hidden (attributes of the soul become manifest).

[1] Ś.B. 3.2.5, p. 711; Bh. B. 3.2.5, p. 162.

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. "But through the wish of the Highest, (the dream consciousness is) sublated, for from that its bondage and (its) reverse (arise)". That is, if it be objected that dreams must be unreal, since the dream-consciousness is sublated by the waking-consciousness, the reply is that the dream-objects are withdrawn by the wish of the Lord alone. Since the Lord can cause the bondage and release of the soul, there is nothing strange in His creating and withdrawing the dream-objects. Hence the dream-objects are not unreal, simply because they are sublated.[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 6

"OR THAT (RESULTS) ALSO FROM THE CONNECTION WITH THE BODY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And "that" obscuration takes place by way of its connection with nescience.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"That also," i.e. the obscuration of the soul's attributes of having true resolves and the rest, arises through its "connection with the body" at the time of creation, and through its connection with prakṛti at the time of dissolution. The sense is that the Lord, who takes into consideration the deeds of the soul, purposely conceals the form of the soul which, as a part of Himself, is endowed with the attributes of having true resolves and the rest,—and this He does by connecting the soul with prakṛti in its effected and causal states. Hence it is established that the dream-objects, conforming to the deeds of particular souls and to be enjoyed by them respectively, are created by the Lord, and not by the individual soul.

Here ends the section entitled "The intermediate place" (1).

[1] G.B. 3.2.5, p. 45, Chap. 3.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They change the order of sūtras 4–6 thus:

Nimbārka, etc.	Rāmānuja, etc.
"Sūcakasya hi . . ." (4).	"Parābhidyānāt . . ." (4).
"Parābhidhyānāt . . ." (5).	"Deha-yogād va . . ." (5).
"Deha-yogād vā . . ." (6).	"Sūcakasya hi . . ." (6).

Baladeva

He takes it as an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with showing that the waking-consciousness too is due to the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "Or that too (viz. the waking-consciousness which arises) from (the soul's connection with the body), (is caused by the Lord)".[1]

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "The absence of that". (Sūtras 7-8)

SŪTRA 7

"THE ABSENCE OF THAT (TAKES PLACE) IN THE VEINS AND IN THE SOUL, BECAUSE OF THE SCRIPTURAL TEXT TO THAT EFFECT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Highest Self is the maker of the dream-objects. During deep sleep too, the soul enters into the vein and the pericardium, and then rests in the Highest Self alone, in accordance with the scriptural text: "Then he comes to fall asleep in those veins" (Chānd. 8.6.3[2]). "Having crept out through them, he lies in the pericardium" (Bṛh. 2.1.19[3]).

[1] G.B. 3.2.6, pp. 46-47, Chap. 3.

[2] Ś, R, ŚK, B. Correct quotation: "Sṛpto bhavati" and not "Suspto bhavati". In that case, the passage would mean: 'The he has crept into those vein'. Vide Chānd. 8.6.3, p. 436.

[3] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been demonstrated that the dream-objects are not created by the dreamers themselves, and that they are transitory. This has considerably promoted the growth of right discrimination and dispassion. After that, now for further promoting the growth of those very same things, the place of deep sleep is being considered.

It is declared by scripture that deep sleep takes place in the veins : "Then when he is sound asleep, composed, placid, he knows no dream; then he comes to fall asleep in these veins" (Chānd. 8.6.3). Another scriptural text declares that deep sleep takes place in the pericardium: "Now when he comes to fall into a profound sleep, then he does not know anything whatsoever, then—there are seventy-two thousand veils called 'Hitā' which lead from the heart to the pericardium—having crept out through them, he lies in the pericardium" (Bṛh. 3.19.1). Again, a third text declares that deep sleep takes place in Brahman also: "That which is the ether within the heart, in that he lies" (Bṛh. 4.4.22), "When this person sleeps, as we say, then, my dear, he comes to be united with the Existent" (Chānd. 6.8.1), "Embraced by the intelligent soul, he knows nothing that is outside, nothing that is inside" (Bṛh. 4.3.21) and so on. Here the doubt is as to whether the soul sleeps in any of these three places, or whether all of them together constitute its place of sleep. The *prima facie* view is: The soul can sleep in any one of these three places, but can never sleep simultaneously in all three of them. So, the soul sleeps in any of these three.

We reply: "The absence of that", i.e. the absence of dream, viz. deep sleep, takes place "in the veins", "in the soul," i.e. in Brahman, denoted by the term 'ether', and in the pericardium as implied by the term "and" (in the sūtra)—i.e. in a particular place intermediate between the vein and Brahman. The sense is that the vein, the pericardium and Brahman conjointly constitute the place of deep sleep and not separately. Why? "On account of the scriptural text to that effect," i.e. on account of the scriptural declaration that the vein, the pericardium and Brahman are the place of deep sleep conjointly. Of these three, again, the vein and the pericardium are but of a secondary importance,—they are like a palace and a bedstead respectively. But the Highest Self alone is of primary

importance—He is like a bed, and as such He alone is the immediate place of deep sleep,—this is the resultant meaning.[1]

SŪTRA 8

"HENCE THE AWAKENING FROM HIM."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For that very reason, the soul rises from the Supreme Lord, as declared by the scriptural passage: "Having come back from the Existent" (Chānd. 6.10.2 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

None but the Supreme Soul is the place where souls rest during deep sleep. "Hence," i.e. for this reason, "the awakening", i.e. their re-attaining the place (or the condition) of waking, "from him", i.e. from the Supreme Soul alone, fits in, in accordance with the statement: "Having come back from the Existent, they do not know: 'We have come back from the Existent'" (Chānd. 6.10.2). If anyone else be the place of the soul's deep sleep, then the text: "Having come from the Existent" (Chānd. 6.10.2) will be contradicted. The sense is that it is not possible for the soul to lie down in one place and arise from another. Hence it is established that Brahman is the place of deep sleep.

Here ends the section entitled "The absence of that" (2).

[1] I.e. a man sleeping on a bed is at the same time sleeping on the bedstead and within the house. As such the bed, the bedstead and the house are his places of sleep conjointly, yet his immediate place of sleep is the bed. In the very same manner the vein, the pericardium and Brahman are the places of the soul's deep sleep, yet Brahman is the immediate place.

[2] Ś, R, ŚK, B.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The remembrance of work, text and injunction". (Sūtra 9)

SŪTRA 9

"BUT HE ALONE (RISES) ON ACCOUNT OF WORK, REMEMBRANCE, TEXT AND INJUNCTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"He alone," i.e. that individual soul which was asleep, arises,—because having half finished a piece of work the previous day, he remembers it and finishes the other half the next day; because there is a scriptural text to that effect: "Whatever they are in his world, whether tiger, or lion, or wolf, or boar, . . .,[1] or gnat, or mosquito, that they become" (Chānd. 6.9.2 [2]) and so on; and because of the injunctions: "Let one perform the Agni-hotra" (Maitrī 6.36 [3]), "Let one meditate on the soul" (Bṛh. 1.4.7 [4]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now apprehending the objection, viz. Naturally, the soul, which has entered Brahman, the place of deep sleep, and has thereby become freed from the two states, the abode of miseries, will never rise from Him again—the author replies:

The doubt is as to whether he alone who was asleep arises at the time of awakening, or some one else? On the suggestion, viz. One who has attained Brahman will not rise from Him again, and hence not the sleeper himself, but another rises—

We reply: The word "but" is meant for disposing of the view. "He alone" who was asleep arises, and not another. Why? On account of the following reasons, viz. work, remembrance, text and injunction.[5] Having begun a piece of work, accomplishable in two days, a man goes to sleep at night, and on arising again, that very man finishes it the next day. From such work it is known that that very one who was asleep is now awoke. This is so, also on account of remembrance,

[1] The portion "kīṭo vā pataṅga vā" left out. Vide Chānd. 6.9.2, p. 341.
[2] Ś, R, ŚK, B. [3] Bh. [4] Bh, B.
[5] Note that while Nimbārka interprets the compound "karmānusmṛti-śabda-vidhibhyaḥ" as (1) remembrance of work, (2) text, (3) injunction; Śrīnivāsa interprets it as (1) work, (2) remembrance, (3) text, and (4) injunction, like Śaṃkara and others.

i.e. on account of the recognition, viz. 'I, who was asleep at night, am awake in the morning'; on account of texts like: "All these creatures go day after day to the world of Brahman, (but) do not know [1] it" (Chānd. 8.3.2), "Whatever they are in this world, whether tiger, or lion, or wolf, or boar, ... ,[2] or gnat, or mosquito, that they become" (Chānd. 6.9.2) and so on; and on account of the injunctive texts, referring to enjoyment and emancipation, such as: "Let one desirous of heaven perform the Agni-hotra" (Maitrī 6.36), "Let one desirous of heaven perform sacrifices" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5 [3]), "Tranquil, let one meditate" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "Let one meditate on the soul" (Bṛh. 1.4.7) and so on. If some one other than the person who went to sleep arose, then these reasons would have been set aside. Hence it is established that the very same person who went to sleep arises.

Here ends the section entitled "The remembrance of work, text and injunction" (3).

COMPARISON

All others interpret the compound "karmānusmṛti-śabda-vidhibhyaḥ" like Śrīnivāsa, i.e. giving four reasons and not three like Nimbārka.[4]

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "The swooning person". (Sūtra 10)

SŪTRA 10

"IN THE SWOONING PERSON, (THERE IS) HALF-ATTAINMENT, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING LEFT OVER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In one who is in a swoon, there is "half-attainment" of death.[5] The state of swoon is not included among the states of deep sleep and

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[1] Correct quotation: "vindanti" (=find).

[2] See footnote 1, p. 519.

[3] P. 208, line 27, vol. 2.

[4] Ś, B. 2.3.9, pp. 719 ff.; Śrī. B. 2.3.9, p. 226, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.3.9. p. 163; ŚK. B. 2.3.9, pp. 240-241, Part 9; G.B. 2.3.9, p. 51, Chap. 3.

[5] I.e. a swooning person attains half the characteristics of death, or is half-dead.

the rest. Hence "on account of being left over", it is something different.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the state of swoon is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether the well-known state of swoon is included under the states of deep sleep and the rest, or is something different from them, the suggestion being: There are four well-known states of the soul, viz. waking, dream, deep sleep and death. So the state of swoon must be included under them, there being no proof that swoon is something different from them,—

We reply: "In the swooning person" there is "half-attainment". One who has fainted owing to excessive grief is said to be a 'swooning person'. He attains 'half' the place of death.[1] That is, the state of swoon is something different from the other four states. Why? "On account of being left over." Thus, the state of swoon is not the same as the state of waking or the state of dream, on account of the absence of knowledge.[2] It is also not identical with death, on account of the presence of life and heat.[3] Nor can it be said that deep sleep itself is swoon, because the soul being embraced by the Existent then, deep sleep is a state of bliss.[4] Hence it is established that "on account of being left over", the state of swoon is not one among the states of deep sleep and the rest, but is a different state.

Here ends the section entitled "swooning person" (4).

[1] I.e. makes a half-way approach to death.

[2] I.e. a swooning person is unconscious, while a person who is awake or a dreaming person is conscious.

[3] I.e. a swooning person is still alive and warm unlike a dead person.

[4] I.e. a swooning person does not enjoy any bliss as a person in a deep sleep does.

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Possessed of two-fold characteristics". (Sūtras 11-21)

SŪTRA 11

"NOT ON ACCOUNT OF PLACE EVEN (IS THERE ANY IMPERFECTION) ON THE PART OF THE HIGHEST, BECAUSE EVERYWHERE (HE IS DESCRIBED AS) POSSESSED OF TWO-FOLD CHARACTERISTICS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It has been already proved [1] that the respective imperfections of the souls do not pertain to the Highest Self, though abiding within all, since He is not subject to karmas. There is no imperfection "on the part of the Highest, on account of place even", since "everywhere" Brahman is stated to be free from all defects and endowed with all auspicious qualities.

Vedānta-kaustubha

With a view to generating an aversion to transmigratory existence, the particular states of this individual soul have been briefly demonstrated above. The attributes of Brahman, the Highest Person, such as, being the creator of dream-creation, having true resolves, being the cause of pleasure during deep sleep and so on too have been demonstrated for the sake of generating an yearning for Him. Now, for generating an yearning for the Highest, the reverend author wants to establish that He is free by nature from all faults and is one mass of all auspicious qualities. Hence he says this:

On the doubt, viz. whether those imperfections,—which arising from the different places pertain to the individual soul abiding in those places, viz. waking, dream and deep sleep,—pertain to the Highest Self, or not,—the *prima facie* view is as follows: Although it has been stated in the first chapter under the aphorism: "If it be objected that enjoyment results, (we reply:) no, on account of difference" (Br. Sū. 1.2.8), that those imperfections cling only to the individual soul, a self-conscious agent, but never to the Highest Self who is not subject to karmas,—yet just as, like Yajñadatta, the owner of a house, his friend Devadatta too, who has entered there, comes to be affected by the heat of fire, owing to his connection

[1] Vide V.P.S. 1.2.8.

with that blazing house,—so the imperfections arising from places pertain to the Highest Self too.[1]

With regard to it we reply: No. There are no imperfections, arising from those particular places, "on the part of the Highest", i.e. on the part of Brahman full of His own bliss, although He has entered into those places out of compassion as the inner controller of the individual souls, His own parts, for their guidance,—"because" "everywhere", i.e. in scriptural and Smṛti passages, the Supreme Brahman is established to be "possessed of two-fold characteristics", i.e. as possessed of the marks of being free by nature from all faults and being an abode of a mass of auspicious qualities. The scriptural texts are to the effect: "The soul that is free from sins, ageless, deathless, griefless, without hunger, without thirst, possessed of true desires, possessed of true resolves" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3), "Who is omniscient, all knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), "Whose penance consists in knowledge (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9), "He who knows the bliss of Brahman" (Tait. 2.4.1; 2.9.1), "Natural is the operation of (His) knowledge and strength" (Śvet. 6.8) and so on. The Smṛti passages are to the effect: "He possesses all auspicious qualities; and has drawn out, by a particle of His own power, the creation of beings [2] (V.P. 6.5.84 [3]), "He is possessed of might, power, lordship and supreme knowledge, and is one mass of qualities like His own strength, power and the rest. He is the highest of the high, in whom, the Lord of the high and the low,[4] there are no miseries and the like" (V.P. 6.5.85 [5]).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "Not even on account of place (i.e. limiting adjunct), two-fold characteristics (viz. saviśeṣa

[1] Here the house stands for the body, Yajñadatta for the soul, Devadatta for the Lord. Just as when the house is on fire, the heat affects not only Yajñadatta, the owner, but also Devadatta, a visitor who has entered into it, so the imperfections inhering in the body affect not only the individual soul, the owner, but also the Lord who has entered into it as its ruler.

[2] Reading: "Sva-śakti-leśāvṛta-bhūta-vargaḥ", meaning: 'Who has covered the group of beings by a particle of His own power'.

[3] P. 837, lines 9-10.

[4] Reading: "Parāpareśe", meaning the same.

[5] P. 837, lines 13–16.

and nirviśeṣa) (are possible) on the part of the Highest, for everywhere (Scripture declares it to be nirviśeṣa)". That is, in Scripture two classes of texts are found, one designating Brahman as possessed of difference, the other designating Brahman as devoid of difference. This gives rise to a doubt, viz. whether Brahman is both saviśeṣa and nirviśeṣa. The answer is that one and the same thing cannot have two different natures. Hence Brahman cannot be saviśeṣa even through the limiting adjuncts which do not change its real nature, but only conceals it for the time being.[1]

Bhāskara

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "Not even on account of place (viz. the world and the rest), two-fold characteristics (viz. sākāra and nirākāra) (are possible) on the part of the Highest, because everywhere (Scripture declares Him to be nirākāra)". That is, although Brahman has two forms—causal or nirākāra and effected or sākāra,—yet He is to be meditated on in His Nirākāra aspect only, which is His real form and which He never loses even when He comes to have a connection with the world and the rest.[2]

Baladeva

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "Not even on account of place (i.e. by the mere fact of His being in two places), two-fold characteristics (i.e. changes of nature) (are possible) on the part of the Highest, because everywhere (He is present simultaneously)". That is, though the Lord manifests himself in various places, yet by reason of His mysterious power, He Himself undergoes no change.[3]

SŪTRA 12

"IF IT BE OBJECTED: ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE STATEMENT OF WHAT IS NOT THAT IN EACH CASE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: Because of its connection with the body, the imperfections arising from the difference of states, do indeed pertain

[1] Ś.B. 3.2.11, p. 724, lines 8–17.
[2] Bh. B. 3.2.11, pp. 164-165.
[3] G.B. pp. 54-55, Chap. 3.

to the individual soul, though endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest. Likewise they may belong to the Highest as well—we reply: "no", because nowhere there is any text designating imperfections on the part of the Inner Controller; on the contrary, there are texts about His immortality, viz. '"He is your soul, the inner controller, immortal"' (Bṛh. 3.7.3, etc.[1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The individual soul passes through many different states and assumes many different bodies (such as human, divine and so on), and hence the stated imperfections do indeed pertain to the individual soul, though it is naturally endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest, established by the statement of Prajāpati, recorded in the Chāndogya.[2] Likewise, the Lord too, the Inner Controller of all, has to pass through many different states and come into contact with many different bodies. Hence, those imperfections may pertain to the Highest as well, naturally endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest,—

We reply: "No". Why? "On account of the statement of what is not that in each case," i.e. because there is no text designating the imperfections of the Highest Person "in each case", i.e. in any state. The stated imperfections pertain to the individual soul,—which though endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest, has yet its real nature concealed through the wish of the Highest, in accordance with its karmas,[3]—but never to the Highest who has His real nature ever-manifest. Thus, in reference to the state of waking, there are texts establishing the imperfections of the individual soul, such as: "Those who are of a stinking conduct attain a stinking birth" (Chānd. 5.10.7) and so on, but none referring to the imperfections of the Highest. Then, in reference to the state of dream, there are texts like: "When one sees a black person with black teeth in his dream, he (i.e. the black person) kills him (i.e. the dreamer" (Ait. Ār. 3.2.4[4]) and so on; and in reference to deep

[1] Repeated altogether 20 times (once at the end of each verse) up to the end of the section beginning with verse 3.7.3.

R, ŚK.

[2] Vide Chānd. 8.7.1, 3.

[3] Vide V.K. 3.2.5.

[4] P. 136-137.

sleep, there are texts like: "All creatures go to this world of Brahman day by day, (yet) do not find it, for they are carried away by untruth" (Chānd. 8.3.2) and so on,—all referring to the individual soul, but not to the Highest. Similarly, it should be understood that in reference to death and the rest as well there is 'statement of what is not that'. Our view is further confirmed by the texts designating the immortality of the Inner Controller and proving His faultlessness, viz.: '"He is your soul, the inner controller, the immortal"' (Bṛh. 3.7.3, etc.). The same text is repeated in connection with each of the objects to be controlled,—beginning with the earth, water, fire and sky, and ending with the skin, understanding and semen [1],—mentioned in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka in the text which begins "He who dwelling in the earth is other than the earth, whom the earth does not know, of whom the earth is the body, who rules the earth from within" (Bṛh. 3.7.3).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading different, viz. adds "na" in the beginning thus: "Na bhedāt . . .". Interpretation also different, viz.: "If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (nirviśeṣa), on account of difference (of forms), (we reply:) No, on account of the statement of what is not that in each case". That is, it may be objected that since Brahman is designated by Scripture as having various forms, e.g. as having four feet, sixteen parts and so on, it must be held to be saviśeṣa, i.e. possessed of attributes and forms; and there is no contradiction involved here in taking Brahman to be so, the difference of Brahman's forms being due to limiting adjuncts. That is, Brahman is both saviśeṣa and nirviśeṣa according to Scripture. To this the reply is that Scripture depicts Brahman as nirviśeṣa only, even though it mentions its different forms, due to limiting adjuncts,—for in every passage describing such adjuncts of Brahman, it is itself described as free from all diversity. Such designations are for the purpose of meditation only, but their real meaning is non-difference only.[2]

[1] Vide Bṛh. 3.7.3–3.7.23.

[2] "Bhedasya upāsanārthatvād abhede tātparyyāt." Ś.B. 3.2.14, p. 725.

Bhāskara

Interpretation absolutely different. He continues the topic of the Nirākāra-upāsanā of Brahman. Hence the sūtra: "If it be objected that on account of difference, (i.e. on account of the corporeal and incorporeal forms of Brahman as designated in Scripture,) (Brahman is not to be worshipped in his casual or formless aspect) (we reply:) no, on account of the statement of what is not that in each case, (i.e. because there is no text which designates difference on the part of Brahman due to limiting adjuncts)".[1] Hence everywhere the one Brahman is to be worshipped.

Baladeva

Reading different, viz. like Śaṃkara, he adds a "na" in the beginning. Interpretation too different. He continues the theme of the previous sūtra, viz. the oneness of the Lord in spite of His various manifestations in different places. Hence the sūtra: "If it be objected that on account of difference (i.e. because the manifestations of the Lord are different), (the oneness of the Lord, alleged above, is not possible), (we reply:) no, because there is the statement of the absence of that (viz. difference) with regard to each (of these manifestations)". That is, with regard to each of the manifestations of the Lord, Scripture is careful to point out that He is one.[2]

SŪTRA 13

"MOREOVER THUS SOME (TEACH)."

"Moreover" the followers of "some" branch teach: "One of these two eats the sweet berry, the other, without eating, looks on" (Ṛg. V. 1.164.20;[3] Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6[4]).

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Moreover", the followers of "some" branch teach that though the individual soul and the Supreme Lord abide in the same place, it is the individual soul alone that is subject to karmas and

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[1] Bh. B. 3.2.12, p. 165.
[2] G.B. 3.2.12, pp. 55-56, Chap. 2.
[3] P. 146, lines 1–3.
[4] R, ŚK.

participates in imperfections, but not the Highest who is not subject to karmas, thus: "Two birds, close friends, cling to the same tree. Of these two, one eats the sweet berry; the other, without eating, looks on" (Ṛg. V. 1.164.20; Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They quote from the Kaṭha and Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads [1] to show that Scripture teaches the essential non-difference of Brahman.[2]

Baladeva

He quotes from the Muṇḍukya-upaniṣad [3] to show that the Lord is one, though appearing as many.[4]

SŪTRA 14

"FOR (BRAHMAN) IS WITHOUT FORM (I.E. NOT AN ENJOYER) INDEED, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING THE PRINCIPAL (AGENT) WITH REGARD TO THAT (VIZ. CREATION OF NAMES AND FORMS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Highest is the principal agent, the creator of names and forms, as declared by the text: '"Let me evolve name and form"' (Chānd. 6.3.2 [5]). Hence He is not the enjoyer of the names and forms to be created by Himself, and as such Brahman is "without form". Hence Brahman is not touched even by an odour of imperfections.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. There may not be any imperfections on the part of Brahman even on account of place; still as the creator of names and forms, Brahman must be their enjoyer too, for generally a creator creates objects for enjoying them. Names and forms

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[1] Kaṭha. 4.11; Śvet. 1.12.
[2] Ś.B. 3.2.13, p. 725; Bh. B.
[3] Muṇḍ. 7.
[4] G.B. 3.2.13, p. 58, Chap. 3.
[5] Not quoted by others.

are known to have Brahman as their creator from the use of the first person in the text: ' "Let *me* evolve name and form " ' (Chānd. 6.3.2). Hence it is established that the Supreme Brahman is subject to karmas, and every imperfection is possible on the part of one who is subject to karmas,—the author replies:

One to whom the forms together with the names,—such as the divine bodies and the rest, created by Brahman in accordance with the works of the individual soul,—are not objects of enjoyment is "without form". Hence Brahman, who is "without form indeed" does not proceed to evolve names and forms for His own enjoyment, since all His desires are eternally fulfilled. The word "for" indicates the absence of all imperfections, arising from the material names and forms, on the part of Brahman. Why? "On account of being the principal (agent) with regard to that," i.e. because "with regard to that", or with regard to that act, Brahman is the principal agent, the creator of names and forms, in accordance with the scriptural text: "The ether, verily, is the creator of names and forms" (Chānd. 8.14.1.). That the Highest creates names and forms for the sake of the individual soul, is indicated by the words 'by the individual soul' (jīvena).[1] The individual soul, possessed of the stated marks, is a part of Brahman; and Brahman, the Whole, dwells in it, in accordance with the scriptural text: "He who dwelling in the soul" (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30 [2]). Here,[3] any activity in connection with the creation of names and forms being impossible on the part of a mere part (viz. the individual soul), the term 'individual soul' refers to Brahman, the Whole, acting for the good of the part. Hence the two words 'jīvena' and 'ātmanā' refer to the same object (viz. Brahman). The individual soul being subject to karmas is connected with these forms, and hence imperfections are possible on its part. But Brahman, though the creator of names and forms in accordance with the works of the individual souls, is not the enjoyer of their fruits, and as such the stated imperfections can never pertain to Him. Hence Brahman is possessed of a two-fold characteristic.

[1] Vide Chānd. 6.3.2—"Anena jīven-ātmanā anupraviśya nāma-rūpe vyākaravāṇi".

[2] P. 1074, line 18.

[3] Viz. in the above passage—Chānd. 6.3.2.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different, viz. "For (Brahman is) without form (i.e. nirākāra) only (and not both sākāra and nirākāra), because of the primariness of that (viz. of the texts teaching that Brahman is formless)". That is, the texts which attribute forms to Brahman are not the main purport of Scripture, since they simply enjoin meditation, and do not set forth the real nature of Brahman.[1]

Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. "For (Brahman is) without form indeed, because He is the principal (being).[2]

After this sūtra, Bhāskara reads an additional sūtra, not found in the commentaries of others, which is as follows: "Asthūlam aṇanv-ahrasvam-adīrgham-aśabdam asparśam-arūpam-avyayam", meaning: "(Brahman is) non-gross, non-fine, non-short, non-long, without sound, without touch, without form, immutable". Hence such a nirākāra or formless Brahman is to be worshipped, and not the sākāra Brahman.[3]

Baladeva

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here concerned with the question of the form of Brahman (four sūtras). Hence the sūtra: "For (Brahman is) without a form, because that (viz. the form) is the chief (viz. Brahman)". That is, Brahman is formless in the sense that He *has* not the form, but *is* the form itself, since the body of Brahman is identical with Brahman Himself.[4]

SŪTRA 15

"AND (BRAHMAN IS) POSSESSED OF LIGHT, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING NOT DEVOID OF MEANING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Untouched by darkness, "possessed of light"—Brahman, possessed of such a two-fold characteristic, is designated by one text:

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[1] Ś.B. 3.2.14, p. 726.
[2] Bh. B. 3.2.14, p. 166.
[3] Bh. B. 3.2.15, p. 166.
[4] G.B. 3.2.14, p. 59, Chap. 3.

"Of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness" (Vj.S. 31.18[1]; Tait. Ār. 3.13.1; Śvet. 3.8;[2] Gītā 8.9[3]), on account of the text being not devoid of meaning.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The view that Brahman is possessed of a two-fold characteristic is being confirmed once more.

Brahman "possessed of light",—that which has light for its attribute is 'possessed of light',—and untouched by the imperfections of the objects to be lighted, as implied by the term "and" (in the sūtra), is possessed of a two-fold characteristic. Why? On account of the texts being not devoid of meaning, viz. "He alone shining everything shines after him. Through his light all this shines" (Kaṭha. 5.15; Muṇḍ. 2.2.10; Śvet. 6.14), "Of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness" (Vj.S. 31.18; Tait. Ār. 3.13.1; Śvet. 3.8; Gītā 8.9) and so on. This aphorism is for showing that one text after another denotes Brahman as possessed of a two-fold characteristic.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "And (Brahman is) like light, on account of non-futility of texts (which designate Brahman as possessed of a form)". That is, just as the light of the sun or the moon, though pervading the entire expanse of the heaven and having no particular shape as such, appears straight, crooked and so on when passing through a finger which is straight, crooked and so on, so Brahman appears as the Universe through its connection with the limiting adjunct. Hence it is that the texts which designate Brahman as having the form of the Universe and so on are not absolutely devoid of meaning, but serve the purpose of meditation.[4]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. "And on account of the non-futility (of texts designating Brahman as possessed of all auspicious qualities and devoid of all imperfections)". That is, just as (the texts designating Brahman as) light such as: "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite"

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[1] P. 857, lines 10-11.
[2] P. 201.
[3] Not quoted by others.
[4] Ś.B. 3.2.15, pp. 726-27.

(Tait. 2.1) establish Brahman to be self-manifesting, so certain texts prove Him to be possessed of two-fold characteristics, viz. having all auspicious qualities on the one hand and being free from all defects on the other, both kinds of texts having a definite meaning.[1]

Bhāskara

Reading slightly different, viz. substitutes "vā" in place of "ca".[2]

Baladeva

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. continues the same topic about the body of the Lord thus: "And because of the non-futility (of this conception of the form or body of the Lord) as in the case of light". That is, just as, though the sun is pure light yet is conceived as having a definite form for the purpose of meditation, so the Lord, though a pure light of knowledge and bliss, is yet conceived to have a form for the purpose of meditation.[3]

SŪTRA 16

"AND (A SENTENCE IS NOT MEANINGLESS WHEN IT) STATES THAT ONLY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

When a text "states that only" or its real meaning only, then indeed it is not meaningless.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, what makes a text have a meaning or be devoid of meaning?

When a scriptural text "states that only", i.e. its real meaning only, then it is not meaningless. The term "and" implies that if it be taken, by foolish persons, to be referring to what is not its subject-matter, then it becomes meaningless. This being so, the texts designating the two-fold characteristics of Brahman being

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[1] Śrī. B. 3.2.15, p. 232, Part 2; ŚK. B. 3.2.16, p. 247, Part 9.
[2] Bh. B. 3.2.15, p. 166. [3] G.B. 3.2.15, p. 60, Chap. 3.

mutually non-contradictory, are literally true and authoritative,—this is the implied meaning.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different as before, viz. "And (Scripture declares that only, (viz. that Brahman is pure, non-differentiated consciousness)".[1]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. "And (texts like: 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite') declare that only", viz. only that Brahman is self-manifesting, but does not deny that Brahman has other qualities, such as, being capable of realizing all His wishes at once and so on, known from other texts. This sūtra and the next answer, according to them, the *prima facie* view, viz. that texts like "Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite" (Tait. 2.1) only designate Brahman as devoid of all differences and self-manifesting by nature; while, on the other hand, texts like: "Not so, not so" (Bṛh. 2.3.6) prove the qualities of Brahman, such as Omniscience and so on, to be false. Hence Brahman cannot be said to be possessed of two-fold characteristics, viz. having all auspicious qualities and being free from all defects whatsoever.[2]

Baladeva

He continues the same topic about the body of the Lord, viz. "And (Scripture) declares that only, (viz. that the body of the Lord is the Lord himself)". That is, it must not be thought, on the ground of the previous aphorism, that Brahman has no actual form, but is conceived to have a form for the sake of meditation only, for Scripture declares that the Lord does possess a form and that this form is not different from Him, but the very essence of His self.[3]

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[1] Ś.B. 3.2.16, p. 727; Bh. B. 3.2.17. p. 166.

[2] Śrī. B. 3.2.16, p. 232, Part 2; ŚK. B. 3.2.16, pp. 247-248, Part 9.

[3] G.B. 3.2.16, p. 429, Chap. 3. "Atra dehād bhinno dehīt-y-evam bhideśvara-vastuni nāsti; kimtu deha eva dehīti labdham."

SŪTRA 17

"AND (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS (THIS), THEN (IT IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI TOO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Numerous texts like: "The Soul that is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3 [1]), "Without parts, without action, tranquil, irreproachable, stainless" (Śvet. 16.19 [2]), "Having true desires, having true resolves" (Chānd. 8.1.5; 8.7.13 [3]) and so on, prove that Brahman is possessed of a double characteristic. "Then" it is "declared by Smṛti too", thus: '"I am beyond the perishable and am superior to even the imperishable. Hence in the world and in the Veda I am proclaimed to be the Highest Person"' (Gītā. 15.18 [4]), '"I am the origin of all, everything proceeds from me"' (Gītā. 10.8 [5]), '"Or, what is the use of so much knowledge to you, O Arjuna? Having pervaded this entire Universe with one part of mine, I abide"' (Gītā 10.42 [6]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And" the mass of scriptural texts "shows" that Brahman is indeed possessed of a two-fold characteristic, viz. "The soul that is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3), "Without parts, without action, tranquil, irreproachable, stainless" (Śvet. 6.19), "Having true desires, having true resolves" (Chānd. 8.1.5; 8.7.1, 3), "He who is omniscient, all-knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), "Supreme is his power, declared to be of various kinds indeed; natural is the operation of his knowledge and power" (Śvet. 6.8), "Him who is the supreme and Great Lord of lords; him, who is the supreme God of gods" (Śvet. 6.7), "He is the cause, the cause of the lord of causes" (Śvet. 6.9*c* [7]), "Of him there is no progenitor whatsoever, nor a lord" (Śvet. 6.9 *a-b*), "This is one bliss of Brahman" (Tait. 2.8), "He who knows the bliss of Brahman does not fear anything" (Tait. 2.4) and so on. This is "declared by Smṛti too" thus: '"I am beyond the perishable and am superior to even the imperishable. Hence in the world and in the Veda I am proclaimed to be the Highest Person"' (Gītā 15.18),

[1] Not quoted by others.
[2] R, ŚK.
[3] Not quoted by others.
[4] Not quoted by others.
[5] *Op cit.*
[6] R.
[7] Correct quotation: "Karaṇādhipādhipa", meaning: the lord of the lord of sense-organs, viz. the individual soul. Vide Śvet. 6.9, p. 70.

'"I am the origin of the entire world, likewise the dissolution"' (Gītā 7.6), '"He who knows me unborn, without beginning and the Great Lord of the world"' (Gītā 10.3), '"The multitudes of gods do not know my origin, nor the great sages"' (Gītā 10.2), '"Having pervaded this entire world with a part of mine, I abide"' (Gītā 10.42), '"There is nothing higher than me, O Dhanañjaya"' (Gītā 7.7), '"For I am the enjoyer of all sacrifices, and the lord indeed"' (Gītā 9.24) and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He quotes from Scripture (Bṛh. 2.3.6, etc.) and Smṛti to show that Brahman is nirviśeṣa or absolutely free from differences.[1]

Bhāskara

He quotes from Scripture (Śvet. 6.13) and Smṛti (Gītā 8.9) to show that Brahman is self-manifest by nature.[2]

Baladeva

He quotes from Scripture (Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī) and Smṛti (Brahma-saṃhitā) to show that the body of the Lord is identical with the Lord Himself.[3]

SŪTRA 18

"AND FOR THAT VERY REASON, (THERE IS) THE SIMILE, LIKE THE SUN AND WATER AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Brahman, though all-pervading, is indeed faultless, possessing as He does two-fold characteristics. "For that very reason," texts like: "Likewise,[4] verily, the one soul abides within many, like the sun within water-receptacles" (Yāj. Sm. 3.144[5]) and so on,

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[1] Ś.B. 3.2.17, p. 728.
[2] Bh. B. 3.2.18, p. 167.
[3] G.B. 3.2.17.
[4] Correct quotation "tathā" and not "yathā".
[5] P. 283.

take the help of "the simile of the sun and water and so on" for establishing Brahman's faultlessness.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Brahman, though abiding in many places, is not subject to even an odour of imperfections arising out of those places. "For that very reason", in Scripture the following "simile" is employed: Just as the sun and the rest, though reflected on water and the like, are not touched by their imperfections, so the Supreme Brahman too, though abiding in the sentient and the non-sentient, is not touched by their respective imperfections. The texts to that effect are as follows: "But just as the one ether becomes divided in the pots and the rest, so verily, the one soul abides within many, like the sun within water-receptacles" (Yāj. Sm. 3.144), "For the soul of beings, which is one only, is installed in each separate being, and is seen as one-fold and many-fold, like the moon reflected on water" (Brahmab. 6.12 [1]).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

The same simile of the sun and water is interpreted differently by them, viz. Just as the same sun appears to be many when reflected on many sheets of water, so the one Brahman appears to be many through being connected with Upādhis or limiting adjuncts.[2] However, Śaṃkara and Bhāskara understand the term 'Upādhi' in two different senses, as already noted.

Baladeva

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (one sūtra), concerned with showing that the worshipper (i.e. the individual soul) is different from the object worshipped (viz. the Lord). Hence the sūtra: "And for that very reason, (i.e. because the individual soul is different from Brahman), the simile, like the sun and water and so on, (is appropriate)". That is, in Scripture we meet with the similes of the sun reflected on water and so on, and such similes simply show that just

[1] P. 338.

[2] Ś.B. 3.2.18, pp. 328-329; Bh. B. 3.2.19, p. 167.

as the sun (or the bimba) is different from its image (or the pratibimba), so the Lord is different from the individual soul.[1]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 19)

SŪTRA 19

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-APPREHENSION LIKE WATER, THERE IS NO BEING SO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is doubted: Water is apprehended to be remote from the sun, but not so the place (viz. the individual soul) from the whole (viz. the Lord).[2] Hence the example cited is not to the point.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It is doubted that the example cited does not illustrate the point.

The word "but" is indicative of the doubt. It may be objected: "There is no being so", i.e. Brahman is not like the reflected sun. Why? "On account of the non-apprehension like water," i.e. water is apprehended to be remote from the sun, and the sun and the rest, though reflected on it, are yet not touched by its imperfections as they are remote from it; but all the sentient and the non-sentient are not apprehended, as in the case of water, to be remote from Brahman. Compare the scriptural texts: "He who abiding within the earth" (Bṛh. 3.7.3), "He who abiding within water" (Bṛh. 3.7.4), "He who abiding in the soul" (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30[3]), "In whom all the worlds are situated" (Kaṭha. 5.8; 6.1) and so on; and also the Smṛti passages: '"The Lord dwells, O Arjuna, in the heart-region of all"' (Gītā 18.61), '"In me all this is woven"' (Gītā 7.7) and so on. Hence there is no parallelism between the Supreme Person, the topic of discussion, and the reflected sun and the rest.

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[1] G.B. 3.2.18, pp. 65-66, Chap. 3.

[2] The C.S.S. ed. (p. 54) reads "sthāninaḥ".

[3] P. 1074, line 8.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 20-21)

SŪTRA 20

"(BRAHMAN'S) PARTICIPATION IN THE INCREASE AND DECREASE ON ACCOUNT OF BEING INCLUDED WITHIN (IS DENIED), ON ACCOUNT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO (I.E. THE EXAMPLE AND THE EXEMPLIFIED) (IT IS) SO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it, we reply: "The participation" of the Lord of places (i.e. Brahman) "in the increase and decrease" of the places (i.e. the individual souls and matter),—He being their Inner Controller,—is what is denied by the example. "On account of the agreement between the two," it is "so", i.e. only the intended portion is to be understood.

Vedānta-kaustubha

With regard to it, the author replies:

The word 'no' is to be supplied from the preceding aphorism. In spite of His "being included within" the places, there is no "participation in the increase and decrease",—due to those places,—on the part of Brahman, the Highest, who is the lord of places, in accordance with the scriptural texts: "He who abiding within the earth" (Bṛh. 3.7.3), "He who abiding within the soul" (Śat. Br. 6.7.30). This is what is denied by the example of the sun and the rest. "On account of the agreement between the two (this is) so", i.e. on account of the agreement between the illustration and the illustrated, only the relevant portion is to be understood. Thus, just as the ether, though actually entered within pots, jars and so on, does not participate in the faults of increase and decrease,—although the ether is in every pot and is distinguished conventionally as: 'There is no water in this pot', 'There is sugar in another', yet it remains one only,—and just as the sun, reflected on different receptacles of water, does not participate in the faults of their increase and decrease, on the contrary manifests a multitude of objects under water,—so the Supreme Brahman, who is one only, abides as manifold in the sentient and non-sentient objects as their Inner Controller, but is not touched by their respective faults, is not divided by their respective differences and does not participate in their increase and

decrease. Thus, "on account of the agreement between the two, (this is) so", i.e. only the relevant points of similarity are to be accepted, otherwise there can be no appropriateness of these two. The resultant meaning is that there can be no relation of example and the exemplified between two objects when the example proves the exemplified to possess contrary qualities.

Or (the word "ubhaya-sāmānyāt" may be explained as): On account of the appropriateness of the two examples of the sun and so on, (i.e. the sun and water, and the ether and pot).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

As before, they interpret the example in a different way. Hence the sūtra: "(There is a common point between the example and the exemplified, viz. their) participation in increase and decrease, owing to being included within, on account of (such an) agreement between the two, (it is) thus: (i.e. the comparison holds good)". That is, just as the reflected image of the sun, being inside the sheet of water, participates in all the qualities of water, viz. increases and decreases when water does so and so on, but the real sun does not do so, so Brahman, when within, i.e. connected with the limiting adjuncts, such as the body and so on, participates in their growth and the like, but real Brahman never does so.[1]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They take this sūtra and the next one as constituting one sūtra.[2] Interpretation same.

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. "(The above simile of the sun and water holds good, though not in its primary sense, yet in its secondary sense of) participating in increase (i.e. greatness) and decrease (i.e. smallness), (i.e. just as the sun participates in increase, i.e. is a large substance untouched by the limitations of water and so on, while the images of the sun participate in decrease, i.e. are limited by the conditions and variations of water, so the Lord participates in greatness, i.e. is great and independent, while the individual soul participates

[1] Ś.B. 3.2.20, pp. 729-730; Bh. B. 3.2.31, pp. 167-168.
[2] Śrī. B. 3.2.20, p. 234, Part 2; ŚK. B. 3.2.20, p. 250, Part 9.

in smallness, i.e. is small and dependent,—this is what is meant to be illustrated by the simile), on account of being included within, (i.e. because the purport of Scripture is fulfilled by this mode of explanation,—everything is contained in it), on account of the agreement between the two (this is) so, (i.e. the comparison holds good)".[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 21

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF OBSERVATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because in ordinary experience, (comparisons like): 'A lion-like boy'[2] are found.

Vedānta-kaustubha

And because in ordinary life, expressions like 'A lion-like boy' and so on are found, this is "so", i.e. the attribute which is common to the example and the exemplified is to be understood as the relevant portion here. Hence it is established that Brahman is possessed of a two-fold characteristic.

Here ends the section entitled "Possessed of two-fold characteristics" (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. "And because it is seen (i.e. declared by Scripture that Brahman enters within the body)".[3]

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[1] G.B. 3.2.20, pp. 69-70, Chap. 3.

[2] The whole point is that when one thing is compared to another, that does not imply that the two must be similar in *all* respects, but only that they are so in some intended points. E.g. when a boy is compared to a lion that evidently does not mean that he has four feet, thirst for blood, etc. like the lion, but simply that he is as brave as the lion. Hence only this point, viz. braveness, is to be taken into account here. Similar is the case with Brahman and the sun.

[3] Ś.B. 3.2.21, p. 730; Bh. B. 3.2.22, p. 168.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "The so-muchness resulting from what has been previously declared". (Sūtras 22–30)

SŪTRA 22

"FOR (THE TEXT) DENIES THE SO-MUCHNESS RESULTING FROM WHAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY DECLARED, AND AFTER THAT SPEAKS (OF BRAHMAN AS LIMITLESS) ONCE MORE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the doubt, viz. whether the text: "Not so, not so" (Bṛh. 2.3.6 [1]) denies the corporeal and the incorporeal forms, mentioned previously in the passage: "There are, verily, two forms of Brahman, the corporeal and incorporeal" (Bṛh. 2.3.1 [2]), or denies simply Brahman's so-muchness resulting from His connection with the previously mentioned forms—the suggestion being that it denies the forms of Brahman—we reply:

It "denies" only "the so-muchness resulting from what has been previously mentioned". "After that," "once more" [3] the concluding portion of the text says: "For there is nothing higher than this—hence (it is called) 'not so'" (Bṛh. 2.3.6 [4]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated above that Brahman is possessed of a two-fold characteristic. Now the world is real, the world which consists of the sentient and the non-sentient, which is not known through any other means of knowledge, which is knowable from Scripture alone as a form of Brahman on account of having Brahman for its soul, and which is not deniable by such texts like: 'This is not a form of Brahman.' Now, it may be thought that Brahman, who possesses the world as His form and is endowed with infinite, inconceivable, auspicious

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[2] *Op. cit.* This text occurs in Maitrī 6.3 as well.

[3] The word "bhūyaḥ" may mean both 'once more' and 'something more'. It is not clear in which sense precisely Nimbārka understands it. Śrīnivāsa gives both the meanings, see V.K. below.

[4] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

qualities and powers, becomes limited owing to His connection with the limited world. The author here denies this.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, having begun thus: "There are, verily, two forms of Brahman, the corporeal and the incorporeal" (Bṛh. 2.3.1), and having exhibited the particular forms of saffron-colour and the rest thus: "The form of this person, verily, is like the saffron-colour" (Bṛh. 2.3.6), the text goes on to record: "Hence, now, there is the teaching: 'Not so, not so'" (Bṛh. 2.3.6). Among these, the corporeal, i.e. the three elements: fire, water and food; the incorporeal, i.e. the two elements: air and ether [1]; as well as the particular forms of the saffron-colour and the rest [2] have been mentioned before. Here the doubt is whether the text: "Not so, not so" (Bṛh. 2.3.6) denies the above-mentioned group of the corporeal and the incorporeal forms of Brahman, or denies Brahman's so-muchness, resulting from His possession of the above-mentioned group of the corporeal and the incorporeal forms. Here on the suggestion: It denies the group of the corporeal and the incorporeal forms,—we reply: The text: "Not so, not so" "denies" Brahman's so-muchness, resulting from His connection with those corporeal and incorporeal forms which have been mentioned previously. The word "for" shows that no things, sentient and non-sentient, are capable of being denied—things which, on account of having Brahman for their soul, are His forms, as established by hundreds of scriptural passages, such as: "There are, verily, two forms of Brahman, the corporeal and the incorporeal" (Bṛh. 2.3.1), "Everything has that for its soul" (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.4, etc.), "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "By proving the enjoyer, the object enjoyed and the Mover, all has been said. This is the three-fold Brahman" (Śvet. 1.12) and so on. The phrase: "And after that speaks once more" shows that Brahman is not limited by so-muchness. That is, "after that" or after denying the so-muchness of Brahman, "once more", i.e. again, the concluding portion of the text "speaks" of Brahman as not limited by so-muchness.

Or else (an alternative explanation): the concluding portion of the text speaks of something more than the previously mentioned corporeal and incorporeal forms thus: "For there is nothing higher than it, hence (it is called) 'not so'. "Now (its) name is 'the real of the real'.

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[1] Vide Bṛh. 2.3.2-3.

[2] Vide Bṛh. 2.3.6.

The vital-breaths, verily, are real. It is their real" (Bṛh. 2.3.6). Its meaning is as follows: It is not to be said that the real nature of Brahman is not other 'than it', i.e. than what has been mentioned above. Brahman is higher than it, unlimited by so-muchness, without an equal or a superior. There is also a 'name' for Brahman, the highest of all. The same text states it thus: 'the real of the real'. Anticipating the enquiry: The real of which reals? the text says: 'The vital-breaths, verily, are real; it is their real'. 'The vital breaths' are the individual souls having the vital-breaths, and they do not, like the ether and the rest, undergo any change of nature at the time of creation, hence they are 'real'. Just as the Vedas, though eternal, arise from Brahman, in accordance with the maxim of a person who was asleep but has arisen now,[1] He being the cause of all,—so the individual souls, too, being under the influence of karmas, come to have births, etc., i.e. undergo changes in the form of contraction or expansion of their knowledge. But the Supreme Brahman is not subject to any such changes. For this reason, and also because He is the whole, He is the real of them too,—this is the sense. For this very reason, Scripture says: "The eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious" (Kaṭha. 5.13; Śvet. 6.13).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation diametrically opposed: The question is, what exactly is denied by the text "Not so, not so". Does it deny the two forms of Brahman merely, or also Brahman Himself possessing those forms? It may be suggested: As none among these is specially mentioned as the object of negation here, so both these are negated. The term 'not so' is repeated twice, which also seems to imply that there are two objects of negation, the universe and Brahman. Or, Brahman alone is negatived here, since it being beyond the eyes and the mind, may very well be non-existent.

The answer to this view is as follows: The two-fold negation of the forms of Brahman and Brahman Himself is not possible. Negation implies something positive and existent on the basis of which the thing is set at naught, e.g. the snake is denied to be in the rope and so

[1] Vide V.K. 1.3.28.

on. Hence absolute and universal negation is impossible and meaningless. Therefore, Brahman cannot be negatived. As such the text "Not so, not so" denies only the two previously mentioned corporeal and incorporeal forms of Brahman and thereby depicts the real nature of Brahman, viz. His absolute freedom from all differences. If it be said: Why should Scripture first designate these forms and then deny them ?—the answer is that Scripture never actually proves that Brahman possesses these forms, but simply mentions them as the views of the ignorant for the purpose of showing their hollowness later on. Moreover, the repetition of the words 'not so' simply refers to the two forms separately. Thus according to Śaṃkara, there are two alternative explanations of the sūtra:

(1) Having first designated Brahman as "Not so, not so", the text goes on to say *once more*: "There is nothing higher than it, hence (it is called) 'Not so' ".

(2) (Or) there is no better designation of Brahman's real nature than the text: "Not so"; and the text declares *something more*, viz. the name of Brahman.[1]

Rāmānuja

Interpretation same, but he does not begin a new adhikaraṇa here, but continues the same adhikaraṇa up to sūtra 25.

Bhāskara

He also does not begin a new adhikaraṇa here, but continues the same topic of the meditation on Brahman in His aspect of non-difference, as pure existence and consciousness. According to Him in the text: "Not so, not so", the first 'not so' denies the corporeal and the incorporeal forms of Brahman, i.e. His form as the elements; while the second 'not so' denies His Vāsanā-maya form, i.e. His form as the individual soul. Thus this text designates the pure, non-differenced form of Brahman, but by no means proves the non-existence of the world. Hence the sūtra: ("The text) denies the so-muchness of the topic of discussion (viz. Brahman) after that speaks (of Brahman) once more (as the Highest Being) ".[2]

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[1] Ś.B. 3.2.22, pp. 737 ff.

[2] Bh. B. 3.2 23, p. 169.

SŪTRA 23

"THAT (VIZ. BRAHMAN IS) UNMANIFEST, FOR SCRIPTURE STATES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The scriptural text: "He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by speech" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.8 [1]) and so on, states that Brahman is "Unmanifest".

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author points out that Brahman, immanent in the corporeal and the rest, yet transcendent, is not apprehended by the ordinary sense-organs.

"That," i.e. Brahman, is "Unmanifest", "for" Scripture "states": "His form is not present to vision, no one whosoever sees Him with the eye" (Kaṭha. 6.9; Śvet. 4.20), "He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by speech" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.8) and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Like Nimbārka, he also holds that Brahman is not perceivable by the ordinary sense-organs; although unlike Nimbārka he holds here, as before, that Brahman has no corporeal and incorporeal forms.[2]

Baladeva

He takes it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself.

SŪTRA 24

"AND (BRAHMAN IS REVEALED) IN PERFECT MEDITATION, ON ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION (I.E. SCRIPTURE) AND INFERENCE (I.E. (SMṚTI)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But Brahman is revealed in loving devotion, i.e. in meditation, in accordance with the following scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. "He, with his nature purified through the clarification of the

[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[2] Ś.B. 3.2.23, p. 741.

knowledge of Brahman, perceives, meditating, him who is without parts" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.8 [1]), '"But through exclusive devotion, I may be known thus, O Arjuna, and perceived in truth, and entered, O conqueror of enemies!" ' (Gītā 11.54 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz. This view, surely, is inconsistent with texts like: '"O, the self is to be seen" ' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6) and so on, the author points out that if an earnest effort be made by virtuous men who follow Scripture and are desirous of a direct vision of Him, then He becomes manifest to them.

The word "and" implies possibility. Brahman becomes manifest "in perfect meditation", i.e. in loving devotion or meditation. And this is known "from perception and inference", i.e. from Scripture and Smṛti. Compare scriptural texts like: "He is attainable only by him whom he chooses. To him he reveals his own person" (Kaṭha. 2.23; Muṇḍ. 3.2.3), "He, with his nature purified through the clarification of the knowledge of Brahman, perceives, meditating, him who is without parts" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.8); and Smṛti texts like: '"But through exclusive devotion, I may be known thus, O Arjuna, and perceived in truth, and entered, O conqueror of enemies!" ' (Gītā 11.54). "He whom the Yogins [3],—sleepless, with subdued breath, with contented minds, with restrained sense-organs,—see as light, obeisance to Him, whose self is Yoga" (Mahā. 12.1642 [4]), "The Yogins see him, the lord, the eternal" and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading slightly different, viz. he adds a "ca" after "api".[5]

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[2] R, B.

[3] A Yuñjāna is a Brahmin, one who by religious exercise called Yoga endeavours to obtain union with the Lord.

[4] P. 423, lines 18-19, vol. 3, Asiatic Society ed. This edition and the Vaṅgavāsī ed. (p. 1420, col. 2, line 5) read "saṃttvasthāḥ" and "sattvasthāḥ" respectively in place of "samtuṣṭāḥ".

[5] Ś.B. 3.2.24, p. 741.

Baladeva

He takes this sūtra too as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation same.

SŪTRA 25

"AND AS IN THE CASE OF LIGHT AND THE REST, (THERE IS) NON-DIFFERENCE (I.E. THE CASE OF BRAHMAN IS SIMILAR TO THE CASE OF LIGHT AND THE REST), AND (BRAHMAN'S) MANIFESTATION (TAKES PLACE) THROUGH REPETITION WITH REGARD TO ACT (I.E. THE MEANS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as there is manifestation of the sun, fire and the like through the repetition of the means resorted to by those who long for them, so there is "non-difference" in the case of Brahman too, i.e. there is "manifestation" of Brahman.[1] The sense is that the direct vision of Brahman results from the incessant repetition of the *sādhanas* or the means consisting in perfect meditation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. To say that Brahman becomes manifest in perfect meditation only does not stand to reason; for why should not everyone equally see Brahman who is the soul of all and all-pervading?—the author replies:

The light of the sun is within the reach of all, yet the sun manifests itself "through the repetition with regard to act", i.e. through the repeated mutterings of sacred formulæ and so on by Kunti, Yudiṣṭhira and the like; the fire is within the reach of all, yet it manifests itself "through the repetition with regard to act", i.e. through the repeated churning and the like by the twice-born; and gold is available only "through the repetition with regard to act", i.e. through repeated searching and so on. The case of Brahman too is "non-different" or similar. That is, Brahman, though available by all, manifests Himself to those alone who are desirous of salvation and meditate on Him incessantly.

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[1] The last portion of the sentence: "Brahma-prakāśo bhavati" is omitted by C.S.S. ed., p. 55.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "And as in the case of light and the rest, there is non-difference (between Brahman and the individual soul), and the light (viz. Brahman) (appears manifold) in work (i.e. through its connection with the limiting adjuncts), on account of repetition (i.e. the repeated declaration of Scripture)". That is, in the preceding sūtra it has been pointed out that Brahman manifests itself in profound meditation. This seems to suggest that there is a difference between Brahman, the object worshipped, and the individual soul, the worshipper. This sūtra controverts the suggestion by pointing out that just as the rays of the sun appear crooked, straight and so on in accordance with the shape and position of the fingers and the like through which they are passing, but the real sun remains what it is, so Brahman appears dual through the limiting adjunct of meditation and so on, but is really one and without a second. That is, for the purpose of meditation, a distinction is made between Brahman and the individual soul, but there is no real difference between them.[1]

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 24 in his commentary.

Interpretation different. Here he continues the problem, viz. What is exactly denied by the text: "Not so, not so" (Bṛh. 2.3.6). The sūtra means, according to him: "Like light (i.e. knowledge) and so on, there is non-difference, (i.e. just as knowledge, bliss and the like constitute the very nature of Brahman, so do His corporeal and incorporeal forms), and (just as) light (i.e. knowledge) (and bliss and the like are known to be constituting the very nature of Brahman) from the repetition with regard to act, (i.e. from the repeated practice of devout meditation), (so are His corporeal and incorporeal forms)". That is, Vāmadeva and others, who obtained a direct vision of the Lord, perceived Him as knowledge and bliss and so on, just as they perceived Him also as possessed of the corporeal and incorporeal forms. And, just as Vāmadeva and others perceived Him as knowledge and bliss and so on through the repeated practice of meditation, so they perceived Him

[1] Ś.B. 3.2.25, p. 742.

as possessed of the corporeal and the incorporeal forms through the repeated practice of meditation. Hence the above text: "Not so, not so" denies only the so-muchness of Brahman, but not His corporeal and incorporeal forms.[1]

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 26 in his commentary. He interprets the first portion of the sūtra like Śaṃkara, the last portion like Nimbārka; although he gives two alternative interpretations of the word "karmaṇi": "(If it be said that the Highest Self being unmanifest, beyond the senses and obtainable through meditation only, must be different from the individual soul,—we reply:) Like light and the rest, there is non-difference also (between Brahman and the individual soul), and the manifestation (of Brahman, which brings about this non-difference, arises) from the repetition (i.e. the repetition of meditation) with regard to act (i.e. with regard to the object to be worshipped, viz. Brahman). (Or an alternative explanation:) from the repetition with regard to act (i.e. with regard to meditation)".[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 24 in his commentary. Interpretation different.

"And as in the case of light (viz. knowledge) and so on (there is) non-difference, and the manifestation (of Brahman takes place) through the repetition with regard to act, (i.e. those who attain a direct vision of the Lord, come to have lordship and the rest like Him, just as they come to have knowledge, bliss and the rest like Him,—there is no difference between their attaining knowledge, bliss and the rest like the Lord and attaining lordship and so on like Him)." [3]

Baladeva

He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras thus: "Prakāśādivac ca vaiśaśyāt" (sūtra 25), "Prakāśaś ca karmaṇy abhyāsāt" (sūtra 26). Interpretation of the first portion entirely different.

Sūtra 25.—Here the word "na" is to be supplied, according to Him, from sūtra 19. Hence the sutra: "And (the Lord is) not like light (i.e. fire) and the rest, for (there are) no (such) distinctions (in

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[1] Śrī. B. 3.2.24, p. 238, Part 2.
[2] Bh. B. 3.2.26 (written as 3.2.25), pp. 169-170.
[3] Śk. B. 3.2.24, pp. 257-258, Part 9.

Him)". That is, fire has two states, subtle and gross, and it is unmanifest in its subtle state, but becomes manifest in its gross state. Such is not the case with the Lord, i.e. it is not that the Lord is unmanifest in His subtle state, but becomes manifest in His gross state,—for, in Him there is no such distinction of subtle and gross. Hence *the manifestation of the Lord does not depend on any such states, but on the love and devotion of the devotee.*[1]

Sūtra 26.—"And *(if it be objected that it is by no means a* universal rule that whoever loves God sees Him, we reply:) the manifestation (of the Lord to the devotee is brought about) through the repetition with regard to act (i.e. through the repeated practice of meditation)." That is, mere love is of no avail, but the constant repetition of the acts of meditation, etc. is necessary.[2]

SŪTRA 26

"HENCE (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL ATTAINS SIMILARITY) WITH THE INFINITE, FOR THUS (IS) THE INDICATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

When the individual soul directly intuits Brahman, it becomes similar to Him, in accordance with the text "When the seer sees the golden-coloured creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahmā, then the wise men, having discarded merit and demerit attains the highest equality" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3 [3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Incidentally, the author is indicating the fruit of the direct vision of Brahman.

"Hence," i.e. through the manifestation or the direct vision of Brahman, the individual soul becomes similar to the Infinite, i.e. to Brahman, the Highest Person, "for thus (is) the indication", i.e. because there is a text intimating this, viz. "When the seer sees the golden-coloured creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of

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[1] G.B. 3.2.25, p. 80, Chap. 3.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.26, p. 81, Chap. 3.
[3] Not quoted by others.

Brahmā, then the wise man, having discarded merit and demerit, attains the highest equality" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.1.3).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 27 in Bhāskara's commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "Hence (i.e. because the distinction between Brahman and the individual soul is due to nescience, while the absolute oneness of Brahman is the ultimate truth), (the individual soul can get rid of nescience and become one) with the Infinite (i.e. Brahman), for this (is) the indication ".[1]

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "Hence (i.e. on account of the above reasons), (it is proved that Brahman is qualified) by infinite (auspicious qualities), for thus (i.e. this being so), the mark (i.e. the two-fold characteristics of Brahman) (is established)".[2] According to Rāmānuja, the section about the two-fold characteristics of Brahman ends here, while according to Nimbārka, as we have seen, it ends with sūtra 21.

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Interpretation different,—very similar to that of Rāmānuja: "Hence (i.e. because the devotees of Brahman, who have attained similarity with Him, are endowed with knowledge, bliss, supreme lordship and the like), (it is proved that Brahman has connection) with infinite (auspicious qualities) for thus (i.e. this being so), the mark (i.e. two-fold characteristics of Brahman) (is established) ".[3]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 27 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "Hence (the direct vision of the Lord is possible) through (the grace of) the Infinite (viz. Brahman) for thus (is) the indication".

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[1] Ś.B. 3.2.26, p. 743; Bh. B. 3.2.27 (written as 3.2.26), p. 170.
[2] Śrī. B. 3.2.25, p. 238, Part 2.
[3] Śk. B. 3.2.25, p. 258, Part 9.

That is, the Lord, though invisible, yet makes Himself visible to His devotees through His mysterious power or grace.[1]

SŪTRA 27

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF BOTH, LIKE THE CASE OF THE SERPENT AND THE COIL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The view that the corporeal and the incorporeal are never negated by Scripture is being confirmed here. The universe, consisting of the corporeal and the incorporeal, abides in its own cause, viz. Brahman, in a relation of difference-non-difference, on account of the designation of both difference and non-difference, "like the case of the serpent and the coil".

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out that the entire expanse of the universe, consisting of the corporeal and the incorporeal, mentioned in Scripture as the effect and form of Brahman, cannot be the object of the denial: "Not so, not so" (Bṛh. 2.3.6); and also that Brahman, being transcendent, is faultless. With a view to confirming this, the reverend author of the aphorisms states his own conclusion, expounding the meaning of all Scriptures, viz. that the universe, the effect, stands in a relation of difference-non-difference to Brahman, the cause.

In spite of their difference from Brahman, the whole groups of effects, like the corporeal and the incorporeal and so on, are non-different from Him. Why? "On account of the designation of both," i.e. on account of the designation of difference and non-difference. Compare the following texts designating difference: "From whom, verily, these beings arise" (Tait. 3.1), "He who abiding within the earth" (Bṛh. 3.7.3) and so on; and the text designating non-difference: "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1) and so on.

Here the author states a parallel instance: "Like the serpent and the coil". In all cases, the parallel instances are to be understood

[1] G.B. 3.2.27, p. 82, Chap. 3.

as referring to the relevant portion only.[1] The serpent, having the form of a rope and the material constituting the coil, is the cause; and analogous to it is Brahman, endowed with all powers, and the one non-different efficient and material cause of the world. The coil, having the form of a bracelet, is the effect; and analogous to it is the Universe, consisting of the corporeal and the incorporeal, the effect. Among these, the coil is dependent on another, something to be pervaded and an effect; while in contrast to it, the serpent is self-dependent, the pervader and the cause. Hence there is a difference between the two. And, since the coil has no existence and activity apart from the serpent, it is non-different as well from the serpent. In the same way, the Universe, the effect of Brahman who is possessed of the powers of the sentient and the non-sentient, is both different and non-different from Brahman, the cause. There is a multitude of scriptural texts in conformity with the aphorisms, viz. "Two birds, close friends" (Ṛg. V. 1.164.20[2]; Muṇḍ. 31.1; Śvet. 4.6), "Thinking the Mover and the soul to be separate" (Śvet. 1.6), "And all this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "All this has that for its soul" (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.), "Brahman alone is all this" (Nṛ. Ut. 7), "The soul alone is all this" (Chānd. 7.26.1) and so on. The sense is that there can be no negation of the corporeal and the incorporeal, because they have Brahman for their soul.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 28 in Bhāskara's commentary.

They take this sūtra as stating a *prima facie* view regarding the relation between Brahman and the individual soul, i.e. how to reconcile the texts designating difference and those designating non-difference. Hence the sūtra: "But on account of the designation of both (i.e. because in Scripture we meet with two kinds of texts, one designating difference, the other non-difference), (the individual soul is both different and non-different from Brahman), like the serpent and the coil". That is, the snake is one as a whole, yet is different, as having

[1] As shown under V.K. 3.2.20-21.

[2] P. 146, line 1.

different postures, viz. coil, the erect hood and so on. Similarly Brahman is one, but is different as soul, matter and so on.[1]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 26 in their commentaries. Rāmānuja begins a new adhikaraṇa here. Interpretation different. They too take this sūtra as stating a *prima facie* view regarding the relation between the *non-sentient* (i.e. the acit) and Brahman, and interpret it to mean that the non-sentient is but a particular state (saṃsthāna-viśeṣa) of Brahman, just as the coil is of the serpent.[2]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here, concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the identity between the Lord and His attributes (four sūtras). Hence the sūtra: "But on account of the designation of both, (the Lord is both bliss and blissful and so on), like the serpent and the coil". That is, the Lord is essentially intelligence and bliss, yet possesses these as His attributes, just as the serpent is nothing but the coil, yet possesses it as its attribute.[3]

SŪTRA 28

"Or like light and (its) substratum, on account of being light."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is such a relation (of difference-non-difference) between the individual soul and the Highest Person as well,—on account of the designation of both,—as between light and its substratum. Hence, it is not to be supposed that there is an absolute non-difference (between the two) on the ground of the aphorism: "Hence with the infinite" (Br. Sū. 3.2.26),—this is the sense.

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[1] Ś.B. 3.2.27, p. 743; Bh. B. 3.2.28 (written as 3.2.27), p. 170.
[2] Śrī. B. 3.2.26, pp. 245-246, Part 2; Śk. B. 3.2.26, pp. 258-259, Part 9.
[3] G.B. 3.2.28, p. 85, Chap. 3.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. There may be a relation of difference and non-difference between the non-sentient and Brahman, but there is no such relation between Him and the individual soul, since in accordance with the aphorism: "Hence with the infinite, for thus (is) the indication" (Br. Sū. 3.2.26), the individual soul attains equality with the Infinite, and as such it appears that there is an absolute non-difference between the two,—the author replies:

The phrase: 'on account of the designation of both' is to be supplied. The word "or" is meant for disposing of the objection. There is no absolute non-difference between the two, on account of the designation of a natural difference between the two. On account of the designation of a natural difference in the passages: "When the seer sees the golden-coloured creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahmā" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3; Maitrī 6.18), "But then he meditating perceives him who is without parts" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.8), "The knower of Brahman attains the Highest" (Tait. 2.1), "He obtains the Person, higher than the high, celestial" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.8), "Non-knowing, a beast (as it were), and not the Lord", "He who is omniscient, all-knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), "Those who abiding the midst of ignorance" (Kaṭha 2.5; Muṇḍ. 1.2.8), "This soul is free from sins, having true desires, having true resolves" (Chānd. 8.1.5; 8.7.1, 3; Maitrī 7.7), "He who abiding in the soul" (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30[1]) and so on; and on account of the scriptural statement of a natural non-difference in the passages: "That thou art" (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.), "I am Brahman" (Bṛh. 1.4.10), "This soul is Brahman" (Bṛh. 2.5.19) and so on, there is a relation of natural difference-non-difference between the soul and Brahman.

The author states a parallel instance: "Like light and (its) substratum". "Light" is the ray of the sun and the like. There is a natural relation of difference and non-difference between light and its substratum, since the former has no separate existence apart from the latter. In answer to the objection: Why is there such an insistence on the non-difference between those two absolutely different objects? the author states here another reason: "On account of being light". There is non-difference between light and its substratum also because both are equally light; and like that, there is a natural relation of

[1] P. 1074, line 18.

difference and non-difference between the individual soul, the part and the whole (viz. Brahman),—this is the sense. Under the aphorism: "A part, on account of the designation of variety, and otherwise also" (Br. Sū. 2.3.42) the relation between the individual soul and the Highest soul has been discussed for the sake of removing the conflict between the two classes of texts; but here it is stated once more for refuting the view of the logicians and the rest who hold that there is an absolute non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman—this is the distinction.

COMPARISON.

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 29 in Bhāskara's commentary. They take this sūtra too as stating another *prima facie* view regarding the relation between Brahman and the individual soul. Hence the sūtra means: just as the sun and its rays are identical, both being light, yet they are taken to be different, so also Brahman and the individual soul.[1]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 27 in their commentaries. They too take this sūtra as laying down another *prima facie* view regarding the relation between the non-sentient and Brahman. This *prima facie* view, Rāmānuja points out, criticizes the preceding *prima facie* view by pointing out that if the non-sentient world be a state of Brahman, as the coil is of the snake, then it will become identical with Him, seeing that the coil is after all nothing but the snake itself. Hence the correct view is that the world is related to Brahman just as the ray is to the sun, i.e. is His form (rūpa) and is different from Him.[2]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. He continues the topic of the identity between Brahman and His attributes, illustrating it by a second example. Hence the sūtra means: "Just as the sun is essentially light, yet a substratum of light, so Brahman is essentially knowledge, yet the substratum of knowledge (i.e. a knower)".[3]

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[1] Ś.B. 3 2.28, pp. 743-744; Bh. B. 3.2.29 (written as 3.2.28), p. 170.

[2] Śrī. B. 3.2.27, p. 246, Part 2; Śk. B. 3.2.27, p. 259, Part 9.

[3] G.B. 3.2.29, p. 86, Chap. 3.

SŪTRA 29

'OR AS BEFORE.'

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Objections, like the consequence of entire (transformation) and the rest, have been refuted "before".[1]

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. If the universe be a particular state of Brahman, as the coil is of the serpent, then there results a mass of objections like the consequence of entire (transformation of Brahman), the contradiction of scriptural texts and so on,—(the author) replies:

The word "or" is meant for refuting the objection. There can be no objection whatsoever "as before"; i.e. the above objections have already been refuted under the aphorism: "But on account of Scripture, on account of being based on word" (Br. Sū. 2.1.25).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 30 in the commentary of Śaṃkara. They take it as stating the correct conclusion as against the above two *prima facie* views regarding the relation between Brahman and the individual soul. Hence the sūtra means: The relation between the two is to be understood as before, i.e. as stated under the sūtra 3.2.25 (sūtra 3.2.26 in Bhāskara's commentary), viz. the relation between light and its limiting adjuncts, like fingers, etc.[2]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 28 in their commentaries. They too take it as stating the correct conclusion as against the above two *prima facie* views regarding the relation between the non-sentient and Brahman. They point out that both the above alternatives lead Brahman Himself to partake of the faults of the non-sentient world. Hence the correct view of the relation between the two is the same as that mentioned before under sūtras 2.3.42 and 2.3.45, in connection with the

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[1] Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.25.

[2] Ś.B. 3.2.29, p. 744; Bh. B. 3.2.30 (written as 3.2.29), p. 170.

discussion of the relation between the sentient and Brahman, i.e. an attribute-substance relation. That is, just as it has been shown that the individual soul is a part and an attribute of Brahman and as such different from Him, so exactly is matter too.[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 30 in his commentary. He continues the topic of the identity between the Lord and His attributes, illustrating it by a third example, viz. Brahman is both bliss and blissful, knowledge and knower and so on, just as the one, indivisible time is said to be prior and posterior. Baladeva points out that of these three illustrations, viz. the serpent and its coil, the sun and its rays, and time, each of succeeding one is meant for finer and subtler intellect.[2]

SŪTRA 30

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF NEGATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the negation," viz. "He is not smeared with the misery of the world" (Kaṭha 5.1), Brahman, the topic of discussion, does not possess any imperfections.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Moreover, although Brahman, as abiding within all, and being the cause of all, has everything as His form, yet He has no connection with imperfections, "also on account of the negation" of imperfections, celebrated in Scripture thus: "Just as the sun, the eye of the whole world, is not smeared with the external faults of the eyes, so the one inner soul of all beings is not smeared with the misery of the world, being external (to it)" (Kaṭha 5.11). "Just as the one air, entered in the world, corresponds in form to every form, so the one inner soul of all beings corresponds in form to every form, and is (yet) external (to it)" (Kaṭha 5.10) and so on. Hence it is established that Brahman, having everything as His form, is

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[1] Śrī. B. 3.2.28, pp. 246-247, Part 2; Śk. B. 3.2.28, p. 259, Part 9.

[2] Not quoted by others.

untouched by every fault, is an abode of a mass of auspicious attributes and is the highest of all.

Here ends the section entitled "The so-muchness resulting from what has been previously declared" (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 31 in Bhāskara's commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "And on account of the denial (of a reality besides Brahman, non-difference is the ultimate truth)".[1]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 29 in their commentaries. Interpretation different, viz. "On account of the denial (of the attributes of the non-sentient[2] on the part of Brahman, they stand in the relation of attribute and substance)".[3]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. He concludes the topic of the identity between Brahman and His attributes thus: "On account of the prohibition (by Scripture of any difference between Brahman and His attributes, they are never to be taken as different)".[4]

To sum up: Sūtras 27–50 are interpreted in four different ways thus:—

(1) According to Nimbārka, sūtra 27 states the relation between Brahman and the non-sentient; sūtra 28 states the relation between Brahman and the sentient; and sūtras 29-30 state that Brahman's having the corporeal and incorporeal forms gives rise to no objections.

(2) According to Śaṃkara and Bhāskara, sūtras 27-28 state two *prima facie* views regarding the relation between Brahman and the sentient; and sūtras 29-30 state the right conclusion.

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[1] Ś.B. 3.2.30, p. 744; Bh. B. 3.2.31 (written as 3.2.30), p. 171.

[2] Śrīkaṇṭha adds the sentient too.

[3] Śrī. B. 3.2.29, p. 247, Part 2; Śk. B. 3.2.29, pp. 259-260, Part 9.

[4] G.B. 3.2.31, p. 88, Chap. 3.

(3) According to Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha, sūtras 27-28 state two *prima facie* views regarding the relation between Brahman and the non-sentient; and sūtras 29-30 state the right conclusion.

(4) According to Baladeva, all these four sūtras show the identity between Brahman and His attributes.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "The Highest". (Sūtras 31-37)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 31)

SŪTRA 31

"(THERE IS SOME ONE) HIGHER THAN THIS (VIZ. BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATIONS OF BRIDGE, MEASURE, CONNECTION AND DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The *prima facie* objector says: "Than this", i.e. than Brahman, the topic of discussion, there is a reality still "higher", on account of the designation of connection, viz. "Now the soul that is a bridge" (Chānd. 8.4.1[1]) and on account of the designation of difference, viz. "By him . . . . . .[2] all this is filled" (Śvet. 3.9[3]), "That which is beyond that is without form, without disease" (Śvet. 3.10[4]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that Brahman is the cause of all, omnipotent, untouched by faults at times, an abode of a mass

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[2] The word "puruṣeṇa" omitted.

[3] R.

[4] R. The C.S.S. ed., p. 56 has a more detailed reading which is translated below:—

On account of the designation of a bridge, viz. "Now the soul that is a bridge" (Chānd. 7.4.1); on account of the designation of measure, viz. "Brahman has four feet" (Chānd. 3.18.2), "Having sixteen parts" (Praśna 6.1); on account of the designation of connection, viz. "This is the bridge of immortality" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5); and on account of the designation of difference, viz. "By him, by the Person, all this is filled (Śvet. 3.9), "That which is beyond that is without form, without disease" (Śvet. 3.10).

of eternal, infinite, auspicious qualities, unlimited by so-muchness and different and non-different from all. Now, it is being shown that He is not excelled by anything, and this will go to confirm the view that He is not limited by so-muchness. With regard to it, the doubt being whether Brahman is surpassable or unsurpassable, the author states the *prima facie* view:

"Than this," i.e. than Brahman, omnipotent, the cause of all, there is a still "higher" reality. Hence Brahman is surpassable. Why? "On account of the designations of bridge, measure, connection and difference." Thus the Supreme Brahman is designated as a bridge: "Now that which is the soul is a bridge" (Chānd. 8.4.1). From this designation it is known that there is a reality,—analogous to a rare object in another island,—which is to be reached and which is higher than Brahman, analogous to a bridge. Moreover, from the text: "Having crossed that bridge, one who is blind becomes non-blind" (Chānd. 8.4.2) too, it is ascertained that like a bridge, Brahman is only something to be crossed; while the object to be attained is something other and higher than Brahman. Further, there are designations of measure, viz. "Brahman has four feet" (Chānd. 3.18.2), "Having sixteen parts" (Praśna 6.1), i.e. the Supreme Brahman is designated as something limited. These designations clearly indicate the existence of an immeasurable object to be attained by the bridge. And from the designation of connection too, viz. "This is the bridge of immortality" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.25), it is known that there is someone higher than Brahman. Finally, there are designations of difference, viz. "By him, by this Person, all this is filled" (Śvet. 3.9), "That which is beyond that is without part and without disease" (Śvet. 3.10), i.e. there is another reality which is beyond Brahman, denoted by the term 'person'. Thus, it is established that there is a reality higher than even the Highest Brahman,—this is the *prima facie* view.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

According to them the word "param" does not mean something higher, but something different (anya-tattvam).[1] They too take this to be stating the *prima facie* view.

[1] Ś.B. 3.2.31, p. 745; Bh. B. 3.2.32 (written as 3.2.31), p. 171.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 32 in his commentary. He, too, begins a new adhikaraṇa here, but concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. that the bliss of the Lord is the highest (three sūtras). Accordingly, he does not take this sūtra as stating a *prima facie* view, but simply as stating the correct conclusion. Hence the sūtra: "(The bliss of Brahman is) higher than this (viz. worldly bliss), on account of the designation of bridge, immeasurableness, relation and difference". That is, the bliss of Brahman is infinitely higher than the bliss of the individual soul, for the text about the bridge (Chānd. 8.4.1) shows that Brahman, the bliss, is the support of the entire world. Further, the bliss of the Lord is said to be immeasurable (Tait. 2.4). Also, the relation between the bliss of the Lord and human bliss is declared to be that between infinity and one (Bṛh. 4.3.22). Finally, the difference between the bliss of the Lord and human bliss is declared. All these go to prove that the bliss of the Lord is the highest.[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 32–37)

SŪTRA 32

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF RESEMBLANCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The author states the correct conclusion.

The term "but" is meant for disposing of the above view. There is nothing whatsoever higher than the Universal Lord, the cause of the world. The Lord is designated as a bridge only because He is similar to the bridge in a certain respect, i.e. He keeps the worlds apart.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author states the correct conclusion.

The word "but" is meant for disposing of the *prima facie* view. It cannot be said that there is something 'higher than this'. Why? On account of the following reasons: First, the Lord is designated

[1] G.B. 3.2.32, pp. 90-91, Chap. 3.

as a bridge "on account of resemblance", i.e. simply because He is similar to the bridge, well-known in ordinary life. Just as in ordinary life a bridge adjusts water[1], so the Soul too is a bridge as adjusting the boundary of the world[2], in accordance with complementary passage: "For keeping these worlds apart" (Chānd. 8.4.1). In the text: "Having crossed the bridge" (Chānd. 8.4.2), the word 'crosses' means 'attains', as in the statement: 'He crosses the Vedānta'.[3]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 33 in his commentary. He continues the topic of the bliss of Brahman. Hence the sūtra: "(If it be objected that human bliss cannot be different from the bliss of Brahman, because the same word 'bliss' is applied to both, just as an object designated by the word 'jar' cannot be different from another object designated by the same term 'jar'—we reply: the word 'bliss' is applied to human bliss) on account of generic resemblance". That is, just as the common term 'jar' is applied to all jars irrespective of their individual differences, so the common term 'bliss' is applied to human and divine bliss, irrespective of the difference between the two.[4]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 33

"(THE DESIGNATION OF MEASURE IS) FOR THE PURPOSE OF UNDERSTANDING, AS IN THE CASE OF FEET."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The designations of measure are for promoting meditation. It is for this reason that Brahman is designated as having feet thus: "Let one meditate on the mind as Brahman,—thus with reference to the self" (Chānd. 3.18.1 [5]), "That Brahman has four feet. Speech is one foot" (Chānd. 3.18.2 [6]) and so on.

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[1] I.e. separates one sheet of water from another, and marks the boundaries of contiguous fields.

[2] I.e. separates one world from another.

[3] Which means that he has attained or mastered the Vedānta.

[4] G.B. 3.2.33, p. 91, Chap. 3.

[5] Not quoted by others.

[6] R, ŚK.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The designations of measure too are "for the purpose of understanding" or meditation. "As in the case of feet," i.e. as in the case of the designation of the feet of the mind and the rest. Thus, in the text: "Let one meditate on the mind as Brahman,—thus with reference to the self. That Brahman has four feet. Speech is one foot, the vital-breath is one foot, the eye is one foot, the ear is one foot" (Chānd. 3.18.1-2), the mind, a symbol of Brahman, is declared to have feet. In the same manner the fire and the rest are described as the feet of the ether (Chānd. 3.18.2) for promoting meditation, but not for indicating a particular measure or size. Similarly, here too Brahman,—who is the cause of the world and who is ascertained to be unlimited from the text: "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite" (Tait. 2.1)—is designated as having four feet (Chānd. 3.18.2) "for the purpose of understanding" only, but this never implies that He is something measured or limited—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 34 in his commentary. He concludes here the section concerned with showing that the bliss of Brahman is the highest. Hence the sūtra: "(If it be objected: If the bliss of Brahman be different from human bliss, i.e. if Brahman be different from the Universe of the sentient and the non-sentient, then how can the teaching in Chānd. 3.14.1, viz. that 'All this, verily, is Brahman', be reasonable?—we reply: that teaching is) for the purpose of Understanding, as in the case of feet". That is, the whole world is said to be Brahman in order to bring about an easy realization of Him, just as everything is said to be His foot (Rg. V. 10.90.3) for the same reason.[1]

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[1] G.B. 3.2.34, pp. 92-93, Chap. 3.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 34

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE SPECIALITY OF PLACE, AS IN THE CASE OF LIGHT AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The thinking of what is unlimited as limited fits in "on account of the speciality of place, as in the case of light and so on".

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. The unlimited can never become limited even for promoting meditation?—the author replies:

It is possible for Brahman, though Himself unlimited, to become limited "on account of the speciality of place", "as in the case of light and so on", i.e. just as light, the ether and the like, though unlimited, yet appear to be limited through their connection with windows, pots and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different, viz. "(There is nothing besides Brahman) on account of the difference of place (i.e. limiting adjunct), as in the case of light and so on". That is, Brahman is one, though it appears to be many through its connection with limiting adjuncts, just as the light of the sun appears to have many shapes through its connection with fingers, etc. Hence plurality is not ultimately real.[1]

Bhāskara

This sūtra is not found in his commentary.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 35 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here, concerned with showing that the Lord has a variety of manifestations (two sūtras). Hence the sūtra: "(The manifestations of the Lord are different), on account of the difference of place (i.e. the

[1] Ś.B. 3.2.34, p. 748.

difference of the devotees to whom He manifests Himself), as in the case of light and so on". That is, the Lord, though one, manifests Himself in different forms to His devotees, in accordance with the difference of their devotions,—those who worship Him; as the Master see Him as the Majestic, and those who worship Him as the Beloved, see Him as the Sweet,—just as the same light appears different when it falls on different parts of a temple and so on.[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 35

"ON ACCOUNT OF APPROPRIATENESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And "on account of the appropriateness" of the designation of a relation, since He Himself leads to His own attainment, there is no other reality, higher than Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been alleged that on account of the designation of a relation between the object to be attained and that which causes to attain, there is something 'higher than this'. To this the author replies:

The Supreme Person causes the attainment of His own self, the object to be attained, in accordance with the scriptural text: "This soul is not attainable by instruction, nor by intellect, nor by much learning. He is attainable only by one whom he chooses. To him the soul reveals his own person" (Kaṭha 2.23; Muṇḍ. 3.2.3); and in accordance with the statement of the Highest Person: '"Fix your mind in me, be my devotee, sacrifice to me, bow down to me. You shall come to me alone. I promise you truth; you are dear to me" ' (Gītā 18.65). "On account of the appropriateness," thus, of the designation of the object to be attained and that which causes to attain,—to say that there is something 'higher than this' does not stand to reason.

[1] G.B. 3.2.35, p. 94, Chap. 3.

COMPARISON

All others add a "ca" at the end, thus "Upapatteś ca".

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. In answer to the objection (stated under sūtra 31), viz. that there is something other than Brahman, since during deep sleep the individual soul is said to enter into Brahman —which implies a difference between the two,—it is pointed out here that such a relation between the individual soul and Brahman is appropriate, since it does not imply that the individual soul is related to Brahman as a man to a city, (according to Bhāskara, as a rope to a pot), i.e. externally, but that the two are really identical. Hence it is that the individual soul is said to enter into *itself* during deep sleep.[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 36 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic of the different manifestations of the Lord in accordance with the different kinds of devotion thus: "And on account of the appropriateness (of the Chānd. text 3.14.1)". That is, the text: "As you meditate, so you become" is explicable only on this view, viz. that the devotees realize the Lord differently in accordance with their different modes of worshipping Him.[2]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 36

"LIKEWISE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DENIAL OF ANOTHER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Likewise," it is not to be said that on account of the designation of difference, viz. "That which is beyond that" (Śvet. 3.10[3]), there is a reality other than Brahman,—"on account of the denial", viz. "Than whom there is nothing else whatsoever higher" (Śvet. 3.9; Mahānār. 10.4[4]).

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[1] Ś.B. 3.2.35, p. 748; Bh. B. 3.2.35, p. 171.
[2] G.B. 3.2.36, p. 95, Chap. 3.
[3] R, B.
[4] Ś, R, Bh, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said that on account of the designation of difference, viz. "By him, by the Person, all this is filled. That which is beyond that is without form, without disease" (Śvet. 3.9-3.10), there is something 'higher than this'. To this the author replies:

On account of the stated reasons Brahman is without an equal and a superior; "likewise on account of the denial of another", i.e. of an equal or a superior, as well, it is established that He has no equal or a superior; In accordance with the scriptural text: "Than whom there is nothing else whatsoever higher" (Śvet. 3.9; Mahānār. 10.4) and so on,—the word 'higher' meaning something better, the word 'something else' meaning something equal [1],—as well as in accordance with the Smṛti passage: '"There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya!" ' (Gītā 7.7) and so on, the section is concerned with the supremacy of the Person, the topic of discussion; and hence by the text: "That which is beyond that" (Śvet. 3.10) another reality is not established. On the contrary, in accordance with the text: "Than whom there is nothing else whatsoever higher, than whom there is nothing else smaller, nothing else greater,—the One stands motionless like a tree in heaven, by him, the Person, all this is filled" (Śvet. 3.9; Mahānār. 10.4), Brahman, the Highest Person, is without an equal and a superior, and all-pervading; and for this reason, Brahman, called 'Person', is said to be beyond that.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They understand this sūtra to mean that in Scripture there is the denial of anything else besides Brahman, and hence Brahman is the sole reality.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 35 in his commentary.

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with the question whether there is anything *equal* to the Lord, the doubt that there may be something *superior* to Him being disposed of in the previous adhikaraṇa. Hence the sūtra: "Likewise (i.e. just as

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[1] The text is: "Yasmāt *paraṃ nāparam* asti kiñcit".

[2] Ś.B. 3.2.36, pp. 748-749; Bh. B. 3.2.36, p. 172.

there is nothing superior to the Lord, so there is nothing equal to Him), on account of the denial of another (creator), (i.e. because Scripture denies that there is any other creator besides Him)".[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. He takes it as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with proving that the Lord is the highest, for unless the Lord be the Highest, there can be no love and devotion for Him.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 37

"HEREBY THE ALL-PERVASIVENESS (OF THE LORD IS CONFIRMED), ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL TEXTS ABOUT EXPANSION AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Hereby" the "all-pervasiveness" of the Supreme Brahman is confirmed, "on account of the scriptural texts" like: "By Him, the Person, all this is filled" (Śvet. 3.9 [2]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Hereby," i.e. by the section designating the Lord as having no equal or a superior, the "all-pervasiveness" of Brahman is confirmed. If there were an equal or a superior to the Lord, He would not have been all-pervasive. The author states the authority for this: "On account of the scriptural texts about expansion and so on" —the word 'expansion' here means all-pervasiveness—such as: "By Him, the Person, all this is filled" (Śvet. 3.9; Mahānār. 10.4), "And whatever is seen or heard in this world,—Nārāyaṇa abides by pervading all that, inside and outside" (Mahānār. 11.6 [3]), "Eternal, omnipresent, all-pervasive, excessively subtle" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6) and so on. The words "and so on" imply the scriptural texts that denote Brahman as the cause of all, as the soul of all, thereby confirming

[1] Śk. B. 3.2.35, p. 266, Part 9. [2] R.
[3] A slightly different version is found in Tait. Ār. 10.11.1.

His all-pervasiveness, viz. "He is the cause, the cause of the lord of causes"[1] (Śvet. 6.9), "All this has that for its soul" (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.). "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "Brahman alone is all this" (Nṛ. Ut. 7), "The soul alone is all this" (Chānd. 7.26.1) and so on. Hence it is established that Brahman, the cause of the world, is without an equal and a superior.

Here ends the section entitled "The Highest" (7).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

While Nimbārka takes the section to be establishing that there is nothing higher than Brahman, they take it as establishing that there is nothing besides Brahman. Hence the sūtra: "Hereby (i.e. by proving that there is nothing besides Brahman) (His) all-pervasiveness (is established). . . . . ".[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 36 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic, viz. that there is nothing equal to Brahman. Interpretation different, viz. "Hereby (i.e. through Nārāyaṇa) (Śiva's) all-pervasiveness (is known), on account of scriptural texts about expansion (i.e. supreme all-pervasiveness) and so on". That is, Scripture declares that the Lord Śiva pervades the entire universe through Nārāyaṇa, the material cause who is but a part of Himself. Hence it is known that the Lord Himself is all-pervasive.[3]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 38 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with establishing the all-pervasiveness of the Lord, though he interprets it differently thus: "(If it be objected that the Lord is not all-pervasive, but of a middle size, i.e. of the size of the body or form in which He appears before His devotees,

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[1] Correct quotation: "Karaṇādhipādhipa" = lord of the lord of sense-organs (or the individual soul).

[2] Ś.B. 3.2.37, p. 749; Bh. B. 3.2.37, p. 172.

[3] Śk. B. 3.2 36, pp. 269-270. Vide also the commentary on Śk. B. on the same pages.

—then we reply:) "By Him (i.e. by the Lord) all-pervasiveness (is possible), on account of the scriptural texts about expansion and so on". That is, even the middle form of the Lord, i.e. the form in which He appears before His devotees, is all-pervasive, for Scripture declares so.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "The Fruit". (Sūtras 38–41)

SŪTRA 38

"THE FRUIT (ARISES) FROM THIS, ON ACCOUNT OF APPROPRIATENESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"From this," i.e. from Brahman alone, arises "the fruit" accruing to different individuals, in accordance with the particular duties to which they are entitled,—as He alone can be such a giver of fruits.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus the attributes of Brahman, viz. being free from sins, being an abode of eternal and infinite, auspicious attributes, having no equal or superior and the like, have been stated. Now the author states a particular quality of Brahman, the Highest, viz. being the giver of fruits.

"The fruit," consisting in enjoyment and salvation, accruing to particular individuals in accordance with the particular duties to which they are entitled, arise "from this", i.e. from the Highest alone. Why? "On account of appropriateness," i.e. because the Highest Person alone, omniscient, omnipotent, the controller of all can be such a giver of fruits.

SŪTRA 39

"AND BECAUSE OF BEING DECLARED IN SCRIPTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because the fact that He is the giver of fruits is declared by texts like: "He, verily, is the great, unborn self, the eater of food, the

[1] G.B. 3.2.38, p. 98, Chap. 3.

giver of wealth" (Bṛh. 4.4.24 [1]), "For he alone causes bliss" (Tait. 2.7 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

And as the fact that the Highest Self is the giver of fruits is declared by texts like: "He, verily, is the great, unborn self, the eater of food, the giver of wealth" (Bṛh. 4.4.24), "For He alone causes bliss" (Tait. 2.7),—from Him alone can the fruit arise.

OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtra 40)

SŪTRA 40

"RELIGIOUS MERIT (IS THE GIVER OF FRUITS), JAIMINI (THINKS SO) FOR THOSE VERY REASONS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Jaimini" thinks that "religious merit" is the cause of the fruit,—because, as in the case of tilling, it alone can appropriately be its cause; and because the text: "One desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5 [3]) declares it to be such a cause.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated above that 'On account of appropriateness' (sūtra 38), 'And on account of being declared' (sūtra 39), the fruit arises from the Highest. Now, as in the case of tilling, Karmas alone can appropriately be the cause of fruits. Further, Karmas like sacrifices and the rest, are declared to be productive of fruits by texts like: "One desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5) and so on. Hence, "for those very reasons," i.e. on account of the same two reasons, the teacher "Jaimini" thinks that "religious merit" alone, or Karma, is the cause of fruit through the

[1] Ś, R, Bh, B.
[2] R.
[3] P. 208, line 27, vol. 2. Ś, R, Bh.

intermediary of the operation called 'apūrva'. The operation called 'apūrva' is said to be a particular subsequent state of the sacrifice.[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 41)

SŪTRA 41

"BUT (THE GIVER OF FRUITS IS) THE FORMER (VIZ. THE LORD), BĀDARĀYAṆA (THINKS SO), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF (HIM AS) THE CAUSE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The word "but" is meant for disposing of the above view. The teacher of the Veda thinks that the giver of fruits is the Highest Self, mentioned before, "on account of the designation" of the Highest as the cause of it thus: "In consequence of good work, it leads to a holy world" (Praśna 3.7 [2]), "He is attainable by one alone whom he chooses" (Kaṭha 2.23; Muṇḍ. 3.2.3 [3]).

Here ends the second quarter of the third chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts, by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The term "but" indicates the hollowness of Jaimini's view. Never in the past, present or future do Karmas like tilling and the rest bestow the fruit to the tiller independently, but the Supreme Lord alone does so. Similarly, the Vedic works too (viz. sacrifices and the like), unacquainted with the nature of themselves and of others, and done by persons who are tormented by the wheel of the world and are dependent on another, are not able to bring about the fruit independently. Even texts like : "One desirous of heaven

[1] According to Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, the results of sacrifices and so on are due neither to a Supreme Deity—which it does not recognize—, nor to the particular deities to whom the oblations are offered, but to an unseen potency generated by the very performance of the sacrifices and so on. This unseen potency is called 'apūrva'. Vide Pū.Mī.Sū. 2.1.5.

[2] B.

[3] Not quoted by others.

should perform sacrifices" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5) and so on, never assert that Karma is the giver of fruits independently. On the contrary, these texts instigate men to Karmas such as, worship of the deity, that lead to heaven. But Bādarāyaṇa thinks that the giver of fruits like enjoyment and salvation is "the former", i.e. the Highest Self, the soul of all, omniscient, mentioned above. Why? "On account of the designation of (Him as) the cause," i.e. because the Highest Self alone is designated as the cause, as the instigator of actions and as the giver of fruits by a mass of scriptural texts like: "For he alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do good deed" (Kauṣ. 3.8), "In consequence of good work, it leads to a holy world" (Praśna 3.7), "He is attainable by one alone whom he chooses" (Kaṭha 2.23; Muṇḍ. 3.2.3) and so on; as well as by a group of Smṛti passages like: '"And he attains his desires from him, the benefits are decreed by me alone" ' (Gītā 7.22) '"I give that connection with intellect whereby they come to me" ' (Gītā 10.10) and so on. Hence it is established that the fruit arises from this.

Here ends the section entitled "The fruit" (8).

Here ends the second quarter of third chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīrakamīmāṃsā, by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

Résumé

The second quarter of the third chapter contains:—

(1) 41 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
(2) 41 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
(3) 40 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
(4) 41 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
(5) 40 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
(6) 42 sūtras and 19 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha take sūtras 20 and 21 in Nimbārka's commentary as one sūtra. Bhāskara omits sūtra 34 in Nimbārka's commentary, while sūtra 15 in Bhāskara's commentary is not found in Nimbārka's. Baladeva breaks sūtra 25 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras.

THIRD CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

THIRD QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "The understanding from all the Vedāntas". (Sūtras 1 – 5)

SŪTRA 1

"THE UNDERSTANDING (I.E. WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD) FROM ALL THE VEDANTAS (IS ONE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DIFFERENCE OF INJUNCTION AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Although mentioned in many places, meditation is one only, "On account of the non-difference of injunction and the rest".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, with a view to instigating one who desires salvation to the meditation on the Highest Self which is a means to attaining His nature, the attributes of the Highest Self have been stated. Now, although knowledge is a means to attaining the nature of the Highest Self, yet just as sacred texts, spiritual teachers and the like, though well-known, come to be productive of fruits only when meditated on, so the Highest Self, though well-known, comes to be productive of fruits only when meditated on. Now, we shall discuss the nature of vidyās or meditations on such a Supreme Brahman, as well as the problem whether these different vidyās [1] are really identical or not, for ascertaining the combination or options of the details in them.

The Udgītha-vidyā,[2] the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā,[3] the Puruṣa-vidyā,[4] the Dahara-vidyā,[5] the Vaiśvānara-vidyā [6] and the rest are mentioned

[1] The vidyās are the various meditations mentioned in the various Upaniṣads and so on.

[2] Bṛh. 1.3 and Chānd 1.2. Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.6.

[3] Bṛh. 5.6; Śat. Br. 10.6.3; and Chānd. 3.14. Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.19.

[4] Chānd. 3.16–3.17 and Ait. Ār. 10.64. Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.24.

[5] Bṛh. 2.1.17 and Chānd. 8.1–8.6. Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.38.

[6] Bṛh. 5.9 and Chānd. 5.11–5.18. Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.55.

by many schools. It will be shown later on that the peculiar features or details, mentioned in connection with each particular vidyā, are to be combined together. However, the arrangement of the syllables in the aphorism is as follows: The same vidyā is mentioned in many Vedāntas. On the doubt, viz. whether it is different, or whether the same vidyā is mentioned in many places,—if the *prima facie* view be: As it is mentioned in texts again and again without any specification, and because of the force of context, it is different. For this very reason, surely, the restriction with regard to the imparting of knowledge to the followers of the Atharva-veda who practise the head-rite[1] mentioned in the passage: "Let one declare this knowledge of Brahman to them alone by whom, however, the head-rite has been practised according to rules" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.10), is reasonable; otherwise the head-rite, a part of vidyā, being open to the followers of all schools, the above restriction will be meaningless,—

We reply: "The understanding from all the Vedāntas", i.e. the meditation which is known from all, i.e. many, Vedāntas should be known to be one only. Why? "On account of the non-difference of injunction and the rest." Among these, 'injunction' means an injunction like 'one should know', 'one should meditate'. The words 'and the rest' imply connection, form and name, mentioned as the reasons for the non-difference of Karmas, in the aphorism laying down the correct conclusion under the section treating of different schools in the Pūrva-tantra, viz. "Or, one, on account of non-difference of connection, form, injunction and name" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 2.4.9[2]). That is, the meditations are identical, on account of the non-difference of their injunctions, connections, forms and names,—just as the obligatory Agni-hotra[3], mentioned in many branches, such as "He performs the Agni-hotra" (Chānd. 5.24.1, 2), is one, on account of the non-difference of injunction; just as the Vaiśvānara-vidyā is recorded in both the Chāndogya (Chānd. 5.11–5.18) and Vājasaneyaka (Bṛh. 5.9), and here on account of the non-difference of injunctions, viz. "He meditates on Vaiśvānara" (Chānd. 5.12.2–

[1] For explanation see V.K. 3.3.3 below.

[2] P. 200, vol. 1.

[3] Agni-hotra is an oblation to fire, chiefly of milk, oil and sour gruel, and there are two kinds of it, nitya or of constant obligation and kāmya or optional.

5.13.2, etc.), as well as of forms, name and of connection, viz. the attainment of Brahman, the vidyās are identical. In this case, the root 'as' indicates that the injunction is same; the form, viz. Vaiśvānara, is the same; and the name also is the same, viz. Vaiśvānara-vidyā.

COMPARISON.

Śaṃkara

Literal interpretation same. But the fundamental difference is that according to Śaṃkara, all these vidyās are concerned with Saguṇa or lower Brahman only, and are not as such means to the attainment of the Nirguṇa or the higher Brahman. Some of them lead to the attainment of results here, while others lead to salvation on gradually by way of generating knowledge.[1]

Baladeva

He does not refer to the various vidyās, mentioned in the various Upaniṣads. In fact, as we shall see, he does not regard this pāda as dealing with the vidyās at all. He interprets the word: "Sarva-vedānta-pratyam" as "Sarva-veda-antapratyam". The word "anta" means settled conclusion. Hence the sūtra: "The settled conclusion of all the Vedas is the knowledge (of Brahman), on account of the non-difference of injunction and the rest". That is all the Vedas seek to teach Brahman, since all of them enjoin meditation on Brahman.[2]

SŪTRA 2

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCES (OF THE OBJECT OF MEDITATION, THERE IS) NO (IDENTITY OF VIDYĀ), (WE REPLY:) (THERE MAY BE REPETITION) EVEN WITH REGARD TO ONE (VIDYĀ)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: the object of meditation is not the same, otherwise the same vidyā would not have been repeated in different Scriptures. Hence the vidyās are different—(we reply:) No, because

[1] Ś.B. 3.3.1, p. 754. [2] G.B. 3.3.1.

the repetition of one and the same vidyā is appropriate sometimes, because the readers are different, and sometimes for making the topic clear.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: the same vidyās are often found repeated in the very same form in different sections. Hence the object to be meditated on must be different, and so the vidyās cannot be identical,—

We reply: Such repetitions of the same vidyās in different sections are quite reasonable, as they serve a useful purpose. The same vidyā, set forth in one branch, is set forth again in the same form in other branches for the benefit of the different readers of those branches. If there be differences in some parts, then the device of the combination of points is to be resorted to.[1] In the case of one and the same branch, on the other hand, the readers being the same, every section deals with a different vidyā, since the texts are mutually sufficient by themselves.[2]

[1] Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.5.

[2] The sense is as follows: If one and the same vidyā be repeated in different Upaniṣads and so on, then there must evidently be some reasonable explanation for such a repetition. The *prima facie* objector points out that such a repetition serves no purpose and hence we must hold that really there is no repetition of the same vidyā, but that each is a *new* and separate vidyā, concerned with a different object. The answer to this is that such a repetition of one of the same vidyā in different branches of the Vedas is not meaningless, but serves two purposes:—

(*a*) First, such a repetition is for the benefit of the different readers of the different branches of the Vedas. Each and every person does not evidently study each and every branch of the Vedas, but may read only one or some. A man, e.g. who studies the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, may not study the Chāndogya as well, and vice versa. Hence one and the same vidyā is set forth in both these Upaniṣads in order that both these persons may equally have an access to the vidyā in question.

(*b*) Secondly, such a repetition serves to rectify possible mistakes, and make the topic clearer and confirm what has been already said.

Thus, the fact that we meet with the same vidyā in different branches gives rise to no inconsistency. In the case of one and the same branch, however, the above two purposes being absent, there is no such repetition. Hence here every section deals with a different vidyā.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. "If it be objected that on account of the differences (of details) (there is) no (oneness of vidyā), (we reply:) (there may be difference of details) even in (one vidyā)". That is, the *prima facie* objector holds that the same vidyā is mentioned with different particulars in different places, e.g. in connection with the Pañcāgni-vidyā, five fires are spoken of in the Chāndogya, but six in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka. This proves that the two Pañcāgni-vidyās are not identical. The answer is that such differences of details are permissible even in the case of one and the same vidyā. If two vidyās agree in all essential points, the difference in some details by no means makes them two separate vidyās.[1]

Baladeva

As before, he does not raise the problem of the identity of vidyās at all, but only the problem whether Brahman is known from all the Vedas or not. Hence the sūtra: "If it be objected that on account of difference (i.e. the different accounts of Brahman), (Brahman is) not (designated in all branches), (we reply:) even in the same (branch) (other attributes of Brahman are mentioned)". That is, if it be objected that Brahman is designated differently in different Upaniṣads, —e.g. in one place He is depicted as knowledge and bliss (Bṛh. 3.9.28), in another as omniscient and all-knowing (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9),—and as such the same Brahman is not set forth by all the Upaniṣads—the reply is that in the same Upaniṣad where Brahman is designated as knowledge and bliss, He is designated as omniscient as well. Hence all branches speak of the same Brahman.[2]

[1] Ś.B. 3.3.2, pp. 757-758; Bh. B. 3.3.2, pp. 175-176.
[2] G.B. 3.3.2.

SŪTRA 3

"BECAUSE (THE HEAD-RITE IS A SUBSIDIARY PART) OF THE STUDY OF THE VEDA (AND NOT OF VIDYĀ), (IT) BEING SO (THERE IS) THAT RESTRICTION, (BECAUSE IT IS MENTIONED TO BE SO) IN THE SAMĀCĀRA, AND BECAUSE OF THE TOPIC, AND AS IN THE CASE OF LIBATIONS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And that head-rite too, which is mentioned in the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda thus: "Let one declare this knowledge of Brahman to them alone by whom, however, the head-rite has been performed according to rules" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.10 [1]), does not prove that the vidyās are different, since the head-rite is enjoined as a subsidiary part of the study of the Veda. It being a subsidiary part of the Vedic study, is not performed by any one other than a follower of the Atharva-veda, and hence there is "that restriction".[2] Since in the book called "Samācāra" too they record the head-rite as a Vedic rite, and since there is a text: "One who had practised the vow does not read this" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.11 [3]), that restriction is indeed appropriate, as it is in the case of oblations, beginning with the Sauryya.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If the rite of carrying a pot of burning charcoals on the head, taught as a sacred duty in the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda thus: "Let one declare the knowledge of Brahman to them alone by whom, however, the head-rite has been performed according to rules" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.10), were a subsidiary part of the vidyā, then only we could have said that the vidyās are different. But as it is not a subordinate part of vidyā, we cannot do so.[4] The word "because" states the reason, i.e. because the sacred duty called 'head-rite' is a subsidiary part "of the study of the Veda" alone, and not of the vidyā stated in it. "(It) being so," i.e. the head-rite being a subsidiary part of the study of the Veda, there is "that restriction", i.e. the restriction with regard to the teaching of

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[1] Ś, R, Śk.

[2] Viz. that only those who have performed the head-rite are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

[3] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

[4] This answers the *prima facie* view mentioned above under V.K. 3.3.1.

the rite, viz. that the sacred duty called 'head-rite' is to be perfomed by the followers of the Atharva-veda, and not by others. How is this known? "In the Samācāra," i.e. in a book concerned with teaching Vedic rites, the followers of the Atharva-veda record the head-rite as a Vedic rite,—from that this is known: also "from the topic", i.e. because in the subsequent and concluding text: "One who has not practised the vow does not read this" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.11), the word 'this' refers to the collection of the Muṇḍaka-treatises forming the topic previously treated; further, the word 'reads' means 'studies'.

Here (the author) quotes a parallel instance: "And as in the case of libations". The 'libations', i.e. the seven oblations, beginning with the Sauryya and ending with the Śataudana, have no connection with the three fires mentioned in a different branch, but are connected with the one fire mentioned by the texts belonging to the Atharva-veda, and hence they are to be offered to one fire by the followers of the Atharva-veda alone. In the very same manner, the followers of the Atharva-veda alone are entitled to perform the sacred duty called 'head-rite', which is a subsidiary part of the study of the Veda, and not others. In the text: "Let one declare the knowledge of Brahman" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.10), on the other hand, the word 'Brahman' denotes the sound Brahman (i.e. the Vedas).[1]

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

He reads "salila-vac ca" in place of "sava-vac ca".[2] Interpretation same.

Baladeva

He breaks the sūtra into two separate sūtras thus: "Svādhyayasya . . . . adhicārac ca" (sūtra 3), and "Sava-vac ca tan niyama" (sūtra 4). Interpretations entirely different, viz.:—

Sūtra 3: "For the injunction of the study of the Veda being such (i.e. of a general import), and because of the eligibility (of all) to the sacred duties (mentioned in the Veda), (the entire Veda must

[1] That is, the head-rite being a Vedic rite, a part of the Vedic study,—those who practise it become entitled to the knowledge of the Atharva-veda in general.

[2] Bh. B. 3.3.3, p. 176.

be studied)". That is, injunctions like "Let one study his own sacred text" (Tait. Ār. 2.15) do not specify that only one particular portion of the Veda is to be studied, but that it is to be studied entirely. Moreover, the followers of one branch are not necessarily confined to the sacred duties of that branch only, but to all the duties enjoined in all the branches. Hence Brahman may be realized by all the religious practices taught in all the Vedas.[1]

Sūtra 4: "And the restriction is not like libations". That is, the seven libations, beginning with the Sauryya and ending with the Śataudana, are open to the followers of the Atharva-veda only, and cannot be offered by the followers of other Vedas. But such is not the case with the worship of Brahman, which is universal and may be performed by any and every one.[2]

SŪTRA 4

"AND (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And" the scriptural text: "The word which all the Vedas record" (Katha 2.15[3]) "shows" that the vidyās are identical.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Scripture "shows" that the vidyās are the same thus: "The word which all the Vedas declare" (Kaṭha 2.15); Smṛti too: '"Through all the Vedas I alone am to be known" ' (Gītā 15.15).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He quotes the same passage, but as before does not refer to the identity of vidyās, but concludes the topic that Brahman is the object taught by all the Vedas.[4]

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[1] G.B. 3.3.3, pp. 114-115, Chap. 3.
[2] G.B. 3.3.3, pp. 114-115, Chap. 3.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, B.
[4] G.B. 3.3.5.

SŪTRA 5

"AND (THE VIDYĀS) BEING THE SAME, (THERE IS) COMBINATION (OF THE SPECIAL FEATURES), ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DIFFERENCE OF MEANING AS IN THE CASE OF WHAT IS COMPLEMENTARY TO INJUNCTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The vidyās being identical, and their meaning being the same, their special features are to be combined together, "as in the case of what is complementary to the injunction" with regard to the Agni-hotra and the like.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The identity of the vidyās being thus established, the author explains its purpose.

"And" meditations "being the same", their special features are to be combined together. The sense is that the special features or details found in one vidyā are to be applied to others as well, "on account of the non-difference of meaning", i.e. on account of the unity of purpose. "As in case of what is complementary to injunction," i.e. just as there is the combination everywhere of what is complementary to the injunctions regarding the Agni-hotra and the rest,—like that.[1] Hence it is established that on account of the non-difference of injunctions and the rest, vidyās or meditations are the same, and that their special features are to be combined together.

Here ends the section entitled "The understanding in all the Vedāntas" (1).

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

They take this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation same.

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[1] I.e. in the Karma-Kāṇḍa, the special features or aṅgas of a sacrifice are mentioned in various places and not in the same place; yet when the sacrifice is performed, all these scattered features and details are combined. Similarly, the special details of a particular vidyā or meditation may be mentioned in various places; yet when it is practised, all these details are to be brought together.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 6 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras) concerned with the problem of the coalescence of the attributes of the Lord. Brahman is described variously in various texts. In one place, He is described as Kṛṣṇa, in another as Rāma, in another as Nṛsiṃha and so on. Hence the problem is whether all of these different attributes of the Lord,—His sweetness, heroism, terribleness, and so on—are to be combined when meditating on Him, or not. The *prima facie* view is that they being contradictory attributes are not to be combined. Hence the reply: "And if (the meditation) be the same, the combination (of attributes) (is permissible), on account of the non-difference of the object (viz. Brahman), as in the case of what is complementary to injunction". That is, in the case of the common meditation on pure Brahman, the object of meditation being the same, all the attributes are to be combined, just as Agni-hotra being the same, all its details are to be combined.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "Difference". (Sūtras 6–9)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 6)

SŪTRA 6

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THERE IS) DIFFERENCE (BETWEEN THE TWO UDGĪTHA-VIDYĀS) ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL TEXT, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF NON-DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is stated in the Vājasaneyaka: "Then, verily, they said to this breath in the mouth: 'Sing the udgītha for us'. 'So be it'—that breath sang the udgītha for them" (Bṛh. 1.3.7[2]). And it is stated in the Chāndogya too: "Then, verily, he who is this chief vital-breath him they worshipped as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.2.7[3]). On the doubt, viz. whether the vidyās are the same here, or different, the *prima facie* view is that the vidyās are the same. If it be objected that

[1] G.B. 3.3.6, pp. 119-120, Chap. 3.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.
[3] *Op. cit.*

in the Vājasaneyaka text: '"Sing the udgītha for us"' (Bṛh. 1.3.7), breath is said to be a subject; while in the Chāndogya text: "Him as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.2.7), it is said to be an object. Hence the vidyās are different,—(the *prima facie* objector replies:) "no", "on account of non-difference" in the introductory part, i.e. because in the texts: "Let us overcome (the demons) by the udgītha" (Bṛh. 1.3.1 [1]), "They took the udgītha, (thinking:) with this we shall kill [2] them" the udgītha alone appears to be the object to be meditated on (Chānd. 1.2.1 [3]). Hence it is established that the meditations are the same.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said above that the vidyās, though recorded in many places, are really identical as the injunctions and the rest are so; and it has been shown that their special features are to be mutually combined. Now, wishing to point out the difference of several vidyās, the author is first stating the *prima facie* view.

Having begun thus: "The gods and the demons were the offspring of Prajāpati" (Bṛh. 1.3.1), having mentioned the vow of the gods, viz.: "Those gods said: 'Let us overcome the demons at the sacrifice with the udgītha'" (Bṛh. 1.3.1), and having shown how they failed to realise their purpose, i.e. to destroy the demons through speech and the rest, the Vājasaneyins record how they finally overcame the demons through the knowledge of the udgītha thus: "Then, verily, they said to the breath in the mouth: 'Sing the udgītha for us'. 'So be it,' that breath sang the udgītha for them" (Bṛh. 1.3.7). They further state the fruit of the knowledge of the udgītha thus: "He becomes superior by himself, his hateful enemy (becomes inferior) who knows thus" (Bṛh. 1.3.7).

Having begun thus: "Then, verily, the gods took the udgītha, (thinking) 'With this we shall kill [4] them'" (Chānd. 1.2.1), and having shown, as before, how they failed to realise their purpose though striving hard, the Chandogas too record how they finally overcame the demons through the knowledge of the udgītha thus: "Then, verily,

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[1] R, ŚK.

[2] Correct quotation: "abhibhaviṣyāmaḥ", meaning "we shall overcome". Vide Chānd. 1.2.1, p. 20.

[3] R, ŚK.

[4] For correct quotation see footnote 2, above.

he who is the chief vital-breath,—him they worshipped as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.2.7). They, further, state the fruit of the knowledge thus: "So exactly he falls to pieces who wishes evil to one who knows thus" (Chānd. 1.2.8 [1]).

On the doubt, viz. whether here the vidyās are identical or different,—we (i.e. *prima facie* objectors) say: The vidyās are the same. Why? "On account of the non-difference" of injunctions and the rest. Thus, the injunction, expressed by the root 'to know', is the same; the fruit too, viz. the overcoming of the demons, is the same; the form, as well, is the same as the object to be meditated on, viz. the udgītha viewed as the vital-breath, is so; and the name, too, viz. 'udgītha-meditation' is the same.

If it be objected: There is "difference", i.e. there is difference from the admitted sameness of the vidyās, i.e. the vidyās are not identical. Why? In the text: "'Sing the udgītha for us.' That breath sang the udgītha" (Bṛh. 1.3.7), the vital-breath is indicated as a subject by the Vājins by a word in the nominative case. But in the text: "Him, the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.2.7), it is described as an object, having the form of the udgītha, by the Chandogas by a word in the accusative case,—on account of such scriptural texts,—

[1] Vide the udgītha-vidyā or the doctrine of the udgītha in Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya:—

(*a*) *Bṛh.* 1.3.—The story begins: The gods and the demons, the offspring of Prajāpati fought with one another for the worlds. The gods, then resolved to overcome the demons at the sacrifice by the udgītha. So they asked speech to sing the udgītha for them. But the demons, coming to know of this, rushed upon it and pierced it with evil. Thereupon the gods successively approached the in-breath, the eye, the ear and the mind, each of which was however corrupted by the demons. Finally, they approached the chief vital-breath which sang the udgītha for them, and when the demons rushed upon it, trying to pierce it with evil, they themselves were scattered and perished (Bṛh. 1.3.1–1.3.7).

(*b*) *Chānd.* 1.2.—A very similar account given. The story begins: The gods and the demons, the offspring of Prajāpati fought with one another, and the gods took the udgītha, thinking that they would overcome the demons with it. Then they worshipped the breath in the nose as the udgītha, but the demons pierced it with evil. Thereupon, they successively worshipped as the udgītha speech, the eye, the ear and the mind, each of which were, however, corrupted by the demons. Finally, they worshipped the chief vital-breath as the udgītha, and when the demons tried to corrupt it, they themselves fell to pieces (Chānd. 1.2.1–1.2.7).

(We, i.e. the *prima facie* objectors, reply:) "no", because in the texts: '"Let us overcome (the demons) by the udgītha"' (Bṛh. 1.3.1), "They took the udgītha, (thinking) 'With this we shall kill them'" (Chānd. 1.2.1), the udgītha alone appears to be the object to be meditated on. Nor can it be said that this difference of case-endings would make them differ in major points.[1] In the text: '"Sing the udgītha for us"' (Bṛh. 1.3.7), the udgītha which is really an object is said to be a subject figuratively.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 7 in his commentary. He does not take it to be setting forth a *prima facie* view, and does not begin a new adhikaraṇa here, but continues the topic of the coalescence of the different attributes of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "If it be objected that the contrary is the case (i.e. all the attributes of the Lord are not to be combined while meditating on Him), (we reply:) no, on account of non-specification, (i.e. because there is no specific text to the effect)".[2]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 7–9)

SŪTRA 7

"OR (THERE IS) NO (SAMENESS OF THE VIDYĀS), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCES OF THE SUBJECT-MATTERS, AS IN THE CASE OF BEING HIGHER THAN THE HIGH."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it we reply:

The vidyās are not identical. Having begun by designating the praṇava, which is a part of the udgītha, as the object to be worshipped, in the text: "Let one meditate on the syllable 'Om' as the

[1] E.g. the war between the gods and the demons; the approach of the gods to speech, eye, ear and mind; the successful attempt of the demons to corrupt them; their unsuccessful attempt to corrupt the chief vital-breath; the final overcoming of the demons by the chief vital-breath as the udgītha, etc.

[2] G.B. 3.3.7, pp. 120-121, Chap. 3.

udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1 [1]), the text goes on to say: "They took the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.2.1 [2]); and hence in the Chāndogya, the praṇava, a part of the udgītha, is enjoined as the object to be viewed as the vital-breath. In the Vājasaneyaka, on the other hand, in accordance with the introductory passage, containing no specification, viz. ' "Let us overcome (the demons) by the udgītha" ' (Bṛh. 1.3.1 [3]), the entire udgītha is the object to be viewed as the vital-breath. Hence, the introductory parts being thus different, the vidyās themselves must be so; just as in spite of the sameness of injunctions, viz. that the praṇava, which is a part of the udgītha, is to be viewed as the Highest Self,—the injunction that the udgītha is to be viewed as the golden Person is different from the injunction that it is to be viewed as qualified by the attributes of being higher than the high and so on.[4]

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author refutes the above view.

The words "or not" imply that the above view is to be rejected. The udgītha-meditations are not identical. Why? "On account of the difference of subject-matters". The word 'subject-matter' means 'introduction', i.e. on account of the difference of the introductory parts. Thus, having begun with the praṇava,—which is a part of the udgītha, the object of the action of the singer of the udgītha,—as the object to be worshipped in the text: "Let one meditate on the syllable 'Om' as the udgītha (Chānd. 1.1.1), the text goes on to say: "They took the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.2.1); and hence in the Chāndogya, the praṇava, a part of the udgītha, is stated as the object to be viewed as the vital-breath. In the Vājasaneyaka, on the other hand, in accordance with the introductory passage, containing no speci-

[1] S, R, ŚK. [2] Not quoted by others. [3] R.

[4] I.e. in Chānd. 1.6.9 it is said that sāman, i.e. the udgītha, is to be viewed, i.e. meditated on, as the golden Person within the sun; while in Chānd. 1.9.2 it is said that the udgītha is to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes of being higher than the high and so on. Now, although in both cases the udgītha is the object enjoined to be meditated on, yet as it is to be meditated on under two different aspects, in the one case as a golden Person and in the other as higher than the high and so on,—the two udgītha-meditations are taken to be different. In the very same manner, here although the same udgītha is enjoined to be meditated on, yet since in the one case it is to be meditated on as a part, in the other as the whole, the two udgītha-meditatons are not identical.

fication, viz. ' "Let us overcome (the demons) by the udgītha" ' (Bṛh. 1.3.1), the entire udgītha is the object to be viewed as the vital-breath. Hence as the introductory parts are different, the objects enjoined too must be so; the things enjoined being different, the forms too must be so, and on account of that, the vidyās themselves must be different; just as, even in the same branch [1], in spite of the sameness of injunctions, viz. that the praṇava, which is a part of the udgītha, is to be viewed as the Highest Self,—the injunction that it is to be viewed as the golden Person is different from the injunction that it is to be viewed as qualified by the attributes of being higher than the high and so on.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 8 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with an altogether different topic. It has been pointed out in the previous adhikaraṇa that while meditating on the Lord, all His attributes are to be combined. Now it is pointed out in this adhikaraṇa that that is the case with the svaniṣṭha devotees only, but in the case of the ekāntin devotees, there is no such combination. He interprets the word "prakaraṇa" in the sūtra as "prakṛṣṭa karaṇam", i.e. excellent act, viz. devotion. Hence the sūtra: "Or (there is) no (combination of attributes in the case of the ekāntins) on account of the difference of devotion (i.e. because the devotion of the ekāntins is one-pointed, while that of the svaniṣṭha is universal), as in the case of being higher than the high, (i.e. just as the ekāntin worshipper of the golden Person in the sun does not combine the qualities of being higher than the high and so on).[2]

[1] The rule is that meditations are different when the *objects meditated* on are different, whether in the same branch or in different branches. If the objects meditated on are not different, then the meditations are identical, in spite of repetition, and serve other purposes. See footnote 2, p. 578.

[2] G.B. 3.2.8, pp. 122-123, Chap. 3.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 8

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT (OF THE SIMILAR) NAME (THERE IS SAMENESS OF THE VIDYĀS), (WE REPLY:) THAT HAS BEEN SAID, ON THE OTHER HAND, (THERE IS) THAT TOO (I.E. THE IDENTITY OF NAMES) (EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF IDENTITY OF THE OBJECTS NAMED)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"If it be objected that on account of name" the vidyās must be identical,—(we reply:) Under the aphorism: "Or not, on account of the difference of subject-matter" (Br. Sū. 3.3.7) it has been shown the more identity of names is of no great force. "On the other hand," names may be identical even when the subject-matters enjoined are different; just as the name 'Agni-hotra' applies to the regular Agni-hotra, and to the Agni-hotra which is a part of the ceremony called 'Kuṇḍapāyinām ayanam'.[1]

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected that "on account of name", i.e. on account of the name 'udgītha-meditation', the udgītha-vidyās are identical—(we reply:) The reply to this has been given under the aphorism: "Or not, on account of the difference of subject-matter" (Br. Sū. 3.3.7). That is, the difference of vidyās being established on the ground of the difference of introductory parts, mere identity of names cannot make the vidyās identical. Moreover, even two different subject-matters may have identical names, just as the name 'Agni-hotra' applies to the regular Agni-hotra and to the Agni-hotra which is a part of the ceremony called 'Kuṇḍa-pāyinām ayanam', and just as the First-Day sacrifice is to be observed both in the Twelve-Days' sacrifice and in the Gavāmayana sacrifice.

[1] A particular religious ceremony in which ewers or pitchers are used for drinking.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 9 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic that in the case of the ekāntin devotees, there is no combination of all the attributes of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "If it be objected that on account of (the similarity of) name (i.e. because both the svaniṣṭha and ekāntin are called 'worshipper of Brahman') (the ekāntin, too, must be called 'worshipper of Brahman') (the ekāntin, too, must meditate on all the attributes of the Lord), (we reply:) that has been said (under the previous sūtra), on the contrary, there is that[1]". That is, there is an instance to the effect, viz. the meditation on the golden Person[2] and that on the ether[3] have both the name 'udgītha-meditation', yet the attributes of the one are not combined in the other.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 9

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF UNIVERSALITY, (IT IS) APPROPRIATE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As the praṇava, mentioned in the beginning, is the object to be meditated on, in all the udgītha-meditations in the Chāndogya, it is "appropriate" that the word 'udgītha', mentioned in the middle in the text: "They took the udgītha" (Chand. 1.2.1), too should really imply the praṇava. In the Chāndogya the praṇava, a part of the udgītha, is to be meditated on under the aspect of the vital-breath; in the Vājasaneyaka, the entire udgītha,—as such, the vidyās are different.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the first chapter of the Chāndogya, various udgītha-meditations

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[1] G.B. 3.3.9, pp. 123-124, Chap. 3.
[2] Chānd. 1.6.9. [3] Chānd. 1.9.2.

are mentioned. Now, the praṇava,—introduced in the text: "Let one meditate on the syllable 'Om' as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1),—is the common object to be meditated on as a part of the udgītha. So it is "appropriate" that the word 'udgītha', mentioned in the middle in the text: "Then, forsooth, the gods took the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.2.1), too should really imply the praṇava. It is often found that a word denoting the whole denotes its parts, as e.g. when one part of a piece of cloth is burnt, it is said that the cloth is burnt. This being so, in the Chāndogya, the praṇava alone, denoted by the term 'udgītha' and a part of the udgītha, is the object to be meditated on under the aspect of the vital-breath. In Vājasaneyaka, by the term 'udgītha' the entire udgītha, that which the singer of the udgītha sings, is to be understood, i.e. that alone is to be meditated on under the aspect of the vital-breath. Hence, it is established that the udgītha-meditation mentioned in the Chāndogya is different from the udgītha-meditation mentioned in the Vājasaneyaka.

Here ends the section entitled "Difference" (2).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They take it as an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation different, viz. It is said in the Chāndogya (1.1.1) that the 'Om' is to be meditated on as the udgītha. Here the Om and the udgītha are designated as standing in a relation of co-ordination (sāmanādhikaraṇa). Now the problem is what exactly this co-ordination between the two implies,—whether adhyāsa or conscious voluntary super-imposition of one object upon another and thereby thinking the two as identical; apavāda or bādha, i.e. the negation of the former false knowledge of a thing by the latter correct knowledge; or finally viśeṣaṇa, i.e. qualification, distinguishing the thing qualified from other things. The last is the correct view. The udgītha here specializes and thereby restricts the Om which extends over the entire Veda,—i.e. only that Om which is a part of the udgītha is to be meditated on here and not the Om which extends over the entire Veda. Hence the sūtra: "On account of the extension (of the Om to the entire Veda), (the view

that the term udgītha expresses a specialization of the Om is) appropriate ".[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He too takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation different, viz. In the text: "Let one meditate on the syllable Om, the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1), the Om and the udgītha are mentioned separately. The problem is whether they are to be meditated on separately or co-ordinately. The *prima facie* view is that they are to be meditated on separately, since they are mentioned separately. But the correct conclusion is that the udgītha qualifies the praṇava and as such the praṇava is the object to be meditated on here. Hence the sūtra: "And on account of the universality (of the praṇava as the object to be meditated on), (the view that the praṇava is qualified by the udgītha is) appropriate". That is, just as the praṇava is designated as the object to be meditated on in the introductory passage, so in the subsequent passages too. Hence here the object to be meditated is the praṇava as qualified by the udgītha, and not the praṇava *and* the udgītha.[2]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 10 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the attributes of infancy and the like too are to be included in the meditations on Him. Hence the sūtra: "And on account of all-pervasiveness, (this is) consistent". That is, the Lord is all-pervading in spite of His states of infancy and the like, since He is not limited by those attributes of infancy and so on. Hence the meditation on the Lord as possessed of these attributes is perfectly consistent.[3]

[1] Ś.B. 3.3.9, pp. 766 ff.; Bh. B. 3.3.9, pp. 177-178.
[2] Śk. B. 3.3.9, pp. 296–298, Part 9.
[3] G.B. 3.3.10, pp. 127-128, Chap. 3.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "Non-difference of everything". (Sūtra 10)

SŪTRA 10

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DIFFERENCE OF EVERYTHING (I.E. EVERYWHERE, VIZ. CHĀNDOGYA AND BṚHADĀRAṆYAKA), THOSE (QUALITIES ARE TO BE INSERTED) ELSEWHERE (VIZ. IN THE KAUṢĪTAKI)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the Chāndogya as well as in the Vājasaneyaka, under the dialogue of the sense-organs, the vital-breath, endowed with the attributes of being the oldest and the best, is designated as the object to be worshipped, and also speech and the rest are designated as possessed of the attributes of being the richest and so on; and those attributes are ascribed to the vital-breath. In the dialogue of the sense-organs in the Kauṣītaki, on the other hand, the attributes of speech and the rest are stated, but are not ascribed to the vital-breath. With regard to it, we reply: "Elsewhere", i.e. in the dialogue of the sense-organs in the Kauṣītaki as well, they are to be ascribed to the vital-breath, as in all the three dialogues speech and the rest are said to be under the control of the vital-breath,—which is the cause of the seniority and excellence of the latter.

Vedānta-kaustubha

While in one place (viz. in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka) the word 'udgītha' refers to the whole, in another place (viz. in the Chāndogya) it refers to a part only and as such does not relate to the whole,—hence the two udgītha-meditations are different. Likewise since in some cases the vital-breath is designated as endowed with the attributes of being the richest and the like, in some cases, again, not so endowed, the meditations on the vital-breath too are different,—the author is refuting this view now by the maxim of the combination of special features.[1]

In the dialogue of the sense-organs, the Chandogas as well as the Vājasaneyins demonstrate the vital-breath, endowed with the attributes of being the oldest and the best, as the object to be worshipped thus: "He who, verily, knows the oldest and the best, becomes, for-

[1] Designated under Br. Sū. 3.3.5.

sooth, the oldest and the best of his own people. The vital-breath, verily, is the oldest and the best" (Bṛh. 6.1.1 [1]) and so on; and they demonstrate the attributes of speech and the rest, such as: being the richest and so on, thus: "These divinities, verily, disputed for self-superiority" [2] and so on, "Disputing for self-superiority" (Bṛh. 6.1.7 [3]) and so on; as well as establish the excellence of the vital-breath on the ground that speech and the rest and the body have their existence as well as activities under the control of the vital-breath; and finally ascribe the attributes of speech and the rest, such as, being the richest and so on, to the vital-breath, the oldest and the best, thus: "Then, verily, speech said to him: 'If I am the richest, you are the richest' " (Chānd. 5.1.13 [4]) and so on. Thus, according to them, the object to be worshipped is the vital-breath, endowed with the attributes of being the oldest, the best, the richest and so on, as subserving speech and the rest.

In the dialogues of the sense-organs in the branches of the Kauṣītaki and the rest, on the other hand, the excellence of the vital-breath is demonstrated, but the attributes of speech and the rest are not ascribed to it (Kauṣ. 2.14).

The attributes in question are those belonging to speech, the eye, the ear and the mind,—namely, being the richest being the support, being prosperity and being the abode (respectively), to be known from the following texts: "He who, verily, knows the richest . . . . Speech, forsooth, is the richest" (Bṛh. 6.1.2; Chānd. 5.1.2), "He who, verily, knows the support . . . . The eye, forsooth, is the support" (Bṛh. 6.1.3; Chānd. 5.1.3), "He who, verily, knows prosperity . . . . The ear, verily, is prosperity" (Bṛh. 6.1.4; Chānd. 4.1.4), "He who, verily, knows the abode . . . . The mind, verily, is the abode" (Bṛh. 6.15; Chānd. 5.1.5) and so on.

On the doubt, viz. whether these attributes are to be included in the meditations on the vital-breath of the Kauṣītakins, or not, the

[1] An exactly similar passage—omitting only the word 'svānām', is Chānd. 5.1.1.

[2] This is evidently a mis-quotation, since it is traceable neither in the Chānd. nor in the Bṛh.

[3] Cf. Chānd. 5.1.6.—"Now the sense-organs disputed among themselves about self-superiority."

[4] Cf. Bṛh. 6.1.4.—"She (i.e. speech) said: 'Verily, wherein I am the richest, therein you are the richest'."

prima facie view is that since they have not been mentioned in those scriptural texts as belonging to the vital-breath, they are not to be so included.

With regard to it, we reply: "These," i.e. the attributes of being richest and the best belonging to speech and so on, are to be accepted as belonging to the vital-breath, "elsewhere" than in the Chāndogya and the rest, i.e. in the meditations on the vital-breath of the Kauṣītakins as well. Why? "On account of the non-difference of everything," i.e. because in all the three dialogues the cause of the seniority and excellence of the vital-breath, the object to be meditated on, is the very same. Just as in the meditations on the vital-breath in the Chāndogya and the rest, the dependence of speech and the rest and of the body on the vital-breath, as well as the connection of the vital-breath with the attributes of being the richest and the rest have been stated with a view to establishing the seniority and excellence of the vital-breath,—so in the meditations on the vital-breath in the Kauṣītaki too, the attributes of speech and the rest, such as being the richest and so on, have been stated with the same view to establishing the seniority and excellence of the vital-breath. The text: "Then these divinities said to Father Prajāpati: 'Who among us is the best?' He, Prajāpati, said: 'That one among you, on whose departure the body appears to be most miserable, is the best'. Then speech went out",[1] and so on, shows that speech and the rest, their attributes, as well as the body depend on the vital-breath. Here, their own attributes of being the richest and the rest are not attributed to the vital-breath by speech and the rest. Hence they are to be ascribed to the vital-breath,—this is established.

Here ends the section entitled "Non-difference of everything" (3).

COMPARISON

Śāṃkara, Bhāskara and Srīkaṇṭha

The interpretation of the phrase: "Sarvābhedāt" different, viz. "on account of the non-difference of the prāṇa-vidyā in the three Upaniṣads". That is, the meditation on the vital-breath is every-

[1] Cf. the very similar passages in Chānd. 5.1.7–5.1.8.

where the same, and hence the special features mentioned in one place are to be ascribed to others.[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 11 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the acts of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "(The acts of the Lord, viz. the deeds performed by him in His infancy and so on are eternal) on account of the non-difference of all (viz. of the Lord and His companions) they (manifest themselves) elsewhere (i.e. in another place and time)". That is, the Lord and His companions, viz. the freed souls, exist subsequently in other places and times and enact the same parts. In this sense, those acts of the Lord which He performs through His cit-śakti are eternal, while those acts which He performs through matter and so on are non-eternal.[2]

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "Bliss". (Sūtras 11–17)

SŪTRA 11

"BLISS AND THE REST (ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD EVERYWHERE), (ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DIFFERENCE) OF THE CHIEF."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The substratum of attributes (viz. Brahman) being the same, the attributes like "bliss and the rest" are to be inserted in all the meditations on the Highest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the question of the combination of the essential attributes of Brahman is being considered.

The phrase: 'On account of non-difference' is to be supplied (from the preceding aphorism). On the doubt, viz. whether the attributes of Brahman, such as, bliss and the rest, are to be included in all meditations on Brahman or not—the suggestion is: these attributes are not to be so included, because the texts of every Vedānta are

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[1] Ś.B. 3.3.10, p. 770; Bh. B. 3.3.10, p. 171; ŚK. B. 3.3.10, pp. 298 ff.

[2] G.B. 3.3.11, pp. 130–133, Chap. 3.

complete by themselves and do not require other texts to complete their meaning; because there is no restriction with regard to the inclusion of qualities not mentioned in a particular section; and because the meditating devotees can attain their goals from that very knowledge which they derive from a particular section where certain attributes are recorded,—

We reply: On account of the sameness "of the chief", i.e. as Brahman, the substratum of attributes, is the common object to be meditated on in all these Brahma-vidyās, His attributes, viz. "bliss and the rest", are to be comprised everywhere. It being impossible for texts to have a complete sense in isolation, the attributes, not mentioned in a particular section, should, nevertheless, be inserted there from another section for the benefit of meditating devotees.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 12 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation same.

SŪTRA 12

"(THERE IS) NO RELEVANCY OF (THE ATTRIBUTES OF) HAVING JOY FOR THE HEAD AND THE REST, FOR (THERE WILL BE) INCREASE AND DECREASE (ON THE PART OF BRAHMAN) IF (THERE BE) DIFFERENCE (OF LIMBS ON HIS PART)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The attributes of having joy for the head and the rest do not constitute the essential nature and attributes of the Highest,—since "if there be difference" of limbs like the head and the rest, then there will result increase and decrease on the part of Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. then, on account of the non-difference of Brahman, the attributes, mentioned in the Taittirīya-text: "Of him joy alone is the head, delight the right wing, excessive delight the left wing, bliss the soul, Brahman the tail, the foundation" (Tait. 2.5), too should be comprised everywhere like His essential attributes of bliss and the rest,—the author replies:

The attributes of having joy for the head and the rest are not necessary for a clear understanding of the nature and attributes of Brahman,—since they are not His essential attributes. Otherwise, "if there be difference" of limbs like the head and the rest, then there must be "increase and decrease" on the part of Brahman. If that be so, texts like "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite" (Tait. 2.1) will come to be contradicted.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

The interpretation of the last portion, viz. "upacayāpacayau hi bhede" different, viz. "because increase and decrease are possible only if there be difference". That is, lower and higher degrees like joy, delight, excessive delight, bliss and so on, which are all different, are possible only if there be a plurality of beings, i.e. only on the part of ordinary enjoyers, (and hence they are not possible on the part of Brahman who is one only).

Śrīkaṇṭha

He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself.

SŪTRA 13

"BUT THE OTHER (ATTRIBUTES ARE TO BE COMBINED), ON ACCOUNT OF THE SAMENESS OF THE PURPORT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"But" as the substratum of attributes (viz. Brahman) is the same everywhere, the attributes like bliss and the rest are to be combined.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"But" bliss and the rest, "other" than (the attributes of) having the joy as the head and so on, are to be supplied everywhere, "on account of the sameness of the purport", i.e. "on account of the sameness", i.e. identity everywhere, "of the purport", i.e. of the object to be demonstrated, viz. Brahman, the substratum of attributes. As He is not described as a person everywhere, so those (attributes of having the joy for the head and so on), if applied (everywhere),

would be purposeless. In order that there may be a clear knowledge of the real nature of Brahman, bliss and the rest are to be comprised everywhere, as they are connected with the real nature of Brahman. This aphorism is meant for indicating the reason why bliss and the rest should be included everywhere, and also for suggesting that it is simply meaningless to include others everywhere.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation of the phrase: "artha-sāmānyāt different, viz. "on account of (their) equality with the object itself". That is, the attributes of bliss and the rest, determining the very nature of the thing (viz. Brahman) are similar to the thing itself and are accordingly included in all meditations just like the thing itself.[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 14 in his commentary. Literal interpretation different, though the conclusion is the same. Thus: "But others (i.e. the other attributes mentioned in the Taittirīya) (are to be combined everywhere), on account of the sameness of the result". That is, the meditation on Brahman, as possessed of the attributes of all-pervasiveness and the rest, mentioned in the Taittirīya, leads to the attainment of Brahman, just as the meditation on Him as possessed of other attributes, mentioned in other Vedāntas, does.[2]

SŪTRA 14

"(THE DESIGNATION OF BRAHMAN AS HAVING JOY FOR HIS HEAD AND SO ON IS) FOR THE PURPOSE OF MEDITATION, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF (ANOTHER) PURPOSE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The designation: "Of him, joy alone is the head" (Tait. 2.5 [3]) and so on, on the other hand, serve the purpose of meditation, "on account of the absence of" any other "purpose".

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[1] Śrī. B. 3.3.13, p. 277, Part 1; Śk. B. 3.3.13, Part 9.

[2] G.B. 3.3.14, p. 137, Chap. 3.

[3] R.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In that case, the teaching of the attributes of having joy for the head and the rest will have no meaning,—to this the author replies:

The teaching, concerned with determining Brahman as a person, viz. "Of him, joy alone is the head" (Tait. 2.5) and so on, on the other hand, is "for the purpose of meditation", i.e. for the sake of helping easy comprehension. That is, in the absence of any other purpose, this alone is the purpose of such a designation.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They begin a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. a discussion about a text in the Kaṭhopaniṣad. Thus, in Kaṭha 3.10–3.11 it is said that sense-objects are higher than the sense-organs, the mind is higher than the sense-objects and so on and finally the Person is said to be the highest of all. The question is as to whether each of these, viz. sense-objects and so on, is high or only the Person. The answer is given in this sūtra thus: "(The Person alone is designated as the High) for the purpose of meditation, (and not others) on account of the absence of purpose". That is, there is no necessity for designating the sense-objects, the sense-organs and the rest as high, while there is such a necessity for designating the Person as high, viz.—meditation.[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He also begins a new adhikaraṇa here (four sūtras), concerned with the question, viz. whether the self consisting of food and the rest (Tait. 2.2 ff.) too are to be meditated on constantly as the self consisting of bliss is. The answer is: "(They are not to be meditated on constantly) on account of the absence of purpose (for such meditations)". That is, the meditations on the self consisting of food and the rest have a purpose only so long as the self consisting of bliss is not reached. But when it is reached, they become meaningless. Hence, such meditations are not to be practised perpetually.[2]

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[1] Ś.B. 3.3.14, pp. 773-774; Bh. B. 3.3.14, p. 180.

[2] ŚK. B. 3.3.14.

SŪTRA 15

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE TERM 'SELF' ALSO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As head, wings and the rest cannot possibly belong to the soul, designated thus: "Another internal self" (Tait. 2.5), that designation serves the purpose of meditation on Him.

Vedānta-kaustubha

That the designation: "Joy alone is the head" (Tait. 2.5) in the beginning of the text about that which consists of bliss serves the purpose of meditation and is concerned only with demonstrating (Brahman) as a person, is ascertained "from the term 'self' also". Thus, as head of the form of joy, wings and the rest cannot possibly belong to an object, which is denoted by the term 'self' in the text: "Another internal self is that which consists of bliss" (Tait. 2.5), and the real nature of which is different from joy, delight, excessive delight and the rest,—it is merely for helping one to meditate on the self that in the text: "Of him, joy alone is the head" (Tait. 2.5) (the self) is designated as a person,—this is known from the term 'self' as well.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They conclude here the discussion about the above Kaṭha-text. The immediately following passage designates the Person as the self. This also proves that the Person alone is intended to be designated as high. The designation of the rest as high is simply for the purpose of showing the supremacy of the Person.[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He continues the topic whether the selves consisting of food, consisting of the vital-breath and the rest are to be meditated on perpetually or not, and gives the second reason why they are not to be so meditated here. The term 'self' is applied to each of the selves, consisting of food and so on. This shows that these denote the presiding deities of food and the rest. Now, Brahman alone is to be

[1] Ś.B. 3.3.15, p. 774; Bh. B. 3.3.15, p. 180.

meditated on and not any other deity. For this reason too the selves consisting of food and so on are not to be meditated on.[1]

SŪTRA 16

"(THERE IS THE) UNDERSTANDING OF THE SELF (IN THE TAITTIRĪYA) AS IN OTHER (PLACES), ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT FOLLOWS."

Vedānta-pārijata-saurabha

In the text: "Another internal self" (Tait. 2.5[2]), by the term 'self' there is the "understanding of" the Supreme Soul alone, just as in the passage: "The soul, verily, was this, one alone, in the beginning" (Ait. Ār. 2.4.1[3]), by the term 'self' the Supreme Self alone is meant. Further, another text too, subsequent to the text about that which consists of bliss, viz. "He desired: 'May I be many'" (Tait. 2.5[4]), supports this meaning.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Since we know that in the preceding cases the term 'self' refers to what is not the self, it cannot be said that in the text: "Another internal self is that which consists of bliss" (Tait. 2.5) the term 'self' refers to the Self,—the author replies:

In the text: "Another internal self" (Tait. 2.5), by the term 'self' there is the "understanding of the self", i.e. the apprehension of the self, or the Supreme Soul alone. "As in other (places)," i.e. just as in a text other than the text: "Another internal self is that which consists of bliss" (Tait. 2.5),—viz. in the Aitareya-text: "The self, verily, was this, one alone, in the beginning, there was nothing else blinking. He thought: 'Shall I create worlds?' He created these worlds" (Ait. Ār. 2.4.1), by the term 'self' the Soul is understood, so is the case here. This is definitely ascertained also from a text which is subsequent to the text concerned with the soul consisting of bliss, viz. from the text: "He desired: 'May I be many'" (Tait. 2.6).

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[1] ŚK. B. 3.3.15, p. 309, Part 9.
[2] R, ŚK.
[3] P. 118.
[4] R, B.

COMPARISON

Saṃkara and Bhāskara

They begin a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with a different problem, viz. a discussion about a passage in the Aitareya-āraṇyaka (2.4.1). The question is as to whether the term 'self' in this passage stands for Brahman or for Hiraṇyagarbha. The answer is: "(There is) the understanding of the self (i.e. Brahman) (by the term 'self' in the passage), as in other (places) (i.e. in Tait. 2.1, etc.), on account of what follows (i.e. the word 'perceives')".[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He continues the above topic, viz. whether the selves consisting of food and so on are to be meditated on or not. The answer is that as the self consisting of bliss is nothing but the Supreme Brahman, that alone is to be meditated on and not the other selves. Hence the sūtra: "(In Tait. 2.5 by the term 'self' there is) the understanding of the self (i.e. Brahman), as in other places (i.e. in Tait. 2.1, etc.), (this is known also) from what follows". Thus, literal interpretation is the same, though import different.[2]

SŪTRA 17

"IF IT BE OBJECTED: ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION (OF THE TERM 'SELF' WITH WHAT IS NOT-SELF, THERE IS NO UNDERSTANDING OF SELF HERE, WE REPLY:) THERE MAY BE (SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING), ON ACCOUNT OF ASCERTAINMENT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that since the term 'self' is found to refer to the vital-breath and the rest in the previous çases, in the text: "The self, consisting of bliss" (Tait. 2.5[3]), the Supreme Self is not meant by the term 'self'—(we reply:) "There may be" indeed such an understanding by that term,—as we know that in the previous cases

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[1] Ś.B. 3.3.16, pp. 775 ff.; Bh. B. 3.3.16, p. 180.

[2] ŚK. B. 3.3.16, pp. 309-310, Part 9.

[3] Not quoted by others.

too, the term 'self' refers to the not-self simply because those not-selves are viewed as the Supreme Self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected that as in the previous cases, e.g. in the text: "Another internal self is that which consists of the vital-breath" (Tait. 2.2) and so on, the term 'self' refers to the not-self, so in the text: 'Another internal self is that which consists of bliss" (Tait. 2.5) the Highest Self is not referred to by the term 'self',—

(We reply:) "There may be" indeed the apprehension of the Highest Self by the term 'self'. Why? "On account of ascertainment." That is, we have, first, in mind the idea of the Highest Self, mentioned previously in the passage: "From him, verily, the ether arose" (Tait. 2.1); then, with a view to determining His nature and attributes, the term 'self' is made to refer to the selves consisting of food and so on, simply because they are viewed as the Highest Self.[1] Hence it is established that attributes like bliss and the rest alone are to be combined for the sake of determining the real nature of the substratum of attributes (viz. Brahman), and not those of having joy for the head and the like which are not His (essential) attributes.

Here ends the section entitled "Bliss" (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Here they conclude the discussion about the above Aitareya-āraṇyaka text. "If it be objected that on account of the connected meaning (of the passage as a whole, i.e. because of the reference to the creation of the world and so on, Hiraṇyagarbha is here denoted by the term 'self'), (we reply:) there may be (the understanding of Brahman here) on account of ascertainment (viz. that the self is said to be the one)." [2]

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[1] I.e. right from the beginning of the section we get the idea that the Highest Self is the topic of discussion, and hence the subsequent references to the not-self in the chapter are made with the Highest Self in mind.

[2] Ś.B. 3.3.17, pp. 777-778; Bh. B. 3.3.17, pp. 180-181. For Śaṃkara's alternative explanation of these two sūtras, vide Ś.B. 3.3.17, pp. 338 ff.

Śrīkaṇṭha

Here he concludes the discussion as to whether the selves consisting of food and the rest are to be meditated on or not. Hence the sūtra: "If it be objected that on account of the connection (of the term) 'self' with the selves consisting of food and so on, these latter too are to be meditated on like the self consisting of bliss, (we reply:) there must be the meditation on the self consisting of bliss alone), on account of ascertainment, (i.e. because the self consisting of bliss is known to be different from the other selves)".[1]

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "The telling of a thing to be done". (Sūtra 18)

SŪTRA 18

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE TELLING OF A THING TO BE DONE, (ALREADY ESTABLISHED BY SMṚTI AND CUSTOM,) (THAT IS NOT ENJOINED BY THE TEXT HERE, BUT) SOMETHING NEW, (I.E. THE MEDITATION ON WATER AS THE DRESS OF THE VITAL-BREATH."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "He should rinse the mouth with water when about to eat, and should rinse the mouth with water when he has eaten. Thus indeed he makes the breath non-naked" (Śat. Br. 14.9.2, 15[2]), the meditation on water as forming the dress of the vital-breath, not mentioned before, is enjoined, there being only a re-mention here, on the other hand, of the rinsing of the mouth with water, already established by Smṛti and custom.[3]

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[1] ŚK. B. 3.3.17, p. 310, Part 9.

[2] P. 1103, line 7. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

[3] I.e. the ordinary practice of rinsing the mouth with water before and after meals is not enjoined by Scripture here, since it is already enjoined by Smṛti and custom and Scripture does not enjoin what has already been enjoined. Hence the text simply *re-mentions* this ordinary custom, but does not *enjoin* it. What it enjoins here is something new, viz. the meditation on water as the dress of the vital-breath.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now a particular subsidiary part of the above-mentioned meditation on the vital-breath is being considered. In the Vājasaneyaka it is said that the vital-breath asked speech and the rest: 'What is my food, what is my dress?" (Bṛh. 6.1.14; Śat. Br. 14.9.2, 14[1]). They replied: '"Whatever there is here, as far as dogs, worms, crawling and flying insects,—that is your food; water is your dress" ' (Bṛh. 6.1.14; Śat. Br. 14.9.2, 14). After that we read: "Those versed in the Veda who know this rinse the mouth with water when they are about to eat, and rinse the mouth with water when they have eaten. So indeed they think that they are making the breath non-naked" (Bṛh. 6.1.14), "Hence he who knows this should rinse the mouth with water when about to eat and should rinse the mouth with water when he has eaten. Thus indeed he makes the breath non-naked" (Śat. Br. 14.9.2, 15).

In the very same manner, we read the following in the Chāndogya as well: "He said: 'What will be my dress?' 'Water,' they said. Hence, verily, those who are about to eat clothe it before and after with water. It is accustomed to receive a dress; it becomes non-naked" (Chānd. 5.2.2).

Here the doubt is as to whether here the rinsing of the mouth is enjoined or the meditation on water as forming the dress of the vital-breath, while there is simply a re-mention of the rinsing of the mouth. If it be suggested: As in the text: "So indeed he makes the breath non-naked" (Śat. Br. 14.9.2, 15), there is no mention of an injunctive form referring to the meditation on water as forming the dress of the vital-breath, and as in this text: "He *should* rinse the mouth with water when about to eat" (Śat. Br. 14.9.2, 15), there is the mention of an injunctive form, it is the rinsing of the mouth that is enjoined here, and water is designated as forming the dress of the vital-breath for glorifying the rinsing of the mouth.—

We reply: It is the meditation on water as forming the dress of the vital-breath—which is "something new", i.e. is something not mentioned before,—that is alone enjoined here. For this very reason there is the mention of clothing only[2] in the Chāndogya: 'They

[1] P. 1103, line 3.

[2] And no mention of the rinsing of the mouth with water.

clothe it with water" (Chānd. 5.2.2). From the circumstance also of its being found together with the meditation on food as far as dogs and so on, (enjoined) in the text: "As far as dogs" (Bṛh. 6.1.14; Śat. Br. 14.9.2, 14), it is known that the meditation on (water) as forming the dress (of the vital-breath) alone is what is enjoined here, but the rinsing of the mouth with water is not what is enjoined.[1] Why? "On account of the telling of a thing to be done," i.e. because of the telling, i.e. mention, of a thing to be done, i.e. of a duty to be performed daily, already established by Smṛti and custom, and simply re-mentioned in the meditation on the vital-breath, as well for the sake of laying down a clothing of the vital-breath. Hence it is established that the meditation on the rinsing-water as forming the dress of the vital-breath is enjoined here as a subsidiary part of the meditation on the vital-breath, while there is simply a re-mention of the act of rinsing the mouth with water.

Here ends the section entitled "The telling of a thing to be done" (5).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 19 in his commentary. He also takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, though concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the designation of the Lord as Father. He interprets the word "apūrva" in the sūtra as: similar ("a") to what precedes ("pūrva"). Hence the sūtra: ' (The attributes of fatherhood and the like), similar to the preceding ones (viz. bliss, and so on) (are to be comprised in all meditations on Brahman), on account of the

[1] I.e. the preceding passage: "Whatever there is here, as far as dogs . . , that is your food", does not enjoin the use of the food of all kinds,—since that would be contrary to Scripture and impossible,—but merely enjoins the *meditation* on all food as the food of the vital-breath. Therefore, we must conclude that the text: "Water is your dress" also, which forms the immediate continuation of the above passage, does not enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth with water, but only the *meditation* on water as forming the dress of the vital-breath.

statement of the effect, (i.e. the fruit, i.e. because such meditations also lead to salvation)".[1]

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "In the same". (Sūtra 19)

SŪTRA 19

"IN THE SAME (BRANCH) TOO, (IT IS) THUS, (I.E. THERE IS IDENTITY OF VIDYĀS), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In a branch of the Vājasaneyins,[2] i.e. in the 'Mystery of fire',[3] viz. in the section which beginning: "Let one meditate on truth as Brahman" (Śat. Br. 10.6.3, 1 [4]), continues: "Let one meditate on the self, consisting of mind" (Śat. Br. 10.6.3, 2 [5]) and so on; as well as in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text: "This person consists of mind" (Bṛh. 5.6.1 [6]), the meditation taught by Śāṇḍilya is recorded. And just as the vidyās, mentioned in different branches, are identical owing to the identity of the objects meditated on, so the Śāṇḍilya-vidyās, though mentioned in the same branch, are identical.[7] The vidyās being the same, their special features are to be combined together.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now (the author) points out the identity of the meditations intuited by Śāṇḍilya.

The meditation taught by Śāṇḍilya is recorded in the 'Mystery of Fire' in a branch of the Vājasaneyins thus: "Let one meditate on truth as Brahman. Now, verily, this person consists of thought.

[1] G.B. 3.3.19, pp. 143-144, Chap. 3.
[2] The followers of the white Yajur-veda.
[3] The name of the tenth book of the Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa.
[4] P. 806, line 14. R, Bh.
[5] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[6] *Op. cit.*
[7] Vide V.P.S. 3.3.2.

With whatever thought he departs from this world, that he becomes on departing to the other world. Let him meditate on the self, consisting of mind, having the breath for its body, of the form of light, having true resolves, having the ether for its soul" [1] (Śat. Br. 10.6.3, 1-2 [2]). In that very branch, i.e. in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, that meditation is recorded once again thus: "This person within this heart consists of mind, is of the nature of light, is like a grain of rice or a barley-corn. He, verily, is the ruler of all, the Lord of all, governs all this, whatsoever there is" (Bṛh. 5.6.1).

Here the doubt is as to whether the two vidyās mentioned in the 'Mystery of Fire' and Bṛhadāraṇyaka are identical or not. The suggestion being that on account of repetition the vidyās are different, just as on account of the five-fold repetition, the preliminary offerings are so,—

We reply: Just as the vidyās mentioned in different branches are the same, and consequently their special features are combined, so "in the same", i.e. in the same branch, the vidyās are identical, and consequently their special features are combined. Why? "On account of non-difference," i.e. because of the identity, in both the places, of the objects to be meditated on, viz. (the selves) endowed with the attributes of consisting of mind and the rest.

If it be objected: There may be identity of vidyās in both the cases, and the combination of the attributes like 'being the ruler of all' and so on. But the laying down, over again, of (the attributes like) 'consisting of mind' and the rest does not stand to reason,—for if there be the laying down of the unknown attributes in one place, then the realization of our purpose results simply through a combination of them elsewhere.[3]—

[1] The phrase 'having the ether for its soul' is put immediately after 'of the form of light'. The text really is: ". . . . having the form of light, having the ether for its soul, changing its shape at will, swift as thought, having true resolves, having true purposes . . . ."

[2] P. 806, lines 14–16. Cf. a very similar Śāṇḍilya-vidyā in Chānd. 3.14.1–4.

[3] I.e. the attributes like 'being the ruler of all', etc., mentioned in the Bṛh., but not in the Śat. Br.,—are to be inserted in the latter, and as such they serve a useful purpose. But the attributes like 'consisting of mind', etc.—mentioned in both the Bṛh. and Śat. Br.—are mere useless repetitions, serving no purpose.

We reply: No, because the mention of several already-mentioned attributes serves the purpose of recognition.[1] Hence it is established that in both cases the vidyās are identical.

Here ends the section entitled "In the same" (6).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 20 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the problem whether the Lord is to be meditated on as a pure soul or as possessed of a body. The *prima facie* view is that He is to be meditated on as a pure soul only, for if one is to meditate on the form of the Lord, then he will have to meditate on His eye sometimes, on His ears sometimes and so on and as such no uniform and uninterrupted flow of the devotional sentiment, which alone is the means to salvation, will be possible. The answer is given in this sūtra. He reads "samāna" instead of "samāne". Hence the sūtra: "Even (in the meditation on the form of the Lord, the sentiment is) the same thus, on account of the non-difference (of the Lord's different limbs, such as eyes, and so on, with His very self)". That is, just as a golden image is gold throughout and by looking at the different parts of the image, viz. the eyes and so on, one does not get different ideas, but only one idea, viz. that of gold, so the different parts of the Lord are identical with the Lord Himself and hence they do not give rise to different ideas, but to one idea of the Lord. Hence the meditation on the Lord as having a form does indeed lead to release.[2]

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[1] I.e. in order that we may recognize the two vidyās to be identical, there must be mentioned some features common to both. Hence the repetition of certain attributes in two identical vidyās is not useless.

[2] G.B. 3.3.20, p. 145, Chap. 3.—"Evam api cakṣurādīnām vailakṣaṇyena bhāne'pi samāna eka-rasaḥ sa eva hiraṇya-pratimādi vat bhagvān vodhyaḥ."

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "The connection". (Sūtras 20–22)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 20)

SŪTRA 20

"ON ACCOUNT OF CONNECTION, SO ELSEWHERE ALSO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as the Śāṇḍilya-vidyās are identical, and through connection with them, there is the combination of special features, "so" on account of their connection with the same vidyā through the introductory passage: "Truth is Brahman" (Bṛh. 5.4.1 [1]), the two names, mentioned in the scriptural texts: "His secret name is 'Day'—this in reference to the presiding deities" (Bṛh. 5.5.3 [2]), "His secret name is 'I'—this in reference to the self" (Bṛh. 5.5.4 [3]), are to be combined,—this is the *prima facie* view.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, having suggested a *prima facie* view, viz. Just as owing to the identity of the objects to be meditated on, there is combination of attributes in the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, so there is combination of the names in the meditation on the true Brahman also, having the mystic words [4] for His body,—(the author) disposes of it in two aphorisms.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, we read, beginning: "Truth is Brahman" (Bṛh. 5.4.1), and continuing: "Now the real is the yonder sun. The Person who is there in that orb and the Person who is here in the right eye" (Bṛh. 5.5.2) and so on. Here, having declared that the true Brahman is the object to be meditated on—in the orb of the sun as well as in the right eye—as having the mystic words as His body in the passage: "Bhūr is his head, Bhuvar is his arms, Svar is his feet" (Bṛh. 5.5.3), the text teaches two secret names as complementary to the meditation. Here, the true Brahman, the support of the sun and the support of the eye, is successively stated to have the name 'Day' and the name 'I', thus: "His secret name is 'Day'—this in reference to the presiding deities" (Bṛh. 5.5.3), "His secret name is 'I'—this in reference to the self" (Bṛh. 5.5.4).

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.
[2] Ś. R, Bh, ŚK.
[3] *Op. cit.*
[4] Viz. Bhūr, Bhuvar and Svar.

Here the doubt is as to whether the stated names are each to be meditated on singly in its own place (i.e. where mentioned), or whether each is to be meditated on in both the places as combined with the other. Just as in the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā there is a mutual combination of attributes on account of their connection with an identical vidyā, "so elsewhere too", i.e. in the case of the orb of the sun and the eye, the two names are to be mutually combined in both the places "on account of their connection" with an identical vidyā,—this is the meaning of the *prima facie* aphorism.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 21 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (five sūtras), concerned with the worship of the aveśāvatāras or God-possessed souls like Nārada and so on. The question is whether they too are to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes of the Lord Himself. This is the *prima facie* view: "On account of (their intimate) connection (with the Lord Himself), in others also (i.e. the God-possessed souls), (are to be meditated on) thus, (i.e. as possessed of the attributes of the Lord ".[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 21-22)

SŪTRA 21

"OR NOT, ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But the correct conclusion is that "on account of the difference" of place, (such) a combination is "not" appropriate.

Vedānta-kaustubha

(The author) refutes (the above view).

The names are "not" to be combined. Why? "On account of difference," i.e. on account of the difference of place. Just as the attribute, stated of a teacher when seated, does not belong to him

[1] G.B. 3.3.21, p. 147, Chap. 3.

when walking, so exactly on account of the difference of the forms of Brahman,—who is one indeed,—in consequence of His connection with those respective places, (viz. the orb of the sun and the eye), there is difference of vidyās, and as such no combination. Thus, in one case, truth is to be meditated on as connected with the locality of the sun, and here the name: "His secret name is 'Day'—this is in reference to the presiding deities" (Bṛh. 5.5.3) is appropriate. The insertion of such a name to the locality of the eye is not possible. In the other case, on the other hand, it is to be meditated on as connected with the locality of the eye, and here the name: 'His secret name is 'I'—this is in reference to the self" (Bṛh. 5.5.4) is appropriate. There can be no insertion of it to the locality of the sun. In the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, on the contrary, there is no difference of place, since the object to be meditated on is, in both the cases, situated within the heart.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 22 in his commentary. It answers the *prima facie* view. He reads "aviśeṣāt" instead of "viśeṣāt". Hence the sūtra: "Or not, (i.e. the God-possessed souls are not to be worshipped as possessed of all God-like attributes,) on account of (their) non-difference (from other souls)". That is, the God-possessed souls too are after all jīvas and hence they are to be highly venerated, but not worshipped like the Lord Himself.[1]

SŪTRA 22

"AND (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The scriptural text, viz. "The form of this one is the very same as the form of that one" (Chānd. 1.7.5[2]), "shows" the absence of a combination of the attributes of that which is situated within the sun and that which is situated within the eye.

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[1] G.B. 3.3.22, p. 147, Chap. 3.

[2] Ś, R, Bh.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In another place, a scriptural text concerned with transference "shows" the absence of a combination of the attributes of that which is situated in the sun and that which is situated in the eye. Thus, the scriptural text concerned with transference, viz. "The form of this one is the very same as the form of that one" (Chānd. 1.7.5) transfers the form of the Person abiding in the sun to the Person abiding in the eye. And this (text) clearly indicates the absence of a combination of attributes in such a case. If there were any combination of attributes, then the transference would have been meaningless.[1] Hence it is established that there is no combination of the names.

Here ends the section entitled "The connection" (7).

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

He takes this sūtra as constituting a new adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the Maṇḍala-vidyā, or the meditation on the Person within the orb of the sun, in the Chāndogya (Chānd. 1.6.6) and the Mahā-nārāyaṇa (Mahā. 12.2) Upaniṣads, and concludes that the two vidyās are identical, since Scripture "shows" their identity.[2]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 23 in his commentary. He gives here a second reason why the God-possessed souls are not to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes of the Lord Himself: "And (Scripture, viz. Chānd. 7.1.1) shows". That is, the above text shows that

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[1] I.e. a special transference, identifying two things, is necessary only when the two things are naturally different. E.g. a king is not, as a rule, expressly mentioned to be rich, for it is understood that all kings are naturally rich. Hence we simply say: 'He is a king'. But we say: 'He is a servant and rich', for the quality of being rich does not, as a rule, belong to servants and any exception has to be expressly mentioned. Similarly, since here the form of the person within the sun and the form of the person within the eye are expressly mentioned to be identical, it is clear that there is no natural identity between them, so that no combinations of their attributes, names and so on are possible.

[2] ŚK. B. 3.3.22, pp. 319-320, Part 9.

Nārada, a God-possessed soul, approached Sanatkumāra with a view to learning about the Supreme Soul from him. This proves that the God-possessed souls are not perfect like the Lord. Hence they cannot be worshipped as possessed of His attributes.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "Holding together". (Sūtra 23)

SŪTRA 23

"(THE ATTRIBUTES LIKE) HOLDING TOGETHER AND PERVADING THE HEAVEN TOO (ARE NOT TO BE INSERTED IN ALL VIDYĀS) AND FOR THIS REASON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Owing to the very same difference of places,[2] there is no insertion, in other vidyās, of the attributes like "holding together, pervading the heaven" and so on, laid down in the manual of the Taittirīyas[3] thus: "The powers of which Brahman is the oldest, were held together. Brahman stretched out the heaven, the oldest, in the beginning" (Tait. Br. 2.4.7, 10[4]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now (the author) is extending the above-mentioned maxim to other cases.

In the manual of the Taittirīyas, i.e. in the supplementary writings of the Rāṇāyanīyas, a mass of attributes belonging to Brahman, such as, holding the powers together, pervading the heaven and so on, is recorded in the passage: "The powers of which Brahman is the oldest, were held together. Brahman stretched out the heaven, the oldest, in the beginning. Brahman was born first among all beings.[5] Who then is fit to rival that Brahman?" (Tait. Br. 2.4.7, 10). The sense is: 'energies'—here the word 'vīryyāḥ' (in the masculine gender) means 'vīryyāṇi' (in the neuter gender)—have Brahman as their

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[1] G.B. 3.3.23, p. 148, Chap. 3.

[2] Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.21.

[3] A school of the Yajur-veda.

[4] Pp. 252-253. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK. Cf. Athar. V. 19.22.21, 30—same, only "Brahma-jyeṣṭhā sambhṛtā vīryyāṇi",—slightly different.

[5] The text reads: "Ṛtasya Brahma prathamota jajñe".

'oldest', i.e. as their chief,—that means: they are the attributes of Brahman. (They are) 'held together', i.e. supported, by the substratum of the attributes, (viz. Brahman),—hereby (Brahman's attribute of) holding the powers together is designated. That chiefest Brahman stretched out the heaven,—hereby (Brahman's attribute of) pervading the heaven is designated.

Here the doubt is as to whether these attributes of Brahman are to be inserted in the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā and the rest,—that are meditations on Brahman—enjoined in their (i.e. Rāṇāyanīyas's) Upaniṣads, or not to be inserted, a different kind of meditation (on Brahman) as possessed of these attributes being enjoined here. On the suggestion that they are to be inserted,

We reply: Just as the two names are not combined, so the group of attributes like "holding together and pervading the heaven" and so on too is not to be combined. Why? "For this reason," i.e. on account of the very same difference, i.e. on account of the difference of abodes. In the Śāṇḍilya-vidyās and the rest, Brahman is declared to have a small abode in the texts: "This soul of mine within the heart" (Chānd. 3.14.3, 4). Here, there (is no mention of the) attribute of occupying a place that is not small, resulting from (His) 'pervading the heaven', as well as of other attributes of occupying a place that is not small, such as, 'holding together' and the rest, resulting from (their) association with that. Hence it is established that there is a separate meditation (on Brahman) as qualified by the attributes of holding the powers together, pervading the heaven and so on.

Here ends the section entitled "Holding together" (8).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 24 in his commentary. He continues the topic that the God-possessed souls are not to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "And (the attributes like) holding together and pervading the heaven too (are not to be combined in the meditations on the God-possessed souls) also for this reason (i.e. because they are not equal to the Lord)".[1]

[1] G.B. 3.3.24, pp. 148-149, Chap. 3.

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "The meditation on the Person". (Sūtra 24)

SŪTRA 24

"AND EVEN IN THE MEDITATION ON THE PERSON (THERE IS NO TRANSFERENCE OF ATTRIBUTES), ON ACCOUNT OF OTHERS BEING NOT RECORDED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As "even in the meditation on the person",—recorded in the Chāndogya thus: "The person, verily, is a sacrifice" (Chānd. 3.16.1 [1]) and in the manual of the Taittirīyas thus: "For him who knows thus" (Tait. Ār. 10.64; [2] Mahānār. 25.1),—the details mentioned in one place, viz. "His twenty-four years are the morning libation" (Chānd. 3.16.1), are not recorded in another, so the vidyās are different.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Previously, in accordance with the reason (stated in Br. Su. 3. 3. 21): 'On account of difference', the meditation on (Brahman) as endowed with the attributes like holding together and so on was demonstrated to be different from the meditations on Brahman as taught by Śāṇḍilya and others. Now, by showing the difference of the meditations on the person, (the author) is removing the doubt that in the case of meditations on the person, the meditations are identical on account of the non-difference of names and the rest.

The meditation on the person is recorded in the Chāndogya in the Rahasya-brāhmaṇa of the Tāṇḍins and the Paiṅgins thus: "The person, verily, is a sacrifice. His twenty-four years are the morning libation" (Chānd. 3.16.1), "Now the forty-four years are the mid-day libation" (Chānd. 3.16.3), "Now the forty-eight years are the third libation" (Chānd. 3.16.5) and so on. In the manuals of the Taittirīyas too, there is a meditation on the person in the first section: "For him who knows thus, the soul of the sacrifice is the sacrificer, faith his wife, his body the fuel, his breast the sacrificial altar, his body-hairs the sacrificial grass" (Tait. Ār. 10.64; Mahānār. 25.1).

Here the doubt is as to whether the meditations recorded in the two places are different or identical. If it be suggested that on account

[1] R, ŚK. [2] P. 779. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

of the non-difference of names and the rest, the meditations are the same,—(the author) states the correct conclusion: "Even in the meditation on the person". The meditations on the person are different. Why? Because "even in the meditation on the person" of the Chāndogya and the Taittirīya-manual, recorded without distinction, the attributes which are mutually different are "not recorded", i.e. not mentioned, in the other place. Thus, in the Chāndogya, the life of a person, up to his hundred and sixteen years, divided thrice, is imagined to be a libation. In the Taittirīya-manual, on the other hand, in the text: "The evening, the morning and the mid-day are the libations" (Tait. Ār. 10.64; Mahānār. 25.1), three libations are imagined, but in the Chāndogya three libations are not imagined.[1] Moreover, in the Chāndogya, the desire to eat and the rest are imagined to be the purificatory ceremony and so on,[2] but not in the Taittirīya-manuals. In the Chāndogya, a person is imagined to be a sacrifice thus: "The person, verily, is a sacrifice" (Chānd. 3.16.1), but his soul and the rest are not imagined to be the sacrificer and so on. In the Taittirīya-manual, on the other hand, the soul of the person is imagined to be a sacrifice and so on thus: "For him who knows thus, the soul of the sacrifice is the sacrificer" (Ait. Ār. 10.64; Mahānār. 25.1[3]). Hence there is a difference of form in the two cases, since everywhere the difference of special points is the cause of the difference of meditation. There is a difference of connection with fruit as well. In the Chāndogya, to begin with, the fruit of the meditation on the person is the attainment of longevity.[4] In the Taittirīya-manuals, on the other hand, the attainment of Brahman is the fruit of the meditation on the person. Thus, having set forth the meditation on Brahman in the previous section thus: "Let him unite himself with you, the great Brahman,

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[1] In the Chāndogya, the parts of the one and the same thing are fancifully represented as three libations; while in the Taittirīya-manuals three different things are so represented.

[2] Vide Chānd. 3.16.1–5. "When he desires to eat and drink and does not enjoy himself—that is his purificatory ceremony," etc.

[3] The Chāndogya stops at identifying a person with a sacrifice, but does not enter into any details. The Taittirīya-manuals differ from the Chāndogya not only in not identifying a person with a sacrifice, but also in entering into greater details.

[4] Vide Chānd. 3.16.7. "He who knows this lives for hundred and sixteen years."

Om" (Tait. Ār. 10.63;[1] Mahānār. 24.2), and having stated the fruit belonging to a knower of Brahman, viz. the attainment of Brahman thus: "He attains the greatness of Brahman" (Tait. Ār. 10.63;[2] Mahānār. 24.2), the text goes on to say: "For him who knows thus, the soul of the sacrifice" (Tait. Ār. 10.64; Mahānār. 25.2) and so on. As there is a reference to the knower of Brahman by the term 'him' here, and as it (viz. the meditation on the person) is mentioned in the immediate vicinity (of the meditation on Brahman), so it is gathered that the meditation on the person here is a subsidiary part of the meditation on Brahman, and that (as such) the former has no reference to a different fruit. This being so, it is deduced that the attainment of Brahman alone is the fruit of the meditation on the person which is a subsidiary part of the meditation on Brahman. Hence it is established that as the identity of mere names, viz. 'meditation on the person' (puruṣa-vidyā), in the two cases, is of no great importance, the vidyās are different; that being so, there is no combination of their special features.

Here ends the section entitled "The meditation on the person" (9).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He reads "Puruṣa-vidyāyām iva", instead of "Puruṣa-vidyāyām api", and explains the sūtra thus: "As (the record of the Tāṇḍins and Paiṅgins is) in the puruṣa-vidyā, (not such is the record) of others".[3] Conclusion reached, the same.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Like Śaṃkara he reads: "iva" in place of "api". He concludes here the topic of the worship of the God-possessed souls, viz. that they, being not equal to the Lord, are not to be meditated on as possessed of His attributes. Hence the sūtra: ("As attributes like creatorship, rulership, and so on, are declared to be belonging to the Lord) in the meditation on the person (i.e. in the Puruṣa-sūktas of the Veda) and (in the Gopāla-

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[1] Pp. 774-775. [2] P. 775. [3] Ś.B. 3.3.24, p. 790.

pūrva-tāpanī), (so they are) not declared (to be belonging) to others (viz. the God-possessed souls)".[1]

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled "Piercing and so on". (Sūtra 25)

SŪTRA 25

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE OF THE MATTER OF PIERCING AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In meditation there is no insertion of the sacred formulæ like: "Pierce all, pierce the heart"[2], as well as of the sacrificial acts like Pravargya[3] and the rest, mentioned in the passage: "The gods, forsooth, held a sacrificial session" (Śat. Br. 14.1.1, 1[4]) and so on. Why? "On account of the difference of the matter of piercing and so on" from meditation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the following question is being considered: Just as the meditation on the person is a subsidiary part of the meditation on Brahman, it being mentioned in close proximity,—so are the sacred formulæ and the sacrificial acts, to be stated below, to be inserted in the meditation on Brahman as its subsidiary parts, they, too, being mentioned in close proximity, or not?

In the beginning of their Upaniṣads, the followers of the Atharva-veda record sacred formulæ like: "Pierce all, pierce the heart, cleave the veins, cleave the head, divide into three parts" and so on. That is, O Deity! 'pierce', i.e. tear off, 'all' the limbs of my enemy. Thus, (1) 'pierce his heart', (2) 'cleave his veins', (3) 'cleave his head'. In this way, may my enemy be 'divided', i.e. disjoined, 'into three parts'.

[1] G.B. 3.3.25, pp. 149-150, Chap. 3.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[3] Pravargya is a ceremony introductory to the Soma-sacrifice.
[4] Ś, R, p. 1021, line 1.

In the beginning of the Rahasya-brāhmaṇa, the Tāṇḍins also, the singers of the Sāma, read the sacred formulæ: "O God Savitṛ! produce the sacrifice, produce" (C.M.B. 1.1.1 [1]).

The Śāṭyāyanin's record: "Thou art a white horse, tawny and black".

The Kaṭhas and the Taittirīyakas record: "May Mitra give us weal, may Varuṇa" (Tait. 1.1) and so on.

The Aitareyins too record a Mahā-vrata-brāhmaṇa: "Verily, Indra became great by killing Vṛtra".

The Kauṣītakins too record a Mahā-vrata-brāhmaṇa thus: "Verily, Prajāpati is the whole year, his self is the Mahāvrata".

The Vājasaneyins, on the other hand, record a Pravargyya-brāhmaṇa in the beginning of their Upaniṣad thus: "Verily, the gods held a sacrificial session" (Śat. Br. 14.1.1, 1).

Here the doubt is, viz. whether the sacred formulæ and the sacrificial acts like Pravargya and the rest, mentioned in certain Vidyās, are to be comprised under those vidyās as their subsidiary parts, or not. The suggestion being: The inclusion of the sacred formulæ as well as of the sacrificial works as the subsidiary parts of meditation is proper, they being mentioned in close proximity.

We reply: There is no inclusion. Why? "On account of the difference of the matter of piercing and so on." That is, as the matter of piercing and so on, subserving certain magical practices that are different from meditation, is different from meditation, so the matter of piercing and so on, mentioned by those particular texts, are not fit to be applied to meditation. Thus, from the indication, viz. the power of the sacred formulæ to exhibit their own sense,—which is stronger than (mere) proximity [2]—it is deduced that the sacred formulæ are subsidiary parts of works like magical practices, study and so on. From direct scriptural statement, which is stronger than (mere) proximity,[3]—sacrificial works like Pravargya and the rest too are deduced to have an application to Jyotiṣṭoma and the like. Hence

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[1] Vide V.C., p. 491. This passage occurs in many other places. This text is found in many other treatises, vide e.g. Vj. Saṃ. 9.1 ; 11.7; 30.1 ; Tait. Saṃ. 1.7.7, 1; 4.1.1, 2, etc.

[2] Vide Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.3.14.

[3] *Op. cit.*

it is established that there is no inclusion of these in those (vidyās) as the subsidiary parts of meditation.

Here ends the section entitled "Piercing and so on" (10).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 26 in his commentary. He too takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, though concerned with an entirely different problem, viz. whether like the sweet and majestic attributes of the Lord such as bliss, omnipotence, mentioned above, His destructive and fearful attributes too such as piercing and so on, are to be meditated on, or not. The answer is given here. He supplies the word "na" here from sūtra 3.3.22 (21 in Nimbārka's commentary). Hence the sūtra: "(One who is desirous of release should not meditate on the Lord as possessed of the attributes of piercing and so on, on account of the difference of result (of such a meditation, i.e. because such a meditation does not lead to release as the meditation on the Lord as Sweet and Majestic does)".[1]

Adhikaraṇa 11: The section entitled "Abandonment". (Sūtra 26)

SŪTRA 26

"BUT IN THE ABANDONMENT (OF MERIT AND DEMERIT, THE TAKING OF THEM BY OTHERS IS TO BE SUPPLIED) ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORD 'TAKING' BEING SUPPLEMENTARY (TO THE WORD 'ABANDONING'), AS IN THE CASE OF KUŚA, METRE, PRAISE, AND ACCOMPANYING SONG, IT HAS BEEN SAID (IN PŪRVA-MĪMĀṂSĀ)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"In the abandonment," consisting in getting rid of merits and demerits, stated in the scriptural passage: "Then the knower, having discarded merits and demerits" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3[2]), the taking,

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[1] G.B. 3.3.26, p. 151, Chap. 3.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

consisting in taking the merits and demerits, discarded by the knower, stated in the passage: "His sons obtain the inheritance, his friends the good deeds, his enemies the bad deeds",[1] is included. Why? Because the word 'taking', mentioned in another branch, is supplementary to the word 'abandoning', just as the text: "The progeny of the udumbara tree"[2] is supplementary to the text: "The kuśas are progeny of tree"; just as the text: "The metres of the gods are the prior" is supplementary to the text: "Let one praise by the metres"; just as the text: "The sun is half-risen" (Śat. Ś.S. 9.7.19[3]) is supplementary to the text: "He assists the chanting of the ṣoḍaśin[4] with gold[5]", and just as the text: "The Adhvaryyu[6] does not[7] join the singing" (Tait. Saṃ. 6.3.1[8]) is supplementary to the text: "The sacrificial priests join the singing".[9] Moreover, it is said by Jaimini as well: "Let it be supplementary to the text, on account of the impropriety of an option" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 10.8.15[10]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author points out that the inclusion of a particular matter in a particular place, with which it is connected, stands to reason.

In the Upaniṣad of the Tāṇḍins, it is declared: "Shaking off evil, as a horse his hairs, shaking off the body as the moon frees itself from the mouth of Rāhu, I, with the self obtained, pass into the uncreated world of Brahman" (Chānd. 8.13.1). Similarly, it is declared by the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda: "His sons obtain the inheritance, his friends the good deeds, his enemies the bad deeds". The Śāṭyāyanins read: "Then he discards good and evil deeds. His dear relatives obtain the good deeds, those not dear the evil deeds" (Kauṣ. 1.4).

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[1] *Op. cit.* [2] *Op. cit.*

[3] P. 961. The text reads: "Samayābiṣite sūryye Niraṇyeṇa vahirbhyām ca", etc.

[4] A hymn or a formula consisting of sixteen parts.

[5] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

[6] One of the four classes of priests. His special duty was to measure the ground, build the altar, prepair sacrificial vessels, etc., and he had to recite the hymns of the Yajur-veda while doing these duties.

[7] Correct reading: Na upagāyet=should not sing.

[8] P. 175, line 9, vol. 2. R, Bh, Śk. [9] R, Bh, Śk.

[10] P. 631, vol. 2. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

Now, in the Upaniṣad of the Tāṇḍins, as well as in the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda, the abandonment of merit and demerit is declared. In the text of the Śāṭyāyanins, the obtainment of merit and demerit by the dear and the not dear is declared. In the text of the Kauṣītakins, on the other hand, both are declared. This being the case, there is no room for any doubt in the case where both abandoning and taking are mentioned. Where there is the direct mention of taking only, there abandoning too is implied, since taking is impossible without (prior) abandoning.[1] But where only abandoning is mentioned, there the following (question) is to be considered: The doubt is as to whether the taking of the abandoned merit and demerit, which taking is mentioned elsewhere, is to be inserted in the Upaniṣad of the Tāṇḍins and in the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda, or not. On the suggestion, viz. It is not to be inserted owing to the force of separate mention. Otherwise, the double implication (viz. abandoning and taking)—which is the result of such an insertion —being already established in the cases of the two texts of the Tāṇḍins and the followers of the Atharva-veda through such an insertion from the text of the Kauṣītakins, the mention of abandoning in those two texts must become useless,[2]—

We reply: "But in the abandonment, on account of the word 'taking' being supplementary". The word "but" disposes of the (above) *prima facie* view. "In the abandonment," i.e. in the text which designates abandoning only, taking is to be inserted. Why? "On account of the word 'taking' being supplementary," i.e. on account of the word 'taking' being supplementary to the word 'abandoning'. The sense is that in the Upaniṣad of the Kauṣītakins, the text designating the taking of the good and evil deeds is recorded as being supplementary to the text designating the abandoning of the good and evil deeds. Similarly here too, it is essential that the merits and demerits, abandoned by a knower, should be obtained by others.

(The author) states a number of parallel instances, illustrating

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[1] Hence these two cases present no difficulty.

[2] I.e. in the text of the Kauṣītakins both abandoning and taking are mentioned, while in the texts of the Tāṇḍins and the followers of the Atharva-veda only abandoning is mentioned. Now if it be said that taking is inserted from the first to the last two, then abandoning too may very well be so inserted. In that case, the mention of abandoning in the last two texts becomes meaningless.

the fact that a text, mentioned in one branch, may form the supplement of a text, mentioned in another branch, thus: "As in the case of the kuśa, metre, praise and accompanying song". Thus, just as it being known in a general manner that the kuśas are the progeny of tree from the text of the Kauṣītakins, viz. "You kuṣas are the progeny of the tree, do protect me", it is known from the specific text of the Śāṭyāyanins: "The progeny of the udumbara tree", that the kuśas are the progeny of the udumbara tree,—this being so, the text of the Śāṭyāyanins becomes the supplement of the text of the Kauṣītakins,—the construction of this (latter) text is as follows: O Kuśas! You are the progeny of the tree, protect, i.e. save me, the sacrificer;—just as no specific order of priority and posteriority of gods and demons being mentioned in the text: "Let one praise by metres", a specific order is known from the text of the Paiṅgins, viz. "The metres of the gods are prior"; just as on an enquiry into the time of chanting, which is a subsidiary part of the taking of a particular kind of pot, viz. ṣoḍaśin, the time not being known specifically from the text: "He assists the chanting of the ṣoḍaśin with gold", the text of the Taittirīyas, designating the time specifically thus: "When the sun is half risen, he assists the chanting of the ṣoḍaśin" (Śat. Ś.S. 9.7.19) becomes the supplement of that text; and just as the prohibitive text of one branch, viz. "The Adhvaryyu does not join the singing" (Tait. Saṃ. 6.3.1) becomes the supplement of the non-specific text of a different branch, viz. "The sacrificial priests join the singing"—so in the matter under discussion too, viz. abandoning, there is the insertion of taking.

(The author) shows that this view that general texts imply specific texts is supported by another teacher as well, thus: "It has been said", i.e. said by Jaimini, viz. "Let it be, on the contrary, supplementary to the text, on account of the impropriety of an option. Let the injunction refer to the same place" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 10.8.15). The establishing of the double implication (viz. of abandoning and taking) in places concerned, on the other hand, should be known to be meant for the benefit of the respective readers of those (treatises). Hence it is established that "in the abandonment", taking is inserted.

Here ends the section entitled "Abandonment" (11).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 27 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with an entirely different question, viz. whether the meditation on the Lord is obligatory or optional to the freed souls. He reads "Āchanda" instead of "chanda", interpreting it as 'option'. Hence the sūtra: "But on the destruction (of bondage, the released souls are under no obligation to practise meditation, because they have obtained) nearness (i.e. upāyana) (to the Lord), (and) because scriptural texts are supplementary (to this, i.e. are meant for leading the soul to this stage, viz. release), just as the singing of hymns with the kuśa (in hand) is optional (i.e. āchanda) (for a student who has finished his daily duties), it is declared (by Scripture)". That is, the aim of all scriptural texts is to teach men meditation so that they may attain salvation. When that end is reached, i.e. men are freed and approach the Lord, it is no longer necessary for them to go on with further meditation.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 12: The section entitled "The passing away". (Sūtras 27–30)

SŪTRA 27

"IN PASSING AWAY (THERE IS A COMPLETE ABANDONMENT OF MERIT AND DEMERIT), ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING NOTHING TO BE CROSSED, FOR THUS OTHERS (DECLARE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

At the time (of the soul's) departure from the body, it completely abandons (its) merits and demerits. Why? Because after (its) separation from the body, there is no more experience "to be crossed" (i.e. undergone) through these two. This very thing others declare thus: "Verily, when one is bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him" (Chānd. 8.12.1 [2]), "This serene being, having arisen from this body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in

[1] G.B. 3.3.27, pp. 153-154, Chap. 3.
[2] R.

its own form" (Chānd. 8.3.4; 8.12.3 [1]) and so on. This being so, the decay of works which has actually taken place at the time of the soul's separation from the body, is recorded to take place after it crosses the river in the text: "He crosses that river Virajā. Then he discards good and evil deeds" (Kauṣ. 1.4 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

An investigation into the abandoning of sins by a knower and taking (by others) was undertaken above. Now we shall consider the time when such an abandoning of merit and demerit takes place.

The doubt is as to whether some portions of the merits and demerits of a knower decay at the time of his separation from the final body, while some portions of these decay on the way, when, having left the body, he is moving towards the world of Brahman; or whether such an abandonment takes place only at the time of his separation from the body. Here the *prima facie* view is: Having begun thus: "Having reached the path of gods, he comes to the world of fire" (Kauṣ. 1.3), the Kauṣītakins record: "He comes to the river Virajā, crosses it with the mind; then he discards good and evil deeds" (Kauṣ. 1.4). As here such an abandonment appears to take place immediately after he crosses the river, and as in the Upaniṣads of the Tāṇḍins too, viz. in the text: "Having shaken off the evils, as a horse his hair" (Chānd. 8.13.1), such an abandonment appears to take place at the time of his separation from the final body, it follows that he abandons some of his good and evil deeds at the time of his separation from the final body, and of some on the way, both these texts being (equally) authoritative:

With regard to it, we say: "In passing away". "In passing away," i.e. when the soul is going to the next world, viz. at the time of its departure from the body alone, a knower discards his merits and demerits. Why? "On account of there being nothing to be crossed; or no good fruit to be attained through merits, and no evil fruit to be attained through demerits subsequently to the soul's leaving the body, there existing, subsequently to that, the fruit of vidyā alone, consisting in the attainment of Brahman's nature.

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[1] R. [2] Ś, Bh, Śk.

"Thus others," i.e. the followers of the other schools too record that subsequently to the fall of the body, there is no fruit of work to be undergone by a knower, except the attainment of the nature of Brahman, thus: "Verily, when one is bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him" (Chānd. 8.12.1), "This serene being, having arisen from this body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.3.4; 8.12.3). The decay of karmas, which has actually taken place at the time of the soul's departure from the body, is recorded in the text of the Kauṣītakins to take place immediately after it crosses the river Virajā, thus: "He crosses the river Virajā with the mind; then he discards good and evil deeds" (Kauṣ. 1.4),—this is to be understood here. Hence it is that the Tāṇḍins and the rest record that the abandonment takes place actually at the time of the soul's separation from the body, thus: "Shaking off the evils like a horse", etc.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Literal interpretation same, but he takes this (and the following two sūtras) as representing the *prima facie* view.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. He concludes the topic, viz. whether the worship of the Lord is obligatory on the part of the freed or not. He interprets the word, "sāmparāya" as love of the Lord. 'Samparāya' means 'samparayanti tattvāni yasmin', i.e. one in whom all the truths meet, viz. the Lord, and love of the Samparāya is 'sāmparāya'. Hence the sūtra: "When the love of the Lord (has arisen), (i.e. when the soul has become free), (it is no longer obligatory for it to practise meditation), on account of there being nothing to be crossed (i.e. there is no bondage any more), for thus others declare".[1]

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[1] G.B. 3.3.28, pp. 155–158, Chap. 3.

SŪTRA 28

"ACCORDING TO INTENTION, ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-CONTRADICTION OF BOTH."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The friend and the enemy of a knower get respectively his merits and demerits "according to intention",—thus both become free from contradiction.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The good and bad deeds, performed by a knower, go to others "according to intention", i.e. according to resolution, "on account of the non-contradiction of both". A causeless discarding, by parts, of his own deeds to others is inconsistent on the part of a knower who is impartial; and a causeless appropriating of the good and bad deeds, performed by others, too, is inconsistent on the part of any one. One who acting in a friendly manner, wishes the knower good, obtains the merits of the knower for that very reason. But one, who acting in an unfriendly manner, wishes the knower ill, obtains the demerits of the knower for that very reason. Thus, if the good and evil deeds go (to the friend and the enemy) in accordance with their intentions, the discarding and the appropriating come to be free from contradiction. So Smṛti declares: "The sin of one who is being cursed goes to one who is cursing". It has been said by the reverend Manu as well: "Having left his good deeds to his dear relatives, and his bad deeds to those not dear, he is that he Brahman, the eternal, through the path of meditation" (this separatio

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different: "(The soul may attain knowledge) according to (its) liking (only so long as it has a body); (our view is preferable) on account of the non-contradiction of both". That is, a disembodied soul cannot evidently undergo the requisites and so on for attaining knowledge, but an embodied being alone can do so according to its own liking. Hence, if the works of a knower still persist after the fall of his body, it will not be possible for him

[1] P. 225.

to get rid of them ever, seeing that it will not be possible for him, a disembodied soul, to acquire any further knowledge. Further, if knowledge be the cause of the destruction of works, as soon as the knower attains knowledge, all his works must decay at once. Scripture also declares so. Hence our view is preferable, since it avoids a two-fold contradiction—viz. makes knowledge the direct cause of the destruction of works and does not contradict Scripture.[1]

Rāmānuja

Interpretation different. He here explains the Kauṣītaki-text (Kauṣ. 1.4) which seems to go against the view that the soul leaves all its works at the time of leaving the body. Hence the sūtra: "(The different parts of the text are to be arranged) at will, on account of the non-contradiction of both (viz. reason and Scripture)". That is, as it has been established on the ground of reason as well as Scripture that the soul leaves all its works at the time of its departure from the body, in order that these two—reason and Scripture—be not contradicted, the parts of the Kauṣītaki-text are to be re-arranged to suit the above conclusion, i.e. the part: 'He then discards good and evil deeds' is to be put before the part: 'Having attained the path of gods, he comes to the world of fire'.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Literal interpretation same, but the fundamental difference is that he takes it to be laying down the *prima facie* view.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with showing the two ways of meditating on the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "(Either of the two modes of meditation, viz. on God, the sweet or on God, the Majestic, leads to salvation) through the will (of the Lord), since there is no conflict between the two, (i.e. there are texts to both effects and the devotee may choose either of them)".[3] The word "no" is to be supplied from sūtra 3.3.22.

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[1] Ś.B. 3.3.28, p. 806.
[2] Śrī. B. 3.3.28, p. 298, Part 2.
[3] G.B. 3.3.29, pp. 158-159, Chap. 3.

SŪTRA 29

"THERE IS MEANING OF THE GOING (OF THE SOUL) IN A TWO-FOLD WAY (I.E. ONLY IF IT DISCARDS BOTH DEMERIT AND MERIT), FOR OTHERWISE THERE IS CONTRADICTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"There is meaning of the going" through the cessation, without distinction, of good and evil deeds. If the good deeds follow (the soul), then immediately after the enjoyment of their fruits, there must follow recurrence of births.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection: It is not appropriate to hold that at the time of the soul's separation from the body, it discards its good deeds (as well), as that may lead to undesirable results,—(the author) says:

"In a two-fold way," i.e. through the cessation of both good and evil deeds at the time of the soul's separation from the body, "there is meaning of the going", i.e. the soul comes to attain its end immediately after the fall of the body. Otherwise, if it be admitted that bad deeds alone are discarded, and that good deeds—which are non-distinct (from the bad deeds in this respect)—are exhausted through the enjoyment of their fruits, the scriptural text: "His friends attain his good deeds" will be contradicted, as well as the going,—this is the sense. Further, there being recurrence of births at the completion of enjoyment, the scriptural text laying down (the soul's) non-return will also come to be contradicted, viz. the text: "Those proceeding by this path return not to human existence" (Chānd. 4.15.6). It cannot be said that he (i.e. the knower) does not go by it, since there is no mention in Scripture of the soul's going through a different path. If it be said that the fruit of vidyā would be permanent,—(we reply:) there will be uncertainty of the fruit.[1]

[1] I.e. if it be urged that although the fruits of the good deeds of the knower, accompanying him, may entitle him to return, yet the fruit of his vidyā, which also accompanies him and which is permanent, entitles him to non-return—we point out that in that case, what exactly is going to be the fate of the knower, return or non-return, remains uncertain and ambiguous.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation entirely different. He begins a new adhikaraṇa. In some texts, the soul is said to go through the path of gods after having discarded merits and demerits; but in some texts, it is simply said to discard its merits and demerits. Hence the problem is whether the soul has to travel always through the path of gods for attaining Brahman. The answer is that there is no such necessity. The journey through the path of gods is not necessary for one who has attained identity with Brahman here and now. Hence the sūtra: "There is meaning of the going in two ways, (i.e. it is necessary in certain cases, not necessary in others), otherwise there is contradiction (of texts)".[1]

Rāmānuja

He takes this sūtra as laying down the *prima facie* view, thus: "There is meaning of the (soul's) going in two ways, (i.e. only on the hypothesis that it discards a part of its merit and so on at the time of leaving the body and the rest on its way), for otherwise there is contradiction". That is, if he is to discard all its merits and demerits at the time of its departure from the body, its subtle body too must be destroyed simultaneously. In that case, no going through the path of the gods will be possible on its part, a mere disembodied soul.[2]

Nimbarka raises the problem and solves it in the next sūtra, as we shall see.

Śrīkaṇṭha

He inverts the order of this and the next sūtra. Thus:—

Nimbārka and others	*Śrīkaṇṭha*
"Gaterartha-vattvam . . . . " (sūtra 29).	"Upapannas tal-lakṣaṇārtho . . . . " (sūtra 29).
"Upapannas tallakṣaṇārtho . . . . ." (sūtra 30).	"Gater artha-vattvam . . . . " (sūtra 30).

Interpretation too different, viz.:

Sūtra 29.—"Upapannas tal-lakṣaṇārtho . . . . ": Here he concludes the *prima facie* view, viz. that the soul discards all its

[1] Ś.B. 3.3.29, pp. 803-804.
[2] Śrī. B. 3.3.29, p. 299, Part 2, Madras ed.

merits and demerits at the time of leaving the body. He interprets it exactly after Nimbārka [1] (sūtra 30 in Nimbārka's commentary), the fundamental difference being that while Nimbārka takes it to be stating the correct conclusion, Śrīkaṇṭha takes it to be stating the *prima facie* view only.

Sūtra 30.—"Gater artha-vattvam . . . . ": He takes it to be stating the correct conclusion against the *prima facie* view stated above in three sūtras, thus: "There is meaning of the going in two ways, (i.e. only on the hypothesis that the soul discards a part of its merits and so on, i.e. karmas, at the time of its departure from the body, and the rest after crossing the river Virajā), for otherwise there is contradiction". That is, if all the karmas of the soul are destroyed completely at the time of its departure from the body, it will become freed immediately and it would not be necessary for it to travel through the path of gods, attain Brahman, and then be freed. Hence the texts which designate the soul's travelling through the path of gods to attain Brahman and release will come to be contradicted. Further, if the soul becomes freed as soon as it leaves the body, the texts which designate that the soul attains its real form only on approaching Brahman too will come to be contradicted. In order to avoid the contradiction of these two kinds of texts, it must be held that all the karmas of the soul do not decay completely as soon as it leaves the body. The fact is that though the vidyā of the soul leads it to travel through the path of gods, yet as actual release is not obtained until one directly approaches Brahman, some remainders of karmas still cling to the soul until it crosses the sphere of matter and actually attains the Lord.[2]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 30 in his commentary. Here he concludes the section about the two paths of meditation. Hence the sūtra: "There is meaning of the path in two ways, (i.e. both the paths, viz. meditation on God, the sweet, and meditation on God, the majestic, have the power to lead to the Lord), for otherwise there is contradiction (i.e.

[1] ŚK. B. 3.3.29, pp. 332-333, Parts 10 and 11.
[2] ŚK. B. 3.3.30, pp. 333-334, Parts 10 and 11.

the texts which designate both of them to be leading to the Lord will be contradicted) ".[1]

SŪTRA 30

"(THE GOING OF THE SOUL IS) APPROPRIATE, ON ACCOUNT OF FINDING THINGS WHICH ARE MARKS OF THAT, (VIZ. CONNECTION WITH THE BODY), AS IN ORDINARY LIFE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In spite of the decay of all the karmas of a worshipper of Brahman at the time of his separation from the body, the path (i.e. his going through the path of gods) is "appropriate". Why? "On account of finding things which are marks" of connection with the body and the rest, in the passages: "Having attained the form of supreme light, he is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.3.4 [2]), "He roams about there, laughing, playing and enjoying" (Chānd. 7.25.1 [3]) and so on,—just as a royal servant attains mundane ends. The sense is that in spite of the decay of all works and of the gross body, he continues to retain the subtle body, through the power of vidyā, in order that he may go to a distinguished place. Immediately after his separation from that, the knower, having attained the form mentioned in Scripture, comes to attain the nature of Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. if it be admitted that there is the decay of all works at the time of the soul's leaving the body, there must be the destruction of the subtle body too at the same time. This being so, the path defined as the path of gods is "inappropriate",—(the author) says:

In spite of the decay of all the works of a knower at the time of his leaving the body, the path of gods is "appropriate". Why? "On account of finding things which are marks of that," i.e. on account of finding things that indicate that even a knower whose good and evil deeds have decayed and whose real form has become manifest has connection with body and the rest. The things

[1] G.B. 3.3.30, p. 160, Chap. 3.
[2] R, ŚK.
[3] R.

which are marks of his connection with the body and so on, not brought about by karmas, is found in the following scriptural texts: "Stainless, he attained the highest equality" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), "Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.3.4; 8.12.3), "He roams about there, laughing, playing, enjoying" (Chānd. 8.12.3), "He becomes a self-ruler, he comes to wander at will in all the worlds" (Chānd. 7.25.1), "He becomes one-fold, he becomes three-fold" (Chānd. 7.26.2) and so on. That is, just as in ordinary life, a royal servant attains his ends through the grace of the king, though he himself is unable to accomplish them through his own efforts, so through the grace of the Highest Person, the knower obtains a supremely wonderful body and so on, not brought about by karmas. The intention is this: when through the influences of vidyā, the knower, whose karmas have decayed, comes to attain a wonderful body and the rest,—not brought about by karmas,—why should not vidyā, for the sake of bestowing its own fruit, viz. the attainment of Brahman, cause the subtle body to persist through its own power in order to enable him to go through the path of gods, even on the complete decay of all karmas and of the gross body which is the means of enjoying pleasures and pain? The sense is this: The subtle body continues up to the soul's reaching the river Virajā, and immediately after that merges in the cause (viz. Brahman). This (the author) will state under the aphorism: "Those in the Highest, for so (Scripture) says" (Br. Sū. 4.2.14). Hence it is established that there is the decay of all karmas at the time of the soul's separation from the final body.

Here ends the section entitled "The passing away" (12).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation absolutely different,—viz. "(The view that the going through the path of gods holds good in some cases only and not universally is) appropriate, on account of finding a purpose characterized thereby (i.e. a purpose for going)". That is, only those who meditate on the qualified Brahman go through the path of gods to attain Brahman, for in their case only, such a going has any meaning

and purpose, viz. the attainment of certain results, to be reached only through going to different places, as declared by Scripture (e.g. Kauṣ. 1.5-1.6). But in the case of the knowers, there is no necessity for such a going, since they attain identity with Brahman here and now immediately after the removal of the veil of nescience.[1]

Rāmānuja

Here he answers the *prima facie* view stated under the previous aphorism. Similar to Nimbārka's interpretation, though the interpretation of the words "upapanna" and "lokavat" different, thus: "(The view that there is the complete decay of all works at the time of the soul's separation from the body is) appropriate, on account of finding things which are marks of that, (i.e. soul's connection with the body), as in ordinary life". That is, just as a pond, dug at first for the purpose of irrigation of fields, continues to exist and be used by people for other purposes, such as, supplying drinking water and the like, even when its original purpose has been served, i.e. just as the *effect*, viz. the pond, continues to exist when its *cause*, viz. the purpose of irrigation, is no more, so the subtle body, the effect, continues to exist for serving a purpose, viz. the attainment of Brahman, other than its original purpose, viz. the undergoing of karmas, even when the karmas, its causes, are no more.[2]

Bhāskara

He interprets the sūtra thus: "(The teaching about the going of the soul is) appropriate, on account of finding a purpose characterized by that (viz. a purpose for the going), as in ordinary life". That is, in Scripture (Kauṣ. 1.5-1.6) we find that the soul enters into conversation with the Kāryya-Brahman and this is not possible unless it travels through the path of light and so on. This also shows that it is accompanied by the subtle body, since in ordinary experience we find that only those who are endowed with sense-organs can enter into conversations. This subtle body disappears only when the soul attains the Supreme Brahman through the Kāryya-Brahman.[3]

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[1] Ś.B. 3.3.30, p. 804.
[2] Śrī. B. 3.3.30, p. 299, Part 2.
[3] Bh. B. 3.3.30.

Śrikaṇṭha

For Śrīkaṇṭha interpretation, see under the previous sūtra. This is sūtra 29 in his commentary.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. He takes it as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with indicating which of the two paths of meditation—viz. meditation on God, the sweet and meditation on God, the majestic—is the higher. Hence the sūtra: "(The devotee who meditates on God, the sweet) has attained superiority ('upapanna') on account of obtaining an object having that characteristic (viz. the Lord who is devoted to such a devotee), as in ordinary life". That is, just as a person through his love and loyalty for the king brings him under his control, i.e. pleases him, so the devotee who meditates on the Lord as the sweet brings the Lord under his control, i.e. wins over his favour.[1]

Thus, according to Nimbārka, Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara, there is a complete decay of the karmas of a knower at the time of his departure from the body, while according to Śrīkaṇṭha, there is the decay of some works then, the rest coming to decay when the soul has crossed over the river Virajā. Baladeva does not raise the problem at all.

Again, while Nimbārka, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha hold that the going through the path of gods is obligatory for all knowers, Śaṃkara holds that it is obligatory only for those who meditate on the qualified Brahman, but never for those who know the non-qualified Brahman.

[1] G.B. 3.3.31, pp. 161-162, Chap. 3. "Loke yathā sarvādhikasyāpi rājñaḥ sva-janānuvṛtti-rasikasya kaścij janas tad eka-hitanipuṇas taṃ svādhīnam kurvan praśasyate tad-vat."

Adhikaraṇa 13: The section entitled "Non-restriction". (Sūtra 31)

SŪTRA 31

"(THERE IS) NO RESTRICTION (WITH REGARD TO THE GOING THROUGH THE PATH OF GODS, BUT IT BELONGS) TO ALL (THE WORSHIPPERS OF BRAHMAN), (THERE IS) NON-CONTRADICTION ON ACCOUNT OF WORD (I.E. SCRIPTURE) AND INFERENCE (I.E. SMṚTI)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is "no restriction" that the going which is mentioned in the Upakosala-vidyā [1], Pañcāgni-vidyā [2] and so on belongs only to those who are possessed of those vidyās; but it belongs "to all" the worshippers of Brahman. Thus, if the going be common to all, then (alone) there is "non-contradiction" of Scripture and Smṛti, viz. "Those who know this and those who worship faith and truth in the forest, pass over to light" (Bṛh. 6.2.15 [3]), "Fire, light, day, bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun,—departing through these, the knowers of Brahman go to Brahman" (Gītā 8.24 [4]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Previously, it has been stated that the going has a meaning only if there be the cessation of both good and bad deeds at the time of the decay of the gross body. Now, the question is being considered whether all those who possess Brahma-vidyā are entitled to such a supremely excellent journey, or only those who possess the vidyās in which it is mentioned.

[1] Vide footnote 1, p. 640.
[2] Vide footnote 2, p. 640.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[4] R, Śk.

The path beginning with light is mentioned in certain vidyās, such as, Upakosala-vidyā [1], Pañcāgni-vidyā [2], Dahara-vidyā [3] and so on, but is not mentioned in the Madhu-vidyā [4], Śāṇḍilya-

[1] *Upakosala-vidyā* or the knowledge obtained by Upakosala, the disciple of Satyakāma Jābala. Vide Chānd. 4.10–4.15. The story begins thus: Upakosala Kāmalāyana dwelt with Satyakāma Jābala as a student of sacred knowledge, and for twelve years he tended the fires. But his teacher did not allow him to return home, nor did he teach him the knowledge of Brahman, but went off on a journey. Thereupon, Upakosala, filled with grief, began to fast. At this the three fires, Gārhapatya, Anvāhāryya and Āhavanīya took pity on him and each taught him the Agni-vidyā and the Ātma-vidyā, and told him that the teacher would teach him the path. When the teacher returned, he proceeded to instruct Upakosala further thus: "That Person who is seen within the eye is the soul, that is the immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman" (Chānd. 4.15.1).—"Now, whether they perform cremation obsequies in the case of such a person, (i.e. who knows this vidyā), or not, they (i.e. the dead) pass over to light, from light to the day, from day to the fortnight of the waxing moon, from the fortnight of the waxing moon to the six months of the northern progress of the sun, from those months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, from the moon to lightning". Chānd. 4.15.5. Vide V.K. 1.2.13.

[2] *Pañcāgni-vidyā* or the doctrine of the five fires, taught to Gautama by King Pravāhaṇa. Vide Bṛh. 6.2; Chānd. 5.4–5.10. For detailed account see V.K. 3.1.1.

[3] *Dahara-vidyā* or the doctrine of the Small, i.e. the doctrine that the Universal Soul is within the heart of man. Vide Chānd. 8.1–8.6; Mahānār. 10.7. The doctrine begins thus: "Now, what is here in this city of Brahman is a small lotus-chamber, small is the ether within that. What is within that should be searched for, that certainly is what one should desire to understand" (Chānd. 8.1.1), and ends: "Now, as a great extending highway goes to two villages, this one and the yonder, even so these rays of the sun go to two worlds, this one and the yonder. They extend from the yonder sun and enter into these veins. They extend from the veins and enter into the yonder sun" (Chānd. 8.6.2). "But when he thus departs from the body, then he ascends upwards through those very rays of the sun. With the thought 'Om', forsooth, he passes up. As quickly as one could direct one's mind to it, he goes to the sun. That, certainly, is the door to the world (of Brahman), an entrance for knowers, a stopping for non-knowers" (Chānd. 8.6.5). Vide V.K. 1.3.14–23; 3.3.38.

[4] *Madhu-vidyā* or the doctrine of the honey, i.e. the doctrine of the co-relativity of all things, cosmic and personal, and the immanence of the soul, taught to the two Aśvinis by Dadhyañc Ātharvaṇa. Vide Bṛh. 2.5.6–19. It begins: "This earth is the honey for all creatures and all creatures are honey for this earth. This shining immortal Person who is in this earth, and with reference to the self, this shining immortal Person who is in the embodied soul,—he, indeed, is this Soul, this Immortal, this ALL" (Bṛh. 2.5.1) and goes on with

vidyā [1], Vaiśvānara-vidyā [2] and the rest. Hence the doubt is as to whether the path belongs only to those who are possessed of the Upakosala-vidyā and the rest, or to all those who possess the Brahma-vidyā. With regard to it, the *prima facie* view is as follows: It is proper that the path should belong only to those who are possessed of the vidyās in which it is mentioned, on account of the force of the general subject-matter, and not to others,—so is the restriction.

With regard to it, we reply: "No restriction", i.e. there is no restriction that the path belongs only to those who possess the vidyās in which it is mentioned, but this path is open to all those who possess Brahma-vidyā.

If it be objected that in that case, there will result contradiction with the general subject-matter, we say: "non-contradiction", since the general subject-matter is set aside by text.[3] Whence is this known? "From word and inference," i.e. from Scripture and Smṛti, viz. from the scriptural texts: "Those who know this thus and those who worship faith and truth in the forest, they pass over to light" (Bṛh. 6.2.15) and so on; and from the Smṛti passage: "Fire, light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun,—departing through these those who know Brahman go to Brahman" (Gītā 8.24) and so on. Here having stated that those who are devoted to the five fires and who know this heaven-world and the

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similar designations of water, fire, air, the sun, the quarters, the moon, lightning thunder, space, law, truth, mankind, and soul.

There is a different Madhu-vidyā, or the representation of the sun as the honey extracted from all the Vedas in the Chāndogya (Chānd. 3.1–3.11). For detailed account, vide V.K. 1.3.33, footnote 1, p. 335.

[1] *Śāṇḍilya-vidyā* or the doctrine taught by Śāṇḍilya. Vide Bṛh. 5.6; Śat. Br. 10.6.3; Chānd. 3.14. For detailed account vide V.K. 3.3.19.

[2] *Vaiśvānara-vidyā* or the doctrine of the Universal Soul taught to six Brāhmaṇas, Prācīnaśāla and the rest, by King Aśvapati, vide Chānd. 5.11–5.18. The story begins: Six great house-holders, Prācīnaśāla and the rest assembled and pondered: '"Who is our Soul? Who is Brahman?"' Unable to decide, they approached Uddālaka Āruṇi with a view to learning about the Vaiśvānara Ātman or the Universal Soul from him. The latter directed them to King Aśvapati. Aśvapati asked each of the six: '"Whom do you reverence as the Universal Soul?"' They successively answered: the heaven, the sun, the wind, the ether, water and the earth. Thereupon Aśvapati taught them that the Universal Soul is not thus separate, i.e. either the heaven, or the sun, etc., but is the Universal Being, comprehending everything. Vide V.K. 1.2.25; 3.3.55.

[3] Vide Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.3.14.

rest as fire pass over to light, Scripture goes on to say in the text: "And those who in forest" (Bṛh. 7.2.15) that those too who meditate with faith on the true Brahman, celebrated in another scriptural text: "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite" (Tait. 2.1), pass over to light. In this manner, truly, the path is attained by all those who possess Brahma-vidyā, as by those who possess the Pañcāgni-vidyā. Hence it is ascertained that the general subject-matter is set aside by the texts, designating such a journey through the path of light, which are of a greater force. Similarly, by Smṛti as well the journey of all worshippers of Brahman through this path alone is established. Hence it is established that the path beginning with light, which is indeed met with in all the vidyās, is (only) re-mentioned (in the Upakosala-vidyā) and so on.

Here ends the section entitled "Non-restriction" (13).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He reads "sarvasām" (feminine gender) instead of "sarveṣam" (masculine gender), and interprets the sūtra thus: "(There is) no restriction (with regard to the going through path of light, but it is valid) for all (the saguṇa-vidyās or meditations on the qualified Brahman), (there is) non-contradiction on account of work and inference".[1] Thus, literally he interprets the sūtra like Nimbārka, but while he speaks here of saguṇa-vidyās only, which, according to him, do not directly lead to release, Nimbārka does not do so.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They revert the order of this sūtra and the next thus:—

Nimbārka and others	Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha
"Aniyamaḥ . . . . ." (sūtra 31).	"Yāvadhikāram . . . . .". (sūtra 31).
"Yāvadhikāram . . . ." (sūtra 32).	"Aniyamaḥ . . . ." (sūtra 32)

[1] Ś.B. 3.3.31, p. 805.

Interpretation same, only Rāmānuja does not take sūtra 31 (sūtra 32 according to Nimbārka) as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, but includes it under the section entitled "The Passing Away" (section 12 according to Nimbārka). He, however, takes 32 (sūtra 31 according to Nimbārka) as forming a section by itself, like Nimbārka. Śrīkaṇṭha takes each of these two sūtras as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, like Nimbārka.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 32 in his commentary. He too begins a new adhikaraṇa here, but concerned with an entirely different topic. He reads "avirodhāt" instead of "avirodhaḥ". Thus: "(There is) no rule (that meditation, muttering prayers, singing the name of the Lord and the rest are to be performed conjointly always as a means to salvation, since any one of them may singly lead to salvation), since there is no contradiction of all (texts), on account of word and inference".[1]

Adhikaraṇa 14: The section entitled "So long as the office lasts". (Sūtra 32)

SŪTRA 32

"OF THOSE WHO ARE ENTRUSTED WITH (CERTAIN) OFFICE, THERE IS ABIDING SO LONG AS THE OFFICE LASTS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Of Vaśiṣṭha and the rest, on the other hand, "there is abiding so long as the office lasts", owing to the influence of the works of which their office is the result.

Vedānta-kaustubha

(The author) is now refuting the following objection:

The argument stated above, viz. that through the power of knowledge there result the decay of all the karmas of a knower at the time of his separation from the body, and the (consequent) attainment (by him)

[1] G.B. 3.3.32, pp. 164-165, Chap. 3.

of a distinguished place through the path beginning with light, is not justifiable, since it is found that even great sages like Vaśiṣṭha and the rest, (though) possessed of knowledge, were re-born and experienced pleasures and pains. The re-birth of Vaśiṣṭha from a pitcher is well-known.[1] How he experienced grief is declared by Smṛti thus: "He devoured Vaśiṣṭha's hundred sons, Śakti and his younger brothers, as an infuriated lion devours a small deer. On hearing that his sons had been killed by Viśvāmitra, Vaśiṣṭha bore that grief as the great mountain bears the world. He, the best of the sages, planned to destroy himself, but never did the greatest among the wise think of destroying Kauśika (i.e. Viśvāmitra). The holy sage threw himself down from the peak of the Meru. From the mountain he fell down on its stones as on a heap of cotton. When he did not die from that fall, O Pāṇḍava, His Holiness entered a blazing-fire in a great forest. Then, though well-lit, the fire did not burn him. Seeing the sea, the great sage, afflicted with grief, fastened a heavy stone around his neck and dropped into the water. (But) the great sage was placed on the land by the current of the sea-waves. Then, depressed, he, went once more towards his own hermitage" (Mahā. 1. 6737–6744[2]). How he experienced happiness, too, is declared by Smṛti thus: "And he was followed to his hermitage by his daughter-in-law, named Adṛśyantī. Then by chance he heard from behind the sound of the study of the Veda, complete in meaning and ornamented with the six subsidiary parts. 'Who is following me?' he asked then. 'I, Adṛśyantī,' replied his daughter-in-law, Śakti's wife, highly virtuous, endowed with austerities and leading a religious life. 'Daughter, from whom is coming the sound of the study of the Veda with its subsidiary parts? Formerly, the Veda with its subsidiary parts was heard by me from Śakti alone.' 'In my womb has been born, O sage, the offspring of your son Śakti, who repeated the Vedas here for twelve years.' Told thus by her, the sage Vaśiṣṭha, the highest, highly pleased, saying: 'I have an offspring', refrained, O Pārtha, from dying" (Mahā. 1.6755*b*–6760[3]).

(Reply:) "Of those who are entrusted with (certain) office", i.e. of Vaśiṣṭha and the rest, who owing to certain karmas, have been

[1] Vide Ṛg.V. 7.33.13, p. 26.
[2] Pp. 244-245, vol. 1.
[3] P. 245, lines 14–19, vol. 1.

entrusted with offices like composing the Veda and so on, "there is abiding so long as the office lasts", owing to the non-cessation of the works which have already begun to bear fruits and which brought about the office. Hence, in their case too, when through retributive enjoyment, the works which have begun to bear fruits and which brought about the office become exhausted; and when the office (thereby) comes to an end, there result the decay of all works at the time of their separation from the final body and the (subsequent) attainment (by them) of the path beginning with light.

Here ends the section entitled "So long as the office lasts" (14).

Adhikaraṇa 15: The section entitled "The conception of the Imperishable". (Sūtras 33–34)

SŪTRA 33

"BUT THERE IS THE COMPREHENSION (IN ALL BRAHMA-VIDYĀS) OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE IMPERISHABLE, ON ACCOUNT OF GENERALITY AND ON ACCOUNT OF BEING THAT, AS IN THE CASE OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UPASAD, THAT HAS BEEN SAID."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There should be the inclusion, under all meditations on Brahman, of the conceptions of non-grossness and the rest, connected with the Imperishable, stated in the text: "That, verily, O Gārgī, the Brāhmaṇas call the Imperishable, non-gross, non-atomic, non-short" (Bṛh. 3.8.8[1]). Why? Because everywhere the Imperishable, viz. Brahman, the chief, is the same; and because those attributes of non-grossness and the rest form essential parts of an investigation into His real nature; just as in the Jāmadagnya-ahīna[2] sacrifice, in which the Upasad[3] offerings are to consist of puraḍāṣ[4], the sacred formula read

[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[2] A sacrifice lasting four days, called 'Jāmadagnya' because offered by Jāmadagni. Vide Tait. Saṃ. 7.1.9. See V.K. 3.3.33.

[3] Name of a ceremony lasting several days and forming part of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice.

[4] A puraḍāṣ is a sacrificial cake of ground rice, usually divided into pieces and offered in one or more cups (or kapāha).

in the Sāma-veda, viz.: "May the fire promote the sacrifice" (Tāṇḍ. Br. 21.10.11 [1]) and so on, is recited in the low accent of the Yajur-veda. "That has been said," viz.: "If there be opposition between the subsidiary and the primary, there is connection of the Veda with the primary, because of the subserviency of that, (i.e. of the subsidiary to the primary)". (Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.3.9.[2])

Vedānta-kaustubha

By the statement (made above) that the knowers abide (in this world) until the completion of their offices, it is indicated that the departure of such men also from the universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is under the control of the Highest Person alone, different from the universe. Now (the author) points out that the attributes of non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest of that very Highest Person,—the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, the controller of the sentient and the non-sentient, different in nature from the whole group of non-sentient objects which are seen to be possessed of grossness and from the group of sentient beings which are declared by Scripture to be atomic, and an ocean of natural, eternal and infinite mass of attributes,—are to be meditated on by the knower in all the meditations on Him.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, the answer given to Gārgī by Yājñavalkya is recorded thus: ' "That, verily, O Gārgī, the Brāhmaṇas call the Imperishable, non-gross, non-atomic, non-short, non-long, not red, not fluid, without shadow, without darkness, without air, without space, unassociated, tasteless, odourless, without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without breadth, without

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[1] P. 625, vol. 2. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[2] P. 280. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

The sense is that when the primary and the subsidiary belong to two different Vedas, the Vedic characteristic of the subsidiary is to be determined by the primary, because the subsidiary is subservient to the primary, i.e. because the performer takes up the performance of the subsidiary solely for the purpose of making the primary complete in all details. Vide Śab. B. on Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.3.9, pp. 280-281. Hence here the Sāma-veda mantras, instead of being recited in the loud accent of the Sāma-veda, are to be recited in the low accent of the Yajur-veda, since they form subordinate parts of a Yajur-vedic sacrifice, viz. *Jāmadagnya-ahīna*.

happiness [1], without measure, without inside and without outside. It consumes nothing whatsoever. . . . .[2] Verily, O Gārgī, at the command of this Imperishable the sun and the moon stand held apart"' (Bṛh. 3.8.8-9 [3]). In the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda too beginning: "Now, the higher is that whereby the Imperishable is apprehended" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5), it is said: "That which is invisible, intangible, without family, without caste, without eye, without ear, without hands and feet" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6 [4]).

Here the doubt is, whether the attributes, viz. non-grossness, non-atomicity, invisibility, intangibility and the rest, which belong to Brahman, denoted by the word 'Imperishable', which are mentioned in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda, and which establish the difference of Brahman from the sentient and the non-sentient,—are to be inserted in all the meditations on Brahman or not. On the suggestion, viz. that they are not to be inserted, there being no purpose for that,—

(We reply:) There is a purpose. In those meditations on Brahman too, it is Brahman, different from the sentient and the non-sentient, that is the object to be attained by the attainers,—so says (the author): "But there is the comprehension of the conceptions of the Imperishable". "The Imperishable" is Brahman. There should be the "comprehension", i.e. inclusion, of the "conceptions" of non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest also, connected with Him, in all the meditations on Brahman, in order that we may understand

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[1] Correct quotation: "amukham" (=without mouth) and not "asukham". Vide Bṛh. 3.3.8, p. 169.

[2] Omitted portion: "None whatsoever consumes it".

[3] Vide the dialogue between Gārgī and Yājñavalkya, Bṛh. 3.8. Gārgī put two questions to Yājñavalkya: First: "That which is above the sky, that which is beneath the earth, that which is between these two, sky and earth, that which people call the past, the present and the future,—across what is that woven, warp and woof?" (Bṛh. 3.8.4). Answer: "That, O Gārgī, the Brāhmaṇas call the Imperishable", etc.

[4] Vide Muṇḍ. 1.1. Brahmā taught this knowledge of Brahman to his eldest son Atharva, who taught it to Aṅgir, who taught it to Bhāradvaja Satyavāha, who taught it to Aṅgiras. Then, Śaunaka, a great householder approached Aṅgiras with the question: "Sir! Through knowing which everything else becomes known?" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.3). Thereupon Aṅgiras proceeded to teach him two kinds of knowledge, higher (or parā) and lower (or aparā). The lower so is the knowledge of the four Vedas with their subsidiary parts, the higher is the knowledge whereby the Imperishable is apprehended.

His real nature as different from the sentient and the non-sentient. That His essential attributes, like bliss and the rest, are to be so included has been stated under the aphorism: "Bliss and the rest belonging to the chief" (Br. Sū. 3.3.11). Similarly, in order that the illusory notion that His bliss is similar to other kinds of blisses may be set at naught,[1] it is proper that the attributes of non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest should be included everywhere. Why? "On account of generality and on account of being that"; that is, because in all meditations on Brahman, the real nature of the object to be meditated on, which is different from the sentient and the non-sentient and is the object to be attained, remains the same; also because those attributes of non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest form essential parts of an investigation into the nature of the Chief, as they follow Him.

An instance illustrating that the attributes (or the secondary matters) follow the chief (or the primary matter) is given in the phrase: "As in the case of what belongs to the Upasad". That is, just as in the Jāmadagnya-ahīna sacrifice, in which the upasad offerings are to consist of puraḍāś, enjoined in the text: "Jamadagni, desiring prosperity, sacrificed with the four-nightly rite.....[2] The sacrificial cakes become the upasad offerings" (Tait. Saṃ. 7.1.9[3]), the sacred formulæ read in the Sāma-veda, like "May the fire promote the sacrifice" (Tāṇḍ. Br. 7.1.9) and so on, are recited by the Adhvaryyu in the low accent of the Yajur-veda, as they follow the principal matter. "That has been said", i.e. said by Jaimini, viz. "If there be opposition between the subsidiary and the primary, because of the subserviency of that (viz. of the subsidiary to the primary)". (Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.3.9.)

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[1] That is, to know a thing is to know its peculiar attributes which distinguish it from other objects. Now, bliss and the rest do not constitute the exclusive attributes of Brahman, since they are the attributes of the individual souls as well. Hence in order that the bliss and so on of Brahman may not be confused with the bliss and the rest of the individual soul, it is necessary to include in all meditations on Brahman the further attributes of non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest, which belong to Brahman exclusively, over and above the attributes of bliss and so on.

[2] Omitted portion: "He prospered therein and the two descendants of Jamadagni are not found to be grey-haired. He who knowing thus offers the four-nightly rite comes to have that prosperity".

[3] P. 251, line 17, vol. 2.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation of "sāmanya-tad-bhāvābhyām" different, viz. "On account of the equality (i.e. because all texts equally establish Brahman as such, i.e. as different from the Universe) and on account of that object (viz. Brahman, being the object of all texts)".[1]

SŪTRA 34

"SO MUCH (I.E. ONLY THESE ATTRIBUTES) (ARE TO BE INCLUDED EVERYWHERE), ON ACCOUNT OF REFLECTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since Brahman, the best of all, is meditated on through (i.e. as possessed of) bliss and the rest, characterized by non-grossness and so on, bliss and the rest are to be included everywhere. Other attributes like having all works and the like, though following the Chief (viz. Brahman) are to be comprised (only) where mentioned.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. In accordance with the stated maxim[2], it follows that there is the inclusion everywhere of those attributes as well, which are stated in the scriptural text: "Having all works, having all odours, having all tastes" (Chānd. 3.14.2, 4), as they too follow the Chief—(the author) says: "So much", i.e. bliss and the rest, characterized by non-grossness and so on[3], are included in all the meditations on Brahman. Why? "On account of reflection"; that is, "the reflection" on Brahman, different from the

[1] Ś.B. 3.3.33, p. 811; Bh. B. 3.3.33, p. 188.

[2] Viz. that attributes or secondary matters follow their substratum or the primary matter.

[3] Which differentiate such bliss, etc. from ordinary bliss, etc. of the individual souls.

sentient and the non-sentient, is preceded by the differentiation of Him from others by means of the group of attributes like bliss and the rest, characterized by non-grossness and so on,—on account of such a reflection on Him, i.e. meditation on Him with thought directed toward Him. (The attributes like) having all works and so on, though following the chief, are suitable in those place alone where they are mentioned, there being no special purpose for their inclusion everywhere. Hence it is established that 'there is the comprehension of the conceptions of the Imperishable' (Br. Su. 3.3.33).

Here ends the section entitled "The conception of the Imperishable".

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Bhāskara reads "īṣat". They take this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the two passages in the Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad (Śvet. 4.6) and in the Kaṭha-upaniṣad (Kaṭha. 3.1) refer to the same vidyā. The answer is that they are the same "on account of so much (viz. the number two) being recorded". That is, in both the passages the Lord and the individual soul are designated as the objects to be known. As such, both constitute the same vidyā.[1]

Baladeva

Interpretation same, only the interpretation of the word "āmananāt" different, viz. "On account of scriptural declaration[2].

[1] Ś.B. 3.3.34, pp. 814; Bh. B. 3.3.34, p. 188.
[2] G.B. 3.3.35.

Adhikaraṇa 16: The section entitled "Being within". (Sūtras 35–37)

SŪTRA 35

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE FORMER REPLY WHICH DESCRIBES THE SELF AS) WITHIN (SPEAKS) OF ONE'S OWN SELF AS POSSESSED OF THE GROUP OF ELEMENTS, OTHERWISE (THERE IS) UNACCOUNTABLENESS OF DIFFERENCE, (WE REPLY:) NO, AS IN THE CASE OF ANOTHER TEACHING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, to the question of Uṣasta, viz. "He who is Brahman manifest and not visible, he who is the soul within all, explain him to me" (Bṛh. 3.4.1 [1]), the answer given was: '"He who breathes in with the in-breath is your soul which is within all"' (Bṛh. 3.4.1.[2]). Here, the phrase: "He is your soul, which is within all", teaches something "within", i.e. teaches the individual soul as within the body and the rest, it alone being the cause of breathing in and breathing out. In the very same manner, to the question of Kahola, viz. '"He who alone is Brahman, manifest and not invisible, he who is the soul within all, explain him to me"' (Bṛh. 2.5.1.[3]), the answer given was: '"He who passes beyond hunger and thirst, beyond grief, delusion, old age, death"' (Bṛh. 3.5.1[4]). Here, on the other hand, the text teaches the Highest Self,—as such the vidyās are different, otherwise the difference of the answers is unaccountable,—

(We reply:) "No", since in both the cases, the questions and the answers refer to the Primary Being alone (viz. Brahman). Just as in the Sad-vidyā,[5] it is found that with a view to demonstrating

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[1] Ś, R, Śk. [2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[3] R, Śk. [4] Ś, Bh, Śk.

[5] Sad-vidyā or the doctrine of the Existent or the True, taught to Śvetaketu by Āruṇi, vide Chānd. 6 (whole).

The story begins: Śvetaketu became a student of sacred knowledge at the request of his father Āruṇi, and after having studied the Vedas for twelve years, returned home, conceited, thinking himself very learned. Thereupon his father asked him whether he had asked for the instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known. As Śvetaketu

the particular attributes of Brahman, there is repetition of the question: '"Sir, you yourself tell me that"' (Chānd. 6.1.7[1]), '"Sir, inform me once more"' (Chand. 6.5.4; 6.6.5, etc.[2]), as well as of the answer: '"That which is the finest essence,—all this has that for its soul"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.[3]), so here too the repetition of question and answer—with a view to demonstrating that the object to be known passes beyond hunger and so on—is appropriate.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the previous section, concerned with the inclusion of the attributes of non-grossness and the rest, it has been shown that the object to be known is different from other objects. With a view to confirming this, (the author), by showing now the identity of vidyās in the two texts to be mentioned hereafter, refutes the illusory notion that there are two realities as the thing to be known.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Uṣasta asked Yājñavalkya: '"He who is Brahman, manifest and not invisible, he who is the soul within all, explain him to me"' (Bṛh. 3.4.1). The reply to it was: '"He who breathes in with the in-breath is your soul which is within all. He who breathes out with the out-breath is your soul which is within all"' (Bṛh. 3.4.1) and so on. Likewise, in the immediately following section, to the question of Kahola, viz. '"He alone who is Brahman, manifest and not invisible, he who is the self within all, explain him to me"' (Bṛh. 3.5.1), the answer was the following, beginning: '"He who passes beyond hunger and thirst, beyond grief, delusion, old age, death,—forsooth having known such a self, the Brāhmaṇas give up the desire for sons, desire for wealth"', ending: '"Aught else is wretched"' (Bṛh. 3.5.1).

Here, the doubt is as to whether the questions and answers in the two cases refer to two vidyās or to one. Here (the author) having propounded the *prima facie* view, rejects it thus: "If it be objected

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was not acquainted with that doctrine Āruṇi taught him how from the knowledge of the cause, all its effects can be known. Next he proceeded to teach him process of creation from the Sat. (Chānd. 6.2–6.7). Finally, he taught him the great doctrine of "Thou art that" in various ways (Chānd. 6.8–6.16). Each time Śvetaketu asked to be taught once more (altogether nine times) and in answer Āruṇi taught him each time by means of a new illustration.

[1] R. [2] Ś, R. [3] Ś, R.

that (the former reply which describes the self as) within (speaks) of one's own self possessed of the group of elements, otherwise there is unaccountableness of difference, (we reply:) no". If it be objected: The reply, viz. '"He who breaths in with the in-breath"' (Bṛh. 3.4.1), given to the question of Uṣasta, viz.'"He who is the self within all"' (Bṛh. 3.4.1), and referring to something "within", should be known to be referring to "one's own self possessed of the group of elements",[1] i.e. to the individual soul, since the individual soul being the inner soul of all, viz. of the body, the sense-organs, the mind, the intellect and so on, can appropriately be the inner soul of all. Consequently, the question of Kahola and the answer to it refer to the Highest Self, the primary inner soul, since the Highest Self alone is devoid of hunger and the rest. Thus owing to the difference of form, the questions and answers refer to two vidyās. "Otherwise," i.e. if the vidyās be taken to be identical on the ground that the questions and answers refer to the Highest Self in both cases, the difference of the answers is unaccountable,—

(We reply:) "no", i.e. there is no difference of vidyās, as the two sets of questions and answers refer to the same form, viz. to the Highest Self (equally). Thus, to begin with, the question of Uṣasta, viz. '"He who is manifest and not invisible Brahman, he who is the soul within all, explain him to me"' (Bṛh. 3.4.1) does indeed refer to the Highest Self alone. It means: Reverend Yājñavalkya, he who is Brahman, explain him to me. I am not asking about Brahman, consisting in His own power (viz. pradhāna, which may also be called Brahman) simply because of its connection with great attributes like existence and the rest.[2] With this idea he said: 'Explain Brahman who is not invisible and who is the soul'.[3] The individual soul too is Brahman because of its connection with the attribute of knowledge.[4] I am not

[1] I.e. possessed of the body, etc., which are products of the elements.

[2] I.e. the word 'Brahman', meaning 'one possessed of greatness', may figuratively denote pradhāna too owing to its connection with great attributes. That a thing, though not great by nature, may yet be designated as great because of having great attributes, is shown under V.K. 2.3.28.

[3] Pradhāna is not 'not invisible', i.e. its evolutes are visible to all, while the Lord is so to the freed only. Again, pradhāna is not 'soul', which the Lord is. Hence these two epithets show that the word 'Brahman' does not mean here pradhāna, but the Lord alone.

[4] The individual soul, though atomic by nature, is said to be great because of having great attributes. Vide V.K. 2.3.28.

asking about Brahman having such a mark. With this idea, he said, 'Explain Brahman who is manifest, who is the soul within all'.[1] But such a Brahman is none but the cause of the world, having the stated marks, called the Highest Person. Thus it is known that the question is concerned with the Supreme Brahman, in accordance with the following scriptural and Smṛti texts: "The controller of matter and soul, the Lord of the properties of matter" (Śvet. 6.16), "He is your soul, the inner controller" (Bṛh. 3.7.3–23), "Entered within, the ruler of men" (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2 [2]), "He who abiding within the earth is other than the earth" (Bṛh. 3.7.3), "He who abiding within the soul is other than the soul" (Śat. Br. 14, 6.7.30 [3]), '"I transcend the perishable and am higher than even the imperishable. Hence I am celebrated in the world and in the Veda as the Highest Person"' (Gītā 15.18), '"He who sees me everywhere"' (Gītā 6.30), '"And I am situated in the heart of all"' (Gītā 15.15) and so on.

The answer, viz. '"He who breathes in with the in-breath"' (Bṛh. 3.4.1) too refers to the Highest Person alone, since the Highest alone is the primary agent of in-breathing, in accordance with the scriptural text: "For who would live, who would breathe, if there were not this bliss in the ether" (Tait. 2.7).

That the last set of question and answer refers to the Highest Self is admitted by the *prima facie* view as well.

There is repetition of question and answer for the sake of demonstrating that the Highest Person, the cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures, is beyond hunger and so on. (The author) states a parallel instance: "As in the case of another teaching". That is, just as under the same Sad-vidyā, which begins: '"You are proud. Did you ask for that teaching"' (Chānd. 6.1.2), there is repetition of the question thus: '"But you yourself, Sir, tell me that"' (Chānd. 6.1.7), '"Sir, inform me once more"' (Chānd. 6.5.4, etc.); and repetition of the answer as well, thus: '"That which is the finest essence—all this has that for its soul"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.)—with a

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[1] The individual is not 'manifest' Brahman, i.e. it is not directly and actually Brahman, but only *figuratively*, while the Lord is Brahman or great directly. Again, the individual soul is not the 'soul within all', which the Lord is. Hence these two epithets show that the word 'Brahman' here does not mean the individual soul, but the Lord alone.

[2] P. 181.

[3] P. 1074.

view to demonstrating particular attributes in particular cases of one and the same object to be known,—so is the case here.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He breaks the sūtra into two separate sūtras thus:

"Antarā bhūta-grāma-vat svātmanaḥ" (sūtra 35).

"Anyathā bhedānupapattir iti cen nopadeśāntara-vat" (sūtra 36).

Import and the conclusion reached are the same, only the literal interpretation different. Thus, while according to Nimbārka the whole portion "Antarā—bhedānupapatti" constitutes the *prima facie* view, according to Śaṃkara, the portion "Antarā—svātmanaḥ" does not state the *prima facie* view, but the view of the author, while the portion "Anyathā bhedānupapattir" alone states the *prima facie* view. Thus he interprets the portion: "Antarā—svātmanaḥ" (*sūtra* 35 in his commentary) as follows.—"(Both the texts speak) of one's own self (viz. the Lord) (to be) within all, (hence these two selves must be identical, otherwise the inner soul must become relative) as in the case (of the body composed of the) group of elements". That is, both the Bṛhadāraṇyaka passages speak of a self which is within all. Now if these two selves be different, we have to say that there are two selves within all. But in that case neither can be said to be the inner being absolutely, but only relatively, just as none of the five elements which constitute the body can be said to be within another—i.e. water within the earth and so on—absolutely or solely, but only relatively so. Hence to avoid this conclusion we must hold that the two selves are identical, i.e. the two passages refer to the same vidyā.

Śaṃkara gives an alternative explanation of the phrase: "bhūta-grāma-vat", viz. "as (another scriptural passage, viz. Śvet. 6.11 declares the *one* self to be within all) the group of (beings)". Hence here also, there must be only one self within all. This proves the identity of the two selves and the consequent identity of vidyās.[1]

Sūtra 36.—Like Nimbārka's interpretation.

[1] Ś.B. 3.3.35, pp. 814-815.

Bhāskara

Interpretation diametrically opposed. He interprets the first part of the sūtra like Śaṃkara, but arrives at a directly opposite conclusion. Thus, like Nimbārka, according to him also the portion "Antarā—bhedānupapatti" constitutes the *prima facie* view, the rest the reply. Hence the *prima facie* view: "(The two passages in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka refer to the same self, for on this view alone the self which is designated as) within (can be the absolute inner self and not relatively only), otherwise (the self would be) like the group of elements none of which can be said to be within another absolutely). (Hence there is) inappropriateness of difference, (i.e. the two passages refer to the same self)".

Correct conclusion: "No, as in the case of the difference ('antarā') of teaching". That is, just as there are two different teachings here, so the objects taught by them too must be different. Or, an alternative explanation: "No, as in the case of another ('antarā') teaching". That is, just as in the Chāndogya the nine repetitions of the dictum: 'Thou art that' show that in every version the object established is different, so here.[1]

Baladeva

He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras exactly after Śaṃkara. Interpretation absolutely different. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (three sūtras) concerned with the topic of the identity between the Lord and His city. Thus:

Sūtra 36.—"Within (the city of the Lord, viz. Saṃvyoma or the great Ether), (things appear) like (things in) an elemental city ("bhūta-grāma-vat") (i.e. in an ordinary city) (to the vision) of His own (i.e. to the devotees chosen by the Lord)." That is, in the city of the Lord, everything being a manifestation of the Lord is but the Lord Himself, but they look like material objects to His devotees.[2]

Sūtra 37.—"If it be objected that otherwise (i.e. on the view that there is no difference between the Lord and His city), there is inappropriateness of difference (between the dweller and the residence), (we reply:), no, as in the case of another teaching." That is,

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[1] Bh. B. 3.3.35, p. 189.

[2] G.B. 3.3.36, p. 174, Chap. 3. "Yatratyaṃ vastu-jātam sarvam brahmātmakam api pṛthivyādi-nirmita-vat sphurati."

just as another text (Tait. 2.1) declares the Lord to be both bliss and blissful, the attribute and the substratum of attributes, so the Lord is both the dweller and the residence, i.e. is identical with His city, yet dwells in the city. Everything is possible in His case.[1]

SŪTRA 36

"(THERE MUST BE) EXCHANGE (OF IDEAS), FOR (THE TWO TEXTS) SPECIFY (THE SAME BRAHMAN), AS IN ANOTHER CASE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

An investigation into the Highest, distinguished from the individual soul as the cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures, is to be made by Kahola as by Uṣasta. Similarly, an investigation into Him, distinguished from the individual soul as beyond hunger and so on, is to be made by Uṣasta as by Kahola. Thus, there is a mutual exchange of investigations. This being so, Brahman becomes distinguished from the individual soul. Hence the answers given by Yājñavalkya "specify", in both cases, the same soul of all as the object to be worshipped, just as in the Sad-vidyā all the answers specify the same Brahman, the Existent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Let it be that in both the cases the questions and the answers refer to the Primary Inner Soul of all. Still, the vidyās do not become identical, a difference between them being possible by reason of the fact that in the prior section the Primary Inner Soul, characterized by the attribute of being the cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures, is of one form as an object to be known by Uṣasta; while in the subsequent section, the Primary Inner Soul, characterized by the attribute of being beyond hunger and so on, is of another form as an object to be known by Kahola,—(the author) says:

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[1] G.B. 3.3.37, p. 175, Chap. 3.

There is "exchange", i.e. inter-change, of the attributes of being the cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures and being beyond hunger and so on. The object to be known by Uṣasta too is the one Supreme Brahman, differentiated from the sentient by the two distinguishing attributes. Similarly, the object to be known by Kahola too is the same Brahman, "for", with a view to making it known that the Highest Person, the soul of all and the object to be worshipped, is different from the individual soul, endowed with the attributes of occupying a small place and so on,—the answers given by Yājñavalkya "specify", i.e. demonstrate, Brahman as different from the individual soul by defining His attributes of being the cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures and being beyond hunger and so on. "As in another case." That is, just as in another case, viz. in the case in the Sad-vidyā, by the repeated answers, establishing diverse attributes, the same Brahman is specified as the object to be known, but by reason of this difference of attributes, He Himself does not become different, in those cases, as an object to be worshipped,—so is the case here.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 37 in Śaṃkara's commentary.

They take this sūtra to be constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the Aitareya and Jābāla texts: "I am he, he is I" (Ait. Ār. 2.2.4, 6), "You are I, I am you" mean only that the individual soul is the Lord; or both that the individual soul is the Lord and the Lord is the individual soul. The *Prima facie* view is that here the transposition is to be understood in one way only, viz. that the individual soul is the Lord,—since the lower can become the higher,—but never that the Lord too is the individual soul, since the Lord can never become the individual soul. The answer is: "(The texts designate) exchange (i.e. mutual transposition of the ideas of the individual soul and the Lord), for (they) specify (this exchange expressly), as in other cases". That is, in the texts, we must not only understand the individual soul to be the Lord, but vice versa as well, seeing that the texts expressly say not only "I am he", but also "He is I". If the transposition were meant to be understood in one way alone, they would have stopped by

saying "I am he". What the above passages aim at enjoining is the meditation on the unity of the soul. Hence just as other texts record the attributes of being the soul of all and so on for the purpose of meditation, so the above texts record a mutual transposition of the ideas of 'I' and 'He' for the same purpose.[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 38 in his commentary.

Here he concludes the topic of the identity between the Lord and His city. Hence the sūtra: "For (texts like Bṛh. 1.4.15) specify (that an) interchange (is possible between the Lord and His city), like other (texts, e.g. Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī, etc.)". That is, the City of Brahman is identical with Brahman Himself, hence an exchange is possible between them, and the former is equally adorable like the latter.[2]

SŪTRA 37

"FOR HE ALONE (IS THE OBJECT OF MEDITATIONS IN ALL THE VERSIONS), THE TRUE AND THE REST (ARE INSERTED IN ALL THE VERSIONS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"He alone" who is denoted by the term 'true', and is mentioned in the texts: "That divinity thought" (Chānd. 6.3.2 [3]), "Light (merges) in the highest divinity" (Chānd. 6.8.6 [4]), is repeated in the versions, such as: '"Just as, my dear, the bees prepare the honey"' (Chānd. 6.9.1 [5]) and so on. The very same (attributes of being) "the true and the rest", mentioned in the first version thus: '"Everything has that for its self, that is true"' (Chānd. 6.8.7 [6]), are inserted in all other versions.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. In the Sad-vidyā too, there being a repetition of question and answer, how is it ascertained that the object to be meditated on is the same?—(the author) says:

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[1] Ś.B. 3.3.37, pp. 816-817; Bh. B. 3.3.36 (written as 3.3.37), p. 189.
[2] G.B. 3.3.38, p. 176, Chap. 3. "Paramātmaiva loko lokaḥ paramātmeti."
[3] R, ŚK. [4] R.
[5] R. [6] R, ŚK.

"For he alone," i.e. the Highest Divinity alone, denoted by the term 'existent' and referred to in the passages: "That divinity thought" (Chānd. 6.3.2), "Light (merges) in the Highest Divinity" (Chānd. 6.8.6), is repeated in the versions: '"Just as, my dear, the bees prepare the honey"' (Chānd. 6.9.1) and so on. The very same (attributes of being) "the true" and so on, mentioned in the first version: '"All this has that for its soul, that is true"' (Chānd. 6.8.7), are inserted in all the other versions. Hence in the Sad-vidyā, the object to be worshipped is the same indeed. Thus it is established that in both the cases the questions and the answers are concerned with the same vidyā.

Here ends the section entitled "Being within" (16).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 38 in Śaṃkara's commentary. They take this sūtra too as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the two Sad-vidyās (in Bṛh. 5.4 and Bṛh. 5.5) constitute the same vidyā or two different vidyās. The answer is that they are the same vidyā. They read "sā" (meaning vidyā) instead of "sa" (meaning the Lord). Hence the sūtra: "For that (viz. the same Sad-vidyā) alone (is recorded by the two texts), (hence the attributes of) truth and so on (are to be comprehended in one act of meditation)".[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation same.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 39 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with proving that the attributes of the Lord are not unreal. Like Śaṃkara and Bhāskara, he reads "sā" (meaning the parā-śakti of the Lord). Hence the sūtra: "She (viz. the parā-śakti of the Lord) alone is truth and the rest". That is, the attributes of the Lord like truth, omniscience

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[1] Ś.B. 3.3.38, pp. 817–819; Bh. B. 3.3.37 (written as 3.3.38), p. 190.

and so on, are the modifications of the parā-śakti or the svarūpa-śakti of the Lord. Hence they are real, constituting the essential nature of the Lord, and not illusory.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 17: The section entitled "Desire". (Sūtras 38–40)

SŪTRA 38

"(THE ATTRIBUTES OF HAVING TRUE) DESIRE AND SO ON (ARE TO BE INSERTED) ELSEWHERE (I.E. IN THE BṚHADĀRAṆYAKA) AND THERE (I.E. IN THE CHĀNDOGYA), ON ACCOUNT OF ABODE AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the Chāndogya, in the text beginning: "Now, that which is within this city of Brahman is a small lotus-chamber. Small is the ether within that. What is within that should be searched out" (Chānd. 8.1.1[2]) and continuing: "This soul is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.1.5[3]), it is declared that the Highest Self, possessed of the attributes of having true "desire and so on" is the object to be worshipped. And in the Vājasaneyaka, in the text: "He, verily, is the great, unborn self, who is this one consisting of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who lies in the ether within the heart, the controller of all, the Lord of all" (Bṛh. 4.4.22[4]), it is declared that the Highest Self, possessed of the attributes of being the controller and so on, is the object to be worshipped. Here the vidyās are identical. Hence the attributes of having true desires and the rest are to be included in the Vājasaneyaka, and those of being the controller and so on in the Chāndogya. Why? On account of the non-difference of abode and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, (the author) points out that when owing to the non-difference of forms, the vidyās, mentioned in even different treatises, are not different, how much more it is the case that the vidyās, demonstrated by two sections of the same treatise, are not different owing to the non-difference of forms.

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[1] G.B. 3.3.39, pp. 177-178, Chap. 3.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.
[3] Ś.
[4] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

Having designated the Highest Self by the term 'ether' in the passage: "Now, that which is within this city of Brahman is a small lotus-chamber, small is the ether within that. What is within that should be searched for" (Chānd. 8.1.1), the Chandogas go on to mention His special characteristics by means of eight attributes, thus: "This soul is free from sins, without old age, without death, without grief, without hunger, without thirst, having true desires, having true resolves" (Chānd. 8.1.5).

Having stated: "He, verily, is the great, unborn self, who is this one consisting of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who lies in the ether within the heart" (Bṛh. 4.4.22), the Vājasaneyins too go on to mention His special characteristics by means of the attributes of being a controller and so on, thus: "The controller of all, the ruler of all" (Bṛh. 4.4.22).

Here the doubt is, viz. whether the vidyās of the Chandogas and the Vājasaneyins are different, or whether they are identical. On the suggestion, viz. In the one case, the object to be meditated on is the Highest Self, denoted by the term 'ether' and possessed of the attributes of freedom from sins and so on; while in the other case, the object to be meditated on is one who abides within a special kind of ether and is possessed of the attributes of being a controller and so on. This being so, owing to the difference of forms, there results difference of the objects to be known, and hence the vidyās differ,—

We reply: The vidyās are identical, owing to the non-difference of forms. So says (the author): "Desire and the rest". "Desire and the rest," i.e. the group of attributes like having true desires and so on, mentioned in the Chāndogya text: "Free from sins" (Chānd. 8.1.5) and so on, is to be inserted "elsewhere", i.e. in the Vājasaneyaka. "And here," i.e. and in the Chāndogya, the group of attributes like being the controller and so on, mentioned in the Vājasaneyaka text, is to be inserted. This being so, the form is not different; that being so, there is identity of the objects to be meditated on and hence the vidyās are identical.

(The author) states the reasons for this mutual insertion of attributes: "On account of abode and so on", i.e. on account of the non-difference, in both the cases, of the abode, viz. the heart;[1] of the

[1] Vide Chānd. 8.1.1; Bṛh. 4.4.22. See the quotations above.

designation of Brahman, the object to be meditated on, as a bridge;[1] and of the connection with the fruit, viz. the attainment of Brahman, mentioned in the passages: "Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.4.4), "He becomes the fearless Brahman" (Chānd. 4.4.25).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 39 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. He begins by explaining the sūtra exactly like Nimbārka, viz. that there is identity of the vidyās here and hence the attributes are to be mutually combined. But in conclusion he adds that there is, however, a difference between the two passages, viz. that the Chāndogya text refers to the qualified Brahman, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text to the highest Brahman.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He reads: "Kāmādayas tatra tatra". Interpretation same, only while Nimbārka speaks of only two Upaniṣads, he speaks of three, viz. Chāndogya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Māhā-nārāyaṇa (Mahānār. 10.7), and points out that all these three passages refer to the same vidyā.[3] He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 40 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras) concerned with Śrī, the eternal consort of the Lord. According to him, the words 'sā eva' are to be supplied here from the preceding sūtra. Hence the sūtra: "She (viz. the parā-śakti of the Lord) alone (is Śrī), (who creates all) objects of desire and so on elsewhere (i.e. in the material world) and here (i.e. in the city of the Lord or Saṃvyoma), (for the Lord) since (she is) all-pervading ("āya"),

[1] Vide Chānd. 8.4.1; Bṛh. 4.4.22.

[2] Ś.B. 3.3.38, p. 820, "Ayaṃ tu atra vidyate viśeṣaḥ, saguṇā hi Brahmavidyā Chāndogye Upadiśyate, . . . Vājasaneyake tu nirguṇam eva paraṃ Brahmopadiśyamānaṃ dṛśyate".

[3] ŚK. 3.3.38, p. 350, Parts 10 and 11.

spreading out ("tana") (bliss and release for the devotees) and so on".[1]

SŪTRA 39

"ON ACCOUNT OF CARE, THERE IS NON-OMISSION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no negation of the attributes of having true desires and so on, recorded "carefully", since the negation: "There is no plurality here" (Bṛh. 4.4.19; Kaṭha 4.11[2]) refers to the things not having Brahman for their essence.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It may be objected: The statement, made above, that the group of attributes like 'being the controller' and so on, mentioned in the Vājasaneyaka, is to be inserted in the Chāndogya, is not justifiable. In accordance with the text under discussion, viz. "It is to be perceived by the mind alone. There is no plurality here, He gets death after death who perceives here apparent plurality. It is to be looked upon as a unity alone,—this unknowable being" (Bṛh. 4.4.19-20), as well as in accordance with the subsequent text: "This soul is not this, not this" (Brh. 4.4.22), we arrive at the conclusion that the Highest is free from distinctions. Hence it is known that like grossness, atomicity and so on, the group of attributes like 'being the controller' and so on, is something to be negated. Hence, it should be known that in the Chāndogya too, the group of attributes like having true desires and so on, is something to be negated. This being so, such an absence of attributes is to be included in all the meditations subserving final release.—To this (the author) says:

There is "non-omission", i.e. non-denial, of the attributes of the Highest Brahman, like 'having true desires' and so on and 'being the controller' and so on, which are incapable of being denied and are taught "carefully" as something new in the texts: "What is within that should be searched for" (Chānd. 8.1.1), "This soul is free from sins, without old age, without death, without grief, without hunger, without thirst, having true desires, having true resolves"

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[1] G.B. 3.3.40, pp. 182–184, Chap. 3. [2] R.

(Chānd. 8.1.5), "Those who go, having found here the soul and the true desires, come to have free movement in all the worlds" (Chānd. 8.1.6), "The controller of all, the ruler of all" (Bṛh. 4.4.22; 5.6.1), "He is the Lord of all, he is the ruler of all beings, he is the protector of all beings" (Bṛh. 4.4.22), "He is the separating dam for keeping these worlds apart" (Bṛh. 4.4.22) and so on. On the contrary, they are to be inserted, there being no authority for their denial.

The scriptural text: "There is no plurality here" (Bṛh. 4.4.19; Kaṭha 4.11) states, on the other hand, that in Brahman, who is the cause of the world, who is different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient and who has the stated marks, there is no 'plurality', i.e. there are no objects which, not having their existence and activity dependent on Him are dependent on one another only. Since everything has Brahman for its essence, 'he who perceives here apparent plurality', not having Brahman for his essence, 'gets death after death'. He is to be 'looked upon as a unity alone', since all things have Brahman for their essence, and since there is nothing which does not have Brahman for its essence. This is what the text designates, but it does not prove that the real attributes of Brahman are to be denied.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 40 in Śaṃkara's commentary. They begin a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. whether the Prāṇāgni-hotra or the offering of the first food to the vital-breaths, enjoined in the Chāndogya (Chānd. 5.19.1), is to be omitted when eating itself is omitted or not. This sūtra states the *prima facie* view, viz. that there is no omission of the offering to the vital-breath even when there is the omission of eating, but it has to be performed by means of water in place of food, since the Jābāla version of the same vidyā (viz. Vaiśvānara-vidyā) shows great respect for this ceremony of Prāṇāgni-hotra.

Śrīkaṇṭha

He takes it to be an adhikaraṇa by itself, and interprets it in a sectarian way. The question is whether the form of the Lord as having a blue neck (Nīla-kaṇṭha), having Umā by His side and having attributes like true desires and so on is something to be negated

or not. The *prima facie* view is that having parts like a blue neck and so on involves increase and decrease and hence it is not possible on the part of Brahman, the immutable. Therefore, the attributes of having a blue neck, having Umā by the side and so on, are not His real attributes, but are simply imagined for the sake of meditation and are, as such, subject to negation sometime or other. The answer is: "There is no negation (of the attributes having a blue neck, three eyes, Umā by the side and so on), since (they are designated in Scripture) with (great) care". That is, the Lord (viz. Śiva) is to be meditated on always as having a blue neck and so on and as accompanied by Umā,—which are His real attributes—for such a meditation alone leads to release.[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 41 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic of Śrī, viz. her identity with the parā-śakti of the Lord. The problem is that if Śrī be identical with the parā-śakti of the Lord, then she must be identical with the Lord Himself, since the parā-śakti of the Lord is identical with Him. In that case, however, she cannot be devoted to the Lord, since none can be devoted to one's own self. The answer is: "On account of (her great) regard (for the Lord), there is non-cessation (of her devotion for Him)". That is, Śrī, though one with the Lord, cannot but love and be devoted to Him who is her very existence, just as the branch cannot but love the tree, or the ray the moon.[2]

SŪTRA 40

"WHEN ONE HAS APPROACHED (THE LORD, HE COMES TO HAVE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT), FOR THIS REASON, ON ACCOUNT OF STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

When one has attained Brahman by means of meditating on Him who has the stated marks, one comes to have freedom of movement in

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[1] ŚK. B. 3.3.39, pp. 354-355, Parts 10 and 11.

[2] G.B. 3.3.41, p. 185, Chap. 3. "Satyapya bhede vicitra-guṇaratnākaratvena sva-mūlatvena ca śriyaḥ parasmin ādarāt tad bhakter lopaḥ. Na khalu-vṛkṣam anādriyamāṇā śākhāsti, na candraṃ tatprabhā."

all the worlds. If it be objected: How can one have freedom of movement everywhere unless one first aspires to attain those particular worlds and then practises the means leading to them ?—We reply: "For this reason", i.e. on account of this very reason of attaining (the Lord), in accordance with the statement: "Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.3.4 [1]), "He becomes a self-ruler" (Chānd. 7.2.2 [2]), "He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds" (Chānd. 7.25.2 [3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. In the texts: "Now, those who depart having the self here and these true desires come to have freedom of movement in all the worlds. If he comes to desire the world of fathers" (Chānd. 8.2.1) and so on, it is declared that even by those who desire salvation, the worlds common to those who desire enjoyment are attained. This being so, what difference is there between devotion to works and devotion to knowledge ?—(the author) says:

"When one has approached," i.e. when the knower, freed from all connection with matter in its causal and effected states, has come to attain the nature of Brahman, he attains freedom of movement in all the worlds. Why ? "For this reason" alone, i.e. on account of the very reason of attaining the nature of Brahman. The sense is this: Just as a man, desirous of universal sovereignty, having given up the objects of enjoyment, common to all men, as well as the means thereto, attains universal sovereignty through the means thereto, and afterwards for just that reason, comes to have freedom of movement among the objects of enjoyment that are common to all men, as well among those that are difficult to be attained by them,—though not desired by him,—so the knower, having given up all enjoyments, here or hereafter, as well as the means thereto, attains the nature of the Lord through the hearing, thinking, meditation, worship and so on of Him; and for that very reason of attaining His nature, comes to have freedom of movement everywhere. Whence is this known ? To this (the author) replies: "From statement to that effect", i.e. from the statement, everywhere, of a knower's having freedom of movement, such as

[1] R, ŚK. [2] R. [3] *Op. cit.*

"Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.3.4; 8.12.3), "He is the excellent person. He roams about there laughing, playing, enjoying with women, or with carriages, or with relatives, not remembering the appendage of this body" (Chānd. 8.12.3), "He becomes a self-ruler. He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds" (Chānd. 7.25.2), "As to the perfection of means to the four ends of men,—without it a man, whose refuge is Nārāyaṇa, attains them", and so on. Thus, there is a great difference between devotion to works and devotion to knowledge. Hence it is established that through the mutual insertion of the attributes of having true desires and so on and of being the controller and the rest, the Brahma-vidyās of the Chandogas and of the Vājasaneyins are the very same.

Here ends the section entitled "Desire" (17).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 41 in Śaṃkara's commentary. Here they answer the *prima facie* view stated in the previous sūtra, thus: "When (eating is actually) taking place, (then alone an offering to the vital-breaths is to be made) from that (i.e. from the first food), on account of statement to the effect". [1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He takes it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation different. The question is whether the freed attain the very nature of Brahman, as possessed of infinite auspicious attributes, and so on, or something else. The *prima facie* view is that Brahman is declared to be free from distinctions or nirviśeṣa. Hence the freed souls attain this distinctionless form of Brahman. The answer is: "When one has approached (Brahman, one attains the nature of Brahman as possessed of all auspicious attributes), for that reason (i.e. because the freed soul attains its own form), (and) because of texts to that effect (i.e. that the freed become similar to the Lord)". [2]

[1] Ś.B. 3.3.41, pp. 822–824; Bh. B. 3.3.40 (written as 3.3.41), pp. 191-192.
[2] ŚK. B. 3.3.40, pp. 356-357, Parts 10 and 11.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 42 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic of the identity of Śrī with the parā-śakti of the Lord and hence with the Lord Himself. The contention is that if Śrī be identical with the Lord, then no erotic sentiment is possible between them, since any such sentiment is possible only if there be a difference between the lover and the beloved. The answer is: "(Śrī being the highest of the females and the Lord being the best of the males, an erotic sentiment naturally arises between them) when (they) have approached (each other), hence (such a sentiment is possible on the part of the Lord), on account of statement to that effect". [1]

Adhikaraṇa 18: The section entitled "Non-restriction with regard to the specifying of that". (Sūtra 41[2])

SŪTRA 41

"(THERE IS) NON-RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE SPECIFYING OF THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF THAT BEING SEEN, FOR THE FRUIT (VIZ.) NON-OBSTRUCTION IS 'DIFFERENT'."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is "non-restriction" (i.e. no fixed rule) that the meditations that are founded on the subordinate parts of sacrificial acts and are mentioned in texts like: "Let one meditate on the syllable 'Om' as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1[3]) and so on (are to be included) in those acts. Why? Because in the scriptural text: "Both perform with it, he who knows this thus and he who does not know thus" (Chānd. 1.1.10[4]), such a non-restriction is found. As we learn from Scripture that even a non-worshipper is a performer of sacrificial works through the praṇava, a subsidiary part of sacrificial works, so it is ascertained that there is no restriction with regard to the act of meditation. And hence that the fruit of meditation is "different" from the fruit of work is known from the passage: "What only one does with

[1] G.B. 3.3.42, p. 186, Chap. 3.
[2] This topic is resumed in Br. Sū. 3.3.59–64.
[3] Ś, R, Bh.
[4] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

knowledge, with faith, with the mystic doctrine,—that only becomes more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been shown at the end of the previous section that there is a great difference between meditation and work, since the former is the cause of a knower's (attaining) freedom of movement and a supreme place. Now (the author) is showing the superiority of meditation to work, on the ground of the superiority of the fruit of the meditations, founded on the subsidiary parts of work, over that of mere works (like sacrifices, etc.) though performed together with all their subsidiary parts.

Now, there are certain meditations which are founded on the udgītha and the rest, the subsidiary parts of sacrificial works, such as: "Let one meditate on the syllable 'Om' as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1) and so on. Here the doubt is as to whether they are to be inserted regularly in the sacrificial acts, like the quality of being made of parṇa-wood [2]; or not regularly, like the milking-vessel. With regard to this, the *prima facie* view is as follows: As the designation about the meditation on the udgītha, viz.: "Whatever one does with knowledge, with faith, with the mystic doctrine, that becomes more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10), does not mention any separate result, —just as the hearing of non-sinful verses connected with the quality of being made of the parṇa-wood, mentioned in the passage: "He whose sacrificial ladle is made of the praṇa-wood does not hear sinful verses" (Tait. Saṃ. 3.5.7 [3]) (is not a separate or special fruit),—so the meditations on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts are to be inserted regularly (in those acts) as their subsidiary parts, just as the quality of being made of the parṇa-wood (is always connected with sacrificial acts) through the sacrificial ladle.[4]

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[1] Ś, Bh, ŚK. Vide Br. Sū. 4.1.18.

[2] A beautiful sacred tree of the wood of which particular sacrificial vessels are made.

[3] P. 311, lines 23-24, vol. 1.

[4] The problem here is as to whether the meditations, enjoined in the Upaniṣads, on certain subsidiary parts of sacrifices, such as, on the udgītha and so on, are necessarily connected with these sacrifices, i.e. are to be undertaken whenever those sacrifices are undertaken; or whether they may be undertaken optionally in accordance with the will of the sacrificer. In the former case, such meditations

With regard to it, we reply: "Non-restriction with regard to the specifying of that", and so on. The word "specifying" ("nirdhāraṇa) means complete retention by the mind[1], i.e. meditation. There is "non-restriction" with regard to the meditation "of that", i.e. of the meditations founded on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, such as the udgītha-meditation and the like. That is, the meditations on the udgītha and the rest are not to be inserted regularly in sacrifices as their subsidiary parts. Why? "On account of that being seen," i.e. because such a non-restriction is found in Scripture. Thus, in the scriptural text: "Both perform with this, he who knows[2] this thus and he who does not know thus" (Chānd. 1.1.10), even a non-knower being stated to be an agent, it is ascertained that there is no fixed rule that the meditations founded on the udgītha and the rest

would stand to the sacrifices in the same relation as the quality of being made of the parṇa-wood (parṇamayītva) does. The quality of being made of the parṇa-wood is permanently connected with sacrifices through the sacrificial ladle made of the parṇa-wood. Similarly, these meditations on the udgītha and the rest would, on this view, be permanently connected with the sacrifices through the udgītha and the rest. That is, in accordance with the dictum laid down in Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.6.1-2 (vide Śab. B. on the same, pp. 366–368), a sacrificial ladle made of the parṇa-wood is an essential ingredient of a sacrifice and is to be included in it whenever it is performed. Similarly, on the first view, the meditations on the udgītha and so on are to be performed whenever the main sacrifices are performed.

In the latter case, however, such meditations would stand to the sacrifices in the same relation as the milking-vessel does. That is, in accordance with the dictum laid down in Pū. Mī. Sū. 4.1.2 (vide Śab. B. on the same, p. 436), the milking-vessel (go-dohana) is used in certain sacrifices, viz. in the Daśa-pūrṇa-māsa, not universally, but only occasionally, i.e. only if the sacrificer desires for a special end, viz. cattle. Similarly, on the second view, the meditations on the udgītha and the rest are not obligatory to the main sacrifices, but only optional.

The *prima facie* view is that the meditations on the udgītha and the rest serve no special purpose, as the using of the milking-vessel, e.g. does. They simply secure the greater potency of the sacrifices which is the general fruit of all other connected acts, just as having one's sacrificial ladle made of the parṇa-wood secures no special result. Hence it cannot be said those meditations on the udgītha and the like are to be undertaken at will for the sake of securing a special result. Therefore, they are to be undertaken always with the sacrifices.

[1] Niravaśeṣatayā dhāraṇam-nirdhāraṇam.

[2] Here the word "veda" (=knows) may be translated in conformity with the context, as "meditates", the text meaning that one may perform a sacrifice either with meditating on the Om, or not meditating on it.

are to be inserted regularly in sacrificial acts as their subordinate parts. Further, as the fruit of the injunction of meditation is different from that of sacrificial acts, there is no fixed rule with regard to the meditations on that,—so says (the author): "For different", i.e. because "the fruit" of the injunction of meditation, consisting in "non-obstruction", is declared by Scripture to be "different" from the fruit of sacrificial works. The sense is that the fruit of one work is obstructed by the fruit of another stronger work; the fruit of the injunction of meditation is the opposite of that. In accordance with the text: "Both perform with it, he who knows this thus and he who does not know thus. Diverse, however, are knowledge and non-knowledge. What only one does with knowledge, with faith, with the mystic doctrine, that only becomes more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10), 'with it', i.e. with the Om-kara, forsooth, both perform sacrificial acts. Though 'he who knows' 'this', i.e. the syllable, Om, 'thus', i.e. as possessed of the attributes of being the finest essence and so on, and 'he who does not know', are both equal in point of being agents, yet there is a difference in the result on account of knowledge and non-knowledge,—this is what the text designates.. Here 'knówledge' is 'diverse', i.e. different from 'non-knowledge'. That work which one does 'with knowledge', 'with faith', 'with the mystic doctrine', i.e. with the meditation on the Mystic Deity, 'becomes more potent',—this is the sense. Hence, it is established that just as the text: "For one desiring cattle he should fetch water in a milking-vessel" establishes a (special) fruit of the (use of) the milking-vessel, having the fetching of water as its abode [1],—here as the text can very well be so interpreted, the milking-vessel is not a subordinate part of sacrificial acts,—so the meditations, founded on the subsidiary elements of sacrificial acts are to be included in those acts optionally.

Here ends the section entitled "Non-restriction with regard to the specifying of that" (18).

[1] That is, the quality of being made of the parṇa-wood cannot have a special result of its own, since it is only a quality and not an act and must, as such, abide in a substratum to be connected with any result. But the milking-vessel may have a special fruit, since it has an act, viz. the fetching of water, as its abode. Vide Ś.B. 3.3.42, p. 826.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 43 in his commentary. He too takes it to be an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned, however, with an entirely different topic. The question is as to whether the Lord is to be meditated on as Kṛṣṇa alone. The answer is: "(There is) no restriction with regard to the specifying of that (viz. the Lord), (i.e. there is no fixed rule that the Lord is to be worshipped as Kṛṣṇa alone), on account of that being found (in Scripture), for there is a separate fruit, (viz.) non-obstruction (of the worship of Kṛṣṇa)". That is, the worship of Kṛṣṇa is the unobstructed or direct means to salvation, while the worship of other deities is the indirect means.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 19: The section entitled "Offering". (Sūtra 42)

SŪTRA 42

"SIMPLY AS IN THE CASE OF OFFERING, THAT HAS BEEN SAID."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

During the meditations on the attributes also, the meditation on the dahara (or the small), the substratum of the attributes, is to be repeated as qualified by those attributes respectively, "as in the case of the offering" of the sacrificial cake[2], designated in the text: "Let one offer the sacrificial cake on eleven potsherds to Indra, the king, to Indra, the over-lord, to Indra, the self-ruler" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.3.6[3]). "That has been said," viz. "Diverse, forsooth, are the divinities, owing to different conceptions".[4]

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said above that the meditations founded on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts are not to be inserted in those acts

[1] G.B. 3.3.43, pp. 189-190, Chap. 3.
[2] Purodāś.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, Śk. P. 174, lines 13-14, vol. 1.
[4] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

regularly. Now, apprehending the objection, viz. that just as the meditations on the subsidiary parts are independent of the whole, so the meditations on the attributes are independent of the meditation on the substratum of attributes—it is said:

Under the Dahara-vidyā [1], after having first stated the small ether, i.e. the soul, the substratum of the attributes, as the object to be meditated on thus: "Now, those who depart having known the self here" (Chānd. 8.1.6), the text goes on to set forth separately once more the meditations on the attributes of being free from sins and the rest too thus: "And these true desires" (Chānd. 8.1.6). Here the doubt is as to whether while meditating on an attribute, the small ether, the substratum of the attributes, too is to be meditated on as possessed of that particular attribute, or not. On the suggestion: As the small ether can very well be meditated on at all times as qualified by the attributes of being free from sins and so on, during the meditation on the attributes, the meditation on Him as qualified by those particular attributes is not to be repeated.

We reply: "As in the case of offering", the meditation on the small ether, the substratum of attributes, as qualified by those particular attributes, is to be repeated with the meditations on those attributes themselves. The sense is this: Although those attributes like freedom from sins and so on have only one substratum, viz. the small ether, yet in accordance with the text: "Free from sins, without old age" (Chānd. 8.1.5) and so on, which intends to designate its (different) forms as qualified by those particular attributes, it is to be meditated on as diverse. Just as in the case of the sacrifice comprising three sacrificial cakes, laid down in the text: "Let one offer the sacrificial cake on eleven potsherds to Indra, the king, to Indra, the over-lord, to Indra, the self-ruler" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.3.6 [2]), although the same Indra is qualified by the attributes of kingship and the rest, yet as the attributes of kingship, over-lordship and self-rulership are different from one another, the god himself is taken to have different forms as qualified by each particular attribute, and as such the "offerings" of the sacrificial cakes are repeated,—so is the case

[1] Vide Chānd. 8.1 ff. See V.K. 3.3.1, for further explanation.

[2] The text continues to designate these three epithets thus: "Indra, the king is this (earth); Indra, the over-lord, is this (atmosphere); Indra, the self-ruler is the yonder (heaven)—. There are three cakes, these worlds are three".

here. "That has been said" in the section treating of the divinities: "Diverse, forsooth, are the divinities owing to different conceptions". Hence it is established that during the meditation on an attribute, the meditation on the small ether in that particular form, qualified by that particular attribute, is to be repeated.

Here ends the section entitled "Offering" (19).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 42 in Śaṃkara's commentary. Śaṃkara and Bhāskara too take it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, though concerned with an entirely different topic. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka (Bṛh. 1.5.21), the vital-breath is said to be the best among the organs of the body, and the air to be the best among the gods. Similarly, in the Chāndogya (Chānd. 4.3.1), the air is said to be the general absorber of the gods, and (Chānd. 4.3.3) the vital-breath is said to be the general absorber of the organs of the body. Here the question is as to whether the air and the vital-breath are to be conceived as separate or not. The *prima facie* view is that they are not to be conceived as separate, since they do not differ in their true nature. But the real view is that although they are fundamentally one, yet they are to be meditated on separately, since the texts teach them separately. Hence the vidyās here are not the same, but there are two separate vidyās. The parallel instance cited from the Taittirīya-saṃhitā and the maxim are the same as those cited by Nimbārka. Thus the sūtra: "As in the case of offering (the air and the vital-breath are to be conceived separately), that has been said".[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 44 in his commentary. He too takes it as an adhikaraṇa by itself, but concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the grace of the spiritual preceptor. Hence the sūtra: "Like the giving (of knowledge by the preceptor) alone that has been said". That is, salvation depends upon the extent the preceptor is pleased

[1] Ś.B. 3.3.43, pp. 827–830; Bh. B. 3.3.42 (written as 3.3.43), p. 192.

to impart knowledge to the devotee. Mere study of the Veda is not enough to ensure the attainment of Brahman, but the grace of the preceptor is necessary too.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 20: The section entitled "The majority of indicatory marks". (Sūtras 43–50)

SŪTRA 43

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE MAJORITY OF INDICATORY MARKS, FOR THAT (VIZ. INDICATORY MARK) IS STRONGER, THIS ALSO (HAS BEEN EXPLAINED)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The fires, piled up by the mind, piled up by speech, piled up by the vital-breath, piled up by the eye, piled up by the ear, piled up by action, piled up by the fire, and so on,[2] are simply the subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation [3], "on account of the majority of the indicatory marks", such as: "Whatever these conceive with their mind that alone is their composition" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3 [4]), "All beings at all times pile up those (fires) for him who knows thus, even while he sleeps" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12 [5]) and so on; "for" an indicatory mark is "stronger" than the context. "This also" has been said in the section treating of what is supplementary to sacrifices: "If there be combination of direct association, indicatory mark, syntactical connection, context, place and name, then each succeeding one is weaker (than each preceding one), on account of its remoteness from the meaning" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.3.14 [6]).

[1] G.B. 3.3.44, p. 192, Chap. 3.

[2] Vide Śat. Br. 10.5.3 (whole), pp. 796–798.

[3] I.e. these fires do not constitute parts of real sacrifices, and are not actually lighted during the performance of sacrifices, but are simply parts of meditation, i.e. mentally imagined fires.

[4] P. 796, lines 7-8. This shows that the fires are composed by mind only, i.e. not actual fires.

[5] P. 798, lines 14-15. Ś, Bh.

[6] P. 284, vol. 1. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now (the author) points out that the fires too, that are going to be designated now, are not to be taken as subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, just as the meditations founded on the subsidiary elements of sacrificial acts are not to be taken as such.

Having begun: "Verily, in the beginning, this was not existent, not even non-existent" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 1 [1]), having described the appearance of the mind, and having referred to the mind, by pointing out that that mind saw the fires belonging to itself [2], thus: "It saw the thirty-six thousand fires, the suns, belonging to itself, made of the mind, piled up by the mind. By the mind alone they were placed, by the mind they were piled up, by the mind the cups were taken in them, by the mind they praised, by the mind they recited. Whatever work is done in a sacrifice" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3 [3]) and so on, the Vājasaneyins, thus, record imaginary fires, piled up by the mind and so on, viz. piled up by speech, piled up by the eye, piled up by action, piled up by fire,[4] and so on, in the "Mystery of Fire".[5] The life of a person lasts a hundred years. It consists of thirty-six thousand days and nights. In the course of a single day and night, many mental modes arise, and they are taken to be one because they have arisen in the course of the same day and night. Thus, there are thirty-six thousand mental modes in the course of thirty-six thousand days and nights; and they are demonstrated as the bricks which are subsidiary parts of sacrifices, and as elemental fires, by the text: "Thirty-six thousands" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 1) and so on. Among these, those which are 'piled up', i.e. built, by the mind are the 'mind-piled'. Similarly, the meaning of the texts 'breath-piled' and so on are to be understood as the case may be.

Here the doubt is as to whether these fires, piled up by the mind and so on are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in actual action, they being mentioned in a section concerned with sacrificial acts; or whether they are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting only in meditation.

[1] P. 796, line 1.
[2] Quotation mark wrong (in the text).
[3] P. 796, lines 4–6.
[4] Quotation mark wrong (in the text).
[5] The name of the tenth book of the Śat. Br.

First, (the author) begins with the correct conclusion, thus: "On account of the majority of indicatory marks". They are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation only. Why? "On account of the majority of indicatory marks," i.e. on account of the majority or numerosity of the indicatory marks, such as "Whatever these conceive with the mind alone that alone is their composition" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3), "All beings at all times pile up those (fires) for him who knows thus, even while he sleeps" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12) and so on. "For that," i.e. for an indicatory mark, is "stronger" than the context. "That also," i.e. the fact of its being of a greater force, is stated in the Karma-Kāṇḍa thus: "If there be combination of direct assertion, indicatory mark, syntactical connection, context, place and name, then each succeeding one is weaker (than each preceding one), on account of its remoteness from the meaning" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.3.14).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

He takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with an entirely different topic. The question is as to whether the eleventh section of the Mahānārāyaṇa-upaniṣad,—constituting the same vidyā as the vidyā, viz. the Dahara-vidyā, mentioned in the tenth section—establishes only the object to be meditated on in that vidyā, or an object to be meditated on in all Brahma-vidyās. The *prima facie* view is that this section, in accordance with the context, establishes the object which is to be meditated on in the Dahara-vidyā only. The answer is: "(It establishes an object to be meditated in all Brahma-vidyās), on account of the majority of indicatory marks, (i.e. because there are many specific indications that Nārāyaṇa, designated in this section, is none but the object to be meditated on in all Brahma-vidyās), for that (viz. mark) is stronger (than the context), that too (has been stated in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā)".[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He too takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with a topic similar to that of Rāmānuja, only referring to a different passage, designating Rudra instead of Nārāyaṇa. Thus,

[1] Śrī. B. 3.3.43, pp. 325-326, Part 2.

the question is as to whether the Supreme Brahman or Rudra, accompanied by Umā, mentioned in the thirteenth section of the Mahānārāyaṇa-upaniṣad, is the object to be meditated on in all the parā-vidyās, or only in that particular vidyā of that section. The *prima facie* view is that in accordance with the context, such a Supreme Brahman is to be meditated on in that particular vidyā alone. The answer is the same as that given by Rāmānuja, viz.: "(Such a Brahman is to be meditated on in all the parā-vidyās on account of the majority of indicatory marks—".[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 45 in his commentary. He too takes this sūtra to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with an altogether different topic, viz. the grace of the spiritual teacher. Hence the sūtra: "On account of the majority of indicatory marks, (viz. scriptural texts), that (i.e. the grace of the teacher), is stronger (than any other element in bringing about final emancipation), (but) that also (viz. exertion on one's own part, viz. study, meditation and so on,) (must be continued)".[2]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 44-45)

SŪTRA 44

"(THE FIRES BUILT UP BY THE MIND AND THE REST) MAY BE AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF THE PRECEDING FIRE BUILT UP BY BRICKS) ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONTEXT, (THEY ARE) ACTION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE MENTAL (VESSEL)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Now the *prima facie* view: This "may be an alternative form" of that same "preceding" (fire) consisting in action enjoined in the text: "With bricks he piles up the fire" [3]. Since the indicatory mark here is contained in the descriptive portion, the stated fires are indeed of the form of action, as in the case of: "He takes the mental vessel".[4]

[1] Śk. B. 3.3.43, pp. 362 ff., Parts 10 and 11.
[2] G.B. 3.3.45, p. 193, Chap. 3.
[3] Bh.
[4] *Op. cit.*

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now (the author) states the *prima facie* view.

This "may be" "an alternative form", i.e. a mode, of the same "preceding fire", enjoined in the passage: "With bricks he piles up the fire". Why? "On account of the context," i.e. because previously in the passage: "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1 [1]), the fire, piled up by bricks, is mentioned.

If it be argued that it has been said that context is weaker than indicatory mark,—(we reply:) no, since the stated indicatory marks, being contained in the descriptive portion and as such concerned with the glorification of the mentioned imaginary fires, form a coherent whole with the injunction, and are hence not true in their own literal sense. Hence the fact that they are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation is set aside by the context. Therefore these fires too, which have the form of meditation, are really of the form of action, "as in the case of the mental (vessel)". That is, just as the offering of the mental vessel on the tenth day of the twelve-days' sacrifice, mentioned in the passage: "With this (earth) as the jug, with the sea as the juice, he takes the mental cup, offered to Prajāpati, for you" [2], though of the form of meditation, is yet of the form of action because of being the subsidiary part of a sacrifice consisting in action, so is the case here.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. meditation on the self as identical with the Lord (So'ham). Hence the sūtra: "(The meditation on the self as identical with the Lord) may be an optional form of the former (viz. devotion) on account of

[1] P. 499, line 1.

[2] A similar passage is found in Āp. Ś.S. 21.10.2.

The sense is that on the tenth day of the Soma sacrifice, lasting twelve days, a cup is offered mentally to Prajāpati, the earth being imagined to be the cup and the sea the soma-juice. Now, all operations connected with this cup are mental, yet the offering of the cup is taken to be a real, and not an imaginary action, since it is connected with a real sacrifice. In the same way, the fires built up by the mind and so on, though mental, are to be taken as parts of real sacrifices, so says the *prima facie* objector. Vide Ś.B. 3.3.46, pp. 832-833.

the context (i.e. the Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī), like (the physical) acts (of offerings and so on), (and) the mental (acts of meditation and so on)". That is, expressions like 'I am he', and so on, uttered by God-intoxicated devotees in a state of extreme ecstasy, are not to be understood literally as implying an identity between the Lord and His devotee, because they are only particular moods of meditation, just as offerings and the like are.[1]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 45

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF TRANSFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "Of these, each is as great as the former" (Śat. Br. 10.3.3, 11 [2]), the power of the former fire is transferred to them. Hence they are indeed of the form of action.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the text: "There are thirty-six thousand fires, the suns. Of these, each is as great as the former" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3.11), the power of the previous fire, piled up by bricks, is transferred to them. On account of such a transference as well, the fires piled up by the mind and the rest are indeed of the form of action.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 47 in his commentary. Here he concludes the section about the 'I am he'—meditation. Hence the sūtra: "Also on account of analogy". That is, in the Gopāla-uttara-tāpanī-upaniṣad, the Lord is compared to a loving father, and the devotee to His son. This shows that the individual soul is not identical with the Lord. Hence sentiments like 'I am he' and so on are but modes of devotion, and do not indicate any identity between the two.[3]

[1] G.B. 3.3.46, p. 195, Chap. 3.3. "Prakāra-viśeṣeva, nārthāntaram."
[2] P. 798, lines 13-14. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[3] G.B. 3.3.47, pp. 199-200, Chap. 3.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 46–50)

SŪTRA 46

"BUT (THEY ARE) MEDITATION ALONE, ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIFICATION AND ON ACCOUNT OF OBSERVATION (I.E. SCRIPTURAL TEXT)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The correct conclusion is that they are of the nature of meditation alone. Why? "On account of the specification," viz.: "For they are piled up by knowledge alone" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12 [1]); and also because in that very treatise, viz. in the text: "By the mind they were placed, by the mind they were piled up, by the mind the cups were taken in them, by the mind they praised, by the mind they chanted. Whatever work is done in a sacrifice" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3[2]) and so on, a sacrifice consisting of meditation is designated—the whole, of which they (viz. the fires) are subsidiary parts.

Vedānta-kaustubha

(The author) states the correct conclusion.

The word "but" is meant for disposing of the *prima facie* view. The word "only" implies emphasis. The fires piled up by the mind and so on cannot be of the form of action, but are "meditation alone," i.e. are of the nature of meditation alone, or are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation. Why? "On account of specification and on account of observation," i.e. because of the specification, viz.: "For they are piled up by knowledge alone" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12); and because in the text: "By mind alone they are placed, by mind they are piled up, by mind the cups are taken in them, by mind they praised, by mind they chanted. Whatever work is done in a sacrifice, whatever sacrificial work there is, that, consisting of mind alone, was performed by mind alone, in these, consisting of mind, piled up by mind" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3), a sacrifice consisting in meditation alone is designated—the whole, of which they are subsidiary parts.

[1] P. 798, lines 14-15. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[2] P. 796, lines 5-6. R, Śk.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They break the sūtra into two separate sūtras thus: "Vidyaiva ..... nirdhāraṇāt" and "Darśanāc ca". Interpretation same.

Baladeva

Like Śaṃkara, he too breaks the sūtra into two separate sūtras. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (three sūtras) concerned with showing that vidyā or devotion based on knowledge alone is the means to salvation. Thus: *Sūtra* 48.—"But vidyā alone (is the means to salvation), on account of specification, (i.e. because Scripture mentions it exclusively, neither karma nor a combination of vidyā and karma)."[1] *Sūtra* 49.—"And because (salvation results) from the direct vision (of the Lord)." That is, the direct vision of the Lord is attainable through vidyā alone. Hence vidyā alone is the cause of salvation.[2]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 47

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE GREATER FORCE OF DIRECT SCRIPTURAL STATEMENT AND THE REST, (THERE IS) NO SETTING ASIDE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the greater force" of the direct scriptural statement", viz.: "For they are piled up by the mind alone" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12 [3]); of the indicatory mark; "All beings at all times pile up (those fires) for him who knows thus, even while he sleeps" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12 [4]); and of the syntactical connection: "For through knowledge alone these are piled up for one who knows thus" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12 [5]), there is "no setting aside" of the fact that these fires are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation.

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[1] G.B. 3.3.48, p. 202, Chap. 3.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.49, p. 203.
[3] P. 798, line 14. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[4] P. 798, lines 14-15. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[5] P. 798, line 15. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. to say that those fires piled up by the mind and so on are here subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation, does not stand to reason. As in the text: "With mind they were placed" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3) there is no mention of an injunctive word, and as we do not perceive their connection with a fruit, so the fact of their being subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation is set aside by the context, concerned with a sacrifice consisting in action, and suggested to the mind by fires piled up by bricks—(the author) replies:

There is "no setting aside", by the context, of the fact of their being subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation. Why? "On account of the greater force of direct scriptural statement and the rest" than the context. By the words "and the rest", indicatory mark and syntactical connection are to be understood. The direct scriptural text is: "For these are piled up by knowledge alone" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12). The indicatory mark is: "All beings at all times pile up these for him who knows thus, even while he sleeps" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12). The syntactical connection is: "For by knowledge alone these are piled up for one who knows thus" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 50 in his commentary. Here he concludes the section about vidyā being the only means to salvation. It may be objected that some texts speak of karma as the means to salvation, while some texts again speak of the combination of karma and vidyā as such a means. The answer is: "And on account of the greater force of Scripture and so on (there is) no setting aside (of our view)." That is, the scriptural texts quoted by us in support of our view that vidyā *alone* is the cause of release is of a far greater authority than the Smṛti texts quoted by the *prima facie* objector to prove his case.[1]

[1] G.B. 3.3.50.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 48

"ON ACCOUNT OF INSEPARABLE ADJUNCTS AND THE REST, LIKE THE SEPARATENESS OF OTHER COGNITIONS, AND (BECAUSE IT) IS SEEN, THAT HAS BEEN SAID."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the inseparable adjuncts" like hymns, recitations and so on [1], mentioned in the text: "By mind the cups were taken in them" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3 [2]), and on account of direct scriptural statement and the rest,[3] the sacrifice consisting in meditation is indeed different, "like the separateness of other vidyās", such as, the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā and so on. This being so, an injunction is to be supposed. "And" it is "found" that in the case of what is similar to a mere statement, e.g. in the passage: "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10 [4]), an injunction is supposed. It has been "stated" as well: "But the texts, on account of being new" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 10.4.22 [5]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection stated above, viz. that because of the non-mention of an injunctive word in the text: "By mind alone they were placed" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3), and because we do not perceive their connection with a fruit,—to say that they are subordinate members of a sacrifice consisting in meditation does not stand to reason,—(the author) replies:

The sacrifice consisting in meditation is indeed different from the sacrifice consisting in action, and (hence) the fact that they (i.e. fires) are the subordinate members of the former does stand to reason. Why? "On account of the inseparable adjuncts and the rest," i.e. on account of the inseparable adjuncts, transference, Scripture and so on. Among these, the inseparable adjuncts, (i.e. the attendant performances) are stated in the text: "By mind the cups were taken in them" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3). As a sacrifice consisting in action and

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[1] This last portion "like . . . so on" is omitted in the C.S.S. ed.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[3] See V.P.S. 3.3.47.
[4] Śk.
[5] P. 453, vol. 2. R, Śk.

its subordinate members are directly perceivable, these would be meaningless if there be not a separate sacrifice consisting in meditation. The inseparable adjuncts of a sacrifice are the cups, hymns, recitation and so on. The transference, viz. "Of these, each is as great as the former" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 11) has been mentioned above. Such a transference does not fit in if there be no difference (between these two)[1]. The scriptural text and the rest have been indicated above.[2]

With regard to this, a parallel instance is cited thus: "Like the separateness of other cognitions". Just as other cognitions like the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā and the rest are different from a sacrifice consisting in action, as well as from other vidyās, owing to their respective peculiar adjuncts, so is the case here too. This being so, an injunction is to be supposed. "And" it is "found" that in the case of what is similar to a mere statement, e.g. in the text: "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10) and so on, an injunction is supposed. "That has been said," thus: "But the texts, on account of being new" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 10.4.22). Their connection with a fruit too may be known from the transference: "Of these, each one is as great as the former" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 11).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras:—"Anubandhādibhya" and "Prajñāntara . . . . taduktam," and interprets them absolutely differently. Thus:

Sūtra 51.—He takes it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the worship of holy men. Hence the sūtra: "On account of injunction and so on". That is, Scripture expressly enjoins the worship of great and good men, and hence such an worship must be undertaken as an auxiliary and indirect means to salvation.[3]

Sūtra 52.—He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with showing that the devotees realize and intuit the Lord differently. He reads "dṛṣṭiś ca" in place of "dṛṣṭaś ca". Hence the sūtra: "And like the difference between prajñā and the other (sort of knowledge) the perception (of the Lord too differs in the case

[1] Vide under V.K. 3.3.22.
[2] Vide V.K. 3.3.47.
[3] G.B. 3.3.51, pp. 206–208, Chap. 3.

of different devotees), that has been said". That is, in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka (Bṛh. 4.4.21 [1]), two sorts of knowledge, viz. vijñāna and prajñā, are spoken of. The first is intellectual knowledge or mere conception, the latter is intuitional knowledge or direct realization. Now, just as there is a difference between intellect and intuition, so there is a difference among the intuitions themselves. That is, different devotees, following different paths, come to have different intuitions or visions of the Lord. This has been declared in the Chāndogya (Chānd. 3.14.1 [2]).

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 49

"NOT EVEN ON ACCOUNT OF RESEMBLANCE, ON ACCOUNT OF OBSERVATION, AS IN THE CASE OF DEATH, NOR, VERILY, (THERE IS ANY) BECOMING THE WORLD."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Not even on account of their resemblance to the mental cup, they are subordinate members of a sacrifice consisting in action, since they are found to be of the form of meditation. In spite of the resemblance of both fire and the person in the sun to death,—as stated in the texts: "He, verily, is death who is the person within this orb" (Śat. Br. 10.5.2, 3 [3]), "Fire, verily, is death" (Bṛh. 3.2.10 [4]),—the difference (between them) remains; "nor verily" does fire (actually) become the world in accordance with the passage: "The world, O Gautama, is a fire" (Chānd. 5.4.1 [5]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

(The author) condemns the statement made above, viz. that like the mental (cup), the fires piled up by the mind and so on too are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in action.

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[1] Vijñāya prajñām kurvīta.

[2] G.B. 3.3.52, p. 209, Chap. 3. "Yathā kratu asmin loke puruṣo bhavati tathetaḥ pretya bhavati."

[3] P. 793, line 5. Also repeated in various places of the same chapter. Vide p. 794, lines 14-15; p. 795, lines 19-20, etc. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

[4] Ś. [5] Ś, Bh.

"Even on account of the resemblance," in point of being mental, of the fires piled up by the mind and the rest to the mental cup,—mentioned in the text: "With this (earth) as the jug, with the sea as the juice, I take the cup, offered to Prajāpati, for you",—they are not to be taken as the subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in action. Why? Because we find from Scripture and the rest [1] that they are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation. The sense is that a minor resemblance does not invalidate a major difference.

With regard to this, (the author) states a parallel instance: "As in the case of death". Just as, though fire and the person within the sun resemble each other in point of being denoted by the same word 'death' in the texts: "He, verily, is death who is the person within this orb" (Śat. Br. 10.5.2, 3), "The fire, verily, is death" (Bṛh. 3.2.10), they are still different from each other; or just as, in accordance with the text: "This world, O Gautama, is the fire" (Chānd. 5.4.1), the world does not (actually) become the fire,—so though the fires piled up by the mind and so on and the mental cup resemble each other in point of being mental, they still remain mutually different.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different. The *prima facie* objectors say that since the power of the actual fire is transferred to the mental fires (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 11), the latter must be actual brick-built fires like the former. The answer is: "Not even on account of resemblance (i.e. transference) (an identity) between them results), for (it is) found (that there is transference even when there is no identity), as in the case of death, for (there is) no attaining the world (of death by the person in the sun)". That is, the mere transference of the property of one thing to another is by no means an indication of an actual identity between them, for it is found that sometimes such a transference is based on a single point of similarity. E.g. the person within the orb of the same is said to be death (Śat. Br. 10.5.2, 3), but there is only one point of resemblance between them, viz. destructive

[1] See above V.K. 3.3.47.

power, and no resemblance in other points. The person within the sun, e.g., does not occupy the world of death.[1]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 53 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. The *prima facie* objector points out that if the vision of the Lord be the cause of salvation [2], then when the Lord descends on earth as an incarnation, viz. Rāma and so on, everyone who sees Him must become freed immediately. The answer is: "Even on account of the common perception (of the Lord as an incarnation, there is no universal release), like death (which is) not (the cause) of salvation, but) the attainment of (other particular) worlds". That is, death does not necessarily lead to release, but more often to other worlds like heaven and so on. Similarly, all visions of the Lord are not the cause of release, but the vision of the Lord on earth as an incarnation leads to heavenly regions alone.[3]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 50

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT IS SUBSEQUENT, THE BEING OF THIS KIND OF THE WORD (IS ESTABLISHED), THERE IS CONNECTION WITH (ACTION), ON THE OTHER HAND, ON ACCOUNT OF MAJORITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account also of the immediately following (section), viz.: "This world, verily, is piled up by the fire" (Śat. Br. 10.5.4, 1 [4]), this text, referring to the fires piled up by the mind and so on, is of such a kind. "On account of the majority," i.e. numerosity, of the details of (actual) fire which are to be accepted in the fires piled up by the mind and so on, there is the "connection" (of these mental fires) in the very vicinity of a fire built up by action.

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[1] Śrī. B. 3.3.49, p. 331, Part 2; Śk. B. 3.3.49, p. 369, Parts 10 and 11.

[2] Vide G.B. 3.3.49 above.

[3] P. 798, line 17. Ś, R, Bh, Śk. Correct quotation: "A gniś cita", in which case the quotation would mean. "This world, verily, is the piled up fire."

[4] Correct quotation "Agniś Cita", meaning "piled up fire", and not "Agni-Cita".

Vedānta-kaustubha

"On account of what is subsequent" to the section concerned with the fires piled up by the mind and so on, viz. the section concerned with world which is filled, beginning: "This world, verily, is piled up by the fire (Śat. Br. 10.5.4, 1), and on account of the preceding section,—implied by the term "and" (in the sūtra)—, beginning: "This orb that shines" (Śat. Br. 10.5.2, 1), the "text", i.e. the section coming between them, is "of that kind", i.e. concerned with an injunction about meditation. That is, on account of its association with a preceding and a subsequent sections which have meditation for their primary topic, here too there is the primacy of meditation,—that is what it comes to.

To this objection, viz. If in this section, there be the primacy of meditation, then what is the sense in beginning with action?—(the author) replies: "On account of majority". That is, "on account of the majority" or numerosity of the details of the fire built up by action to be accomplished (mentally) in the case of the fires which are the subsidiary parts of meditation, there is the "connection", i.e. setting forth, of the fires, the subsidiary parts of meditation, after the fires which are subsidiary parts of action. Hence it is established that the fires piled up by the mind and the rest are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation.

Here ends the section entitled "The majority of indicatory marks" (20).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 54 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the grace of the Lord. The *prima facie* view is that it cannot be said that the direct vision of the Lord alone, attainable through devotion [1], in the cause of salvation, for a text in the Muṇḍaka (Muṇḍ. 3.2.3 [2]) shows that the vision of the Lord depends on the grace of the Lord.

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[1] Vide G.B. 3.3.49 above.

[2] "Nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyah", etc.

The answer is: "On account of what follows (i.e. the immediately following text [1]), the being of that kind of the word (is established), (there is) the mention (of grace in the passage), on the other hand, on account of preponderance (i.e. because the grace of the Lord is the most predominating factor in attaining salvation)". That is, the Muṇḍaka-text does imply that devotion is the cause of a direct vision of the Lord, and the latter a cause of emancipation, for the grace or choice by the Lord is not arbitrary, but is determined by the devotion of men.[2]

Adhikaraṇa 21: The section entitled "Existence in the body". (Sūtras 51-52)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 51)

SŪTRA 51

"SOME (HOLD THAT THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS TO BE MEDITATED ON IN ITS STATE OF BONDAGE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE (OF SUCH A SOUL) IN THE BODY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

At the time of meditation, the individual soul is to be meditated on in its state of bondage, on account of the existence of such a soul alone "in the body"—so "some" (think).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Immediately above, an investigation has been undertaken into the fires piled up by the mind and so on as forming subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation. Now, the question is being considered, viz. in what form is the individual soul too, entitled to its fruit, to be sought for at the time of meditation?

The doubt is as to whether at the time of meditation, the individual soul is to be conceived of simply in its state of bondage,—i.e. in the form of a knower, a doer, an enjoyer and the rest,—or in its state of

[1] "Nāyamātmā vala-hīnena labhyah", etc.

[2] G.B. 3.3.54, pp. 214 ff., Chap. 3.

salvation, i.e. in its real nature, characterized by the manifested attributes of freedom from sins and the rest. With regard to it "some" think that it is to be conceived of in its state of bondage alone, i.e. in the form of a knower and the rest. Why? On account of the non-existence "in the body", at that time, "of the soul" in its state of salvation, i.e. in its real nature as characterized by freedom from sins and so on. Or else, (an alternative explanation:) on account of the existence of such a soul alone, i.e. of the soul in its state of bondage. [1]

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 53 in the commentary of Śaṃkara and 52 in that of Bhāskara. They take this adhikaraṇa to be concerned with a different problem, viz. the relation between the soul and the body. This sūtra sets forth the opponent's view, viz. the view of the Cārvākas, that the soul is nothing but the body, since consciousness is found only when the body is present, and not found when it is absent. Hence, the sūtra: "Some (maintain the non-difference) of the soul (from the body), on account of the existence (of consciousness) if there be the body".[2]

Baladeva

This is sūtra 55 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the worship of the Lord in the different parts of the body. Hence the sūtra: "Some (recommend the worship) of the soul (viz. the Lord) in the body, on account of the existence (of the Lord there)". That is, the Lord is to be worshipped in the different parts of the body, such as, the stomach, the heart, the top of the head and so on, since He exists in these places also and gives salvation to the devotee.[3]

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[1] Note that while Nimbārka reads only "bhāvāt", Śrīnivāsa reads both "abhāvāt" and "bhābāt".

[2] Ś.B. 3.3.53, pp. 838-840; Bh. B. 3.3.52 (written as 3.3.53), pp. 195-196.

[3] G.B. 3.3.55, pp. 218-219, Chap. 3.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 52)

SŪTRA 52

"BUT (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS TO BE MEDITATED ON IN ITS STATE OF RELEASE) DIFFERENT (FROM ITS STATE OF BONDAGE, AND) NOT (IN ITS STATE OF BONDAGE), BECAUSE OF BECOMING OF THAT NATURE, AS IN THE CASE OF REALIZATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

[1]At the time of meditation, the individual soul is to be conceived of in its freed state, different from its state of bondage,—since during release, it is to become of that very form, just as one attains the Highest Self in accordance with meditation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

With regard to it, we reply:

The word "but" implies emphasis. The individual soul is not to be conceived of simply in its state of bondage, i.e. simply in its form of a knower, a doer and so on. On the contrary, it is the real nature of the soul, in its state of release, possessed of the manifested attributes of freedom from sins and so on, and possessed of the attributes of being a knower and so on, which is "different" from its nature in its state of bondage, that is to be conceived of at the time of meditation. Why? "Because of becoming of that nature," i.e. because during the state of release, the soul becomes "of that nature", i.e. of the nature of its real form, conceived, in accordance with Scripture, at the time of meditation,[2] "As in the case of realization". That is, just as there is the realization of Brahman in accordance with meditation, so is the case here, as declared by the scriptural texts: "As the purpose of man is in this world, so will he be on departing" (Chānd. 3.14.1). "Howsoever he meditates on him, such alone he becomes" (Śat. Br. 10.5.2, 20[3]). Hence it is established that during

[1] The C.S.S. ed. adds "Tan na"—"that is not so", p. 68.

[2] I.e. the form which is meditated on during bondage is the form which is attained later on during salvation.

[3] P. 725, line 13. Cf. a very similar passage in Mudg. 3, p. 384, lines 8-9.

the state of realization, the individual soul is to be conceived of in its state of release.

Here ends the section entitled "Existence in the body" (21).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 54 in the commentary of Śaṃkara, sūtra 53 in that of Bhāskara. Here they answer the Cārvāka view that the soul is identical with the body. They interpret the sūtra in the same way, only Śaṃkara reads: "tad-bhāvābhāvitvāt", instead of "tad-bhāva-bhāvitvāt". Thus, according to him, the sūtra means: "(The soul is) different (from the body), not (identical) because the existence (of consciousness) does not depend on the existence of that (viz. the body), as in the case of perception". That is, consciousness is not a quality of the body, since even where the body is present, there may be no consciousness, e.g. in the case of a dead body. Hence just as perception is other than the object perceived, so consciousness is other than the conscious body.[1]

According to Bhāskara, the sūtra means: "(The soul is) different (from the body) not (identical) because the existence of (the qualities of the body) depend on the existence of that (viz. the body), as in the case of perception". That is, consciousness cannot be an attribute of the body, since an attribute of the body exists when the body exists. But consciousness does not exist always when the body does, e.g. in a dead body.[2] Hence the two explanations are identical in spite of the difference of reading. Bhāskara's reading is preferable.

Rāmānuja

Interpretation same, only the phrase "upalabdhivat" interpreted differently, viz. just as the realization of Brahman, enjoined in Scripture, means the realization of His real form, so exactly, self-realization too means the realization of the real form of the self.[3]

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[1] Ś.B. 3.3.54, p. 840.

[2] Bh. B. 3.3.53 (written as 3.3.54), p. 196.

[3] Śrī. B. 3.3.52, p. 337, vol. 2.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 56 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (three sūtras), concerned with an absolutely different topic, viz. different kinds of realizations in accordance with the different kinds of devotion. Hence the sūtra: "(During release, there is) no (perception of the Lord as possessed of the attributes) other (than those with which He was meditated upon in this life), on account of the existence (of the Lord) as having that nature (i.e. attributes) (during release), as in the case of knowledge". That is, when a man, conceiving a thing in a particular form, meditates on it as such, he obtains that thing in that particular form. Similarly, the devotees who meditates on the Lord as the Sweet, realizes Him as such during release; and who meditates on Him as the Majestic, realizes Him as such.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 22: The section entitled "Connected with the subsidiary parts". (Sūtras 53-54)

SŪTRA 53

"BUT (THE MEDITATIONS) CONNECTED WITH THE SUBSIDIARY PARTS, (ARE) NOT (RESTRICTED) TO (PARTICULAR) BRANCHES, FOR (THEY BELONG) TO EACH VEDA."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The meditations connected with the subsidiary parts of (sacrifices) like the udgītha, enjoined in the passage: "Let one meditate on this syllable 'Om' as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1 [2]) and so on, do not rest upon (their own) branches [3], but are connected with "each Veda", i.e. with all the branches [4], on account of the non-specification of the scriptural text about the udgītha.

[1] G.B. 3.3.56, p. 221, Chap. 3.
[2] Ś, R, Bh.
[3] C.S.S. ed. reads "Sva-śakhāsu", p. 68.
[4] C.S.S. ed. reads "Kutaḥ". *Op cit.*

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that at the time of meditation, the particular form (which the individual soul has) at that time should be disregarded, and (its) special form, as characterized by the manifested (attributes) of freedom from sins and so on, is to be conceived of. Similarly, here too, since a particular form can accomplish the end, the meditations may rest upon the particular forms of the udgītha and the rest, i.e. be based on them, in whatever special forms these udgītha and the rest are mentioned in whatever particular branches with whatever special accents,—this doubt (the author) dispels now by stating his own view.

The doubt is as to whether the meditations, founded on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts like the udgītha and the rest, such as: "Let one meditate on this syllable 'Om' as the udgītha" (Chānd, 1.1.1), "Let one meditate on the five-fold sāman in the worlds'. (Chānd. 2.1.1), "'Hymn, hymn', people say. The hymn is, forsooth, the earth" (Ait. Ār. 2.1.2 [1]), "This world, verily, is the piled up fire" (Śat. Br. 10.5.4, 1 [2]) and so on, enjoined in all the branches of all the Vedas, are based on those particular forms of the udgītha and the rest in which they are read in those particular branches in those special accents, or are connected with the udgītha and the rest contained in all the branches. Here the *prima facie* view is that on account of proximity, they are based on those particular forms of the udgītha and the rest in which these udgītha and the rest are read in those particular branches in those special accents, but are not connected with the udgītha and the rest presented in a different branch.

With regard to this, (the author) states the correct conclusion: "Connected with the subsidiary parts". The word "but" is meant for rejecting the *prima facie* view. Those meditations, "connected with the subsidiary parts", i.e. founded on the subordinate members of sacrifices, do not rest on the udgītha and the rest belonging to their own branches, but are connected with "each Veda", i.e. with the udgīthas and the rest represented in all the branches. The word "for" implies the reason, i.e. because in spite of the difference of the forms of the udgītha and the rest resulting from the difference of accents and so on, the scriptural text about the udgītha, viz. "Let one meditate

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[1] P. 101. [2] P. 798, line 17.

on the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1) and so on, lays down no specification, and thereby proximity is set aside.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 57 in his commentary. Here he illustrates the doctrine that the Lord is realized differently by different devotees in accordance with the kind of devotion with which they worship Him. Hence the sūtra: "But (the priests) are restricted to (particular) parts (of the sacrifice), (but are not appointed) to (all the) branches (of it), because (the parts are regulated) according to each Veda". That is, when a man is about to perform a sacrifice, he chooses several priests, all of whom are able to perform all the parts of it, and appoints them to certain offices. And, the priests, so appointed by their master, must perform only the portions allotted to them, and not the others, and receive the fee accordingly. Similarly, it is the will of the Lord which determines which particular path of devotion a soul should follow, i.e. whether they should meditate on Him as the Sweet, or as the Majestic,—and realize Him accordingly.[1]

SŪTRA 54

"OR, AS IN THE CASE OF THE SACRED FORMULÆ AND THE LIKE, (THERE IS) NO CONTRADICTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"As in the case of the sacred formulæ" like: "Thou art a cock" (M. Saṃ. 1.1.6[2]), or as in the case of preliminary offerings, there is "no contradiction" in applying meditations mentioned in one place to other places.

Vedānta-kaustubha

There is "no contradiction" in connecting meditations, set forth in one place, with the udgītha and the rest, set forth elsewhere, "as in the case of the sacred formulæ and the like." The

[1] G.B. 3.3.57, pp. 221-222, Chap. 3. [2] P. 6, line 14. Ś, Bh.

word "or" means 'and,' i.e. and just as the sacred formula which accompanies the taking of the stone for grinding the rice, viz. "Thou art a cock" (M. Saṃ. 1.1.6), mentioned in one place, is applicable in other places as well, so is the case here. By the words "and the like", it is meant that just as the preliminary offerings, mentioned in one place, are applicable in other places also (so is the case here). Hence, it is established that the meditations founded on the subordinate members (of sacrifices) like the udgītha and the rest, mentioned in one place, are connected with the udgītha and the rest, mentioned elsewhere.

Here ends the section entitled "Connected with the subsidiary parts" (22).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 58 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic, viz. the different modes of worshipping the Lord, by giving a second illustration, thus: "Or, as in the case of the sacred formulæ and the rest, (there is) no contradiction", that is, just as some formulæ are employed in many ceremonies,—some in two, some in one only,—so some men worship the Lord in several ways, i.e. with mixed sentiments or devotion, some only in one.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 23: The section entitled "The superiority of the plentitude". (Sūtra 55)

SŪTRA 55

"(THERE IS) SUPERIORITY OF THE PLENTITUDE, AS IN THE CASE OF A SACRIFICE, FOR THUS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to the Vaiśvānara-vidyā[2], the meditation on the aggregate is commended, just as there is a single performance of the

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[1] G.B. 3.3.58, pp. 222-223, Chap. 3.

[2] See under Br. Sū. 3.3.31.

Paurṇa-māsa sacrifice and the rest together with the subsidiary parts. Thus, the scriptural text: '"Your head would have fallen off if you had not come to me"' (Chānd. 5.12.2 [1]), designating the fault involved in the meditation on each limb, shows the excellence of the meditation on the aggregate.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that in accordance with scriptural statements, meditations mentioned in one place are applicable to other places. Why should we not, then, meditate on the parts in the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, in accordance with scriptural statement?—To this objection (the author) replies:

In the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, from the questions and answers of the six sages, viz. Prācīnaśāla and the rest and king Kekaya, we learn of a meditation on the Vaiśvānara (or the Universal Soul) in its separate aspect, viz. the heavenly world, the sun, the wind, the ether, the earth,—as well as in its aggregative aspect. Here the doubt is, viz. whether one should meditate on the separate parts or on the aggregate. On the suggestion that in accordance with the scriptural texts laying down an injunction regarding the meditation on the separate parts, one should meditate on the separate parts,—

We reply: There is "superiority", i.e. excellence, "of the plenitude," i.e. of the meditation on the aggregate alone, and not of the meditations on the separate parts,—since the object to be meditated on being Vaiśvānara alone, having (different) limbs like the heaven as its head and so on, the beginning and the end form a connected whole. "As in the case of a sacrifice." That is, just as the single performance of sacrifices like Paurṇa-māsa and the rest in their entirety is intended to be designated, but not of the separate parts like the preliminary offerings and the rest, so is the case here also. "For," the scriptural text, designating the fault involved in the meditation on the separate parts, viz.: '"Your head would have fallen off had you not come to me"' (Chānd. 5.12.2), '"You would have become blind had you not come to me"' (Chānd. 5.13.2) and so on, "shows" "thus", i.e. that the meditation on the aggregate alone is to be undertaken and not meditation on the separate parts.

It is not to be said also that (on the above view) the texts enjoining meditating on the separate parts will become meaningless,

[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

viz. those beginning with the question of the king: "'Auhamanyava, whom do you worship as the soul?' 'The heaven alone, O reverend king.' He said: 'The brightly shining one whom you worship as the soul is verily the universal soul'" (Chānd. 5.12.1 [1]) and so on,—since as it is the meditation on the aggregate which is to be enjoined through the explanatory reiterations of the meditations on the separate parts, those texts are concerned with explanatory reiterations only. Moreover, having rejected the meditation on the separate parts, Scripture mentions the result of the meditation on the aggregate only thus: "He eats food in all the worlds, in all beings, in all selves" (Chānd. 5.18.1). Hence, it is established that the meditation on the aggregate alone is to be undertaken.

Here ends the section entitled "The superiority of the plentitude" (23).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 59 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with an altogether different topic, viz. the meditation on the Lord as possessed of the attribute of plurality or manifoldness. Hence the sūtra: "On account of the pre-eminence of (the attribute of) muchness, (the Lord is to be meditated on as possessed of this attribute), as in the case of a sacrifice, for thus (Scripture, i.e. Chānd. 7.2.3, 1) shows". That is, just as a sacrifice is a sacrifice even when the sacrificer first begins it, and remains a sacrifice even when he has finished it, and just as this conception of the sacrifice is the most essential element involved in all sacrifices, so the manifoldness of the Lord, i.e. His appearing in many forms, is the most essential of all His attributes, and therefore must be included in all meditations on Him.[2]

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[1] Quotation given in the text is all wrong.

[2] G.B. 3.3.59, pp. 224-225, Chap. 3.

Adhikaraṇa 24: The section entitled "Difference of words". (Sūtra 56)

SŪTRA 56

"(THE VIDYĀS ARE) DIVERSE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE OF WORDS AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is diversity among the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā and the rest. Why? "On account of the difference of words and so on" regarding them.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, by showing [1] that in spite of Brahman, the object to be meditated on, being one and the same, there are diverse meditations as there are different texts about them and so on, (the author) is after that removing the following doubt: It has been pointed out immediately above that in spite of there being injunctive texts regarding the meditations on the separate parts, the meditation on the Whole is the best of all, as the object meditated on is everywhere the same. Similarly, in spite of there being injunctive texts regarding different kinds of meditations on Brahman, such as the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā and the rest, all these meditations must be one and the same, as the object meditated on is everywhere the same (viz. Brahman).

The doubt is as to whether all the meditations on Brahman which result in final emancipation, consisting in the attainment of Brahman, viz. the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā [2], the Bhūma-vidyā [3], the Sad-vidyā [4], the Dahara-vidyā [5], the Upakosala-vidyā [6], the Vaiśvānara-vidyā [7], the Ānandamaya-vidyā [8], the Akṣara-vidyā [9], and so on,

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[1] Here the śatṛ-suffix implies reason. [2] Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.31.

[3] Bhūma-vidyā or the doctrine of the Plenty taught by Sanatkumāra to Nārada. Vide Chānd. 7.13. Vide also V.K. 1.3.8.

[4] Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.35. [5] Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.31.

[6] *Op. cit.* [7] *Op. cit.*

[8] Ānandamaya-vidyā or the doctrine of the Self consisting of bliss. Vide Tait. 2.

[9] Akṣara-vidyā or the doctrine of the Imperishable taught to Gārgī by Yājñavalkya. Vide Bṛh. 3.8. Vide also V.K. 3.3.33.

as well as the Prāṇa-vidyā[1] and the rest which have a special object and a special result, are to be undertaken collectively or separately. The *prima facie* view is that though there are injunctions with regard to each of the meditations, yet as the object to be meditated on is everywhere the same, they are to be undertaken collectively.

With regard to it, we reply: "Diverse". The meditations are diverse. Why? "On account of the difference of words and so on," i.e. as there are different texts about them like: 'Knows', 'Let one meditate', 'Let one form a resolution' (Chānd. 3.14.1), "But let one desire to enquire into the Plenty" (Chānd. 7.2.3, 1), "Let one meditate on Truth" (Bṛh. 4.1.4) and so on. The sense is this: Though the object to be meditated on is the same, yet these meditations are not exactly identical, since the object to be meditated on has different forms, as (variously) qualified by the special attributes mentioned in the texts designating those special meditations. By the words "and so on" other grounds, besides texts, for taking sacrificial acts as different, as demonstrated in the section concerned with that topic[2], viz. repetition, number, name, attribute and context, are to be understood. These establish that the meditations are different here too.

Here ends the section entitled "Difference of words" (24).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 60 in his commentary. He too takes it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, but interprets it in a sectarian manner thus: "(The meditations on the different forms of the Lord are) different, on account of the difference of words and so on. That is, the meditation on Kṛṣṇa, e.g., is different from the meditation on Nṛsiṃha, because the two words 'Kṛṣṇa' and 'Nṛsiṃha' are different, their forms are different and their mantras too are different.[3]

[1] Prāṇa-vidyā or the doctrine of the primacy of the vital-breath. Vide Bṛh. 6.1; Praśna 2; Kaus. 3. Vide also V.K. 3.3.10.

[2] Vide Pū. Mī. Sū. 2.2.1 ff.

[3] G.B. 3.3.60, p. 225, Chap. 3.

Adhikaraṇa 25: The section entitled "Option". (Sūtras 57-58)

SŪTRA 57

"(THERE IS) OPTION, ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DISTINCTION OF THE RESULT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It has been shown that the various meditations (on Brahman) are not identical but different from one another. There is "option" of performance with regard to them, "on account of the non-distinction of result".

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated above that the meditations are 'diverse'. Now, the mode of performing them, having the attainment of Brahman as their result, is being considered.

The doubt is as to whether these Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, Bhūma-vidyā, Sad-vidyā and the rest, which result in the attainment of Brahman, are to be undertaken collectively or optionally. On the suggestion that like the Agni-hotra, Daśa-pūrṇa-māsa and the rest, they are to be undertaken collectively.—

(The author) says: "Option", i.e. any one alone is to be undertaken. Why? "On account of the non-distinction of the result," i.e. because all the meditations on Brahman lead, without distinction, to the attainment of His nature. That is to say, as our purpose is served through one alone, it is not necessary for us to perform all the rest. Compare the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: "The knower of Brahman attains the highest" (Tait. 2.1), '"My devotees go to me even"' (Gītā 7.23) and so on.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 61 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with showing that the meditations on the different forms of the Lord, such as Kṛṣṇa, Rāma and so on,

are optional, since any one of them leads to release. Hence, the devotee should choose one form and stick to it.[1]

SŪTRA 58

"BUT (THE MEDITATIONS BRINGING ABOUT) OBJECTS OF DESIRE MAY BE COMBINED TOGETHER OR NOT AT WILL, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF THE FORMER REASON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no restriction with regard to the performance of (meditations) having results other than the attainment of Brahman, "on account of the absence of the former reason", which involves such a restriction.

Vedānta-kaustubha

This aphorism supplies a counter-instance with a view to confirming the stated view.

"But the (meditations leading to) objects of desire," i.e. the symbolic meditations having results other than the attainment of Brahman, set forth in the texts: "Verily, he who meditates on Name as Brahman comes to have freedom of movement as far as Name goes" (Chānd. 7.1.5), "He who knows this wind thus as the child of the quarters, mourns not for a son" (Chānd. 3.15.2) and so on, "may be combined together or not at will", like the sacrificial acts which bring about heaven and the rest as results. Why? "On account of the absence of the former reason," i.e. on account of their not having the same result. Hence it is established that just as (the meditations) which have results other than the attainment of Brahman are to be undertaken at one's will, without any restriction, by those who aim at those results, so, contrarily to them, (the meditations) which have the attainment of Brahman as their result are to be undertaken optionally by one who desires for salvation, as all these meditations produce the very same result.

Here ends the section entitled "Option" (25).

[1] G.B. 3.3.61, p. 226, Chap. 3.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 61 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation like Nimbārka's.

Adhikaraṇa 26: The section entitled "Of the same nature as the bases".[1] (Sūtras 59–64)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 59–62)

SŪTRA 59

"(THE MEDITATIONS BASED) ON THE SUBSIDIARY PARTS (OF SACRIFICES) ARE OF THE SAME NATURE AS THEIR BASES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

(The author) raises an objection, viz. On account of numerous indicatory marks, there is a regular inclusion in sacrifices of the meditations based on their subsidiary parts like the udgītha and the rest.

The meditations based on the udgītha and the rest are of the nature of subsidiary parts like the udgītha.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out that the meditations aiming at objects of desire are to be practised at will. Now, although it has been pointed out under the aphorism: "Non-restriction with regard to the specification of that" (Br. Sū. 3.3.41) that those meditations also which are based on the subsidiary parts of sacrifices may be included in those sacrifices at will,—yet with a view to confirming it strongly, (the author) raises an objection, viz. that as these (meditations on the subsidiary parts of sacrifices) subserve those sacrifices, as the subsidiary parts themselves do, they are to be included in sacrifices regularly.

On the doubt, viz. whether the meditations which are based on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, such as the udgītha and the

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[1] Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.41, where the topic has already been treated.

rest, as set forth in the passages: "Let one meditate on the syllable 'Om' as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1) and so on, are to be included regularly in the sacrificial acts like the subsidiary parts themselves, or at will—(the *prima facie* objector says:) Regularly like the subsidiary parts themselves. So he says: "In the subsidiary parts" and so on. That is, with regard to the sacrificial acts, the meditations based on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts are "of the same nature as their bases". The means, just as the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, like the udgītha and the rest, are subsidiary parts, so are the meditations based on them.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 63 in his commentary. He too begins an adhikaraṇa here (continuing up to the end of the chapter), but concerned with an altogether different topic, viz. the meditation on the various limbs of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "In the limbs (of the Lord), (the qualities or gestures), appropriate to them (are to be meditated on)". That is, one should meditate on the eyes of the Lord benevolent, the face as smiling and so on".[1]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 60

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF TEACHING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the teaching, viz. "Let one meditate on the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1[2]), there is a regular inclusion.

Vedānta-kaustubha

And as the passage teaches that these meditations are based on the udgītha: "Let one meditate on the udgītha" (Chand. 1.1.1), there is a regular inclusion of the meditation in sacrificial works.

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[1] G.B. 3.3.63, p. 230, Chap. 3. [2] R, Śk.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 64 in his commentary. He reads "Śiṣṭaiś Ca" instead of "Śiṣṭeś Ca". He continues here the topic of the meditation on the limbs of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "And (such a meditation is performed) by those who are taught".[1]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 61

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF COMBINATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the performance together of the praṇava and the udgītha, in accordance with the text: "From the seat of the Hotṛ[2] simply, he sets right the wrong utterances of the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.5.5[3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And on account of the combination," i.e. performance together, of the praṇava, mentioned in the Ṛg-veda, and udgītha, mentioned in the Sāma-veda, in accordance with the text: "From the seat of the Hotṛ simply, he sets right the wrong utterances of the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.5.5), it is known that there is a regular inclusion of meditation in sacrificial acts. Owing to the potency of the combination of the praṇava and the udgītha, the priest who chants the udgītha sets right the 'bad udgītha', i.e. that udgītha which, though chanted by himself, has been chanted wrongly owing to the lack of his proper knowledge of accents and so on, 'from the seat of the Hotṛ', i.e. by means of the work of the Hotṛ, viz. the act of reciting,—this is the meaning of the scriptural text.

[1] G.B. 3.3.64, p. 230, Chap. 3.
[2] One of the four kinds of officiating priests who recites the Ṛgveda.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 65 in his commentary. It may be objected that a Chāndogya text (Chānd. 1.6.7) mentions only the lotus-like eyes of the Lord, but not His other limbs. Hence this text must be defective. The answer is: "(There is) no (discrepancy in this text) on account of comprehensiveness". The word "na" (=no) is to be supplied from sūtra 3.3.67. The sense is that the description of the eyes only must be supposed to involve the description of other members of the body of the Lord, and hence the description is not defective.[1]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 62

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL TEXT ABOUT THE COMMONNESS OF ATTRIBUTES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the scriptural text about the commonness of attribute," viz. "Thereby this triad . . . . [2] exists" (Chānd. 1.1.9 [3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

And on account of the scriptural mention of the commonness of "attribute", i.e. of the Om-kāra, the basis of meditation, in all sacrificial works, thus: "Thereby this triad . . . . . exists" (Chānd. 1.1.9). The meaning is that 'thereby', i.e. by the Om-kāra, the basis of meditation, 'the triad exists', i.e. the works mentioned in the three Vedas proceed.[4] The sense is that those meditations too which are based on

[1] G.B. 3.3.65, p. 231, Chap. 3.

[2] Correct quotation: "Tenāyaṃ trayī vidyā vartate".

[3] Ś, R, Śk.

[4] The text continues: "With 'Om' the Adhvaryyu gives orders, with 'Om' the Hotṛ recites, with 'Om' the Udgātṛ sings".

the subsidiary parts are to be regularly included in those sacrifices, just like the subsidiary parts themselves.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 66 in his commentary. He continues here the topic of the meditation on the limbs of the Lord. He takes this to be setting forth a *prima facie* view. Hence the sūtra: "(Every limb of the Lord must be meditated on as possessed of the powers or attributes of all the rest), on account of a scriptural text about the commonness of attributes." That is, a text in the Bhagavad-gītā, viz. "Everywhere that has hands and feet" (Gītā 13.14), shows that every limb of the Lord can discharge the function of every other limb. Hence every member must be so meditated on.[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 63-64)

SŪTRA 63

"OR NOT, ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURE NOT DECLARING (THEIR) ACCOMPANYING (SACRIFICES)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no fixed rule that the meditations on the subsidiary parts of sacrifices are to be included always in those sacrifices, just like the subsidiary parts themselves, since Scripture does not declare them to be subsidiary parts of sacrifices.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now (the author) refutes it.

The statement that there is a regular inclusion, in sacrificial acts, of the meditations based on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts,

[1] G.B. 3.3.66, p. 231, Chap. 3.

such as the udgītha, like those subsidiary parts themselves, is not tenable. Why? "On account of Scripture not declaring (their) accompanying." That is, Scripture declares that the subsidiary parts of sacrifices should always accompany the sacrifices themselves. Compare the text: "Having taken the graha [1], having raised the camas [2], he should begin the stotra [3] (Tait. Saṃ. 3.1.2, 4 [4]). But there is no such declaration about the meditations (on the subsidiary parts).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 67 in his commentary. Here he refutes the *prima facie* view, mentioned in the previous sūtra, thus: "Or not, (i.e. every limb of the Lord is to be meditated on as possessed of its peculiar attributes only), because there is no scriptural text (to the effect that it is to be meditated on) as accompanied by (the attributes of other limbs)".[5]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 64

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

This is so also because the scriptural text: "Verily, the Brāhmaṇa priest who knows (or meditates) thus protects the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all officiating priests" (Chānd. 4.7.10 [6]) shows that

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[1] A graha is a vessel used for taking out a portion of fluid from a larger vessel, especially a vessel used for taking up the soma-juice.

[2] A camasa is a vessel used at sacrifices for drinking the soma-juice.

[3] A hymn of praise.

[4] P. 247, lines 14-15.

[5] G.B. 3.3.67, p. 232, Chap. 3.

[6] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

there is no fixed rule that these meditations are to be regularly included (in the sacrifices).

Here ends the third section of the third quarter of the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts, by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Further, as declared by Scripture itself, there is indeed no fixed rule that the meditations based on the subsidiary parts of sacrifices are to be regularly included in those sacrifices. The scriptural text: "Verily, the Brāhmaṇa priest who knows (or meditates) thus protects the sacrifice, the sacrificer and all officiating priests" (Chānd. 4.7.10), designating the protecting of all sacrifices, sacrificers and the rest of the knowers by the Brāhmaṇa priest, shows that there is no fixed rule about the regular inclusion of meditations.[1] Hence it is established that there is no regular inclusion, in sacrificial acts, of the meditations based on their subsidiary parts, like the udgītha and the rest, but only optional inclusion, like the milking-vessel.[2]

Here ends the section entitled "Of the same nature as the bases" (26).

Here ends the third section of the third quarter of the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the sect of the holy Sanatkumāra.

[1] For if meditation were included regularly in all sacrificial acts, then all priests would have such a knowledge and so the text would not have specially announced that a Brāhmaṇa priest who possesses such a knowledge protects others.

[2] See under V.P. 3.3.41.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 68 in his commentary. "And because it is seen." That is, it is more natural to suppose the eyes to see, the ears to hear and so on than to suppose every other member. Hence the conclusion is that every member of the body of the Lord is to be meditated on as (endowed with its own attributes).[1]

Résumé

The third quarter of the third chapter contains:

(1) 64 sūtras and 26 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
(2) 66 sūtras and 36 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
(3) 64 sūtras and 26 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
(4) 65 sūtras and 34 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
(5) 64 sūtras and 36 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
(6) 68 sūtras and 34 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṃkara breaks each of the sūtras 35 and 46 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras.

Rāmānuja inverts the order of sūtras 31 and 32 in Nimbārka's commentary.

Bhāskara breaks sūtra 46 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras.

Śrīkaṇṭha inverts the order of sūtras 29-30, and 31-32 in Nimbārka's commentary.

Baladeva breaks each of sūtras 3, 35, 46 and 48 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras.

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[1] G.B. 3.3.68, p. 232, Chap. 3.

THIRD CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FOURTH QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "The end of men". (Sūtras 1-20)

SŪTRA 1

"THE END OF MEN (ARISES) FROM THIS, ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL STATEMENT, SO BĀDARĀYAṆA THINKS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Brahman can be attained through knowledge [1], "on account of the scriptural statement", viz.: "The knower of Brahman attains the highest" (Tait. 2.1 [2]) "so" the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the previous quarter, discussions about the non-difference of meditations, the consequent combination or non-combination of details and so on were undertaken. Now, in this quarter, the problem as to whether the end of men arises from knowledge or from action, its subsidiary part, and so on is being discussed.

On the doubt, viz. whether the end of men results from knowledge or from action, a subsidiary part of meditation, first (the author) begins with the correct conclusion. The end, i.e. the purpose, of men, viz. the attainment of Brahman, arises "from this", i.e. from knowledge. Why? "On account of scriptural statement," i.e. on account of scriptural statements like: "The knower of the self crosses over grief" (Chānd. 7.1.3), "Verily, he who knows the Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman indeed" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.9), "The knower of Brahman attains the highest" (Tait. 2.1), "He attains all the worlds"

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[1] That is, knowledge leading to meditation, not knowledge in the Śaṃkarite sense.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

(Chānd. 8.7.1, 2.3; 8.12.6)[1], "I know this great person of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness" (Vj.S. 31.18; Śvet. 3.8), "Knowing him thus one becomes immortal on earth; there is no other way to salvation" (Tait. Ār. 3.12[2]), "Just as the flowing rivers merge in the sea, discarding names and forms, so a knower, freed from name and form, attains the celestial Person, higher than the high" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.8), "When the seer sees the Golden-coloured creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahma, then the knower, having discarded merit and demerit, stainless attains the highest equality" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3) and so on,—"so" the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

The word "puruṣārtha" does not mean only 'salvation' according to him, but all the four ends of men, viz. religious merit, wealth, enjoyment and salvation. The *prima facie* view is that meditation brings about salvation only and not heaven and the rest. The answer is that not only salvation, but all the four end of men arise from meditation.[3]

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 2–7)

SŪTRA 2

"ON ACCOUNT OF BEING COMPLEMENTARY, (THE STATEMENTS ABOUT THE FRUITS) ARE GLORIFICATION OF THE MAN, JUST AS IN OTHER CASES, SO JAIMINI (THINKS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As knowledge effects the purification of the agent who is a subsidiary part of action, it is but a subsidiary part of action, on account of the agent "being complementary" to action. The scriptural statement about the fruit is "glorification", just like the scrip-

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[1] Correct quotation: "Sarvāṃś ca", vide Chānd., p. 440.
[2] P. 199.
[3] G.B. 3.4.1.

tural statement about the fruit, viz. the hearing of non-sinful verses, with reference to the objects made of the parṇa-wood.[1]

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having thus begun with the correct conclusion of the Upaniṣads, now (the author) is stating the *prima facie* view.

Knowledge is a subsidiary part of action. Why? "On account of being complementary," i.e. because the self, which to be known, stands in a complementary relation to action, in consequence of being the agent, i.e. because any effort towards acts having heaven and the rest as their ends is possible if there be the knowledge of the self as different from the body and the rest on the part of the agent. Hence as knowledge effects the purification of the agent, it too is a subsidiary element of action[2]. The scriptural statements about the fruit, on the other hand, such as: "The knower of the self crosses over grief" (Chānd. 7.1.3), "The knower of Brahman attains the highest" (Tait. 2.1) and so on, may be taken as a "glorification of the man", i.e. mere glorification, "just as in other cases", i.e. just as in the case of objects, purification and acts, the scriptural statements about the fruit are mere glorifications.

Thus, with regard to objects, there is the passage: "He whose sacrificial ladle is made of the parṇa-wood does not hear sinful verse" (Tait. Saṃ. 3.5.7[3]); with regard to purification, the passage: "He who anoints his eyes wards off the eye of his enemy"; and with regard to acts, the passage: "He who performs the prayāja and the anuyāja sacrifices makes, forsooth, an armour for this sacrifice" and

[1] The object, viz. the ladle, made of the parṇa-wood, is a subsidiary part of the sacrifice and hence the fruit ascribed to it, viz. the hearing of non-sinful verses, subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, i.e. glorifies it. Similarly, the agent, i.e. the sacrificer, is a subsidiary part of sacrifice, and hence the fruit ascribed to the knowledge of the self of the sacrificer subserves the sacrifice, i.e. glorifies it, but such a knowledge has no independent fruit of its own.

[2] That is, the agent, the sacrificer, cannot undertake the performance of sacrifices, leading to heaven and so on, unless he first knows that his soul is different from and survives the body, for evidently the body does not go to heaven, but the soul only. This knowledge of the real nature of the self as distinct from the body, therefore, qualifies the agent for undertaking the performance of sacrifices and as such is a complementary factor of sacrifices.

[3] P. 311, lines 23-24, vol. 1.

so on. It has been said: "The statement about the end attained with regard to substance, quality and purification must be glorification, because they subserve the purpose of another" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 4.3.1 [1]). So is the case here too,—"so" the teacher "Jaimini" thinks.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 3

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE OBSERVATION OF CONDUCT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of the conduct of Janaka and others as declared by the scriptural text: "Verily, Janaka, the king of Videha, performed a sacrifice in which many presents were given" (Bṛh. 3.1.1 [2]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected that in accordance with the aphorisms, viz.: "Not the other, on account of inappropriateness" (Br. Sū. 1.1.17), "And on account of the designation of difference" (Br. Sū. 1.1.22), "And on account of inappropriateness, not the embodied one" (Br. Sū. 1.2.3) and so on; in accordance with the scriptural texts, viz.: "The eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious, the one among the many, who grants desires" (Kaṭha 5.13; Śvet. 6.13), "There are two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord" (Śvet. 1.9), "The Lord of matter and soul, the controller of qualities, the cause of transmigratory existence, salvation, continuance and bondage" (Śvet. 6.16), "He is the cause, the lord of the lord of the sense-organs" (Śvet. 6.9), "He who is omniscient and all-knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7) and so on; and in accordance with the Smṛti-texts, viz.: '"Because I surpass the perishable and am superior to the imperishable also, I am celebrated in world and in the Veda as the highest Person"' (Gītā 15.18) and so on, the Highest Self, different in nature from the individual soul,

[1] P. 487, vol. 1.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, B.

has been established as the object to be known. He is not complementary to action. Hence the knowledge relating to Him is not a subsidiary part of action,—

(We reply:) On the ground of the indicatory marks mentioned by the Vedānta-texts themselves, the Vedānta-texts are concerned with the real nature of the agent, different from his body. Those indicatory marks are being stated.

As Janaka and others, possessed of the knowledge of Brahman, are said to perform Sacrifices, etc., with knowledge, by scriptural and Smṛti texts like: "Verily, Janaka, the king of Videha, performed a sacrifice in which many presents were given" (Bṛh. 3.1.1), "For by work alone Janaka and others attained to perfection" (Gītā 3.20) and so on, knowledge is a subsidiary part of action.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 4

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL STATEMENT ABOUT THAT." [1]

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the scriptural statement" about the subserviency of knowledge to action, viz.: "What alone one does with knowledge, with faith, with the mystic doctrine, that alone becomes more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"That," i.e. the fact that knowledge is a subsidiary part of action, is indeed reasonable. Why? "On account of the scriptural statement", viz.: "What alone one does with knowledge, with faith and the mystic doctrine, that alone becomes more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10).

[1] Note that while Nimbārka understands the word "tac chruteḥ" as a compound word and explains it as "tasya śruteḥ", Śrīnivāsa understands it as "Tat śruteḥ"—two separate words.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 5

"ON ACCOUNT OF LAYING HOLD OF."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because the association of knowledge and work is declared by the text: "Knowledge and work lay hold of him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

On account of the scriptural statement about the association of knowledge and work too, viz. "Knowledge and work lay hold of him" (Chand. 1.1.10), it is known that knowledge is a subsidiary part of work.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 6

"ON ACCOUNT OF ENJOINMENT (OF WORK) ON THE PART OF ONE HAVING THAT (VIZ. KNOWLEDGE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And "on account of the enjoinment" of work [2] in the passage: "Having studied the Veda in the house of a teacher in accordance with rules in (the leisure) time left over from doing work for the teacher, having returned to his own home, studying his sacred text in some clean spot" (Chānd. 8.15.1 [3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"On account of the enjoinment" of work "on the part of one having that", i.e. on the part of one possessed of the knowledge of

[1] *Op. cit.*
[2] The C.S.S. ed., p. 71, adds "on the part of one possessed of knowledge".
[3] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

all the Vedas, by the scriptural text, viz.: "Having studied the Veda in the house of a teacher, according to rules in time left over from doing work for the teacher, having returned to his own home, studying his sacred text in a clean spot" (Chānd. 8.15.1), knowledge is a subsidiary part of work.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 7

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF RESTRICTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the restriction," viz.: "Only doing work here, let one desire to live a hundred years", and so on (Īśā 2) [1].

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And on account of the restriction," viz.: "Only doing work here, let one desire to live a hundred years. Thus work adheres to you, to a man. There is no other way than that" (Īśā 2), knowledge is subservient to work alone.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 8–20)

SŪTRA 8

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF WHAT IS SUPERIOR, SUCH (IS THE VIEW) OF BĀDARĀYAṆA, ON ACCOUNT OF THAT BEING SEEN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it, we reply:

"On account of the teaching" of the Lord of all, the controller of all, who is "superior to" the individual soul, the agent, as the object

[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

to be known,—the view of the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" is that "the end of men arises from this" (Br. Sū. 3.4.1), "On account of that being seen" from the texts: "He is the Lord of all" (Bṛh. 4.4.22 [1]), "Entered within, the ruler of men" (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2 [2]), "The ruler of all, the controller of all" (Bṛh. 4.4.22 [3]), "I ask about that Person taught in the Upaniṣads" (Bṛh. 3.9.26 [4]), "The word which all the Vedas record" (Kaṭha 2.15 [5]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

On this suggestion, (the author) replies:

The word "but" is for disposing of the *prima facie* view. The view of Jaimini,—that by way of effecting the purification of what is complementary to work, viz. the agent, knowledge, obtainable from the Upaniṣads, is a subsidiary part of work,—is not correct. On the contrary, "on account of the teaching of what is superior" to the individual soul, the agent, possessed of the stated marks, i.e. as the Highest Person,—the soul of all, free by nature from all faults, an abode of a mass of auspicious qualities, possessed of natural, infinite and inauspicious powers, the cause of the world, the Lord of matter and soul and the Lord of all,—is taught as the object of knowledge, as He alone is established as the object to be known by the Vedāntas, the end of men arises from knowledge,—"such" is the view of the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa". Why? "On account of that being seen," i.e. because texts are found which establish "that", viz. the Highest Self alone, the object to be known, i.e. a multitude of texts are found establishing Him, such as: "All this has that for its self" (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), "Higher than the imperishable, the high" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2), "Free from sins, ageless, deathless, griefless, without hunger, without thirst, having true desires, having true resolves" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3), "He who is omniscient, all-knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), "He consists of infinite auspicious qualities.—He is possessed of might, power, lordship and supreme knowledge" (V.P. 6.5.84 [6]), "Supreme is his power, declared to be of various kinds, and natural is the operation of his knowledge and might" (Śvet. 6.8), "He is the cause, the lord of the lord of the sense-organs" (Śvet. 6.9),

[1] R.
[2] P. 181. Not quoted by others.
[3] *Op. cit.*
[4] *Op. cit.*
[5] *Op. cit.*
[6] P. 837.

"The lord of matter and souls" (Śvet. 6.16), "The word which all the Vedas record" (Kaṭha 2.15), '"I ask that Person taught in the Upaniṣads"' (Bṛh. 3.9.26), '"I am the source of all, everything originates from me"' (Gītā 10.8), '"There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya" ' (Gītā 7.7), '"And by all the Vedas I alone am to be known" ' (Gītā 15.15) and so on.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He interprets the sūtra thus:

"But on account of the teaching (of vidyā as) more than (or superior to) (karma)—." [1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 9

"BUT THE SCRIPTURAL DECLARATION IS EQUAL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The scriptural declaration,"—viz.: '"For what purpose shall we study, for what purpose shall we perform sacrifices"' [2] and so on,—establishing that knowledge is not a subsidiary part of work, is of equal weight.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: "On account of conduct being seen" (Br. Sū. 3.4.3), knowledge is a subsidiary part of work,—we reply:

"The scriptural declaration" of the non-performance of works by knowers, establishing that knowledge is not a subsidiary part of action, is of equal weight, such as: "Knowing this, forsooth, the sages descended from Kavaṣa said: 'For what purpose shall we study, for what purpose shall we perform sacrifices?'", "Knowing this,

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[1] G.B. 3.4.8, pp. 240-241, Chap. 1.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

indeed, those ancient ones did not perform the Agni-hotra sacrifice" (Kauṣ. 2.5 [1]), "Verily, having known that self, the Brāhmaṇas, rising above the desires for sons, the desires for wealth,—[2] live the life of mendicants" (Bṛh. 3.5.1). Our view is that the performance of works without any desire for results, but only with a desire for knowledge, is justified. This (the author) will state under the aphorism "And reference to all, on account of the scriptural text about sacrifice and so on, as in the case of a horse" (Br. Sū. 3.4.26). It has been stated by the Lord too thus: '"By work also, Janaka and others attained perfection"' (Gītā 3.20), and '"The knowers should similarly act without attachment, desiring the welfare of the world"' (Gītā 3.25). The sense is that if we hold that knowledge is a subsidiary part of work, then the scriptural text about the non-performance of work will come to be contradicted.[3]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 10

"(THE TEXT QUOTED BY THE *prima facie* OBJECTOR IS) NON-UNIVERSAL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The scriptural text, viz.: "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10 [4]) is not concerned with all sorts of knowledge.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: "On account of the scriptural statement of that" (Br. Sū. 3.4.4), we reply:

[1] For correct quotation see Kauṣ., p. 114.

[2] 'Desires for worlds.'

[3] I.e. if we hold that knowledge is not a subsidiary part of work, then those texts which do enjoin the performance of works on the part of knowers may very well be explained as enjoining the performance of works in a purely disinterested spirit with a view to the attainment of knowledge. But if we hold that knowledge is a subsidiary part of work, then those scriptural texts which enjoin the non-performance of action cannot be explained in any way.

[4] Ś, R, Śk, Bh, B.

The scriptural text: "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10), referring to the udgītha alone, is "non-universal", i.e. is not concerned with all sorts of knowledge.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 11

"THE DIVISION (IS) AS IN THE CASE OF A HUNDRED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "Knowledge and work lay hold of him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2 [1]), "the division" is to be known just like the division of a hundred (coins) for the sake of a two-fold fruit.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: "On account of laying hold of" (Br. Sū. 3.4.5), we reply:

In the text: "Knowledge and work lay hold of him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2), a "division" is to be known, viz. knowledge lays hold of him for bringing about its own special result and work for its own special result, "as in the case of a hundred". That is, just as when for the accomplishment of two purposes it is said: 'give him a hundred (coins)', these are divided and fifty are given for one purpose, fifty for the other,—so is the case here.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 12

"ON THE PART OF ONE WHO HAS ONLY READ THE VEDA."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "Having studied the Veda in the house of a preceptor" (Chānd. 8.15.1 [2]), work is enjoined "on the part of one who has only read the Veda".

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[1] *Op. cit.* [2] Ś, R, Śk.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. "On account of the enjoinment on the part of one having that" (Br. Sū. 3.4.6), we reply:

In the text: "Having studied the Veda in the house of a preceptor" (Chānd. 8.15.1), work is enjoined "on the part of one who has only read" the Veda, but not on the part of one who possesses knowledge, so knowledge cannot be taken to be a subsidiary part of work. Though one who has not studied the Pūrva-tantra [1] may, in accordance with the injunction about the Vedic study, viz. "Let one study the Veda", labour with great care to master the Veda, and though he may attain a little knowledge, yet since he lacks the knowledge of the real nature of religious duties and the method of performing them, demonstrated in the Pūrva-tantra, he, as dependent on that tantra, comes to have a reading knowledge only of the Veda, but does not know the meaning thereof. The meaning of the Veda, on the other hand, according to the author of the Pūrva-tantra, is attainable through an investigation into that tantra. But, in our view, even one who after studying the Veda, has come to know the mystery of religious duties and even one who knows everything in a general way, is said to have only read the Veda, since he has not investigated into the Vedānta, designating Brahman, the primary meaning of all the Vedas. Work is enjoined in that text on the part of such a one, but not on the part of a knower,—such is the view of the reverend author of the aphorisms.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 13

"NOT (SO), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-SPECIFICATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And also because the text about restriction does not necessarily refer to the knower.

[1] I.e. the Pūrva-mimāṃsa.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection: "On account of restriction" (Br. Sū. 3.4.7), we reply;

It cannot be said on the ground of the text: "Only doing work here" (Īśā 2) that knowledge is a subsidiary part of work. Why? "On account of non-specification," i.e. because the text contains no specification, viz.: 'knowers doing work' and so on.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 14

"OR THE PERMISSION (OF WORK) IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EULOGY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The allowing of work to one who knows, viz. "only doing work here" (Īśā 2), is "for the purpose of eulogizing" knowledge.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Since the text begins with knowledge thus: "By the Lord all this is to be enveloped. Whatever is moving in this moving world, having that renounced, enjoy. Do not covet the wealth of any one" (Īśā 1), it is ascertained that it is specially concerned with the knower,—(the author) says:

"The permission," i.e. allowing of, work to a knower is "for the purpose of eulogizing" knowledge. Though doing work so long as he lives, a knower is not touched by karmas,—thus there is an eulogy of knowledge here, in accordance with the concluding text: "Thus, work adheres not to you, to a man, there is no other way than that" (Īśā 2), as well as in accordance with the statement by the Lord: '"Though ever doing all works, one who has resorted to me, attains the eternal and immutable place through my grace"' (Gītā 18.56), '"He who thus knows me is not bound by works"' (Gītā 4.14) and so on.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 15

"AND SOME (BRANCHES DESIGNATE THAT KNOWERS GIVE UP WORK) ACCORDING TO VOLUNTARY PROCEDURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For this very reason, "some" designate the voluntary giving up of the life of a house-holder by the knowers thus: '"What shall we do with progeny, we whose is this soul, this world?"' (Bṛh. 4.4.22 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Some," i.e. the members of one branch, record the giving up by the knowers of progeny and the rest, involving the performance of action, "according to voluntary procedure", i.e. voluntarily indeed, thus: "Knowing this, forsooth, those ancient ones did not wish for progeny", '"What shall we do with progeny, we whose is this soul, this world?"' (Bṛh. 4.4.22). The sense is that such a giving up of the life of a house-holder fits in if knowledge be not complementary to work, but not if it be so.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (eleven sūtras), concerned with the power of vidyā. He substitutes "Vā" in place of "Ca". Hence the sūtra means: "Or some (hold that a knower of Brahman may act) according to (his) liking". That is, such great is the glory of vidyā that one who has attained vidyā may act just as he likes, or omit to act yet be not subject to consequences, good or bad [2].

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

[2] G.B. 3.4.15, p. 250, Chap. 3.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 16

"AND (THERE IS) THE DESTRUCTION (OF WORK BY KNOWLEDGE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For this very reason texts declare "the destruction" of work by knowledge, thus "And his works perish, when he who is high and low is seen" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8[1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And" texts record "the destruction" of work,—the cause of the three kinds of miseries, and consisting in good and bad deeds,—by knowledge, thus: "The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are cut off and all his works perish, when he who is high and low is seen" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8) and so on. There are statements by the Lord too, viz. '"Him whose works are burnt off by knowledge the wise call a knower"' (Gītā 4.19), '"The fire of knowledge reduces all works to ashes, O Arjuna!"' (Gītā 4.3.7).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation same, but he is of the opinion that even prārabdha-karmas may be destroyed by vidyā.[2]

[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[2] G.B. 3.4.17, pp. 251-252, Chap. 3. "Yadyapi sarvāṇi karmāṇi nirdagdhum vidyā samarthā tathāpi tat-sampradāya-pracārārthaeśvarec chaiva dehārambhakam karma na nirdahati."

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 17

"AND (KNOWLEDGE ARISES) IN ONE WHO IS CHASTE FOR (SUCH A STAGE OF LIFE IS DECLARED) IN SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And" because knowledge is found to arise in those stages of life which are given to chastity, its independence is definitely ascertained. These (stages) are found in the scriptural text: "There are three branches of religious duty" (Chānd. 2.23.1 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Scripture declares that knowledge of Brahman arises even in those stages of life which are given to chastity, i.e. in which the duties of a house-holder are absent; and Scripture does not mention works, like Agni-hotra and the rest in them. This also proves that knowledge is something independent.

To the objection, viz. The text: "As long as he lives" contains a reference to works like Agni-hotra and the rest. Like these, those stages of life are not mentioned in the Veda,—we reply: "Because in scriptural text". Those stages of life are mentioned "in scriptural text", i.e. in the Veda, in passages like: "There are three branches of religious duty" (Chānd. 2.23.1), "And those who meditate on faith and austerity in the forest" (Chānd. 5.10.1), "Wishing for the world alone the mendicants wander forth" (Bṛh. 4.4.22). Hence there are indeed such stages of life. The scriptural text: "He performs the Agni-hotra sacrifice as long as he lives", on the other hand, refers to those who are attached to wordly life.

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtra 18)

SŪTRA 18

"(THERE IS ONLY) A REFERENCE (TO THOSE STAGES OF LIFE), JAIMINI (THINKS SO), ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING NO INJUNCTION, FOR (SCRIPTURE) CONDEMNS (SUCH STAGES OF LIFE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "There are three branches of religious duty" (Chānd. 2.23.1[1]), there is only a re-mention of those stages of life, in view of the fact that there is no injunctive word there. Also as the text: "He who extinguishes the gods" (Tait. Saṃ. 1.5.2[2]) contains a condemnation of other stages of life, such stages are not to be adopted,—such is the view of "Jaimini".

Vedānta-kaustubha

The statement that such stages of life are mentioned in scriptural texts and hence they exist,—is not justifiable, since when the section concerned with the injunction about the worship of the Sāman[3] has been fully expounded, Scripture, changing the subject, makes "a reference", i.e. a re-mention simply, in the text: "There are three branches of religious duty" (Chānd. 2.23.1), of those stages of life which are celebrated in Smṛti, with a view to eulogizing a separate meditation on Brahman as the praṇava, that being the subject of discussion; but does not enjoin them. Why? "On account of the absence of any injunctive text." And, scriptural texts like: "He who extinguishes the fire is the slayer of the hero among the gods" (Tait. Saṃ. 1.5.2), "After having brought an acceptable gift to the teacher do not cut off the line of progeny" (Tait. 1.11), "He who is childless does not possess the world" (Ait. Br. 33.1[4]) and so on, "condemn" other stages of life. Hence the stage of a house-holder is to be adopted and not other stages,—so the teacher "Jaimini" thinks.

[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[2] P. 57, lines 5-6, vol. 1. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[3] Vide Chānd. 2.22.
[4] P. 838, Ānandāśrama sans. series ed.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They read "acodanā" in place of "acodanāt",[1] and begin a new adhikaraṇa. Interpretation same.

Śrīkaṇṭha

He too begins a new adhikaraṇa here. Interpretation same.

Baladeva

He too reads "acodanā" and interprets this sūtra differently thus: "(There is a favourable) reference (to works in Scripture), Jaimini (thinks so), (there is) no injunction (with regard to the giving up of works), because (Scripture) condemns (such a giving up of works)". That is, here the opponent objects to the view that a knower may or may not act at will[2] by pointing out that even a knower cannot give up all works. All that he is at liberty to do is to perform the obligatory duties at any time he likes unlike ordinary men who must do them at the fixed time only,—but cannot altogether omit them.[3]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 19

"(THEY ARE) TO BE ADOPTED, BĀDARĀYAṆA (THINKS SO), ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION OF EQUALITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since in the text concerned with explanatory re-mention,[4] the other stage of life is mentioned as equal to the stage of a house-

[1] S.B. 3.4.18, p. 863; Bh. B. 3.4.18, p. 204.
[2] Vide G.B. 3.4.15.
[3] G.B. 3.4.18, pp. 254-255, Chap. 3.
[4] Viz. Chānd. 2.23.1.

holder, the former "is to be adopted",—so the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The other stage of life "is to be adopted",—so the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks. Why? "On account of the scriptural mention of equality," i.e. because the other stage of life is mentioned in Scripture as equal to the stage of a house-holder. Thus, in the text: "There are three branches of knowledge, sacrifice, study and charity are the first; austerity alone is the second; a student of sacred knowledge dwelling in the house of a preceptor is the third" (Chānd. 2.23.1) there is an equal inclusion of all the stages of life. Among these, the stage of a house-holder is indicated by the words 'sacrifice, study' and so on. The stage of a religious student is referred to by that very word. The stages of a hermit in the forest [1] and of an ascetic [2] are referred to by the word 'austerity'.

If those who belong to these stages of life devote themselves to the duties incumbent thereon desiring for enjoyment, then they come to attain a world leading to return, in accordance with the scriptural text: "All these become possessors of meritorious worlds" (Chānd. 2.23.1). But one who knows the truth about the Lord, who is desirous of salvation, who is favoured by the Lord and who is devoted to Him, attains His nature. The concluding text: "One who stands on Brahman attains immortality" (Chānd. 2.23.1) intimates this, in conformity with the statement by the Lord: '"Among thousands of men, scarce one strives for perfection; even among the perfected ones who strive, scarce one knows me in truth" ' (Gītā 7.3), '"The worlds up to the world of Brahmā come and go, O Arjuna! But on attaining me, O son of Kuntī, there is no more rebirth" ' (Gītā 8.16).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Here he replies to the opponent thus: "(The obligatory duties) are to be performed, Bādarāyaṇa (thinks so) on account of the scriptural mention of equality". That is, a knower of Brahman may perform the obligatory duties partially just as he likes, but is not

[1] Vāna-prastha. [2] Sannyāsa.

required to perform them exhaustively, like ordinary men. Scripture states that such a partial performance by a knower is equal to a full performance by ordinary men.[1]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 20

"OR, (THERE IS) AN INJUNCTION, AS IN THE CASE OF HOLDING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is indeed "an injunction". Just as with regard to the enjoined Agni-hotra, it is said in Scripture: "Let him follow holding the sacrificial faggot below (the ladle). He holds it above for the gods" (Āp. Ś.S. 9.11.8-9 [2]),—in this text [3] the holding above (of the faggot) by separating (it) is enjoined, since it is something new (not enjoined anywhere)—so is the case here.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having thus pointed out that even if we hold that there is (only) a re-mention (of those stages of life and not injunction), still then the other stage of life may be proved to exist, (the author now) points out that in this text there is indeed an injunction with regard to them and not a re-mention.

The word "or" implies emphasis. In the stated text there is indeed "an injunction" with regard to those stages of life. Apprehending the objection that the text will cease to be a coherent and unbroken whole if it be admitted that in one and the same text there is an injunction with regard to many stages of life,—(the author) says: "As in the case of holding". Just as with regard to the enjoined Agni-hotra it is declared by Scripture: "Let him follow holding the

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[1] G.B. 3.4.19, p. 255-256, Chap. 3.

[2] P. 157, vol. 2. The texts read, "Adastāt samidham dhārayan dakṣineṇa vihāram udravati" (8). "Upari devebhya dhārayati iti vijñāyate" (9). Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

[3] Other editions read "vākyam" instead of "vākye".

sacrificial faggot below (the ladle). He holds it above for the gods" (Āp. Ś.S. 9.11.8-9)—here though occurring in the same sentence with the holding of the faggot below the ladle, the holding of the faggot, by sèparating it, over the clarified butter placed in a ladle is enjoined because of being something new (not enjoined before),[1]—so here too. It has been said in the section treating of what is complimentary (action): " But (there is) an injunction with regard to the holding, on account of being something new" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.4.3[2]). Although with regard to this stage of life, there is an injunction celebrated in a text of the Jābāla, viz. "Having completed the life of a religious student, let one become a house-holder. Having become a house-holder, let one become a dweller in the forest. Having become a dweller in the forest, let one wander forth. Or else, let one wander forth from the very life of a religious student, or from the house, or from the forest. The day one gets indifferent to the world, let him wander forth on that very day" (Jābāla 4),—yet it is shown by his Holiness that the other stage of life occurs in other texts as well irrespective of that,—this is to be understood here. The texts, viz. "He who extinguishes the fire is the slayer of the hero of the gods" (Tait. Saṃ. 1.5.2). "After having brought an acceptable gift for the teacher, let him not cut off the line of progeny" (Tait. I. II), "One who is childless does not possess the world" (Ait. Br. 33.1) and so on, are concerned with people hankering after enjoyment. Hence it is established that the end of men arises from knowledge.

Here ends the section entitled "The end of Men" (1).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He continues here the same topic, viz. whether a knower of Brahman must work or not. Hence the sūtra: "Or (the text designating

[1] I.e. the above passage may be conceived as a coherent and unbroken whole if we take it to be referring to one thing only, viz. the holding of the faggot below. Nevertheless, we conceive it as enjoining the holding of the faggot above too, since this latter is not enjoined anywhere else.

[2] The sūtra really reads: "Vidhistu apūrvatvāt syāt".

that a knower of Brahman may perform his duties in any way is) an injunction, like the holding (i.e. studying)". That is, the above text is an injunction with reference to the pariniṣṭha devotees, allowing them to act according to their will, just like the injunction, viz. that a Brāhmaṇa is to be initiated in order that he may study the Veda.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "A Mere Eulogy". (Sūtras 21-22)

SŪTRA 21

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE TEXTS ABOUT THE BEST ESSENCE AND THE LIKE ARE MERE EULOGY, ON ACCOUNT OF TAKING (THEM AS CONNECTED WITH PARTS OF SACRIFICES,) (THEN WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING NEW."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that texts like: "This is the best essence among the essences" (Chānd. 1.1.3 [2]) and so on, are "mere eulogy" of udgītha and the rest, the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, since the best essence and the rest are taken as related to them,—(we reply:) "No". This being not established before, here there is an injunction with regard to the udgītha and the rest to be looked upon as the best essence.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been established above that since in the text: "There are three branches" (Chānd. 2.2.3, 1) and so on, the other stage of life is mentioned as equal to the stage of a house-holder, the former is to be adopted. Similarly, as the groups of texts about the best essence are similar to the texts about the sacrificial ladle the sun and so on which relate to the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, the former too are subsidiary parts of such acts,—apprehending this objection, (the author) is now disposing of it.

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[1] G.B. 3.4.20, p. 257, Chap. 3.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

Under the udgītha-meditation and the like, the following are mentioned by Scripture: "This is the best essence among the essences, the supreme and the highest place, the eighth,—the udgītha" (Chand. 1.1.3), "The Ric is this earth indeed, the Sāman the fire" (Chand. 1.6.1), "Verily, this world is the piled up fire" (Śat. Br. 10.5.4, 1 [1]), "This earth forsooth, is the hymn" (Ait. Ār. 2.1.2 [2]) and so on. Here the doubt is, viz. whether the texts about the best essence and so on are concerned simply with an eulogy of the udgītha and the rest which are subsidiary parts of sacrifices, or whether they enjoin the udgītha and the rest to be looked upon as the best essence and so on. With regard to this, (the author) states the *prima facie* view: "If it be objected: mere eulogy, on account of taking". That is, they are concerned simply with eulogy. Why? "On account of taking," i.e. as the groups of texts about the best essence and so on are similar to the texts eulogizing the subsidiary parts of sacrificial parts, such as: "This earth indeed in the sacrificial ladle, the sun the tortoise, the heavenly world the āhavanīya-fire", and so on, they must be taken as concerned with the glorification of udgītha and the rest which are subordinate members of sacrificial acts.

To this we say: "No." This cannot be said. Why? "On account of being something new," i.e. because the udgītha and the rest are not established as the best of essence by any other means or proof. The injunction refers to the udgītha and the rest to be looked upon as the best essence and so on, it being unreasonble to take a text to be concerned with the glorification of the udgītha and the rest, enjoined in a different place, when it is possible to interpret it in relation to its own context.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He does not begin a new adhikaraṇa here, but continues the topic of the previous section, viz. that a knower of Brahman is at liberty to act at will. Hence the sūtra: "If it be said that (the texts allowing a knower to act at will are) mere glorification, on account of (their) reference (to works), (we reply:) No, on account of being

[1] P. 798, line 17.
[2] P. 101.

something new". That is, that a knower is at liberty to act at will is not enjoined before, and it is enjoined in the above texts.[1]

SŪTRA 22

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF TEXTS (INDICATIVE OF) THE EXISTENCE (OF INJUNCTION)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And" on account of the injunctive "text", viz. "Let one meditate on the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And" on account of injunctive "texts" like: "Let one meditate on the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1), "Let one meditate on the sāman" (Chānd. 2.2.1) and so on, it is established that the quoted texts enjoin the udgītha and the rest to be viewed (i.e. meditated on) as the best essence and so on.

Here ends the section entitled "Mere Eulogy" (2).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Here he concludes the topic that a knower may perform actions at will. Thus the sūtra: "And on account of texts (indicative of) intense love". That is, the pariniṣṭha devotee is so absorbed in love and devotion for the Lord that he has no time for performing ordinary works.[3]

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[1] G.B. 3.4.21, pp. 257-258, Chap. 3.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
[3] G.B. 3.4.22, pp. 258-259, Chap. 3.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The legends recited at the Aśva-medha". (Sūtras 23-24)

SŪTRA 23

"IF IT BE SAID THAT (THE SCRIPTURAL STORIES) ARE MEANT TO BE RECITED AT THE AŚVA-MEDHA, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING SPECIFIED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not to be thought that the scriptural stories in the Vedāntas are meant to be recited at the Aśva-medha sacrifice,[1]—since only some are specified (to be so) by texts, beginning: "He is to tell the legends recited at the Aśva-medha" and continuing: "Manu, Vivasvat's son, the King" (Śat. Br. 13.4.3, 3 [2]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection that the texts about the best essence are concerned with something else, it has been shown that they relate to meditation (and not to action). Similarly, apprehending the objection that the texts dealing with particular stories are concerned with something else, (the author) shows that they (too) relate to meditation.

In the different Vedāntas, there are many texts relating stories, such as: "Forsooth, Pratardana, the son of Divodāsa, went to the favourite place of Indra" (Kauṣ. 3.1), "Now, there was Jānaśruti, the great-grandson (of Janaśruti) a pious giver, a liberal donor, a preparer of much food" (Chānd. 4.1.1), "Now, there was Śvetaketu, the son of Aruṇa" (Chānd. 6.1.1), "Yājñavalkya had two wives, Maitreyī and Kātyāyanī" (Brh. 4.5.1) and so on. Here the doubt is, viz. whether they are meant to be recited at the Aśva-medha sacrifice, or whether they subserve the injunction of meditation. What is reasonable to begin with? "If it be said that they are meant to be recited at the Aśva-medha, (we reply) no." Why? "On

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[1] A pāriplava is a legend to be recited at the Aśva-medha sacrifice and repeated at certain intervals throughout the year.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

account of being specified," i.e. in the text beginning: "He is to tell the legends recited at the Aśva-medha" and continuing: "Manu, Vivasvat's son, the King" (Śat. Br. 13.4.3, 3) and so on, certain texts alone are specified as those to be recited at the Aśva-medha.

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

He takes this sūtra and the next as constituting a single sūtra, and reads "pāriplavārtha" instead of "pāriplavārthā" [1].

SŪTRA 24

"AND THIS BEING SO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION (OF THESE STORIES WITH MEDITATION) AS FORMING PART OF A COHERENT WHOLE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

This being so, on account of the connection" of other (stories) with injunction,—such as: "Should be seen" (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6 [2]) and so on—"as forming part of a coherent whole", they subserve the purpose of meditation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And this being so," i.e. all the scriptural stories being not legends to be recited at the Aśva-medha, only some being so, these former scriptural stories subserve the end of the injunction of meditation, "on account of their connection" with injunctions like "O, the self should be seen" (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6) and so on, "as forming part of a coherent whole". Hence it is established that the scriptural stories subserve the purpose of the injunction of meditation.

Here ends the section entitled "The legends recited at the Aśva-medha" (3).

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[1] Bh. B. 3.4.23, p. 207.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, B.

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "The kindling of fire". (Sūtra 25)

SŪTRA 25

"AND FOR THIS VERY REASON, (IN THE CASE OF THOSE WHO OBSERVE CHASTITY, KNOWLEDGE IS) INDEPENDENT OF THE KINDLING OF FIRE AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In accordance with the scriptural text: "One who is devoted to Brahman goes to immortality" (Chānd. 2.23.1 [1]), in the case of those who are bound by chastity, knowledge is "independent of the kindling of fire and so on".

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated above that the stages belonging to one bound by chastity are mentioned in Scripture. Immediately after that, two more points [2] were considered by reason of their association with what has been shown. Now, on the doubt, viz. whether by reason of the absence of acts like sacrifices and so on which are subsidiary parts of knowledge, knowledge too, the whole, is possible in those stages or not: and on the suggestion that it is not possible, but is possible in the stage of a house-holder, involving the knowledge of sacrifices and so on,—(the author) states the correct conclusion.

From the scriptural texts, such as: "Desiring which people live the life of religious studentship that word I declare to you in brief" (Kaṭha 2.15), "Desiring this world alone mendicants wander forth" (Bṛh. 4.4.22), "One who stands firm on Brahman attains immortality" (Chānd. 2.23.2), "And those who meditate on faith and austerity in the forest" (Chānd. 5.10.1) and so on, they (viz. those who are bound by chastity) are known to have knowledge. "And for this very reason," it is definitely ascertained that in their case knowledge is "independent of the kindling of fire and so on", i.e. independent

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[1] Correct quotation, "Brahma-saṃsthā". C.U., p. 656.

[2] Viz. that the (*a*) udgītha texts and (*b*) the scriptural stories subserve the purpose of meditation.

of the sacrificial acts to be accomplished by placing the fire on the sacrificial fire-place, i.e. is brought about by the proper duties, incumbent on their own stage of life, such as hearing, thinking, meditating and so on. During the stage of a house-holder there being a variety of unavoidable worldly and scriptural duties, the full development of knowledge, the means to the highest end of men, is not possible; and hence the intentional giving up of the life of a house-holder for the sake of that (viz. knowledge) is known from Scripture itself. Therefore, it is established that in the case of those who are bound by chastity, knowledge is all the more possible.

Here ends the section entitled "The kindling of fire" (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

While Nimbārka holds that knowledge is independent of works only in the case of those who are bound by chastity, Śaṃkara is of the opinion that this is so in all cases, and does not speak here especially of those only who observe chastity. Accordingly he, interprets the phrase "ata eva" as "because the highest end of men arises from knowledge" (established Br. Sū. 3.4.1 [1]).

Baladeva

He also does not speak here of those alone who are bound by chastity. Hence the sūtra: "For this very reason, (i.e. because vidyā is independent of karma, it) does not depend on the kindling of fire and the like, (for manifesting its fruit)". That is, there is no necessity for a combination of vidyā and karma for leading to salvation, but vidyā alone is sufficient.[2]

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[1] Ś.B. 3.4.25, p. 874.
[2] G.B. 3.4.25.

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Dependence on all". (Sūtra 26)

SŪTRA 26

"AND DEPENDENCE ON ALL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCRIPTURAL TEXT ABOUT SACRIFICE AND SO ON, AS IN THE CASE OF A HORSE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In accordance with the scriptural text: "Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by the recitation of the Veda, by sacrifice" (Bṛh. 4.4.2 [1]), knowledge depends for its own origination on all the works which are the means, as one depends on a horse for going.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Knowledge being established to be the means to the highest end of men, it might be thought that all works are to be given up. Apprehending this objection, (the author) is now exhibiting their use for producing the desire to know.

On the doubt, viz. If the highest end of men arises through knowledge alone, then is it independent of all duties incumbent on the stages of life or dependent?—if it be suggested that the desired end being accomplished through it (viz. knowledge) alone, what is the use of works? Hence it is independent of all,—

We reply: "Dependence on all".

The compound "dependence on all" ("sarvāpekṣā") is to be explained as follows: That which depends, for its origin, on all the duties, incumbent on the stages of life, i.e. the subsidiary parts (of knowledge), which are performed by those who are desirous of salvation and aim at knowledge. But when it has originated, it does not depend on anything for bringing about the highest end of men. Why? "In accordance with the scriptural text about sacrifice and the rest," viz. "Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by the recitation of the Veda, by sacrifice, by charity, by austerity, by fasting" (Bṛh. 4.4.22). The word 'Vividiṣanti' is to be explained as: They 'desire to know' by sacrifices and the rest. Here, if the primacy of the meaning of the *suffix* be admitted, then sacrifices and the rest are to be regarded as subsidiary parts of knowledge by way of (producing) a desire (for

[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

knowledge), (i.e. indirectly). If the primacy of the meaning of the *root* be admitted, then sacrifices and the rest are to be regarded as the subsidiary parts of so desired knowledge directly.[1]

A parallel instance is cited: "As in case of a horse". A horse is needed for accomplishing a journey to a desired place; but when the journey is accomplished, it is no longer needed—so is the case here.[2] It has been said by the Lord as well: ' " The acts of sacrifice, charity and austerity are not to be given up, but are to be performed. Sacrifice, charity and austerity are the purifiers of the wise" ' (Gītā 18.8), ' "From whom proceeds the activity of all beings, by whom all this is pervaded, by worshipping Him with his own work, a man attains perfection" ' (Gītā 18.46). Thus it is established that knowledge,—having the form of worship, meditation, highest devotion, steady remembrance and so on; the destroyer of all evil; the special cause of the attainment of the nature of the Highest Person, denoted by the terms 'Highest Brahman' and so on; and attainable through His grace,—arises, through the grace of Scripture and the spiritual teacher, from the proper performance of the daily and occasional duties, incumbent on one's own stage of life, and constituting the means to the worship of Lord Vāsudeva.

Here ends the section entitled "Dependence on all" (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

The example "aśva-vat" interpreted differently. He points out that knowledge is dependent on work in the sense that work gives rise to it; and independent of work in the sense that once generated, it does not depend on work for bringing about its result, viz. salvation. Hence there is no contradiction in saying that knowledge is independent of work (as done in the previous sūtra) and dependent on it (as done in this sūtra). In this world everything has its own particular use. A horse, e.g. is of no use for drawing the plough, but is of use for drawing the chariot only. Similarly, works are of

[1] See Br. Sū. 1.1.4, pp. 37-38.

[2] I.e. Karma is needed for the rise of vidyā; but when vidyā has once originated, it is no longer needed.

no use in bringing about the result of knowledge, but are of use only for giving rise to it.[1]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They too interpret the example "aśva-vat" differently thus: Just as a horse, though the real means of going, depends on some other assisting factors, viz. saddle, attendants, grooming and the like, so knowledge, though the real means to salvation, depends on the co-operation of works.[2]

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Interpretation different. In direct contrast to Nimbārka, he points out that Karma is not the cause of the origin of knowledge[3], but its essential part bringing about salvation. Thus, here he stresses his doctrine of the combination of knowledge and work. He interprets the example "aśva-vat" thus: "Just as a horse is fit for carrying a man, but not for drawing a plough, so knowledge, combined with work, is fit for leading to salvation, and not mere knowledge".[4]

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "Calmness, self-control and so on". (Sūtra 27)

SŪTRA 27

"BUT STILL (THE SEEKER AFTER THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN) MUST BE ENDOWED WITH CALMNESS, SELF-CONTROL AND SO ON; SINCE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE INJUNCTION OF THESE AS THE SUBSIDIARY PARTS OF THAT (VIZ. KNOWLEDGE), THEY ARE TO BE PRACTISED NECESSARILY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Although in the case of one who desires to know Brahman, knowledge may be brought about through the proper performance

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[1] Ś.B. 3.4.26, pp. 875-876.

[2] Śrī. B. 3.4.26, p. 376, Part 2; ŚK. B. 3.4.26, p. 398, Parts 10 and 11.

[3] "Na ca jñāna-svarūpotpattau karma vyapriyate; śravaṇamananādi tad-utpatti-kāraṇam.

[4] Bh. B. 3.2.25 (written as 3.2.26), p. 210.

of the duties incumbent on his own stage of life, yet he "must be endowed with calmness, self-control and so on"; since, "on account of the injunction" of calmness and the rest in the passage: "Hence, he who knows thus, having become calm, self-restrained, indifferent, patient and collected, should see the self in the self alone" (Bṛh. 4.4.23 [1]), "they are to be practised necessarily".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having thus determined the external means to the origination of knowledge, the author is now determining the internal means.

On the doubt, viz. whether a seeker after the knowledge of Brahman must be endowed with calmness, self-control and so on in order that there may be the rise of knowledge, or not,—if it be suggested: Since calmness and the rest, being posterior to the rise of knowledge, are not its subsidiary parts; and since the rise of knowledge is possible by means of those works alone which are mentioned in the text: "Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by the recitation of the Veda" (Bṛh. 4.4.22), it is not reasonable to suppose that the seekers after the knowledge of Brahman should be endowed with calmness and so on,—

We reply: the word "but" is meant for disposing of the objection. Although knowledge is possible on the part of a seeker after the knowledge of Brahman through the purification of the mind by works, "still" he "must be endowed with calmness, self-control and so on". Why? They "are to be performed necessarily", on account of the injunction of them as subsidiary parts of that, i.e. because calmness, self-control and the rest have been enjoined as the subsidiary parts of knowledge, and because "they" are enjoined in the text: "Hence, he who knows thus, having become calm, self-restrained, indifferent, patient and collected, should see the self in the self alone" (Bṛh. 4.4.23). Through calmness, self-control, and so on, one-pointed attention arises (directly), in accordance with the scriptural text: "By religious duty he drives away evil (Mahānār. 22.1). And through works, one-pointed attention arises (indirectly) by way of the removal of sins; thence there is the rise of knowledge;

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

thence, again, there is a still greater rise of calmness and so on.[1] Hence it is established that one who seeks knowledge must be endowed with calmness and so on.

Here ends the section entitled "Calmness, self-control and so on" (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

The word "tathāpi" interpreted differently, viz. even if it be granted that the text about sacrifices and so on (Bṛh. 4.4.22) contain no injunction and the rest. It is shown later on that the above text is really injunctive. He does not take it as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, but as included under the previous one.[2]

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "The permission of all food". (Sūtras 28–31)

SŪTRA 28

"AND THE PERMISSION OF ALL FOOD (IS VALID) IN THE EVENT OF DANGER TO LIFE, ON ACCOUNT OF THAT BEING SEEN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The permission of all food in the text: "Verily, to one who knows thus, there is nothing whatever that is not food" (Chānd. 5.2.1 [3]), is valid only "in the event of danger to life", for Cākrāyaṇa ate the leavings of a rich man when his life was in danger, this being found in Scripture.

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[1] I.e. calmness and the rest produce (1) attention, which produces (2) knowledge; while works first produce (1) mental purity, which produces (2) attention, which finally produces (3) knowledge. Hence, the former are more direct means to knowledge than the latter. Further, calmness, and the rest are both causes and effects, i.e. they give rise to knowledge, but when knowledge has originated, it in its turn produces a greater degree of calmness and so on.

[2] Ś.B. 3.4.27, pp. 876-877.

[3] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated that calmness and the rest are subsidiary parts of knowledge. Now, wishing to dispose of the objection, viz. like that, the eating of all food, too, is a subsidiary part of knowledge,—the author points out that such eating relates only to cases of life being in danger.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, it is said: "Verily, what is not food is not taken by him" (Bṛh. 6.1.14); as well as in the Chāndogya: "Verily, to one who knows thus, there is nothing whatever that is not food" (Chānd. 5.2.1). Here the doubt is, viz, whether this eating of all food by one who knows the vital-breath is valid, as a subsidiary part of the doctrine of the vital-breath, like calmness and so on, even when one is in a healthy state; or only in the event of danger to life. What is reasonable? If it be suggested: when one is in a healthy state,—we reply: only "in the event of danger to life", there is "permission of all food". Why? "On account of that being seen," i.e. because in the text: "When the Kurus were destroyed by hail-storm [1]" (Chānd. 1.10.1), the eating of improper food is found to be allowable only in the event of life being in danger. When all food being eaten up by a kind of animals called 'maṭacī' there came to be a famine among the Kurus, then the sage Cākrāyaṇa, seized with hunger, ate the leavings of an elephant-keeper [2]. From this it is known that the eating of all food is permitted even to one who knows the vital-breath only in the event of danger to life.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation same, but he takes this adhikaraṇa as concerned specially with the pariniṣṭha devotee.

[1] Śrīnivāsa, however, understands the word as a kind of crop-destroying animals. See below.

[2] Vide Chānd. 1.10.1–5 for the story. The sage ate the leavings because he would have died without food, but refused to drink leavings because he could survive without drink.

SŪTRA 29

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF NON-CONTRADICTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the non-contradiction" of the text: "If there be purity of food, there is purity of life" (Chānd. 7.26.2 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the text: "If there be purity of food, there is purity of existence. If there be purity of existence, there is steady remembrance', (Chānd. 7.26.2), the purity of food is enjoined as a means to the rise of knowledge. "On account of the non-contradiction also" of that, it is definitely ascertained, that there is permission of all food only in the event of danger to life.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. "On account of non-obstruction". Although in ordinary cases the taking of improper food obstructs the full manifestation of knowledge, yet when a knower of Brahman is obliged to do so, it does not obstruct his knowledge.[2]

SŪTRA 30

"MOREOVER (IT IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And it is declared by Smṛti too in the passage: "He who being in danger of life eats food from anyone whatsoever is not touched by sin, as a lotus-leaf is not touched by water".[3]

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

[2] G.B. 3.4.29, p. 268, Chap. 3.

[3] The first line of the passage is similar to Manu 10.104, last line to Gītā 5.10. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Moreover," the eating of all food from anyone whatsoever both by a knower and a non-knower in the event of danger of life "is declared by Smṛti" thus: "He who being in danger of life eats food from anyone whatsoever is not touched by sin, as a lotus-leaf is not touched by water".

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Baladeva

They omit the "Ca".

SŪTRA 31

"AND SO THERE IS A SCRIPTURAL TEXT AS TO NON-PROCEEDING ACCORDING TO LIKING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For this very reason, there is "a scriptural text" for preventing wanton acting, viz.: "Hence let not a Brāhmaṇa drink wine" (Kāṭh. Saṃ. 12.12[1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

As the permission of all food to both who knows and who does not is valid only in the event of life being in danger, "so" the "scriptural text" of the Kaṭhas "as to non-proceeding according to liking", i.e. the text regarding the reverse of acting as one likes, viz. "Hence let not a Brāhmaṇa drink wine" (Kāṭh. Saṃ. 12.12) fits in. The permission of all food to a worshipper of the vital-breath refers to his being in danger of life. The texts not referring to such a danger, on the other hand, are for the purpose of glorifying those particular vidyās, but are not enjoined as subsidiary parts of the doctrine of the vital-breath, like calmness and so on,—this is the resulting meaning. Hence it is established that the eating of all food is allowable only in cases of danger to life.

Here ends the section entitled "The permission of all food" (7).

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[1] P. 174, last line but four. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "Being enjoined". (Sūtras 32-35)

SŪTRA 32

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF BEING ENJOINED, THE WORK INCUMBENT ON THE STAGES OF LIFE TOO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Sacrifices and the rest, which are subsidiary parts of knowledge, are to be performed also by one, who does not desire for salvation, as the duties incumbent on one's stages of life, "on account of being enjoined" in the passage: "He performs the Agni-hotra sacrifice as long as he lives".[1]

Vedānta-kaustubha

Under the aphorism: "And dependence on all, in accordance with the scriptural text about sacrifice" (Br. Sū. 3.4.26) it has been said that works like sacrifices and the rest are subsidiary parts of the knowledge of Brahman. After that, two relevant problems have been considered. Now the question is being considered as to whether, for the sake of gaining prosperity, works like sacrifices and the rest are to be performed even by one, who is not desirous of salvation, as the duties incumbent on one's stages of life.

On the doubt, viz. the works, mentioned in the text: "Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by the recitation of the Veda, by sacrifice" (Bṛh. 4.4.22) and so on, have been accepted previously as auxiliaries to the means to salvation. Do they incur on the part of one who does not desire for salvation, but wishes to fulfill the duties of his stage of life merely, or not? The *prima facie* view is that sacrifices and the rest, relating to a definite object, cannot be supposed to be mere duties incumbent on the stages of life, and so they do not incur on his part,—

We reply: "The work incumbent on the stages of life too". The works like sacrifice, charity and so on, which are mentioned in Scripture as auxiliaries to knowledge, are "works incumbent on the stages

[1] Ś, R, Śk.

of life too", i.e. are to be performed even by one, not desirous of salvation, as the duties incumbent on his stage of life too. Why? "On account of being enjoined," i.e. because in texts like "He performs the Agni-hotra sacrifice as long as he lives" and so on, they are enjoined as merely the works incumbent on the stages of life and to be performed always. The sense is that such works are obligatory on the part of one who carries out only the duties incumbent on his own stage of life, but does not desire for salvation.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras) concerned with the svaniṣṭha devotees. Hence the sūtra: "On account of being enjoined, the worked incumbent on the stages of life too (are to be performed by the svaniṣṭha devotee)". That is, even when the devotee has come to acquire knowledge, he must go on performing his duties in order to increase his knowledge.[1]

SŪTRA 33

"ALSO BECAUSE OF BEING AUXILIARY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since sacrifice and the rest are enjoined "also as auxiliary" to knowledge in the text: "The Brāhmaṇas desire to know by sacrifice" (Bṛh. 4.4.22[2]), they are to be performed also by one who is desirous of salvation, a double purpose being possible in accordance with the maxim of conjunction and separateness.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: If this be so, then sacrifices and the rest cannot be auxiliaries to knowledge,—the author replies:

Since sacrifice and the rest are enjoined "also as auxiliary" to knowledge, by way of bringing about its origination, in the passage:

[1] G.B. 3.4.32, p. 271, Chap. 3.

[2] Ś. R. Bh.

"Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by sacrifice" (Bṛh. 4.4.22) and so on, works like sacrifice and the rest are to be performed also by one who is desirous of salvation. If it be objected that the same works cannot serve the purpose of a stage of life and that of knowledge,—we reply: that is not so, because even the same works may serve different purposes, in accordance with the maxim: "But with regard to one and the same thing being both, there is conjunction and separateness" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 4.3.5 [1]). Just as the same quality of being made of the Khādira-wood is laid down as serving the purpose of sacrifices in the passage: "The sacrificial post is made of the Khādira-wood"; and is, again, laid down as serving the purpose of men in the passage: "For one desiring power, let one make a post of the Khādira-wood", so is the case here.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Here he continues the topic, viz. that the svaniṣṭha devotee should continue to act even after attaining knowledge. Hence the sūtra: "And (the works must be done by the svaniṣṭha devotee) as being auxiliary (to knowledge)", i.e. with a view to its further increment.[2]

SŪTRA 34

"IN EVERY WAY EVEN, THOSE VERY (SACRIFICES AND THE REST ARE THE SAME) ON ACCOUNT OF A DOUBLE INDICATORY MARK."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Those very" sacrifices and the rest are to be taken as serving a double purpose, since in both the cases, the works of the same form are recognized.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is proving the non-difference of works.

"In every way," i.e. whether taught as duties incumbent on a stage of life or as serving the purpose of knowledge, "those very"

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[1] P. 493.

[2] G.B. 3.2.33, p. 271, Chap. 3.

sacrifices and the rest are to be understood. Why? "On account of a double indicatory mark," i.e. because in both the cases works of the same form are recognized. The sense is that sacrifices and the rest, each of the same form indeed, are taught, in both the cases, as duties incumbent on a stage of life, and as auxiliaries to knowledge, by respective texts.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with the pariniṣṭha devotees. The sūtra means according to him, "Under all circumstances even (the pariniṣṭha devotee is to perform his duties of worship and so on), on account of a double mark (viz. Scripture and Smṛti)". That is, the pariniṣṭha devotee should first perform his duties of worship and so on, and do other ordinary duties afterwards.[1]

SŪTRA 35

"AND (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS THE NON-OVERPOWERING (OF KNOWLEDGE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The scriptural text: "By means of religious observance one removes one's sins" (Mahānār. 22.1[2]) "shows the non-overpowering" of knowledge through the removal of sins—which are the cause of the overpowering of knowledge—by the very same sacrifices and so on, celebrated in Scripture.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The scriptural text: "For the self which one finds out through the life of a religious student does not perish" (Chānd. 8.5.3[3]) "shows the non-overpowering" of the knowledge of the self by the duties

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[1] G.B. 3.4.34, pp. 274-275, Chap. 3. "Pariniṣṭhitena tena bhagavad-dharmāḥ evānuṣṭheyāḥ. Svadharmās tu kathañ cit gauṇa—Kāle."

[2] P. 23, last line, reading: "anudanti".

[3] Note that Śrīnivāsa understands a different passage here by the term "darṣayati".

incumbent on the stages of life, such as, the life of a religious student and so on. The phrase: 'The self does not perish' means that the self is not forgotten. Sacrifices and the rest, performed as the mere duties incumbent on the stages of life, lead to the attainment of heaven and so on; those very sacrifices and the rest, performed as auxiliaries to knowledge, give rise to knowledge. Hence there is difference of application, but not difference of works. Hence it is established that the same things are to be performed by both one who is desirous for salvation and one who is not.

Here ends the section entitled "Being enjoined" (8).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He concludes here the topic of the pariniṣṭha devotees. "And (Scripture) shows the non-overpowering (of a pariniṣṭha devotees)." That is, a pariniṣṭha devotee is not overpowered by the fault of not performing the duties incumbent on his own stage of life. He incurs no sins by such an omission.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "Widower". (Sūtras 36–39)

SŪTRA 36

"BUT (THOSE) ALSO (WHO STAND) BETWEEN, ON ACCOUNT OF THAT BEING SEEN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Those "also" who stand "between" the stages of life, are entitled to knowledge, since Raikva and the like are found to be well-grounded in knowledge.

[1] G.B. 3.4.35, pp. 275-276, Chap. 3.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated above that those who belong to one or other of the stages of life are entitled to knowledge, and that the works performed by them are auxiliaries to knowledge. Now a discussion is being undertaken with a view to establishing that even those who stand midway are entitled to knowledge and the works done by them also are auxiliaries to knowledge.

The doubt is as to whether those who stand 'between' the stages of life, such as widowers and so on, are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman or not. The *prima facie* view is that the knowledge of Brahman depends for its origin on the duties incumbent on the stages of life and since those who stand "between" have no duties incumbent on the special stages of life, they are not so entitled.

With regard to it, we reply: "Between". That is, even those who stand between, i.e. outside, the stages of life are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. Why? "On account of that being seen," i.e. because "that", viz. the right to the knowledge of Brahman, is found in Scripture and Smṛti to be belonging to Raikva, Samvarta and so on. The scriptural text indicating that Raikva is entitled to the knowledge of Brahman has been quoted in the first chapter.[1] The details of the story of Samvarta, the son of Angiras, may be seen in the Mahā-bhārata in the chapter treating of the horse-sacrifice thus: '"O King, Samvarta, Aṅgiras's son, a pious man, roamed about in all directions, sky-clothed (i.e. naked), perplexing all beings" (Mahā. 14. 137 [2]) and so on.

The purport is this: Religious duties like sacrifices and the rest, auxiliaries to knowledge and mentioned in the scriptural text: "Him" (Bṛh. 4.4.22) and so on, are to be understood, in the case of house-holders, as Agni-hotra and the rest, productive of knowledge and fit for a house-holder who desires for salvation. In the case of those who belong to those stages of life in which chastity is compulsory, the religious duties, incumbent on those stages of life and other than Agnihotra and so on, are to be understood (as productive of knowledge). Similarly, in the case of those also who do not belong to any stage of life, muttering of prayers, fasting, worship of the deity and so

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[1] Vide V.K. 1.3.34.

[2] P. 278, line 1, vol. 4.

on, not obligatory to the special stages of life, are to be understood (as productive of knowledge).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Here he too begins a new adhikaraṇa (three sūtras), but concerned specially with the nirapekṣa devotees only. Literal interpretation same.

SŪTRA 37

"MOREOVER, (IT IS) DECLARED IN SMṚTI."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the Smṛti passage, viz. "But through the muttering of prayers alone a Brāhmaṇa may attain success,—there is no doubt about it. Whether he does something else or not, a friendly man is called a Brāhmaṇa" (Manu 2.87 [1]), it is declared that they too may easily attain knowledge through the muttering of prayers and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the Smṛti passage: "But through the muttering of prayers alone, a Brāhmaṇa may attain success,—there is no doubt about it. Whether he does something else or not, a friendly man is called a Brāhmaṇa" (Manu 2.87), it is declared that through the muttering of prayers alone even those who do not belong to any stage of life may have success. The sense is that when the mind is purified through the muttering of prayers and so on, knowledge arises. Hence they, too, come to have their ends fulfilled.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They omit the "Ca". Baladeva is here speaking of the nirapekṣa devotees.

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[1] P. 46. Ś, R, Śk.

SŪTRA 38

"AND (THERE IS) A SPECIAL FACILITATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is "facilitation" of knowledge also through the particular acts of duties performed in a previous life. This is declared by Smṛti too: '"Perfected through many births, he then goes to a supreme goal" ' (Gītā 6.45 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

There is "facilitation" of knowledge through the particular works done in the course of many lives. It is declared by Smṛti too thus: '"Perfected through many lives, he then goes to a supreme goal"' (Gītā 6.45). The sense is that in those cases where there is the presence of knowledge, but the absence of any duties incumbent on the special stages of life,—mentioned above and auxiliaries to knowledge,—other duties incumbent on the stages of life, performed in previous births, are to be inferred.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He relates this sūtra specially with the nirapekṣa devotees only, thus: "And (the nirapekṣa devotees attain knowledge easily through) the special grace (of the Lord)".

SŪTRA 39

"BUT THAN THIS THE OTHER IS BETTER, ON ACCOUNT OF INDICATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Being within a stage of life is "better" than standing midway, also "on account of the indication", viz. "Let one not remain without a stage of life" (D.Sm. 1.10 [2]).

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[1] Ś, Bh.

[2] P. 71, line 13. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Than this," i.e. than standing midway, "the other", i.e. being within a stage of life, is "better", since it secures the perfection of the means to knowledge, i.e. is productive of knowledge within a short time. Why? "On account of indication." The scriptural text: "By it goes the knower of Brahman, the doer of meritorious deeds, the shining one" (Bṛh. 4.4.9) shows the going of those belonging to particular stages of life through the path of gods. The meaning of the text is that 'the knower of Brahman', 'the doer of the meritorious deeds', i.e. the doer of the works incumbent on his own stage of life, "by it", i.e. by means of knowledge increased by works, go to Brahman through the path of gods—on account of such a scriptural reference to 'the doer of meritorious deeds'. And, there are four stages of life in conformity with the text: "And those who in the forest" (Chānd. 5.10.1). On account of Smṛti passages as well, such as: "Let not a twice-born remain outside the stages of life even for a single day" [1] (D.Sm. 1.10), "If one stays outside the stages of life for a year, one should undergo penance. The Highest Person, forsooth, the soul of the Universe, is pleased by a person who practises the duties incumbent on his caste and stage of life; nothing else pleases Him", and so on.

If, accidentally, it be impossible for one to enter any stage of life, then one may attain salvation through the muttering of prayers, fasting, charity, worship of the deity, non-violence, contentment, straightforwardness, company of the great and so on. Thus says Yājñavalkya: "Being within a stage of life is not the sole impetus to performing religious duties; let a Brāhmaṇa practise them (whether he be within a special stage of life or not). Hence, let no one do to others what is unpalatable to one's own self".

It is said in historical legends too: "For what is the use of an āśrama to one who abiding in knowledge is modest, who has the senses under control and who abides in honesty?" For that very reason, it has been said in the Mahā-bhārata that even in the absence of the mark of an āśrama, one should perform religious duties thus: "Even one who is corrupted should perform religious duties. The mark (of an āśrama) is not the cause of religious duties". Hence it is

[1] The text reads "kṣaṇam".

established that in spite of the greater excellence of the state of belonging to a stage of life, knowledge may be gained even by those who do not belong to any special stage of life,—such as bachelors, widowers and so on,—through the muttering of prayers and the like.

Here ends the section entitled "Widowers" (9).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

All others add a "ca" at the end.

Baladeva

He too begins a new adhikaraṇa here (five sūtras), concerned with the question, viz. whether one who belongs to a stage of life is higher or one who does not, and arrives at a conclusion opposite to that of Nimbārka, viz. that one who does not belong to any stage of life is higher. Hence the sūtra: "But than this (i.e. the state of belonging to a particular āśrama) the other (i.e. the state of not belonging to any āśrama, viz. that of a nirapekṣa devotee) is better, on account of indicatory mark".[1]

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled "One who has become that". (Sūtras 40–43)

SŪTRA 40

"BUT OF ONE WHO HAS BECOME THAT THERE IS NO BECOMING NOT THAT, (THIS IS THE VIEW) OF JAIMINI TOO ON ACCOUNT OF RESTRICTION, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF THE FORMS OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"But" the giving up of the state of chastity which one has reached is not allowed,—this the view of "Jaimini too", on account of the

[1] G.B. 3.4.39, p. 281, Chap. 3. "Ataḥ sāśramatvāditran nirāśramatvam eva jyāyaḥ śreṣṭhaṃ vidyā-sādhanam mantavyam."

absence of texts, on account of the absence of a cause, on account of the absence of good custom.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the problem is being considered, viz. whether those also who have fallen from the stage of a perpetual religious student bound by chastity and so on are entitled to knowledge or not.

It has been established above that there are such stages of life where chastity is obligatory. The doubt is as to whether those who have fallen from these are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, or not. If it be suggested that like widowers and so on, they are so entitled, through the muttering of prayers and so on,—

We reply: The word "but" is meant for disposing of the objection. "Of one who has become that," i.e. of one who has reached, as a supreme fruit, the stage where chastity is obligatory, there is "no becoming not that", i.e. no falling off,—this is the view "of Jaimini too". The word "too" indicates that the author's own view is confirmed through being held by Jaimini as well. The sense is that it being impossible for a perpetual religious student bound by chastity [1], a hermit belonging to the third religious order [2] and a mendicant belonging to the fourth religious order [3] to stay outside a stage of life like widowers and the rest, they cannot be entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

The author states the reasons why such a falling off is not allowable thus: "On account of restriction, on account of the absence of the forms of that", that is, on account of the restriction with regard to the non-deviation from a stage of life, in the passages: A "student of sacred knowledge, dwelling in the house of a teacher, exhausting himself completely in the house of a teacher, is the third" (Chānd. 2.23.1), "One should go to the forest, thence one should not return any more". "Having once given up the fire, one should not return any more" (Kaṭha 5.4). The compound "on account of the absence of the forms of that" is to be explained as follows: The word "that" means 'not becoming that'. The words "the forms" mean scriptural texts. Hence, the clause means: because of the absence of texts indicative of the falling from a stage of life. That means, there are

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[1] Naiṣṭhika. [2] Vaikhānasa. [3] Parivrājaka.

no texts negativing the steady adherence to a stage of life. By the plural (in "abhāvebhyaḥ") other kinds of absence are to be understood, viz. on account of the absence of texts indicative of descent (from a higher stage), unlike the texts indicative of ascent (to a higher stage), such as: "Having completed the life of a religious student, let one become a house-holder; having become a house-holder let one become a dweller in the forest; having become a dweller in the forest, let one wander forth" (Jābāla 4); on account of the absence of any cause for such a falling off; and on account of the absence of good custom.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading slightly different, viz. "niyamātad rūpābhāvebhyaḥ".[1]

Bhāskara

Reading slightly different, viz. "Jaimini" instead of "Jaimineḥ".[2]

Baladeva

Reading like Śaṃkara's. Interpretation different, viz. "But one who has become that (viz. a nirapekṣa), there is no becoming not that, (this is the view) of Jaimini too, on account of the restriction (viz. that the senses of the nirapekṣa devotee are devoted to the Lord alone and never to worldly objects), on account of the want of desire (for anything other than Brahman), and on account of the absence (of the life of a house-holder)". That is, a nirapekṣa devotee never deviates from his vow and enters worldly life.[3]

[1] Ś.B. 3.4.40, p. 885.
[2] Bh. B. 3.4.39, (written as 3.4.40), p. 213.
[3] G.B. 3.4.40, pp. 283-284, Chap. 3.

SŪTRA 41

"AND NOT EVEN (THE EXPIATION) TREATED (IN THE SECTION) ABOUT RIGHTS (IS POSSIBLE ON THE PART OF A TRANSGRESSING HERMIT AND THE LIKE), ON ACCOUNT OF ITS INEFFECTIVENESS BY REASON OF THE INFERENCE (I.E. SMṚTI PASSAGE) ABOUT THE FALL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The expiation, formulated in the section treating of rights,[1] is not possible on the part of a perpetual religious student bound by chastity, "On account of its ineffectiveness" in his case, in conformity with the Smṛti passage: "But the twice-born who having ascended the state of a perpetual religious student bound by chastity deviates therefrom,—I do not see any expiation whereby he, the slayer of himself, may be purified" (Agni 165.23*a*–24*b*,[2] A. Sm. 816[3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Inadvertence (and not wilful negligence) may be the cause of one's deviation from the stage of life one has reached; and expiation may entitle such a fallen one to knowledge once more,—the author replies 'no'.

An expiation is mentioned in the text: "A religious student who has deviated from the vow of chastity should sacrifice an ass to Nirṛti". It is formulated in the sixth chapter, treating of rights, under the aphorism: "The Avakīrṇi-paśu (sacrifice) also (is to be performed like that (viz. the Sthapati-iṣṭi), since the time for the installation of fire has not arrived" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 6.8.22). This is said to be "treated (in the section) about rights". This is not available for one who has deviated from the vow of a perpetual religious student bound by chastity. Why? "On account of its ineffectiveness by reason of the inference about the fall", i.e. because in conformity with a Smṛti passage indicating the fall as very difficult to be atoned for, the expiation is not effective for him. The Smṛti passage is as follows: "But the twice-born who having ascended the state of a

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[1] Pū. Mī. Sū. 6.8.22.

[2] Pp. 158-159. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

[3] P. 33, line 19. Reading slightly different, viz. "Yena śuddhyati karmaṇā".

perpetual religious student, bound by chastity, deviates therefrom,— I do not see any expiation whereby he, the slayer of himself, may be purified" (Agni 165.23*a*-34*b*, A.Sm. 8.16). The word "even" (in the sūtra) suggests that the stated expiation is valid for a religious student who becomes a house-holder after the completion of his study.[1]

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation totally different, viz. "and (the nirapekṣa devotee does) not (desire for) even the office (of world-rulership and the like), on account of the inference (i.e. possibility) of fall (from such office), (and) because (he has) no connection with those (offices)", i.e. no wish for them.[2]

OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtra 42)

SŪTRA 42

"BUT PRECEDED BY 'UPA', (I.E. A MINOR SIN) EVEN, SOME (THINK SO), (THEY CLAIM) THE EXISTENCE (OF AN EXPIATION FOR IT), AS IN THE CASE OF EATING, THAT HAS BEEN SAID."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"But some" think that the deviation of a perpetual religious student bound by chastity [3] from his vow of chastity is a minor sin, and hence there is an expiation for it, since he too is equally a religious student like one who is a religious student for a time only and not for life [4], "as in the case of the taking" of intoxicating liquor. "That has been said:" " Of the subsequent ones, what is non-contradictory." [5]

[1] I.e. an upakurvāṇa. A naiṣṭhika remains a religious student all his life, but an upakurvāṇa only for a time.

[2] G.B. 3.4.41, p. 285, Chap. 3.

[3] A naiṣṭhika.

[4] An upakurvāṇa.

[5] R, Śk.

Vedanta-kaustubha

"Preceded by 'upa'," i.e. the deviation of a perpetual religious student and so on, bound by chastity and the rest, from their vow of chastity by going to women and so on, is "preceded by the word 'upa'", i.e. is but a minor (upa) sin (pātaka); not a major sin that cannot be atoned for. The word "even" implies reason. "Some" teachers think that they too being equally religious students, there is "the existence" of an expiation for them as for those who are religious students for a time, but not always. "As in the case of eating." Just as the prohibition with regard to the taking of spirituous liquor and so on and the expiation thereof apply equally to those who are religious students for life and those who are so for a time only,—so is the case here. "That has been said" by the Smṛti-writer: "Of the subsequent ones, what is non-contradictory to that". The sense is that what has been said with regard to one who is a religious student for a time is possible in the case of one who belongs to a subsequent stage of life, viz. one who is religious student for life and so on, in so far as it is not contradictory to the stage of life of the latter. In this way, an expiation for the deviation of perpetual religious students from their vow of chastity being possible, they come to be entitled to knowledge once again. Similar is the case with the hermits belonging to the third order of life and the wandering mendicants belonging to the fourth order.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He takes it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation same.

Bhāskara

This sūtra is not found in his commentary.

Baladeva

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "But what is preceded by 'upa' (i.e. upāsanā or meditation) (is the only object desired by a nirapekṣa devotee) some (branches declare so), (and) the sentiment (of devotion) is like food (to him), that has been said (in Scripture)"[1].

[1] G.B. 3.4.42, pp. 286-287, Chap. 3.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 43)

SŪTRA 43

"BUT (SUCH A TRANSGRESSOR IS) OUTSIDE (THE SPHERE OF KNOWLEDGE), IN EITHER CASE EVEN, ON ACCOUNT OF SMṚTI AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONDUCT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Whether the deviation of perpetual religious students from their own stage of life be a major or a minor sin, "in either case even", they are "outside" the right to the knowledge of Brahman, "on account of the Smṛti passage: "I do not see any expiation whereby he, the killer of himself, may be purified" (Agni 165.24*b* [1]) "and on account of the conduct" of the good.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Whether the deviation of those who are bound by chastity from their own stage of life be a major or a minor sin, "in either case even" they are to be kept "outside" [2] indeed by the good. Why? "On account of Smṛti and on account of conduct," i.e. on account of the Smṛti passage censuring such a deviation, viz.: "I do not see any expiation whereby he, the killer of himself, may be purified" (Agni 165.24*b*), "If one sees a Brāhmaṇa who ascended (to a high stage) has fallen (therefrom), one should undergo the Cāndrāyaṇa [3] penance"; and on account of the conduct of the good who always shun one who has deviated from the vow of chastity. Hence it is established that those who have deviated from their stages of life are not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled "One who has become that" (10).

[1] Ś, R, Śk.

[2] Note that the interpretation of the term "bahih" is different from Nimbārka's.

[3] An expiatory penance regulated by the moon's age. The method is to begin with taking fifteen mouthfuls of food at the full moon, and decrease it daily by one mouthful during the dark-half, and increase by one mouthful again during the bright-half. Vide Manu 6.20 and Kullukabhaṭṭa's commentary.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, and interprets the work "bahiḥ" like Śrīnivāsa.[1]

Bhāskara

He omits the word "api" and interprets the word "bahiḥ" like Śrīnivāsa [2]. This is sūtra 41 in his commentary.

Baladeva

He too omits the word "api". Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "(The nirapekṣa devotee is) outside (all worldly entanglements) in both ways, (viz.) on account of Smṛti and on account of conduct".[3]

Adhikaraṇa 11: The section entitled "The Lord". (Sūtras 44-45)

OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtra 44)

SŪTRA 44

"OF THE LORD, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL STATEMENT ABOUT FRUIT, SO ĀTREYA (THINKS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The meditation based on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts is performed by the sacrificer, "so Ātreya" thinks, on account of the scriptural statement about the result attained, viz. "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10 [4]).

[1] Ś.B. 3.4.43, p. 888.
[2] Bh. B. 3.4.41, (written as 3.4.42), p. 214.
[3] G.B. 3.4.43, pp. 287-288, Chap. 3.
[4] Not quoted by others.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The view of one who knows is acceptable, but not that of one who does not know. Hence in the previous section the view of Jaimini has been accepted, while that of others has been rejected. Now by showing that the meditation on the subsidiary parts is the work of the officiating priest, and having thereby rejected the view of one who does not know, the author is again demonstrating that the view of only one who knows is acceptable.

On the doubt, viz. whether the meditation on the udgītha and the rest, the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, is the work of the sacrificer, the Lord, or of the sacrificing priest,—"of the Lord, so" the teacher "Ātreya" thinks. Why? "On account of the scriptural text about fruit," i.e. because in the text: "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10) the result produced, viz. greater potency, is declared to be pertaining to the sacrificer.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He too begins a new adhikaraṇa here (three sūtras), but concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the special favour shown by the Lord to His nirapekṣa devotees. Hence the sūtra: "From the Lord (arises the fulfilment of all the wants of the nirapekṣa devotee), on account of the scriptural text about fruit, so Ātreya thinks".[1] Hence he does not take this sūtra as representing the opponent's view.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 45)

SŪTRA 45

"THE WORK OF THE PRIEST, SO AUḌULOMI (THINKS), BECAUSE FOR THAT (HE) IS BOUGHT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The meditation based on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts is performed by the officiating priest, because the priest has been

[1] G.B. 3.4.44, pp. 289-290, Chap. 3.

bought "for that" [1], i.e. for the sacrificial act; and the result produced pertains to the sacrificer [2].

Vedānta-kaustubha

The meditation on the udgītha and the rest, which are subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, is to be performed by the officiating priest—"so" the teacher "Auḍulomi" thinks. Why? The word "because" states the reason. That is, as the officiating priest, who performs the sacrificial act, has been "bought" with fees by the sacrificer "for that", i.e. for the sacrificial act together with its subsidiary parts, so it is to be performed by him alone.

If it be objected that the result produced, viz. greater potency, mentioned in the scriptural text: "What alone one does with knowledge, that alone becomes more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10), can belong only to one who meditates,—we reply: not so. In accordance with the maxim: "The fruit mentioned in Scripture (accrues) to the instigator" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.7.18 [3]), and in accordance with the scriptural text: "Whatever blessing, forsooth, the priests pray for, all those accrue to the sacrificer" (Śat. Br. 1.1.1, 26 [4]), the fruit belongs to the sacrificer alone. Hence it is established that the meditation based on the subordinate members of sacrificial acts is the work of the officiating priest.

Here ends the section entitled "The Lord" (11).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

After this sūtra, he reads a sūtra "Śruteś ca", not found in Nimbārka's commentary. Here he quotes some passages to the effect that the fruit belongs to the sacrificer himself [5].

[1] C.S.S. ed. reads "tasya", p. 77.

[2] This last portion: "and . . . sacrificer" not found in the C.S.S. ed. Brindāban ed. reads "phalasya", p. 1164.

[3] P. 395, vol. 1.

[4] P. 25, lines 7-8.

[5] Ś.B. 3.4.46, p. 890.

Baladeva

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "the work of the priest, so Auḍulomi (thinks), for (the Lord) is bought for him". That is, just as an officiating priest sells himself, as it were, to the sacrificer, so the Lord sells Himself to the nirapekṣa devotees.[1]

He too like Śaṃkara reads a sūtra "Śruteś ca" after this sūtra.

Adhikaraṇa 12: The section entitled "The injunction of another auxiliary". (Sūtras 46–48)

SŪTRA 46

"(THERE IS) INJUNCTION OF ANOTHER AUXILIARY FOR ONE WHO POSSESSES THAT, AS IN THE CASE OF INJUNCTION AND SO ON, (THE TERM 'MAUNA' DENOTING), IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OTHER ALTERNATIVE, A THIRD SOMETHING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "Hence let a Brāhmaṇa, being disgusted with learning, desire to live in the childlike state; being disgusted with the states of childhood and learning, then he becomes an ascetic" (Bṛh. 3.5.1 [2]), the term 'ascetic' may, of course, mean 'one possessed of knowledge', yet "according to the other alternative", it may also mean 'one given to profound reflection'. Hence, "another auxiliary", "a third" something as distinguished from learning and childlike state, viz. asceticism, has been enjoined here, like sacrifice and the rest and like calmness and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Previously, sacrifices and the rest and calmness and the rest have been determined as auxiliaries to one who is possessed of knowledge. Similarly, asceticism is another auxiliary to one possessed of knowledge. Now, a discussion relating to this is being undertaken.

[1] G.B. 3.4.45, p. 291, Chap. 3.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, to the question of Kahola, it is said: "Hence let a Brāhmaṇa, being disgusted with learning, desire to live in the childlike state; being disgusted with the states of childhood and learning, then he becomes an ascetic; being disgusted with the non-ascetic and ascetic states, then he becomes a Brāhmaṇa" (Bṛh. 3.5.1). Here the doubt is as to whether here like the states of childhood and learning, asceticism too is enjoined, or is only referred back (as something already enjoined). If it be suggested that 'asceticism' means knowledge, and that has indeed been already established by the phrase: 'Being disgusted with learning', and (hence) the word 'ascetic' simply refers back to this,—

We reply: "For one who is possessed of that", i.e. for one possessed of knowledge, "a third", i.e. a means, viz. asceticism, a third something as distinguished from learning and childlike state, is enjoined. This very thing the author states in the phrase: "An injunction of another auxiliary". The states of learning and childhood are auxiliaries to a direct vision of Brahman, the object to be attained; asceticism is another auxiliary as distinguished from them; and the word 'ascetic' is nothing but an injunction with regard to it. "As in the case of injunction and so on." An injunction is what is enjoined as helpful, such as, all the duties incumbent on the stages of life, sacrifice, charity and so on, and calmness and the rest. By the words "and so on" the states of learning and childhood are understood.

To the argument, viz. that 'asceticism' means knowledge, and that has indeed already been established by the phrase: 'Being disgusted with learning', and hence the word 'ascetic refers back to this,—we reply: "In accordance with the other alternative". That is, since the word 'ascetic' is well known to mean, alternately, 'one given to profound reflection', as in the statement "Among ascetics also, I am Vyāsa" (Gītā 10.37) 'asceticism' is a different thing, a third something, distinguished from the state of learning. Here although in the phrase: 'Then an ascetic', there is no employment of the imperative, yet this special kind of reflection, not enjoined before, must be taken as something to be enjoined. As in this way the previous Brāhmaṇas have attained their ends 'so' let another Brāhmaṇa too, 'being disgusted with', i.e. having succeeded with certainty, in 'the state of learning', i.e. the duties of a learned man, viz. hearing of the Veda, 'desire to stay in the childlike state', i.e. wish to stay reflecting. Having succeeded in both, he may be an 'ascetic', i.e. given to profound

meditation. After that, having succeeded in non-asceticism, i.e. in the group of means other than asceticism, as well as 'asceticism', he becomes a 'Brāhmaṇa', i.e. comes to attain knowledge,—this is the meaning of the text.[1]

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He too begins a new adhikaraṇa here (one sūtra), but continues the topic of the nirapekṣa devotees. This is sūtra 47 in his commentary. Hence the sūtra: "(There is) the injunction of another third auxiliary (viz. meditation), an alternative (to hearing and thinking) for one who has that, (viz. for the nirapekṣa devotees), as in the case of injunction and so on". That is, in the case of the svaniṣṭha and pariniṣṭha devotees, sacrifice and calmness, self-control and so on are enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge. But the nirapekṣa devotees already possess these, and so in their case these two sets of auxiliaries cannot be enjoined. Hence in their case meditation is enjoined instead, and this they must practise necessarily, just as house-holders and the rest must necessarily perform the saṃdhyā-ceremony and so on.[2]

SŪTRA 47

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE OF ALL (DUTIES INCUMBENT ON THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF LIFE), (THERE IS) CONCLUDING WITH THE HOUSE-HOLDER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The concluding with the house-holder" in the passage: "Forsooth, having stayed thus as long as he lives, he reaches the world of Brahman and does not return any more" (Chānd. 8.15.1[3]), is meant for exhibiting all religious duties, as in the stage of a house-holder the religious duties, incumbent on all the stages of life, are obligatory.

[1] I.e. here *pāṇḍitya* means: *śravaṇa, bālya manana* and *mauna nididhyāsana.*
[2] G.B. 3.4.47, p. 293-294, Chap. 3.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It may be objected: If the religious duties like sacrifice, charity, austerity, calmness, self-control and the like, as well as those called hearing, thinking and meditating,—duties that are to be performed by men of all stages of life who desire for salvation,—be auxiliaries to knowledge; and if knowledge, attainable through them and common to men of all stages of life, be the means to salvation, then there cannot be any justification for "concluding with the house-holder" in the Chāndogya-text, which beginning: "Having studied the Veda in the house of a teacher in accordance with rules, in time left over from doing work for the teacher; having returned to his own house, studying his sacred texts in a clean spot" (Chānd. 8.15.1), concludes: "Forsooth, having stayed thus as long as he lives, he reaches the world of Brahman and does not return any more" (Chānd. 8.15.1). Hence, such a conclusion clearly indicates that there are no other stages of life [1]. To this the author replies here.

The word "but" is meant for disposing of the objection. That is, simply because the stage of a house-holder has been mentioned at the end, it is not to be thought that there are no stages of life other than that. "On account of the existence of all" religious duties therein, "the concluding with the house-holder" is meant for exhibiting all religious duties.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

The phrase compound "kṛtsna-bhāvāt" interpreted differently, viz. 'on account of the existence (of knowledge) in all (the stages of life).[2] Śrīkaṇṭha takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself.

Baladeva

He too takes it as an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation same.

[1] Vide the same objection raised on another ground in Br. Sū. 3.4.18.

[2] Śrī. B. 3.4.47, p. 394, part 2; Śk. B. 3.4.47, pp. 411-412, Parts 10 and 11.

SŪTRA 48

"AS IN THE CASE OF ASCETICISM, ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF OTHERS AS WELL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the very same manner, the teaching of asceticism in that text is meant for exhibiting all religious duties, since like the teaching of asceticism, there is the teaching of the duties incumbent on all stages of life in the text: "There are three branches of religious duty" (Chānd. 2.23.1 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author points out that similarly here too the teaching of asceticism in the passage: "Then an ascetic" (Bṛh. 3.5.1), preceded by that of the life of a mendicant: "Then they live the life of mendicants" (Bṛh. 3.5.1), is meant for exhibiting the religious duties incumbent on all stages of life.

Thus, here too, the teaching of asceticism, preceded by that of the life of a mendicant, in the passage: "The Brāhmaṇas, having risen above the desires for sons, desires for wealth, desires for worlds, live the life of mendicants" (Bṛh. 3.5.1), is meant for exhibiting the religious duties incumbent on all the stages of life. Why? "As in the case of asceticism," i.e. because like the teaching of asceticism, there is the "teaching of other" stages of life too in the passage: "There are three branches of religious duty. Sacrifice, study and charity are the first; austerity alone is the second; a student of sacred knowledge living in the house of a preceptor and exhausting himself completely in the house of a teacher is the third. All these become possessors of meritorious worlds. One who stands on Brahman goes to immortality" (Chānd. 2.23.1) and so on. Hence it is established that the states of learning, childhood and asceticism are enjoined here.

Here ends the section entitled "The injunction of another auxiliary" (12).

[1] Ś, R, B.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. whether those who practise the vow of Pāśupata and do not belong to any particular stage of life are entitled to salvation. The answer is that they are entitled. Hence the sūtra: "On account of the teaching of others too (viz. calmness and the like, etc.) like, asceticism". That is, asceticism, as well as calmness, self-control and the rest, which have been designated as auxiliaries to knowledge, the means to salvation, are enjoined in connection with the vow called Pāśūpata as well. Hence it follows that those who practise this vow, automatically practise asceticism and the rest, gain knowledge thereby, and attain salvation through it.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 13: The section entitled "Non-manifestation". (Sūtra 49)

SŪTRA 49

"NON-MANIFESTING, ON ACCOUNT OF CONNECTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Without manifesting one's own greatness and so on, due to learning, let one remain in the childlike state, i.e. without pride, since it is possible for this alone to have a "connection" with the topic.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been established that in the text: "Hence let a Brāhmaṇa, being disgusted with learning desire to stay in the childlike state; being disgusted with the childlike state and learning, then he becomes an ascetic" (Bṛh. 3.5.1), asceticism too is something to be enjoined. Now the meaning of the phrase 'childlike state' is being considered.

[1] Śk. B. 3.4.48, pp. 413-414, Parts 10 and 11.

The doubt is whether the action of a child, i.e. nothing but wilful behaviour, is meant by the phrase 'childlike state', and that is to be practised by one desirous of salvation; or whether freedom from arrogance, pride, self-consciousness and so on are denoted by the phrase 'childlike state' here, and these are to be practised by one desirous of salvation. If it be suggested that 'childlike state' means the state of a child, i.e. nothing but wilful behaviour; that is to be practised by one desirous of salvation, there being no reason for the restriction that only freedom from arrogance and the rest are to be practised and not simply wilful behaviour,—

We reply: "Without manifesting" one's wisdom, generated through hearing and so on, one should desire to stay in the childlike state, i.e. be free from arrogance and the rest. Why? "On account of connection," i.e. because the state of freedom from arrogance and so on alone can have any "connection" with the topic of discussion, while wilful behaviour can have no connection whatsoever with it, in accordance with the scriptural text: "Not one who has not refrained from bad conduct, not one who is not tranquil, not one who is not composed, not one who is not of peaceful mind, can obtain Him even through intelligence" (Kaṭha 2.24). Hence it is established that one desirous of salvation should have 'childlike state', i.e. freedom from arrogance and the like.

Here ends the section entitled "Non-manifestation" (13).

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Here he concludes the topic, viz. whether those who practise the vow called Pāśupata are entitled to salvation or not. The *prima facie* view is that since such people do not belong to any stage of life, they are not so entitled. The answer is: "(Although the Pāśupata-āśrama) does not manifest itself, (i.e. is not, a particular āśrama, yet) owing to (its) connection (with all the requisites of the stage of asceticism, such as, chastity and so on, it is called an 'atyāśrama' or super-āśrama, and is the cause of salvation)".[1]

[1] Śk. B. 3.4.49, pp. 415-416, Parts 10 and 11.

Baladeva

He, like Nimbārka, takes this sūtra (sūtra 50 in his commentary) as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, but dealing with an entirely different topic, viz. the keeping of knowledge as secret. Hence the sūtra: "(Let one remain) without manifesting (i.e. revealing the knowledge attained), on account of connection (i.e. tradition)". That is, when a preceptor teaches his disciple, he should ask the disciple to keep what he has learnt a strict secret, for such is the tradition [1].

Adhikaraṇa 14: The section entitled "In this life". (Sūtra 50).

SŪTRA 50

"(THERE IS THE RISE OF KNOWLEDGE) IN THIS LIFE IF OBSTRUCTION BE NOT PRESENT, ON ACCOUNT OF THAT BEING SEEN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"If obstruction" be non-existent, then there is rise of knowledge "in this life"; if it be present, in the next, "on account of that being declared" by the text: "Then Naciketas, having obtained the knowledge declared by Death" (Kaṭha 6.18 [2]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having stated the multitude of means that lead to the rise of knowledge, the author is now considering its time.

On the doubt, viz. whether through the means, demonstrated in the group of aphorisms ending with "Non-manifesting, on account of connection" (Br. Sū. 3.4.49), knowledge arises in this life or in the next,—the *prima facie* view is that in accordance with the scriptural text: "Let one desirous of salvation perform sacrifices" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5 [3]) and so on, people strive for only prosperity

[1] G.B. 3.4.50, pp. 299-300, Chap. 3.
[2] B.
[3] P. 208, line 27, vol. 2.

in the next life, but not for the rise of knowledge, knowledge being possible in this very life.

With regard to it, we reply: "If obstruction", i.e. if the obstruction to knowledge, viz. works which are dependent on particular place and time and are about to produce results other than knowledge, "be not present". That is, if the group of means which lead to knowledge be performed well, there is the rise of knowledge "in this life"; if any obstruction to such works be present, then in the next. Why? "On account of that being seen," i.e. because the rise of knowledge is found to take place in both ways. That in the absence of any obstruction, there is the rise of knowledge in this life is declared by the text: "Then Naciketas, having attained the knowledge declared by Death and this rule [1] of the Yoga entirely, attained Brahman and became stainless, deathless" (Kaṭha 6.18). That through the means, practised in one life, there is the rise of knowledge in another life is declared by the text: "Even when in the womb, Vāmadeva perceived". If there be a large number of obstructions, the attainment of knowledge is indeed very difficult, in accordance with the scriptural text: "He whom many, though hearing, know not" (Kaṭha 2.7). Hence it is established that the rise of knowledge takes place on the removal of obstructions. There is no fixed rule that knowledge arises in that very life in which the means were performed.

Here ends the section entitled "In this life" (14).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He reads: "Aihikam *api aprastuta*-pratibandhe...." [2]. Interpretation same. This is sūtra 51 in his commentary.

Rāmānuja

He reads: "Aihikama *aprastuta*-pratibandhe....". Interpretation of the word "aihikam" different, viz. "What belongs to this

[1] Our text reads "yoga-śiddhi"—a mis-quotation. Correct one "Yoga-vidhi". Vide Kaṣha, p. 120.

[2] Ś.B. 3.4.51, p. 894.

world (i.e. meditation aiming at worldly prosperity)". That is, there are two kinds of meditation, viz. that which aims at worldly prosperity only ("aihikam") and that which aims at final release. The former may or may not arise in this life according to the absence or presence of obstruction [1]; and similarly there is no fixed rule with regard to the latter also as will be shown in the next sūtra.

Bhāskara

He reads: "Aihikam *aprasutam pratibandhena darśānat*". Accordingly the sūtra means: "(There is the rise of knowledge) in this life, (if the works which obstruct it have) not sprung up, through (the presence of such an) obstruction (however, there is the rise of knowledge in the next world), because (that) is seen".[2] Thus, the import is the same as Nimbārka's. This is sūtra 48 in his commentary.

Śrīkaṇṭha

His reading of the sūtra is like Rāmānuja's reading. Interpretation different, i.e. he is here speaking of the time of the rise of salvation and not of knowledge. Nimbārka speaks of this in the next sūtra. Śrīkaṇṭha interprets the sūtra thus: "(The result of meditation, viz. salvation, arises) in this life (i.e. as soon as the present body ceases), if obstruction be not present, on account of that being seen". That is, if there be no contrary karmas, then a knower attains release as soon as he dies. But if there be such karmas, he has to be re-born and exhaust them before he can attain release. Hence it is that even knowers like Vāmadeva are seen to have re-births [3].

Baladeva

His reading too is like Rāmānuja's reading. Interpretation same.

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[1] Śrī. B. 3.4.50, p. 398, Part 2.
[2] Bh. B. 3.4.48, (written as 3.4.49), p. 216.
[3] Śk. B. 3.4.50, pp. 416-418, Parts 10 and 11.

Adhikaraṇa 15: The section entitled "The fruit, viz. salvation". (Sūtra 51)

SŪTRA 51

"SIMILARLY, (THERE IS) NON-RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE FRUIT, VIZ. SALVATION, ON ACCOUNT OF ONE HAVING THAT STATE BEING ASCERTAINED, ON ACCOUNT OF ONE HAVING THAT STATE BEING ASCERTAINED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Likewise, there is "non-restriction with regard to the fruit, viz. salvation", in accordance with the statement: "For him there is delay so long" (Chānd. 6.14.2 [1]).

Here ends the fourth quarter of the third chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The question as to when a seeker attains knowledge, whether here or hereafter, has been considered above. Now, the question as to when one who has attained knowledge and is a seeker of salvation attains salvation is being considered.

The doubt is as to whether or not there is any universal rule that the fruit of knowledge, viz. salvation, arises only after the knower is freed from the body in which he has attained knowledge. The *prima facie* view is as follows:—

As soon as the means are accomplished, the fruit may be attained at that very moment; hence the fruit arises immediately after he is freed from the body.

With regard to it, we reply: "There is non-restriction with regard to the fruit, viz. salvation". That is, just as there is non-restriction or no universal rule with regard to the rise of knowledge,—viz. in the absence of obstructions, there is the rise of knowledge here; in their presence elsewhere,—"so" there is "non-restriction" with regard to the fruit of knowledge, viz. "salvation", belonging to one who

[1] B.

has attained knowledge. If the works which have begun to bear fruits be absent, then the fruit of knowledge, viz. salvation, belonging to the knower, arises after he is freed from the present body; but if they be present, then after he is freed from still another body,—thus there is no fixed rule here. Why? "On account of one having that state being ascertained," i.e. because the Chāndogya text: "For him there is delay only so long as I am (i.e. he is) not free, then I shall (i.e. he will)[1] attain (Brahman)" (Chānd. 6.14.2) speaks of "one having that state", i.e. one having the state of a knower, or, one by whom knowledge has been obtained. Hence it is established that there is no fixed rule with regard to the fruit, viz. salvation. The repetition of the last words indicates the completion of the chapter.

Here ends the section entitled "The fruit, viz. salvation" (15).

Here ends the fourth quarter of the third chapter in the Vedānta-kaustuba, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Nimbārka, the founder and the teacher of the sect of the holy Sanatkumāra.

And this third chapter, entitled "The means", concerned with the discussion about the knowledge of Brahman, is completed.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different, viz. "Similarly, (there is) no fixed rule with regard to the fruit, viz. salvation, on account of such a state being ascertained (to be Brahman)". That is, the *result* of knowledge is *not* subject to the same rule as the *origin* of knowledge. The latter may vary, i.e. take place here or hereafter; but the former is not subject to any variations, but is the same always, since Scripture declares salvation to be Brahman, the UNCHANGEABLE.[2]

Rāmānuja

Interpretation same. He points out that just as there is no fixed rule with regard to the rise of the fruit of that kind of meditation

[1] See V.K. 1.1.7.

[2] Ś.B. 3.4.51, pp. 896 ff.

which aims at worldly prosperity (considered in the previous sūtra), so there is no fixed rule with regard to the rise of the fruit of that of meditation which aims at salvation.[1]

Bhāskara

He interprets the first part, viz. "muktiphalāniyamaḥ" like Nimbārka, the second part, viz. "tadavasthāvdhṛteḥ" like Śaṃkara. Thus, according to him the sūtra means: although there is no fixed rule as to whether salvation is to arise here or hereafter, yet there is no non-fixity in the very nature of salvation, for salvation is nothing but the state of the Highest Lord.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. "(There is) no fixed rule that the fruit, viz. salvation (has grades like the fruit of karma) since (salvation) is ascertained to be that condition (viz. the state of Brahman)". That is, salvation means attaining similarity with the Lord; hence the Lord being the same, salvation does not vary, though there may be gradations in the meditations.[3]

Résumé

The fourth quarter of the third chapter contains:

(1) 51 sūtras and 15 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
(2) 52 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
(3) 51 sūtras and 15 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
(4) 49 sūtras and 16 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
(5) 51 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
(6) 52 sūtras and 16 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Sūtra 46 in the commentaries of Śaṃkara and Baladeva is not found in Nimbārka's commentary.

Bhāskara takes sūtras 23 and 24 in Nimbārka's commentary as forming a single sūtra, and omits sūtra 42.

[1] Śrī. B. 3.4.51, p. 399, Part 2.
[2] Bh. B. 3.4.49, (written as 3.4.50), p. 217.
[3] Śk. B. 3.4.51, pp. 418-419, Parts 10 and 11.

FOURTH CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FIRST QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "Repetition". (Sūtras 1-2)

SŪTRA 1

"REPETITION MORE THAN ONCE, ON ACCOUNT OF TEACHING."

The interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras, entitled Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

There must be "repetition" of the means "more than once", "on account of the teaching" of the means that lead to a direct vision of Brahman, viz. "Should be heard, should be thought, should be meditated on" (Bṛh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6[1]).

The Commentary, the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

In the third chapter, the nature of the means were determined. Now, in this fourth chapter, that of the fruit or the result is being determined. Thus, in the first quarter, it will be established that the attainment of the fruit results straight on through the steady practice of the means. With a view to this, the means are to be repeated till death. Further, it will be clearly shown that a knower, having Brahman for his soul, attains salvation through the might of his knowledge, the cause of the cessation of the prior and subsequent works. It will also be proved that the end, viz. Brahman, is attained when there is a complete exhaustion of works, which have begun to bear fruits, by retributive experiences. In the second quarter, problems like the departure of a knower from the body and so on will be considered. In the third quarter, those of his going through the path beginning with light will be discussed. In the fourth quarter, the real nature and attributes of one, who has attained Brahman and has his real nature manifest, will be determined. Now, first of all, the author points out that the means are to be practised more than once.

[1] Ś, R, Bh.

The doubt is as to whether the means leading to a direct vision of Brahman, mentioned in scriptural texts like: '"O! the self is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated on. It is to be sought for, it is to be enquired into"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6), "Knowing him alone, one passes beyond death, there is no other way to salvation" (Śvet. 3.8, 6.15), "The knower of Brahman attains the highest" (Tait. 2.1) and so on, are to be practised once, or are to be repeated more than once. With regard to it, the *prima facie* view is that they are to be performed once, there being no evidence for a repetition more than once.

With regard to this, we reply: "Repetition", i.e. there must be a repetition, more than once, of the means leading to a direct vision of Brahman. Why? "On account of teaching," i.e. on account of the teaching of meditation, the means to a direct vision of Brahman, which teaching is preceded by that of hearing of and reflecting on the scriptural texts. The purport is this: The real knowledge of the meaning of texts cannot be attained, through a mere hearing of the scriptural texts only once, even on the part of men like Śvetaketu, the meaning of the Vedānta-texts being very difficult to be understood; otherwise, the repetition of the text: "Thou art that" (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.[1]) would have been meaningless. For this very reason, texts like: "Whom they do not know, though hearing" (Kaṭha 2.7[2]) and so on are not without meaning. For this very reason, considering that no understanding of the meaning of the Vedānta-texts is possible through a mere hearing of those texts in accordance with the injunction about Vedic study, His Holiness composed this treatise. Thus, in the text: '"O! the self is to be seen"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6) the teaching: 'to be heard', aiming at a direct vision of Brahman, indicates that there is hearing more than once. If the direct vision of Brahman be attainable through a mere hearing of the scriptural texts about Brahman, celebrated in the passages: "From whom, verily, all these beings arise" (Tait. 3.1), "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite" (Tait. 2.1) and so on, then the teaching "should be heard" (Bṛh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6) becomes futile. Exactly similar is the teaching: "Should be thought" (Bṛh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6), i.e. the teaching about thinking which means

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[1] Repeated nine times. Vide Chānd. 6.8.7 ff.

[2] Correct quotation: "Śṛṇvanto' pi vahavo yaṃ na vidyoḥ". Vide Kaṭha, pp. 35-36.

constantly reflecting on Reality. After that there is the teaching about meditation, viz. "Should be meditated on" (Bṛh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6), i.e. the teaching of meditation, which means an unbroken perception of Brahman, the object of hearing and thinking, and is the special cause of a direct vision of Him. On account of such a teaching, when the meditation on Brahman is practised more than once, then alone there is, through Brahman's grace, a direct vision of Him, in accordance with the scriptural text: "But then he, meditating, sees him who is without part" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.8).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They all connect the word "asakṛt" (more than one) with the word "upadeśāt" and not with the word "āvṛtti". That is, according to them, the means are to be repeated because Scripture teaches them more than once, i.e. repeatedly.[1]

SŪTRA 2

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF INFERENTIAL MARK."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the Smṛti passage: '"By force of practice, desire to attain me, O Dhanañjaya"' (Gītā 12.9[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

An inferential mark means Smṛti. There are Smṛti passages to this effect, such as '"But through repetition O son of Kunti!"' (Gītā 6.35), '"Desire to attain me, O Dhanañjaya"' (Gītā 12.9), "Viṣṇu is to be remembered always, and should never be forgotten. Let all injunctions and prohibitions be subordinate to these two"

[1] Ś.B. 4.1.1, p. 900; Bh. B. 4.1.1, p. 218; G.B. 4.1.1.
[2] Correct quotation: "abhyāsa-yogena". Not quoted by others.

and so on. Hence it is established that the means to a direct vision of Brahman are to be repeated more than once.

Here ends the section entitled "Repetition" (1).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He omits the "ca".

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "Meditation under the aspect of Self". (Sūtra 3)

SŪTRA 3

"BUT 'THE SELF'—SO (THEY ADMIT AND MAKE OTHERS) UNDERSTAND."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"This is my self" (Chānd. 3.14.3, 4 [1])—so the previous teachers "admit". "This is your self" (Bṛh. 3.4.1, etc.[2]), so they teach the disciples. Hence the Highest Person is to be meditated on by one desirous of salvation as one's own self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the immediately adjoining section, it has been shown that the means are to be practised more than once. This suggests an absolute difference between the knower and the object known. Now we hasten to remove this misconception.

The doubt is as to whether the object to be known, viz. Brahman, is to be meditated on as different from the knower or as the self of the knower? With regard to it, the *prima facie* view is: As different. Why? For the following reasons: First, the self, being within the range of the perception of the 'I', is easily knowable. Secondly, the means are, on the contrary, enjoined to be repeated more than once

[1] Ś. [2] Ś. R. Bh.

for knowing the self in question. Thirdly, there are a great many scriptural and Smṛti texts as well as aphorisms teaching a fundamental difference between Brahman and the individual soul like: "And on account of the designation of difference" (Br. Sū. 1.1.18), "But something more, on account of the indication of difference" (Br. Sū. 2.1.21) and so on. In this way, such a difference between Brahman and the individual soul being established by the direct evidence of one's own realization, as well as by Scripture, no other supposition is to be made, in accordance with the condemnatory statement: "He who supposes the self to be otherwise than what it really is,—what sin is not committed by him, the thief, the stealer of his own self?"

With regard to it, we reply: "But 'the self'—so (they) admit", since the Highest self is the whole of which the individual self is a part and since the former is the very soul of the latter, which can have no existence and activity independently of Him, just as the thousand-rayed sun, having independent existence and activity in contrast to its own rays, is their soul, and the rays are non-different from it. Similarly, the Lord should be known to be non-different from the individual souls.

The word "but" indicates clearly the difference in nature between the individual soul and the Highest self, the non-knowing and the all-knowing. The relation of identity is possible between two things when they are non-different in some way or other. No identity is possible between a cow and a horse. Again, identity is not possible in the case of a single horse also. But there is a relation of identity between the effect and its cause, the attribute and its substratum, the power and its possessor,—i.e. only between two things which are both different and non-different. Otherwise, in accordance with the text: "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), the universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, must be non-different from Brahman in nature, which is impossible.

Hence, the Lord is the soul of the meditating devotee,—a part of Brahman and different, indeed, from Him in nature,—as the tree is of the leaf, the substratum of light of light, the chief vital-breath of the sense-organs. Hence, both difference and non-difference are equally fundamental and natural. Thus, alone, texts like: "Thou art me, O lord Deity! I am 'Thou'" and so on can have a meaning. For this very reason, again, the non-difference of the individual soul from Brahman being established,—as of the leaf from the tree, light

from its substratum,—texts like: "He who worships another deity, (thinking:) 'The Deity is one, I another', does not know, like a beast" (Bṛh. 1.4.10) and so on, too, fit in. Since between Brahman and the individual soul there is a non-difference of this kind which is not in conflict with difference, there is no contradiction of scriptural and Smṛti passages and aphorisms like: "The conscious among the conscious" (Kaṭha 5.13; Śvet. 6.13), '"And I am superior to the imperishable as well"' (Gītā 15.18), "But on account of the teaching of something more" (Br. Sū. 3.4.8), "Not the other, on account of inappropriateness" (Br. Sū. 1.1.17) and so on, the relation of difference-non-difference between the two being approved by all Scriptures. Hence "This is my self" (Chānd. 3.14.3, 4), "This is the inter soul of all beings" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.14),—so the previous teachers admit. "This is your soul, within all" (Bṛh. 3.4.1, 2; 3.5.1), "This is your self, the inner controller, immortal" (Bṛh. 3.7.3, etc.), '"All this has that for its soul . . . Thou art that"' (Chānd. 6.8.7) and so on,—so they teach their disciples the very same thing. In accordance with the Smṛti passage as well, viz. '"I am the soul, O thick-haired one! dwelling within the heart of all beings"' (Gītā 10.20), '"Know me also as the knower of the field"' [1] (Gītā. 13.2), it is established that the Highest Person is to be meditated on as one's own self.

Here ends the section entitled "Meditation under the aspect of self" (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The Symbol". (Sūtras 4-5)

SŪTRA 4

"NOT IN A SYMBOL, FOR THAT (IS) NOT (THE SELF)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But the self is not to be sought for "in a symbol"; "that" is "not" the self of the meditating devotee.

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[1] I.e. the individual soul, the knower of the body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author points out that similarly, the self is not to be sought for in a symbol.

With regard to the meditations on symbols, such as, "Let one meditate on the mind as Brahman" (Chānd. 3.18.1), "He who meditates on name as Brahman" (Chānd. 7.1.5) and so on, the doubt is as to whether the self is to be sought for in symbols or not. What is reasonable, to begin with? If it be suggested: It is to be done so indeed, symbolic meditations too being equally meditations on Brahman.

We reply: The self is not to be sought for "in a symbol", since "that", i.e. the symbol, is not the soul of the meditating devotee, seeing that symbols like the mind and the rest are to be meditated on under the aspect of Brahman.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

The interpretation of the clause: 'na hi sah" different, viz. "for he (i.e. the meditating devotee) does not (look upon the symbol as his self)".[1]

Baladeva

He omits the word "sah".[2]

Bhāskara

He omits the first "na".[3]

SŪTRA 5

"THE VIEW OF BRAHMAN, ON ACCOUNT OF SUPERIORITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The viewing of the mind and the rest as Brahman is indeed proper, but not the viewing of Brahman as the mind and the rest, "on account of the superiority" of Brahman.

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[1] Ś.B. 4.1.4, p. 908.
[2] Bh. B. 4.1.4, p. 221.
[3] G.B. 4.1.4, p. 4, Chap. 4.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. In the above cases, let Brahman alone be the object to be meditated on, viewed as the mind and so on,—the author replies:

The mind, name and so on are to be viewed as Brahman. Why? "On account of superiority," i.e. on account of Brahman's superiority to the mind, name and the rest. But Brahman is not to be viewed as the mind, name and the rest. Just as to view a minister as the king is proper, but not the king as a minister, so is the case here. Hence it is established that the self is not to be sought for in a symbol.

Here ends the section entitled "The Symbol" (3).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. "The view of Brahman (is to be super-imposed upon the Lord), on account of superiority (of such a meditation)". That is, just as the Lord is to be meditated on as the self of the devotee, so He is to be meditated on as Brahman as well, i.e. as possessed of great attributes and powers, since such a meditation is the highest of all.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "The ideas of the sun and the rest". (Sūtra 6)

SŪTRA 6

"AND THE IDEAS OF THE SUN AND THE REST (ARE TO BE SUPER-IMPOSED) ON THE SUBSIDIARY PART, ON ACCOUNT OF APPROPRIATENESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to the meditations, viz. "Verily, he who shines, let one meditate on him as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.3.1 [2]) and so on, "the

[1] G.B. 4.1.5, p. 7, Chap. 4. [2] Ś. R. Bh. ŚK.

ideas of the sun and the rest" are to be super-imposed on the udgītha and so on, on account of the superiority of the sun, etc.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Certain meditations, based on the subsidiary parts, are mentioned in Scripture thus: "Verily, he who is the sun, let one meditate on him as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.3.1) and so on. Here, on the suggestion that on account of the superiority of the udgītha and the rest,—as the subordinate parts of sacrificial acts which are means to an end,—to the sun, etc., which lead to no end, the ideas of the udgītha, etc., are to be super-imposed on the sun and so on—the author now states the correct conclusion.

"The ideas of the sun and the rest," i.e. the views of the sun and the rest alone, are to be super-imposed "on the subsidiary parts", i.e. on the subordinate members of sacrificial acts. Why? "On account of appropriateness," i.e. because the superiority of the sun and the rest is appropriate. When the udgītha and the rest are ceremoniously purified by being viewed as the sun, etc., then alone can the sacrificial acts come to produce results. Hence the superiority of the sun and the rest stands to reason. So it is established that the view of the sun, etc., is to be super-imposed on the udgītha and the rest.

Here ends the section entitled "The ideas of the sun and the rest" (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He reads "aṅgeṣu" instead of "aṅge".[1]

Baladeva

He too takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, but, as usual, concerned with an entirely different topic, thus: "The ideas of the sun and the rest (as generating from the eyes of the Lord and

[1] Ś. B. 4.1.6, p. 9, Chap. 4.

so on, should be super-imposed) on the limb (of the Lord), on account of appropriateness". That is, the Lord is to be contemplated on as producing the sun from His eyes and so on.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Sitting". (Sūtras 7-11)

SŪTRA 7

"SITTING, ON ACCOUNT OF POSSIBILITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

One should practise meditation "sitting" only, since meditation is possible only on the part of one who is sitting.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been proved above that meditation, the special cause of a direct vision of Brahman, is to be repeated more than once. Now, the problem is being considered as to whether it is to be practised somehow without following any restrictive rule, or only in a sitting posture.

On the doubt, viz. whether there is no restrictive rule how meditation is to be practised,—whether in a sitting posture, as lying down, walking or standing still; or whether there is a restrictive rule that it is to be practised in a sitting posture alone,—if the *prima facie* view be that there being no cause for such a restriction, there is no restriction,—

We reply: "sitting". Why? "On account of possibility," i.e. because meditation is possible on the part of a devotee who is sitting. One who is lying down may fall asleep, while one who is walking or standing still may have his attention diverted owing to his effort for holding the body up and so on, and as such no meditation is possible on their part.

[1] G.B. 4.1.6, p. 9, Chap. 4.

SŪTRA 8

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTEMPLATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Meditation being of the form of contemplation, it is to be carried on in a sitting posture alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And" meditation being of the form of contemplation, as evident from the text: "Should be meditated on" (Bṛh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6); and contemplation, consisting of a continuous stream of ideas having the form of the object contemplated, being possible only on the part of a contemplating devotee who is sitting, there can be no question as to the propriety of the above restrictive rule,—this is the sense.

SŪTRA 9

"AND WITH REFERENCE TO IMMOBILITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "The earth contemplates, as it were" (Chānd. 7.6.1 [1]), the word 'contemplates' has been used "with reference to (its) immobility". Hence one should practise meditation in a sitting posture only.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the scriptural text: "The earth contemplates, as it were. The heaven contemplates, as it were. Water contemplates, as it were. The mountains contemplate, as it were" (Chānd. 7.6.1), the term 'contemplates' has been used "with reference to the immobility" of the earth and the rest. On account of this indicatory mark too, meditation, having the form of contemplation, knowing and so on, is to be practised in a sitting posture alone.

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[1] Ś. R. Bh. ŚK. B.

SŪTRA 10

"AND SMṚTIS DECLARE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And the Smṛti texts declare": "Having placed in a clean spot" (Gītā 6.11 [1]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And Smṛti texts declare" that contemplation is possible only on the part of one who is sitting, thus: "Having placed, on a clean spot, one's steady seat that is neither very high nor very low and consists of a cloth, deer-skin, and kuśa-grass, one over the other; having sat there on the seat, concentrating one's mind and with the functions of the mind and sense-organs controlled, let one practise deep meditation for the purification of his self" (Gītā 6.11) and so on.

SŪTRA 11

"WHERE CONCENTRATION (IS POSSIBLE) THERE, ON ACCOUNT OF NON-SPECIFICATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Where" concentration of the mind is possible "there" one should practise meditation, there being no mention in Scripture of a special place and the rest over and above this.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Where," i.e. in whatever place, time and so on, "concentration" of the mind is possible, "there" meditation is to be practised, there being no mention in Scripture of a special place, time and so on. "In a clean level spot; free from pebbles, fire and sand; favourable to the mind by reason of sound, pond and so on; but not hurtful to

[1] *Op. cit.*

the eye; full of caves and free from wind,—let one apply one's self (to meditation)" (Śvet. 2.10),—this text of the Śvetāśvataras also speaks of a place favourable to the concentration of the mind, but not of any special place and so on, as evident from the concluding phrase: 'favourable to the mind'. Hence, it is established that meditation is to be carried on in a sitting posture.

Here ends the section entitled "Sitting" (5).

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "Until death". (Sūtra 12)

SŪTRA 12

"UNTIL DEATH, FOR THERE ALSO (IT) IS SEEN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Meditation is to be carried on "until death", since "there also" that "is seen" in the text: "Verily, having stayed thus as long as he lives" (Chānd. 8.15.1 [1]) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated above that the means are to be practised repeatedly. Now, the duration of meditation is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether meditation, denoted by the terms 'contemplation', 'knowing' and so on, is to be finished within a short time, or is to be continued till the fall of the body,—if it be suggested that it is to be finished within a short time, that much being sufficient to satisfy the demands of the scriptural texts which teach repetition more than one,—

We reply: "Until death". Meditation is to be continued uninterruptedly until death. The word "for" states the reason for this: That there is the continuance of the thought of the object to be meditated on "there also", i.e. during that period (viz. from the beginning till death), "is seen", i.e. declared by the scriptural text: "Now, verily,

[1] R. ŚK.

a person consists of purpose. With whatever purpose he departs from this world, that he becomes on departing to that world" (Śat. Br. 10.6.3, 1 [1]). The phrase: 'consists of purpose' means 'is given primarily to contemplation'. Similarly, that there is the continuance of the thought of the object to be meditated on till life lasts is declared also by the scriptural text: "Verily, having stayed thus as long as he lives, he attains the world of Brahman" (Chānd. 8.15.1); and in the Smṛti passage: '"Remembering whatever being he leaves the body at the end, to that alone he goes, O son of Kunti, ever permeated by its nature"' (Gītā 8.6). Hence it is established that meditation is to be continued day after day until death.

Here ends the section entitled "Until death" (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Although literally Śaṃkara interprets the sūtras 7–12 like Nimbārka, yet there is a great difference between them, viz. while Nimbārka is speaking here of the meditation which leads to salvation, Śaṃkara especially excludes such a meditation and speaks of that meditation alone which leads to worldly prosperity. Thus, he points out that the rule about the posture of meditation holds good only in the case of that meditation which leads to worldly prosperity ("abhyudaya-phalopāsanā"), but neither in the case of the meditation on the subordinate members of sacrifices ("karmāṅgopāsanā"), nor in the case of the meditation which aims at real knowledge ("samyag darśanopāsanā"), since the first depends on action, the second on object.[2] Similarly, the rule regarding the duration of meditation does not hold good in the case of the meditation aiming at knowledge, since a jīvan-mukta, i.e. one who has attained knowledge by meditation and has become freed thereby, need not carry on meditation further as long as he lives.[3]

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[1] P. 806, lines 14-15.

[2] Ś.B. 4.1.7, pp. 915-916. "Karmāṅga-sambandhiṣu tāvad upāsaneṣu karma-tantratvāt na āsnādi-cintā; nāpi samyag-darśane, vastu-tantratvāt jñānasya".

[3] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.12, p. 918.

Baladeva

He interprets the phrase: "tatrāpi" to mean 'even after death'. That is, the devotee not only practises meditation as long as he lives, but even after death, i.e. even when he is freed, since the Lord is so beautiful that he is drawn to worshipping Him, though not enjoined to do so.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "On the attainment of that". (Sūtra 13)

SŪTRA 13

"ON THE ATTAINMENT OF THAT, (THERE FOLLOW) NON-CLINGING AND DESTRUCTION OF SUBSEQUENT AND PRIOR SINS ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There take place "the non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and prior sins" on the part of a knower. Why? "On account of the designation," viz. "To one who knows thus, evil deeds do not cling" (Chānd. 4.14.3[2]), "All his sins are burnt" (Chānd. 5.24.3[3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, for indicating clearly that if one wishes to have the obstructions removed in order that he may directly attain the place of the Highest Person, one should resort to the means with the greatest care, a discussion about the repetition of the means and so on was undertaken in the chapter dealing with the end. Now, the author shows how on the rise of knowledge all obstructions cease immediately.

The text: "Just as water does not cling to the lotus-leaf, so no evil deeds cling to one who knows thus" (Chānd. 4.14.3), declares

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[1] G.B. 4.1.12, p. 15, Chap. 4. "Mokṣa-paryyantam upāsanaṃ kāryyam iti. Tatrāpi mokṣe ca."

[2] Ś. R. Bh. ŚK. B.

[3] *Op. cit.*

that there is the non-clinging of the subsequent sins on the part of a knower. Again, the texts: "Just as a tuft of the Iṣikā-reed placed on a fire is burnt up, so all his sins are burnt up" (Chānd. 5.24.3), "And all his works decay when he who is high and low is seen" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), declare that all his prior sins are destroyed. Here the doubt is as to whether the non-clinging and destruction respectively, of the subsequent and prior sins on the part of one who has attained knowledge are justifiable or not. If it be suggested: In accordance with the declaration: "A work done, good or bad, must necessarily be experienced" (Br. V.P. 26.70 [1]) and so on, the consequences of the work done must necessarily be undergone. Hence the non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and prior sins are not justifiable; the scriptural texts about such non-clinging and destruction simply refer to the cessation of works the consequences of which have already been undergone,—

We reply: "On the attainment" of knowledge, otherwise called 'steady remembrance', 'highest devotion' and so on, through the maturity of such a meditation, "the non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and prior sins" are justifiable. Why? "On account of the designation of that," i.e. on account of the designation of the non-clinging of the subsequent sins in the text: "To one who knows thus, evil deeds do not cling" (Chānd. 4.14.13),—this designation cannot be taken to be referring to the non-clinging of works the consequences of which have already been undergone, since in their case there being no question of clinging at all, there is no sense in the denial;—and on account of the designation of the destruction of prior sins in the passages: "So all his sins are burnt up" (Chānd. 5.24.3), "And all his sins decay when he who is high and low is seen" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8). This designation too cannot be taken to be referring to works the consequences of which have already been undergone since the destruction of such works holds good equally in the case of a non-knower; and since the declaration: "A work which is not experienced does not decay even in hundreds of millions of ages. It must be experienced necessarily" (Br. V.P. 26.70) and so on, refers to the case of non-knowers, and to works which have begun to produce consequences. Hence it is established that the non-clinging and

[1] P. 119, col. 2, line 12.

destruction of a knower's subsequent and prior sins, sprung up from thoughtlessness, are indeed justifiable.

Here ends the section entitled "On the attainment of that" (7).

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "The other". (Sūtra 14)

SŪTRA 14

"OF THE OTHER TOO, (THERE IS) NON-CLINGING THUS, BUT ON THE FALL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since the good deeds also, aiming at selfish ends, are incompatible with salvation, just as the sins are, there result the non-clinging of the subsequent and the destruction of the prior (in their case too). Immediately after the non-clinging and destruction of the subsequent and prior (merits and sins), salvation arises at once "on the fall" of the body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the immediately adjoining sūtra, it has been said that there is the cessation of the knower's evil deeds, sprung up from thoughtlessness. Now the author points out that there is the cessation of his good deeds no less.

If it be suggested: subsequent and prior sins being harmful, let there be the non-clinging and destruction, respectively, of subsequent and prior sins, through knowledge. But such non-clinging and destruction of good deeds through knowledge are not justifiable, since they being enjoined in Scripture are not incompatible with knowledge,—the author extends the above reasoning here too thus: "Of the other too". That is, as in the case of sins, there must be non-clinging and destruction, through knowledge, of what is other than sins, i.e. of the good deeds too which aim at selfish ends. Why? On account of the designation of that, i.e. just as the evil deeds are designated as rejectible by one desirous of salvation, since they are incompatible with salvation, so the good deeds, too, are likewise

designated,—on account of that. And there is the designation of both good and evil deeds as equally rejectible, both being equally incompatible with salvation. The following texts refer both to good and evil deeds: "All sins return therefrom" (Chānd. 8.4.1). "He shakes off good and evil deeds" (Kauṣ. 1.4). "Verily, he crosses both these" (Bṛh. 4.4.22). Thus, when there are no more good and evil deeds, which are incompatible with salvation, salvation arises at once "on the fall", i.e. on the fall of the body. The word "but" (in the sūtra) implies emphasis. Hence it is established that the non-clinging and destruction of the good deeds, too, are justifiable.

Here ends the section entitled "The other" (8).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation of the phrase: "pāte tu" is different, viz. 'There is the destruction of the good deeds, which facilitate knowledge, on the fall of the body and not here and now.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "The works the effects of which have not yet begun". (Sūtra 15)

SŪTRA 15

"BUT ONLY THOSE FORMER (WORKS) THE EFFECTS OF WHICH HAVE NOT YET BEGUN, BECAUSE TILL THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the attainment of knowledge, "the former" good and evil deeds, the effects of which have not yet begun, alone perish. Why? Because in the scriptural text: "For him there is delay so long I am

[1] Śrī. B. 4.1.14, p. 416, Part 2; ŚK. B. 4.1.14, pp. 441-442, Parts 10 and 11.

(=he is) free; then I shall [1] (=he will) attain Brahman" (Chānd. 6.14.2 [2]), it is declared that salvation does not arise till there is the fall of the body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been established that both good and evil deeds are destroyed through knowledge. Now, to the objection, viz. Let there be the destruction of those good and evil deeds, too, the effects of which have already begun,—the author replies here:

On the doubt, viz. whether through knowledge there is the destruction of all good and evil deeds, i.e. equally of those the effects of which have already begun and those the effects of which have not yet begun, or of those alone the effects of which have not begun,—if it be suggested: since no specification is mentioned in scriptural texts like: "And his works perish when he who is high and low is seen" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), "All sins are burnt up" (Chānd. 5.24.3), there is the destruction of all without distinction,—

The author states the correct conclusion: "Only those the effects of which have not begun yet". The "former" good and bad deeds the effects of which have not begun yet alone perish through knowledge, but not those the effects of which have already begun. Why? "Because till that," i.e. because in the scriptural text: "For him there is delay only so long I am (=he is) not free; then I shall (=he will) attain (Brahman)" (Chānd. 6.14.2), it is declared that there is delay for the knower till the fall of the body. This being so, the non-specific texts are to be interpreted in the light of the specific text. Hence it is established that through knowledge there is no destruction of those good and evil deeds the effects of which have already begun.

Here ends the section entitled "The works the effects of which have not yet begun" (9).

[1] See V.K. 1.1.7.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled "Agni-hotra". (Sūtras 16–18)

SŪTRA 16

"BUT THE AGNI-HOTRA AND THE REST (ARE TO BE PERFORMED) WITH A VIEW TO THAT EFFECT (VIZ. KNOWLEDGE) ALONE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE OBSERVATION OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not to be apprehended that through knowledge there results the cessation of the duties incumbent on one's own stage of life, such as, Agni-hotra [1], charity, austerity and so on. They are to be performed indeed, as they foster knowledge. The scriptural text about sacrifice and so on, prove them to be productive of knowledge.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated that through the might of knowledge, there results the non-clinging of the other too, i.e. of the good deeds too. Similarly, there results the non-clinging of the daily and occasional duties incumbent on one's own stage of life. Hence they are not to be performed,—this objection the author disposes of now.

On the doubt, viz. whether the daily and occasional duties like the Agni-hotra and the rest are to be performed by a knower or not,—if it be suggested: Through knowledge there result the non-clinging and destruction of good and evil deeds. What is the use of performing them, seeing that there results the cessation of the Agni-hotra and the rest too, they too being good deeds equally?—

We reply: The word "but" clearly indicates the speciality of the Agni-hotra and the rest. "The Agni-hotra and the rest," i.e. the daily and occasional duties incumbent on one's own stage of life, are to be performed by a knower "with a view to that effect alone", viz. the production of knowledge alone. Why? "On account of the observation of that," i.e. because the text: "Him, the Brāhmaṇas desire to know,[2] by sacrifice, by charity, by austerity, by

[1] Oblation to fire.

[2] "By the recitation of the Veda."

fasting" (Bṛh. 4.4.22) declares the duties incumbent on one's own stage of life, such as, Agni-hotra and the rest, to be means to knowledge. Knowledge is to be acquired so long as life lasts. Hence the duties incumbent on the stages of life are to be performed so long as life lasts.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation of the phrase "tat-kāryyāya" different, viz. "for the sake of that effect (viz. salvation)". That is, just as knowledge produces salvation, so does works like Agni-hotra and the rest.[1] Of course, Śaṃkara points out that works are indirect means to salvation, i.e. produce knowledge which produces salvation; while according to Bhāskara, it is a direct means.

SŪTRA 17

"FOR (THERE ARE) ALSO (GOOD AND BAD WORKS) OTHER THAN THESE (TO WHICH REFER THE TEXT) OF SOME (ABOUT THE DIVISION) OF BOTH (MERIT AND DEMERIT)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Other than" these works the effects of which have been produced, viz. those that are productive of knowledge, there are "also" works the effects of which have not been produced. To these refer the text of "some", designating the division "of both" merit and demerit, viz. "The friends, the good deeds, the enemies, the bad deeds".[2]

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. To what then does the following text refer to: "His sons inherit his property, his friends the good deeds, his enemies the bad deeds"?—the author replies:

[1] Ś.B. 4.1.16, pp. 923-24; Bh. B. 4.1.16, p. 225.
[2] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

"Other than these" works which are productive of knowledge, there are "also" good and bad works the results of which have been obstructed by some works of greater strength. "As" some works are undertaken for the sake of selfish ends and what is prohibited is performed through thoughtlessness,[1] so the text "of some", designating the division "of both" merit and demerit, refer to these above works only. The declaration of non-clinging and destruction, viz. "The friends the good deeds, the enemies the bad deeds" should be known to be referring to those works.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They interpret the word "ubhayayoḥ" differently, viz. '(This is the view) of both (Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa)'.[2]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

According to them the word "ubhayayoḥ" means '(There are works) of both (kind, i.e. either prior or subsequent to the rise of knowledge, which are obstructed from producing results)'.[3]

Baladeva

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (three sūtras), concerned with the case of some Nirapekṣa devotees. Hence the sūtra: "Because other than this (viz. the Chāndogya text) (there is) another (text of Śāṭyāyanins) also, (there is the destruction) of both (good and evil prārabdha-karmas in the case of some nirapekṣa devotees)". That is, the Chāndogya text (Chānd. 6.14.2) declares that a man has to wait until those works the effects of which have already begun to operate are exhausted. But this rule does not hold good in the case of some nirapekṣa devotees, where, as declared by the text of the Śāṭyāyanins, even their prārabdha good and evil deeds go to their friends and foes respectively. Thus, some nirapekṣa devotees

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[1] All these works are other than those which produce knowledge.

[2] Ś.B. 4.1.17, p. 925; Bh. B. 4.1.7, p. 226.

[3] Śrī. B. 4.1.17, p. 418, Part 2; ŚK. B. 4.1.17, p. 448, Parts 10 and 11.

become free at once, without having to wait for the full exhaustion of their prārabdha-karmas.[1]

SŪTRA 18

"BECAUSE 'WHAT ALONE WITH KNOWLEDGE'—SO (SCRIPTURE DECLARES)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For, with a view to indicating the strength and weakness of works, it is said, "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author here refers again to the greater potency of some works and the lesser potency of others, mentioned under the aphorism "For (there is) a separate fruit, (viz.) non-obstruction" (Br. Sū. 3.3.41).

The text: "What alone one does with knowledge that alone is more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10) designates the greater potency of some works and the lesser potency of others. Among these, works of greater strength first begin to produce their own fruits. Hence, when such works of greater strength are about to produce their fruits, certain other good and bad deeds of lesser strength, performed with a view to attaining certain ends, remain without producing those results, like a weak cow kept off from water, grass and so on by a stronger one. When the knower becomes free immediately after the decay of those works the effects of which have already begun, those above works go to his friends and foes respectively,—this is the sense. Hence it is established that with a view to the rise of knowledge, the duties incumbent on his own stage of life, such as, Agni-hotra and the rest, are to be performed by a house-holder; and works like austerity, muttering of prayers and so on by one who is bound by chastity.

Here ends the section entitled "Agni-hotra" (10).

[1] G.B. 4.1.17, pp. 26–28, Chap. 4.

[2] Ś. R. SK. B.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question of the two kinds of Agni-hotra, with or without knowledge, and points out that the former, of course, has a greater capability of producing knowledge, yet the latter too is not absolutely ineffective, but helps the rise of knowledge.[1]

Bhāskara

He omits this sūtra, pointing out that it is merely superfluous.[2]

Baladeva

He continues here the topic of the immediate destruction of the prārabdha-karmas of some nirapekṣa devotees, and points out that since the celebrated Chāndogya text (Chānd. 1.1.10) shows the great potency of vidyā, it is possible that through the grace of vidyā even the prārabdha-karmas may be destroyed at once.[3]

Adhikaraṇa 11: The section entitled "The destruction of others". (Sūtra 19)

SŪTRA 19

"BUT HAVING DESTROYED THE OTHER TWO BY ENJOYMENT, THEN (HE) ATTAINS (BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"But having destroyed" the good and evil deeds, the effects of which have already begun, "by enjoyment", he "attains" Brahman.

Here ends the first quarter of the fourth chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

[1] Ś.B. 4.1.18, pp. 925-926.
[2] Bh. B. 4.1.17, p. 226.
[3] G.B. 4.1.18, p. 29. Chap. 4.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been established at the end of the third chapter that as the end, viz. knowledge, depends upon the cessation of the obstructions, viz. the works the effects of which have already begun, so there is no fixed rule with regard to the time when knowledge is going to arise actually.[1] But here, it has been said that knowledge arises on the fall of the body.[2] Now, anticipating the enquiry, viz. Whence arises the cessation of the two kinds of works the effects of which have already begun? On the fall of which body is there salvation?—the author replies:—

On the doubt, viz. Whether the good and evil works—the effects of which have already begun, other than the good and evil works the effects of which have not yet begun, which are the objects of the non-clinging and destruction, and are mentioned under the aphorisms: "On the attainment of that, (there are) non-clinging and destruction, of the subsequent and prior sins, on account of the designation of that" (Br. Sū. 4.1.13). "Of the other too (there is) non-clinging thus, but on fall" (Br. Sū. 4.1.14),—are to be experienced in the body in which knowledge originates, or to be experienced in another body,—if it be suggested: Since another body is not desired, they are to be experienced in the body in which knowledge originates; on its fall, salvation arises,—

We reply: The word "but" is meant for disposing of the objection. "Having destroyed the other two," i.e. good and evil deeds the effects of which have already begun, "by enjoyment", whether in the body in which knowledge originates or in another body, one "attains" Brahman, in accordance with the text: "What is not experienced does not perish" (Br. V.P. 26.70). Hereby, the means to the removal of the obstruction to knowledge, exhibited under the aphorism; "In this world, if obstruction be not present" (Br. Sū. 3.4.10), too is explained. Hence, it is established that there is salvation when on the decay of the works,—the effects of which have already begun,—by enjoyment, there is the fall of the body at the completion of enjoyment.

Here ends the section entitled "The destruction of others" (11).

[1] Vide V.P.S. 3.4.51.
[2] Vide V.P.S. 4.1.14.

Here ends the first quarter of the fourth chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the holy Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Here he ends the discussion about the Nirapekṣa devotee, thus: "Having given up the other two (viz. the gross and the subtle bodies), (the Nirapekṣa devotee) then attains (i.e. joins) in the enjoyment (of the Lord)".[1]

Résumé

The first quarter of the fourth chapter contains:

(1) 19 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
(2) 19 sūtras and 14 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
(3) 19 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
(4) 18 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
(5) 19 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
(6) 19 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Bhāskara omits sūtra 18 in Nimbārka's commentary.

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[1] G.B. 4.1.19. pp. 29-30, Chap. 4.

FOURTH CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

SECOND QUARTER (Pada)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "Speech". (Sūtras 1-2)

SŪTRA 1

"SPEECH IN THE MIND, ON ACCOUNT OF OBSERVATION AND ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The text: "Speech merges into the mind" (Chānd. 6.8.6 [1]) denotes the merging in, i.e. the connection of the organ of speech with, the mind,—since it is found that the function of the mind continues even when the organ of speech has ceased to function; "also on account of the scriptural text": "Speech merges in the mind" (Chānd. 6.8.6).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said at the end of the previous quarter that the knower attains Brahman. Now, the knower's departure from the body for attaining Brahman and similar problems are being considered. First, the author determines the mode of departure which is common to a knower and a non-knower.

The doubt is as to whether in the text: "Of this person, my dear, who has departed, speech merges into the mind, the mind in the vital-breath, the vital-breath in fire, fire in the Highest Divinity" (Chānd. 6.8.6), the merging of the function of speech in the mind is denoted or of speech alone having the function. If it be suggested that the functions of speech and so on are directed to their respective objects by the mind. Hence the merging of the function of speech in the mind stands to reason—

We reply: Speech alone having the function merges in the mind. Why? "On account of observation," i.e. the function of the mind

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

is observed to continue even when the organ of speech has ceased to function. Apprehending the objection that this is possible even if there be the merging of only the function of speech, the author states the main reason: "And on account of scriptural text", i.e. on account of the text: "Speech merges in the mind" (Chand. 6.8.6). There is no text to the effect that the *function* of speech merges in the mind.

'Merging' is to be understood here as denoting 'connection' and not 'absorption', since the absorption of speech into the mind, which is not its material cause, is impossible,[1] since in order that the non-knower [2] may obtain another body, it is essential that speech should continue, and since it will be stated further on [3] that speech and the rest are absorbed in the Highest Soul alone.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different. In direct opposition to Nimbārka, who holds that the organ of speech is *connected* with the mind, they point out that the function of speech and not the organ of speech *merges* in the mind.[4]

Further, the most fundamental point of difference between Nimbārka and Śaṃkara is that Śaṃkara all throughout makes a distinction between the higher knower and the lower knower, i.e. one who *knows* Brahman as identical with himself, and one who *meditates* on Brahman as different from himself. Hence, while according to Śaṃkara, this quarter deals with the path of gods belonging only to the lower knowers or worshippers of the qualified Brahman,[5] according to Nimbārka, this is the highest path *belonging to all knowers.*

[1] I.e. a thing is absorbed in its material cause alone, a gold ear-ring into gold.

[2] This mode of departure is common to knowers and non-knowers, as pointed out above, and a non-knower is born again.

[3] Vide Br. Sū. 4.2.14.

[4] Ś.B. 4.2.1, pp. 929-930; Bh. B. 4.2.1, p. 227.

[5] While the higher knowers do not need to travel through any path to attain Brahman, but attain Brahman then and there as soon as real knowledge dawn. Vide Ś.B. 4.3.14. As we shall see, Śaṃkara takes the entire pāda as referring to lower knowers, except sūtras 12–16 (12–15 according to Nimbārka's numbering).

Śrīkaṇṭha

He also holds that when Scripture says that speech merges in the mind, it means that *the function* of speech *merges* in the mind.[1]

Baladeva

He is of the opinion that *both* the organ of speech itself and its function are *connected* with the mind.[2]

SŪTRA 2

"FOR THESE VERY REASONS, ALL AFTER (SPEECH)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"After" speech, all the sense-organs merge in the mind, on account of that being observed and on account of the scriptural text: "With the sense-organs merged in the mind" (Praśna 3.9[3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"For these very reasons," i.e. on account of observation and on account of scriptural text, "after" the organ of speech, all the sense-organs, too, merge in the mind. The fact observed, to begin with, is just the same as before.[4] The scriptural text, on the other hand, is as follows: "Hence he whose heat has ceased attains re-birth with his sense-organs merged in the mind" (Praśna 3.9). Hence it is established that the sense-organs like speech and the rest are united with the mind.

Here ends the section entitled "Speech" (1).

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[1] ŚK. B. 4.2.1, p. 451, Parts 10 and 11.

[2] G.B. 4.2.1.

[3] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

[4] Viz. that the mind continues to function even when the function of the organ ceases.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Here too they hold that the *functions* of speech the other sense-organs *merge* into the mind. They add a "ca" after "ata eva".[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He too adds a "ca", as before, he holds that the *functions* of the other sense-organs *merge* in the mind.[2]

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "The Mind". (Sūtra 3)

SŪTRA 3

"THAT MIND IN THE VITAL-BREATH, ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT IS SUBSEQUENT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And that is united with the vital-breath.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author points out that that is united with the vital-breath.

To the enquiry: In what does mind, connected with speech and the rest, merge?—we reply: "That", i.e. the mind, connected with speech and the rest, merges in the vital-breath. Why? "On account of what is subsequent," i.e. on account of the subsequent text: "The mind in the vital-breath" (Chānd. 6.8.6). Thus, it is established that the mind, connected with all the sense-organs, is united with the vital-breath.

Here ends the section entitled "The Mind" (2).

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[1] Ś.B. 4.2.2, p. 931; Bh. B. 4.2.2, p. 227.
[2] ŚK. B. 4.2.2, p. 450, Parts 10 and 11.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

As before, they hold that the *function* of the mind is *merged* in the vital-breath. They add a "ca" after "ata eva".[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Śrīkaṇṭha holds, as before, that the *function* of the mind *merges* in the breath.[2]

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The ruler". (Sūtra 4)

SŪTRA 4

"THAT IN THE RULER, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS APPROACH AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The vital-breath is united with the individual soul. Why? On account of the texts indicating "its approach", viz. "Thus, verily, do all the vital-breaths approach together to the soul at the time of death" (Bṛh. 4.3.38 [3]), "He going out, the vital-breath goes out after him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2 [4]), "Or, who staying should I stay?" (Praśna 6.3 [5]). The vital-breath, connected with the individual soul, is united with fire,—this is the resultant meaning.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, the meaning of the text "The mind in the vital-breath" (Chānd. 6.8.6) has been determined. Now, the author states the meaning of the text: "The vital-breath in fire" (Chānd. 6.8.6).

On the doubt, viz. whether the text: "The vital-breath in the fire (Chānd. 6.8.6) denotes that the vital-breath is united with fire or with the individual soul,—the *prima facie* view is: Just as in the previous cases, it is known from scriptural texts that speech is united

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[1] Ś.B. 4.2.3, p. 931; Bh. B. 4.2.3, p. 227.
[2] ŚK. B. 4.2.3, p. 452.
[3] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
[4] Ś, R, Bh.
[5] R.

with the mind and the mind with the vital-breath, so too, it is definitely ascertained from a scriptural text that the vital-breath is united with fire alone. Compare: "The vital-breath into the fire" (Chānd. 6.8.6).

With regard to this, we reply: "That, i.e. the vital-breath with which the mind is united, merges "in the ruler", i.e. in the individual soul, the ruler of the body and the sense-organs, i.e. is united with it. Why? "On account of its approach," i.e. on account of its approach, going after and staying. Thus, to begin with, the approach of the vital-breath to 'the ruler' is declared in the scriptural text: "Just as the servants go towards a king who wishes to set on a journey, so do all vital-breaths approach together to the soul at the time of death (Bṛh. 4.3.38). The going after of the vital-breaths with 'the ruler is declared in the scriptural texts: "When he comes to breathe upwards" (Bṛh. 4.3.38), "He going out, the vital-breath goes out after him" (Bṛh. 4.4.22). The staying of the vital-breath with 'the ruler' is declared in the scriptural text: "'Who going out, shall I go out, or who staying stay?"' (Praśna 6.3). The vital-breath, united with the individual soul, is united with fire. Hence it is established that the vital-breath being united with the individual soul is again united with fire together with it.

Here ends the section entitled "The ruler" (3).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

As before, they hold that the *function* of the vital-breath is *merged* in the individual soul.[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha

He reads: "adhyakṣena" in place of "adhykṣe"[2]. Interpretation same.

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[1] Ś.B. 4.1.4, p. 932; Bh. B. 4.1.4, p. 228.

[2] ŚK. B. 4.1.4, p. 452, Parts 10 and 11.

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "The elements". (Sūtras 5-6)

SŪTRA 5

"IN THE ELEMENTS, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And that (viz. the union) of that (viz. the vital-breath) which is connected with the soul takes place "with the elements", since in the text: "Composed of the earth, composed of water, composed of the air, composed of the ether, composed of fire" (Bṛh. 4.4.5 [1]), the soul is declared to be composed of all the elements.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been established that the vital-breath being connected with the ruler is connected with fire. Now the meaning of the word 'fire' is being considered.

'On account of its approach and so on,' the vital-breath is united with fire. Now, the question is whether the vital-breath is united with fire alone or with the elements together with fire. If it be suggested that on account of the scriptural text: "The vital-breath in fire" (Chānd. 6.8.6) it is united with fire alone—

We reply: "In the elements", i.e. the words 'in fire' mean 'in the elements together with fire'. Why? "On account of the scriptural declaration to that effect," i.e. because in the scriptural text: "Composed of the earth, composed of water, composed of the air, composed of the ether, composed of fire" (Bṛh. 4.4.5), the soul that is moving on is declared to be composed of all the elements.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

"Tac chruteḥ" interpreted differently, viz. on account of the scriptural text to that effect, (viz. Chānd. 6.8.6 [2]).

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[1] R, B.

[2] Ś.B. 4.2.5, p. 933.

Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. ". . . ataḥ śruteḥ". He interprets the word "śruteḥ" like Śaṃkara.[1]

SŪTRA 6

"NOT IN ONE, FOR (SCRIPTURE AND SMṚTI) SHOW."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But such a union is not possible with one element. Scripture and Smṛti "show" that one element is incapable of producing effects thus: '"Let me make each of them tripartite"' (Chānd. 6.1.3[2]).

"These (elements), possessed of various powers but separate, were unable, hence, to produce beings without aggregation, (i.e.) without coming together entirely" (V.P. 1.2.48[3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. the text. "Composed of the earth" (Bṛh. 4.4.5) and so on is justified even if it be admitted that the soul is united with fire and the rest successively (and not simultaneously),—the author says:

"As" the scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. '"Having entered with this living soul, let me evolve name and form; let me make each of the three tripartite"' (Chānd. 6.3.2-3), "These (elements), possessed of various powers (but) separate, were unable to produce beings without aggregation, (i.e.) without coming together entirely. Having come together through mutual conjunction, dependent on one another, beginning with mahat and ending in viśeṣa they produced, forsooth, the egg" (V.P. 1.2.48–50[4]) "show" that a single element is incapable of producing effects,—so "no" union of the vital-breath, joined with the soul, "with one", viz. with one of fire and the rest successively, is possible. Hence in the text: "The vital-breath in fire" (Chānd. 6.8.6) the word 'fire' means 'fire connected with other ele-

[1] Bh. B. 4.2.5, p. 228. [2] R, B. [3] P. 19.
[4] Excluding the 2nd line of verse 49 and 1st line of verse 50.

ments'. Therefore, it is established that the soul is united with all the elements.

Here ends the section entitled "The elements" (4).

COMPARISON

Thus, we have four different views:—

(1) According to Nimbārka and Rāmānuja, first the organ of speech is connected with the mind, and then the other sense-organs; the mind with the breath; the breath with the soul; the soul in the elements.

(2) According to Śaṃkara and Bhāskara, first the function of the organ of speech (and not the organ itself) is merged in (and not connected with) the mind, and then the functions of other sense-organs, the function of the mind in the breath; that of the breath in the soul, and the soul abides in the elements.

(3) According to Śrīkaṇṭha, first the function of speech is merged in the mind and then the functions of other sense-organs; and the function of the mind in the breath. So far he agrees with Śaṃkara and Bhāskara. But as to the rest, he agrees with Nimbārka, viz. that the breath is connected with (and not merged in) the soul, the soul with the elements.

(4) According to Baladeva, first speech is connected with the mind both organically and functionally and then the other sense-organs; the mind with the breath, the breath with the soul and so on.

Adhikaraṇa 5: The sūtra entitled "Up to the beginning of the path". (Sūtras 7–13)

SŪTRA 7

"AND SAME UP TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PATH, AND THE (KNOWER ATTAINS) IMMORTALITY WITHOUT HAVING BURNT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The scriptural text: "There are a hundred and one veins of the heart. Of these, one goes out through the crown of the head. Going

up through it, one goes to immortality. The others are for departing in other directions" (Chānd. 8.6.6 [1]), declares that a knower, too, departs from the body through a particular vein. This being so, the mode of a knower's departure up to the beginning of the path, i.e. till entering into the vein, is just "the same" (as that of a non-knower). The scriptural declaration of "the immortality" of the knower here and now, viz. "When all those desires which abide in the heart are loosened, then a mortal becomes immortal" (Bṛh. 4.4.7 [2]) really means that a knower's prior sins are destroyed and subsequent sins do not attach to him any more [3], and not that his connection with sense-organs and the like is destroyed all at once.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, it is being considered as to whether or not the mode of departing from the body is the same for both knowers and non-knowers.

On the doubt, viz. whether this mode of departure holds good only for one who does not know, or equally for a knower and a non-knower,—if it be suggested that as the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-text: "When all those desires which abide in the heart are loosened, then a mortal becomes immortal, attains Brahman here" (Bṛh. 4.4.7), declares that a knower attains immortality here and now,—so the departure is for the non-knower alone,—

We reply: "And the same up to the beginning of the path". The word "and" implies emphasis. The words: "up to" indicate the limit. "Up to the beginning of the path," the mode of departure is the "same" for a knower and a non-knower; that is, up to the beginning of the path which begins with light, or prior to the soul's entrance into the vein. The Chāndogya declares that a knower too departs from the body through the vein that passes out of the crown of the head. Compare the text: "There are a hundred and one veins of the heart. Of these, one goes out through the crown of the head. Going up through it, one goes to immortality. The others are for departing in other directions" (Chānd. 8.6.6). A difference, however, is stated with regard to the entering into the vein, thus:

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[1] Ś, R, ŚK, B.

[2] Ś, R, ŚK, B.

[3] Vide Br. Sū. 4.1.13.

"For the tip of his heart is lighted up. By that light, this soul goes out, either through the eye, or through the head or through any other part of the body" (Bṛh. 4.4.2). Thus, one who wishes to go to Brahman departs through the vein which passes out of the crown of the head; while a non-knower departs through the eye and the rest, and goes to heaven or hell—this is the difference.[1]

"And the immortality, without having burnt." The word "and" implies emphasis. The words "without having burnt" (anupoṣya) are a form of the root 'uṣ' meaning 'to burn'. That immortality which one attains without having one's connection with the body, sense-organs and so on burnt, i.e. which consists in the non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and prior sins, is what is denoted by the text: "When all these desires which abide in the heart are loosened, then a mortal becomes immortal" (Bṛh. 4.4.7). Here the phrase "attains Brahman" means that one attains Brahman at the time of meditation through direct realization. Hence the departure of a knower too is justifiable.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

The term "anupoṣya" means according to him 'without having burnt (nescience)'. That is, the passage in question (Bṛh. 4.4.7) means that the lower knower (with whom the entire pāda is concerned, according to Śaṃkara, as noted above) attains a sort of relative immortality only.[2]

SŪTRA 8

"THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF TRANSMIGRATORY EXISTENCE UP TILL ENTERING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"That" immortality is to be understood as that which takes place without one's connection with the body being burnt indeed.

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[1] Vide Br. Sū. 4.2.16.

[2] Ś.B. 4.2.7, p. 935.

Why? "On account of the designation of transmigratory existence" up till release in the passage: "For him there is delay only so long I am (=he is) not free; then I shall (=he will)[1] attain (Brahman)" (Chānd. 6.14.2[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"That" immortality is to be known as belonging to one who has not his connection with the body and the rest burnt or completely destroyed. Why? "On account of the designation of transmigratory state up till entering," in the passage: "For him there is delay only so long I am (=he is) not free; then I shall (=he will) attain Brahman" (Chānd. 6.14.2), "Having shaken off sin as the horse his hairs, having shaken off the body as the moon frees itself from the month of Rāhu, I, with the self obtained, pass into the uncreated world of Brahman" (Chānd. 8.13). "Entering" means 'attaining the nature of Brahman', and this takes place when one has reached a particular region through the path beginning with light. Prior to that, the soul is subject to transmigratory existence.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different. They begin a new adhikaraṇa here (four sūtras), renewing the discussion left incomplete at the end of the adhikaraṇa previous to the last. Thus, fire and other elements, in which the soul has taken its abode, merge in the Highest Being. The question is: What is meant by the term 'merging' here? It may be suggested that it means absolute or complete merging, just like the merging of a thing into its own material cause. The answer is: "(It is only a relative merging and not absolute) since that (viz. the aggregate of elements continues to exist) up till entering, (i.e. salvation), on account of the designation of transmigratory existence". That is, the aggregate of elements or the subtle body in which the soul has taken its abode, is not dissolved in Brahman at once at the time of death, but accompanies one till the rise of perfect knowledge or salvation.[3]

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[1] R. [2] See V.K. 1.1.7.
[3] Ś.B. 4.2.8, p. 916; Bh. B. 4.2.8, p. 229.

Śrīkaṇṭha

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here. Interpretation same.

SŪTRA 9

"THE SUBTLE (BODY FOLLOWS) BECAUSE THUS IT IS KNOWN FROM PROOF."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The subtle" body of the knower follows, "because thus it is known from proof", viz. from the text: "To him he should say" (Kauṣ. 1.5 [1]), "'The real' [2], he should say" (Kauṣ. 1.6 [3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, by the text: "Then a mortal becomes immortal" (Bṛh. 4.4.7), that immortality is referred to which belongs only to a knower who has his connection with the body unburnt, since "the subtle" body follows. Why? "Because it is known from proof." The proof to this effect is the text designating a dialogue between the knower, going through the path of gods, and the moon, viz. "To him he should say" (Kauṣ. 1.5), "'The real', he should say" (Kauṣ. 1.6). From this proof, the persistence of the subtle body is definitely known.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. "(The aggregate of fire and other elements which form the body accompanying the soul is subtle, because it is known to be thus from proof (viz. from the fact that the soul goes out through a small opening like the veins)".[4]

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[1] R, B.
[2] Correct quotation: "Satyam iti". Vide Kauṣ. 1.6, p. 114.
[3] R, B.
[4] Ś.B. 4.2.9, p. 936; Bh. B. 4.2.9, p. 229.

SŪTRA 10

"HENCE NOT (THE IMMORTALITY WHICH TAKES PLACE) THROUGH THE DESTRUCTION (OF THE BODY)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Hence" the text: "Then a mortal becomes immortal" (Bṛh. 4.4.7 [1]) does "not" speak of an immortality which takes place "through the destruction" of one's connection with the body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Hence," i.e. on account of the group of reasons stated above, the scriptural text: "Then a mortal becomes immortal" (Bṛh. 4.4.7) does "not" speak of an immortality which takes place "through the destruction" of one's connection with the body.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. "Hence (i.e. on account of its subtleness), (the subtle body is) not (destroyed) through the burning (of the gross body)".[2]

SŪTRA 11

"AND OF THIS ALONE (IS) THE HEAT, ON ACCOUNT OF APPROPRIATENESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Heat," which is an attribute of the subtle body, is felt in the gross body, "on account of appropriateness", i.e. because when it (viz. the subtle body) is not present, that (viz. heat) is not felt.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Heat" which is an attribute "of this alone", i.e. of the subtle body alone, is felt in the gross body so long as it is alive. Why?

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[1] R, ŚK, B.

[2] Ś.B. 4.2.10, pp. 936-937; Bh. B. 4.2.10, p. 229.

"On account of appropriateness,"—i.e. because when the subtle body is present, heat is felt in the gross body; when it is not present, that is not felt in it too. Thus, from such positive and negative evidences, it is known that heat is an attribute of the subtle body. For this reason also, the mode of departure of a knower and a non-knower is the same up to the beginning of the path,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They add an "eṣa" after "upapateḥ". Interpretation same.[1]

SŪTRA 12

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DENIAL, (WE REPLY:) NO, (THAT REFERS TO THE GOING OUT OF THE SENSE-ORGANS) FROM THE EMBODIED SOUL, FOR (THE TEXT) OF SOME (MAKES THIS) CLEAR."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that on account of the denial, viz. "Now, he who does not desire, who is without desire, who is free from desire, who has attained his desire, who desires for the self,—his sense-organs do not go out" (Bṛh. 4.4.6 [2]), a knower's departure from the body is not justifiable,—we reply: There is no such contradiction, since that this is a denial of the departure of the sense-organs "from the embodied soul", the topic of discussion, is clear from the reading "of some", viz. "From him the vital-breaths do not depart" (Śat. Br. 14.7.2, 8 [3]). Scripture denies their departure from that alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Under the aphorism: "And the same up to the beginning of the path" (Br. Sū. 4.2.7) it has been established that a

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[1] Ś.B. 4.2.12, p. 937; Bh. B. 4.2.12, p. 229.

[2] Ś,R, Bh, ŚK, B.

[3] P. 1089, line 8. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. I.e. the Kāṇva recension reads "tasya" which might have given rise to some misunderstanding. But the Mādhayandina recension reads "tasmāt" leaving no room for doubt.

knower, too, departs from the body. That does not stand to reason, "On account of the denial" of a knower's departure from the body, in the scriptural text: "Now he who does not desire, who is without desire, who is free from desire, who has attained his desire, who desires for the self,—his sense-organs do not go out. Having become Brahman alone, he enters into Brahman" (Bṛh. 4.4.6) and so on.

We reply: "No". This denial is not a denial of the departure of the soul from the body. Having referred to the embodied soul, the topic of discussion by the word 'him' in the text: "Now, he who does not desire", the text goes on to deny the departure of those sense-organs "from the embodied soul" by the clause: "His sense-organs do not go out", since by the sixth case 'his', the body, which is not mentioned before as connected with the sense-organs is not referred to. By the texts: "By that light, this soul goes out" (Bṛh. 4.4.2), "He going out, the vital-breath goes out after him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2), "He assumes another newer and a more auspicious form" (Bṛh. 4.4.4) and so on, it is suggested that during the state of trans-migratory existence, the sense-organs of the embodied soul depart in order that there may be the origin of a new body,—and it is this that is denied here. Further, it is suggested that at the time of the knower's departure from the final body, set up so long by the works the effects of which have already begun, he is separated from the sense-organs,—and this too is denied. The sense is that these sense-organs accompany him as he proceeds through the path of gods, and are not separated from him prior to his attaining Brahman. In the reading "of some" branches, viz. "From him the sense-organs do not depart" (Śat. Br. 14.7.2, 8), there is an explicit denial of the departure of the sense-organs from the embodied soul, mentioned as the topic of discussion thus: "He who is without desire, who is free from desire, who has attained his desire" (Śat. Br. 14.7.2, 8), and indicated as an ablative by the fifth case-ending.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He breaks it into two different sūtras: "Pratiṣedhāt . . . . . śārīrāt" and "spaṣṭo . . . . . ekeṣām", and takes the first as the *prima facie* view, the second as the correct conclusion.[1] Thus, he arrives

[1] Pp. 937-38.

at an exactly opposite conclusion to that of Nimbārka, viz. those who meditate on qualified Brahman, go out of their bodies and travel through the path of gods, and not higher knowers. Accordingly he takes this section, viz. sūtras 12–14[1] as referring to higher knowers only. But Nimbārka, as we have seen, makes no such distinction; according to him both knowers and non-knowers go out, only they travel through different paths.

SŪTRA 13

"AND (IT IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The departure of the knower "is declared by the Smṛti passage". "But by it the soul is confined forsooth in all the abodes. It went out penetrating the crown of the head, and flew up towards the heaven" (Mahā. 13.7764*b*-7765*a*).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The departure of the knower is declared by the Mahā-bhārata thus: "He who has become the self of all, who has a proper perception of beings at his path, even the gods are perplexed, seeking a path for him who has no path" (Mahā. 12.9657). This Smṛti passage denotes that the path leading to the attainment of the Highest Brahman is impassable. The phrase: 'who has no path' denotes that the knower, endowed with a subtle body, is devoid of a gross body. The phrase: 'seeking a path' denotes a special place.

It is declared at the end of Dāna-dharma too, beginning: "The sense-organs of him, the great-souled one went upwards" (Mahā. 13. 7760*b*), and continuing: "But by it the soul is confined in all the abodes. It went out penetrating the crown of the head and flew up towards the heaven" (Mahā. 13.7764*b*-7765*a*). Yājñavalkya also says: "Of them, there is one that is situated above, penetrating the disc of the sun. Having passed the world of Brahman, one goes to a

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[1] Sū. 12-13 according to Nimbārka.

supreme place through it" (Yāj. Sm. 3.167 [1]). Hence it is established that a knower too has to depart from the body for attaining Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled "Up to the beginning of the path" (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He quotes the same passage quoted by Śrīnivāsa (Mahā. 12. 9657) to show that a *real* knower has no departure.[2]

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section "Merging in the Highest". (Sūtra 14)

SŪTRA 14

"THOSE IN THE HIGHEST, FOR THUS (SCRIPTURE) SAYS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The subtle elements like fire and the rest merge in the Highest. The Scripture says: "Fire in the highest divinity" (Chānd. 6.8.6 [3]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the author states the meaning of the text: "Fire in the highest divinity" (Chānd. 6.8.6), the last one of the series.[4]

It has been said that at the time of departure, the vital-breath, together with speech and the rest, enter into the subtle elements like fire and the rest through 'the ruler' (viz. the soul). On the doubt, viz. whether those subtle elements, accompanied by the entities beginning with speech and ending with the vital-breath, and forming the parts of the knower's subtle body, proceed to produce their respective effects as appropriate or are dissolved in the Highest Self,—if the first alternative be taken to be true,

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[1] P. 75.
[2] Ś.B. 4.2.14, p. 939.
[3] R, Śk, B.
[4] Beginning with speech. Vide Br. Sū. 4.2.1.

We reply: "Those" merge "in the Highest, i.e. in Brahman, the Highest, the soul of all. Why? "For" Scripture itself "says" "thus", i.e. says that the Highest Self is the resting place of the soul as He is during the state of deep sleep and universal dissolution, thus: "Fire in the highest divinity" (Chānd. 6.8.6.). That is, 'fire', or those subtle elements like fire and the rest, enter into the supreme cause. The sense is that having departed from the gross body, having resorted to the subtle body set up by knowledge, having thereby reached the Virajā, the best of the rivers, and having discarded the subtle body in the Highest, the knower attains the nature of the Highest. Hence it is established that those merge in the Highest.

Here ends the section entitled "Entering into the Highest" (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

According to him, this sūtra too refers to the higher knower only and not to the lower knower. The subtle body of a real knower is directly merged in Brahman at once, (without having to travel through any path) [1]. This is sūtra 15 in his commentary.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "Non-division". (Sūtra 15)

SŪTRA 15

"NON-DIVISION, ON ACCOUNT OF DECLARATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Those subtle elements together with speech and the rest come to have "non-division", i.e. essential identity, with the Highest "On account of the declaration": "And their name and form are destroyed; it is simply called 'a person'" (Praśna 6.5 [2]).

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[1] Ś.B. 4.2.15, pp. 940-941.

[2] Ś, B, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the question, 'Of what kind is that merging', is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether the merging of the subtle elements, united with the vital-breath which is accompanied by the sense-organs discarded by a knower, is of the form of conjunction, like that of speech and the rest with the mind and so on, or of the form of essential identity, like the merging of rivers in the sea,—if it be suggested: Of the form of conjunction alone, since the word 'merges' in the first clause: "Speech merges in the mind" (Chānd. 6.8.6) is used everywhere as denoting 'conjunction'.—

We reply: Since speech and the rest have not the mind and the rest as their material causes, in their cases, 'merging' means conjunction only. But they have 'non-division' with Brahman, the universal cause, i.e. in this case, merging means essential identity. Why? "On account of declaration," i.e. because Scripture, having designated the merging of the parts in the Highest Brahman thus: "So exactly, this seer's sixteen parts, going towards the Person, disappear on reaching Him" (Praśna 6.5), goes on: "And their name and form are destroyed; it is called simply 'a person'" (Praśna 6.5). Although there are seventeen parts in the subtle body, viz. the sense-organs like speech and the rest, the internal-organ, viz. the mind, five subtle essences and the vital-breath, yet in the above text, only sixteen are mentioned for designating the identity between the vital-breath and the subtle essence of touch. Hence, it is established that their merging in the Highest Self, the cause of the world, is of the form of essential identity.

Here ends the section entitled "Non-division" (7).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

As before, he takes this sūtra too as referring to the higher knower only. This is sūtra 16 in his commentary. Thus we find that according to him, only sūtras 12–16 [1] refer to the higher knower, while the rest of the sūtras to the lower knower.

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[1] Sūtras 12–15 according to Nimbārka's numbering.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "His Abode". (Sūtra 16)

SŪTRA 16

"(THERE IS) LIGHTING UP OF THE FOREPART OF HIS ABODE, WITH THE DOOR REVEALED BY HIM (VIZ. THE LORD) THROUGH THE MIGHT OF KNOWLEDGE AND THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF REMEMBRANCE OF THE PATH WHICH IS A SUPPLEMENTARY PART OF THAT (VIZ. KNOWLEDGE), (THE KNOWER), FAVOURED BY ONE WHO DWELLS IN THE HEART, (DEPARTS) THROUGH THE HUNDRED AND FIRST (VEIN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is a vein, mentioned in Scripture thus: "There are hundred and one veins of the heart. Of these, one passes out of the crown of the head. Going up by it, one goes to immortality. Others are for departing in other directions" (Chānd. 8.6.5[1]). When the knower comes to be "favoured" by the object to be known (viz. the Lord) who has become pleased "through the might of (his) knowledge and through the application of the remembrance of the path which is a supplementary part of that (viz. knowledge)",—then there results "a lighting up of the forepart of his abode", viz. the heart. Then "with the door revealed" by the Highest Lord, he, knowing that vein, departs through it.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Under the aphorism: "And the same up to the beginning of the path" (Br. Sū. 4.2.7), the modes of the departure of the knower and the non-knower have been determined to be the same. It has been said also that the knower's subtle body dissolves in the Highest and, as such, becomes identical with Him. Now, the points of difference between their modes of departure are being stated.

The Scriptural text: "There are a hundred and one veins of the heart. Of these, one passes out of the crown of the head. Going up by it, one goes to immortality. Others are for departing in other

[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

directions" (Chānd. 8.6.6) states that a knower departs through the hundred and first vein that passes out of the crown of the head, while a non-knower through others. On the doubt, viz. whether there is any difference between their modes of departure—if it be suggested: There is no difference, the knowledge of that particular vein being impossible,—

We reply: "Favoured by one who dwells in the heart". In accordance with the text: '"And I am situated in the heart of all"' (Gītā 15.15), such a "Being who dwells within the heart" is the Highest Person,—"favoured" by Him, who has become subject (as it were) to one devoted to Him alone and to none else, and who is the giver of intellectual union, befitting the devotee, under all conditions. This is the vein departing through which one comes to have real knowledge, as evident from the statement: '"You shall come to (attain) similarity with me"'[1], in accordance with the declaration by the Lord Himself: '"I give him intellectual union whereby they come to me"' (Gītā 10.10). Through His grace alone, there comes to be "a lighting up of the forepart of his abode", i.e. of the place,—mentioned in the scriptural text: "Having taken these elements of light, he descends into the heart alone" (Bṛh. 4.4.1.),—belonging to the knower who has become the favourite of the Being who dwells in the heart. The phrase: 'lighting up of the forepart' means 'the revelation of the forepart', i.e. the vein becomes favourable (to the knower for departure). "With the door revealed by him," i.e. having the door or the base of the vein revealed by the same one who dwells in the heart (viz. the Lord), the knower comes out through that very hundred and first vein, which issuing forth from the heart goes up through the crown of the head, and becomes one with the rays of the sun.

The author states the cause of Lord's favour, showing thereby the absence of any partiality on the part of the Lord: "Through the might of knowledge and through the application of the remembrance of the path which is a supplementary part of that". That is, owing to the knower's might which consists in subjugating (as it were) the object to be known (viz. the Lord), and which is brought about by the full perfection of knowledge; as well as owing to the meditation on the path which is a supplementary part of knowledge, thus: 'One day,

[1] This quotation is not traceable in the Gītā.

the object, to be known through the Vedānta (viz. the Lord), will be obtained by means of this path recorded in the Vedānta',—the knower is favoured by Him. Hence it is established that the departure of the knower takes place through a special vein.

Here ends the section entitled "His Abode" (8).

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "Following the rays". (Sūtra 17)

SŪTRA 17

"FOLLOWING THE RAYS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Having come out through the vein that passes out of the crown of the head, having then followed the rays of the sun, the knower goes up, in accordance with the assertion: "Through those very rays" (Chānd. 8.6.5 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said that the knower comes out through the vein that passes out of the crown of the head. Now the problem is being considered as to whether or not there is a fixed rule that, having come out through it, he follows the rays of the sun on his way.

The Chāndogya, having stated: "Now, when he departs from this body, then through those very rays he goes up" (Chānd. 8.6.5), continues: "Going up through it, he goes to immortality" (Chānd. 8.6.6). From this it is known that having come out of the vein that passes out of the crown of the head, and having then followed the rays, the knower goes to the disc of the sun. Here the problem is whether it is obligatory for a knower to follow the rays of the sun, or optional. On the suggestion, viz. since one who has come out of the gross body during night does not follow the rays, it is not obligatory for a knower to follow the rays—

1 Ś, R, Bh, Śk. B.

We reply: The knower proceeds by following the rays alone, in accordance with the assertion: "Then through those very rays he goes up" (Chānd. 8.6.5). That there are rays during night too is ascertained from the heat that is then experienced. During winter, however, no heat is experienced during night, it being overpowered by frost. Further, that there is a natural connection between the vein and the rays is declared by Scripture thus: "Now, just as a long road goes to two villages, this one and the yonder, so do the rays of the sun go to the two worlds, this one and the yonder. They stretch out from the yonder sun and creep into these veins. They stretch out from these veins and creep into the yonder sun" (Chānd. 8.6.2). Hence, it is established that there is a fixed rule that on his upward progress, the knower follows the rays of the sun.

Here ends the section entitled "Following the rays" (9).

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled "The night". (Sūtra 18)

SŪTRA 18

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT DURING NIGHT, NOT, (WE REPLY:) NO; ON ACCOUNT OF THE RELATION LASTING TILL THE BODY DOES, AND (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not to be said that there is "no" attainment of the Highest by a knower who dies "during the night". Owing to the cessation of his connection with karmas, "lasting till the body does", he can indeed attain Him, in accordance with the scriptural text: "For him there is delay only so long I am (= he is) not free. Then I shall (= he will) [1] attain (Brahman)" (Chānd. 6.14.2 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the problem, whether one who dies at night attains the Highest Brahman or not, is being considered.

[1] Vide V.K. 1.1.7. [2] R, ŚK.

On the doubt, viz. whether a knower who dies during night attains Brahman, or not,—if it be objected: In accordance with the statement: "Day, the bright fortnight and the six months of the northern progress of the sun are excellent for those who are about to die. But the contrary times are condemnable", dying during the night is condemnable, and hence even though one who dies "during night" may reach the rays of the sun, there is "no" attaining of Brahman by him,—

We reply: "no", i.e. such a view is not reasonable. Why? "On account of the relation lasting till the body does." That is, the non-clinging and destruction, respectively, of subsequent and prior sins, result from knowledge [1]; also as one's relation with the works, the effects of which have begun to operate, "last till the body does", they are destroyed on the fall of the body. Hence, there being no more obstructions to salvation, even a knower who dies during night can attain Brahman through the path beginning with light. "And" Scripture "shows" this: "For him there is delay only so long I am (= he is) not free. Then I shall (= he will) attain (Brahman)" (Chānd. 6.14.2). The statement: "Day, the bright fortnight" and so on, on the other hand, refers to a non-knower. Hence it is established that even a knower who dies during night attains Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled "The night" (10).

COMPARISON.

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

This is sūtra 19 in the commentaries of Śaṃkara and Bhāskara. They interpret the phrase: "sambandhasya yāvad deha-bhāvitvāt" differently, viz. 'because the relation between the vein and the rays lasts till the body does'.[2]

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[1] Vide Br. Sū. 4.1.13.

[2] Ś.B. 4.2.19, p. 944; Bh. B. 4.2.18, p. 232; B.B. 4.2.19, pp. 53-54, Chap. 4.

Adhikaraṇa 11: The section entitled "The Southern Progress of the Sun". (Sūtras 19-20)

SŪTRA 19

"AND HENCE DURING THE SOUTHERN PROGRESS OF THE SUN TOO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For the stated reason, even a knower who dies "during the southern progress of the sun" attains Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the problem, whether a knower who dies during the southern progress of the sun attains Brahman or not, is being considered.

The question is whether a knower who dies during the southern progress of the sun attains Brahman or not. It may be suggested that since it is found that Bhīṣma, a knower of Brahman, waited for the northern progress of the sun, one who dies during the southern progress of the sun does not attain Brahman. So, the author applies the above argument here too. "Hence," i.e. for the same reason, viz. on account of the connection lasting till the body does, it is perfectly reasonable to hold that even a knower who dies "during the southern progress of the sun" attains Brahman. Bhīṣma waited for the northern progress of the sun in order to promote pious faith and practice, and to show his power of dying at will.

SŪTRA 20

"DECLARED BY SMṚTI TO THE ASCETICS, AND THESE TWO ARE TO BE REMEMBERED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Smṛti passage: "But at which time, there is non-return" (Gītā 8.23[1]) declares two paths to the ascetics. "And these two"

[1] Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

are to be remembered. Hence there is no fixed rule with regard to a particular time.

Here ends the second quarter of the fourth chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

An objection may be raised: The passage: "At what time the ascetics departing return not, and also when they return, that time I shall tell you, O best of the Bhāratas. Fire, light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun,—departing there the knowers of Brahman go to Brahman. Smoke, the night, likewise the dark fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun,—the ascetics departing there, having attained the Light of the moon, return. The white and the dark,—these two are thought to be the eternal paths of the world. By the one, one goes who returns not; by the other, he returns again" (Gītā 8.23–26), enjoins a special time as the cause of the non-return of those who are devoted to Brahman, or as the cause of the return of those who are devoted to works. Hence it is not reasonable to hold that one who dies during the southern progress of the sun attains Brahman.

We reply: "No", since here the path called the 'path of gods' and the path called the 'path of fathers' "are declared to the ascetics"; "and" since "these two are to be remembered", i.e. are to be remembered as the subsidiary part of knowledge and the subsidiary part of work, in accordance with the conclusion: '"Knowing these two paths, O Pārtha, an ascetic is never deluded"' (Gītā 8.27). In the Smṛti text, "At which time", etc., the term 'time' means the path, connected with the presiding deities of time; and accordingly, the phrase "At which time" means 'in which path, connected with the presiding deities of day and so on who are conductors of the soul', it being impossible for fire and smoke to be time. Hence there is no fixed rule with regard to time. Therefore it is established that even a knower who dies during the southern progress of the sun surely attains Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled "The southern progress of the sun" (11).

Here ends the second quarter of the fourth chapter of the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsa texts by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the holy Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He gives two explanations of the word "smārte", viz. these two rules regarding dying by day and so on are mentioned in Smṛti alone, but what holds good in Smṛti does not necessarily hold good in Scripture. The second explanation is like Nimbārka's.[1] This is sūtra 21 in his commentary.

Bhāskara

His explanation of the word "smārte" is like Śaṃkara's first explanation.[2]

Résumé

The second quarter of the fourth chapter contains:

(1) 20 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
(2) 21 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
(3) 20 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
(4) 20 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
(5) 20 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
(6) 21 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṃkara and Baladeva break sūtra 21 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras.

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[1] Ś.B. 4.2.21, pp. 945-46.

[2] Bh. B. 4.2.20. p. 233.

FOURTH CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

THIRD QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "Beginning with light". (Sūtra 1)

SŪTRA 1

"THROUGH (THE PATH) BEGINNING WITH LIGHT, THAT BEING CELEBRATED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It should be known that there is only one path, viz. that beginning with light. Hence through it alone the knowers go, since in the Chāndogya: "They reach the light, from light the day, from the day the waxing fortnight, from the waxing fortnight the six months when the sun moves to the north, from those months the year, from the year the sun, from the sun the moon, from the moon lightning. Then there is a Person, a non-mortal. He leads them to Brahman. Those who go through this, do not return to this human whirlpool" (Chānd. 4.15.5-6 [1]); in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka: "They reach light, from light the day, from the day the waxing fortnight, from the waxing fortnight the six months when the sun moves to the north, from the months the world of gods, from the world of gods the sun, from the sun lightning. A Person consisting of mind comes and leads those who have reached lightning to the worlds of Brahman" (Bṛh. 6.2.15 [2]) and in other places too it is celebrated in the very same way.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, in the previous quarter, the problems concerning a knower's departure and the rest have been considered. Now, discussions about the path through which he proceeds for attaining Brahman are being undertaken.

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[2] R, B.

[2] R, B. Quotation faulty. Vide Bṛh., p. 303. Correct quotation translated.

In the Vedāntas various paths are mentioned. Thus, in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, one beginning with light is mentioned thus: "Those who know this thus and those who meditate on faith and truth in the forest, reach light, from light the day, from the day the waxing fortnight, from the waxing fortnight the six months when the sun moves to the north, for the months the world of gods, from the world of gods the sun, from the sun lightning. A Person consisting of mind comes and leads those who have reached lightning to the worlds of Brahman [1] (Bṛh. 6.2.15). In the same treatise, a different path is mentioned: "When, verily, a person departs from this world, he comes to the wind. There it makes way for him like the hole of a chariot wheel. Through it he ascends higher up. He comes to the sun. There it makes way for him like the hole of a drum. Through it he ascends higher up. He comes to the moon. There it makes way for him like the hole of a drum. Through it he ascends higher up. He comes to the world" (Bṛh. 5.10.1).

The Kauṣītakins, too, speak of the path in a different way thus: "Having reached this path of gods, he comes to the world of fire, to the world of air, to the world of Varuṇa, to the world of the sun, to the world of Indra, to the world of Prajāpati, to the world of Brahman" (Kauṣ. 1.3).

In the Chāndogya, again, it is mentioned in another way: "Now, whether they perform the crematory rites or not in the case of such a person, (the knowers) reach light, from light the day, from the day the waxing fortnight, from the waxing fortnight the six months when the sun moves to the north, from these months the year, from the year the sun, from the sun the moon, from the moon the lightning. Then there is a Person, a non-mortal. He leads them to Brahman. This is the path of gods, the path of Brahman. Those who go through this do not return to the human whirlpool, return not" (Chānd. 4.15. 5-6). In the very same treatise, it is mentioned once more as a relation between the vein and the rays thus: "Then through those very rays he goes up" (Chānd. 8.6.5).

It is, again, designated in a different way in another place: "Through the door of the sun they depart, passionless" (Muṇḍ. 1.2.11).

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[1] For correct quotation see above.

Here the doubt is, viz. whether mutually different paths are established by different Scriptures, or whether there is only one path, viz. the one beginning with light. If it be suggested: since they are of various forms, they are established by Scriptures as mutually different,—

We reply: Only one path, viz. the one beginning with light, is established by all the Scriptures. Through that alone, which begins with light, a knower of Brahman should proceed. Why? "That being celebrated." That is, as some part or other of the path which begins with light is recognized everywhere in Scriptures, so that path alone which begins with light is celebrated everywhere. Hence it is established that through the mutual combination of the details mentioned in one Scripture with all the rest, only one path,—viz. the one beginning with light and qualified by all the details,—is designated everywhere.

Here ends the section entitled "Beginning with light" (1).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

According to him, the entire pāda refers only to the lower knowers and not to the higher ones. But Nimbārka takes it to be referring to knowers in general.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "The air". (Sūtra 2)

SŪTRA 2

"(THE KNOWER GOES) TO THE AIR FROM THE YEAR, ON ACCOUNT OF NON-SPECIFICATION AND SPECIFICATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

After the year, mentioned in the Chāndogya-text, and before the sun, the knower reaches the world of air, mentioned in the Kauṣītaki-text: "He comes to the world of fire, to the world of air" (Kauṣ. 1.3 [1]),

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

"on account of non-specification and specification", i.e. because in the text: "He comes to the world of fire, to the world of air" (Kauṣ. 1.3) the air is taught non-specifically; and because the text: "There it makes way for him like the hole of a chariot-wheel. Through it he ascends higher up. He comes to the sun" (Bṛh. 5.10.1 [1]), contains, a specification.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said that everywhere the same path is designated, viz. the one beginning with light. Now the process of arranging its stages, mentioned in different places, is being determined.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-text: "From the months to the world of gods, from the world of gods to the sun" (Bṛh. 6.2.15), the world of gods is mentioned in between the months and the sun. But in the Chāndogya-text: "From the months to the year, from the year to the sun" (Chānd. 4.15.5), the year is mentioned in between these two. These two (viz. the world of gods and the year) are to be mutually combined, the path being the same in both the cases. The year is to be placed in between the months and the world of gods, mentioned in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, since the order being day, after that the fortnight, then the six months,—the year is appropriate after the months.[2] The world of gods is to be placed in between the year and the sun, mentioned in the Chāndogya.[3]

This being so, in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-text: "When, verily, a person departs from this world, he comes to the world of air. There it makes way for him like the hole of a chariot-wheel. Through it he goes up. He comes to the sun" (Bṛh. 5.10.1), the air is mentioned before the sun. But in the Kauṣītaki-text: "Having reached this path of gods, he comes to the world of fire, to the world of air" (Kauṣ. 1.3), the air is mentioned immediately after fire, consisting in light and denoted by the words 'world of fire'. Here the doubt is as to whether the knower goes to the air immediately after fire consisting in light,

[1] *Op. cit.*

[2] Here the progress is from shorter periods of time to longer ones.

[3] Thus the preliminary order is: light, day, bright fortnight, six months of the northern progress of the sun, year, world of gods, sun. This, first of all, explains away the apparent inconsistency between Bṛh. 6.2.15 and Chānd. 4.15.5.

or immediately after the year, the stage which is indicated above, and before the sun. If it be suggested: On the ground of the order of textual sequence: "Having reached this path of gods, he comes to the world of fire to the world of air" (Kauṣ. 1.3), as well as the proximity between the effect and the cause [1] being reasonable, the knower goes to the air immediately after fire,—

We reply: "To the air from the fire". The knower enters the air immediately after the year and before the sun. Why? "On account of non-specification and specification." Although in the Kauṣītaki-text: "He comes to the world of fire, to the world of air" (Kauṣ. 1.3), the air is mentioned immediately after the fire, yet the priority or posteriority of the air in the successive order of progress is not specifically known therefrom, but the air is taught non-specifically. Just as from the statement: 'A student, having come out of the house of the teacher, goes to the house of Caitra, to the house of Maitra to ask for alms', no specific order can be ascertained, viz. that he goes to the house of Maitra immediately after the house of Caitra,—so is the case here. On the other hand, in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-text: "When, verily, a person departs from this world, he comes to the air. There it makes way for him like hole of a chariot-wheel. Through it ascends higher up. He comes to the sun" (Bṛh. 5.10.1), the air is taught specifically as prior to the sun. On account of these non-specification and specification—this is the sense.[2]

The words 'world of gods', mentioned in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-text quoted above, mean 'air', i.e. the world or the dwelling place of gods (viz. air). The compound 'world of air', mentioned in the Kauṣītaki-text, is to be explained as a Karmadhāraya [3], since it has been said by the author of the aphorisms too: "To the air from the year", and since there is the scriptural statement: "He comes to the air" (Bṛh. 5.10.1). The air can be appropriately viewed as a world, since it is the dwelling-place of gods, in accordance with the scriptural text: "He who blows is, forsooth, the cave of gods". Hence it is

[1] I.e. fire arises from air. Vide Br. Sū. 2.3.7.

[2] Thus, secondly, we get the following order: light, day, bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, year, world of gods, air, sun. This explains away the apparent inconsistency between Bṛh. 6.2.15, Chānd. 4.15.5, Bṛh. 5.10.1, and Kauṣ. 1.3. The words 'world of fire' in Kauṣ. 1.3 means light. It will be shown just below that the world of gods = air.

[3] That is, 'world of air' = the world that is air = air.

established that the air is to be placed in between the year and the sun.[1]

Here ends the section entitled "The air" (2).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They do not identify the world of gods with air, but take them to be two separate places. Thus, according to them, the order is: light, day, bright fortnight, six months of the northern progress of the sun, year, world of gods, air, sun and so on.[2]

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They interpret the phrase "aviśeṣa-viśeṣābhyām" differently, i.e. take it to be stating the reasons why the world of gods is to be identified with air, and not as stating the reasons why the air is to be placed after the year and before the sun. Thus, the phrase 'world of gods' denotes 'air', because the compound 'world of gods' generally implies the air which is the dwelling-place of gods; and because Scripture specifically says that the soul comes to the air.[3]

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "Varuṇa". (Sūtra 3)

SŪTRA 3

"ABOVE LIGHTNING, VARUṆA, ON ACCOUNT OF CONNECTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Varuṇa," mentioned in the Kauṣītaki-text: "Having reached this path of gods he comes to the world of fire, to the world of air,

[1] Thus, thirdly, we get the following order: light, day, bright fortnight, six months of the northern progress of the sun, year, air, sun. Note the difference from Śaṃkara's order.

[2] Ś.B. 4.3.2, pp. 949-950; Bh. B. 4.3.2, p. 234.

[3] Śrī. B. 4.3.2, p. 451, Part 2; Śk. B. 4.3.2, p. 472, Parts 10 and 11.

to the world of Varuṇa, to the world of the sun, to the world of Indra, to the world of Prajāpati, for the world of Brahman" (Kauṣ. 1.3 [1]), is to be placed above lightning, mentioned in the Chāndogya-text: "From the moon to lightning" (Chānd. 4.15.5 [2]), "on account of the connection" between lightning and Varuṇa. And, Indra and Prajāpati are to be placed above him.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The place of air, mentioned in the Kauṣītaki-text, in the path beginning with light has been stated. Now, the author points out the place of Varuṇa, mentioned immediately after it.

The question is whether Varuṇa, mentioned in the Kauṣītaki-text: "To the world of air, to the world of Varuṇa, to the world of the sun" (Kauṣ. 1.3), is to be placed above the air, on the ground of the order of textual sequence; or elsewhere, on the ground of the sun being mentioned prior to the air in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-text.[3] If it be suggested: on the ground of the textual order of sequence, he should properly be placed above the air alone, it being improper to suppose what is not mentioned in Scripture,—

We reply: "Above lightning, Varuṇa". That is, Varuṇa is to be inserted "above lightning", mentioned in the Chāndogya-text: "From the moon to lightning" (Chānd. 4.15.5). Why? "On account of connection," i.e. on account of the connection between lightning and Varuṇa. Indra and Prajāpati are to be inserted above Varuṇa, the stated stage. Hence it is established that the order of logical sequence being of a greater force than that of textual sequence [4], Varuṇa is to be placed above lightning.[5]

Here ends the section entitled "Varuṇa" (3).

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[1] R, Bh, Śk. [2] Ś.

[3] Viz. Bṛh. 5.10.1. [4] Vide Pū. Mī. Sū. 5.1.4–7.

[5] Thus, finally, we get the following order: light, day, bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, year, air, sun, moon, lightning, the world of Varuṇa, the world of Indra, the world of Prajāpati. Vide V.P.S. 4.3.5.

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "The conductors". (Sūtras 4-5)

SŪTRA 4

"THE CONDUCTORS, ON ACCOUNT OF THE INDICATORY MARK OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Light and the rest lead the approaching souls. As the text: "He leads them to Brahman" (Chānd. 5.10.2 [1]) declares that the non-human person leads the souls, it is known that the previous ones, too, do the same.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, the successive order of the twelve stages of the path, beginning with light and ending with Prajāpati, have been shown. Now the question is being considered, viz. what service do light and the rest render to the knower.

The doubt is as to whether these light and the rest are mere signs indicating the road to the knower who wishes to go to Brahman, or places of enjoyment, or conductors. With regard to this, it may be suggested: They may be signs indicating the road, like tree, mountain and so on. Or, since in the text: "To the world of fire, to the world of air, to the world of Varuṇa" (Kauṣ. 1.3), they are mentioned as worlds, they may be places of enjoyment,—

We reply: "Conductors", i.e. in accordance with the command of the Lord, they are the conductors of the knowers, devoted to the Lord. Why? "On account of the indicatory mark of that," i.e. because in the concluding passage: "Then there is a non-human Person. He leads them to Brahman" (Chānd. 5.10.2), the non-human Person is declared to be leading the souls. "That," i.e. the indicatory mark of conductorship, indicates that the previous ones, viz. light and the rest too, are conductors. The word 'light' and the rest should be understood as denoting the presiding deities of light, etc., respectively.

[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Baladeva

After this sūtra, they insert another sūtra: "Ubhaya-vyāmohāt tat-siddheḥ", not found in Nimbārka's commentary. Śaṃkara explains the phrase: "Ubhaya-vyāmohāt" as 'because of the perplexity (of both the souls and light and the rest)'. That is, when the souls leave the body to travel through the path of gods, their organs being incapable of functioning, they cannot control themselves, but need conductors to lead them. The light and the rest too, being non-intelligent, cannot conduct them. For these two reasons, we must hold that light and the rest are really conducting divinities.[1]

Baladeva explains the phrase thus: 'On account of the untenableness of the two alternatives'. That is, light and the rest can neither be landmarks, nor persons standing on the path. Hence these two alternatives being impossible, the third alternative, viz. that they are conducting divinities, is the correct one.[2]

SŪTRA 5

"THENCE FORWARD, (THE SOUL IS CONDUCTED) ONLY BY ONE WHO BELONGS TO LIGHTNING, THAT BEING DECLARED BY SCRIPTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Above lightning, the knower is led by the non-human person alone. Varuṇa and the rest, on the other hand, are assistants conjointly.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. In accordance with the text: "From the moon to lightning. Then there is a non-human Person. He leads them to Brahman" (Chānd. 4.15.5), it follows that it is the non-human Person alone who leads the souls from lightning to Brahman, and that

[1] Ś.B. 4.3.5, pp. 952–956.
[2] G.B. 4.3.5, pp. 68-69, Chap. 4.

Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati, who are above lightning, are not conductors,—the author replies:

After the knower has reached lightning, as mentioned in the text: "From the moon to lightning" (Chānd. 4.15.5) he is led on, in order that he may attain Brahman, "only by one who belongs to lightning", i.e. by the non-human Person alone who has come up to lightning. The Person who has come to the world of lightning as the conductor of the knower is said to be "one belonging to lightning". Why? "That being declared by Scripture," i.e. because in the Chāndogya-text: "He leads them to Brahman" (Chānd. 4.15.5), and in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-text: "A Person, consisting of mind, comes and leads them who have reached lightning" (Bṛh. 6.2.15), that non-human person is declared to be leading the souls. The nine, beginning with light and ending with lightning, are conductors primarily; while the three, Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati, are so conjointly—this is the distinction.

Thus, having come out of this gross body by means of the vein that passes out of the crown of the head, having, then, mounted the rays of the sun, the knower wishes to go to the highest region. He is then highly honoured by the presiding deity of light, the conductor, and is led by him to the presiding deity of the day. In the very same manner, he is led by the latter to the presiding deity of the fortnight, by the latter to the presiding deity of the six months, by the latter to the presiding deity of the year, by the latter to the air, by the latter, who makes a hole in itself for him, to the sun, similarly, by the latter to the moon, by the latter to the presiding deity of lightning. After that, having reached the three conductors, Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati, who are dependent on the Person of lightning, and having pierced through sphere of the material world, he reaches the river Virajā. Having then discarded his subtle body in the Highest, having crossed the river, and having entered the world of the Highest Brahman, he attains similarity with Brahman. Hence it is established that light and the rest are conductors.

Here ends the section entitled "The conductors" (4).

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "The effected". (Sūtras 6–15)

FIRST OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtras 6–10)

SŪTRA 6

"To the effected (Brahman), Bādari (holds so), because his going is reasonable."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The troupe of light and the rest leads the worshippers of the effected Brahman "to the effected Brahman", "because the going" to the effected Brahman alone is "reasonable".

Vedānta-kaustubha

The path beginning with light has been determined. Now the question is being determined, viz. Who are these who go through this path.

On the doubt, viz. whether the troupe of conducting divinities of light and the rest leads the worshippers of the effected Brahman, or the worshippers of the Highest Brahman, or the worshippers of the Highest Brahman as well as of the individual soul as unconnected with matter and having Brahman for its essence,—they lead the worshippers of the effected Brahman "to the effected Brahman", called Hiraṇya-garbha. Why? "Because his going," i.e. the going of the effected Brahman alone, occupying a particular place, i.e. his being the object to be approached, is "reasonable",—so the teacher "Bādari" thinks.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Unlike Nimbārka, he takes the view of Bādari as the correct conclusion. Literal interpretation same.

FIRST OPPONENT'S VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 7

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF BEING SPECIFIED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of being specified" by the word 'worlds' and the plural number in the text: "In those *worlds* of Brahman dwell the highest, possessed of the highest" (Bṛh. 6.2.15 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the text: "A person consisting of mind comes and leads them to the worlds of Brahman. In those worlds of Brahman dwell the highest, possessed of the highest" (Bṛh. 6.2.15), by the word 'worlds' and the plural number, the effected Brahman alone, occupying a particular place, is specified. Hence they lead his worshippers to him alone.

FIRST OPPONENT'S VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 8

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF PROXIMITY (THERE IS) THAT DESIGNATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"But on account of the proximity" (of the effected Brahman) to (the Highest) Brahman, owing to (the effected Brahman's) being the first-born being, the "designation": "Leads to Brahman" (Chānd. 4.15.5 [2]) is appropriate.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. the word 'Brahman' in the neuter gender, denotative of the Highest Brahman, cannot possibly refer to Hiraṇya-garbha,—the author replies:

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[1] Ś, Bh. [2] R, Śk, B.

In accordance with the scriptural text: "He who creates Brahmā" (Śvet. 6.18), Hiraṇyagarbha, the effected Brahman, is the first-created being, and as such "on account of (his) proximity" to Brahman, the cause, the designation of him, by the neuter gender, denotative of the cause, viz.: "Leads them to Brahman" (Chānd. 4.15.5), is appropriate.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 9 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "But the designation of that (viz. salvation) is on account of nearness". That is, the souls are said to go to the world of Brahman and never return (Bṛh. 6.2.15) not because they obtain salvation directly, but because they are very near getting it.[1]

FIRST OPPONENT'S VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 9

"ON THE DISSOLUTION OF (THE WORLD) OF THE EFFECTED (BRAHMAN), WITH ITS RULER, (THE SOUL GOES) TO WHAT IS HIGHER THAN HIM, ON ACCOUNT OF DECLARATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the destruction of the world "of the effected" Brahman, the soul together with the effected Brahman, attains "what is higher than" the effected Brahman, "on account of the declaration": "But they all, attaining the highest immortality, are freed in the world of Brahman at the time of the great end" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.6[2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

An objection may be raised here, viz. The path beginning with light cannot lead to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha for the following

[1] G.B. 4.3.9, p. 72, Chap. 4.

[2] R, Śk.

reasons: First, in the text: "This is the path of gods, the path of Brahman. Those who proceed through it do not return to this human whirlpool, return not" (Chānd. 4.15.5) and so on, one who has gone through the path beginning with light is declared to have no return; secondly, in the text: "Going up through it, one goes to immortality" (Chānd. 8.6.6; Kaṭha 6.16), immortality is designated (on the part of one who goes through this path); thirdly, the world of Hiraṇyagarbha is subject to creation and destruction; and finally, Hiraṇyagarbha being subject to creation and so on, in accordance with the text: "He who creates Brahma formerly" (Śvet. 6.18), one who has attained him has to return, as declared by the Smṛti passage: "The world up to the world of Brahmā return, O Arjuna!" (Gītā 8.16). To this Bādari replies:

"On the dissolution of the effected," i.e. on the destruction of the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, together "with its ruler", i.e. with the lord of that world who is possessed of knowledge, the soul which as entitled to knowledge has itself attained knowledge there as well, attains Brahman who is "higher than this", i.e. the cause of Hiraṇyagarbha, the effected Brahman. Why? "On account of declaration," i.e. on account of the declaration: "Going up through it, one goes to immortality" (Chānd. 8.6.6; Kaṭha 6.16), "Those who proceed through this do not return to this human whirlpool, return not" (Chānd. 4.15.6), and "But they all, attaining the highest immortality, are freed in the world of Brahman at the time of the great end" (Muṇḍ. 3.2.6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He, as pointed out above, regards the view of Bādari as the correct conclusion. Accordingly he holds that a lower knower, i.e. one who meditates on the qualified Brahman, can attain Brahman in this indirect way alone (viz. Krama-mukti) [1]. But Nimbārka, as we have seen, does not admit it.

[1] Ś.B. 4.3.10, p. 955.

FIRST OPPONENT'S VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 10

"ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF SMṚTI."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

This is known "also from the Smṛti passage": "When the universal dissolution has come as well as the end of the highest, then they, with their selves realized, enter the highest place together with Brahman" (K.P. 12 [1]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Also on account of the Smṛti passage:" "When the universal dissolution has come as well as the end of the highest, then they, with their souls realized, enter the highest place together with Brahman" (K.P. 12), the non-return of even one who has attained Hiraṇyagarbha is justifiable.

SECOND OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtras 11-13)

SŪTRA 11

"TO THE HIGHEST, JAIMINI (HOLDS), ON ACCOUNT OF BEING PRIMARY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

He leads the soul "to the highest" Brahman, since the word 'Brahman' in the text: "Leads them to Brahman" (Chānd. 4.15.5 [2]), primarily refers to the Highest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The troupe of conductors leads the worshippers of the Highest Brahman "to the highest" Brahman,—so the teacher "Jaimini" thinks. Why? Because the word 'Brahman' in the text: "Leads them to Brahman" (Chānd. 4.15.5) primarily refers to the Highest Brahman.

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[1] P. 139, lines 5-6. Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[2] Ś, R, Bh.

To the allegation, made above, viz. that the effected Brahman alone, occupying a particular place, being specified by the word 'worlds' and the plural number, the group of conductors leads his worshippers to him alone,—we reply: That the Highest Brahman who is all-pervading may voluntarily occupy a particular place is known from scriptural texts like: "He who is his ruler remains in the supreme void", "That is the supreme place of Viṣṇu" (Kaṭha 3.9; Maitrī 6.26) and so on. The eternity of His world, too, is denoted by the scriptural text: "Having my self realized, I reach the unerected world of Brahman" (Chānd. 8.13.1). The plural number, too, is appropriate, intending to designate, as it does, the plurality of the regions of the world, in accordance with the declaration by the Lord Himself in the Droṇa-parva: '"Those worlds of mine which are free from stains, which shine for ever and which are longed for even by the highest gods headed by Brahmā, go there quickly, O performer of the Agni-hotra at all time! Be like me, having Garuḍa as conveyance! "' (Mahā. 7.6059-6060 [1]).

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz.: "(The souls are led to Nārāyaṇa) higher than (Hiraṇyagarbha), etc.".[2]

SECOND OPPONENT'S VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 12

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF OBSERVATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because the text: "Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.2.23 [3]), declares that the Highest is the object to be attained.

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[1] P. 742, lines 13-14, vol. 2.
[2] Śk, B, 4.3.11, p. 476, Parts 10 and 11.
[3] R, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

And also because the texts: "Going up through it, one goes to immortality" (Chānd. 8.6.6; Kaṭha 6.16), "This serene being, having arisen from the body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.2.23), declare that a knower, who having come out through the vein which passes through the crown of the head, has proceeded by the path of gods, attains Brahman.

SECOND OPPONENT'S VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 13

"AND THE INTENTION OF ATTAINING (DOES NOT REFER) TO THE EFFECTED (BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"I reach the court of Prajāpati, the chamber" (Chānd. 8.14.1 [1])—this intention does not refer to the effected Brahman, but to the Highest Self, He alone being the topic of discussion.

Vedānta-kaustubha

An objection may be raised here: The word 'Brahman' mentioned in the text: "Leads them to Brahman (Chānd. 4.15.5) does indeed denote the effected Brahman, since in accordance with the text: "I reach the court of Prajāpati, the chamber" (Chānd. 8.14.1) a knower proceeding by the path that begins with light aims at attaining the effected Brahman. To this we reply:

"The intention of attaining," i.e. the resolve for attaining, mentioned in the scriptural text: "I reach the court of Prajāpati, the chamber" (Chānd. 8.14.1), does "not" refer "to the effected" Brahman, but this intention of attaining refers to the Highest Brahman, since, as known from the text: "The evolver of name and form. That within which they are in Brahman" (Chānd. 8.14.1), the Highest alone is the topic of discussion.

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 14-15)

SŪTRA 14

"LEADS THEM WHO DO NOT DEPEND ON SYMBOLS—SO BĀDARĀYAṆA (HOLDS) ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS, AND WHOSE INTENTION IS THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The troupe of light and the rest "leads those who do not depend on symbols",—i.e. those who meditate on the Highest Brahman, as well as those who meditate on their own imperishable nature as having Brahman for its essence,—to the Highest Brahman. Why? "On account of fault in both ways." That is, on the view that it leads only those who meditate on the effected Brahman, the following scriptural text will come to be contradicted, viz. "Having risen from the body having attained the form of highest light" (Chānd. 8.12.3 [1]). On the fixed rule, on the other hand, that it leads those only who meditate on the Highest Brahman, the following scriptural text will come to be contradicted, viz. "Those who know thus and those who meditate on faith and penance in the forest—reach light" (Chānd. 5.10.1 [2]). Hence in accordance with the scriptural text: "Just as the intention a man has in this world, so alone does he become after departing" (Chānd. 3.14.1 [3]), "he whose intention is that" attains that alone,—this is the correct conclusion, the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having set forth two views, the reverend author of the aphorisms is now stating his own conclusion.

The troupe of conducting divinities of light and the rest "leads those who do not depend on symbols,—so" the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks. That is, it leads other than those who meditate on name and the rest as Brahman, viz. those who meditate on the Highest Brahman, as well as those who meditate on the real nature of the individual soul unconnected with matter and as having Brahman for its essence. There is no fixed rule that it leads only those who meditate

[1] R, B. [2] R, B. [3] R, Bh, B.

on the effected Brahman, or that it leads only those who meditate on the Highest Brahman. Why? "On account of fault in both ways." That is, because on the view of Bādari that it leads only those who meditate on the effected Brahman, the following scriptural text will come to be contradicted: "This serene being, having arisen from the body, having attained the form of highest light is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.12.3); and because on the view of Jaimini that it leads only those who meditate on the Highest Brahman, another scriptural text will come to be contradicted, viz. the one indicating that the knowers of the five fires proceed through the path beginning with light: "Those who know thus and those who meditate on faith and truth in the forest reach light" (Chānd. 5.10.1). Hence it leads the two kinds of worshippers—this the author says: "And he whose intention is that". In accordance with the scriptural texts: "Just as the intention a man has in this world, so alone does he become on departing" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "Just as one meditates on Him, so alone does one become" (Mudg. 3 [1]), one who aims at attaining the Highest Brahman attains Him ; while, one who aims at attaining the individual soul, unconnected with matter and having the Highest Brahman as its essence, first attains such a soul and then the Highest Soul.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Having completed the above topic by taking Bādari as representing the correct conclusion and Jaimini the opponent's view, Śaṃkara begins a new adhikaraṇa here, concerned with the question as to whether those who meditate on symbols too are led to (the qualified) Brahman. He reads "adoṣāt" instead of "doṣāt". Hence the sūtra: "(The troupe of conducting divinities) leads those who do not depend on symbols, so Bādarāyaṇa (thinks), since there is no fault (in speaking) in two ways, and he whose thought is that". "That is, it has been said above [2] that all those who meditate go to the world of Brahman, while here an exception is made. But these two different designations involve no contradiction in accordance with the maxim of 'As you sow, so you reap'.[3] This is sūtra 15 in Śaṃkara's commentary.

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[1] P. 384, lines 7–9. [2] Ś.B. 3.3.31. [3] Ś.B. 3.4.15, pp. 965-966.

Rāmānuja

He adds a "ca" after "ubhayathā".[1]

Bhāskara

Reading like Śaṃkara's. Interpretation as follows: "(The troupe of conducting divinities) leads those who do not depend on symbols (i.e. excluding those who meditate on symbols, those who meditate on the effected Brahman are led to him, and those who meditate on the Highest Brahman are led to Him,) since this two-fold (view) involves no fault", and so on. That is, to hold that those who meditate on the effected Brahman are led to the effected Brahman, while those who meditate on the Highest Brahman are led to the Highest Brahman does not give rise to any contradiction that even those who meditate on the effected Brahman do not return, for they attain a gradual release, while the former, immediate release.[2]

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading like Rāmānuja's. According to him, those who meditate on the Highest Brahman alone are led to Him, neither those who meditate on Hiraṇyagarbha nor those who meditate on Nārāyaṇa.[3]

Baladeva

Reading like Rāmānuja's.[4]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 15

"AND (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS A DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The scriptural text: "As far as name goes, so far he comes to have freedom of movement" (Chānd. 7.1.5 [5]) and so on "shows" that

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[1] Śrī. B. 3.4.14, p. 460, Part 1, Madras ed.
[2] Bh. B. 4.3.14, p. 240.
[3] Śk. B. 4.3.14, pp. 477-78.
[4] Bh. 4.3.15, p. 77, Chap. 4.
[5] Ś, R, Bh.

symbolic meditation has a different result, independent of going (through the path of gods).

Here ends the third quarter of the fourth chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the meditations on symbols, beginning with name up to the vital-breath [1], since the Highest Brahman stands in an attributive relation to the symbol, the symbol itself is the primary thing, and as such those who meditate on symbols do not meditate on the Highest Brahman. Hence they do not proceed by the path of gods and attain the Highest Brahman. For them, the holy Scripture, viz.: "As far as name goes so far he comes to have freedom of movement" (Chānd. 7.1.5) and so on, "shows" a different limited result, independent of going. Hence it is established that the troupe of conducting divinities leads those—who meditate on the Highest Brahman—as well as those—who meditate on their own real nature, unconnected with matter and having Brahman for its essence,—to the Highest Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled "The effected" (5).

Here ends the third quarter of the fourth chapter of the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the venerable Nimbārka, the teacher and founder of the sect of the holy Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. "And (Scripture) shows the difference between Hiraṇyagarbha, Nārāyaṇa and Śiva)."

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[1] Vide Chānd. 7.1–7.15.

Baladeva

He takes this sūtra (sūtra 16 in his commentary) as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with showing the special favour shown by the Lord for the nirapekṣa devotees. "And (Scripture) shows the special (rule with regard to the nirapekṣa devotees)." That is, the general rule is that the conducting divinities lead the devotees to the Lord. But in the case of the nirapekṣa, the Lord Himself comes down to fetch them to Him.

Thus we have five different views with regard to those who approach or the *gantṛ* and the goal approached or the *gantavya :*

Gantṛ	*Gantavya*
1. (*a*) Those who meditate on the Highest Brahman, (*b*) as well as those who meditate on the real nature of the individual soul. (This is the view of Nimbārka and Rāmānuja.)	(*a*) and (*b*) The Highest Brahman.
2. (*a*) Those who meditate on the qualified Brahman. (This is the view of Śaṃkara.)	(*a*) The qualified or effected Brahman.
3. (*a*) Those who meditate on the Highest Brahman. (*b*) Also those who meditate on the effected Brahman. (This is the view of Bhāskara.)	(*a*) The Highest Brahman. (*b*) The effected Brahman.
4. (*a*) Those who meditate on the Highest Brahman. (This is the view of Śrīkaṇṭha.)	(*a*) The Highest Brahman.
5. (*a*) Those who do not meditate on any symbols, whether they meditate on the Highest Brahman or not. (This is the view of Baladeva.)	(*a*) The Highest Brahman.

Résumé

The third quarter of the fourth chapter contains:—

(1) 15 sūtras and 5 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
(2) 16 sūtras and 6 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
(3) 15 sūtras and 5 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
(4) 15 sūtras and 5 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
(5) 15 sūtras and 5 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
(6) 16 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Sūtra 5 in the commentaries of Śaṃkara and Baladeva is not found in the commentary of Nimbārka.

FOURTH CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FOURTH QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "The manifestation on attaining". (Sūtras 1–3)

SŪTRA 1

"HAVING ATTAINED, (THERE IS) MANIFESTATION, ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORDS 'IN HIS OWN'."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Having attained" the Highest through the path beginning with light, the individual soul becomes manifest in its own natural form. This is proved by the text: "Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.12.3 [1]) "on account of the words 'in his own'".

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been established in the previous quarter that the very same path, beginning with light, is designated by all Scriptures, and that it leads the knowers to the Highest Brahman. Now the problem is being discussed, viz. in what form one, who has attained Brahman through that path, becomes manifest.

In the Chāndogya Prajāpati's declaration is recorded thus: "So exactly, this serene being, having arisen from the body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in its own form." (Chānd. 8.12.3). Here the doubt is, viz. whether it is established by the text that one, who has attained the form of highest light, comes to have an adventitious form, or that having attained the Highest, the knower, becomes manifest in his own natural form alone. If it be suggested: From the words 'is completed' it is known that having attained the form of highest light, he comes to have an adventitious form like that of a god and so on,—

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

We reply: "Having attained, manifestation". That is, having attained the form of highest light, the individual soul comes to have "manifestation", i.e. have its real nature and qualities, such as freedom from sins and so on, manifest,—this is what is established by the text. Why? "On account of the words 'in his own'," i.e. on account of the adjective: 'in his own form'. Otherwise, an adventitious form being established by the mere word 'form', the adjective 'in his own' would become meaningless. The sense is that the individual soul, the real nature of which is veiled during its state of bondage, having attained the Lord through the path beginning with light, becomes manifest in its own unenveloped and natural form.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

According to him, sūtras 1–7 of this pāda refer to the higher knower, the rest to the lower knower.

SŪTRA 2

"FREE, ON ACCOUNT OF PROMISE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is said that he alone who is free from bondage is completed in his own form. Why? Because, beginning: "The soul that is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.7.1 [1]), Prajāpati promised: '"But this alone I shall explain to you again"' (Chānd. 8.9.3; 8.10.4, 5 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. One's natural form being ever present, what is the difference between the state of bondage and that of release,—the author replies:

One, who being subject to nescience consisting in karmas is surrounded by matter in its causal and effected forms, who is tormented

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, B.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

by various afflictions, and who is deluded by various false argumentations, is said to be eternally fettered. He does not know his own form, though ever-present. During the period when he desires for salvation also, though he comes to know his real nature through the grace of Scripture and spiritual preceptor, yet due to his connection with matter in its causal and effected states, he is not completed in his own real form. The very same person, coming to attain the form of highest light through the path beginning with light, and free from all fetters, is completed in his own form, and then he is said to be freed,—this is the distinction between these three states. Why? "On account of promise," i.e. because beginning: "The self which is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.7.1), Prajāpati promised: "'But this alone I shall explain to you'" (Chānd. 8.9.3, etc.), which promise refers to the demonstration of the real nature of the soul, free from all faults, such as the three states of waking and the rest, and from the body and the like, their substratum. If there be no distinction, the promise of Prajāpati must be meaningless,—this is the sense.

SŪTRA 3

"THE SELF, ON ACCOUNT OF CONTEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The self", alone comes to have its real nature manifest, "on account of context".

Vedānta-kaustubha

"The soul," the real nature of which is veiled during its state of bondage, having attained the Highest Brahman, denoted by the words 'highest light' becomes manifest in its own form, i.e. is completed as having the qualities of freedom from sins and so on, but is not completed in another adventitious form. This fact is known from the introductory portion of Prajāpati's declaration, viz.: "The self that is free from sins, without old age, without death, without grief, without hunger, without thirst, having true desires" (Chānd. 8.7.1),—i.e. from the context, which refers to the individual soul. In the very same manner, Śaunaka declares: "Just as the lustre of a gem is not created by the washing off of the dirt, so the knowledge of the soul is not created

by the removal of faults. Just as water is not created by the digging of a well, only what is already existent is brought to manifestation,—for how can there be the origination of what is non-existent,—so the attributes of knowledge and the rest are manifested, and not created, through the destruction of the evil qualities, for they belong to the soul eternally."

Hence it is established that having attained the Highest Brahman through the path which begins with light, the individual soul is completed in its own natural form alone.

Here ends the section entitled "Manifestation on attaining" (2).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They interpret the sūtra thus: "(The light is) the soul (viz. Brahman), on account of context".[1]

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "Seen as non-divided". (Sūtra 4).

SŪTRA 4

"AS NON-DIVIDED, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING SEEN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The freed soul realizes itself "as non-divided" from the Highest Self, which non-division is compatible with a division (between the two), since this truth is directly intuited at that time (viz. during release), and since Scripture too intuits this.

Vedānta-kaustubha

From the text: "Having attained the form of highest light" (Chānd. 8.12.3) and from the aphorism: "Having attained, manifestation" (Br. Sū. 4.4.3), it appears as if there is an absolute difference

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[1] Ś.B. 4.4.3, p. 968; Bh. B. 4.4.3, p. 242; G.B. 4.4.3.

between one who approaches (viz. the individual soul) and the goal approached (viz. the Lord). With regard to this, the author now points out:

On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul, the real nature of which has become manifest and which has attained the highest light, realizes itself as distinct from the Highest Self or as non-distinct from Him being His part,—the *prima facie* view is: In accordance with the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: "Stainless, he approaches the highest identity" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), "He enjoys all desires together with Brahman, the all-knowing" (Tait. 2.1), '"They have come to attain similarity with me"' (Gītā 14.2), it realizes itself as distinct.

With regard to it, the author replies: "As non-divided". That is, the individual soul, freed from all fetters, realizes itself as non-divided or non-distinct from the Highest Self, the Highest Person. Why? "On account of being seen," that is, because at that time (viz. during release) the Highest Self, the soul of all, is intuited by the freed soul. Through the influence of nescience, the individual soul comes to have a perverse notion about itself. But, when through the influence of the repeated practice of hearing, thinking and meditating, the Highest Lord is intuited, all the obstacles to the real knowledge regarding the real nature of itself as well as of the Highest Self are immediately destroyed, in accordance with the scriptural text: "The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are cut off, and all his works perish when he who is high and low is seen" (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8). Hence there can be no doubt whatsoever that the freed soul, a part of the Lord, having intuited the Soul of all, the Whole, realizes itself, all the more clearly, as non-distinct from Him. The individual soul, having Him for its essence, has no distinction from Him; and hence in spite of a distinction of nature between the individual soul and Brahman, there is still a non-distinction between them,—a non-distinction which is compatible with distinction,—just as there is between an attribute and its substratum. This relation between the individual soul and Brahman has been demonstrated many times before,[1] and a multitude of scriptural and Smṛti texts too has been quoted there. We do not mean to say that there is any non-distinction of nature between the

[1] Vide e.g. V.K. 1.1.1; 1.1.7; 1.2.21; 1.4.9; 1.4.20; 1.4.21; 2.1.13; 2.1.21; 2.2.33, etc. etc.

soul and the Lord, otherwise in accordance with scriptural and Smṛti texts like: '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only and without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "Vāsudeva is everything", "Know everything Kṛṣṇa, the movable and the immovable, all souls and the universe as Kṛṣṇa" (Mahā. 13.7391 [1]), there must be a non-distinction of nature between the non-sentient and the Lord too, or,[2]—because Scripture is found to refer to distinction and non-distinction. Hence it is established that the freed soul realizes itself as non-distinct from the Highest Self, which non-distinction is compatible with distinction.

Here ends the section entitled "Seen as non-divided" (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

To understand the word "avibhāga" as absolute identity.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "Relating to Brahman". (Sūtras 5–7)

FIRST OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtra 5)

SŪTRA 5

"AS RELATING TO BRAHMAN, JAIMINI (THINKS SO), ON ACCOUNT OF REFERENCE AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The individual soul becomes manifest as endowed with the attributes "relating to Brahman", such as freedom from sins and

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[1] P. 258, line 7, vol. 4. Reading: "Sarvaṃ kṛtanam . . . viśvam enam".
[2] An alternative explanation of the word "dṛṣṭatvāt".
[3] Ś.B. 4.4.4, p. 969; Bh. B. 4.4.4, p. 243.

so on,—so "Jaimini" thinks, because freedom from sins and the rest, mentioned in the text about the 'small' [1] as belonging to Brahman, are referred to, in the declaration of Prajāpati,[2] as belonging to the individual soul as well; and because of eating and so on,[3] as indicated by the words "and so on".

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said above that having attained the Highest Brahman, the soul becomes manifest in its own form. Now the question as to the nature of that form is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul becomes manifest in its own form, endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and so on; or in the form of mere consciousness; or in a form which is conformable to both kinds of texts,—Jaimini's view is as follows: The freed soul becomes manifest as endowed with the group of attributes "relating to Brahman", i.e. with freedom from sins and the rest which are recorded as belonging to Brahman. Why? "On account of reference and so on." That is, the attributes of freedom from sins and so on, mentioned under the meditation on the 'small' as belonging to Brahman, are referred to as belonging to the individual soul too in the declaration of Prajāpati, viz.: "The self that is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3) and so on. By the words "and so on" eating and the rest, as well as omniscience, etc., are to be understood. The teacher "Jaimini" thinks so.

SECOND OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtra 6)

SŪTRA 6

"IN INTELLIGENCE, AS THAT ALONE, ON ACCOUNT OF HAVING THAT AS THE ESSENCE, SO AUḌULOMI (THINKS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The individual soul, having approached Brahman who is of the form of intelligence, becomes manifest in the form of intelligence alone,

[1] Chānd. 8.1.5. [2] Chānd. 8.7.1, 3. [3] Chānd. 8.12.3.

since in the text: "Consisting of intelligence alone" (Bṛh. 4.5.13 [1]), it is said to have that (viz. intelligence) as its soul.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The individual soul, having approached "intelligence", i.e. Brahman who is of the form of intelligence, becomes manifest "as that alone", i.e. in the form of intelligence alone. Why? "On account of having that as the essence", i.e. because the individual soul has intelligence for its essence, or is nothing but intelligence. The scriptural text: "Just as a lump of salt is without inside and outside, a mass of taste only through and through, so, verily, O! this soul is without inside and outside, a mass of intelligence only through and through" (Bṛh. 4.5.13) shows, by using the word 'only', that the soul is nothing but intelligence and devoid of any other attribute. The text designating freedom from sins and so on, on the other hand, simply establishes that the soul is free from changes and so on,—"so Auḍulomi" thinks.

COMPARISON

Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

They read: "Citi-mātreṇa".[2]

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 7)

SŪTRA 7

"EVEN SO, ON ACCOUNT OF REFERENCE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE FORMER, NON-CONTRADICTION, BĀDARĀYAṆA."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Even if the real nature of the soul be established to be intelligence only, still owing to the manifestation of the real nature of the soul as possessed of freedom from sins and so on, there is "no contradiction'

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[1] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[2] Bh. B. 4.4.6, p. 243; ŚK. B. 4.4.6, p. 485, Parts 10 and 11.

—so the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks. Why? "On account of the reference" to freedom from sins and so on as belonging to the freed soul.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the reverend teacher of the Vedas states his own view in conformity with both the scriptural texts.

"Even so," i.e. even if the soul be established to be mere intelligence, yet "on account of the existence of the former", i.e. owing to the manifestation of the individual soul as intelligence by nature and as endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest, there is "no contradiction" with regard to the nature of salvation, —so the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks. Why? "On account of reference," i.e. because in the declaration of Prajāpati,[1] freedom from sins and the rest, belonging to Brahman, are referred to as belonging to the freed soul as well. It cannot be said that in the text: "A mass of intelligence only" (Bṛh. 4.5.13), the word 'only' proves that the attributes of freedom from sins and so on do not belong to the soul, because they are clearly proved to be belonging to it by another text: "The self that is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3) and so on, and because the word 'only' simply distinguishes the self from non-sentient objects,—just as it cannot be said that in the text: "A mass of taste only" (Bṛh. 4.5.13), the word 'only' proves that colour, touch and so on do not belong to salt, because they are known from other means of knowledge,[2] and because the word 'only' simply distinguishes salt from other objects. The purport is that Auḍulomi's view, designating the freed soul as devoid of consciousness, is not acceptable. Hereby other logicians and the rest too, holding the freed soul to be devoid of consciousness, are refuted. Hence it is established that having attained the form of highest light, the individual soul becomes manifest in its own natural form as endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and so on, conformably with both the scriptural texts.

Here ends the section entitled "Relating to Brahman" (3).

[1] Chānd. 8.7.1.

[2] Just as a lump of salt has not taste only, but has also colour and so on, so the soul is not intelligence only, but has other attributes also.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He takes Jaimini to be representing the phenomenal point of view, Auḍulomi the transcendental point of view, and Bādarāyaṇa as reconciling these two points of view.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "Will". (Sūtras 8-9)

SŪTRA 8

"THROUGH MERE WILL, THAT BEING DECLARED BY SCRIPTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The freed soul attains its fathers and so on "through mere will". Why? On account of the scriptural text designating that: "If he comes to desire the world of fathers, through mere wish, his fathers rise up" (Chānd. 8.2.1 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said that having attained the form of the highest light, the individual soul becomes manifest in its real nature as a mass of intelligence and possessed of the attributes, beginning with freedom from sins and ending with true desires.[3] Hence the freed soul has the power of fulfilling all its desires. But if the freed soul be devoid of consciousness, it cannot have such a power. With this in mind, the author is now showing the freed soul's power of will.

Referring to the freed soul, it is declared in the Chāndogya: "He roams about there, laughing, playing, enjoying with women, or with carriages, or with relatives" (Chānd. 8.12.3). Here the doubt is, viz. whether the freed soul's meeting its relatives and so on arises from its will accompanied by effort, or from mere will. If it be suggested: In ordinary experience it is found that kings and the rest

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[1] Ś.B. 4.4.7, p. 971.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

[3] Vide Chānd. 8.7.1, 3.

come to attain the implements of enjoyment through will accompanied by effort,—hence from effort accompanied by will alone,—

We reply : There is the attainment of relatives and so on, " through mere will ". Why ? " On account of that being declared by Scripture ", i.e. because in the text : " If he comes to desire the world of fathers, through mere wish his fathers rise up " (Chānd. 8.2.1), it is declared that the rising up of the fathers and so on is brought about through will without any reference to any effort, and because it is not declared that will is accompanied by an effort. The kings and the rest do not possess the power of fulfilling their desires at will, and hence in their case it is reasonable to suppose that they attain what is desired through will accompanied by effort.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He adds a " tu " after " saṃkalpād eva ",[1] He takes this and all the following sūtras as referring to the lower knower alone.

SŪTRA 9

" FOR THIS VERY REASON, WITHOUT ANOTHER RULER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The freed soul, which has the Highest Brahman as its essence, comes to have the attributes of true desires and so on manifest,—and for this very reason, it becomes " without another ruler ", in accordance with the scriptural text : " He becomes a self-ruler " (Chānd. 7.25.2 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

As the freed soul's power of fulfilling its desires at will becomes manifest, so it becomes " without another ruler ", i.e. without any ruler except the Highest Brahman, the Whole, of which it is a part. That is, of one, who has Brahman for his essence, who has become

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[1] Ś.B. 4.4.8, p. 971. [2] R.

freed from the world, and who has come to have lordship manifest through the manifestation of the attribute of true desires owing to the grace of Brahman, there are no other creators and lords like matter, time, Yama, Indra, and so on, in accordance with the scriptural text: "He becomes a self-ruler" (Chānd. 8.12.1). Hence it is established that the freed soul attains relatives and so on immediately at will.

Here ends the section entitled "Wish" (4).

COMPARISON

All others add a "ca" after "ata eva".

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Absence". (Sūtras 10-16)

SŪTRA 10

"ABSENCE, BĀDARI, FOR (SCRIPTURE) DECLARES SO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Bādari" thinks that the body and the rest of the freed soul are absent, since the scriptural text: "When he becomes bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him" (Chānd. 8.12.1 [1]), "declares" the same thing.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been established that the freed soul attains relatives and so on through mere will. Now, with a view to showing that it may connect itself with a body, sense-organs and so on according to its will, the author is stating the view of another.

On the doubt, viz. whether the freed soul has a body and the rest, or not, or whether he has them or not at will,—the teacher "Bādari" thinks that they are absent, since the scriptural text: "Forsooth, when he possesses a body, he has no freedom from pleasure and pain;

[1] R, B.

but when he becomes bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him" (Chānd. 8.12.1) "declares so", i.e. establishes, positively and negatively, the absence of the body and the rest.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He reads "abhāve" instead of "abhāvam".[1]

SECOND OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtra 11)

SŪTRA 11

"PRESENCE, JAIMINI, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL STATEMENT OF VARIETY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Jaimini" thinks that its body and the rest are present. Why? "On account of the scriptural statement" of manifoldness: "He becomes one-fold, three-fold" (Chānd. 7.26.2 [2]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Presence", i.e. the teacher "Jaimini" admits the existence of the freed soul's body and the rest. Why? "On account of the scriptural statement of variety", i.e. because under the doctrine of the Plenty, in the passage: "He becomes one-fold, becomes three-fold, five-fold, seven-fold, and nine-fold truly; then, again, he is said to be eleven, hundred and ten, thousand and twenty" (Chānd. 7.26.2), its manifoldness is recorded. Such a manifoldness refer to the *body* of the free soul, since manifoldness is not possible on the part of the soul which is atomic and indivisible. The scriptural text about its having no body, on the other hand, refers only to the body which is brought about by works.

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[1] G.B. 4.4.10, p. 101, Chāp. 4.

[2] Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 12)

SŪTRA 12

"THEREFROM, BĀDARĀYAṆA (HOLDS), OF BOTH KINDS, AS IN THE CASE OF THE TWELVE DAYS' SACRIFICE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks that through mere wish, the freed soul may or may not have a body, just as the twelve days' sacrifice is a 'satra' or an 'ahīna', in accordance with the texts: "Those desiring for wealth should resort to the twelve days' sacrifice"[1], "The priest is to offer the twelve days' sacrifice for one who desires for progeny"[2]. So is the case here.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author states his own conclusion.

"Therefrom," i.e. through mere wish, the soul is "of both kinds", so the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks. That is, the freed soul may or may not have bodies and the rest according to its will. This being so, none of the texts is contradicted. "As in the case of the twelve days' sacrifice," i.e. just as the twelve days' sacrifice is of two kinds owing to the difference of wish. In accordance with the injunction of 'resorting': "Those who are desirous of prosperity should resort to the twelve days' sacrifice", it is a 'satra'; while in accordance with the injunction of offering: "A priest should offer the twelve days' sacrifice for one who desires progeny", it is an 'ahīna'. So is the case here.

Or[3], the word "therefrom" is to be understood as "on account of two texts". There is a text designating the enjoyment of one who is bodiless, viz. "Having perceived these objects of desire by mind alone who enjoys in this world of Brahman" (Chānd. 8.12.5); and there is a text designating the enjoyment of one who has a body, viz. "He becomes one-fold" (Chānd. 7.26.2) and so on.

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[1] R, Bh. [2] *Op. cit.*

[3] An alternative explanation of the term "atah".

SŪTRA 13

"IN THE ABSENCE OF A BODY, AS IN THE CASE OF THE INTERMEDIATE STAGE (VIZ. DREAM), ON ACCOUNT OF POSSIBILITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As "in the absence of a body" created by itself, enjoyment is possible on the part of the freed soul by means of the body and the rest created by the Lord during dreams,—so there is no fixed rule that the body and the rest are to be created by the freed soul itself.

Vedānta-kaustubha

As "in the absence of a body", i.e. in the absence of a body created by itself, the enjoyment of sportive pleasures is possible on the part of the freed soul by means of the group of instruments created by the Lord, so there is no fixed rule that the freed soul creates its body and the rest through mere wish. That is, the freed soul, having true desires, is able to create the world of fathers and the rest, as well as its own body and the like, yet it enjoys sportive pleasures by means of the instruments created by the Highest Person in sport. It has been demonstrated above [1] that during the state of dream, the soul in bondage enjoys chariots and the rest created by the Lord alone.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He interprets the sūtra thus: "In the absence of a body, (the freed soul's objects of desire, such as, fathers and so on are mere perceptions and not actual objects), as during dreams, on account of possibility".[2]

Bhāskara

According to him, the sūtra means that in the absence of a body, the freed soul enjoys pleasure and so on by the mind, as does the soul in bondage during its state of dream.

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[1] Vide V.K. 3.2.1.

[2] Sk. B. 4.4.13.

SŪTRA 14

"IN (ITS) PRESENCE, AS DURING THE STATE OF WAKING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As in the presence of the body and the rest created by itself too, the enjoyment of sportive pleasures is possible on the part of the freed soul,—so it sometimes creates these through its own wish too, corresponding to the sport of the Lord.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The words 'on account of possibility' are to be supplied. As in the presence of the body and the rest created by itself, the enjoyment of sportive pleasures on the part of the freed soul is possible, "as during the state of waking", so there is also no fixed rule that the freed soul itself never creates its own body and the rest. Just as a man in the waking state creates,—so far as it lies within his power,—sons, houses, chariots and the like,—included within the sphere of His creation,—with the help of man, wood, stone and the rest, and enjoys them,—so the freed soul too having, through the Lord's grace, the power of realizing its wishes, creates, in accordance with His sport,[1] fathers, relative and the like, as well as its body and the rest, through its own wish, corresponding to His wish, and enjoys His sportive pleasures,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They interpret the sūtra thus: When there is a body, the objects desired by the freed soul have real existence.[2]

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[1] Cf. the Sū. "Loka-vat tulita-kaivalyam" All objects are created by the Lord in sport. So the objects created by a freed soul conform to such sportive creative designs of the Lord.

[2] Ś.B. 4.4.14, p. 974; Bh. B. 4.4.14, p. 246.

SŪTRA 15

"THE ENTERING (INTO MANY BODIES IS) AS IN THE CASE OF A LAMP, FOR (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS THUS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The soul's "entering" into many bodies takes place through its attribute of knowledge, as of the lamp through its ray,—"for" the scriptural text: "It is capable of infinity" (Śvet. 5.9 [1]) "shows thus".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz. The manifoldness, mentioned in the text: "He becomes three-fold" (Chānd. 7.26.2) and so on, is not possible on the part of the freed soul even though it may have a body, since it is never possible for one and the same soul, which is atomic by nature, to pervade many bodies,—the author replies:

"The entering" of the freed soul, atomic in size and abiding within one body, into many bodies,—i.e. its complete entering into those bodies as their soul with the thought: 'This is my body and that as well'—is possible through its attribute of knowledge. "As in the case of a lamp." That is, just as a lamp, though placed in one place, pervades many places through its attribute, viz. rays, so is the case here. "For thus" Scripture shows, viz. "The individual soul is to be known as a hundredth part of the point of a hair, divided a hundred times, yet it is capable of infinity" (Śvet. 5.9).

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They interpret the sūtra a little differently, viz. Just as one lamp multiplies itself into many lamps—all lighted from the original lamp,—so the freed soul multiplies itself into many bodies, since it has the power of realizing its wishes.[2]

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[1] R.

[2] Ś.B. 4.4.15, p. 975; Bh. B. 4.4.15, p. 247.

SŪTRA 16

"(THE TEXT) REFERS EITHER TO MERGING INTO ONE'S OWN SELF OR TO ATTAINING, FOR (THIS IS) MANIFESTED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The text: "Embraced by the intelligent self, he does not know anything that is outside, nor anything inside" (Bṛh. 4.3.21 [1]), however, does not refer to the freed soul, but "refers either" to deep sleep or to death. In the texts: "Verily, now he does not know himself as: 'I am he', nor indeed the things here" (Chānd. 8.11.1 [2]), "Having arisen from these elements, he perishes into them alone" (Bṛh. 4.5.13 [3]), "Verily, with this celestial eye, the mind, he sees these desires" (Chānd. 8.12.5), the soul's absence of knowledge during these two states (viz. deep sleep and death), as well as its omniscience during the state of release, are "manifested" or clearly declared by Scripture.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. It cannot be said that the individual soul can abide in many bodies even by means of its attribute of knowledge, since in the text: "Embraced by the intelligent self, he knows nothing that is outside nor anything inside" (Bṛh. 4.3.21), one who has attained the Highest Self is declared to be devoid of any knowledge of particular objects,—the author replies:

This text "refers either to merging in one's own self or to attaining", i.e. either to deep sleep or to death. "For (this) is manifested", i.e. because the soul's absence of all knowledge of particular objects during deep sleep and death, as well as its omniscience during the state of release, are "manifested" or clearly declared by Scripture itself. The text: "Verily, now he does not know himself as: 'I am he', nor indeed the things here. He has gone to utter annihilation. I do not see any good in it" (Chānd. 8.11.1), declares that the soul has no knowledge of particular objects during deep sleep. And the text: "Having arisen from these elements, he perishes into them alone" (Bṛh. 4.5.13), declares that it has no knowledge of particular objects when dead. The word 'perishes' means that its knowledge ceases to be

[1] R, Śk, B. [2] R, Śk, B. [3] Ś, Bh, Śk.

manifest. Finally, the following texts declare that the soul is omniscient during its state of release: "Verily, with this celestial eye, the mind, he sees desires, and enjoys in this world of Brahman" (Chānd. 8.12.5), "Verily, the seer sees everything, attains everything everywhere" (Chānd. 7.26.2). Hence it is perfectly reasonable to hold that the freed soul possesses the instruments, such as the body and the rest, created by the Lord; may have, according to will, a body or not or many bodies; and is omniscient.

Here ends the section entitled "Absence" (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He interprets the word "sampatti" as 'final release'. His view is that the lower knowers who meditate on the qualified Brahman do not attain kaivalya or absolute isolation as the soul gets during deep sleep and release, but only a particular condition when the knowledge of difference still persists.[1]

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "Exclusive of the activities in connection with the Universe". (Sūtras 17–22).

SŪTRA 17

"EXCLUSIVE OF THE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE UNIVERSE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER, AND ON ACCOUNT OF NON-PROXIMITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The lordship of the freed soul consists in something other than the activities in connection with the creation and the rest of the

[1] Ś.B. 4.4.16, p. 976.

universe. Why? Because in the text: "From whom, verily, these beings arise" (Tait. 3.1 [1]), the Highest Brahman is referred to as the subject-matter; and because the individual soul has no place therein.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the question is being considered, viz. of what nature is the lordship of the freed soul, which has thus come to attain the highest identity.

The doubt is, viz. Whether the lordship of the freed soul consists in the activities in connection with universe or is exclusive of it. The *prima facie* view is that like the Highest Person, the lordship of the freed soul too consists in the activities in connection with the creation, maintenance and so on of the entire universe.

With regard to this, we reply: "Exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe". That is, the lordship of the freed soul does not consist in the activities in connection with the controlling of the universe, such as its creation and so on. But the activities in connection with the creation of the universe belong to the Highest Brahman alone. Why? "On account of subject-matter," i.e. because in the texts designating creation snd so on, viz. "From whom, verily, these beings arise" (Tait. 3.1) and so on, He alone is the subject-matter; "also on account of non-proximity", i.e. because in the texts designating creation and so on, the freed soul is never mentioned as the creator and the rest of the universe.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

As pointed out above, he refers all these sūtras to the lower knowers only.

Bhāskara

He too refers this and the following sūtras to those who attain the effected Brahman only.

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[1] R, Śk, B.

SŪTRA 18

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF DIRECT TEACHING, NO, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THAT WHICH ABIDES WITHIN THE SPHERE OF THOSE ENTRUSTED WITH SPECIAL OFFICES BEING MENTIONED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: Since by the scriptural text: "He becomes a self-ruler. He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds" (Chānd. 7.25.2 [1]) the freed soul is proved to have the activities in connection with the universe, the stated view: "Exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe" (Br. Sū. 4.4.17) is not tenable,—

We reply: "no", since that text simply declares that the objects of enjoyments inhering in the worlds of Hiraṇyagarbha and the rest are the objects of the freed soul's enjoyment.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The view, stated above, that the lordship of the freed soul is exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe, is not tenable. Why? "On account of the direct teaching": "He becomes a self-ruler. He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds" (Chānd. 7.25.2). The word 'direct' means 'Scriptural'. By Scripture, i.e. by the Chāndogya and the rest, the lordship of the freed soul is taught as consisting in the activities in connection with the universe,—on account of that,—

We reply: "no". Why? "On account of that which abides within the spheres of those who are entrusted with special offices being mentioned," i.e. because "that which abides within the spheres of those who are entrusted with special offices", or the objects of enjoyment inhering in the worlds of Hiraṇyagarbha and so on too "are mentioned", i.e. established, by the Chāndogya-text, to be the objects of the freed soul's enjoyment.

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[1] R.

COMPARISON.

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. The soul who has attained the effected Brahman has not unlimited lordship, since it depends on the Lord abiding in the disc of the sun and the rest.[1]

SŪTRA 19

"AND THAT WHICH IS NOT SUBJECT TO CHANGE, FOR THUS (SCRIPTURE) DECLARES (ITS) EXISTENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The freed soul intuits Brahman alone, free from the changes of birth and the rest, an ocean of natural, inconceivable and infinite attributes, and possessed of super-human power, "for" Scripture declares the soul's "existence" during salvation[2] to be "thus": "For when, verily, he finds fearlessness as a foundation in that which is invisible, incorporal, undefined, unsupported, then he has gone to fearlessness" (Tait. 2.7[3]), "Verily, he is the essence, for on attaining this essence one becomes blissful" (Tait. 2.7).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said the lordship of the freed soul is exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe. On the enquiry: In what, then, does it consist?—the author now shows that the lordship of the freed soul consists in a direct intuition of the Highest Brahman, possessed of super-human power, and thereby rejects the view—suggested by the statement made above that the objects of enjoyment, inhering in the spheres of those who are entrusted with special offices, are the freed soul's objects of enjoyment,—viz. that the freed soul is just like the soul in bondage.

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[1] Ś.B. 4.4.18, pp. 977-978; Bh. B. 4.4.8, p. 248.

[2] C.S.S. reads "mukta-sthiti", (p. 91), also Brindāban ed. (p. 1354).

[3] R.

The freed soul intuits the Highest Brahman alone, "not subject to change", i.e. untouched by any change like birth and so on, free by nature from all faults, the one ocean of all auspicious qualities, and possessed of super-human powers. The word "and" implies emphasis. Scripture declares "the existence" of the freed soul to be "thus": "For when, verily, he finds fearlessness as a foundation in that which is invisible, incorporal, undefined, unsupported, then he has gone to fearlessness" (Tait. 2.7), "Verily, he is the essence, for on attaining this essence, one becomes blissful" (Tait. 2.7), '"Whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known"' (Chānd. 6.1.3). The sense is this: Even when the soul in bondage happens to go to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, it does not find freedom from fear, in accordance with the declaration by the Lord: '"The worlds up to the world of Brahmā do return, O Arjuna!"' (Gītā 8.16). But the freed soul, on attaining the Lord, possessed of supreme power, enjoys the pleasures belonging to the worlds of Hiraṇyagarbha and others too, which are included within Him as His particular power. This is declared by the scriptural text: "He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds" (Chānd. 7.25.2). All the worlds, which are powers of the Highest Brahman, abide in Him. This is declared by the scriptural text: "That alone is the bright, that is Brahman, that alone is said to be immortal. In him all worlds rest. Nothing surpasses him" (Kaṭha 5.8; 6.1). It cannot be said that the individual soul being other than the Highest must be subject to some fear, in accordance with the declaration: "Fear arises from a second" (Bṛh. 1.4.2),—because the freed soul is not a second something, distinct from the Lord, as a deer is from a tiger; and because it has been established many times before [1] that the individual soul, because of having Brahman as its essence, is non-different from Him.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

"(The Highest Brahman) does not abide in effects (like the sun and the rest), for (Scripture) declares (His) existence (to be) thus." That is, it has been said in the previous sūtra that those who attain the effected Brahman are subject to the Lord abiding within the sun

[1] Vide, e.g., V.P.S. 1.1.1, 1.1.7, 1.2.21, 1.4.9, 1.4.20, etc. etc.

and the rest. But here it is shown that the Highest Brahman, who is non-qualified, does not abide in sun and the rest, but only the qualified Brahman does.[1]

SŪTRA 20

"AND THUS PERCEPTION AND INFERENCE SHOW."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Brahman alone is capable of the activities in connection with the creation and the rest of the entire universe. The following scriptural Smṛti passages "show" the lordship of the freed soul to be exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe: "He is the cause, the lord of the lord of causes[2]" (Śvet. 6.9[3]), "The controller of all, the ruler of all" (Bṛh. 4.4.22[4]), '"With me as the ruler, prakṛti brings forth the movable and the immovable"' (Gītā 9.10[5]).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Perception" means Scripture, "inference" Smṛti. These two, Scripture and Smṛti, "show" that Brahman alone, not subject to any change, is capable of the activities in connection with the universe. The scriptural texts are to the effect: "The lord of matter and souls, the controller of attributes" (Śvet. 6.16), "Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold" (Śvet. 6.8), '"The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), "He is the Lord of all, he is the ruler of beings, he is the protector of beings, he is the bridge for keeping these worlds apart" (Bṛh. 4.4.22), '"Verily, at the command of the Imperishable, (Gārgī), the sun and the moon stand held apart"' (Bṛh. 3.8.9), "Through fear the wind

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[1] Ś.B. 4.4.19, p. 978; Bh. B. 4.4.19, p. 248. The difference between Śaṃkara and Bhāskara with regard to these two aspects of the Lord—non-qualified and qualified—is that while Śaṃkara takes the former alone to be true, the latter false, Bhāskara takes the former to be real and eternal, the latter, real and non-eternal.

[2] Correct reading: "Karṇādhipādhipa"—the lord of the lord of sense-organs (or the individual soul). Vide Śvet. 6.9, p. 70.

[3] Not quoted by others. [4] *Op. cit.* [5] R.

blows, through fear the sun arises, through fear fire, the moon and death as the fifth speed on" (Tait. 2.8), " He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of causes" (Śvet. 6.9), "In whom all the worlds rest. None, surpasses him" (Kaṭha 5.8; 6.1), " Kṛṣṇa, the one, the controller, moving everywhere, is to be worshipped" (G.P.T.[1]). The Smṛti passages are to the effect: ' " With me as the ruler, prakṛti brings forth the movable and the immovable " ' (Gītā 9.10), ' " Pervading the entire universe with a part of mine, I abide " ' (Gītā 10.42), ' " I am the source of all, everything originates from me " ' (Gītā 10.8), ' " On me all this is strung, like gems on a piece of thread " ' (Gītā 7.7), ' " There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya " ' (Gītā 7.17).

The freed soul, however, though similar to the Highest Brahman, yet cannot possibly be the lord of all the sentient and the non-sentient, their controller, their supporter, all-pervasive and so on; and hence its lordship is exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe.

SŪTRA 21

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE INDICATION OF EQUALITY IN POINT OF ENJOYMENT ONLY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the indication of equality in point of enjoyment only," viz.: " He enjoys all pleasures together with Brahman, the all-knowing" (Tait. 2.1[2]), the lordship of the freed soul is exclusive of the activities with regard to the universe.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And on account of the indication" to the effect that the freed soul has similarity with the Lord in point of enjoyment only, viz.: "He enjoys all desires together with Brahman, the all-knowing" (Tait. 2.1), it is known that the lordship of the freed soul is exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe.

[1] P. 195. [2] R, Bh, Śk, B.

SŪTRA 22

"NON-RETURN, ON ACCOUNT OF TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no return for the soul which has attained the form of the highest light and has become free from transmigratory existence. Why? "On account of the texts": "Those who proceed by this do not return to this human whirlpool, return not" (Chānd. 4.15.6[1]), '"But on attaining me, O son of Kuntī, there is no re-birth"' (Gītā 8.16[2]).

Here ends the fourth quarter of the fourth chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

By demonstrating that the freed soul has similarity with the Lord in point of enjoyment alone, it has been shown there is no similarity of nature between the two. It is to be known that the freed soul, different from Brahman, has no return, "on account of texts", i.e. in accordance with following scriptural and Smṛti texts: "Those who proceed by this, do not return to this human whirlpool, return not" (Chānd. 4.15.6), "They attain the world of Brahman, and do not return" (Chānd. 4.15.1), "This is immortal, fearless, this is the highest abode. From this, one does not return" (Praśna 1.10), '"On attaining me, the great-souled ones who have attained supreme perfection, are not subject to re-birth, the abode of miseries and non-eternal"' (Gītā 8.15), '"But on attaining me, O son of Kuntī, there is no re-birth"' (Gītā 8.16), '"Resorting to this knowledge, they have come to attain similarity with me. They are not born at the time of creation, nor suffer at the time of dissolution"' (Gītā 14.2) and so on. The repetition of the aphorism indicates the completion of the treatise.

[1] Ś, Bh, B.

It is established that the lordship of the freed soul consists in a direct intuition of the Highest Brahman, the Highest Self, the soul of all.

Here ends the section entitled " Exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe (6).

I bow down to the author of the aphorisms and to him who explained them, through whose grace the Vedānta-kaustubha has been churned out of the ocean of Scripture for the well-being of knowers.

Here ends the fourth quarter of the fourth chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the venerable Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the sect of the holy Sanatkumāra.

This fourth chapter entitled "The fruit" is completed.

Résumé

According to Nimbārka and others, the fourth quarter of the fourth chapter contains 22 sūtras. The number of adhikaraṇas is 6 according to Nimbārka and Rāmānuja, 7 according to Śaṃkara and Bhāskara, 8 according to Śrīkaṇṭha and 10 according to Baladeva.

THE END

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VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA

OF

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AND

VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA

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(DOCTRINES OF NIMBĀRKA AND HIS FOLLOWERS)

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PREFACE.

The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal accepted Dr. Roma Bose's (Choudhury) doctoral dissertation on Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha of Nimbārka and Vedānta-Kaustubha of Śrīnivāsa for publication in the Bibliotheca Indica Series and the printing of the first volume was completed early in 1940. When the second volume was printed off in 1941, the two volumes together came to 884 pages, Royal 8vo. Dr. B. S. Guha, the then General Secretary hoped to publish Indexes for both the volumes at the end of Vol. II, but the Indexes were not ready and as the third volume would give a general survey of the life and thoughts of Nimbārka, we found it convenient to print the Indexes of all the three volumes together at the end of Vol. III.

The learned author has given a lucid and comprehensive exposition of the doctrinal as well as the historical problems of the Nimbārka school in its entirety. Opening with a brief survey of the life of Nimbārka, the author discusses briefly the date as well as the specific works of the great philosopher. The rest of the book is devoted to a detailed analysis of the doctrines of Nimbārka and his followers (pp. 18–279). Incidentally the author institutes comparison of the doctrine of Nimbarka with some other Bhedābheda (unity in plurality) doctrines as coming from Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva. A résumé of the various doctrines was then given, bringing out the inherent similarities and dissimilarities. The various rituals of the Nimbārka sect were finally described and an evaluation of Nimbārka's system was made in the concluding section of the book. An exhaustive bibliography has been added and the Index to all the three volumes will facilitate, let us hope, further studies along the line chalked out by the author whom we congratulate on the completion of her monumental work. *Brahmavādinī* was a well-known and well-merited title held by several *femmes savantes* of the later Vedic age and the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, the pioneer institution in the revival of ancient Indian culture, may take legitimate pride in the fact of setting its seal on the merits of the exposition of Brahmavāda by a brilliant woman scholar of modern India.

KALIDAS NAG,
General Secretary,
Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal.

21*st October*, 1943.

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LIFE OF NIMBĀRKA

Nothing much is known for certain about the life of Nimbārka. He was believed to be an incarnation of the Sudarśana-cakra (disc) of Lord Viṣṇu, born on earth for suppressing the heretical doctrines, then prevalent, and for preaching the holy Vaiṣṇava religion.[1] He was a Tailaṅga Brāhmaṇa born in Teliṅga,[2] in the Sudarśana-āśrama, situated on the bank of Devanadī.[3] According to a different account,

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[1] V.K., p. 1, Kāśī ed.; V.R.M., p. 1; S.J., p. 1; S.S., p. 1; A.S., quoted in Ā.C., p. 35, cf. also S.R., pp. 124-125; G.M., p. 1; V.M., p. 1; L.M., p. 1; Preface to V.P.S., p. 3, C.S.S. ed.; Preface to Ś.K., p. 4; Ś.M.M., p. 2; Ś.M., pp. 1-2; Bh.P., quoted in the Preface to V.P.S., p. 2, Kāśī ed.

The account given in Ā.C., pp. 42–48, is as follows:—

Once all the sages were assailed with doubt as to whether the pravṛtti-mārga was better or the nivṛtti-mārga, and they approached Brahmā with this question. Brahmā took them to Lord Aniruddha on the bank of the Kṣīra-sāgara and requested him to point out the right path to the sages. Thereupon, an unseen voice declared from heaven that to the Lord and to His devotees the nivṛtti-mārga was preferable, and that He should teach the nivṛtti-mārga to the world. Being satisfied, the sages went away. Then the Lord summoned His own Sudarśana-cakra—a part of Himself—and commanded him to descend on earth to revive and teach the Bhāgavata-dharma, which was waning and which he could learn from Nārada, and spread it all around. Accordingly the Sudarśana-cakra was born as the son of Aruṇa and Jayantī.

The account given in Bh.P. is much the same, omitting only the first portion, viz., the going of the sages to Brahmā, etc.

The account given in Naimiṣa-khaṇḍa, as quoted in Ā.C., pp. 34-35, is as follows:—

At the end of the Tretā-yuga, the Brāhmaṇas, being afraid of the Asuras, prayed to the Lord Hari. They also prayed to Brahmā, who himself prayed to Lord Hari again. Thereupon Lord Hari gave him His own Sudarśana-cakra for the protection of the Brāhmaṇas. Sudarśana descended on earth as a sage, called Havirdhāna or Niyamānanda.

[2] V.R.M., p. 1.

Teliṅga is the country along the coast south of Orissa as far as Madras.

According to one account, Nimbārka was born in a village called Muṅgī-pātana in Tailaṅga; Ś.N., p. 2, and p. 2 footnote; cf. also Ś.N.M., p. 2.

[3] Bh.P., quoted in the Preface to V.P.S., p. 2, Kāśī ed. Devanadī is identified with the river Godāvarī in Southern India (vide G.M., p. 47).

In A.S. it is said that Nimbārka was born in a village called Nimbagrāma near Govardhana. Govardhana is a celebrated hill in Vṛndāvana or the country about Mathurā.

however, he was born in Vṛndāvana, on the bank of Sūryaputrī or Yamunā.[1]

According to one account he was born in the month of Kārtika in the evening of the full-moon night,[2] while according to another, he was born in the month of Vaiśākha on the third day of the bright half of the moon.[3]

His father's name was Aruṇa, and his mother's Jayantī.[4] According to a different account, however, his father's name was Jagannātha, and his mother's Sarasvatī.[5]

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[1] Ā.C., p. 48.

Note that Puruṣottama, who was the fourth in succession from Nimbārka, states in the introductory part of his V.R.M. that Nimbārka was born in Teliṅga (Southern India), but Puruṣottama, the author of Ā.C., holds that Nimbārka was born in Vṛndāvana (Northern India).

British Museum Catalogue (Supplementary catalogue of Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit books, 1928) makes Puruṣottama, the author of V.R.M., identical with Puruṣottama, the author of Ā.C. (vide p. 819). But this is not really the case, as will be clear from the following evidence:—

The Ā.C. begins thus:—

Once several highly learned men like Svabhūdeva and the like approached the great sage *Harivyāsadeva* in the Dhruvakṣetra in Mathurā, and wanted to hear the biography of Nimbārka, the founder of their sect. Thereupon, Harivyāsadeva first made obeisance to his guru *Śrībhaṭṭa* and began to tell them about the life and doings of Nimbārka, etc. (Ā.C., pp. 1–4).

This shows that Puruṣottama, the author of Ā.C., must have flourished *subsequent to* Śrībhaṭṭa, Harivyāsadeva, and Svabhūdeva. But Śrībhaṭṭa was the thirty-first in succession from Nimbārka, Harivyāsadeva, the thirty-second and Svabhūdeva, the thirty-third, while Puruṣottama, *the author of V.R.M.*, was only the fourth (vide pp. 105-106 of the thesis, Part 1). This proves conclusively that Puruṣottama, the author of Ā.C., was other than Puruṣottama, the author of V.R.M.

[2] Ā.C., p. 48; Bh.P., quoted in the Preface to the V.P.S., p. 2, Kāśī ed.; Ś.N.M., p. 2.

[3] Ś.K., p. 3; A.S., quoted in Ā.C., p. 35, etc. Vaiśākha is the April-May month.

[4] Ā.C., p. 48; A.S., quoted in Ā.C., p. 35, also given in S.R., pp. 124-125; Preface to Ś.K., p. 4; Preface to V.P.S., p. 3, C.S.S. ed.; Bh.P., quoted in the Preface to V.P.S., p. 2, Kāśī ed. (according to it, Aruṇa belonged to the Bhṛgu clan); Ś.N.M., p. 2; Ś.N., p. 2.

[5] Ś.K., p. 3.

It is interesting to note that the account given by Harivyāsadeva in his Ś.K. tallies with that given by Audumbara Ṛṣi in A.S. regarding the time of Nimbārka's birth (viz. the month of Vaiśākha) and his father's name (viz. Jagannātha), but differs from it regarding his mother's name, which the latter gives as " Vaijayantī ".

Eggeling's identification of Nimbārka with Bhāskarācārya is wrong.[1] His disciples never refer to him as Bhāskara, but always as Niyamānanda or Nimbārka.[2] It will be shown later on that Bhāskara and Nimbārka were two different persons representing two different schools of thought altogether.

According to tradition, Nimbārka had some other names as well, viz. Āruṇi, because he was the son of Aruṇa [3]; "Jayanteya", because he was the son of Jayantī [4]; "Haripriya", because he was very dear to the Lord, being His incarnation [5]; "Havirdhāna", because he was a supporter and a nourisher of the haviṣ, or sacrificial *ghee* [6]; and "Sudarśana", because he was an incarnation of the Sudarśana-cakra of the Lord.[7]

His most well-known names are, however, the first two, viz. Niyamānanda and Nimbārka. Various etymological explanations of the first name have been given by his disciples,[8] and several legends are connected with the second.

We do not know. and have no means of knowing, whether the parents of Nimbārka each bore two names: Aruṇa and Jagannātha. Jayantī and Sarasvatī.

[1] I.O.C. of Sanskrit MSS., Part IV, 1894, p. 802.

[2] Śrīnivāsa, V.K., pp. 1-2—Nimbabhāskara and Niyamānanda; Puruṣottama, V.R.M., p. 1—Niyamānanda; Devācārya, S.J., pp. 2, 6—Niyamānanda; Sundarabhaṭṭa, S.S., p. 1—Niyamānanda; Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa, T.P., p. 1—Nimbārka; Harivyāsadeva, Ś.K., p. 3—Nimbāditya and Nimbārka; Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava I, Ś.K., pp. 1, 148—Niyamānanda; Anantarāma, V.M., p. 1—Niyamānanda.

Cf. also Gopāla Śāstrī, Preface to Ś.K., p. 4—Niyamānanda; Vindhyeśvarī-prasāda Dvivedin, Preface to V.P.S., K.S.S., p. 3—Nimbārka; Kiśorī Dāsa, Ś.N.M., p. 2 and Ś.N., pp. 1, 2, etc.

[3] Ā.C., p. 56. This name, it is said, was given to Nimbārka by Brahmā. See footnote 1, p. 6 of the thesis, Part 1.

[4] *Op. cit.*

[5] Ā.C., p. 61. This name, it is said, was given to Nimbārka by Nārada.

Keśavakāśmīrin, at the end of his T.P., p. 380, refers to Nimbārka as "Haripriya", but the word seems to be used as an adjective rather than as a pronoun.

[6] Naimiṣa-khaṇḍa, quoted in Ā.C., p. 35; Sanmohanatantra, quoted in Ā.C., p. 37. Kṛṣṇa-upaniṣad, quoted in Ā.C., p. 39.

[7] Naimiṣa-khaṇḍa, quoted in Ā.C., p. 34; Kāñcī-khaṇḍa, quoted in Ā.C., p. 37.

[8] L.S., p. 1. He was called "Niyamānanda" because (cf. the commentary on L.S., p. 3) he brought all people under his control, or because he devoted (controlled) himself to supreme bhakti of the Lord.

Vide G.M. also, p. 2, on L.S.; various explanations given, such as, He was niyama, because he controlled (niyamayati) those who deviated from the path of

According to one account, when the boy was about five years old, Father Brahmā went to the hermitage of the sage Aruṇa, in the guise of an ascetic. The sage was not at home at that time, and Jayantī, as the hostess, respectfully offered some refreshment to the guest. But as it was past sunset, the ascetic refused to comply with her request. Thereupon, the boy approached the ascetic and said: "Reverend Sir, do be pleased to accept our hospitality, for look, the sun is still lingering over the yonder Nimba-tree", and showed him the sun, shining as bright as ever over the said tree. But when the ascetic finished his meal, he was astonished to find that it was really past midnight. Thereupon Brahmā, being pleased, gave the boy the name "Nimbārka" because he had shown him the sun (arka) over the Nimba-tree long after sunset.[1]

According to a different account, once a great and learned Daṇḍin (or a Jaina ascetic, according to another account) visited our sage, and the two were engaged in controversial discussions till sunset. Then the sage offered some refreshment to the visitor, but as the sun was already setting, the mendicant was obliged to decline. Thereupon the great sage arrested the further descent of the sun, and ordered it to stay over a yonder Nimba-tree till the guest had taken

religion, and he was ānanda because he gladdened (ānandayati) the heart of his devotees; and so on.

Ā.C., p. 56. He was called "Niyamānanda" because he expounded the Law, i.e. the Veda.

S.P. p. 2 and S.S., p. 4. He was called "Niyamānanda" because the Bliss (ānanda, i.e. Brahman) taught by him universally (niyamena) manifests the world; i.e. because he was the teacher of the highest truth, viz. Brahman.

Keśavakāśmīrin, in the Maṅgala-pāṭha of his T.P., p. 1, gives an etymological explanation of the word "Nimbārka", viz. he was like a medicinal fruit (nimba) in curing people from the disease of the world, and he was like the sun (arka) in removing the darkness of the heart.

[1] Ā.C., pp. 52-56. According to this account, Brahmā not only gave him the name "Nimbārka", but also some other names, viz. Āruṇi, Jāyanteya, and Niyamānanda.

A slightly different account is given in Ś.N.M., pp. 2-3. Once Brahmā (or Nārada, according to another account) went to the hermitage of Aruṇa and asked for alms. But the sage was out, and nothing was available at home. Then seeing the guest turn back, disappointed, Niyamānanda placed his own Sudarśana-tejas (which looked just like the sun) on a Nimba-tree, and fetched, in the meantime, fruits, etc. for the ascetic, from the forest.

Cf. also the similar account given in Bh.P., quoted in the Preface to V.P.S., pp. 2-3, Kāśī ed.

his meal. The sun did so, and from that time the sage came to be known as "Nimbārka" or "Nimbāditya" or the Sun of the Nimba-tree.[1]

Nimbārka is said to be the immediate disciple of Nārada.[2] He himself refers to Nārada as his guru in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtras.[3] The tradition is that Brahmā, out of pity for the world, merged as it was in the darkness of ignorance, produced four Kumāras, viz. Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, and Sanatkumāra, out of his mind (mānasa-putra). These Kumāras requested their Father to teach them the highest reality. Brahmā, being himself unable to teach them, prayed to Lord Viṣṇu. Thereupon, the Lord, for the good of the world, manifested Himself as a swan (Haṃsāvatāra) and taught the supreme truth to the Kumāras, who taught it to Nārada,[4] and Nārada in his turn handed down this knowledge to Nimbārka.[5]

It is evident that no historical importance can be attached to this alleged fact of Nimbārka's being the immediate disciple of Nārada, who is, after all, a mere traditional figure, like the swan-incarnation and the four Kumāras. It is true that Nimbārka himself refers to him as his preceptor,[6] but that by no means guarantees us in con-

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[1] B.M.G., p. 171.

Cf. the similar account given in Ś.N., p. 3.

[2] Ā.C., pp. 57ff.; Ś.N., p. 4; Ś.N.M., pp. 7, 8.

[3] V.P.S., 1.3.8, p. 80, Kāśī ed.

[4] Cf. also the Chānd., 7th chap., the dialogue between Nārada and Sanatkumāra. Here Sanatkumāra is represented as teaching the supreme truth to Nārada. See V.K., 1.3.8

Nimbārka also represents Nārada as learning the truth from Sanatkumāra in his V.P.S., 1.3.8.

[5] Ā.C., pp. 7–21, 57–64. Nārada went to the hermitage of Nimbārka, initiated him properly, gave him the name "Haridāsa Haripriya" and taught him five-fold knowledge, viz. the Gāyatrīmantra, the Viṣṇu-bhakti-rahasya-mantra, the Upaniṣads, the Vedas, and the Śrī-gopāla-mantra of eighteen syllables. He taught him, further, the Vedānta doctrine, viz. that there are three realities, viz. God, Soul and World, and that the relation between them is a relation of difference-non-difference.

Cf. also Maṅgala-pāṭha, V.K., verse 1, p. 1, Kāśī ed., where Śrīnivāsa makes obeisance to the Lord Swan, Sanaka, and the rest, and Nimbārka.

Maṅgala-pāṭha, T.P., verse 4, p. 380, where Keśavakāśmīrin makes obeisance to the Lord who assumed the form of a swan for teaching the truth to Sanaka and the rest; P.R., p. 8, where Baladeva quotes from Padma-purāṇa to the effect that Śrī, Brahmā, Rudra, and the four Kumāras, respectively chose Rāmānuja, Madhva, Viṣṇusvāmin, and Nimbārka as the founders of their respective sects; Ś.N.M., p. 8; Ś.N., p. 5.

[6] See footnote 3, above.

cluding that he actually learnt the Vedānta-doctrine from Nārada, as alleged. Nimbārka might have very well called Nārada his preceptor simply for showing the antiquity of his own doctrine, as well as for glorifying it and making it more acceptable to the people, for quite naturally people would fall in with his doctrine far more easily if they were to learn that it was not invented by Nimbārka, a man, but was handed down to him by Nārada, a divine sage, who, again, learnt it from the Kumāras, sons of Brahmā, who, finally, learnt it from the Lord Himself. Another reason why Nimbārka chose to refer to Nārada as his preceptor was perhaps that Nārada was supposed to be well acquainted with the glory of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa, the central point of Nimbārka's doctrine.[1]

Of course, Nimbārka does not seem to have been the first to hold the Bhedābheda doctrine. In the Brahma-sūtras, for example, we find a reference to the view of Āśmarathya [2] who seems to have held a sort of Bhedābheda doctrine. Nimbārka might, however, have been its first systematic propounder.

Nimbārka was a Naiṣṭhika-brahmacārin, i.e. led the life of a perpetual religious student, observing the vow of chastity through his life, and never became a householder.[3] He is said to have practised a severe penance under a Nimba-tree, living on the juice of its fruits only.[4] Afterwards, it is said, he visited all the holy places and travelled all around preaching the holy Vaiṣṇava religion wherever he went. He visited the Setu-bandha in the South,[5] Gurjara,[6] and Nārāyaṇa-sarovara. Finding the world plunged in ignorance, he deputed the sage Audumbara to compose a Saṃhitā in his (i.e. Audumbara's) name, preaching the path of devotion.[7] Next he went to the Naimiṣāraṇya and stayed there for a few years with prominent

Cf. also M.R.Ş., verse 1, p. 1, where Nimbārka makes obeisance to the Swan, the Kumāras, and Nārada.

Nimbārka refers to Sanaka and others as well as to Nārada in his D.Ś., Śloka 6, also.

[1] The Nārada-pañca-rātra brings out this fully.

[2] Vide Br. Sū., 1.4.20.

[3] Ā.C., p. 64.

[4] Ā.C., p. 72.

[5] The ridge of rocks extending from Rāmeśvara on the south-eastern coast of India to Ceylon, and supposed to have been formed by Hanumat for the passage of Rāma's army.

[6] Modern Gujrat.

[7] Audumbara-saṃhitā, quoted in Ā.C., p. 35, also S.R., pp. 124-125.

sages. Afterwards, he visited the Bādarī-āśrama.[1] After that he returned to his own place and engaged himself in a great penance.[2] It is clear from the above account that our knowledge of the life of Nimbārka is at present meagre and not satisfactory. The available accounts about Nimbārka's life are mostly traditional which may, however, contain some elements of truth.

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[1] The place near the source of the Ganges.

[2] Ā.C., pp. 64ff.

WORKS OF NIMBĀRKA

Nimbārka wrote a short commentary on the Brahma-sūtras called "Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha".[1] It is said that he dedicated it to his immediate disciple Śrīnivāsa.[2]

This commentary is very condensed, and its peculiarity is that unlike most of the commentaries, it contains no attempt at refuting rival schools of thought,[3] or at expounding at length the theory of the author himself. In it there are very few [4] discussions and argumentations, and the author is content with stating his case in as few words as possible in course of explaining the word-meaning of the sūtras without ever entering into details of any sort. His language, too, is very simple, and just to the point. He quotes from the Upaniṣads, etc., the Bhagavad-gītā, the Mahā-bhārata, Manu-smṛti, the Purāṇas, etc. in support of his case.

Nimbārka composed also a small work containing ten stanzas, called "Daśa-ślokī" or "Siddhānta-ratna". It is said that he composed this also for his immediate disciple Śrīnivāsa.[5] This book is a succint statement of his views regarding the nature of the three realities (tattvas), viz. Kṛṣṇa,[6] the cit,[7] and the acit.[8] Here Nimbārka emphasises the fact that Brahman, i.e. Kṛṣṇa, is to be meditated on at all times,[9] supreme devotion being the highest sādhana.[10] And the object of meditation is not Kṛṣṇa alone, but Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa con-

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[1] "The Odour of the Heavenly Flower of the Vedānta." Traditionally, he is supposed to have composed it during his stay in the Badarikāśrama with Vyāsa.

The colophons to V.P.S. call it "Śārīrakamīmāṃsāvākyārtha", and not a Bhāṣya, as they do Śrīnivāsa's V.K., vide e.g. the Kāśī ed. of V.P.S., pp. 46, 47, etc. etc.

[2] Ā.C., p. 87, and p. 120.

[3] Nimbārka, of course, criticises like other commentators, the theories of the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, etc. (vide V.P.S. 2.2), but he makes no attempt at criticising other schools of the Vedānta. His criticisms of the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, etc., too, are very brief.

[4] Cf. e.g. V.P.S., 1.1.4.

[5] Ś.K., p. 3; Ā.C., p. 120.

[6] D.Ś., śloka, 4.

[7] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 1-2.

[8] *Op. cit.*, śloka 3.

[9] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 6, 8.

[10] *Op. cit.*, śloka 9.

jointly.[1] This is a new point brought out, not found in the "Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha", there being not a single mention of Rādhā or Kṣṇa in it.[2] Nimbārka ends this treatise by pointing out the five truths to be known by the wise, all of which, however, he himself does not propound in it.[3]

It is interesting to note that in this treatise Nimbārka insists, specially and separately, on the reality of all cognitions of objects, and on the trinity of reals (tri-rūpa).[4] By nature a very concise writer, he would not have devoted an entire verse (out of ten only) to this topic, unless there were prevalent at that time some views insisting on the falsity of our ordinary perceptions of the things of the world of plurality, and on the sole unity and reality of the Self. This seems to suggest that Nimbārka flourished in an age when Advaita-vāda was already in vogue.[5] In no other work of Nimbārka we find any such special and separate emphasis on this point.[6] The reality of the world is taken for granted everywhere, as if self-evident and outside the sphere of all dispute.

The "Daśa-ślokī" being so very concise itself needs commentation and interpretation in order to be understood properly. Several

[1] D.Ś., śloka 5.

[2] Footnote 1, p. 18.

[3] D.Ś., śloka 10. The five truths or arthas are as follows: (1) the nature of the Upāsya (i.e. Brahman), (2) the nature of the Upāsaka (i.e. the jīva), (3) the fruit of the Lord's grace, (4) the Bhaktirasa, and (5) the obstructions to the attainment of the Lord. In D.Ś. Nimbārka propounds the first two only, and incidentally mentions the fourth, but says nothing about the fifth and the third, whatever he may mean by the latter. (According to most commentators, he means "mokṣa" here; vide e.g. V.R.M., p. 132. According to Harivyāsadeva however, the word means self-surrender (prapatti) and the giving up of all actions except the service of the Lord which results in self-surrender. Vide Ś.K., p. 38.)

[4] D.Ś., śloka 7. Vide also V.R.M., p. 84.

[5] Cf. discourses regarding the date of Nimbārka; *vide infra*.

[6] In V.P.S., 3.3.39, Nimbārka says simply that the text "Neha nānāsti kiñcana" (Bṛh., 4.4.29, Kaṭha, 4.11) means that everything is brahmātmaka, but says nothing more, p. 334, Kāśī ed.

In his Ś.N.K.S., too, as we shall see, while insisting on the saguṇatva of Brahman (as against Nirguṇavāda), on the reality of the "I" (as against the view that the ahaṃ-padārtha is something unreal as composed of the Ajaḍa cit and the jaḍa ahaṃkāra), and on the view that Brahman is never the substrate and object of ajñāna, he does not specially insist on the reality of the world as against Māyā-vāda.

commentaries have been written on it by different disciples of Nimbārka.[1]

The style of the "Daśa-ślokī" is very simple and charming, specially suited to a devotee who does not want to be bothered with abstract logical theories and hair-splitting wranglings, but wants to have the truth immediately in a nut-shell.[2] Hence it has been appropriately termed "Vedānta-kāma-dhenu Daśa-ślokī".[3]

Nimbārka composed also a hymn of twenty-five verses in praise of Lord Kṛṣṇa, called "Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja". The tradition is that when Nimbārka went to see Kṛṣṇa in Vṛndāvana, he eulogized the Lord by these twenty-five verses.[4]

The Lord is belauded here as Hari, Kṛṣṇa, Keśava,[5] the abode of all power,[6] and all beauty,[7] the source of everything,[8] the greatest of all,[9] all-pervading,[10] yet abiding within all,[11] and essentially fond of His devotees.[12] The Lord is always an object of adoration and worship,[13] and can be attained through devotion alone.[14]

This book contains undeniable attempts at criticising Nirguṇa-vāda,[15] the doctrine that the Aham-artha or the "I" is not the essence

[1] See Appendix.

[2] Vide Ś.K., p. 3, where it is said that the mastering of many śāstras being very difficult, Nimbārka, with a view to favouring his disciples, taught the kernel of truth in ten verses.

[3] V.R.M., p. 2.

[4] Ś.N., p. 2.

[5] Ś.N.K.S., śloka 7.

[6] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 8, 12.

[7] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 1, 3, 4, 10.

[8] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 1, 9.

[9] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 3, 11.

[10] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 1, 7.

[11] *Op. cit.*, śloka 7. The Lord is both aṇu and mahān.

[12] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 11, 12.

[13] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 3, 7, 15, 16.

[14] *Op. cit.*, śloka 18.

[15] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 2, 6, 10. In śloka 2 it is said that the Upaniṣadic texts which declare the Lord to be devoid of attributes simply mean that He is absolutely free from all āvidyaka viśeṣaṇas only, which fact does not prevent the Lord from being an abode of an infinite number of auspicious qualities.

In śloka 6, the same thing is affirmed once more, viz. that the text "Not so, not so" (Bṛh., 2.3.6) denies only certain (i.e. unworthy and inauspicious) qualities to the Lord, and not any and every (i.e. worthy and auspicious) quality.

The same thing is affirmed in śloka 10:—The Lord is said to be 'nirviśeṣa-cit' (in the sense of being free from all imperfections), and 'maṅgalālaya' (in the sense of being an abode of all auspicious qualities). These repeated attempts at explaining the nirguṇa-texts cannot but aim at refuting the theory based on them.

of the self,[1] Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda [2] and the doctrine that Brahman is the āśraya and viṣaya of ajñāna.[3]

The style of the "Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja" is rather heavy, and not so simple and to the point as those of the two books mentioned above. This book is also more controversial than them, for even the "Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha" contains no sectarian controversy, as we have seen. Several commentaries have been written on this work.[4]

Nimbārka is alleged to have written also a book called "Rahasya-mīmāṃsā".[5] We know only of two sections of it, viz. "Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī" and "Prapanna-kalpa-vallī".[6]

Both these sections deal with the sādhana called gurūpasatti, i.e. the complete self-surrender to a preceptor as a means of being led to God. The latter speaks of both gurūpasatti and prapatti with its six parts, but recommends the former as the essential pre-requisite of every sādhana.

These two sādhanas, viz. prapatti and gurūpasatti, are not mentioned in the "Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha", and though referred to incidentally in the "Daśa-ślokī" [7] and the "Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja",[8] are not set forth in details therein. The above two sections of the "Rahasya-mīmāṃsā" indicate to us the detailed method of procedure of approaching God through an intermediary—viz. a guru, the god on earth.

Besides the above-mentioned works, we know of a few hymns and verses composed by Nimbārka—viz. the "Prātaḥ-smaraṇa-stotra", or ten stotras in praise of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, to be recited

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[1] Ś.N.K.S., śloka 21. It is said here that the Aham-artha or the "I", the object of introspection (ahaṃ-pratīti) (viz. "I know", etc.) is not a combination of two things ('dvyaṃśa') (viz. the cit and the acit). This seems to refer to the Advaita view that the "I" is not the essence of the self, but is ultimately unreal, because it is due simply to the unwarrantable commingling of two diametrically opposed things—the ajaḍa cit and the jaḍa ahaṃ-kāra.

[2] *Op. cit.*, śloka 22. It is said here explicitly that the 'Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda' is an untenable doctrine.

[3] *Op. cit.*, śloka 23. Here it is explicitly said that the Lord is neither the āśraya nor the viṣaya of ajñāna.

[4] Vide Appendix.

[5] P.S.M., p. 1.

[6] Vide Ś.R., where these two chapters have been collected (Rahasya-ṣoḍaśi, pp. 86-87; Prapanna-kalpa-vallī, pp. 108-111). Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī has been published separately with commentary. See Appendix.

[7] D.Ś., śloka 8.

[8] Ś.N.K.S., ślokas 3, 7, etc.

daily in the morning by the devotee,[1] the "Rādhāṣṭaka" or eight verses in praise of Rādhā[2] and the "Kṛṣṇāṣṭaka" or eight verses in praise of Kṛṣṇa.[3]

These stotras are merely hymns in praise of the upāsya-devatā of Nimbārka, and are as such of no philosophic value.

The "Sva-dharmādhva-bodha", attributed to him, is preserved in manuscript form only[4] and mainly deals with ritualistic problems.

Other works by him, also preserved in manuscript forms, are "Madhva-mukha-mardana",[5] "Aitihya-tattva-rāddhānta",[6] "Pañca-saṃskāra-pramāṇa-vidhi",[7] and "Vedānta-tattva-bodha".[8]

These are all the works of Nimbārka actually known. Besides these, he composed some other treatises as well, which have not been found as yet. That he wrote a book called "Sadācāra-prakāśa", dealing with the Karma-yoga, is known from the works of some of his disciples.[9] It is evident from the same source that he wrote another book called "Prapatti-cintāmaṇi"[10] and a commentary on the Bhagavad-gītā.[11]

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[1] As given in Ś.R., pp. 71-72; also in L.S.V., pp. 21–23.

[2] Quoted in Ā.C., pp. 122–125; given in L.S.V., pp. 32–34.

[3] Quoted in Ā.C., pp. 130–133.

According to tradition, Nimbārka commanded his immediate disciple Śrīnivāsa to go to Śrī-Rādhā-kuṇḍa and recite the eight verses in praise of Rādhā and as a result he would be able to have a direct vision of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa. But Śrīnivāsa, not being satisfied, said to his guru that he had taught him that the highest form of worship was the conjoint worship of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, but so far he had been taught the Rādhāṣṭaka only, and asked him to teach him the Kṛṣṇāṣṭaka as well. Thereupon, Nimbārka taught him eight verses in praise of Kṛṣṇa. Then Śrīnivāsa went to Govardhana, did as he was told by his guru, and was able to have a direct vision of the Lord Kṛṣṇa accompanied by Rādhā. Vide Ā.C., pp. 128-129.

[4] I.O.C. of MSS., Part IV, 1894, MS. No. 2486.

[5] Cat. Cat., p. 428, Part 1; N.W.P., Part 1, 1874, pp. 274-275.

[6] Cat. Cat., pp. 14, 64, Part 2; Rep. Bh., 1894, p. 56.

[7] Cat. Cat., p. 63, Part 3; Rep. Kath., p. 29.

[8] Cat. Cat., p. 297, Part 1; Oudh MSS., 1898, p. 42.

[9] V.R.M., p. 97; Ś.K., p. 128; G.M., p. 34.

It is claimed that a few torn leaves of this treatise have been found in a place called "Aruṇa-ghāṭa" in Bengal. Vide Preface to V.P.S., p. 6; Kāśī ed.; Ś.N.M., p. 9.

[10] V.R.M., p. 140; vide also Preface to V.P.S., p. 3, Kāśī ed.

We do not know whether this treatise is identical with the "Rahasya-mīmāṃsā". The subjects of the two,—judging the first by its name and the second by its two known sections,—seem to be identical. Even if this be the case, still we have no sure ground for inferring that the two are identical.

[11] T.P., p. 380.

Finally, it has been claimed that Nimbārka wrote a commentary on the Veda,[1] too, but this view has no more than a traditional value, until we come across some definite evidence. The Vedānta-siddhānta-pradīpa, attributed to Nimbārka in the Notices of Sanskrit MSS. (No. 2826), and the Guru-paramparā noticed in the Catalogue of MSS. in the Private Libraries of N.W.P., Parts I–X, as a work of Nimbārka are not actually his works. The former is a work on the Advaita Vedānta school of Śaṃkara and the latter is a list of the successive teachers of the school.

[1] Ā.C., p. 56.

DATE OF NIMBĀRKA

So far as the date of Nimbārka is concerned, we do not unfortunately get any help from the writings of his disciples, for most of them are silent about it,[1] and the few who mention it, unfortunately, contribute nothing to the problem, their accounts being mostly based on tradition and more or less exaggerated.

This latter class of followers attempts to assign Nimbārka to a very ancient date. Thus some of them make him a contemporary of Vyāsa, the author of the Brahma-sūtras,[2] and other ancient mythical figures.[3] Others,[4] again, identify the names Haripriya, Āruṇi and Sudarśana—the first mentioned in the Brahma-vaivarta-purāṇa and the last two in the Bhāgavata-purāṇa—with Nimbārka, and argue therefrom that Nimbārka must have flourished in an ancient date.

It is evident at once that the above arguments are based on pure tradition, and not on historical truth; and may be rejected as such without further ado. Further, Haripriya and the rest are very common names, and may belong to anybody, and there is no evidence to show that they really refer to Nimbārka.

It has been claimed further that Nimbārka was the oldest of the commentators of the Brahma-sūtras, because his commentary contains no refutation of the views of any other commentator. As such, it is said, Nimbārka must have flourished earlier than Śaṃkara.[5] It is alleged [6] also that in the Gauḍapāda-kārikā there is a reference to the Dvaitādvaita-vāda of Nimbārka in the italicised portion of the passage:—

"Advaitaṃ paramārtho hi dvaitaṃ tad-bheda ucyate.
Teṣām ubhayathā dvaitaṃ tenāyaṃ na virudhyate." [7]

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[1] E.g., Śrīnivāsa, Puruṣottama, Devācārya, Sundarabhaṭṭa, Keśavakāśmīrin, and Harivyāsadeva, the well-known disciples say nothing about his date.

[2] Ā.C., p. 87; Ś.N.M., p. 7; Ś.N., pp. 18ff.; Preface to V.P. 3, p. 3, Kāśī ed.

[3] Ā.C., pp. 47, 57ff., e.g. Kṛṣṇa and Nārada.

[4] Ś.N.M., pp. 4ff.; Ś.N., pp. 18ff.; Preface to V.P.S., pp. 3-4, Kāśī ed.

[5] Ś.N., p. 20; Intro. to V.P.S., p. 6, Kāśī ed.

[6] Preface to V.P.S., pp. 4-5, Kāśī ed.

[7] G.K., 3.18, p. 216.

Now, as we have seen, it is a fact that in his Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, Nimbārka makes no attempt at all to criticise Śaṃkara. But we find that in his Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja there are references to Nirguṇa-vāda, the doctrine that the 'aham-artha' is not the essence of the self, Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda and the doctrine that Brahman is the āśraya-viṣaya of ajñāna.

In Gauḍapāda we do not find any exposition of the Nirguṇa-vāda. He, of course, repeatedly emphasises the point that there is absolutely no difference (bheda) in the Ātman,[1] that the Ātman is unborn, immortal, changeless,[2] etc., but he says nowhere explicitly that it is nirguṇa, or free from attributes, as Śaṃkara repeatedly does.

Again, Gauḍapāda never once says that the Ātman is the substratum (āśraya) and object (viṣaya) of ajñāna.

Hence when Nimbārka refers to these doctrines he cannot but refer to Śaṃkara and his school. Gauḍapāda was the first systematic exponent of the monistic school, and hence it cannot be said also that Nimbārka is referring to some earlier teacher, in whose doctrine these tenets are found, though not in Gauḍapāda's.

We also find that Śrīnivāsa, the immediate disciple of Nimbārka, explicitly refers to the Pratibimba-vāda.[3]

Now Gauḍapāda makes no reference to this doctrine also. He illustrates his theory by three sets of examples. First, he brings in the famous rope-snake illustration, and points out that just as in darkness a rope is imagined to be a snake, so the Ātman, too, is imagined to be what it is not.[4] Next he refers, at length, to the no less famous ether-pot illustration, pointing out that the individual soul is really nothing but the Ātman, just as the ether within the pot is nothing but the universal ether, etc.[5] Finally, he gives the illustration of a burning stick, and points out that just as a stick burning at one end, when waved round quickly, produces the illusion of a circle of fire (alāta-cakra), so is the world of plurality nothing but an illusion.[6] But he does not say for a single time that the world of plurality is a reflection of the Ātman on avidyā, like the reflection of the sun on water, as Śaṃkara often does.

Hence, there is no doubt that Śrīnivāsa could not have flourished before Śaṃkara. And this serves as a further evidence that Nimbārka,

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[1] Vide G.K., Advaita-prakaraṇam. [2] *Op. cit.*

[3] "Pratibimba-vādi-vadaś ca pāpīyān apramāṇataḥ", V.K.V., Ist taraṅga, verse 5, p. 5.

[4] G.K., 2.17-18. [5] *Op. cit.*, 3.3-9. [6] *Op. cit.*, 4.47-50.

who was a contemporary of Śrīnivāsa, being his preceptor, cannot be a predecessor of Śaṃkara. In the passage, alleged to contain a reference to Nimbārka's Bhedābheda-vāda, there is really nothing of the kind.

The phrase "Teṣām ubhayathā dvaitaṃ" does not at all refer to Bhedābheda-vāda, but it simply means: 'For them (i.e. for the Dvaitavādins) duality (is the truth) in both ways (i.e. from both pāramārthika and apāramārthika points of view).[1] This is the explanation given by Śaṃkara. He explains the whole verse thus: Non-duality is real, duality is its work (tad-bheda = tat-kāryya), i.e. is simply due to the working of the mind and ceases when the mind ceases to work, as in the states of deep sleep, swoon, etc. This is our view. But they, the Dualists, hold that duality is the ultimate truth, either from the real or from the non-real points of view. But our view is not contradicted by their view, because for an Advaitin there can be no opponent, since he thinks every one, even his opponent, as his own self.

Thus there is a reference to the Dualistic view alone; and if there were really a reference to the Bhedābheda view, we see no reason why Śaṃkara would not have interpreted as such.

Even if the phrase does refer to the Bhedābheda view, that does not prove in any way that Nimbārka's view is referred to here. Gauḍapāda explicitly refers to the Dvaita view,[2] but will any one take Madhva to be prior to Gauḍapāda for simply that reason? Just as absurd will be to take Nimbārka to be prior to Gauḍapāda and Śaṃkara, simply on the ground of their referring to a kind of Bhedābheda doctrine.

There is a manuscript called "Madhva-mukha-mardana", a criticism of Madhva's religion, attributed to Nimbārka.[3] This places Nimbārka after Madhva, provided the work is really by Nimbārka. The fact that the manuscript is not lent to anybody by the followers of Madhva,[4] perhaps prevented us as well from having it, no reply even being given to our enquiries. It seems Nimbārka undertook the work because it was Madhva's immediate influence upon the people which he had to fight against for making his own campaign successful.

[1] "Dvaitināṃ tu teṣāṃ paramārthataḥ aparamārthataś ca ubhayathāpi dvaitam eva." Vide Śaṃkara-bhāṣya on G.P., 3.18, p. 121.

[2] "Sva-siddhānta-vyavasthāsu dvaitino niścitā dṛdham", etc., G.P., 3.17.

[3] Cat. Cat., p. 428, Part 1; N.W.P., Part 1, 1874, pp. 274-275.

[4] N.W.P., Part 1, 1874, p. 275.

Thus, from internal evidences from well-known works by Nimbārka, we can definitely assert that Nimbārka could not have flourished before Śaṃkara, whereas we are led to think, on the evidence of the manuscript mentioned above, that he did not flourish also before Madhva; i.e. not before the 13th century A.D.[1]

[1] Madhva's date is about 13th century A.D. According to Sir R. G. Bhandarkar (Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and minor religious systems *in loco*), Nimbārka flourished shortly after Rāmānuja. According to Dr. R. L. Mitra (Notices), he, however, flourished after Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha.

DOCTRINE OF NIMBĀRKA

I. Brahman.

The Highest Reality, according to Nimbārka, is Brahman, Kṛṣṇa or Hari,[1] a Personal God. There is nothing that is equal to Him, nothing that is superior. He is the Lord of all, and the Controller of all. He is called 'Brahman' because of the unsurpassed greatness of His nature and qualities, because He is beyond any limit of any kind of space, time or thing.[2]

Brahman is the sole cause of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the universe. All beings arise from Him, are preserved by Him and return to Him. The Lord alone is the First Cause, the manifestor of all names and forms, and none else.[3]

Brahman is thus both the material and efficient cause (upādāna and nimitta Kāraṇa) of the universe.[4] In ordinary cases we find

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[1] Nimbārka does not use the terms "Kṛṣṇa" and "Hari" in V.P.S. There he speaks of the Highest Reality throughout as "Paramātman" (V.P.S., 1.1.13–15; 1.1.21-22, etc. etc.) also as "Brahman" (V.P.S., 1.2.3-4, etc.), "Para" (V.P.S., 1.2.3, etc.) and "Puruṣottama" (V.P.S., 1.1.1, 1.1.19, 1.2.9, 1.2.13, 1.3.8, 1.3.11, 1.3.24, etc.). Once he refers to Him as "Ramākānta Puruṣottama" (V.P.S., 1.1.1).

In D.Ś., śloka 4, he uses all these three terms, viz. Brahman, Kṛṣṇa and Hari, simultaneously, and in śloka 8 he speaks of Kṛṣṇa.

In Ś.N.K.S. also he uses all these three terms; e.g. in verse 1, he speaks of Hari, in verse 7 of Kṛṣṇa, Hari and Keśava, in verse 8 of Brahman and in verse 16 of Hari. He refers to the Highest Reality also as "Keśava" (verse 7), "Vibhu" (verses 16, 19) and "Mādhava" (verse 24).

[2] V.P.S., 3.2.32. Cf. also V.P.S., 3.2.31–36, where a pūrva-pakṣa is raised that there is something superior to Brahman and refuted. D.Ś., śloka 1; Ś.N.K.S., ślokas 3, 7.

Ś.N.K.S., śloka 3. V.P.S., 1.1.12, etc. D.Ś., śloka 8. Ś.N.K.S., śloka 5. V.P.S., 1.1.1, "Svābhāvika-svarūpa-guṇa-śaktyādibhiḥ bṛhat-tamaḥ". Ś.N.K.S., śloka 14. Thus, Nimbārka identifies Brahman, Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa; Ramā and Rādhā. For him "Ramā-kānta Puruṣottama" or (Viṣṇu) is none but "Rādhā-vallabha Kṛṣṇa". This is a distinct difference between Rāmānuja and Nimbārka.

[3] V.P.S., 1.1.3, 1.4.14-15. Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1. Ś.N.K.S., śloka 9. V.P.S., 1.3.42. *Op. cit.*, 1.1.19.

[4] V.P.S., 1.4.23–27.

that the clay, the material cause of a pot, and the potter, its efficient cause, are different. But in the case of the Universe, the two are identical, because Brahman, wishing to be many, transformed (and therefore He is the nimitta) Himself (and therefore He is the upādāna) into the form of the world.[1] The Universe is thus a transformation (pariṇāma) of Brahman.

Brahman is, thus, both transcendent and immanent. He is not an external creator, but pulsates within the entire universe. He is the inner soul, the inner controller and constant sustainer of His own creation.[2]

Several objections have been raised against this doctrine of the Causality of Brahman. The most formidable one is: Why should Brahman create this universe? All philosophies and religions have to answer this important and very natural question at the outset. Acts of intelligent beings are never motiveless. So the acts of the Supreme Intelligence must, too, have some definite motives or ends in view. We, as imperfect beings, act for attaining some goal. But how can we attribute any unfulfilled desire, any unattained goal to the Perfect Being in whom there is no incompleteness or insufficiency? What possible motive can He have in creating the world? It can be of no good to Him, for He lacks nothing; it can be of no good to the individual souls, for worldly life is full of sorrows and sufferings, and, salvation, admittedly, consists in getting rid of the Saṃsāra, of the eternal cycle of births and rebirths.

This leads to the second difficulty, no less formidable. Why should the merciful Lord deliberately plunge souls in grief? If He cannot prevent pains and evils on earth, He is not all-powerful; if He can, but does not, He is not all-merciful. What is the way out of this eternal dilemma? Again, people undergo different lots, without any apparent reason, the honest and the good suffer; in spite of contrary reasons, the wicked prosper. Hence if God be the creator of this world, He must, of necessity, be charged with cruelty and partiality.

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[1] V.P.S., 1.4.26.

Nimbārka does not explain in what sense precisely Brahman is the material cause of the universe. That He is the efficient cause of the universe is evident enough, but how He can be its material cause as well in view of the fact that all things are said to arise from prakṛti, the primeval Matter-eternal and real—is not explained. This is explained clearly by his disciple Puruṣottama, vide V.R.M., p. 65.

[2] V.P.S., 2.1.35; 1.2.5-6; 1.2.19.

These fundamental questions can by no means be easily solved. Some doubt the very capacity of human mind to grasp the motives of the Divine Mind. Reason must halt here, and make room for intuition or revelation. The sacred texts, learned prophets, ancient and modern, assure us that God alone is the cause, the creator of the world, whatever be His motive in creating it; that God is constantly working for our good, in spite of apparent injustice, wrongs and sufferings. And, we must accept these on trust.

Hindu philosophers, in spite of their deep trust in revelation or scripture, attempt also to find rational explanations, as far as possible, of these problems. In trying to solve the first problem, Nimbārka and other Vedānta philosophers bring in the conception of sport or līlā.[1] The creation of the world implies no want, no imperfection on the part of Brahman, for it is but a mere sport to Him. As a supreme monarch indulges in sports, not because he is in need of something, but because, on the contrary, he, as a King, has all his desires fulfilled and can indulge in pastimes at will, so Brahman creates the world not because He needs something, but, on the contrary, out of the fulness of His nature, out of the abundance of His joy.

But, the creation of the world may be a spontaneous sport, and not a necessity, on the part of Brahman, but to the poor souls, it is not so. How can that God be called merciful who only for the sake of sport, not even for any essential necessity, condemns souls to eternal grief? Hence it is pointed out that Brahman's indulgence in this cosmic sport, though not serving His own purpose, is not entirely motiveless, but is essentially guided by the demands of morality. This explanation tries to exonerate Brahman from the charges of cruelty and partiality.[2] Though creation is a sport, it is not a senseless or arbitrary sport. It is the eternal and inexorable law of Karma that determines the nature of every new creation and the fates of different individuals. "As you sow, so you reap"—this is the universal rule. So Brahman cannot be made responsible for the sufferings and varying lots of individuals,—it is the individuals themselves who are really responsible through their own Karmas.[3] These Karmas are without beginning and are, as such, existent before the individual souls come

[1] V.P.S., 2.1.32.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.33.

[3] Brahman may be here compared to the cloud. The cloud, as rain, is the common cause of the growth of all sorts of plants, good or bad, but the differences among those plants themselves are not due to the rain, which pours down upon all of them equally, but to the differences lying inherent in their respective

into existence, and Brahman takes these Karmas into account when creating the world.

But can we really say that this creation of the world serves no purpose of Brahman, is of no use whatsoever to Him? Even if we suppose that creation is but a sport, can we say that this sport is of no use to Brahman? Sports, too, have their own uses. The fact is that, as admitted by Nimbārka himself, Brahman and the universe are correlatives, one always implying the other. Hence, the evolution of the universe is a logical necessity on the part of Brahman. If the universe is impossible without Brahman, Brahman is no less incomplete without the universe.

Can we, again, say that Brahman is never responsible for the Karmas of souls, and hence for their consequent sufferings and unjust lots? If Brahman be the inner controller, how can He disclaim all responsibilities for the actions of the souls in whom He inheres?

Good and evil are necessary correlatives. One is possible only in contrast to the other. Moral life requires freedom of will, and freedom is meaningless unless there be two things to choose between. Hence, He who creates souls as free moral agents, must of necessity create both good and evil. The existence of evils in a world created by the Supreme Good may, thus, be justified. But the problem as to why virtue and happiness should not always go hand in hand, why should the sins of fathers be visited upon their children, requires a better and a more convincing explanation.

We may consider here one or two other objections against this doctrine that Brahman is the creator of the world. It has been urged, for example, that the material cause and its effect are of the very same kind.[1] From a lump of clay, we can get clay-pots alone, and not gold ones; from a piece of gold we can get gold rings alone, not clay ones. So, from the sentient Brahman a sentient world alone can arise. But who can assert that the world is sentient?

But, Nimbārka points out,[2] there is no rule that the cause and the effect must always be absolutely similar. So it cannot be said

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seeds. In the very same manner, the differences among men are due to the anādi karma-bījas of the men themselves, and not to the Lord.

Cf. Ś.B., 2.1.34.

Cf., also, V.K., p. 175, Kāśī ed.; V.R.M., pp. 13-14.

[1] V.P.S., 2.4-5.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.6-7. Here he cites the examples of nail, hair, etc. arising from living beings; and dung-beetles from the dung.

that the world, being different from Brahman in nature, cannot arise from Him.

The real point, however, is that Brahman is immanent in the world, animates and sustains its every part,—so the world is by no means absolutely separate, absolutely different from Brahman.

It has also been urged that the universe not only does not arise from Brahman, but cannot return to Him as well at the time of universal dissolution,[1] for then it is sure to defile Him with its own impurities.

But when the universe returns to Brahman, it inheres in Him as His power (śakti) and ceases to be imperfect.

Further, it has been objected[2] that as Brahman is a component whole, without separable parts (niravayava), He must be transformed into the world in his entirety; or, else, He must be held to be possessed of such parts (sāvayava) which will make Him something divisible, and hence mutable.

In reply, Nimbārka points out that[3] the universe is not a part, actually cut off from Brahman, but always inheres in Him during creation, as during dissolution. Before creation, it remains as a subtle power of Brahman, during creation this subtle power comes to be manifested. Creation, thus, means the full manifestation of the powers of Brahman (svaśakti-vikṣepa). So there is no question of Brahman's divisibility and mutability here.[4]

There remains one more objection to be considered. If Brahman be the material cause of the universe, He Himself becomes individual souls (jīvas), and as such, must of necessity undergo all worldly pleasures and pains.[5] But why should Brahman be so foolish as to do what is not beneficial to His own self and create a world that causes nothing but intense and infinite suffering to Him?[6] Again, if Brahman dwells within the hearts of jīvas, that also implies that He must share

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[1] V.P.S., 2.1.8.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.25.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.26, 27. Vide also V.P.S., 1.4.26. Cf. Bṛh., 5.1.1. "From the whole arises the whole, ... still the whole remains."

[4] Nimbārka refutes a few other objections against Brahma-kāraṇa-vāda that are not of any philosophical importance, such as: (1) a creator must have external implements. A potter, e.g., needs clay, wheels, etc. But Brahman has no such implements. (V.P.S., 2.1.23.) Hence, He cannot be the creator of the world. (2) Brahman cannot be a creator, for He has no sense-organs (*op. cit.*, 2.1.30), etc.

[5] V.P.S., 2.1.13.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.20.

all the experiences (bhogas) of the jīvas and be contaminated by their defects and blemishes.[1]

The fact, however, is, Nimbārka points out, that the individual souls are both different and non-different from Brahman.[2] The former only are subject to Karmas and the consequent bhogas, not the latter. Again, though Brahman is the in-dwelling spirit, He is untouched by human defects and sins, for the pristine purity of Brahman can never be sullied by anything.[3] God is God, Pure and Perfect *in spite of* all impurities and imperfections, and not *excluding* them. He pervades and contains everything, yet transcends everything.

So, Nimbārka concludes, Brahman is the cause of the universe, and its soul.

Thus, on the one hand, Brahman is eternal and great, the Greatest of the great, the Highest of the high,—the Creator, etc. of the universe, high above the individual soul, of which He is the Lord and the Ruler. But this is but one aspect of Brahman.

He has another aspect, equally real. He is also an abode of infinite beauty, bliss and tenderness, and in intimate connection with the soul. He is an abode of supreme peace, supreme grace,[4] the ocean of all sweetness and charms.[5]

Bliss is His very essence like existence and knowledge, since He is one indivisible mass of bliss.[6] His bliss is unlimited, unlike human bliss.[7] He is called Blissful also because He is the cause of the bliss of the soul.[8] He brings forth and maintains the universe through bliss.[9]

[1] V.P.S., 1.2.8.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.13. This point will be discussed fully later on. Cf. V.P.S., 2.1.21-22.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.9; 3.2.11; 3.2.30.

Nimbārka refutes some other objections against the doctrine that Brahman is the Antaryāmin, Inner controller. These are philosophically unimportant, e.g. it has been objected that Brahman, the all-pervading Being, cannot abide within the atomic soul, etc. V.P.S., 1.2.7, etc.

[4] Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1. Śānti, Kānti.

[5] *Op. cit.*, śloka 3. Sudhā-nidhi.

[6] *Op. cit.*, śloka 4.

[7] V.P.S., 1.3.9.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.15.

[9] Vide Tait., 3.6. Cf., also, Tait., Brahmānandavallī.

Finally, Brahman is essentially gracious to His devotees [1] (bhakta-vatsala). He strikes terror in the heart of the wicked, but to his devotees He is tender and solicitous as ever. Out of pity for them, He enables them to have a direct vision of Himself,[2] and is thereby the giver of salvation.[3] He is, in fact, not only the giver of salvation, but the giver of all fruits whatsoever in accordance with the karmas of individual souls.[4] Further, He manifests Himself in various forms with a view to pleasing His devotees,[5] and descends on earth in the forms of various vyūhas (and avatāras) for the good of the world.[6]

We see, thus, that the Lord is, on the one hand, all-powerful, on the other, all-merciful; He is transcendent, yet immanent; all-pervading, yet abiding within the heart of man; Ruler, yet Helper. His supreme might and majesty constitute no truer aspect of His nature than His boundless love and kindness.[7]

It is clear from the above that Brahman is essentially possessed of attributes.[8] On the one hand, He possesses an infinite number of auspicious qualities (which again, as we have seen, are of two broad kinds, viz. omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, etc. on one side, beauty, bliss, tenderness, on the other), and on the other hand, He is absolutely devoid of all that is inauspicious, unworthy and defective.[9] In this sense, the Lord is possessed of a double set of characteristics,[10] one positive, the other negative. And it is this negative aspect of the Lord, i.e. His freedom from all unworthy qualities, which sometimes leads to the description of Him as

[1] Ś.N.K.S., śloka 12. Bhakta-vatsala. The Lord is called "Ātma-supriya" (śloka 4) and "Ātma-vallabha" (śloka 14), which means, according to commentators, that He is bhakta-vatsala. Vide Ś.K., pp. 19 and 46.

[2] V.P.S., 3.2.24; Ś.N.K.S., śloka 11.

[3] V.P.S., 3.2.5; Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1.

[4] V.P.S., 1.1.4; 3.2.39–41.

[5] D.Ś., śloka 8. Cf. Arjuna's Viśvarūpa-darśana, Gītā 11.

[6] D.Ś., śloka 4. Cf. V.R.M., pp. 47-48. See also pp. 121ff. of the thesis, Part 1. Nimbārka does not himself say what these vyūhas are.

[7] It is to be noted that Nimbārka makes no reference to the softer aspect of the Lord—to His beauty, loveliness, tenderness, etc., in V.P.S., where the Lord is depicted in His sterner aspect of a creator, controller, and judge. The softer aspect of the Lord has been developed at length by the disciples of Nimbārka. Vide e.g., V.R.M., pp. 45, 49, 113, 119, etc.

[8] V.P.S., 1.1.1-2, etc.; Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1.

[9] D.Ś., śloka 4; Ś.N.K.S., śloka 10.

[10] V.P.S., 3.2.11; 3.2.15, 17, 18. Ubhaya-liṅga.

attributeless.[1] He is thus attributeless in the sense of being free from all ordinary material and inauspicious qualities, and He is possessed of attributes in the sense of being possessed of all celestial and auspicious ones.[2]

The conclusion is, therefore, that the Lord Kṛṣṇa is an abode of an infinite number of auspicious qualities, absolutely undefiled by any blemish, pure, complete and independent. He is one and self-sufficient, yet out of His own free will and without any want on His part, creates the world of plurality out of Himself, to fulfil the demands of morality, and He, out of His boundless kindness, again, leads the individual soul from the trammels of mundane existence.[3]

The Lord is accompanied, on His left, by Rādhā, the giver of all fruits, and of equal auspiciousness like Himself[4] and who is to be worshipped conjointly with him.[5]

The general nature and characteristics of the Lord being thus determined, the next question is: What is the proof of the existence of such a Being as Brahman? What is the source of our knowledge regarding Him? The reply is that Scripture alone is our source of knowing Brahman,[6]—from Scripture alone we come to know that there is a Being possessed of the above marks. The entire Scripture, in fact, is concerned with establishing Brahman as its sole supreme object.[7] Scripture may apparently seem to depict a variety of things, but really it depicts only one thing, viz. Brahman, for in Him alone all the diverse scriptural passages find their complete reconciliation.

Thus, some texts seem to enjoin the worship of the Person within the sun and the eye.[8] Here a doubt may be felt as to whether this

[1] Ś.N.K.S., śloka 6. Nirguṇa.

[2] *Op. cit.*, śloka 2. Cf. also V.P.S., 3.3.39.

[3] Saṃsāra.

[4] D.Ś., śloka 5. Vide also "Nanda-gṛha-candanam". Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1. Nimbārka identifies Ramā or Lakṣmī with Rādhā. Vide above, p. 28, Part I. Ś.N.K.S., śloka 5.

[5] D.Ś., śloka 5. Cf. also Rādhāṣṭaka, Kṛṣṇāṣṭaka, and Prātaḥ-smaraṇa-stotra.

[6] V.P.S., 1.1.3.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4. For the objection to this view and its refutation, see V.P.S., 1.1.4.

[8] Chānd., 1.6.6–8.

Person is identical with Brahman or some other Being. In the latter case, of course, it cannot be held that the entire Scripture teaches Brahman alone as the sole object to be known and worshipped. But the fact is that this Person is none but Brahman, for the Person is said to be free from all sins, to be the soul of all, etc., and these qualities can belong to the Lord alone.[1]

Similarly, all scriptural passages, Nimbārka points out, which seem to deal with objects other than Brahman really refer to Brahman and Brahman alone.[2]

Thus, the conclusion is that the Lord Kṛṣṇa is known from Scripture alone, and is the sole object and purport of all scriptural passages.

It may pertinently be asked: Why should we resort to Scripture alone for having any knowledge of Brahman? Is not our own reasoning faculty a safe and sure guide here? Nimbārka frankly admits the limited capacity of *ordinary* human reason. Ordinary individuals like us can reason or infer about mundane, empirical objects alone,—but what is extra-mundane, transcendental, lies beyond the scope of reasoning. And, here and here alone Scripture is our sole guide.

But what, after all, is Scripture? It is nothing but the product of the mature reflection and sustained thinking of inspired prophets and sages. To them, to those extraordinary minds, minds that are wiser and purer than our own, nothing is a sealed book, and even transcendental truths are known directly through the help of super-developed reasoning faculty.

Hence, it would be manifestly wrong to accuse Nimbārka, and for the matter of that, other Indian philosophers, of dogmatism, of a blind, unwarranted reliance on authority and revelation alone. In the first place, they are only frank and practical enough to admit the distinction between grades of human reason—its undeveloped and super-developed forms. In the second place, even in the stage of this lack of full development, they admit, rather insist on, the need of manana or reflection after śravaṇa or acquisition of philosophical truths from Scripture.

[1] V.P.S., 1.2.9; 1.2.26–28; 1.3.14-15.

[2] V.P.S., 1.1.21-22; Chānd., 1.9.1; V.P.S., 1.1.23; Chānd., 1.11.15; V.P.S., 1.1.24; Kauṣ., 3.2; V.P.S., 1.1.29–32; Chānd., 3.13.17; V.P.S., 1.1.25; Chānd., 3.14.1; V.P.S., 1.2.1–5; Kaṭha., 2.25.

II. The cit: the jīva.

1. *Nature, size, number and kind of the jīva.*

First and foremost, the jīva or the individual soul is essentially of the nature of intelligence.[1] It is different from the body, the sense-organs, the vital-breath, the mind and buddhi, which are all material and inanimate. It manifests all these, but does not need to be manifested by them,[2] being manifested by the all-manifesting Lord alone. In fact, the sense-organs (eleven in number),[3] the vital-breath (with its five modes),[4] and the mind (with its four modes),[5] are but implements of the soul;[6] they serve different purposes of the soul,[7] such as perception, enjoyment and action—and are under its complete control.[8] As such, the jīva is not identical with any one of them, but is a different and a superior intelligent principle.[9]

The individual soul is not only knowledge (jñāna), but a knower (jñātā) as well.[10] That is, it is not a mere phenomenon of knowledge, but an intelligent substance having knowledge for its essential attribute.[11] To say that the individual soul is knowledge and has knowledge for its attributes is not contradictory by any means—for in spite of the fact that the individual soul, the substratum, and knowledge, the attribute, are equally knowledge, there is a distinction between them,[12] as declared by Scripture itself,[13] so that the relation of substratum and attribute is possible between them.[14]

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[1] V.P.S., 2.3.26–30; D.Ś., śloka 4. Jñāna-svarūpa.

There is no discussion about the individual soul in Ś.N.K.S., except in śloka 21.

[2] Cf. V.R.M., p. 3; V.M., śloka 5, p. 2.

[3] V.P.S., 3.4.6. For the eleven sense-organs and their functions, vide V.R.M., pp. 26–29. Vide *infra*.

[4] For the four vṛttis of the mind and their functions saṃśaya, garva and ahaṃkāra, vied *infra*, V.R.M., p. 25.

[5] For the five vṛttis and their functions, see V.R.M., p. 28; see below.

[6] V.P.S., 2.4.10–12. Upakaraṇas.

[7] Vide V.R.M., for details, pp. 26-27. [8] V.P.S., 2.4.15-16.

[9] Vide V.M., śloka 1. A man thus is composed of the ātman or the jīva (soul), deha (body), indriyas (sense-organs), the prāṇa (the vital-breath) and the manas (the mind). The first alone is intelligent or non-material and eternal, the others not.

[10] V.P.S., 2.3.18; D.Ś., śloka 1.

[11] V.P.S., 2.3.25-26. [12] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.27.

[13] Vide e.g., Kauṣ., 3.6. Cf. V.R.M., pp. 4-5. Also Śri. B., 1.1.1. See below.

[14] V.P.S., 2.3.27.

Knowledge being the very essence of the individual soul, persists always under every state whatsoever.[1] It is present even in the states of deep sleep and the rest, though during these states it is not fully manifested as it is during the waking state.[2]

The soul being a knower is essentially a self-conscious Ego or "I" (aham).[3] The "aham-artha" does not consist of two factors, one intelligent and the other non-intelligent,[4] i.e. it is not something which is ultimately unreal, but is the very essence of the soul, and real throughout. As we shall see, the soul continues to be an "I", a distinct individual even when it is freed.[5]

The soul being a self-conscious Ego, is an active agent.[6] If the individual soul be not an agent, all the spiritual injunctions regarding different means leading to different ends (viz. heaven or salvation) would be simply meaningless[7]; for example, it has been enjoined that one who desires to go to heaven should perform sacrifices,[8] or that one who desires salvation should meditate on Brahman.[9] But if the individual soul be not an agent, it cannot possibly carry out these injunctions; and why should Scripture enjoin something which is quite impossible?[10]

Further, during the state of dream, the soul is said to move about within the body, controlling the organs as desired.[11] This also proves that the soul is an active agent. The sense is that the soul is the guide and the controller of the entire body, regulating the different organs to their different functions and this the soul could not be unless it were an active agent. The fact that the soul sometimes acts in a way which brings about unforeseen and undesired for consequences is no ground for arguing that it is not an agent, for the argument: "Why should one wilfully do what is harmful to one's self?"—has no force here seeing that the individual soul in bondage

[1] V.P.S., 2.3.30.

[2] *Op. cit.* See V.R.M., pp. 7-8.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.18.

[4] Ś.N.K.S., śloka 21: "Dvyaṃśatā'pi na ca bhāti cetane ahaṃpratītiviṣaye aham-arthake", etc. Cf. the Advaita Vedānta view of Śaṃkara.

[5] See below.

[6] V.P.S., 2.3.32–40.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.32.

[8] Vide e.g., Tait. Saṃ., 2.5.5.

[9] Bṛh., 1.4.7.

[10] Scripture enjoins "Samādhi" also, which is possible on the part of an active agent only. Vide V.P.S., 2.3.38.

[11] V.P.S., 2.3.33. Cf. Bṛh., 2.1.18.

is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, and as such cannot always foresee or prevent the adverse consequences of its own acts.[1]

The individual soul is an agent not only during the state of mundane existence, but also in its state of release.[2]

The individual soul is an enjoyer, too.[3] This follows from the above; for an agent, a doer of karmas, good or evil, is also an enjoyer—the reaper of the fruits thereof, good or evil.[4] Even when the soul is freed from all karmas, and consequently from the trammels of mundane existence, it remains an enjoyer still,[5] though this enjoyment is not like earthly enjoyment and does not lead to rebirths.

Thus, the individual soul is a self-conscious intelligent principle, a knower, a doer and an enjoyer.

But in spite of this, it is not independent or self-dependent, as might be supposed, but is essentially under the control of the Lord,[6] and its existence, knowledge, activity, enjoyment—everything in fact—depend on and are guided by the Lord Himself.[7] Even when it becomes free and comes to attain similarity with Him, it remains under His control.[8]

The individual soul is without beginning and without end—eternal.[9] This is declared by Scripture itself, which explicitly says that there is no such thing as birth or death of the soul, for the soul does not die when the body is dead and is not born when the body is born.[10] Hence such expressions like "One is born, one is dead" are only figurative, and imply only that the material body is born or dead, but not the soul itself.[11]

[1] V.P.S., 2.3.36. Cf. V.K., 2.3.36.

[2] The freed soul, e.g., creates its own body, roams about and sports with the Lord, etc. All these acts, however, incur no more rebirths or earthly existences for the soul. See below.

[3] V.P.S., 1.3.7; 3.2.17.

[4] Of course, an exception is to be made in the case of the Lord, who is a kartā—as creator of the universe—but not a bhoktā of it.

[5] E.g., the freed soul enjoys all sorts of celestial pleasures with the Lord. See below.

[6] D.Ś., śloka 1.

[7] See below. It is pointed out that the fact that the Lord makes some do good deeds, while others bad deeds, does not imply any partiality on His part, for He makes one do this or that act not arbitrarily, but out of regard for one's own karmas. Vide V.P.S., 2.3.33 and 41.

[8] See below.

[9] V.P.S., 2.3.16-17. Aja.

[10] Cf. e.g., Kaṭha., 2.18. Also Gītā, 2.20.

[11] V.P.S., 2.3.16.

The fact that the individual soul is equally eternal with the Lord does not in any way subtract from Brahman's supreme majesty, for the eternal soul from all eternity exists *in* Brahman and is under His control, so that no question of its being a "second" principle besides Brahman, the One, arises at all.

The souls (and the pradhāna) are, in fact, both unborn and have Brahman as their essence or cause without giving rise to any contradiction, for these two designations refer to two *different conditions* of the souls (and the pradhāna)—viz. their causal[1] and effected[2] states. In their causal state, they remain as powers of Brahman, and as Brahman is eternal, His powers must also be so; and it is in this sense that the individual souls, etc. are called unborn and eternal; in their effected states, on the other hand, they emanate from Brahman in some form or other and are said to have Brahman for their cause.[3]

The soul is a part of Brahman, and as such both different and non-different from Him.[4] All of them (as pure souls, untainted by Avidyā) are really equally pure, all being equally parts of one Lord, yet they are distinguished from one another as Brāhmaṇa, Śūdra, pure, impure, etc., owing to their connection with different kinds of bodies, just as the same fire is acceptable from the house of a learned Brāhmaṇa, but not from a crematory.[5]

Finally, the soul is really possessed of celestial qualities like 'freedom from sins' and the rest,[6] though through the wish of the Lord, all these qualities remain veiled by Avidyā, i.e. Matter and Karma, and consequently non-manifest during its state of bondage.[7]

Next, the size of the soul. It is atomic in dimension.[8] This is proved from the fact that the soul is said to pass out of the body through such small openings like the eyes, etc.,[9] and unless it be very minute in size, it cannot possibly do so.[10] This is declared by Scripture as well which designates the soul as the hundredth part of a hair divided a hundred-fold.[11]

But although the soul is atomic, it can yet experience the pleasures, pains, etc., i.e. sensations, of the entire body, just as a single

[1] Kāryyāvasthā.
[2] Kāraṇāvasthā.
[3] V.P.S., 1.4.10. Cf. also V.K., 1.4.10.
[4] See below.
[5] V.P.S., 2.3.47. Vide also V.P.S., 2.1.22.
[6] Cf. Prajāpati-vākya. Chānd., 8.5.1.
[7] V.P.S., 3.2.5-6
[8] V.P.S., 2.3.19–22.
[9] Cf. Bṛh., 4.4.2.
[10] V.P.S., 2.3.19, etc.
[11] Cf. Śvet., 5.9.

drop of sandal in one part of the body can soothe and delight the entire body.[1]

And the atomic soul is capable of experiencing the sensations of the entire body through its attribute of knowledge, which is all-pervasive.[2] Hence just as the rays of a small lamp in one corner of a room flood the entire room,[3] or just as the smell of a tiny flower spreads far and wide,[4] so the all-pervasive attribute of knowledge of the atomic soul, abiding in the heart only, pervades the entire body and makes it possible for the soul to experience all the various states of the body.

Sometimes, of course, the soul is designated as all-pervasive like Brahman, but such designations are simply due to its all-pervasive[5] quality of knowledge. That is to say, while Brahman is by nature great and all-pervasive and also possessed of equally great and all-pervasive attributes, the soul is by nature small and atomic, though possessed of the all-pervasive attribute of knowledge, by virtue of which alone it is sometimes called all-pervasive.[6] And there is nothing contradictory in such a designation of the atomic soul as all-pervasive on the ground of the all-pervasiveness of its attribute of knowledge, seeing that this attribute of knowledge is the very essence of the soul, persisting so long as the soul itself does.[7]

The doctrine of the all-pervasiveness of the soul, Nimbārka points out, is open to many serious objections. On this doctrine there must result either eternal perception or eternal non-perception on the part of the soul,[8] for, the all-pervasive soul must be eternally in connection with all objects; or, even if somehow this connection be denied, there is no extra third principle outside the all-pervasive soul to bring it about. Further, since on this view, all all-pervasive souls will be in connection with all karmas, there is sure to result a confusion among the karmas of the different souls. The recourse to adṛṣṭa is of no avail here, for there is no mark for distinguishing that one particular adṛṣṭa belongs to one particular soul. Further, it cannot be said that particular resolves, viz. "I shall do this and not that", etc., on the part of particular individuals lead them to be connected with particular karmas and adṛṣṭas (and hence with different lots), for such particular resolves themselves

[1] V.P.S., 2.3.23. [2] *Op. cit.* [3] *Op. cit.*
[4] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.26. [5] Cf. e.g., Muṇḍ., 1.1., etc. [6] V.P.S., 2.3.28.
[7] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.29. [8] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.31.

are not possible. Finally, it cannot be said that one particular soul is connected with one particular body only, hence there can be no confusion of karmas and enjoyments, for that particular soul being universal, must be in contact with all bodies.[1]

Thus, the doctrine of the universality of the soul is fallacious.[2] It is because the soul is by nature atomic, in spite of being a part of the all-pervasive Lord, and in spite of possessing the all-pervasive attribute of knowledge, that there is no confusion among the karmas, no universal perception or universal non-perception.[3] Thus, we conclude that the soul is essentially atomic in size and ever remains so, even in its state of release.[4]

Next, the number of souls. They are infinite in number.[5]

Finally, the kinds of souls. There are broadly two kinds of them, viz. souls in bondage and freed souls.[6] The souls are, therefore, in a condition to be associated or disassociated with the body,[7] i.e. the souls in bondage, surrounded by beginningless māyā, i.e. matter and karma, are associated with earthly bodies, while the freed souls, through the knowledge of the Lord, gained through His grace, get rid of all connection with matter and karma, and thereby of their earthly bodies.[8]

Thus, the conclusion reached is that:—

(1) In nature, the soul is knowledge, yet a knower, a doer, and an enjoyer, under the control of the Lord and a part of the Lord, yet eternal—all these being true of the soul in bondage as well as in release; further, it is possessed of the qualities of 'freedom from sins' and the rest, although not during its state of bondage.

(2) In size, it is atomic, in bondage as in release.

(3) In number, it is infinite;

(4) and it is of two broad kinds—bound and freed.

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[1] V.P.S., 2.3.48–52.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.49.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.48.

[4] See below.

[5] D.Ś., śloka 1. That is, in spite of the fact that more and more jīvas are being freed from the saṃsāra, the saṃsāra still continues and will evidently do so eternally. This proves that the number of jīvas is infinite. Vide V.R.M., p. 19. See below.

[6] D.Ś., śloka 2. Baddha and mukta. Cf. V.R.M., pp. 22-23, for details and subdivisions. See below.

[7] D.Ś., śloka 1.

[8] The freed soul may, of course, possess a celestial body at will. See below.

2. *Different states of the jīva : jāgrat, svapna, suṣupti, mūrchā and maraṇa.*

The soul has five different states: viz. the states of waking (jāgrat), dream (svapna), deep sleep (suṣupti), swoon (mūrchā) and death (maraṇa).[1]

The state of waking has been considered above. The waking soul is a self-conscious, knowing subject, an active agent and an enjoyer, experiencing the inevitable fruits of its own karmas and thereby undergoing a variety of conditions.

In the state of dream, too, the soul is a conscious subject,—a knower and an enjoyer.[2] It enjoys the various dream-objects created by the Lord in accordance with its own karmas. It is held by some that the soul itself, and not the Lord, is responsible for the dream-creation,[3] but that is not possible, because the omnipotent and omniscient Lord alone, capable of realising all His wishes at once (without the help of any external implements), can produce the wonderful dream-objects and never the soul.[4] The latter, of course, is possessed of the equal qualities of realising its wishes at once and the rest, but that fact is of no avail here, for all these qualities of the soul remain veiled, as we have seen, during its state of bondage.

Further, dreams are indicative of the future.[5] Now, if the soul were indeed the creator of dreams, it would surely have dreamt only lucky dreams indicative of future prosperity to itself. But that, evidently, is not the case.

Next, the state of deep sleep. During this state, too, the soul is a conscious subject—a knower and an enjoyer, though its knowledge, etc. are not fully manifest as they are during its state of waking, but remain unmanifest and latent, as we have seen before.[6]

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[1] These are, of course, the states of the baddha-jīva only, not of the mukta-jīva.

[2] V.P.S., 3.2.1–6. [3] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.21-22.

[4] The sense is that the soul can make different things out of the materials and implements supplied, but it cannot evidently make anything without the help of these. Now, the dream-objects, unlike the ordinary objects, are not made out of ordinary materials, etc.—there being no such materials, etc. present then. Hence they are outside the limited power of the soul, and can be produced by the Lord alone who can produce anything through a mere wish.

[5] V.P.S., 3.2.4.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.30. That the soul is a knower and an enjoyer in the state of deep sleep is clear from such memories: "So long I sleep well and do not know anything", etc.—which proves the presence of the conscious subject as

Suṣupti takes place in the Lord.[1] The soul, after entering the vein and the pericardium finally rests in the supreme Lord and rises from Him again.[2]

It is the very same soul who went to sleep that rises again and not a different one.[3] This is proved from three facts—viz. recollection of work, scripture and injunction.[4] Thus, a soul after rising from deep sleep, remembers the work begun before, but left half-done, and finishes it. This proves that the soul which began the work before falling asleep is identical with the one which finishes it after rising from sleep. Scripture also proves the very same fact,[5] and finally, injunctions regarding sacrifice, meditation, etc. are meaningless unless the same soul persists throughout.[6]

Next, the state of swoon.[7] This is a distinct state, not to be included under any one of the other states, though it resembles some of the other states in some points; for example, the state of swoon possesses half the characteristics of death, yet is not identical with it—it is, in fact, midway between sleep and death and not exactly identical with any one of them.[8]

Finally, the state of death. There are two kinds of death—that which leads to rebirth and that which does not. In the first case, the soul leaves the body, goes to heaven, or to hell, and returns to a new body; while in the second case, the soul goes to the world of Brahman, not to return any more. These are considered in detail in the next section.

3. *Different destinies of the jīva: svarga, naraka, and apavarga: heaven, hell, and salvation.*

There are broadly two classes of souls in bondage, viz. doers (or karmin) and knowers (or jñānin). The former are, again, divided

the substrate of the knowledge: "I do not know anything", and of the feeling of happiness: "I am sleeping happily". Cf. V.R.M., pp. 7-8; Ś.K., pp. 101-102; cf. also Śrī. B., 1.1.1.

[1] V.P.S., 3.2.7.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.8.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.9.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.9.

[5] E.g. Chānd., 6.9.2; 6.10.2.

[6] The souls go to sleep daily, but if the same souls do not arise, there is evidently no sense in telling them to do this or that—to follow this or that path with a view to attaining this or that goal.

[7] V.P.S., 3.2.10.

[8] Cf. V.K., 3.2.10.

into pious workers (puṇyavān or iṣṭakārins), and sinners (pāpins or aniṣṭakārins); and these three kinds of classes of souls, pious workers, sinners and knowers, undergo different destinies, attaining different ends, through different paths.[1]

What happens to a pious worker after death is as follows[2]: His soul, accompanied by the sense-organs[3] and surrounded by the subtle elements[4] such as water, fire, etc., which are the germ for a new body, leaves the body with a view to enjoying the fruits of its own karmas. Thus, first the senses of the pious worker are connected with the mind—first speech and then the rest—next, the mind is connected with the vital breath, the vital breath with the soul, and the soul with the subtle elements. Then the soul comes out of the body through the eyes or any other opening.

After having come out of the body, the soul follows the path of Fathers, which begins with 'smoke'. Thus, it first goes to the smoke, and then successively to night, the dark half of the moon, six months of the sun's southern progress, world of Fathers, and finally to the moon.[5] There it enjoys the fruits of its karmas, and after that, with a remainder of its karmas still clinging to it,[6] it returns once more to earth and assumes a new body in accordance with its karmas.[7] Thus, on its return journey, first it becomes the ether, the air, the smoke, mist, the cloud in succession, and then as rain, it pours down on earth; after that it grows as grains, herbs, and

[1] Here, Nimbārka, like Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja and the rest, follows the account given in Chānd., 5.3–5.10, and also in Bṛh., 6.2.

[2] V.P.S., 3.1.1.

[3] This is proved from the scriptural passage: "He going out, the prāṇa goes out; and the prāṇa going out, all the prāṇas go out". (Bṛh., 4.4.2.)

[4] For objections to this view and refutation thereof, vide V.P.S., 3.1.2.

[5] Cf. Chānd., 5.10.3-4; also Bṛh., 6.2.16.

[6] V.P.S., 3.1.8. There are two kinds of karmas—those which produce fruits to be experienced hereafter in heaven or hell as the case may be, and those which produce fruits to be experienced here, in this world. The soul, after leaving the present body, goes to heaven or hell, to experience the first kind of fruits, and then returns to earth to experience the rest here. Cf. V.K.S., 3.1.8.

[7] Cf. Chānd., 5.10.7.

trees, i.e. as food, then it is eaten by a man and becomes seed, and from this seed is born a new man.[1]

Of course, "becoming" the ether, etc. here does not mean actual becoming, but only becoming *similar* to the ether and the rest[2]; while "growing" as rice, etc. also does not mean actual growing, but only becoming connected with them.[3] And the descending soul remains in a state of similarity with the ether and the rest for but a short time, while it has to remain connected with rice, herbs and the rest for a comparatively longer time.[4]

This is the destiny of pious workers, who perform sacrifices, and practise charity and the rest.[5]

But sinners, who act contrary to sacrificial injunctions, i.e. do what is forbidden and omit to do what is enjoined, are not subject to the same destiny.[6] They follow neither the path of Fathers, nor the path of Gods, and go neither to the world of the moon, nor to

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[1] Nimbārka, as pointed out, follows the process of generation as depicted in the "Pañcāgni-vidyā" in the Chānd. and Bṛh. thus:—

Chānd., 5.3–5.9. (*Five offerings*)	*Chānd., 5.10.5-6.* (*The way of return*)
(*a*) The prāṇas offer śraddhā (i.e. water, vide V.P.S., 3.1.5), i.e. the soul accompanied by the subtle elements—water and the rest, to the *ether*, and it then becomes the moon.	(*a*) Ether.
(*b*) Then the prāṇas offer this body to the *clouds* and then it becomes *rain*.	(*b*) Air.
(*c*) Then the prāṇas offer the rain to the *earth*, and then it becomes *food*.	(*c*) Smoke.
(*d*) Then the prāṇas offer this food to *man* and then it becomes *seed*.	(*d*) Mist.
(*e*) Finally, the prāṇas offer the seed to *woman* and it becomes a *man*.	(*e*) Cloud.
	(*f*) Rain.
	(*g*) Food.
	(*h*) Seed.
	(*i*) Man.

Cf. Bṛh., 6.2 for a similar account. Cf. V.K., 3.1.1.

[2] V.P.S., 3.1.22.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.1.24.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.1.23.

[5] It is to be noted that the performance of sacrifices, etc. may lead to mokṣa, through generating vidyā, if undertaken *in a different spirit*. See below.

[6] V.P.S., 3.1.12–17.

the world of Brahman, but to a "third place".[1] Thence they return to earth and their method of returning is different from that of pious workers, i.e. they are not born in the usual way.[2]

Finally, the destiny of the knower is different from that of both pious workers and sinners. What happens to a knower after death is as follows[3]: After death, the senses of a knower are merged[4] in the mind—first speech and then the rest—the mind then is connected with the vital breath, the vital breath with the soul, the soul with the subtle elements. Up to this point, as evident, the cases of a pious worker and a knower are exactly alike. But while the soul of a pious worker leaves the body through the eyes, etc., the soul of a knower—thus accompanied by the senses, the mind, the vital breath and the subtle elements, i.e. by the subtle body[5]—leaves the gross body through the vein which passes out of the crown of the head,[6] in recognising which it has no difficulties, since the Lord Himself, being pleased with a knower, lights up the tip of that particular vein.[7] The soul then comes out of the body through that vein which is directly connected with the rays of the sun and ascends up, following

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[1] V.P.S., 3.1.17.

Nimbārka does not say what precisely this "third place" is, nor does Scripture (Chānd. or Bṛh.). According to the followers of Nimbārka, this "third place" is hell, the soul of a sinner is led to it by the servants of Yama through a path full of scorching sand, etc. and has to suffer innumerable agonies there. Vide Ś.K., pp. 132, 141-2. See below.

The pūrva-pakṣa, viz. that the soul of a sinner, too, goes to the moon, though not directly like the soul of a pious worker, but after a full retribution of its sins in hell, is rejected on the ground of Scripture. Vide V.P.S., 3.1.12–16.

[2] V.P.S., 3.1.18.

Nimbārka does not tell us in what forms exactly the souls which go to a "third place" are reborn on earth, nor any one of his followers. Evidently he means that they are born as the most primitive forms of life, in accordance with Bṛh., 6.2.16—which states that those who do not follow either the path of (puṇya) karmas, or the path of jñāna are born as worms, gnats, etc.

[3] V.P.S., 4.2.1–7.

[4] Cf. Chānd., 6.15.1-2.

Here "merging" means neither a mere functional absorption (as held by Śaṃkara), nor a complete material absorption, but conjunction (saṃyoga).

[5] 4.2.9, 11. Cf. also V.P.S., 3.3.30.

It is said here that the subtle body of the knower persists, in spite of the fact that all his karmas come to decay, for unless the soul be accompanied by a substratum, it cannot move through the path of Gods.

[6] Cf. Chānd., 8.6.5.

[7] V.P.S., 4.2.16.

the rays of the sun and goes through the path of Gods.[1] The successive stages of the path are as follows: light, day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, the year, the air (otherwise called the "world of Gods"), the moon, the lightning, the world of Varuṇa, the world of Indra, the world of Prajāpati.[2]

Then it reaches the world of Brahman to return no more.[3] This is the destiny of a knower.

It may be supposed that as the soul of a knower is said to follow up the rays of the sun, a knower who dies at night cannot follow the path of Gods and reach Brahman, nor can a knower who dies during the inauspicious period of the sun's southern progress attain Brahman. But this is really not the case, for the main obstruction to the attainment of Brahman, viz. karma, being removed, there is nothing that can hinder such an attainment on the part of a knower—the time-factor plays no part here.[4]

Thus, the conclusion arrived at is:—

(*a*) Knowers go to the world of Brahman through the path of Gods, not to return any more.[5]

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[1] V.P.S., 4.2.17. Devayāna-panthā.

[2] This order is arrived at by reconciling the different scriptural accounts, viz. Chānd., 4.15.5; 5.10.1-2; Bṛh., 6.2.15; Kauṣ., 1.3. Vide V.K., 4.3.35.

Thus, when the soul leaves the body through the vein, it goes to light first, following the rays of the sun. Then the presiding deity of light leads it to day; the presiding deity of day leads it to the bright fortnight and so on. Then, when the soul reaches lightning, the presiding deity of lightning, an immortal Person, leads it to the world of Varuṇa; this immortal Person of lightning, assisted by Varuṇa, leads it to the world of Indra; thence the same immortal Person of lightning, assisted by Indra, leads it to the world of Prajāpati. Then, assisted by Prajāpati, the same immortal Person of lightning leads the soul above the sphere of the material world to the river Virajā where the soul discards its subtle body, and enters the world of Brahman, not to return any more.

[3] V.P.S., 4.3.4-5.

The sense is that from light up to the moon, the ascending soul is led from one stage to another by presiding deities of each stage, but from lightning to the world of Brahman, it is the immortal Person of lightning who is the chief conductor, while Varuṇa and the rest are only assistants.

[4] V.P.S., 4.2.18–20. It is pointed out that the rays of the sun persist in the night-time.

A question is raised also whether the soul is led to the effected Brahman or to the Supreme Brahman. Vide V.P.S., 4.3.6–15.

[5] For the state of knowers in the world of Brahman, see the section on Salvation.

(*b*) Pious workers go to the world of the moon through the path of Fathers, to return again in accordance with their karmas.

(*c*) Sinners go to the "third place" (i.e. hell) to return to earth again, though not through the ordinary way.

These two famous paths, celebrated in the Upaniṣads—the path of Fathers (Pitṛ-yāna), followed by the pious workers, and the path of Gods (Deva-yāna), followed by the knowers—may appear meaningless from the philosophical point of view. But they are but figurative ways of indicating the essential difference between the destinies of mere workers (Karmin) and real knowers (Jñānin). The soul of a person,—who spends his time in doing this thing or that in the hope of acquiring merit (puṇya), and not in the acquisition of knowledge that alone can put an end to all karmas and the consequent rounds of birth and rebirth,—has to traverse a *dark* path that gets darker and darker as it proceeds, although it finally leads to the world of Fathers and hence to the moon. But the soul of a person, who has acquired knowledge, goes through a *bright* path that gets brighter and brighter as it proceeds, finally leading to the world of Gods, the moon, higher and higher worlds; and thence to the world of Brahman. The darkness of the one path and the brightness of the other symbolically stand for the ignorance of the karmins and the knowledge of the jñānins respectively.

The return journey of the soul of the karmins is also something very ingenious. The soul of the unborn child must somehow enter the bodies of its future parents and become one with their souls. Hence arises the novel conception of the incoming soul being gradually coming into contact with the food taken by the parents.

III. The acit: the jagat, etc.

The acit is of three different kinds: viz. prākṛta, or what is derived from prakṛti, the primal matter, aprākṛta, or what is not derived from prakṛti, and kāla, or time.[1]

Prakṛti, or the primal matter—the stuff of the entire universe is real and eternal like the individual souls, and like them, though eternal and unborn, has yet Brahman for its cause.[2] It consists of the three guṇas, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas.

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[1] D.Ś., śloka 3.

[2] See below.

Nimbārka distinguishes between the "aupaniṣada-pradhāna" and the "Sāṃkhya-pradhāna", i.e. matter dependent on and under the control of the Lord, and independent and self-sufficient matter. The former alone is admitted by Scripture and not the latter.[1]

The process of the origin of the world is as follows[2]: First, the ether originates from the Lord, from the ether air, from air fire, from fire water and from water earth, although in every case it is the Lord who is the real creator.[3]

And the process of dissolution is just the reverse of the process of creation[4]—viz., first the earth is merged in water, water in fire, fire in air, air in the ether and the ether in the Lord.

Like the elements, the vital breath, the mind and the sense-organs all originate from the Lord.[5]

Nimbārka, in fact, accepts the usual Sāṃkhya view of creation.[6] But to say that the elements and the vital breath, etc. arise from the Lord is not wrong on the acceptance of this view, for the Lord really is the material cause of the universe.[7] He accepts the doctrine of tri-partition (trivṛt-karaṇa), and points out that everything is a mixture of all the elements, but is called one particular thing because of the preponderance of one particular element in it.[8]

Nimbārka does not tell us what exactly the aprākṛta is, nor does he define kāla more precisely, beyond noticing, as pointed out above, that the aprākṛta and the kāla are species of the acit.[9]

IV. Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit: Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda.

Thus, we have seen that, according to Nimbārka, there are three equally real and co-eternal realities, viz. Brahman, the cit and the acit. Brahman is the Controller (Niyantṛ), the cit the enjoyer (bhoktṛ) and the acit the object enjoyed (bhogya).[10] The next question which confronts us is: What is the exact relation between these three?

In the first place, there is an essential difference of nature (svarūpa-bheda) between Brahman on the one hand, the soul and the world

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[1] V.P.S., 1.4.3. [2] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.1–13. [3] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.13.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.14. [5] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.15; 2.4.1–4.
[6] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.15. V.R.M., pp. 23–29. Vide pp. 144ff. of the thesis, Part 1.
[7] See p. 29 of thesis, Part 1. [8] V.P.S., 2.4.19–21; 3.1.2.
[9] Cf. V.R.M., pp. 37–40 for details. See below under Puruṣottamācārya: **Kāla and Aprākṛta.**
[10] V.P.S., 2.1.13; 3.3.36. D.Ś., śloka 7.

on the other. Thus, Brahman is the cause and the soul His effect, and there is evidently a difference between the cause and its effect, as between the sea and its waves, between the sun and its rays.[1] Also, the Brahman is the whole, and the soul His part, and the part and the whole cannot be identical.[2] Again, Brahman is the object to be worshipped,[3] the object to be known,[4] the object to be attained,[5] while the soul is the knower, the worshipper and the attainer, and there is always a difference between the worshipper and the worshipped, the knower and the known, the attainer and the attained.[6]

Further, Brahman, as the Inner Controller, dwells within the soul and controls it, and the dweller and the place dwelt in, the controller and the controlled, must be different.[7]

Other essential differences between Brahman and the soul are that while the former is never subject to avidyā,[8] absolutely and always free from sins, capable of realising all His wishes at once, etc.,[9] all-pervading,[10] and possessed of the power of creation, maintenance and destruction,[11] the latter is not.

Even the freed soul, which is similar to Brahman in other points, differs from Him in the last two points.[12]

Thus, the difference between Brahman and the soul is eternal and natural, and can by no means be denied at any time. Brahman is essentially other than and superior to the soul.[13]

In the yery same manner, there is an essential difference between Brahman and the universe. Brahman is the cause, the universe the effect, and as such the two cannot be absolutely identical.[14] Brahman is sentient, non-gross, non-material, ever-pure, the universe is quite the reverse.[15] The former is the ruler, the universe the ruled.[16] Hence the two must be different.

Thus, the difference between Brahman and the universe is equally eternal, natural and undeniable.

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[1] V.P.S., 2.1.13. Cf. V.K., 2.1.13, p. 159.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.42. Cf. also Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1, where the Lord is said to be "aṃśin".

[3] V.P.S., 1.2.12.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.12; 1.3.5.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.15, 18, 20.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.12; 1.3.5; 1.1.18.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.5-6; 1.3.44.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.8; 1.3.7; 3.2.13-14.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.8. Although the soul possesses all these qualities really, yet it does not do so during its state of bondage. See above.

[10] V.P.S., 2.3.28.

[11] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.17.

[12] See below.

[13] V.P.S., 1.4.18; 2.1.21.

[14] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.16.

[15] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.4–6; 3.3.33.

[16] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.19.

But if, on the one hand, difference is true, on the other, non-difference is no less true. The souls and the universe—as effects and parts of Brahman, are distinct from Him, the cause and the whole, but as effects and parts, again, they are also non-distinct from Him.[1] This is proved by the fact that the effect is completely dependent on the cause for its very being and existence—that the effect can exist solely when the cause itself exists and never otherwise.[2] The fact is that the effect and the cause, the part and the whole are neither absolutely distinct nor absolutely non-distinct, but the relation between them is a relation of both difference and non-difference (bhedābheda).[3] Thus, the relation between Brahman, on the one hand, and the souls and the universe on the other, is a relation of natural difference-non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābheda),[4] just like that between a snake and its coil,[5] or between the sun and its rays.[6] Just as the coil is nothing but the snake, yet different from it, just as the ray is nothing but the sun, yet different from it, just as the different kinds of stones, though nothing but earth, are yet different from it,[7] so the souls and the universe, though nothing but Brahman (brahmātmaka),[8] are different from Him because of their own peculiar natures and attributes.

The conclusion arrived at, therefore, is that difference (bheda) and non-difference (abheda) are both equally real, natural and eternal, without contradicting each other. Just as it is true that the souls and the universe exist in Brahman from all eternity (as a tree exists in its seed) and do not become separate from or independent of Him, even when actually produced (or rather manifested), as a pot becomes separate from the potter—being ever permeated, supported and controlled by Him, so it is equally true at the same time that they retain their peculiar natures—their own individuality and separateness from Brahman all along.

V. Criticism of other schools of thought.

Nimbārka criticises (though not in details) the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Bauddha, the Jaina, the Śaiva and the Śakti schools of thought.[9]

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[1] V.P.S., 1.4.20; 2.1.14-15.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.5.
[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4; 3.2.27-28.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.42; 3.2.27-28.
[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.27.
[6] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.28.
[7] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.22.
[8] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.31; 3.3.39. D.Ś., śloka 7.
[9] See translation of V.P.S., Vol. I, 2.2.

VI. Mokṣa.

Mokṣa or salvation means becoming like the Lord (tad-bhāvāpatti)[1]—i.e. attaining similarity (sāmya)[2] with Him in nature and qualities, and it is due to the grace of the Lord.[3]

Thus, the process of attaining release is as follows:—

A man, desirous of salvation,[4] approaches a guru, and follows one or other of the sādhanas as directed by him; this has the effect of pleasing the Lord Who Himself frees him from the shackle of avidyā,[5] i.e. from all karmas, good or bad, which are the causes of bondage. But the man has to wait till he has completely exhausted the effects of works which have already begun to bear fruit (prārabdha karmas) by retributive experience (or bhoga).[6] After that, when he is completely freed from them and has no more birth to undergo, his soul leaves the body through the vein which passes out of the crown of the head, follows the path of Gods and attains the world of Brahman.[7] Then, through the grace of the Lord, it comes to have a direct vision of the Lord,[8] and attains similarity with Him,[9] i.e. attains the nature and qualities of the Lord—and this is salvation.

But this, viz. the attainment of the nature of Brahman (Brahma-svarūpa-lābha), is only one element in mokṣa, and not the whole of it. The other and equally important element is the attainment of one's own real and essential nature (ātma-svarūpa-lābha) as well.[10] Mokṣa, thus, means no less a full development of one's own individuality. The difference of the soul from Brahman being natural and eternal persists always—in bondage as well as in release,[11] and hence salvation does not imply any identity between the two, or any annihilation of the individuality of the soul. In fact, the word

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[1] M.R.Ṣ., śloka 14. P.K., śloka 22.

[2] V.P.S., 3.2.26. [3] See below.

[4] According to the followers of Nimbārka, this very fact that one has an inclination towards salvation (and not towards earthly enjoyment) is due to the grace of the Lord. It is because one particular person has been looked at with favour by the Lord at the time of his birth that he has from the very beginning a natural inclination to higher ends, viz. the attainment of Brahman, and a natural aversion to worldly ends. Vide V.R.M., pp. 133–142; Ś.K., p. 142.

[5] D.Ś., śloka 6. [6] See below. [7] See below.

[8] V.P.S., 3.2.22 (though no mention of grace here). But vide V.P.S., 3.2.5—where it is said that the Lord is the cause of salvation—which means that the Lord Himself leads men to a direct realisation of Himself—which is salvation.

[9] V.P.S., 3.2.26. [10] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.1-2. [11] See above.

"sāmya" used often[1] to describe the state of salvation, means similarity and never identity. The freed soul, therefore, is similar to the Lord without losing its own nature and individuality.

This full development of the real nature or individuality of the soul implies the full manifestation of its real nature as consciousness through and through, untainted by matter, and of real qualities of freedom from sins, from decay and death, from hunger and thirst, etc.[2] This real nature of the self as pure consciousness remains hidden during its state of bondage through its connection with avidyā, i.e. matter, karma, like the rays of a lamp within a pot.[3] Similarly, its real qualities remain veiled through avidyā, which subjects the soul to all sorts of sins and impurities, to decay and death and endless rebirths. But in salvation, this veil of avidyā being completely lifted up, the true self shines forth in all its brilliance and purity.[4]

It is clear from the above that since salvation means the attainment of the nature of Brahman, as well as that of one's own nature,[5] the freed soul realises itself as non-distinct from Brahman—which non-distinction is not incompatible with a distinction between itself and Brahman.[6] That is to say, as everywhere else, the relation between the soul and Brahman is one of natural difference-non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābheda), in salvation, too, there being similarity as well as distinction between the two.

The similarity between the freed soul and Brahman consists in the following facts:—

First, as noted above, the freed soul attains the nature and qualities of the Lord, viz. pure and obstructed consciousness, omniscience, freedom from sins, faults and impurities, decay and death.[7] It, further, comes to have the power of realising all its wishes at once and can meet its forefathers, etc. through a mere wish.[8] It comes to possess also the power of moving about everywhere at will and can attain any world without resorting to any means.[9] It comes to possess, in fact, supreme majesty[10] and becomes a self-ruler, not under the control of any one else[11] (excepting the Lord, of course).[12]

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[1] Vide e.g., "paramaṃ sāmyam upaiti" (Muṇḍ., 3.1.3).
[2] See above.
[3] See above.
[4] Cf. Chānd., 8.3.4, "svena rūpeṇa abhiniṣpadyayte".
[5] Ś.N.K.S., śloka 13.
[6] V.P.S., 4.4.4. Vibhāgavirodhinā'vibhāgena.
[7] V.P.S., 4.4.7. See above.
[8] V.P.S., 4.4.8.
[9] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.40.
[10] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.9.
[11] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.9.
[12] See below.

It shares all the pleasures and enjoyments with Brahman in this world.[1] It may possess a body or not at its own liking[2] and in the absence of a body created by itself, it enjoys pleasures by means of the body created by the Lord.[3] The sense is that the freed soul, being capable of realising all its wishes, can, of course, create its own body, yet sometimes it voluntarily refrains from doing so and prefers to have a body created by the Lord. And even when it creates its own body, it does so in accordance with the Lord's wish. That is, the freed soul, though a self-creator, is ever under the control of the Lord and always follows His will.[4]

On the other hand, the difference between the freed soul and the Lord consists in the following:—

In the first place, the freed soul is atomic in size,[5] while the Lord is all-pervading.[6] As pointed out above,[7] atomicity is the very essence of the soul, hence since salvation does not imply the disappearance of the essence or nature of the soul, the essentially atomic soul cannot become all-pervasive in salvation. But this atomicity of the freed soul does not prevent it from enjoying the pleasures, etc. of several bodies simultaneously,[8] for just as a small lamp pervades several rooms with its rays extending far and wide, so can the freed soul experience the pleasures of several bodies through its all-pervading quality of knowledge.[9]

In the second place, the freed soul, in spite of possessing supreme powers and majesty, never possesses the power of creating, maintaining and destroying the universe, which power belongs exclusively to the Lord alone.[10]

Thus, we find, that the state of salvation is a definite acquisition—a positive state of supreme self-development, knowledge and enjoyment, and not a negative state of unconsciousness and blankness.[11] The freed soul abides with a constant intuition of the Lord and is, thereby, free from all fear and full of bliss.[12]

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[1] V.P.S., 4.4.21.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.14. This body, like that of the Lord, is non-material—aprākṛta. Vide V.R.M., pp. 31, 39.

[3] V.P.S., 4.4.13.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.14. See above.

[5] V.P.S., 4.4.15.

[6] See above.

[7] See above.

[8] Cf. Chānd., 7.26.2, where it is said that the soul becomes one-fold, three-fold, etc.

[9] V.P.S., 4.4.15.

[10] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.20.

[11] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.16.

[12] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.19.

Finally, according to Nimbārka, there is no such thing as jīvan-mukti, or salvation in this life, here and now. When a man is favoured by the Lord (because of following the paths of knowledge, devotion, etc.), he comes, of course, to be freed from any further karmas, i.e. his past karmas are destroyed and the future ones do not accumulate.[1] But those karmas which have already begun to bear fruits remain intact, and hence, as we have seen, he must continue his mundane existence until such karmas are completely destroyed by means of retributive experience,[2] although any further karmas which he may have to do during that period do not cling to him, as pointed out above, and he attains release, i.e. fellowship with the Lord and a full manifestation of his real self—after exhausting all these karmas that have already begun to fructify and discarding the physical body.

VII. Ethics: the sādhanas.

There are five sādhanas or means to emancipation, viz. karma or work, vidyā or knowledge, upāsanā or meditation, prapatti or self-surrender to the Lord, and gurūpasatti or devotion to a guru.[3]

(1) *Karma.*

Karmas by themselves do not lead to salvation directly, yet they are not useless, because, if performed conscientiously in a proper spirit, in accordance with one's caste and stage of life, they give rise to vidyā or knowledge which is a means to salvation.[4] Hence, karmas being indirect means to salvation are to be undertaken as essential duties and not to be avoided or neglected as worthless or as leading away from salvation.

(2) *Vidyā.*

(*a*) *Nature of vidyā and its relation to karma.*

Brahman, the highest goal of men, can be attained through vidyā.[5] Vidyā is not a subsidiary factor of karma (karmāṅga),

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[1] V.P.S., 4.1.13. [2] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.51; 4.1.15.

[3] For details, vide V.R.M. See below under Puruṣottamācārya: Sādhana.

[4] This is considered in details immediately in sub-section (2).

[5] V.P.S., 3.4.1.

"Vidyā" means not mere "knowledge", but "meditative knowledge", i.e. knowledge ending in meditation. According to Nimbārka, knowledge and meditation are interconnected: knowledge ends in meditation, meditation is based on knowledge. Vide *infra*.

but is an independent means.[1] Far from being a subordinate factor of karma, it, on the contrary, destroys karmas which lead to endless rebirths, thereby hindering the attainment of final emancipation.[2]

But in spite of this, it is not to be supposed that karmas are absolutely useless, or that they have no relation whatsoever with vidyā. The fact is that karmas help the rise of vidyā and are, as such, elements of vidyā (vidyāṅga).[3] The conscientious performance of the religious duties incumbent on particular stages of life (or the āśrama-dharmas), viz. the performance of sacrifices, the practice of charity and the rest,[4] have the effect of purifying the mind and thereby helping the rise of knowledge.[5] Of course, the function of karmas ends here, i.e. in giving rise to knowledge, for once knowledge is generated, it does not wait for anything else, but itself leads to salvation.[6] Thus, karmas produce knowledge, but are, in their turn, destroyed by that very knowledge which they have produced. It is to be noted, however, that karmas do not always give rise to knowledge and thereby lead to salvation—sometimes they give rise only to merit, and thereby lead to heaven only. The fact is that it is the spirit with which one undertakes a work that determines the end attained. A man, who, desirous of salvation, performs sacrifices, etc. in a disinterested spirit with no desire for heaven, attains knowledge as a result and through it, salvation. But a man not desirous of salvation, who performs his duties in a selfish spirit with a view to attaining heaven, and the rest, accumulates merit as a result, goes to heaven, and is born on earth once more.[7]

Not only the external performance of sacrifices and the rest, but the internal control of the senses and so on, too, are incumbent on one desirous of knowledge as a means to salvation. In order that there may be a rise of knowledge in him, he must be calm, self-controlled, indifferent to worldly objects, forbearing and collected.[8]

Further, one wishing to have knowledge of Brahman must have deep learning, childlike simplicity and unostentatiousness and profound

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[1] For the pūrva-pakṣa that vidyā is karmāṅga and the refutation thereof, vide V.P.S., 3.4.1–18.

[2] V.P.S., 3.4.16.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.26.

[4] Cf. Bṛh., 4.4.22.

[5] V.P.S., 3.4.36.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.27. Cf. V.K., 3.4.27 : the analogy of a horse, etc.

[7] V.P.S., 3.4.32–34.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.27. Cf. Bṛh., 4.4.23.

thoughtfulness and the gift of silence. All these help the rise of knowledge.[1]

There are, thus, three sets of auxiliaries to knowledge—first, the disinterested performance of one's own duties, such as sacrifices, the practice of charity and penance, etc.; secondly, the possession of self-control, forbearance, etc.; and thirdly, the possession of deep learning, simplicity and thoughtfulness.

Of course, each of these auxiliaries (sahakārin) is not universally needed for the rise of knowledge; for example, those who lead a life of chastity are not required to perform sacrifices, etc. for attaining knowledge, but can do so independently of any such things.[2]

The conclusion is, therefore:—

(*a*) vidyā is independent of and separate from karmas; hence some, viz. the ascetics, who are not required to work or perform sacrifices, etc., can attain knowledge without the help of karma; [3]

(*b*) while others, again, viz. religious students and householders—who are required to work in accordance with their respective castes and stages of life—can attain knowledge only through the proper performance of sacrifices and the rest.

Nimbārka, therefore, does not regard the giving up of the active life of a householder as the essential pre-requisite to attaining Brahman.

Finally, it is recommended that one desirous of knowledge should take particular care regarding the food he takes, for purity of food, guarantees purity of the heart which quickens the rise of knowledge,[4] and should always avoid wanton conduct.[5]

(*b*) *Adhikārins of vidyā.*

The proper relation between knowledge and work being thus determined, the next question is: Who are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman?

As seen above, all those who belong to one or other of the stages of life (or the āśramas)—both householders and ascetics—are entitled

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[1] V.P.S., 3.4.46; 3.4.48-49. Cf. Bṛh., 3.5.1. Pāṇḍitya; bālya; mauna.

[2] V.P.S., 3.4.25.

[3] They attain vidyā through the duties incumbent on their stage of life, viz. śravaṇa, manana, etc., vide V.K., 3.4.25.

[4] V.P.S., 3.4.29-30.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.31.

to knowledge through the proper performance of their duties prescribed for the particular stages of life.[1]

Further, even those who do not belong to any particular stage (or the anāśramin), are entitled to knowledge provided that the fact of their not belonging to any particular stage of life is due to mishap and not to actual lapse or wilful negligence on their own parts; for example, a widower, by misfortune, happens to be outside all stages of life—being neither a religious student nor a householder, nor an ascetic. Such men can gain knowledge through the muttering of prayers (or japa) and the rest (there being no particular āśrama-dharmas to be performed by them).[1] It is to be remembered, however, that one should belong to one or other of the stages of life if one can help, for it is far better to do so than to remain outside.[2] But persons who voluntarily leave or lapse from their stages of life through misbehaviour, are not entitled to knowledge like widowers and the rest. Such a lapse is a very serious offence. A Naiṣṭhika-brahmacārin or a perpetual religious student, observing the vow of chastity, who lapses from his vow is as good as a murderer of his own self and no penance can atone for his sin.[3]

Generally speaking, one who has studied the Veda with its six parts, and the science of religious duties, who is, as a result, averse to worldly ends and desirous of attaining the Lord, and who accordingly approaches a preceptor and devotes himself to him—is entitled to Brahma-vidyā.[4]

The conclusion, thus, is that the adhikārins of vidyā are:—

(*a*) generally speaking, those who have studied the Vedas and the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, have approached a preceptor and have been ceremonially purified;

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[1] V.P.S., 3.4.37. [2] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.39. [3] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.41.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1.

(*a*) The sense is: The study of the Vedas generates a doubt regarding the exact nature of karmas and their fruits, since some Vedic passages teach that the fruits of karmas are eternal, while others teach that they are not.

(*b*) This leads a man to study the Karma-mīmāṃsā.

(*c*) From his study of the Karma-mīmaṃsā, he comes to see the distinction between the non-eternal karmas and the eternal Brahman.

(*d*) This generates an aversion in him for the transitory fruits of karmas, i.e. for ordinary objects of enjoyment—here or hereafter in heaven—and a desire for knowledge of Brahman.

(*e*) This leads him to approach a guru, and learn the Brahma-vidyā from him. Vide V.P.S., 1.1.1.

(*b*) all who belong to one or other of the stages of life, through their performance of the duties incumbent thereon, and

(*c*) some who do not belong to any stage of life, like widowers, etc., through muttering of prayers and so on.[1]

(*c*) *The rise of vidyā.*

There is no fixed rule when knowledge is going to arise.[2] It may arise here or hereafter.[3] If there be no obstructions, knowledge arises here in this world, otherwise not.

(3) *Upāsanā or Dhyāna.*

(*a*) *The mode of meditation.*

A man who desires for salvation should meditate on his own self—on his real and essential self, freed from all sins and imperfections.[4] He should meditate on the Lord as his own self.[5] He should neither meditate on the self as it is during its stage of bondage,[6] nor on any symbol.[7] The best kind of meditation, thus, is the meditation on the self as one with the Lord (abhedopāsanā).

(*b*) *Posture of meditation.*

Meditation is to be carried on in a sitting posture, meditation being best possible in that posture alone,[8] i.e. on the part of one who is motionless.[9]

(*c*) *Place of meditation.*

There is no particular rule regarding the place of meditation the only requisite being that meditation should be practised in a place which helps the concentration of the mind.[10]

[1] The Śūdras, on the other hand, are not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The rule is that before any man is fit to receive instruction, he must be initiated with the holy thread as a preparatory purifying rite. But since a Śūdra belongs to the fourth caste, he is not entitled to any such purificatory ceremony and as such not entitled to knowledge. V.P.S., 1.3.34–39.

According to Puruṣottama and Sundarabhaṭṭa, the Śūdras are entitled to the study of the Purāṇas, etc., but are not to that of the Veda. Vide V.R.M., p. 74; S.S., p. 8.

[2] V.P.S., 3.4.50-51. [3] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.38, 50. [4] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.52.
[5] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.3. [6] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.51-52. [7] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.4–6.
[8] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.7-8. [9] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.9. [10] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.11.

(d) Time of meditation.

Meditation is to be carried on, not off and on, but continuously as long as life lasts.[1]

(e) Fruits of meditation.

Meditation, like knowledge, brings about the destruction of all karmas and leads to salvation.[2]

(f) Kinds of meditation.

The process of meditation depicted above[3] is a somewhat higher intellectual process, presupposing the consciousness of identity between the individual soul and the Highest Soul. Ordinarily, however, this process is not always resorted to.[4] The Lord is taken simply as a supreme object of worship and worshipped as such in Himself without the above preliminary identification of Him with the individual soul. Kṛṣṇa should be worshipped with steady and wholehearted devotion.[5] He alone is to be worshipped and no other deity.[6] Everything depends on His grace; hence those who are averse to the Lord, but given to the worship of other deities or to the pursuit of worldly ends—never attain success in anything[7]—not even in worldly pursuits. On the contrary, they have to face endless miseries at every step.[8] The fact is that it is only through a complete dedication of one's life to the service and worship of the Lord that human life can have any meaning or worth.[9]

Whenever the Supreme Brahman is meditated on, He must be meditated on as possessed of the essential qualities of truth, knowledge, bliss, being the soul of all, having true desires, non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest[10]—which pertain to His very nature—whether they be specially mentioned or not in connection with various Brahmopāsanās set forth in various schools of the Vedas, while the inessential qualities of having joy for His head and the rest, need not be included in all meditations.[11] That is to say, the various

[1] V.P.S., 4.1.12.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.5; 4.1.13-14. D.Ś., śloka 6.

[3] Under the sub-section (*a*).

[4] Cf. D.Ś., and Ś.N.K.S. See below. [5] Ś.N.K.S., ślokas 1, 3, 7.

[6] *Op. cit.*, śloka 5. It is said that those who worship other deities are no better than ignorant beasts (paśu). D.Ś., śloka 6.

[7] Ś.N.K.S., śloka 16. [8] *Op. cit.*, śloka 18. [9] *Op. cit.*, śloka 25.

[10] V.P.S., 3.3.11; 3.3.13; 3.3.34. [11] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.12.

Brahmopāsanās, depicted in various schools of Scripture, are really one and the same, since they are all connected with the same object, viz. Brahman. Hence the special features mentioned in connection with one are to be extended to all the rest.[1]

But in spite of this fact that the various kinds of meditations designated in various Upaniṣads, viz. the meditation as taught by Śāṇḍilya,[2] meditation on the Small,[3] meditation on the Imperishable,[4] and the rest, are really one as referring to the same object, viz. Brahman, yet since the method of procedure is different in each case and since different forms are resorted to by different adhikārins,[5] they are taken to be different in this sense.[6] But since they all lead to the same result, viz. the attainment of Brahman, it is not necessary to resort to each of them, any one being enough to yield the desired result, viz. the salvation.[7]

The symbolic meditations, on the other hand, do not lead to the attainment of Brahman, but to other limited results only,[8] and hence they are to be avoided, as noted above.[9]

Finally, the Lord is, sometimes, meditated on as the Inner Controller of the non-sentient.[10]

The conclusion is, thus, there are broadly three kinds of meditation[11]:—

(*a*) Meditation on the Lord as one's own self, i.e. meditation on the Lord as the Inner Controller of the sentient.

(*b*) Meditation on the Lord as the Inner Controller of the non-sentient.

(*c*) Meditation on the Lord Himself, as different from the sentient and the non-sentient.

The various kinds of meditation taught in the Upaniṣads, etc. may be included under one or other of these three headings.

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[1] V.P.S., 3.3.1–5.

[2] See translation, Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, V.K., 3.3.1.

[3] *Op. cit.*, Dahara-vidyā.

[4] *Op. cit.*, Akṣara-vidyā, V.K., 3.3.56.

[5] The sense is that the followers of different śākhās are evidently entitled only to those forms of meditations recorded in their own particular śākhās respectively, and hence arises the variety of meditations.

[6] V.P.S., 3.3.56.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.57-58.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 4.3.15. Cf., e.g., Chānd., 7.1.

[9] See 3(*a*) above.

[10] V.P.S., 1.1.32.

[11] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.32.

(*g*) *Adhikārins of meditation.*

It is clear that meditation, involving as it does scriptural knowledge, is confined to the upper three classes only.[1] That meditation involves knowledge is clear from the following facts:—

(*a*) The first kind of meditation, viz. meditation on the Lord as the self of the individual, is based on the real knowledge of the Lord, of the individual soul, and of the identity between them, which knowledge can be obtained from Scripture alone, barred to the fourth caste.[2]

(*b*) The second kind of meditation, viz. the meditation on the Lord as the Inner Controller of the non-sentient, too, is based on the real knowledge of the Lord and the non-sentient, obtainable from Scripture.

(*c*) The third kind of meditation, viz. the meditation on the Lord Himself, too, is based on the knowledge of the essential nature and qualities of the Lord, obtainable from Scripture.[3]

(*h*) *Upāsanā and Bhakti.*

According to Nimbārka, bhakti is not a synonym for upāsanā, but consists in a special love for the Lord.[4] Meditation and devotion mutually involve each other.[5]

Devotion is a supreme sādhana. It can be obtained through the grace of the Lord alone. The grace of the Lord generates a feeling of utter humility, which in its turn generates devotion.[6]

There are two kinds of devotion, parā and aparā or sādhana-rūpikā.[7]

[1] *Op. cit.*, 1.3.34–41. See above. [2] See above.

[3] According to V.R.M., pp. 74 and 127, Śūdras are entitled to meditation enjoined in the Purāṇas, but not to those enjoined in the Upaniṣads.

[4] D.Ś., śloka 9. Prema-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇā.

The followers of Nimbārka, however, use the word exactly in the sense of upāsanā. Vide V.P.M., p. 97; Ś.K., p. 127. See p. 169 of the thesis, Part 1.

[5] See below. [6] D.Ś., śloka 9.

[7] *Op. cit.*

According to the commentators, the distinction between these two kinds of devotion is that the parā bhakti is generated through the grace of the Lord, while the sādhana-rūpikā bhakti through the performance of the sādhanas, i.e. through meritorious works, company of the good and so on. Vide V.R.M., pp. 126–128.

(4) *Prapatti.*

(*a*) *Its general nature and factors.*

Prapatti means a complete resignation or self-surrender to the Lord, and is one of the most effective means to salvation.[1] It consists in depending on the Lord in every respect and at every step,[2] relinquishing one's narrow individuality as a separate self-dependent and self-sufficient being,[3] giving up every other sādhana,[4] and throwing one's self completely on the mercy of the Lord.[5] One who wants to attain salvation through this sādhana should, after having received instruction from a preceptor,[6] take refuge in the Lord with whole mind and body,[7] looking upon Him as Father, Mother, Friend and Master, as knowledge, wealth, and everything,[8] serving Him as a son serves his father, a friend his friend, a servant his master.[9]

Self-surrender consists of six factors (or aṅgas):—

(1) bearing good will to all, (2) absence of ill-will, (3) faith that the Lord will protect, (4) acceptance of Him as the Saviour, (5) feeling of helplessness, and (6) self-surrender to the Lord; the last is the main factor (aṅgin) while others are its elements (aṅgas).[10]

The Lord is ever-gracious to one who has thus taken refuge in Him.[11] He protects him at all times from all harms and difficulties,[12] regards him as His special ward, as His dear friend and never abandons him,[13] in spite of his faults and failings. And, finally, He, with His own hands, leads him to salvation, to an attainment of Himself.[14]

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[1] D.Ś., śloka 8: "There seems to be no way to salvation except the lotus-feet of the Lord". P.K., śloka 22, given in S.R., p. 110.

[2] *Op. cit.*, śloka 4, p. 108.

[3] *Op. cit.*, śloka 19, p. 110,

[4] *Op. cit.*, śloka 24, p. 110. Cf. Gītā 18.66.

[5] P.K., śloka 4, 19, pp. 108, 110, S.R.

[6] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 4-5, p. 108.

[7] *Op. cit.*, śloka 19, p. 110.

[8] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 6–8, p. 109.

[9] *Op. cit.*, śloka 9, p. 109.

[10] The six factors are: (1) ānukūlyasya saṃkalpaḥ, (2) prātikūlyasya varjanam, (3) rakṣiṣyati iti viśvāsaḥ, (4) goptṛtva-varaṇam, (5) kārpaṇyam, (6) ātma-nikṣepaḥ. P.K., ślokas 10-11, p. 109, S.R. The above translation is based on the explanation of these factors (not given by Nimbārka himself) in V.R.M., pp. 100 ff.

[11] P.K., śloka 12–14, p. 108, S.R.

[12] *Op. cit.*, śloka 14, p. 108, S.R.

[13] *Op. cit.*, śloka 15, p. 108, S.R.

[14] *Op. cit.*, śloka 22-23, p. 110, S.R.

(b) *Adhikārins of Prapatti.*

One who desires for release, who is utterly destitute of any interest other than the Lord, who has no end in view other than the attainment of the Lord, who has recourse to no other sādhana than the complete self-surrender to the Lord and who is conscious of his own utter helplessness and insignificance is entitled to self-surrender.[1]

It is clear that while the other sādhanas like knowledge and meditation are confined to the upper three classes only, self-surrender is open to all—to the high as well as to the low, to the learned as well as to the ignorant, to Brāhmaṇas as well as to Śūdras.

Self-surrender does not imply complete inactivity on the part of the person surrendering himself, because he has to exert himself for doing what is liked by the Lord, and avoid what is not. He must be benevolent, charitable and friendly towards all, striving to help everyone—high and low—and must be free, on the other hand, as we have seen, from violence, anger, malice and haughtiness, refraining from harming any one. Thus, love and devotion to the Lord mean love and service of mankind, and not indifference to fellow beings, just as self-surrender to the Lord means ceaseless effort to follow the right path, and thereby please the Lord, and not mere idleness and apathy.

(5) *Gurūpasatti or Guru-ājñānuvṛtti.*[2]

(a) *Its general nature.*

Self-surrender is of two kinds: self-surrender to the Lord and self-surrender to a guru or spiritual preceptor. The first has been considered in the previous section, the second is being considered here.

Gurūpasatti, as the name implies, means complete self-surrender to a preceptor and not directly to the Lord Himself. The guru is the intermediary between the individual soul and the Lord, and leads the former to the latter. "Jīva→Guru→Hari"—this is the eternal secret of all truth.[3]

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[1] P.K., ślokas 24-25, p. 110, S.R.

[2] Vide Sundarabhaṭṭa's account for details. See pp. 193 ff. of the thesis, Part 1.

[3] M.R.Ṣ., ślokas 1-2, p. 1.

It is this truth which is contained in both the mysterious Āgama-mantra: "Om", and in the Bīja-mantra: "Klīm." In the first case, the

The soul is, thus, to offer itself to the Lord through the preceptor in the same manner as clarified butter is first poured in a ladle and then offered to the fire;[1] and having thus offered itself, it becomes free from the fetters of the mundane existence and attains similarity with Brahman;[2] i.e. salvation.

The sense is that one who has surrendered his own self completely to his preceptor, needs do nothing else,—perform no other duties, follow no other sādhana—except to obey and serve him. The method of taking refuge to and serving him is very similar to that of serving the Lord.[3] The devotee should dedicate himself heart and soul to the preceptor,[4] as well as everything belonging to himself,[5] his wealth,[6] his youth,[7] his works.[8] He should regard him as his all in all, and serve him as such.[9] He should give up all sense of egoity and be completely merged in him.[10] He must obey implicitly whatever he commands him and learn the sacred Mantra in the way recommended by him.[11] The preceptor, on his part, is to impart the supreme knowledge to him, his disciple alone, and not to any one else.[12]

(6) *Adhikārins of Gurūpasatti.*

One who desires for release, who has no attachment either to his own self (ātman) or to anything belonging to himself (ātmīya), and one who is willing to dedicate himself, body and soul, to his preceptor, is entitled to this sādhana.[13]

It is clear that like self-surrender to the Lord, self-surrender to the preceptor is open to all, and not only to the upper three classes.

syllable "a" means Hari, the syllable "u" means the preceptor and the syllable "m" means the soul; while in the second case, the syllable "k" means Hari, the syllable "i" means the preceptor and the syllable "m" means the soul.

M.R.Ṣ., ślokas 3, 5, pp. 1, 2 and *op. cit.*, ślokas 4, 5, pp. 1, 2.

[1] M.R.Ṣ., śloka 8. Here the clarified butter stands for the soul, the sacrificial ladle for the preceptor and the fire for the Lord.

For a full working out of the simile, see Sundarabhaṭṭa's M.R. See below.

[2] M.R.Ṣ., śloka 9, p. 2.
[3] See above.
[4] M.R.Ṣ., śloka 15, p. 4.
[5] P.K., śloka 19, p. 110, S.R.
[6] M.R.Ṣ., ślokas 12, 15, pp. 3, 4.
[7] *Op. cit.*, śloka 12, p. 3.
[8] P.K., śloka 19, p. 110, S.R.
[9] M.R.Ṣ., ślokas 15-16, p. 4. P.K., ślokas 5-6, S.R.
[10] P.K., ślokas 18, 20-21, p. 110, S.R. Ātmasāt-kṛta.
[11] M.R.Ṣ., śloka 17, p. 4.
[12] *Op. cit.*, śloka 18, p. 4.
[13] *Op. cit.*, śloka 13, p. 3.

This means is specially fit for those who cannot perform even the six factors[1] of self-surrender to the Lord independently of their own unaided efforts, but are required to be led by someone else in all respects, their only duty being to obey their preceptor with blind faith as a child obeys his mother.[2] And, all that is necessary for their attainment of salvation is done by the preceptor himself, just as the mother of a suckling baby herself takes medicine for curing her child's disease.[3]

Sahakārins to the sādhanas.[4]

There are certain sahakārins or auxiliaries to the above sādhanas, which help the attainment of salvation. These are broadly five in number, viz. śraddhā or reverence, ārjava or straightforwardness, viśvāsa or faith, sat-saṅga or company of the good and virāga or detachment.[5]

Reverence means reverently accepting as true what is taught by Scripture and the spiritual teacher.[6] That is, one who desires to have salvation should have complete faith in Scripture and the spiritual teacher.

Straightforwardness means perfect harmony between mind, speech and body.[7] That is, one who desires salvation should be truthful and keep his word; he should speak what he thinks, and do what he says, but should not think one thing, say one, and do another.[8]

Faith means the belief that the Lord is sure to make the devotee His own.[9] That is, one who desires for salvation should have unshaken faith in the Lord and His protection, otherwise there is no sense in resorting to the sādhanas.

Company of the good means associating with and serving the good.[10] The good are those who are endowed with knowledge, detachment and devotion, who follow the path indicated by the Swan Incarnation (i.e. belong to the sect of Nimbārka) and are devoted

[1] See above. [2] Cf. V.R.M., pp. 97, 122. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

[4] This account is based on V.R.M., V.K.V. with its commentary A.S.T., as is the account (given in the next section) of the obstacles (virodhins) to salvation. Nimbārka himself does not consider these points. But it seems best to include them here for facility of reference.

According to V.R.M., p. 140, the various kinds of virodhins have been set forth in the Prapatti-cintā-maṇi by Nimbārka.

[5] V.K.V., 5th taraṅga, śloka 1, p. 53. [6] *Op. cit.*, śloka 2, *op. cit.*

[7] *Op. cit.* [8] A.S.T., p. 53.

[9] V.K.V., 5th taraṅga, ślokas 3-4, p. 54. [10] *Op. cit.*, ślokas 5–7, p. 55.

to their sect, who are untouched by any vices and passions like greed, malice, and the rest and free from all selfish desires for sons or wealth and so on, who are devoted to the Lord alone and ever accompanied by the Lord as a consequence,[1] i.e. who regard every end other than the Lord as utterly negligible and who implicitly follow the commands of the Lord.[2] The mere sight of such good men, it is said, is enough to bring about salvation, not to speak of associating with them.[3] And, they are to be served more devotedly, so to speak, than even the Lord.[4]

Finally, detachment means absence of both attachment (rāga) and detachment (dveṣa) to objects of senses.[5] That is, one who desires for emancipation should neither be attracted by beautiful objects, sweet sounds and the rest, nor feel disgusted with non-attractive objects and the rest, but should maintain an attitude of strict indifference.[6]

There are two kinds of detachment[7]: sahetuka and nirhetuka. Detachment that is sahetuka or due to some cause is that which arises through the loss of one's nearest and dearest ones, of health, wealth and power, etc. That is, when a man all of a sudden loses all that he had valued so long, he naturally becomes averse to the world through sheer disappointment. Such a detachment, however, being only temporary, and not based on a proper discrimination between what is eternal and what is not, does not conduce to salvation. The detachment that is nirhetuka or not due to any cause, on the other hand, is that distaste for the world which arises through the grace of the Lord Himself. A man who is looked at with favour by the Lord at the time of his birth, from the beginning, comes to be averse to the world, and inclined to the Lord, and such a detachment, being based on a proper discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, leads to salvation.

Virodhins to the sādhanas and mokṣa.[8]

There are many virodhins or obstacles which prevent one from attaining salvation. They are broadly of two classes: viśeṣa and sāmānya.[9]

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[1] V.K.V., 5th taraṅga, ślokas 5–8, pp. 55, 57.
[2] V.R.M., p. 129.
[3] A.S.T., p. 56.
[4] V.R.M., p. 131.
[5] V.K.V., 5th taraṅga, śloka 9, p. 58.
[6] A.S.T., p. 58.
[7] V.R.M., pp. 141-2.
[8] See above.
[9] V.R.M., p. 134. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, śloka 1, p. 64.

(1) The viśeṣa-virodhins or special obstacles are, again, of four kinds, viz. relating to the knowledge of the self, relating to the knowledge of Brahman, relating to the means and relating to the fruit, viz. salvation.[1]

(*a*) Thus, the first kind of special obstacles consist in having a wrong notion of one's own self—the individual soul, i.e. in taking the not-self, viz. the body, the sense-organs, the mind, etc. as the self; in thinking one's self self-sufficient and independent of the Lord and the preceptor, or dependent on someone else; in disbelieving that one's self belongs to the Lord, in disregarding the commands of the Lord as laid down in Scripture and Smṛti; in worshipping, praying and bowing down to other deities; and in feeling attracted toward unworthy texts, i.e. doctrines which are opposed to the Upaniṣad doctrine,[2] etc. Those who have, thus, a wrong notion about their own selves are no better than "stealers of the self" and the greatest sinners.[3]

(*b*) The second kind of special obstacles consists in having a wrong notion of the Supreme Self, i.e. in taking the Lord (Viṣṇu) to be identical with some other deity (Brahmā, Śiva, etc.), and on the other hand, these deities (Brahmā, Śiva, etc.) as the Supreme Deity; in taking the incarnation of the Lord as mere ordinary men, and the copper or earthen images (pratimā) of the Lord and the sacred stone (śālagrāma) as mere ordinary copper, earth, stone, etc., and not as God (which they really are); in taking the sacred formulae relating to the Lord as mere ordinary words and the legends, etc., relating to Him as mere ordinary stories; and finally, in supposing the Lord—who is an ābode of infinite auspicious qualities,—as devoid of qualities.[4]

(*c*) The third kind of special obstacles consists in having a wrong notion of the means to be followed, i.e. slighting the sādhanas like prapatti or self-surrender and the

[1] V.R.M., pp. 134 ff. V.K.M., 6th taraṅga, śloka 2, p. 64.
[2] A.S.T., p. 65.
[3] V.R.M., p. 134. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, ślokas 3–5, p. 64.
[4] V.R.M., pp. 134-135. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, ślokas 6–8, p. 65.

like, for fear of entrusting one's self—so full of faults—to the Lord; in having no faith in the object (viz. the Lord) to be reached by the sādhanas; in being attached to sādhanas other than the scriptural ones; in adopting other mantras; in hankering after worldly ends other than service, worship, etc. of the Lord; in regarding the religious duties, and the like—which are to be performed as the Lord's commands in an altogether disinterested spirit—as means to furthering one's selfish ends; in taking the preceptor, the incarnation of the Lord on earth, as a mere earthly being, etc.[1]

(*d*) The fourth kind of special obstacles consist in having a wrong notion about the fruit, viz. salvation, i.e. in taking religious merit, wealth and pleasure as supreme ends and desiring for them (instead of desiring for salvation); in thinking one's self an independent agent (while really one's acts are regulated by the Lord[2]); in acting wantonly and contrary to Scripture, etc.; in being reluctant to leave the earthly body; in shunning the company of the good and seeking that of the bad, and so on.[3]

(2) The general obstacles consist in not complying with the commands of the Lord, Scripture and Smṛti, i.e. in giving up the religious duties incumbent on one's own caste and stage of life, while doing what is incumbent on other stages of life; in making a sale of one's own power—which is of two kinds: internal and external, consisting in selling one's knowledge, and so on; in insulting Brāhmaṇas out of pride of knowledge, and defeating them in argumentations, etc.; in partaking of refreshment before worshipping the Lord; in abandoning one's relatives and friends, not because one has become an ascetic (in which case it would not have been blamable), but out of sheer spite; in thinking ill of others; in scheming how to injure them; in being under the sway of passions like greed, anger, pride and the rest, etc.[4] All these obstacles which hinder the attainment of salva-

[1] V.R.M., pp. 135-136. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, ślokas 9–12, pp. 66-67.
[2] Vide A.S.T., p. 68.
[3] V.R.M., pp. 136–138. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, ślokas 13-14, p. 67.
[4] V.R.M., pp. 138–140. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, ślokas 13–18, p. 70.

tion are to be avoided by one who desires salvation with the greatest care.[1]

Conclusion.

Thus, we see that Nimbārka speaks of five sādhanas or means. Devotion accompanies each of these. Thus, knowledge generates supreme devotion for the Lord by making us realise His unsurpassed greatness, and infinite kindness, on the one hand, and our own utter worthlessness and helplessness, on the other.

Meditation similarly implies devotion. Constant meditation on the Lord cannot but generate a supreme love for Him, and on the other hand, it is the supreme love for Him that leads us to meditate on Him unceasingly. In this way, meditation and devotion mutually involve each other.

Self-surrender also generates devotion.[2] The complete self-surrender to the Lord cannot but give rise to a feeling of devout love for Him, and on the other hand, it is supreme devotion for the Lord which leads us to surrender ourselves to Him. Self-surrender and devotion, too, thus mutually involve each other.

Finally, self-surrender to the preceptor, too, involves devotion first for the preceptor, god on earth, and then for the Lord Himself.

It is clear that these sādhanas are not mutually exclusive, but, on the contrary, mutually involve one another. Nimbārka does not tell us definitely which of these sādhanas he considers to be the best and the most effective, but points out simply in course of treating them separately that each of them leads to salvation in its own way.[3]

[1] V.R.M., p. 141. [2] D.Ś., śloka 9.

[3] Thus:—

(*a*) In V.P.S., 3.4.1, he says that the attainment of Brahman takes place through vidyā.

(*b*) In V.P.S., 3.2.24-25, he says that the direct vision of Brahman results from meditation. In D.Ś., śloka 6, he says that the meditation on the Lord removes the darkness of ignorance.

(*c*) In D.Ś., śloka 8, he says that there is no other way to salvation except resorting to the lotus-feet of the Lord.

(*d*) In M.R.Ṣ., śloka 9, he says that those who offer themselves to the Lord through a guru are delivered from the saṃsāra and attain similarity with Him, i.e. salvation.

(*e*) In V.P.S., 3.2.24, he quotes a text to the effect that one can have a direct vision of the Lord through devotion. In Ś.N.K.S., he points out that those who are not devoted to the Lord can attain no end (śloka 13), and that the Lord is obtained through devotion

Hence we may conclude that according to him, any one of these [1] may lead to salvation, either by itself or in conjunction with others, and that they are to be resorted to accordingly by men of different castes, stages of life, inclination, and capacity.[2] The first three classes may gain salvation through any one of these, while the fourth class through the last two only. And in the former case, those who are confident of reaching their goal, viz. salvation through their own unaided effort, follow the paths of work, knowledge and meditation, while those who are not—those of self-surrender to the Lord and to the preceptor.

It is to be noted that, according to Nimbārka, the approach to a guru is the essential pre-requisite of all sādhanas,[3] the difference being that in other cases it is but a preliminary factor, not the only factor involved, while as an independent sādhana it is so.

Nimbārka did not develop the theory of grace at length, though his writings furnish evidence of his belief in it. Thus, it is said that the Lord is the cause of bondage and release.[4] It is through the wish of the Lord that the real nature and qualities of the souls remain hidden through their state of bondage,[5] but again it is the Lord Himself who, out of pity for the souls in bondage, manifests Himself before them,[6] and leads them to salvation. Salvation, thus, is the result of the Lord's grace. The Lord also infuses the spirit of self-surrender (as noted above) in men, which in its turn generates supreme devotion,[7] and these two lead to the attainment of the Lord. Thus, without the grace of the Lord, even the sādhanas themselves cannot be availed of.

If one is to follow all the sādhanas, one may follow the order as given below:—

(1) Karma, which purifies the mind, and makes it fit for knowledge and meditation.

(2) Gurūpasatti, or approach to a sad-guru.

as "rasa", "ānanda" (śloka 17). Cf. also the views of his followers, e.g., V.R.M., p. 94, where five kinds of sādhanas are described.

[1] Excepting karma, of course, which as pointed out many times, is but an indirect means, not a direct one.

[2] See below for further confirmation of this view.

[3] V.P.S., 1.1.1. See above. Cf. also V.R.M., p. 120.

[4] V.P.S., 3.2.25. Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1.

[5] V.P.S., 3.2.25.

[6] Ś.N.K.S., śloka 11.

[7] D.Ś., 9.

(3) Jñāna, or attainment of knowledge from him, which by generating bhakti or love, leads to
(4) Dhyāna, or meditation on the object known, viz. Brahman, which leads to
(5) Prapatti, which generates
(6) Bhakti, which induces
(7) the grace of the Lord—and this brings about
(8) Sākṣātkāra and saṃyoga—and i.e. mokṣa.

Finally, it is pointed out that the sādhanas are to be repeated constantly, till the end is reached.[1]

VIII. Theology.

This has been noticed incidentally in connection with the treatment of other topics. The system of Nimbārka is philosophico-theological. While Nimbārka tries to give philosophical explanations of the ultimate categories and their inter-relations, and so on, he does not overlook the needs of the human heart, its inborn spirit of religion, its sense of living fellowship with another. In this sense, his system may be said to stand midway between the absolutist system of Śaṃkara—in which there is no place for religion, and the theistic system of Baladeva, which frankly gives up the attempt to reconcile philosophical antitheses, and concerns itself with religion mainly.[2]

The eternal relation between God and men, according to Nimbārka, is a relation between the worshipped and the worshipper. As we have seen, the soul is never equal to the Lord, but is always under His control—always His servant, following His will and command under every circumstance, even in release.

But this relation is not a relation of awe, but a most intimate relation of love and spontaneous devotion. The soul does not serve the Lord out of fear, but out of love. To the devotee, the Lord is not a cold and merciless Being, standing aloof in His supreme majesty far beyond his reach, but is an infinitely tender Being, essentially loving towards His devotees, meeting them half-way down, and lifting them above the endless miseries of the world. And it is because the Lord is such an abode of love and kindness that there is any sense in worshipping Him and praying to Him for mercy. Though the devotee is fully conscious of his own insignificance, yet he turns to God with the simple faith of a child in its mother, because he knows

[1] V.P.S., 4.1.1-2.

[2] See below for Baladeva's system.

that however puny he may be, God will never scorn or forsake him, but is ready at hand to guide and help him at every step.

It is this sweet, intimate relation between God and man that has made the doctrine of Nimbārka—which makes such a relation possible—so popular, along with other Vaiṣṇava schools, as against the Advaita theory of the identity of man and God, which may satisfy intellect, but not feeling—the head, but not the heart.

The personal God worshipped by Nimbārka, as we have seen, is Gopāla-Kṛṣṇa—the cowherd Kṛṣṇa, brought up in the house of Nandagopa, engaged in playful pastimes with the gopīs, and attended by Rādhā. This conception of Kṛṣṇa brings out clearly the intimate nature of the relation between man and God—a relation of love and bosom friendship, as pointed out above.

The object of worship according to Nimbārka, as we have seen, is Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa conjointly. This Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa cult, to which Nimbārka gives an exclusive prominence, is one of the most popular and influential cults that have ever flourished in India.

FOLLOWERS OF NIMBĀRKA

Introduction.

The following is the succession list of the high priests of the sect founded by Nimbārka (Ācārya-paramparā)[1]:—

1. The Swan Incarnation.
2. The four Kumāras, Sanaka and the rest.
3. Nārada.

(1–3: Mythological. Hence the sect of Nimbārka is often known as Haṃsa-sampradāya or Sankādi-sampradāya.)

4. Nimbārka.
5. Śrīnivāsācārya.
6. Viśvācārya.
7. Puruṣottamācārya.
8. Vilāsācārya.
9. Svarūpācārya.
10. Mādhavācārya.
11. Balabhadrācārya.
12. Padmācārya.
13. Śyāmācārya.
14. Gopālācārya.
15. Kṛpācārya.
16. Devācārya.
17. Sundarabhaṭṭa.
18. Padmanābhabhaṭṭa.
19. Upendrabhaṭṭa.
20. Rāmacandrabhaṭṭa.
21. Vāmanabhaṭṭa.

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[1] Vide "Śrī-guru-nati-vaijayantī" (as given in S.R., pp. 127–136).
"Ācārya-paramparā-stotra" (as given in L.S.V., pp. 9–11).
"Ācārya-praṇāmāvalī" (*op. cit.*, pp. 11–13).
These three lists tally exactly. We have a fourth list given in Ś.N., pp. 6-7, which differs from the above three in two points: (1) Bhāskara is placed immediately after Śrīnivāsa. This is, however, not correct, for as we shall see later on Bhāskara represents a different school of thought and cannot be taken to be a disciple of Nimbārka. (2) There is no mention of Keśavabhaṭṭa after Gopīnāthabhaṭṭa.

22. Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa.
23. Padmākarabhaṭṭa.
24. Śravaṇeśabhaṭṭa.
25. Bhūribhaṭṭa.
26. Mādhavabhaṭṭa.
27. Śyāmabhaṭṭa.
28. Gopālabhaṭṭa.
29. Balabhadrabhaṭṭa.
30. Gopīnāthabhaṭṭa.
31. Keśavabhaṭṭa.
32. Gāṅgalabhaṭṭa.
33. Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa.
34. Śrībhaṭṭa.
35. Harivyāsadeva.

36.	Svabhūdeva.	Paraśurāmadeva.
	Karmaharadeva.	
	Mathuradeva.	Harivaṃśadeva.
	Śyāmadeva.	Nārāyaṇadeva.
	Sevadeva.	Vṛndāvanadeva.
	Naraharideva.	
	Dayārāmadeva, etc.	Govindadeva, etc.

Thus after Harivyāsadeva, the school split into two rival groups of teachers.

I. Śrīnivāsācārya.

1. Life and date.

Śrīnivāsa was the immediate disciple of Nimbārka. Traditionally, he is supposed to be an incarnation of the Pāñcajanya, the Conch-shell of Viṣṇu (Śaṅkhāvatāra),[1] and to have flourished when Vajra-

[1] Pañcadhātī-stotram, p. 126, S.R.; V.R.M., p. 3. Puruṣottama here quotes a verse from the above, composed by Viśvācārya, his preceptor, beginning "Śaṅkhāvatāra Puruṣottamasya..." and ending: "Taṃ Śrīnivāsaṃ śaraṇaṃ prapadye", S.J., p. 89. Devācārya also quotes the above verse. S.S., p. 1; V.K.P., p. 20; Ā.C., p. 152; A.S.T., p. 1; G.M., p. 1.

nāma, the great-grandson of Kṛṣṇa was reigning in Mathurā.[1] The fact is, however, that he can by no means be assigned to a very ancient date. At least, it is absolutely certain from internal evidence that he could not have flourished before Śaṃkara.[2]

Śrīnivāsa is said to have born in the hermitage of Nimbārka in the month of Māgha [3] on the fifth day of the bright half of the moon. His father's name was Ācāryapāda and his mother's Lokamatī. Both of them were highly learned and pious. Tradition is that once Ācāryapāda, out on a mission to conquer the whole world with his scholarship, accepted the hospitality of Nimbārka, but refused to take any refreshment as it was nearly sunset. Thereupon, Nimbārka made the setting sun linger over a Nimba tree, in order to enable his guests to finish their meal. Ācāryapāda was so much struck with this extraordinary feat that he at once became a disciple of Nimbārka and continued to stay in the hermitage.[4]

It is said that Śrīnivāsa was taught all the Scriptures by Nimbārka himself. Nimbārka dedicated his "Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha to him,[5] and also composed the Daśa-ślokī [6] for him. Nimbārka, further, taught him eight verses in praise of Rādhā (Rādhāṣṭaka) and eight verses in praise of Kṛṣṇa (Kṛṣṇāṣṭaka) [7] by reciting which, in accordance with his command, Śrīnivāsa, so the tradition goes, was able to have a direct vision of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa.

Śrīnivāsa travelled a good deal accompanied by his disciple Viśvācārya, preaching the holy Vaiṣṇava religion and is said to have converted many people.[8]

2. Works.

He composed the "Vedānta-kaustubha" in compliance with the request of Nimbārka himself.[9] He is said to have composed also commentaries on the Bhagavad-gītā and the Upaniṣads.[10] But so far we know only of his Vedānta-kaustubha, which elucidates the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha of Nimbārka.[11]

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[1] Ā.C., p. 114.
[2] See above.
[3] Māgha corresponds to January-February.
[4] Ā.C., pp. 96ff.
[5] See above.
[6] See above.
[7] See above.
[8] Ā.C., p. 143.
[9] V.K., p. 2, Kāśī ed.; Ā.C., p. 143.
[10] Ā.C., p. 143.
[11] See Preface.

We know of another work of Śrīnivāsa—which is, however, of no philosophical importance—viz. "Laghu-stavarāja-stotram",[1] a collection of forty-one verses in praise of Nimbārka.

A third work by Śrīnivāsa is "Vedānta-kārikāvalī", a metrical exposition made from the teaching of Nimbārka in seven taraṅgas or sections.[2] From this work, it is evident that Śrīnivāsa could not have flourished prior to Śaṃkara, for here he criticises the Pratibimba-vāda.[3]

We also find here a strong support of our view that according to Nimbārka, any one of the sādhanas, viz. knowledge, meditation, and the rest—as suited to the capacity of one desirous of salvation, leads to his goal,[4] for the author explicitly says that the means to salvation are of various kinds in accordance with the capacities of different adhikārins,[5] and then goes on to elucidate them one by one.[6]

Another work by Śrīnivāsa, preserved in manuscript form, is "Stava-pañcaka-māhātmya".[7]

He is said to have composed a commentary on the Veda, too,[8] and a treatise called Nigada.[9]

3. Doctrine.

His doctrine is exactly similar to that of Nimbārka, only it is far more elaborate. Like Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsa is content with elucidating simply his own view, without attempting to criticise the doctrine of Śaṃkara or any other rival Vedānta school, except a single hostile reference to the Pratibimba-vāda, as noted above. Like Nimbārka, he

[1] Published by C.S.S., with commentary. See Bibliography. Also given in S.R., pp. 120–124.

[2] Vide B.M.C., Supplementary Catalogue of Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit Books, 1928, p. 1003.

[3] See above.

[4] See above.

[5] V.K.V., 4th taraṅga, śloka 1, p. 40:—

"Upāyāḥ śreyasāḥ proktā adhikāry-anusārataḥ.
Vividhāḥ śrutibhis te vai nirṇīyante svarūpataḥ".

And the commentary says: "Adhikāri-vaividhyāt sādhana-vaividhyam" (p. 40).

[6] V.K.V., 4th taraṅga, ślokas 2 ff, pp. 40 ff.

[7] Rep. Bh., 1894, p. 76.

[8] Cat. Cat., p. 671, Part 1.

[9] *Op. cit.*

accepts the trinity of reals, viz. Brahman, the cit and the acit,[1] and a relation of natural difference-non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābheda) between them—a point upon which he insists again and again.[2] He takes Brahman to be identical with Kṛṣṇa,[3] but makes no mention of Rādhā in his commentary. His elucidation of the doctrine of Nimbārka is admirable and lucid, also very useful in view of the fact that Nimbārka was a very succint writer.

II. Viśvācārya.

Viśvācārya was the immediate disciple of Śrīnivāsa [4] and second after Nimbārka. We know nothing about his life and works. We know of only one work by him, viz. "Pañcadhātī-stotram", a collection of seven hymns in praise of his guru Śrīnivāsa,[5] but this work contains nothing about his philosophical view.

It is interesting to note that in his copious commentary Vedānta-ratna-mañjuṣā, Puruṣottama the immediate disciple of Viśvācārya, makes obeisance to Śrīnivāsa in the beginning and in the end,[6] and not to his immediate guru Viśvācārya, in accordance with the usual custom. And he sometimes refers us back to Śrīnivāsa,[7] but makes no reference whatsoever to Viśvācārya, except only once, and there also he only quotes a verse from Viśvācārya in praise of Śrīnivāsa.[8] This seems to suggest that Viśvācārya was not, after all, a very prominent man and did not have any work of great philosophical worth to his credit, otherwise his immediate disciple at least would have referred to his works.

[1] V.K., 1.1.1, p. 7, K.S.S.

For a summary statement of his view, see V.K., 1.1.1. See translation, vol. I.

[2] V.K., 1.1.1, p. 11 (page references are to K.S.S. throughout); 1.1.7, p. 25; 1.2.21, p. 66; 1.4.9, p. 124; 1.4.20, p. 139; 1.4.21, p. 140; 2.1.13, p. 159; 2.1.21, p. 165; 2.1.22, p. 166; 2.2.33, p. 205; 2.3.42, p. 236; 3.2.28, p. 291; 4.1.3, p. 386; 4.4.4, p. 425; etc.

[3] V.K., 1.1.1, p. 5, etc.

[4] Vide Ā.C., p. 143.

[5] S.R., pp. 125-126. Also published separately. See Bibliography.

[6] V.R.M., pp. 1, 148.

[7] Vide e.g., V.R.M., pp. 127, 134, etc.

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

III. Puruṣottamācārya.

1. Life and date.

Puruṣottama was the immediate disciple of Viśvācārya, and the third after Nimbārka.

Nothing definite is known of his life and date. He is said to have been born in Teliṅga,[1] although his exact birth-place is not known, and to have flourished in the fifth century A.D. as a contemporary of Gauḍapāda.[2] But this latter view is not tenable, for it is absolutely clear from internal evidence that he flourished *at least* after Śaṃkara, as he criticises many full-fledged Advaita doctrines, not found in Gauḍapāda's system.

2. Works.

He wrote a copious commentary called "Vedānta-ratna-mañjuṣā" on Nimbārka's "Daśa-ślokī". Another work, attributed to him,[3] viz. the "Ācārya-caritam" is, however, not really his work, but of a different Puruṣottama, as already shown.[4] He is claimed to have composed some other treatises, too, such as "Siddhānta-kṣīrārṇava" which, unfortunately are all lost.[5]

3. Doctrine.

Puruṣottama gives a very lucid exposition of the general doctrine of Nimbārka, adding many new details. His main originality consists in the fact that he was the first (so far known) of the sect of Nimbārka to undertake a thorough ciriticism of the Advaita tenets.

He divides his work [6] into four sections, the first concerned with the padārthas or the categories, viz. Brahman, the cit and the acit; the second with the reconciliation of apparently contradictory texts, viz. the bheda-vākyas or texts designating difference, and the abheda-vākyas or texts designating non-difference, etc.; the third with the sādhanas or the means to emancipation, viz. work, knowledge, devotion, etc.; and the fourth with the fruit, viz. salvation.

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[1] Teliṅga is supposed to be the birth-place of Nimbārka also. See above.

[2] Preface to V.R.M., p. 1.

[3] B.M.C., Supplementary Catalogue of Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit Books, 1926, p. 819.

[4] See above.

[5] Preface to V.R.M., p. 1.

[6] V.R.M.

Section 1. The Trinity of Reals.

(A) Brahman.

(i) *His nature and qualities.*

The Highest Reality is Brahman or Kṛṣṇa.[1] He is called "Brahman" because He is great in nature and qualities,[2] and He is called "Bhagavān" because He is possessed of supreme excellence.[3]

On the one hand, the Lord is absolutely free from all defects and faults due to beginningless matter, viz. from the five kinds of kleśas, such as avidyā or tamas (i.e. nescience which veils the real nature of things), asmitā or moha (i.e. confounding the body to be the soul), rāga or mahā-moha (i.e. hankering after enjoyment), dveṣa or tamisrā (i.e. malice), and abhiniveśa or andha-tamisrā (i.e. death); from the six kinds of vikāras, such as janma (birth), astitva (i.e. existence), vṛddhi (growth), pariṇāma (transformation), kṣaya (decay) and maraṇa (death); from the three guṇas of prakṛti, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas; from all the numerous effects of connection with prakṛti. In this sense alone, Brahman is attributed.[4]

On the other hand, He is an abode of infinite auspicious qualities and powers, like jñāna, śakti, bala, aiśvaryya, tejas, vīryya, sauśīlya, vātsalya, ārjava, etc. etc. Thus jñāna means the power of directly intuiting all space, time and objects; śakti means the power of making the impossible possible; bala means the power of supporting the Universe, etc.; aiśvaryya means the power of controlling; tejas means tirelessness or absence of exertion in spite of continued and immense labour; and vīryya means the power of defeating all enemies without being ever defeated by them. These six qualities of the Lord lead Him to undertake the creation, maintenance and destruction, etc. of the Universe. Further, sauśīlya means His willingness to associate even with the lowliest and the most unworthy, in spite of His own greatness; vātsalya means overlooking the faults of His servants; mārdava means not being able to tolerate the miseries of those who have resorted to Him; ārjava means the coincidence of mind and speech; sauhārddya means the attempt to protect others; sarva-śaraṇyatva or saumya means being the one common resort of all; kāruṇya means removing the faults of others; sthiratva means remaining steady in wars; dhairyya means keeping promises; dayā means feeling grieved

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[1] V.R.M., p. 40.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 50.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 112.
[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

at the grief of others and the wish to allay it, and mādhuryya means infinite nectar-like sweetness, etc. All these qualities of the Lord lead him to undertake the protection of His devotees.[1]

Thus, negatively, the Lord is devoid of all the qualities of the soul in bondage, i.e. of the qualities due to avidyā or matter and karma; and positively, He is possessed of infinite number of greatest and worthiest qualities—which are majestic on the one hand, sweet on the other. Hence just as He is called "Brahman" and "Bhagavat" because of His supreme might and majesty, so He is called "Hari" also, because of His infinite beauty and sweetness which captivates (harati) the heart of His devotees.[2]

The Lord is called "Hari" also because He removes (harati) all sins of His devotees.[3] He is called Kṛṣṇa for the very same reason.[4] He is, thus, essentially devoted and solicitous to His devotees, and goes out of His way to help and please them. He removes not only the sins, but the merits (puṇya) as well of His devotees, i.e. frees the soul from the bondage of beginningless karmas. In this sense, the Lord is the giver of salvation.[5]

The Lord is deva, because He plays with the Universe, i.e. the creation, etc. of the Universe is but a mere play to Him; conquers the demons, i.e. is the destroyer of the evil and the protector of the good; controls all beings from within; shines eternally; is worshipped by Brahmā and other gods; moves everywhere and finally, because He enjoys.[6]

The Lord is para, superior to both the perishable and the imperishable.[7] He is the cause of causes, the Lord of lords, the God of gods, the original source of all deities like Brahmā, Śiva and others, and eternally worshipped by them.[8] These latter deities, though possessed of great power and lordship, are not yet para or the most supreme. Some Purāṇas, it is true, speak of Brahmā, Śiva, etc. as the most supreme deities, but it must be remembered that all Purāṇas are not equally authoritative. There are, in fact, four classes of Purāṇas, viz. sāttvika, rājasika, tāmasika and saṃkīrṇa. The first are concerned with sāttvika objects, the second are concerned with rājasa

[1] V.R.M., pp. 44–47. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 49. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 49.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 52. "Pāpam karṣayati nirmūlayati iti Kṛṣṇa."
[5] V.R.M., p. 52.
[6] Vide B.M., p. 238, Part 2. "Divu krīdā-vijigīsā-vyavahāra-dyuti-stuti-moda-mada-svapna-kānti-gatiṣu."
[7] Vide Gītā 4.8. [8] V.R.M., pp. 103–113.

objects and had their origin in a rājasa time, and so on. The sāttvika Purāṇas are concerned with Hari, the rājasa ones with Brahmā, the tāmasa ones with Śaṁkara and the saṃkīrṇa ones with Sarasvatī. The sāttvika Purāṇas like the Viṣṇu Purāṇa and the rest are the most authoritative, for they alone lead to salvation, while the other kinds of Purāṇas lead to the mundane existence.[1] Hence the Lord Viṣṇu alone, and none else, is the most Supreme Deity,—"ekamevādvitīyam", one without a second.

The Lord is the cause of the Universe, both material and efficient cause.[2]

Several objections may be raised to this view.

Firstly, it may be argued that He cannot be the material as well as the efficient cause, because we do not find ordinarily that the material and the efficient causes are identical, e.g. the clay, the material cause of a pot, is different from the potter, its efficient cause. To this we reply: we do find instances of the material and the efficient causes being identical; e.g. the soul is both the material and the efficient cause of its own knowledge. Hence we may argue thus: Brahman is the one *identical* material and efficient cause of the world,

> because He possesses the power of being so
> just as the soul is of its own knowledge.[3]

Secondly, it may be objected that if Brahman be the one material and efficient cause of the world, then the nature of the effect, the world, becomes a riddle indeed. Thus, the world cannot be of one form of collection,[4] nor something produced or begun, for Scripture declares the Universe to be beginningless; nor, finally, can it be a transformation of Brahman, for no transformation is possible on the part of an all-pervading Being like Brahman who is devoid of parts. Hence we may argue thus: Brahman cannot be subject to transformation, because He is all-pervading (vibhu) and devoid of parts (niravayava), like the ether. Hence the world is not a real transformation (pariṇāma) of Brahman, but an illusory one (vivarta).[5]

To this objection, the reply is as follows[6]: Firstly, there is no rule whatsoever that an all-pervading (vibhu) object can have

[1] V.R.M., pp. 55-56.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 63.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 63.
[4] Saṃhati-rūpa.
[5] V.R.M., p. 63. For a full criticism of the vivarta doctrine, see below.
[6] V.R.M., pp. 63-64.

no transformation; e.g. the ether, which is all-pervading, is declared by Scripture itself to be transformed into air.[1]

Secondly, even what is devoid of parts (niravayava) can have transformations, provided it is possessed of such a *power* of having transformations; e.g. in the case of the transformation of milk into curd, it is not the milk really, but the milk-atoms, which are devoid of parts (niravayava), that undergo transformation. The fact is that it is the power (śakti) inherent in a thing which determines whether a particular thing can be transformed into something else or not, and not the fact of its having parts or not. Hence, water though possessed of parts (sāvayava) is never transformed into curd, because it lacks the power of being so transformed, while the milk-atoms, though devoid of parts (niravayava), are transformed into curd, because they possess the power of being so transformed.

Thus, the two reasons cited in the above argument, viz. all-pervasiveness and not having parts, are both logically fallacious; and finally, the parallel instance cited, too, viz. the ether, is not correct, because as shown above, the ether can have transformation. Hence, the above argument that Brahman can have no transformation, because He is all-pervading and without parts, is not a valid one. On the contrary, we may argue as follows:—

> Brahman is capable of having transformation, because He is all-pervading, like the ether.

Thirdly, it may be objected that either the entire Brahman must be transformed into the world, or Brahman must have parts, both of which are impossible. Puruṣottama refutes this objection just like Nimbārka.[2]

Thus, we conclude that the world is a transformation of Brahman who is its one identical material and efficient cause.

The Lord is the material cause of the Universe in the sense that creation means the manifestation of His subtle powers of the sentient and the non-sentient into gross effects. That is, during dissolution the entire Universe of the sentient and the non-sentient merges in the Lord and exists in Him in a subtle state as His natural powers. Then, in the beginning of a new creation, the Lord manifests these powers of the sentient and the non-sentient, developing them into

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[1] Tait., 2.1.1.

[2] V.R.M., pp. 64-65. See above under Nimbārka.

grosser effects and producing, thereby, the Universe of names and forms.[1]

And the Lord is the efficient cause of the Universe in the sense that He unites individual souls with their respective karmas, their results, and the instruments for experiencing them, i.e., it regulates the destiny of individuals in accordance with strict justice. During dissolution, the beginningless impressions of past karmas [2] get dimmed and confused, and at the time of a new creation, the Lord revives these impressions in particular individuals, thereby making each individual undergo the fruits of his past acts.[3]

(ii) *His forms (vyūha) and manifestations (avatāra).*

Like Nimbārka, Puruṣottama holds that the Lord is possessed of an external and celestial body, the abode of all beauty, grace and auspiciousness.[4] This body is made of the luminous stuff, aprakṛti.[5]

The Lord has different forms and manifests Himself in different incarnations.[6]

A vyūha is a form which the Lord assumes for the sake of creation, preserving and destroying the Universe, as well as for the sake of being worshipped. There are four kinds of vyūhas, viz. Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha.[7] Further, there are twelve vyūhas, like Keśava and the rest who, as the mantra devatās of the ceremony of putting the white perpendicular line on the forehead (ūrdhvapūṇḍra), are to be worshipped as such where enjoined.[8]

An incarnation is the form which the Lord assumes for the sake of establishing religion and destroying sin,[9] as well as for fulfilling

[1] V.R.M., p. 65.

[2] Anādi-karma-saṃskāras.

[3] V.R.M., p. 63. Cf. V.K., 1.1.2, p. 13, K.S.S. for an exactly similar definition of the upadāntva and nimittatva of the Lord. See Trans., vol. I.

[4] V.R.M., pp. 39-40.

[5] See below.

[6] Hence the Lord is called Anantamūrti, V.R.M., p. 47.

[7] According to Śaṃkara, Vāsudeva denotes the highest self, Saṃkarṣaṇa the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind, and Aniruddha the principle of egoity. Of these four, Vāsudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, the three others are the effects. Vide Ś.B., 2.2.42.

According to Rāmānuja, Vāsudeva is the highest self, while Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest are beings ruling over the individual souls, the mind and the principle of egoity respectively. Vide Śrī. B., 2.2.42.

[8] V.R.M., pp. 47-48. See also under "Ritualistic Doctrine of the School of Nimbārka" below.

[9] Vide Gītā, 4.8.

the desire of His devotees. There are three kinds of incarnation: viz. guṇāvatāra, puruṣāvatāra and līlāvatāra. Guṇāvatāras are the creator, etc. of the Universe through regulating the guṇas (viz. sattva, rajas and tamas) of prakṛti. Thus the Lord creates the world through Brahmā, Kāla, Dakṣa and others; maintains it through Kāla, Manu and others; and destroys it through Rudra, Kāla and others.[1]


The puruṣāvatāras are of three kinds, in accordance with the difference of limiting adjuncts, viz. first, the Person, lying on the Kāraṇārṇava (Kārṇārṇavaśāyin), the controller of prakṛti from which arises the mahat; second, the Person lying on the Garbhoda (Garbhodaśāyin), the inner controller of the aggregate (samaṣṭi); third, the Person lying on the Kṣīroda (Kṣīrodaśāyin), the inner controller of individuals (vyaṣṭi).

The līlāvatāras are of two kinds, viz. āveśāvatāras and svarūpāvatāras. The former, again, are of two kinds—svāṃśa-āveśa and śakty-aṃśa-āveśa. A svāṃśāveśāvatāra is a part of the Lord Himself directly embodied in a material form with, however, no distinguishing individuality between him and the Lord, as Naranārāyaṇa; while a śakty-aṃśāveśāvatāra is but a part of the power of the Lord, embodied as an individual soul and distinguished from Him as such, and carrying out His mission. There are, again, two kinds of śakty-aṃśāveśāvatāras in accordance with greater or lesser degree of the power manifested, viz. vibhava and prabhava, Ṛṣabha, Kapila, the four Kumāras, Nārada, Vyāsa, etc. belonging to the first class, Dhanvantarī, Paraśurāma, etc. to the second.

The svarūpāvatāras are of the form of existence, consciousness and bliss[2] like the Lord Himself, since they are the manifestations of the Lord's own essential nature or svarūpa. They are non-different from the Lord in nature, quality and power, just as one lamp is from another. There are two kinds of svarūpāvatāras, viz. aṃśa-rūpa and pūrṇa-rūpa. The former, though full manifestations of the Lord, manifest few qualities and powers such as the fish, the tortoise, the boar, the dwarf and the swan incarnations, etc. The latter fully manifest all the qualities and powers such as Nṛsiṃha, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa and the rest.[3]

[1] V.R.M., p. 48.
[2] Sac-cid-ānanda-rūpa.
[3] V.R.M., pp. 47-49.

The following is a chart of the various kinds of avatāras:—



But although the Lord manifests Himself in all these various vyūhas and avatāras, yet the Lord's own nature and powers remain untransformed and undiminished. The Lord remains ever Full, over One, in spite of appearing as many.[1]

(iii) *Criticism of rival theories regarding Brahman.*

(*a*) *Criticism of Nirguṇa-vāda and Nirviśeṣa-vāda.*

If Brahman be devoid of all attributes (guṇas) and specifications (viśeṣas), He will be outside all pramāṇas or sources of knowledge,[2] and as such be unreal (or tuccha) like the sky-flower, which also is outside all sources of knowledge. Thus, the attributeless Brahman is not, evidently, an object of perception, since He is beyond the sense-organs; nor is He an object of inference, since He is without any mark (liṅga)[3]; nor is He an object of Scripture even, for what is devoid

[1] V.R.M., p. 47.

[2] See Epistemology below.

[3] That is, in the inference—

All men are mortal.
John is a man.
John is mortal,

John possesses the mark of humanity (the middle term), shared by infinite *number of other beings—which alone makes the inference possible. But in the case of Brahman, this is not possible, because Brahman does not possess* any marks.

of attributes cannot be expressed by words. Thus, the attributeless and non-specific Brahman cannot be an object of rūḍhavṛtti,[1] as He is devoid of class, attribute and action, nor an object of yogavṛtti, as He can have no root-meaning, nor an object of lakṣaṇā, as He is devoid of any connection with anything else, nor lastly, an object of gauṇa-vṛtti, as He is devoid of qualities. Such a Brahman, therefore, incapable of being established by any proof, is but a myth, and not a reality. The real Brahman is essentially possessed of attributes, as shown above.[2]

(*b*) *Criticism of Aprameyatva-vāda.*

Brahman is by no means aprameya or unknowable and outside all the pramāṇas, for in that case He would be tuccha or unreal like the sky-flower—as pointed out above. Texts like "He is known by one who does not know Him, but he who knows Him does not know Him. He is not known to the knower and known to the non-knower" (Kena 11), "From Him speech turns back with the mind, not getting Him" (Tait., 2.4.1), etc. do not prove that Brahman is never an object of knowledge, but they only deny any possible limit to the Lord. Thus, the first text means that those really wise men who never know Him in His real nature, i.e. absolutely unlimited, while those who, in pride of their little knowledge, know Him as limited, fail to know Him. The fact is that the nature and qualities of the Lord being infinite, are really outside the sphere of ordinary logical thinking, and the wise recognise this fact instead of thinking that they have grasped the Lord fully. But they know the Lord through intuition. Otherwise, how can we explain such texts: "Knowing Him alone, one surpasses death"? (Śvet., 3.8). Hence, the conclusion is that though Brahman surpasses ordinary comprehension, yet He is known through Scripture and direct intuition.[3]

(*B*) *The cit.*

(i) *Its nature, size, number and kind.*

The soul is essentially of the nature of knowledge (jñāna-svarūpa), i.e. different from whatever is non-sentient, viz. the body, etc. The Cārvāka view that the soul is nothing but the body, and the Naiyāyika

[1] For the explanation of this and the following terms, see under Epistemology below.

[2] V.R.M., pp. 60–63. [3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

view that the intelligence is not the very essence of the self, but only an adventitious quality of the self, generated through its connection with the internal organ—are both wrong.[1]

The soul is not only knowledge, but a substratum of knowledge, i.e. a knower.[2]

An objection may be raised here[3]: The soul cannot be both knowledge and knower, i.e. possess knowledge as its attribute, for here the substratum itself and what inheres in it, the possessor and the quality possessed—both being equally knowledge—are identical, just as one drop of water has no separate existence from water, but is identical with it. Hence the soul is not a knower, but pure knowledge, and only appears to be a knower.[4]

The answer to this objection is as follows[5]: In many cases, the substratum (dharmin) and the attribute (dharma) are very similar, but that does not mean that they are identical; e.g. a gem and its rays are equally luminous, yet they are different and stand in the relation of substratum and quality. Similarly, though the soul and its quality of knowledge are equally knowledge, yet on account of this very fact that one is the substratum and the other its quality, they belong to different categories (vijātīya) and are hence distinct from each other. The fact is that there does exist a difference between a drop of water and water, for that drop of water, having a distinct form (sāvayava), must be different from other drops of water. We can argue thus: A drop of water is distinct from water, because it has a form just like dust thrown into dust, or sesamum-grain in a heap of sesamum-grains.

To say that the soul is a knower is to say that it is an ego—an "I", for a knower always feels "I know", "I see", etc.[6]

An objection may be raised here[7]: If the "I" were the very essence of the self, it would have always accompanied it. But that is not the case, for in the states of deep sleep, salvation, etc. the "I" no longer exists. Hence the "I" is simply an effect of prakṛti, i.e. non-sentient.

To this, we reply[8]: Even in deep sleep the "I" persists, as is proved from such memory as "So long I slept happily and did not know anything", which shows that the "I" was present during the

[1] V.R.M., pp. 3-4. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 4. [3] *Op. cit.*
[4] For criticism of this view, see below. [5] V.R.M., p. 5.
[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 7. [7] *Op. cit.*
[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 7-8. Cf. Śrī. B., 1.1.1. The arguments are exactly alike.

state of deep sleep as the substratum of knowledge (viz. "I do not know") and the feeling of happiness (viz. "I am sleeping happily"). Even the memory—"So long I did not know even myself"—does not prove the absence of the "I" during the same state. For here the first "I" (aham) means the self as it is during that state of suṣupti, i.e. the soul, the knower, pure and devoid of all connection with matter, i.e. the body, the sense-organs, etc., while the second "I" (mām) means the self as it is during the waking state, in union with matter, i.e. the body, etc. Hence "So long I did not know even myself" means simply that the real, pure "I" persists in deep sleep, what is absent is the "I" as it is during the waking state. Otherwise, on rising from deep sleep, one would have felt to the effect: "So long I did not exist, but now I have come into existence", etc.—but such is never the case.

Hence, the "I" must persist even during states of deep sleep, swoon and the rest. During those states, of course, there is no definite well-defined consciousness, as during the waking state, for there are present no well-defined, special objects then. Nevertheless, such a vague and general consciousness during deep sleep, etc., too, requires a substratum, for consciousness implies one who is conscious, and this substratum is the "I"—the real I.

Moreover, there may be some room for doubt whether the "I" persists during the states of deep sleep, etc., but there can be no doubt that it persists in the state of release—for release is not the destruction of the self, but its full development.

The soul is, further, an active agent or a kartā, and continues to be so during its states of deep sleep and release. Of course, during the state of deep sleep its agency is not manifest as during its state of waking. This is due to the fact that the soul in bondage has to work through its sense-organs, i.e. during its state of bondage the kartṛtva of the soul has to depend on the function of its sense-organs, and hence, since in the state of deep sleep the sense-organs function no more, the soul does not seem to be an agent at the time. During its state of waking, too, it is not always an agent, but only when its sense-organs function in relation to some or other particular object.[1]

The soul is an enjoyer or bhoktā and continues to be so during deep sleep and release. During deep sleep, it enjoys happiness (as

[1] V.R.M., p. 11. For objection to the view that the jīva is essentially a kartā and refutation thereof, see below.

is evident from the memory: "So long I slept happily") and during release it enjoys supreme bliss arising out of its direct vision of Brahman.[1]

The soul, though knowledge by nature, knower, doer and enjoyer,[2] equally like the Lord, is yet never equal to Him, but is essentially under His control. Although the sentient is different from and superior to the non-sentient, yet it, in common with the latter, is dependent on the Lord for its very nature, existence and activity. In one word, the soul is dependent, and not independent like the Lord.[3]

An objection may be raised here[4]: If the souls be not responsible for their own acts, but the Lord, then seeing that He induces some to meritorious acts, while others to evil ones, the Lord must be accused of partiality and cruelty. Puruṣottama refutes this objection just in the same way as Nimbārka[5] does.

It is not to be argued that since the freed soul has no karmas, it is not under the control of the Lord, for the essential nature of the soul is to be controlled, while the essential nature of Brahman is to control,[6] and one can never change one's essential nature. Hence the freed souls, too, are dependent on the Lord for its nature, existence and activity.[7]

It is not to be supposed, further, that since it is the Lord alone who leads the souls to this or that course of action, there is no use of the study of Scripture, recommending different courses of action, for the study of Scripture is by no means useless, seeing that it arouses the soul to the consciousness of its real nature. The soul, engrossed in the world of matter, thinks itself to be an independent being, but Scripture reveals to it the great truth that far from being an independent being, its very nature and existence depend on the Lord.[8]

Because of having Brahman for its very essence (tad-ātmaka), the soul is dependent on Him. This may be proved from the following positive and negative arguments:—

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[1] V.R.M., p. 12.

[2] Of course, the Lord is not an enjoyer in the sense of experiencing the fruits of work, as the soul in bondage is; He is an enjoyer of celestial pleasures which He shares with the freed.

[3] V.R.M., p. 13. [4] *Op. cit.*, p. 13. [5] See above.

[6] V.R.M., p. 14: "Niyantṛtva-niyamyatvayos-tat tvaṃ-padārtha-svarūpatvāt".

[7] *Op. cit.* [8] V.R.M., p. 14. Vide V.K., 1.1.7.

(Positive). Whatever has something else for its very essence, depends on that for its nature, existence and activity, like pots which have the clay for their essence.

The jīva has Brahman for its essence. The jīva depends on Brahman for its nature, etc.

(Negative). Whatever has not something else for its essence, does not depend on that for its nature, etc., like the sky-flower.

The soul has Brahman for its nature. The soul depends on Brahman for its nature, etc.[1]

Thus, in nature, the soul is knowledge by nature, knower, doer, enjoyer and dependent.

Next, the size of the soul. In size, it is atomic, although it is able to pervade the whole body and experience its pleasures, pains, etc. through its all-pervading attribute of knowledge.[2]

An objection may be raised here[3]: If the soul be atomic in size, it must be without form, without parts. But in that case, how can the Lord be said to be pervading it and abiding within it? For, to pervade is to pervade something definite with a form of its own, to abide within is to abide within something which occupies space.

The answer to this objection is that,[4] even if the soul be atomic and without parts, still it can be pervaded by the Lord who pervades everything. The fact is that the relation of the controller and the controlled, the pervader and the pervaded does not depend upon the sāvayavatva or niravayavatva of a thing, but on the power inhering in it. That is, if one thing possesses the power of pervading and controlling something else, it does so, whether that thing is with or without parts, or whether it itself is with or without parts. Conversely, if a thing possesses the power, i.e. fitness to be pervaded, and controlled by something else, it is done so, irrespective of the fact whether it is with or without parts, or whether that which pervades is with or without parts. Hence, the Lord, possessing as He does, the power of pervading and controlling everything, pervades and controls the soul.

Next, the number of souls. The souls are many,[5] while the Lord is one—herein lies one great difference between the soul and Brahman.

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[1] V.R.M., pp. 14-15.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 15-16. For objection to this view and refutation thereof, see below.

[3] V.R.M., p. 17. [4] *Op. cit.*

[5] For the objection to this view and refutation thereof, see below.

The souls are, in fact, infinite in number, and hence it is that in spite of the fact that more and more souls are being freed from the world, the course of mundane existence still goes on, and will ever do so.[1]

Finally, the kinds of souls. The souls are broadly of two kinds—souls in bondage (baddhas) and those that are free.[2]

The souls in bondage are connected with various kinds of bodies, through the beginningless impressions of past works, and are possessed of a strong sense of egoity, i.e. falsely regard themselves to be independent of the Lord. They are of two kinds: mumukṣus or those who, after having undergone all sorts of pains and miseries in the world, have lost all attachment for it, but wish to get rid of their earthly existence and attain salvation, and bubhukṣus, or those who hanker after earthly enjoyment.

Those desirous of salvation, again, are of two kinds, viz. those who desire for salvation which implies attaining the nature of the Lord, and those who desire for salvation which implies attaining their real nature.[3] The bubhukṣus also are of two kinds, viz. those who hanker after future happiness (i.e. perform sacrifices, etc. for attaining heaven) and those who hanker after ordinary earthly enjoyments only.[4]

The freed souls are of two kinds: nitya-muktas, or those who are ever-free, i.e. are never subject to the transmigratory existence and its miseries, are never in contact with matter, but ever abide in supreme bliss, intuiting and worshipping the Lord; and baddha-muktas or those who were in bondage previously, but are now freed. The nitya-muktas are, again, of two kinds: ānantaryya, viz. the crown, the ear-ornaments and the flute of the Lord considered as living beings; and pārṣada, viz. Garuḍa, Viśvaksena, and the rest. The baddha-muktas, too, are of two kinds, viz. those who have attained supreme bliss consequent on their attaining the very nature of the Lord, and those who are content with the bliss consequent on their attaining their own real nature.[5]

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[1] V.R.M., p. 19.


[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

[3] Of course, salvation always implies the attainment of the nature and qualities of the Lord and the attainment of the real nature of the individual (see above). But some mumukṣus desire more for the former, others the latter. Hence the distinction between the two classes of mumukṣus.

[4] V.R.M., p. 22.

[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-23. Vide footnote 3.

The following is a chart of the different kinds of souls:—



Thus the conclusion is:—

In nature, the soul is knowledge by nature, knower, doer, enjoyer and dependent.

In size, it is atomic.

In number, it is endless.

And it is broadly of two kinds with various sub-divisions.

(ii) *Criticism of rival theories regarding the jīva.*

(a) *Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda.*[1]

The doctrine that the soul is not really a knower, but it appears to be so through the reflection of consciousness on buddhi, is an absurd one, for a mere reflection cannot behave as if it is really possessed of knowledge—a knower. The reflection of the sun, e.g. can never do what the real sun does, viz. remove darkness and cold. In the very same manner, if the knowing soul were a mere reflection, it could not have acted—as it evidently does—like a real knower. Further, here both the object reflected (the bimba, viz. caitanya) and the limited adjunct (the upādhi, viz. buddhi) are without form and colour, hence no reflection is possible, otherwise we have to admit that there may be reflection of taste on sound, or on time, of time on taste, etc.—which is evidently absurd.

The very same argument applies equally to the doctrine that the soul is but a reflection of Brahman, for here, too, the object reflected (viz. Brahman) and the object on which it is reflected (viz. avidyā) are devoid of form and colour.

[1] V.R.M., pp. 5-6. See below for further criticism under Keśavakāśmīri-bhaṭṭa.

If it be argued that the ether, though without form and colour, is seen to have reflection over rivers, etc.—so why not here? We reply, the ether does possess a form and colour, since it is an intermixture of all the elements (cf. the process of Pañcīkaraṇa).

(b) Criticism of Avaccheda-vāda or Upādhi-vāda.[1]

According to this doctrine, Brahman, as limited by avidyā or antaḥkaraṇa (internal organ), is called the soul. Just as the ether within a pot (ghaṭākāśa) is distinct from the universal ether (mahākāśa), but when the pot is broken, it is no longer distinct from the universal ether, so the soul as limited by avidyā is distinct from Brahman, but when free from avidyā is no longer distinct from Him.

But this view is absolutely untenable. Thus, whether the limited adjunct be avidyā or antaḥkaraṇa, the question is: how does it exactly limit Brahman? Does it actually cut off Brahman into separate piece, as an axe cuts a log of wood, or does it limit one portion of Brahman (without actually cutting off that portion from Brahman)? The first alternative is not possible, because what is all-pervading and without parts cannot be actually cut off into pieces, and also because in that case, the soul would cease to be eternal and unborn, as Scripture declares it to be.[2] The second alternative, too, is equally untenable. Here the question arises whether the limiting adjunct is all-pervading or limited. First, it cannot be all-pervading, for then no going out, coming back, etc. of the soul would be possible.[3] Also, if the limiting adjunct, too, be all-pervading like Brahman, everything will be veiled, even Brahman, in His entirety. Secondly, it cannot be limited either, for in that case, although the going out, etc. of the soul become possible, some other difficulties arise, viz. just as on the motion of the pot, no motion of the ether within it is possible, the ether being motionless, so, on the motion of the limiting adjunct, no motion is possible on the part of Brahman, the all-pervading, who is motionless like ether. In that case, there will

[1] V.R.M., pp. 6-7.

[2] The sense is that if the soul be a part of Brahman cut off by avidyā, then it is something produced in course of time and not eternal, just as a particular piece of log is something which did not exist before as such, but is brought about by the cutting off the log by an axe.

The Advaitins might reply that the eternal avidyā limits Brahman from all eternity, hence the eternity of the soul is not jeopardised.

[3] That is, the soul departs from the body at death, and returns to a new body. Now, if the upādhi (viz. antaḥkaraṇa) be all-pervading—this evidently is not possible.

arise sudden and causeless release and bondage and violation of the law of karman. So the doctrine that the soul is but Brahman, limited by limiting adjunct, does not stand to reason in any way.[1]

Further, the doctrine that the soul, which is but Brahman, is not really an active agent, but the limiting adjunct (viz. antaḥkaraṇa) of the soul is the real agent, is also absolutely untenable, for the limiting adjunct, being non-sentient, can never be an agent. If it be said that it is not the limiting adjunct by itself, but the soul in connection with limiting adjunct which is the agent, we point out that the soul (which, according to Advaitins, is not an agent) cannot become so simply through its union with the limiting adjunct, which also is not an agent, otherwise we have to admit that a hermaphrodite can produce children through associating with a woman—which is evidently absurd. Hence the fact is that just though the fire is the substrate of the natural power of burning, yet this power is manifested only in connection with fuel, etc., so though the soul is the substratum of natural power of being an agent, yet this power is manifested through the functioning of the sense-organs only. That is, just as there is nothing contradictory in the fact that the fire does not burn always, though the power of burning is natural (svābhāvika) to it, so exactly, there is nothing contradictory in the fact that the soul is not always active (e.g. in deep sleep, etc.), though the power of being an agent is natural to it.[2]

(*c*) *Criticism of Sarva-gatātma-vāda.*[3]

The doctrine that the soul is really all-pervading (being Brahman itself) but appears to be atomic through its connection with the limiting adjunct (viz. antaḥkaraṇa), is equally absurd. If the soul be all-pervasive, the question arises whether there is a plurality of souls or one soul only. In the first place, there cannot be a plurality of souls, for in that case, whether the mind be all-pervasive or atomic in either case, the souls being all-pervasive, must be in eternal connection with all objects, therefore with all minds, and hence everyone must be aware of the thought of everyone else.[4] Hence there will be

[1] Cf. Śrī. B., 1.1.4.

[2] V.R.M., pp. 11-12. For further criticism see below under Keśavakāśmīri-bhaṭṭa.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

[4] That is, knowledge arises through the connection of the mind with the soul. Now, suppose there is a plurality of souls A, B, C, etc., all all-pervasive, and a plurality of minds A_1, B_1, C_1, etc. A, being all-pervasive, must be simul-

no special perceptions to the effect "I", "You", "He", etc., all perceptions being universal and identical. And, if every soul were to know everything and every mind, it would become equal to Brahman who is omniscient.

In the second place, to say that there is not a plurality of souls, but one soul only, does not obviate the above difficulty, for the one all-pervasive soul, being connected with all minds, must be omniscient. If not, i.e. if it be said that the soul, though in connection with all minds, feels the pleasures, pains, etc. of only *one* of them (viz. its own), we are inevitably led to the conclusion that the soul is non-sentient.[1] And if the soul be non-sentient, it cannot, evidently, be the knower and hence we have to say that the limiting adjunct of the soul (viz. antaḥkaraṇa) must be the knower. Now, if the limiting adjunct be atomic, there can be no simultaneous experience of pain, etc. in different parts of the body (which, however, is an undeniable fact), for the limiting adjunct which is atomic cannot be simultaneously connected with different parts of the body. If, again, the limiting adjunct be of the size of the body,[2] the soul, limited by the upādhi, must also be so, which will go against the view of the Advaitins themselves.

(*d*) *Criticism of Eka-jīva-vāda.*[3]

The doctrine that there is only one soul does not stand to reason. If there were only one soul, when one sleeps, faints or dies, everyone else would have been found to be sleeping, fainting and dying simultaneously—but this is never found. So this doctrine is absurd, and there is really a plurality of souls.

(*C*) *The acit.*

There are three kinds of acit, viz. prākṛta or what is derived from prakṛti; kāla or time; and aprākṛta or what is not derived from prakṛti.[4]

taneously connected with all the minds of A_1, B_1, C_1, etc.; similarly, B, too, being all-pervasive, must be equally connected with all the minds A_1, B_1, C_1, etc. simultaneously, and so on; and hence the knowledge of A, B, C, etc. must all be identical.

[1] That is, a jaḍa or non-sentient object is one which though *in connection* with something, does not *feel* it. Hence, if to avoid the conclusion that the soul is omniscient (which evidently it is not, seeing that it knows its own states and feelings only, and not those of others) it be said that the soul, though *connected with* all minds (which it must be, since it is alleged to be all-pervading), yet does not *feel*, i.e. know the states and feeling of all of them, the soul must be non-sentient or jaḍa.

[2] Madhyama-parimāṇa. [3] V.R.M., p. 19. [4] *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

(i) *The prākṛta.*[1]

Prākṛta or primal matter is also called "māyā", "pradhāna", "tamas", "avyakta", etc. It is the substratum of three guṇas, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas. The sattva is the cause of knowledge, etc. As such it is the best means to salvation, and also because it, surpassing the rajas and the tamas, gives rise to self-control, etc. which lead to emancipation. The rajas is the cause of avarice and the rest. As such it is the cause of the soul's deviation from the path of truth. The tamas is the cause of delusion, etc. As such it is the main cause of the veiling of its own nature, as well as that of others. Prakṛti is a state of equilibrium of these three guṇas.[2] Then, when through the wish of the Lord—who is all along guided by the beginningless karmas of the soul—this equilibrium of the guṇas is disturbed, and they enter into a natural relation of subordination and co-ordination, prakṛti begins to produce various effects.

The successive stages in the process of creation is as follows:—

The first product of prakṛti is the mahat. The mahat is the cause of perseverance, and is of three kinds, viz. sāttvika, rājasika and tāmasika. From the mahat arises ahaṃkāra, which is the general cause of the sense of egoity in the body of individual souls. The ahaṃkāra, too, is of three kinds, viz. sāttvika, etc., and is called then vaikārika, taijasa and bhūtādi respectively. From the vaikārika ahaṃkāra arise the presiding deities of the sense-organs and also of the mind or the internal organ—which has four vṛttis or mode, viz. manas, buddhi, citta and ahaṃkāra. The manas is the cause of thought (manana). It is the cause of bondage when it is connected with, i.e. engrossed in the ordinary worldly objects, such as sound and the rest, but is a cause of salvation when, discarding worldly objects, it devotes itself wholly to the thought of the Lord. There are two kinds of manas, viz. impure and pure; the former full of worldly desires, the latter devoid of them. The buddhi is the instrument of discerning or understanding (bodhana). The ahaṃkāra is the cause of the sense of egoity in the body, etc., and citta is the cause of reflection (cintanam). The presiding deities of these four modes are respectively Candra, Brahmā, Rudra and Kṣetrajña. According to one description, their presiding deities are the four vyūhas, viz. Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha,

[1] V.R.M., pp. 23–37.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 24ff. Cf. the Sāṃkhya doctrine of creation.


respectively. But these two different descriptions do not come into conflict by any means, because Candra and the rest are responsible for their functioning, while the four vyūha deities are to be worshipped as their inner controller. The location of the manas is in the throat; of buddhi, the mouth; of ahaṃkāra, the heart; and of citta, the navel.

From taijasa ahaṃkāra arise the ten external sense-organs. These are divided into two classes, viz. the organs of knowledge, which are the general causes of the perceptions of sound and the rest, and the organs of action, which are the general causes of actions like speech, etc. There are five organs of knowledge, viz. the ear which can hear sound only, the skin which can feel only, the eyes which can perceive colour, form, etc. only, the tongue which can taste only, and the nose which can smell only. The presiding deities of these five organs of knowledge are respectively Dik, Vāyu, Āditya, Varuṇa, and Aśvinī, and their objects are sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. Similarly, there are five organs of action, viz. the organ of speech, which is the organ for uttering sound, and is situated in the throat; the hands which are the general instruments for taking, holding, etc. (in the case of elephants, etc., however, these functions are performed by the tip of the nose), the feet which are the general instruments for moving about (in the case of snakes, birds, etc., however, these functions are performed by the breast, the wings, etc., respectively), the organ of elimination and the organ of generation. The presiding deities of these five organs of sense are respectively Vahṇi, Indra, Upendra, Mṛtyu and Prajāpati, and their objects are speech, receiving, moving about, elimination and enjoyment.

From the tāmasa ahaṃkāra or bhūtādi arise the five tan-mātras, viz. the śabda-tan-mātra and the rest, and the five great elements like the ether and the rest. The tan-mātras are the subtle elements or essences which are called the elements or bhūtas in their grosser forms. Thus from the tāmasa ahaṃkāra or bhūtādi arise the śabda-tan-mātra and from that the ether; from that the sparśa-tan-mātra and from that the air; from that the rūpa-tan-mātra and from that the fire; from that the rasa-tan-mātra and from that water; from that the gandha-tan-mātra and from that the earth. The qualities of the earth are five, viz. śabda (sound), sparśa (touch), rūpa (colour), rasa (taste) and gandha (smell); those of water are four, viz. the first four; those of fire, three, viz. the first three; those of air, two, viz. the first two; and that of the ether, only one, viz. the first.

The prāṇa or the vital-breath is a special kind of air, which upholds the body.[1] It has five different modes, viz. prāṇa or that which goes up through the nose, apāna or that which goes down through the organ of elimination, vyāna or that which moves about everywhere throughout the body, udāna or that which is the cause of eructation, and samāna or that which is the cause of digestion. According to some, there are five kinds of air, viz. Nāga or that which is the cause of eructation, Kūrma or that which is the cause of the opening of the eyes, Kṛkala or that which is the cause of appetite, Devadatta or that which is the cause of yawning, and Dhanañjaya or that which is the cause of nourishment. But these are really included under the five modes mentioned above, and are not independent ones.

Thus, there are altogether twenty-four principles. Cf. the following chart:—



Prakṛti, mahat and the five gross elements are the constituting material of the gross body of the soul; while the five subtle elements,

[1] Vide Br. Sū., 2.4.9–12. (N.B.).

and the mind, the ten sense-organs, and the vital-breath are the constituting material of its subtle body. The body is controlled by the soul, and is the instrument of the soul's enjoyment; it is the substrate of the soul, and non-separate from it. There are two kinds of body, permanent and non-permanent. The Lord and the ever-free souls have permanent bodies.[1] There are two kinds of non-permanent bodies, viz. those due to karma and those not due to karmas. Thus, the forms assumed by the Lord, viz. the forms of Virāj and the rest, as well as the forms assumed by the ever-free souls, are non-permanent, but not due to karmas. And, the forms which are both non-permanent and due to karma are of various kinds, viz. the sthāvaras or the immovable, such as mountains, trees, etc., and the jaṅgama or the movable, viz. gods, men, etc. These latter, again, are born from womb, or from eggs, etc.

Thus, beginning from the mahat down to the body, everything is an effect of prakṛti, and as such, non-different from it; for the cause and the effect are always non-different. The distinctions of names, forms, number, use, etc. are due to the distinctions of states only of prakṛti.[2]

The entire prakṛti, together with its effects, constitutes the object of enjoyment, the implement of enjoyment and the place of enjoyment of the soul. Thus, the objects of enjoyment are testes, sounds, colours and the rest, as well as the objects having taste, sound, colour, etc., viz. food, etc. The implements of enjoyment are the body, the sense-organs, the mind, the buddhi, etc. The places of enjoyment are the fourteen worlds included within the Brahmāṇḍa. And the entire prakṛti, together with its effects, constitutes the object of sport, the instrument of sport and the place of sport of the Lord. That is, while prakṛti is an object of enjoyment to the soul, it is but an object of sport to the Lord.[3]

The first two, viz. the objects of enjoyment, sound and the rest, and the instruments of enjoyment, the body and the rest, have already been explained above. Now, only the place of enjoyment, viz. the Brahmāṇḍa, remains to be explained.[4] The Brahmāṇḍa is of the shape of a kapittha fruit, formed out of the great elements, through the process of Pañcīkaraṇa,[5] and contains fourteen worlds.

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[1] See below under "Aprākṛta". [2] V.R.M., p. 31. [3] *Op. cit.*

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 32ff. Here the author follows the description given in Viṣṇu-purāṇa, 2.4.

[5] See below.

It is thus a product of matter, and as such, negligible by one who desires for final release.

The fourteen worlds are Bhūr-loka and the rest, viz.:—

1. Bhūr-loka is this world, the abode of men and the rest. It is of the shape of a lotus and occupies a space of fifty koti [1] yojanas [2]. It consists of seven islands, surrounded by seven oceans. The seven islands are Jambu, Plakṣa, Śālma, Kuśa, Krauñca, Śāka and Puṣkara. And the seven oceans are Kṣārodakārṇava or the ocean of salt-water; Ikṣurasārṇava or the ocean of sugar-cane juice; Surārṇava or the ocean of wine; Ghṛtārṇava or the ocean of clarified butter; Kṣīrārṇava or the ocean of milk; Madhura-jalārṇava or the ocean of fresh water.

Each island is surrounded by an ocean as large as itself, which in its turn is surrounded by another island twice as large and consisting of seven varṣas or lands, except the last, viz. Puṣkara, which consists of two only. Thus, the Jambu-dvīpa occupies a space of lakṣa[3] yojana. In its centre there is a mountain called Meru, of the shape of a karṇikā or the seed vessel of a lotus. It is surrounded by nine varṣas or lands, viz. Bhārata and two others in the south, Ramyaka and two others in the north, Bhadreśvara in the east, Ketu-mālā in the west, and Ilāvṛta in the middle. This Jambu-dvīpa is surrounded by the Kṣārodakārṇava or the ocean of salt-water, as large as itself.

That ocean is surrounded by the Plakṣa-dvīpa, twice as large and consisting of seven varṣas or lands. This Plakṣa-dvīpa is surrounded by the Ikṣurasārṇava or the ocean of sugar-cane juice, as large as itself. And so on.

2. Above the Bhūr-loka there is the Bhuvar-loka or the space extending from the earth up to the orb of the sun, occupying a lakṣa yojana, and inhabited by perfected souls, sages and the rest.

3. Above the Bhuvar-loka there are the orbs of the Candra (the moon), Nakṣatra (the constellation through which the moon passes), Budha (the planet Mercury), Śukra (the planet Venus), Bhauma (the planet Mars), Bṛhaspati (the planet Jupiter) and Saptarṣi (the seven stars in the constellation of the Ursa Major), and above these, there is the Dhruva-cakra (the Polar Star). The Svar-loka, the region of Indra, extends from the orb of the sun up to the Dhruva, i.e. it is

[1] One koṭi = ten millions.

[2] A yojana = 4 krośas or about 9 miles.

[3] One lakṣa = one hundred thousand.

the space between the sun and the Polar Star, occupying fourteen lakṣa yojanas.

4. Above the Svar-loka there is the Mahar-loka, occupying a koṭi yojanas, inhabited by Bhṛgu and other saints.

5. Above Mahar-loka there is the Jana-loka, twice as large, the abode of Brahman's sons, Sanatkumāra and the rest.

6. Above the Jana-loka there is the Tapo-loka, four times as large, the abode of deified vairāgins.

7. Above the Tapo-loka there is the Satya-loka or Brahma-loka, occupying twelve koṭi yojanas, the abode of Brahmā.

These are the seven worlds from the earth upwards. There are seven more worlds from the earth downwards. Thus: The Bhūr-loka (with its seven islands and seven seas) is surrounded by the Kāñcana-bhūmi, twice as large, and not inhabited by any animals; that, again, is surrounded by the Lokā-loka mountain; that, again, by the Andha-tamaḥ (deep darkness); that, again, by the Garbhodaka (the ocean of the womb, i.e. the fluid in the mundane egg, viz. Brahmāṇḍa); and that, again, by the Aṇḍa-kaṭāha (the shell of the mundane egg, viz. the Brahmāṇḍa). Below that, there are seven worlds, one below the other and ten times as large, viz. Atala, Pātala, Vitala, Sutala, Talātala, Rasātala and Mahā-tala.

In between these seven worlds, the Atala and the rest, there are twenty-one narakas or hells, viz. Raurava and the rest, the abode of sinners. Below that there is the Andha-tamas, below that the Garbhodaka, and below that the Aṇḍa-kaṭāha.

Such is the constitution of one Brahmāṇḍa. There is an infinite number of such Brahmāṇḍas floating like bubbles in the ocean of pradhāna—which is of the essence of the Lord's power. Hence the Brahmāṇḍa is endless.

The process of Pañcīkaraṇa, referred to above, consists in the following[1]: The Lord, first, created the five great elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether. Then He divided each element into two parts. Of these two halves, He kept one half apart, and then divided the other half into four parts, mixed each of these parts with each of the other four elements, taking just as equal portion in return from each of these four elements and mixing them in return with the element with which He has begun. Thus earth, e.g. $\frac{1}{2}$ earth $+\frac{1}{8}$ water $+\frac{1}{8}$ fire $+\frac{1}{8}$ air $+\frac{1}{8}$ ether. Similar is the case with every other element. The

[1] V.R.M., p. 36.

earth is called *earth* (and not any other element), because of the preponderance in it of the element of earth. Similar is the case with every other element.

So far is the process of creation.

Next, the process of dissolution (pralaya-krama)[1]: The order of dissolution is that each effect is merged into its respective cause and not vice versa, i.e. the cause into its effect; for the effect can have no existence at all apart from its cause. Thus, the successive order of dissolution is as follows: the earth, through the gandha-tan-mātra, merges in water; water through the rasa-tan-mātra into fire; fire through the rūpa-tan-mātra into the air; the air through the sparśa-tan-mātra into the ether; the ether through the śabda-tan-mātra into Bhūtādi or the tāmasa ahaṃkāra. The sense-organs on their parts merge into the rājasa ahaṃkāra, and the mind and its presiding deities in the vaikārika or the sāttvika ahaṃkāra. Then these three kinds of ahaṃkāra disappear into the mahat, and the mahat into prakṛti, the prakrti into the Imperishable, the Imperishable into Darkness, and the Darkness into the supreme Lord.

(ii) *Kāla.*[2]

The second kind of the acit is kāla or time—which is different from the prākṛta and the aprākṛta. It is eternal, and all-pervasive, and persists even before creation and during dissolution. It is the cause of such conventional distinctions like the past, present and future, the simultaneous, the eternal, the quick,[3] etc. It is, further, instrumental in the creation and destruction of the universe, which, evidently, involve time, and the specific instrument of such measurements like paramāṇu,[4] etc., up to parārdha.[5] Thus, time is the basic principle of the entire cosmic existence. But though the regulator and controller of everything, it, itself is entirely under the control of the Lord. Though time is indivisible and ever continuous and ever present in its own nature, yet it is non-permanent in the form of

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[1] V.R.M., p. 37.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

[3] That is, in practical life, we constantly use such expressions like "This is", "That will be", "These are simultaneous", "That is eternal", etc., and all these expressions involve time.

[4] A paramāṇu is the time taken by the sun to traverse an atomic sphere. All these measures are evidently based on time alone.

[5] Vide V.K., 1.1.1., p. 19, K.S.S.

its effects which are due to the limiting adjunct being the sun's revolution.[1]

(iii) *The aprākṛta.*[2]

Aprākṛta is a kind of the non-sentient different from prakṛti and kāla. It is termed variously as nitya-vibhūti, paramātma-loka, parama-vyoma, viṣṇu-pada, parama-pada, etc. It is illuminous or refulgent by nature, i.e. does not veil itself or anything else, absolutely unlimited and eternal. It is called "bliss", because it manifests bliss. It is the stuff of the Lord's nitya-vibhūti or celestial manifestation, e.g. the manifestation of the viśvarūpa by the Lord Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna.[3] It is also the stuff of the region and forms of the Lord and of the ever-free souls. It constitutes, in short, the objects of enjoyment such as the forms (vigraha), etc., the implements of enjoyment—such as ornaments, weapons, carriages, seats, flower, leaves, fruits, etc.—and the places of enjoyment—such as gateways, courtyards, ramparts, crystal palaces, forests, glens, lakes, etc.—of the Lord and the ever-free souls, just as prakṛti (as shown above)[4] constitute the objects, implements and places of enjoyment of the souls.

The body of the Lord and the bodies of the ever-free souls are due to the Lord's own eternal wish, and are, as such, eternal and natural. The freed souls, too, when they are released from their earthly bodies, i.e. from all connection with prakṛti, are endowed with such eternal and celestial bodies, which are subject to no change or decay. Just as during a festival, the king gives clothes, ornaments, etc. to his servants. So when the freed souls are freed from matter, the Lord endows them with eternal bodies as instruments of His own service.[5]

The body of the Lord, like His own nature, is the substratum of infinite auspicious qualities, such as beauty, grace, sweetness and the

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[1] That is, time as a whole is eternal, while particular portions of time are non-eternal, e.g. a minute passes away, so does a day, or a month or a year. And these particular portions are not real divisions of time—which is really indivisible—but only divisions to the limiting adjunct in the sense that time is divided by *us* for practical convenience only, in accordance with the revolution of the sun. Thus, the sun's revolution on its own axis once constitutes a day for us, its revolution round the sun once constitutes a year for us, and so on.

[2] V.R.M., pp. 39-40. Vide V.K., 1.1.1, p. 10, K.S.S.

[3] That is, just as the soul enjoys its body, so the Lord, too, enjoys His.

[4] See above, p. 91.

[5] That is, the muktas worship and serve the Lord through their celestial bodies.

rest—every one of them immeasurable and infinite. But though the Lord possesses a body, He is not in need of the sense-organs for seeing, etc.—as He can do so without the help of sense-organs. Similar is the case with the freed souls, too, who are similar to the Lord. And, they are all beyond influence of time.

(iv) *Criticism of rival theories regarding the jagat.*

(*a*) *Criticism of Vivarta-vāda.*[1]

The doctrine that the world is simply a vivarta (illusory, and not real, transformation) of Brahman is absolutely untenable. The Lord is, undoubtedly, one and without a second, but that does not imply by any means the falsity of any and everything besides the Lord. It implies that the Lord is without an equal or a superior. How can the world be falsely superimposed upon Brahman, seeing that there can be no superimposition of what is unreal? The rule is that a thing existing in one place is superimposed upon another, but a sky-flower is never superimposed on anything.

If it be said that the only requisite for making the superimposition of one thing upon another possible is that the thing superimposed must be *perceived* and not necessarily that it must be real, we reply, that the very perception of what is asat is not possible.

If it be said that just as there is the perception of a snake in place of a rope, so the perception of the world, too, is a false perception, due to doṣas (avidyā, etc.) and not a real perception, we reply, the unreal world can never be the *cause* of the perception of the world, its effect. The fact is that an unreal object can never be the *cause* of anything, for the cause must be possessed of certain powers of producing the particular effect. The unreal snake is not the cause of fear, trembling, etc., but the real *knowledge* of the snake. And the unreal snake is not also the cause of this knowledge of the snake, but the real doṣas—such as distance, absence of proper light, defective eyesight, etc., are the cause of that knowledge. Similarly, the knowledge of past rain is not produced by the non-existing rain, but by the existing effects of the rain, such as muddy road, wet grass, etc., and the knowledge of future rain, too, is produced by the real science of Astronomy. So, nowhere the asat is a cause. Hence the superimposition of the asat being impossible, the vivarta theory is absolutely untenable.

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[1] V.R.M., pp. 65–69.

If it be said[1] that the following process of inference proves the falsity of the world, viz. the world is false, because it is perceivable, like the nacre-silver, we reply that in that case, Brahman, too, being perceivable (by the knowers), must be false, on the ground of the inference: Brahman is false, because He is perceivable, like the world. That Brahman is perceivable by knowers is proved from many scriptural passages.[2]

The famous passage "Vācārambhaṇa-vikāra"(Chānd., 6.1.5) by no means proves the vivarta theory. The use of the term "vikāra" (transformation) leaves no room for doubt that the effects are real transformations of the cause, otherwise the term "bhrānti" (error) would have been used. Moreover, the vivarta illustrations, viz. snake-rope, etc., do not fit in with the above text which professedly teaches the doctrine that through the knowledge of one (viz. the cause) there is the knowledge of all (viz. its effects). Now, this fits in very well with the Pariṇāma doctrine, e.g. through the knowledge of clay, there is the knowledge of all the effects of clay; but how can it be said that through the knowledge of rope, there is knowledge of snake? [3]

Hence the vivarta-vāda is supported by neither reason, nor Scripture.[4]

(v) Epistemology.

There are three sources of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), viz. perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and authority (śabda). Perception is the knowledge arising from the connection of sense-organs with objects, e.g. "I see my teacher," etc.; inference is the knowledge arising from the knowledge of vyāpti, e.g. the mountain is on fire, because it smokes, and whether smoke is on fire, as the oven; and authority is the word or testimony of the wise (āpta-vākya). A wise person is one who is free from the four causes of error, viz. weakness of intellect, etc., and speaks the truth.

There are three kinds of the wise—the wisest (Āptatama) is the Veda, and the Vedic texts are the most authoritative. A little less wise are the Smṛtis, like the Manu Smṛti and the rest, and the Smṛti texts are a little less authoritative, while the commentators

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[1] V.R.M., pp. 68-69.

[2] Vide, e.g., Bṛh., 2.4.5, etc.

[3] V.R.M., p. 67.

[4] See for further criticisms under Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa.

and expounders of Śruti and Smṛti are one degree less wise, since they have to depend on both Śruti and Smṛti and their words are one degree less authoritative.

Now, among these three sources of knowledge, perception and inference are liable to error, e.g. on seeing a magic head, one may take it to be a real head, or again, simply on seeing smoke issuing from a hill, one may infer that the hill is on fire, although the fire may have been long before extinguished by rain. But śabda is more authoritative and trustworthy than these two.

Upamāna and the rest are not to be taken as independent pramāṇas, since they really fall under one or other of the above three.[1]

There are two kinds of śabda-vṛttis, viz. mukhya and gauṇa.[2] The former is of the form of śakti or the inherent power of a word to express its meaning. It is of three kinds, viz. rūḍhi, yoga and yoga-rūḍhi. The first implies the samudāya śakti of a word, as Hari, Nārada, etc. It, again, is of two kinds, viz. paryyāya (synonyms or having one sense), e.g. hasta (hand), etc., and anekārtha (having many senses), e.g. hari (which means a variety of things like horse, lion, the sun, etc.). The second implies the avayava śakti of a word, e.g. Mādhava, Ramākānta, etc. The third is a combination of the first two, e.g. soma, paṅkaja, etc.

The second kind of śabda-vṛtti also is of two kinds, viz. lakṣaṇā and gauṇī. The first implies something connected with the actual object (śakya) implied by the word (and not the actual object itself). It is of three kinds, viz. jahat, e.g. "The village situated on the Ganges", does not mean that the village is situated on the river Ganges, but that it is situated on the coast of the Ganges (which is connected with the Ganges); ajahat, e.g. "Protect the curd from crows" does not mean that the curd is to be protected from crows alone, but that other pests as well, as dogs, etc., and jahadajahat, e.g. "Thou art that"—here the peculiar attributes of the soul and Brahman are overlooked, while both are regarded in their common features alone.


The second implies connection with the qualities of the actual object (and not the actual object itself) implied by the word, e.g. "Devadatta is a lion". Here, evidently, it is not meant that Deva-

[1] Vide the Advaita view which regards these as independent pramāṇas. Cf. Vedānta-paribhāṣā, chs. 1–6.

[2] Vide Vedānta-paribhāṣā, ch. 4.

datta is actually a lion, but simply that he possesses some qualities of the lion—great strength, fearlessness, etc.

This is a chart of the sources of knowledge acknowledged by Puruṣottama:—



Section 2. Reconciliation of Abheda and Bheda Vākyas.

(i) *Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

On the one hand, the cit and the acit are non-different from Brahman, on the following three grounds:—

(*a*) because they have Brahman for their essence (Brahmātmaka), and whatever has something else for its essence is non-different from it, as e.g. a gold ear-ring from gold;

(*b*) because they have their existence and activity under the control of Brahman (tad-āyatta-sthiti-pravṛtti) and whatever is under the control of something else for its existence and activity is non-different from it, e.g. the sense-organs are non-different from the prāṇa;

(*c*) because they are pervaded by Brahman (tad-vyāpya), and whatever is pervaded by something is non-different from it.[1]

On the other hand, the cit and the acit are different from Brahman, for there is an essential difference between the nature of these three: Brahman is the controller (niyantṛ), the cit the enjoyer (bhoktṛ) and the acit the enjoyed (bhogya).[2]

[1] V.R.M., pp. 88-89.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

Hence the truth of things is a natural difference-non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābheda).

In this way alone can the bheda and abheda texts be reconciled. There are two kinds of existence, sva-tantra (or independent), para-tantra (or dependent). An independent being has his own existence and activity under his own control—the Supreme Brahman alone is such an independent Being. A dependent being has his existence and activity under the control of someone else, the soul and the pradhāna are such dependent beings. The soul is kūṭastha and nitya, i.e. unchangeable and eternal, the pradhāna is pariṇāmī and nitya, i.e. changeable, yet eternal. Now, the abheda-texts, designating abheda and denying bheda, refer to the sva-tantra-sattvā, the Lord. The Lord is self-subsistent and needs nothing besides Himself—hence there can be nothing outside Him, nothing other than Him—and it is in this sense alone that there is Unity—the One, without a second, and no plurality outside, and independent of Him. Hence if we look from the point of view of Brahman, there is abheda. The bheda-texts, affirming bheda between Brahman and the universe, refer to the para-tantra-sattvā, the cit and the acit. The sentient and the non-sentient are not self-subsisting, but point beyond themselves to something else. Hence if we look from the point of view of the universe there is bheda,—i.e. at least two realities—the universe, the dependent, and Brahman, the substratum. Thus, bheda and abheda are equally true—only due to different view-points.[1]

(ii) *Interpretation of the text "Tattvamasi".*

In the light of the above discussion alone, can the great text "Tat tvam asi" (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.) be properly interpreted. Here the term "tat" refers to the Lord, "tvam" to the soul, and "asi" the relation between them; and this relation is that the soul is non-different from the Lord, which *non-difference is compatible with a difference between them.*[2]

Section 3. The Sādhanas.

(i) *The five sādhanas.*

There is a variety of sādhanas—viz. Karma, Jñāna, Bhakti, Prapatti and Gurv-ājñānuvṛtti.[3]

[1] V.R.M., pp. 89-90. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 91. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 94.

1. Karma-yoga.[1] There are three kinds of karmas—viz.: Nitya, Naimittika and Kāmya. The nitya karmas are those which are to be performed always, such as, evening-prayer, ablution, muttering of sacred formulae, etc. Of these, the performance of sacrifices, the practice of charity, and Vedic study are obligatory to the upper three classes, while conducting and assisting sacrifices, receiving gifts and teaching the Vedas are special duties of the Brāhmaṇas alone. Thus, the Brāhmaṇas have six obligatory duties,[2] while the Kṣatriyas and the Vaiśyas only three. And, sense-control, visiting holy places, fasting, fruit-diet, distribution of food, etc. are obligatory to everyone equally. As to the different results achieved through these duties performed in different spirits, Puruṣottama holds the same view as Nimbārka.[3]

The naimittika karmas are those which are to be performed on special occasions only such as the ceremony in honour of the dead.[4]

The kāmya-karmas are those which are undertaken with worldly ends in view, e.g. the performance of sacrifices with a view to attaining heaven, etc. Such karmas lead one to endless births and rebirths, and are, hence, to be avoided by one who desires for final release. But the other two classes of karmas—viz. the nitya and the naimittika, are to be performed by those as entitled in accordance with their respective castes and stages of life. The upper three classes are to perform those which are enjoined in the Vedas, while the Śūdras are to satiate gods and deceased persons by libations of water, distribution of food,[5] etc. as laid down in the Purāṇas.

2. Jñāna-yoga. Jñāna is a special kind of direct intuition (anubhava-viśeṣa) regarding the nature, attributes, power and majesty, etc. of the Lord. It is generated through the repeated and continuous practice of the sādhanas, śravaṇa, etc. (hearing of Vedic texts, etc.) by one desirous of salvation, who, having his mind purified by the disinterested performance of the daily and occasional duties, as befitting his caste and stage of life, has come to be entitled to the study of Scripture.[6]

Thus, having ascertained the fact that the Vedānta-texts are concerned with establishing the nature and attributes of the Lord, one desiring for salvation approaches a preceptor, and hears and learns the real meaning of the Vedānta-texts from him. This is Śravaṇa.

[1] V.R.M., pp. 94–96.
[2] Nitya-karmas.
[3] See above.
[4] Śrāddha.
[5] Tarpaṇa; anna-dāna.
[6] V.R.M., p. 97.

Next, wishing to realise and see for himself the truth of what he has heard, i.e. been taught by the preceptor, he reflects on it, discusses and tests it by means of ratiocinative argumentations, etc., in accordance with Scripture. This is manana. Finally, being himself convinced that what he has been taught is the true doctrine, and wishing to have a direct vision of the Lord,—the object of śravaṇa and manana,—he devotes himself to a continuous meditation on the Lord. This is nididhyāsana.[1]

3. Bhakti-yoga. Bhakti is a special kind of direct intuition (anubhūti-viśeṣa) consisting in an unceasing meditation on the Lord, continuous and uninterrupted like the flow of a river, increasing day by day so long as life lasts.[2]

The Lord is to be worshipped by men of all castes alike, the only distinction being that the higher three classes are entitled to the meditations recommended in the Vedas, while the fourth class to the upāsanās laid down in the Purāṇas only.[3]

There are two kinds of bhakti, viz.: sādhana-rūpikā and phala-rūpā. The sādhana-rūpikā bhakti is so called because it is generated through the continuous performance of sādhanas, i.e. through the accumulated mass of puṇyas or meritorious deeds, like penance charity, self-control, etc.

Sādhana-rūpikā bhakti is, again, of two kinds—Vaidika and Paurāṇika. The former consists in practising the meditations laid down in the Upaniṣads—e.g. the Madhu-Vidyā[4] and the rest, and only the first three classes are entitled to them. The latter consists in worshipping the Lord as laid down in the Purāṇas. Sādhana-rūpikā bhakti is so called also because it is conducive to phala-rūpā bhakti, considered below.[5]

Phala-rūpā bhakti is that which is generated through the grace of the Lord Himself. A man who conscientiously performs his duties as best as he can, pleases the Lord, and gains thereby a true knowledge of his own self, and then, through the grace of the Lord, again, this knowledge of his self—by convincing him of the utter worthlessness of his own self and of the absolute greatness of the Lord, naturally generates a supreme bhakti for the Lord. Phala-rūpā bhakti is also

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[1] V.R.M., p. 43.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 97. Note that the author uses the term "bhakti" in the sense of "upāsanā" exactly after Rāmānuja.. Contrast Nimbārka's interpretation of the word.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 74. [4] Chānd., 3.1 ff. [5] V.R.M., p. 127

called "parā bhakti", "prema-lakṣaṇā bhakti", "dhruvā smṛti", etc. It is a kind of mental mode continuous and lasting so long as the self does—regarding the nature and attributes of the Lord, just like the modes of sense-organs regarding particular objects, lasting so long as those objects do. It leads to a direct intuition of the Lord. The attainment of this kind of bhakti is facilitated by keeping company with the good and hence those who wish to attain it, must always seek the company of the good,—or those whose sole end of life is the realisation of the Lord and who have consequently given up all worldly pursuits, and who never act contrary to the Lord's command.[1]

4. Prapatti-yoga or Śaraṇāgati. Prapatti is the complete entrusting of one's own self to the infinitely merciful Lord through the means recommended by the good, when one is convinced of one's incapacity for resorting to other sādhanas like knowledge and the rest.[2] It has six parts:—

(*a*) The resolve to treat everyone with good-will and friendliness, being convinced of the great truth that everyone and everything, down to a tuft of grass, is the body of the Lord and as such deserves respect.

(*b*) Discarding what is contrary to the above solemn determination, i.e. refraining from all violence, malice, backbiting, falsehood, etc.

(*c*) Strong faith in the protection of the Lord.

(*d*) Praying to the Lord for protection, being aware of the fact that the Lord, though all-merciful, does not release any one who does not pray to Him, but is, on the contrary averse to Him (otherwise there would have resulted universal release).

(*e*) Discarding all false pride and sense of egoity, i.e. assuming an attitude of utter humility.

(*f*) Complete entrusting of one's own self and whatever belongs to one's self to the Lord, being convinced that such a complete resignation of the "I" and the "mine" to the Lord alone induce the mercy and grace of the Lord.[3]

As to the qualifications of a person entitled to the prapatti-yoga, Puruṣottama holds the same view as Nimbārka.[4]

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[1] V.R.M., p. 127. See under Nimbārka 'Sahakārins to the Sādhanas'.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 97. Nimbārka simply mentions these factors but does not, as is natural with him, explain them.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 100–102.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 102. See under Nimbārka.

The object of prapatti, i.e. He to whom a man is to surrender himself is the Lord Kṛṣṇa alone, and not any other deity like Brahmā, Śiva and the rest, who are all subordinate to the Lord.[1]

It is not to be apprehended that the soul, poor and puny as it is, can have no access to the Supreme Lord, the abode of infinite might and majesty, and worshipped by great deities like Brahmā and the rest, for the Supreme Lord is not only all-powerful, but all-merciful as well and essentially devoted to His bhaktas.[2] Hence although the Supreme Lord is not easily attainable even by great deities like Brahmā and the rest, He is, nevertheless, easily attainable by those who have had recourse to Him.[3] And no reason can be assigned why the Lord, in spite of His unsurpassed greatness, should stoop low to please His devotees, for the motives and doings of the Lord are beyond all explanation and are not to be judged by ordinary standards.[4]

The peculiar efficacy or virtue of prapatti consists in the following: Through the grace of the Lord all the sins of the devotee are washed off at once. He immediately attains the fruits of all meritorious deeds, as if he has practised every penance immediately, performed every sacrifice, visited every holy place and practised every charity. What others attain through one or other of the sādhanas, after a long period of continuous effort, he attains at once without any direct effort on his own part. He becomes entirely free from all fears and all embarrassment, and is ever protected by the Lord Himself. Through the grace of the Lord he obtains the supreme sphere, whence there is no return. In this way, prapatti leads to salvation.[5]

5. Gurūpasatti or Gurv-ājñānuvṛtti. As to the nature and adhikārins of this means, Puruṣottama holds the same view as Nimbārka.[6]

He points out that every one is not to be a preceptor or a disciple. Both must be endowed with certain qualities.[7]

He, who has resorted to a guru, has everything looked after by the guru, who helps him in all matters, relation to this world or to the next.[8] This will be made clear from the following analogy of a mother and her child[9]:

[1] V.R.M., pp. 102-103. [2] See above, under Puruṣottamācārya.
[3] V.R.M., pp. 113–115. [4] *Op. cit.*, p. 115. [5] *Op. cit.*, p. 117.
[6] For details, see the account given by Sundarabhaṭṭa.
[7] V.R.M., pp. 121-122. For details, see Sundarabhaṭṭa's account.
[8] V.R.M., p. 123. [9] *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

(*a*) A child does not know what is good or what is bad for himself. (*b*) Hence he follows his mother in all respects and does what she tells, being convinced, whether by instinct or by knowledge, that whatever she does and orders is always for his own good. (*c*) His mother, on her side, protects him from all danger and (*d*) ensures safety, peace and happiness for him; alsò (*e*) she herself takes medicine, etc. for curing her (suckling) child's disease.

In the very same manner, (*a*) one who desires salvation, finding himself incapable of following any of the sādhanas by his unaided effort, gives up thinking for himself of what is good and what is bad for him, but (*b*) resorts to a guru following him in all respects and obeying his commands. (*c*) The guru, in his turn, protects him and (*d*) leads him to salvation, and (*e*) does whatever is necessary for his emancipation.

(ii) *The theory of grace.*

It remains to consider the part played by grace of the Lord as a means to release. It is emphasized again and again that it is the grace of the Lord which is the ultimate and the most immediate cause of salvation in every case without distinction. Whatever path a man may follow—knowledge, meditation, or self-surrender, etc., *in every case*, he must somehow or other invoke the grace of the Lord, otherwise all his efforts will be in vain, all his time and energy wasted. Salvation means attaining one's own real nature as well as attaining similarity with the Lord, and unless the Lord is pleased to free the soul from the fetters of beginningless karmas, thereby enabling it to realise its real nature fully and to have a direct vision of Himself, no amount of unaided effort on its own part, however great and earnest, will be of any avail in bringing about the desired end.

The successive stages in the attainment of salvation (mokṣa-prāpti-karma) are as follows[1]: A man who is looked at with favour by the Lord at the time of his birth becomes sāttvika from the very beginning,[2] i.e. has a tendency to a life of purity and knowledge. This inborn sāttvika tendency in him leads him to give up all worldly pursuits and hanker after mukti alone. This leads him to devote

[1] V.R.M., p. 133.

[2] It is said that if a man is looked at by Madhusūdana at the time of his birth, he becomes sāttvika, if by Brahmā, rājasika, and if by Rudra, tāmasika. V.R.M., p. 133.

himself whole-heartedly to the sādhanas, which has the effect of pleasing the Lord, who manifests Himself before him, and thereby he becomes free.

It is clear from the above that right from the very beginning, down to the very end, a man has to depend upon the Lord at every single step. It is the grace of the Lord which makes him desire for salvation[1] in the beginning, it is the grace of the Lord which makes him a successful pursuer of the means in the intervening period, and it is the grace of the Lord which makes him free in the end. Thus, the grace of the Lord is the most essential pre-requisite to salvation.

An objection may be raised here[2]: The grace of the Lord must be either limited or all-pervasive. But it cannot be limited, because then it must be dependent on some initiating cause (as the favour shown by a soul)[3] and not of much worth as such. Neither can it be all-pervasive, because then there will result universal emancipation and the scriptural injunctions regarding the sādhanas will become useless simply.[4]

To this objection, we reply[5]: The Lord's favour is undoubtedly all-pervading, yet it is manifested not to any and every one indiscriminately, but only to those who having approached a preceptor have had recourse to the sādhanas. A thing may be universal, yet its actual manifestations may depend on certain conditions, e.g. according to the Nyāya view the universal (sāmānya) "gotva" (cowness) is all-pervading (all universals are all-pervading according to this view), yet all things are not found to be pervaded by it (a pot, e.g. has no "gotva" in it, nor a horse), but only a certain species of animals having dew-lap, etc. (i.e. cows which alone possess "gotva"). Again, according to the Advaita view, Brahman is all-pervading, yet

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[1] Vide Ś.B., 1.1.1, Mumukṣutva is taken to be one of the four sādhanas which entitle one to Brahma-jijñāsā.

[2] V.R.M., p. 18.

[3] That is, a man favours his fellowmen sometimes, and sometimes not, such favour being dependent on some reason or other; e.g. he favours them whom he likes and not others, etc. Now, if the Lord's favour too be limited like the jīva's favours, it too, like that of the jīva, must be dependent on and conditioned by alien and external factors, and cannot, therefore, like human favour amount to much.

[4] That is, if the Lord favours any and every one at all times, evidently the sādhanas, which are for this very purpose of invoking His favour, become useless.

[5] V.R.M., p. 18.

any and every one cannot perceive it, but only those who are fit for knowing it. Such is the case with the universal grace of the Lord.

Another objection may be raised [1]: If it be said that the grace of the Lord, though all-pervading, depends on certain conditions—(viz. the sādhanas) the view that the Lord's grace is the chief cause of salvation can no longer be held. There will arise also the logical fallacy of mutual dependence: grace depends on the sādhanas, the latter on the former.

To this we reply [2]: The Lord is without an equal or a superior, thence the grace of the Lord does not *really* depend on any other condition besides Himself, but in order that He may not be accused of wantonness,—of partiality, cruelty, etc. in His bestowal of favour and also in order that Scripture, dealing with the sādhanas, may not be useless,—the Lord depends on those sādhanas *apparently* only in His bestowal of favours, and this dependence being but a mere semblance (and not a reality), in no way disproves His absolute independence.

Section 4. Mokṣa.[3]

Here Puruṣottama brings forward no new points, except that he gives a detailed account of the obstacles which prevent the attainment of salvation—which have already been noticed above.[4] The attainment mokṣa implies, thus, the performance of the sādhanas on the one hand, and the rejection of the virodhins on the other.

IV. Devācārya.

(1) Life and date.

Devācārya was twelfth after Nimbārka. Of the previous teachers who flourished between Puruṣottama and Devācārya, we know nothing. Devācārya was supposed to be an incarnation of the lotus of Viṣṇu (padmāvatāra) [5] and to have flourished in Tailaṅga in the Vaikrama Yuga-rudrendu 1112,[6] i.e. 1112 Saṃvat or 1056-57 A.D. But this view is untenable, since it is clear from internal evidences that he could not have flourished prior *at least* to Rāmānuja and Madhva,

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[1] V.R.M., p. 21. [2] *Op. cit.*

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 132ff.

[4] See under Nimbārka: 'Virodhins to the Sādhanas'.

[5] S.S., p. 2, Intro. to S.J., p. 2. [6] Intro. to S.J., p. 2.

i.e. not prior to the thirteenth century A.D., as he criticises the views of these latter philosophers.[1]

(2) Works.

Devācārya composed a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, styled "Siddhānta-jāhnavī". Unfortunately, the whole of this commentary has not yet been found, but it has been published only up to the first pāda of the first chapter (sūtras 1.1.1–1.1.31).

(3) Doctrine.

He accepts the usual doctrines of the sect—viz. the trinity of reals; Brahman, the cit and the acit, and a relation of svābhāvika-bhedābheda between them. His arguments are in many places exactly similar to those of Puruṣottama, whom he often cites as authority.[2]

(*a*) *Brahman.*

Brahman is Puruṣottama, the husband of Ramā (or Lakṣmī), possessed of infinite auspicious qualities and free from material qualities.[3]

Brahman is the creator of the Universe, both its material and efficient causes.[4] He alone can be the universal cause, (1) neither the soul, since in that case, the souls being infinite in number, there will be an infinite number of creators; (2) nor the four-faced Brahmā or Hiraṇyagarbha, since he, not being eternal, but a created being, did not exist prior to creation; (3) nor Śiva, since he too is a temporal being and not eternal; (4) nor time itself, since this view is set aside by Scripture as false; (5) nor accident (svabhāva), since on this view an effect has no fixed *cause*, but arises somehow by itself and hence how can it be said that accident is the *cause* of the effect (viz. the world) without contradiction? Thus, this view leads to the horns of a dilemma: If the effect *has a cause*, it cannot be said that it is

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[1] Vide S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 43-44, No. 94. Here he criticises the Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda of Rāmānuja. And vide S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 36-37, 42, No. 94, where he criticises the Atyanta-bheda-vāda of Madhva. Vide also S.S., p. 34, "Anye Mādhvāḥ prāhuḥ".

[2] Vide e.g., S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 51, 56; 1.1.2, p. 121, etc. (No. 94).

[3] S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 27-28 (No. 94). Also vide 1.1.1, p. 54 (No. 94).

[4] S.J., 1.1.2, p. 121, No. 94. In defining the *upādānatva* and the *nimittatva* of Brahman, the author quotes verbatim from V.R.M., p. 65. See above under Puruṣottama for explanation.

accidental, but if it *has not a cause*, it cannot be said that it has accident as its *cause*; (6) nor, finally, non-existence (abhāva), since non-existence can never give rise to existence, the sky-flower to scent.[1]

Like Nimbārka, he points out that the Universe of souls and matter is a pariṇāma or actual transformation of Brahman—who in spite of being without parts and all-pervading can have transformation,[2] and in spite of having transformation remains Himself untransformed.[3]

Brahman is satya or ever-true or eternal, jñāna or knowledge and ananta or infinite. It is the last characteristic which distinguishes Him from the non-sentient—which is eternal and devoid of knowledge and from the sentient—which is eternal.[4]

Brahman is śāstra-yoni, i.e. can be known through Scripture alone, and not through any other source. Thus, He cannot be known through perception, since in spite of the fact that the all-pervading Brahman pervades the sense-organs, these latter fail to grasp and manifest Him, as the tongue fails to see colour, the fire-fly to manifest the sun. Secondly, Brahman cannot be known through inference also, since inference is not an independent source of knowledge, but is based on perception.[5] It cannot be said that the following inference establishes Brahman:—

> Whatever is an effect has a cause, like pots, etc., and whatever is not an effect has not a cause, like time, etc. The great elements like the earth and the rest are effects. Therefore they have a cause (viz. Brahman),[6]

since, by this process of inference we can arrive at best only at a particular kind of soul, like potters, etc. Further, the ether is not admitted to be an entity by the logicians and hence it cannot be an effect, and hence the reason cited here "Whatever is an effect" does not apply to the case in hand. Thirdly, Brahman cannot be known through comparison or similarity (upamāna), for there is nothing similar to Brahman on the analogy of which He can be known,

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[1] S.J., 1.1.2, pp. 95–98, No. 94.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, pp. 109-110, 116, No. 99. The author repeats the arguments given in V.R.M., pp. 63-64. See above.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 116, No. 99. This is a point accepted by all others, Nimbārka and the rest. See above.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 122, No. 99.

[5] That is, we infer that a hill is on fire, when we first *see* smoke issuing from it, etc.

[6] Cf. V.K., 1.1.3, pp. 25-26, K.S.S.

possessed as He is of omniscience, omnipotence, etc. If it be urged that not only similarity, but dissimilarity too is a source of knowledge, e.g. we say "The elephant is dissimilar to the camel", etc.—and hence although there may be nothing similar to Brahman, yet we can know Him from His dissimilarity to the sentient and the non-sentient thus: "Brahman is one who is dissimilar to the sentient and the non-sentient"—, then we reply: the knowledge of dissimilarity between objects is based on the knowledge of the dissimilar objects themselves, e.g. we cannot know that an elephant is dissimilar to a camel, unless we first know what an elephant is, and a camel is. Similarly, we cannot know that Brahman is dissimilar to the sentient and the non-sentient, unless we first know what Brahman Himself is,—to do which we must first resort to Scripture. Fourthly, Brahman cannot be known through postulation (arthāpatti), since it is but a mode of inference which has already been disposed of. Finally, Brahman cannot be known through non-perception (anupalabdhi), since it is included under perception, which has already been disposed of. Hence the conclusion is that Brahman can be known through Scripture alone.[1]

(*b*) *The cit.*

Devācārya points out, exactly like other followers of the sect, that the soul is of the nature of knowledge, etc. He does not elucidate these points, but refers us back to Puruṣottama's "Vedānta-ratna-mañjūṣā".[2]

(*c*) *The acit.*

Like others, he holds that there are three kinds of the acit: prākṛta, aprākṛta and kāla,[3] and describes them exactly after Puruṣottama.[4]

(*d*) *Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

Devācārya criticises four different schools—viz. Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda, Advaita-vāda,[5] Dvaita-vāda and Viśiṣṭādvaita-

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[1] S.J., 1.1.3, pp. 126ff., No. 99.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 56, No. 94. See above.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 77, No. 94.

[4] Except that he does not speak of them in such great detail. Vide S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 77-78, No. 94, for the prākṛta; *op. cit.*, p. 84, for the aprākṛta; and *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87, for kāla. Vide *supra*.

[5] The point of distinction between the Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda and Pure Advaita-vāda is not clear, for both seem to represent the identical doctrine. Of course, Devācārya himself does not use these terms, Aupādhika-bhedābheda-

vāda, and establishes the doctrine of Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda.[1]

1. According to the first doctrine, Brahman is by nature One,—a pure identity, while the differences are due to beginningless adjuncts, which cease on the rise of the knowledge of identity through texts like "Thou art that", etc. (Chānd., 6.8.7, etc.). But this view is untenable, for each of the following five possible alternatives leads to absurdities. Thus:—

(*a*) It cannot be said that the soul is a portion of Brahman actually cut off from Him by the limiting adjunct, since first, Brahman cannot be cut off thus, and secondly, the soul becomes non-eternal on this view.[2]

(*b*) It cannot be said that the soul is a part of Brahman (not actually cut off from Him but) connected with the atomic upādhi,[3] since first, in that case all the faults of the upādhi will pertain to Brahman, and secondly, motion of Brahman being not possible on the motion of the upādhi, there will arise sudden bondage and release on the part of the souls.[4]

(*c*) It cannot be said that the soul is Brahman Himself, connected with the limiting adjunct,[5] for if Brahman becomes the soul in His own nature, there will remain no transcendent Brahman, unconnected with upādhis.

(*d*) It cannot be said that the soul, a conscious being and connected with upādhis, is different from and other than Brahman (who is a conscious being, but not connected with upādhis), for if a second reality besides

vāda, etc., but he evidently makes a distinction between the first view (called Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda by Sundarabhaṭṭa in S.S., p. 30) and the second view (called Māyā-vāda in S.S., p. 30), while no distinction is discernible between them. Sundarabhaṭṭa (S.S., p. 30) makes Bhāskara the representative of the first view, but it does not represent the doctrine of Bhāskara, but rather the ordinary Advaita theory.

[1] S.J., pp. 30ff., No. 94.

[2] Cf. V.R.M.,—exactly similar. See above.

[3] "Aṇurūpopādhisaṃyukta-Brahma-pradeśa-viśeṣaḥ." S.J., 1.1.1, p. 31, No. 94.

[4] Cf. V.R.M.,—exactly similar. See p. 140 of the thesis, *op. cit.*

[5] "Upādhi-saṃyuktaṃ Brahma-svarūpaṃ eva jīvaḥ." S.J., 1.1.1, p. 31, No. 94.

Brahman be admitted, the view that all difference is due to upādhis only (and is not real) falls to the ground.

(e) Finally, it cannot be said that the limiting adjunct itself is the soul, for that will lead to the Cārvāka view which identifies the soul with the body.

2. According to the second doctrine Brahman is pure consciousness, free from all specifications and all differences, sajātīya, vijātīya or svagata,[1] and absolutely non-different from the entire universe of soul and matter. But this view is not tenable, because there are hundreds of scriptural texts which teach the difference between Brahman and the universe.

3. According to the third view, the opposite extreme, there is an absolute difference between Brahman and the universe. According to this view, the so-called abheda-texts cannot refer to Brahman, for according to the abheda-view, Brahman is absolutely devoid of specifications and qualities and as such cannot be designated by words which indicate always objects possessing particular qualities. Hence the abheda-texts designate only the similarity between Brahman and the soul, but the real fact is that Brahman is absolutely different from the sentient and the non-sentient as depicted by bheda-texts. But this view too is equally untenable, for the abheda-texts cannot be set aside summarily in this fashion.

4. According to the fourth view, the sentient and the non-sentient are the attributes or adjectives of Brahman, and Brahman, thus qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient, is a unity, omniscient and omnipotent. But though the sentient and the non-sentient are attributes of Brahman, they are different fron Him, and do not corrupt Him with their own faults and defects. But this view is not tenable for the following reason. The very task of an attribute or an adjective is to differentiate the particular object which possesses that particular attribute from other objects which do not possess it,[2] e.g. the red colour of a red ball differentiates it from a blue ball and the rest. Now, in the very same manner, if the sentient and the non-sentient be attributes of Brahman, the question at once arises: from whom or

[1] Sajātīya-bheda is the difference of a tree from other trees, vijātīya-bheda is the difference of a tree from a stone or an animal, while svagata-bheda is internal difference, viz. difference of fruits, leaves, branches, etc. in the same tree. Vide Pañcadaśī, 2.14, p. 67.

[2] "Vyavarttakatvaṃ tāvad-viśeṣaṇatvam iti sarva-pakṣa-sāmānyam." S.J., 1.1.1, p. 43, No. 94.

from what object do they differentiate Brahman? It cannot be said that they differentiate Brahman from themselves (i.e. the sentient and the non-sentient), for that which differentiates can never be itself the object from which the original object (i.e. the object of which it is an attribute) is differentiated, e.g. it is absurd to say that the red colour of a red ball differentiates the ball from red colour. But nor can it be said that the sentient and the non-sentient differentiate Brahman from any other object, because there are no other objects or realities besides these three: Brahman, the sentient and the non-sentient. Hence the sentient and the non-sentient cannot be attributes of Brahman. Moreover, the Viśiṣṭādvaita view also admits of a svābhāvika bheda between Brahman on the one hand and the sentient and the non-sentient on the other, and between the sentient and the non-sentient themselves. Hence instead of admitting difference-non-difference in this round-about fashion, it is far better and reasonable to admit svābhāvika-bhedābheda all at once.

This criticism of Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda is an original contribution by Devācārya, not made by any of the previous teachers of the sect (so far known), and brings out the subtle point of distinction between the Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda and the Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda, which are so very alike in most other points.

Hence, Devācārya continues, the right conclusion is that the sentient and the non-sentient are both different and non-different from Brahman.[1]

(e) *Mokṣa.*

Salvation implies attaining the Lord, consequent on being free from Matter. "Attaining" means giving up the sense of puny and selfish egoity—the ideals of "I" and "mine" (sva-mamatva-bhāvanā) and abiding in pure unceasing intuition of the Lord.[2] Therefore, salvation does not imply the destruction of the real individuality of the soul, but only of its narrow egoity.

The freed soul, too, is under the control of the Lord, like the soul in bondage, but the great difference between the two is that while the soul in bondage is subject to fear, the freed soul is not, for fear arises only from one's separation from the Lord and the freed soul being ever in the presence of the Lord, has no cause to fear anything.[3]

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[1] S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 44-45, No. 94. Here the author follows V.R.M. See above.

[2] S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 164-165, No. 99.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.21, p. 22, No. 358.

The freed soul is possessed of a non-material body, by means of which it enjoys all sorts of pleasures and worships the Lord.[1]

Like others, he holds that there is no such thing as jīvanmukti. The soul is finally released only when it is freed from the body.[2]

(*f*) *The sādhanas.*

Dhyāna or meditation is the most direct and immediate (antaraṅga) cause of salvation. Mere knowledge of scriptural texts is of no avail here. Just as the mere knowledge of a medicine does not cure a patient unless he actually takes it, so the mere dry textual knowledge of Brahman does not free a man from the fetters of the world, unless he actually feels or realises Brahman by meditation. Hence Śravaṇa (or hearing of texts) must lead to manana (or pondering over them), and manana must lead to nididhyāsana (or meditation).[3]

If it be objected here that meditation is a kind of mental activity, and if salvation be something brought about through it, salvation becomes something produced—an effect and as such non-eternal—then, we reply: Salvation is not something generated by meditation, but the task of meditation is simply that it removes the veil which so long hid the Lord from the soul and enables it to have a direct vision of Him.[4]

Both the substratum and the object of salvation are eternal, being free from four kinds of operation,—viz. origination, modification, attainment and purification. Thus, the substratum of salvation, viz. the soul, has no origin like pots and the rest, no modification like curd and the like, is not something to be obtained, since its own nature is ever-obtained and is not something to be purified, being eternal knowledge. And, that the object, viz. Brahman is beyond all these four kinds of operation, needs no elucidation. Hence salvation too is eternal.[5]

The fact is that when the eternal knowledge of the soul becomes contracted through its connection with the beginningless ajñāna, i.e. matter and karma, it is called "bound", but when through the grace of the Lord, its connection with matter and karma ceases, and its original knowledge becomes manifest, it is called "freed". Hence

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[1] S.J., 1.1.4, p. 189, No. 99.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 195.
[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 175.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, pp. 177-178, No. 99.
[5] Utpatti, vikāra, prāpti and saṃskṛti. S.J., 1.1.4, pp. 181-182, No. 99.

bondage does not imply the destruction of the essential purity of the soul, but only a temporary contraction of its attribute of knowledge.[1]

Thus, Devācārya too admits the grace of the Lord to be an essential prerequisite of salvation.[2]

He also holds that approach to a guru (gurūpasatti) and devotion to him (guru-bhakti) are essential prerequisites of it.

Thus: Gurūpasatti → Śravaṇa → Manana → Nididhyāsana → Bhagavat-prasāda → Sākṣātkāra or Mokṣa.

V. Sundarabhaṭṭa.

(1) Life and date.

He was the immediate disciple of Devācārya and thirteenth after Nimbārka. We know nothing (so far) of his life and date. But from internal evidence, it can be asserted that he flourished after Bhāskara, Rāmānuja and Madhva.[3]

(2) Works.

He wrote a super-commentary, styled "Dvaitādvaita-siddhānta-setukā", on his guru Devācārya's commentary on the Brahma-sūtras. He also wrote an extensive commentary, styled "Mantrārtha-rahasya", on "Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī" of Nimbārka. The first work, viz. Siddhānta-setukā, has not yet been found as a whole, but only up to the Catuḥ-sūtrī.

(3) Doctrine.

His doctrine is exactly similar to that of Puruṣottama and Devācārya. In many places, specially while criticising the Advaita view, he quotes Puruṣottama verbatim.[4]

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[1] S.J., 1.1.4, pp. 182-183, No. 99.

[2] *Op. cit.* Vide also S.J., p. 3, No. 94.

[3] Vide S.S., pp. 30, 34 and 42, No. 94. See above.

[4] Vide S.S., 1.1.1, pp. 3ff., No. 94. Thus the following are some of the examples where he quotes from V.R.M. verbatim:—

(*a*) The distinction between the two kinds of virāgas, sahetuka and nirhetuka, p. 21, V.R.M., pp. 141-42. See above.

(*b*) The distinction between the different kinds of duḥkhas, p. 23, V.R.M., p. 144.

(*c*) The distinction between svatantra and paratantra sattvās, p. 48, V.R.M., pp. 89-90. See above.

(4) The sādhana "Gurūpasatti".

In his "Mantrārtha-rahasya", Sundarabhaṭṭa gives a most elaborate and detailed account of the method and procedure involved in the sādhana "Gurūpasatti"—which is really an original contribution to the sect, furnishing a guide to those who want to resort to this means.

(i) *Mokṣa or the end.*

Mokṣa involves two factors, viz.: (1) freedom from the fetters of the world and (2) attaining the nature of Brahman.[1]

(1) The first means freedom from the beginningless avidyā (or karma), which is due to the connection of the soul with prakṛti or matter and consists in a narrow sense of "I" and "mine".[2]

(2) The second means abiding in a constant intuition of the Lord, consequent on a direct vision of the Lord, due to his grace.[3]

Thus: Freedom from egoity→direct vision of the Lord→ abiding in eternal intuition of the Lord.

(ii) *Gurūpasatti or the means.*

A. Its general nature.

Gurūpasatti—which is a direct means to salvation—means renouncing or offering one's own self (ātma-nyāsa), i.e. of one's narrow

(*d*) Arguments how the soul can be both knowledge and the substratum of knowledge, pp. 60-61. V.R.M., pp. 4-5. See above.

(*e*) Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda, pp. 61-62. V.R.M., pp. 5-6. See above.

(*f*) Criticism of Avaccheda-vāda, pp. 62-63. V.R.M., pp. 6-7. See above.

(*g*) Criticism of the view that the "I" does not pertain to the essence of the self, but is something unreal, pp. 63-64. V.R.M., pp. 7-8. See above.

(*h*) Arguments that the soul is a kartā, pp. 66-67. V.R.M., pp. 11-12. See above.

(*i*) Arguments that the soul is Aṇu, pp. 69–72. V.R.M., pp. 16-17. See above.

(*j*) Criticism of Adhyāsa-vāda, pp. 78–80. V.R.M., pp. 66-67. See above.

[1] M.R., p. 28.

[2] *Op. cit.* Vide also p. 18 where it is said that the two syllables "mine" (mama) mean death and bondage, while the three syllables "not mine" (na mama) mean eternity and salvation.

[3] M.R., pp. 30-31.

individuality, together with whatever belongs to one's self (ātmīya) to the Lord, *through the guru.*[1] This may be made clear by the following two examples:—

Just as in a sacrifice, clarified butter (haviṣ) is poured into the fire (agni) by means of a ladle (sruva), so the soul is to throw itself into the Lord through the preceptor. Here the clarified butter stands for the soul, the fire for the Lord, and the preceptor for the ladle. Just as the clarified butter, when poured into the fire, is burnt off completely, so the narrow egoity (or karmas) of the soul disappear completely when it gives itself up to the Lord. Secondly, just as the clarified butter cannot be poured into the fire all at once, but has to be poured into the ladle first and *then* into the fire, so the soul is to dedicate itself first to the preceptor, and *through him* to the Lord. Thirdly, just as the fire alone can consume the clarified butter, and nothing else, so the Lord alone can burn off the karmas of the soul and none else.[2]

Or, to take another illustration: Just as a fond father at first ignores the faults of his son and lets him keep the object which he has stolen from him, but after a time sends an intermediary, a mutual friend, to his son to bring him (son) back, so the Lord at first overlooks the faults of the soul which has stolen itself (ātman), His property, from Him, and lets it enjoy the world, but after a time sends a preceptor to it to bring it back to Him. And just as in exchange for the few stolen objects, the son becomes heir to the whole property of his father, so exactly the soul in exchange for its narrow and puny egoity comes to attain the nature and qualities of the Lord.[3]

This essential truth that the soul is to offer itself to Brahman through the guru is contained in the praṇava-mantra "Om" and the bīja-mantra "klīm".[4]

Gurūpasatti is the best of all the sādhanas, involving, as it does, every other means,—work, knowledge and devotion. Thus, obeying the commands of the preceptor is following the path of action (karma-

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[1] M.R., pp. 14-15.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 14–17.
Here: Haviṣ→Sruva→Agni.
Jīva→Guru→Bhagavat.

[3] M.R., pp. 18–25.
Here: Putra→Madhyastha→Pitṛ.
Jīva→Guru→Bhagavat.

[4] M.R., pp. 9-10. See above.

yoga); knowing one's self as having the guru for his essence (tad-ātmaka) is following the path of knowledge (jñāna-yoga); and being devoted to the guru is following the path of devotion (bhakti-yoga).[1]

Gurūpasatti, further, involves the eight-fold yogas (aṣṭāṅga-yoga) which are regarded as means to a direct vision of the Lord, viz.: yama, or forbearance, niyama or religious observance, āsana or posture, prāṇāyāma or regulation of breath, pratyāhāra or restraint of the senses, dhyāna or contemplation, dhāraṇā or steadying of the mind and samādhi or profound meditation. Thus:—

(*a*) The soul's distaste for its narrow individuality (ātman) and what belongs to itself (ātmīya) is yama.
(*b*) Intense love for the Lord and the preceptor is niyama.
(*c*) The steadfast idea that all things, sentient or non-sentient, belong to the Lord, accompanied by a complete indifference to them is āsana.
(*d*) Assigning the different modes of the vital-breath (prāṇa, apāna, etc.) to the Lord, is prāṇāyāma.
(*e*) Directing the mind to the Lord alone is pratyāhāra.
(*f*) The uninterrupted intuition, viz. "Brahman is my self or essence" is dhyāna.
(*g*) The steadfastness of the above belief is dhāraṇā.
(*h*) The continuous and uninterrupted meditation of the Lord is samādhi.[2]

Thus, as every sādhana is included under this sādhana, the latter does not wait for any other sādhana, but by itself leads to salvation straight. Here Sundarabhaṭṭa holds the same view as Puruṣottama.[3]

B. Qualifications of the guru and the śiṣya.

It is evident that any and every one is not fit to be a guru or preceptor, since the preceptor is entrusted with a great task—that of leading the erring and strayed off soul back to its proper resort, viz. the Lord. The preceptor thus must belong to one or other of the upper three classes; be versed in the Vedas; devoted to the Lord; devoted to the Sacred Mantra; devoted to his guru; engaged in the proper performances of the nitya and the naimittika karmas, as well

[1] M.R., p. 26.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.
[3] Op. cit., pp. 27-28. See above.

as in the constant worship of the Lord; impartial, pure and free from malice; and an abode of kindness, parental love, forgiveness, honesty, tenderness, etc.

A man who wants salvation should resort to a preceptor who is endowed with the above qualifications, and not to any one else, for just as one cannot cross the ocean and reach the shore in a holed boat, so one cannot cross the ocean of life and attain salvation through a preceptor who is not worthy and learned.[1]

On the other hand any and every one cannot be a śiṣya or disciple. First and foremost, the disciple must be devoted to his preceptor heart and soul. He must regard his very self and everything he possesses,—his body and mind, wealth and youth, merit and demerits, relatives and friends, as but instruments for serving his preceptor. He must regard the preceptor as his all in all[2]; be wholly indifferent to his own self and to whatever belongs to his self and renounce them to his preceptor; have complete faith in the words of the preceptor and Scripture; have right discrimination of what is permanent and what is not and what belongs to himself and what not. That is, he must realise that his own self and what belongs to himself really belong to the Lord and must be returned to Him as soon as possible, through the preceptor.[3] Further, he must be honest and truthful; must not resort to any other means except self-surrender to the Lord and to the preceptor; be humble and not over-confident, i.e. must not think himself capable of resorting to other sādhanas without the help of the preceptor and so on.[4]

The preceptor should instruct only such a disciple and none else.[5]

C. Successive stages of Gurūpasatti.

The sādhana Gurūpasatti involves the following successive stages[6]:—

1. First, a man who desires for salvation approaches a preceptor,—who is endowed with the stated qualities,—with fuel in hand, lies prostrate before him and prays for his emancipation. He chooses him as his only saviour from mundane existence, from three kinds of pain (viz. physical, mental and elemental), six kinds of changes (birth,

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[1] M.R., p. 48.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 15.
[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.
[5] The guru must teach the "most intimate" disciple alone. See below.
[6] M.R., pp. 51ff.

growth, etc.), five kinds of miseries (ignorance, etc.)[1] and the three guṇas of prakṛti (sattva, etc.), as his sole master, father, husband and friend, asking him to make his own self and whatever belongs to him as his (i.e. the preceptor's) own.[2] This is the process of choosing the saviour or preceptor by the disciple.[3]

2. Prayed thus the preceptor then proceeds to examine the fitness of the candidate, allowing him to stay with him as a probationer for a whole year, or for six months, or two months—or at least for one month, as the case may require.

3. When the preceptor is satisfied of the candidate's fitness, he brings him before him, takes hold of his (the candidate's) hand, places them on his (the guru's) own feet and asks the candidate thrice whether he is really willing to give up the world and become his servant. Each time the candidate answers in the affirmative. Then the preceptor accepts the candidate finally as his servant, son, wife and friend, makes him his own and assures him that he has become his Saviour. This is the process of accepting and making the disciple his (the preceptor's) own.[4]

4. Then, reciting suitable mantras, the preceptor puts the caste-mark or the tilaka on the disciple's forehead with his own hands.

5. After that, with the utterance of prescribed formulae, the preceptor stamps the marks of Viṣṇu's conch-shell and disc on the two arms of the disciple.

6. Now the preceptor once more consecrates the body and the soul of the disciple by reciting the name and the holy mantra of the Lord.

7. After that, he puts the disciple's right arm around his (the preceptor's) own neck and teaches him the succession of the spiritual teachers of the sect.[5] Thenceforward, the disciple is to be known as belonging to that sect of teachers.

8. Next, the preceptor proceeds to inaugurate the disciple to supreme lordship with the words: "You are a king. The lap of your preceptor is your throne, his right hand is your royal umbrella, his left hand is your royal fan, the knowledge that you gain through worshipping him is your army, association with the Lord is your capital, attaining the Lord is your victory, the destruction of desires

[1] Tāpa, vikāra, kleśa.
[2] Ātmasātkaraṇa.
[3] Goptṛtva-varaṇa-vidhi.
[4] Ātmasāt-karaṇa-vidhi.
[5] Guru-paramparā.

and the connection with matter is your universal conquest". Then the preceptor blesses the disciple, assuring him that he will teach him the knowledge of Brahman. This is the process of inaugurating to the kingdom of the Lord.[1]

9. Next, the preceptor, after uttering auspicious mantras, whispers the Sacred Mantra of the sect in the right ear of the disciple and recites the "Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī" (composed by Nimbārka) to him.

10. Then the disciple comes down from the lap of the preceptor and makes obeisance to him by lying prostrate before him. The preceptor now places water in the disciple's palms, puts the Sacred Stone (śālagrāma) before him, repeats the disciple's resolution to renounce his own self and what belongs to him, as well as makes the disciple repeat it himself. Then, the preceptor takes the right hand of the disciple in his own hand and prays to the Lord to accept the disciple and make him His own (ātmasāt) through His infinite mercy and grace. Afterwards the preceptor makes the disciple take up the Sacred Stone in his hand and thereby makes the Lord accept the disciple and make him His own. The preceptor next makes the disciple eat some food first tasted by himself (by the preceptor) and drink some water touched by his (the preceptor's) feet,[2] embraces him and says to him thrice that he (the disciple) is now made his own (ātmasāt-kṛta) entirely, so he must serve his preceptor as a servant, son, wife and friend. Thrice the disciple consents to do so. The preceptor now proceeds to teach the disciple as befits his intelligence, place and time.

11. Next the preceptor worships the Sacred Stone as fitting, places It over the head of the disciple, commanding him to love and serve It as a servant serves his Master, a son his Father and so on; teaches him how to worship It, making him repeat the method lest he should forget and finally delivers the Sacred Stone to him.

12. Lastly, the disciple makes obeisance to the preceptor thrice by lying flat before him, accepts the Sacred Mantra and the Sacred Stone from him as eagerly as a penniless beggar accepts riches and offers remuneration to his preceptor as proper and enjoined.[3] Henceforward, the disciple must daily perform a three-fold worship, viz. the worship of the Sacred Mantra, that of the preceptor (who has imparted it to him) and that of the Lord (who is its object) and these

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[1] Svārājyābhiṣeka. [2] Prasāda and pādodaka. [3] M.R., p. 63.

three kinds of worship are really identical. The worship of the Mantra consists in reciting it, every word distinctly and understanding its meaning, the worship of the preceptor has been already indicated and the worship of the Lord consists in five duties.[1]

The Brahma-vidyā or the Sacred Mantra is to be imparted by the preceptor only to his most intimate and trusted disciple, who is the well-beloved of the Lord and to none else. There are four kinds of disciples, viz. an ordinary disciple (śiṣyamātra), an intimate disciple (antaraṅga), a more intimate disciple (antaraṅgatara) and a most intimate disciple (antaraṅgatama). It is only this last one who is entitled to the Sacred Mantra.[2]

The disciple, on his part, must learn the Mantra from his preceptor *directly* and from no one else, e.g. not from another favoured disciple who has learnt it directly from the preceptor himself.[3] If, however, the preceptor is in a far-off country, or dead, one wishing to know should approach a learned person who has been taught the knowledge directly by the preceptor and learn what he desires from him.[4]

VI. Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa.

(1) Life and date.

Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa was the twenty-ninth pontifical head after Nimbārka. He was the immediate disciple of Gāṅgalabhaṭṭa.[5] In his Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, however, he makes obeisance, not to Gāṅgalabhaṭṭa, but to Mukunda as his guru.[6] Perhaps, he had two gurus, or else they were identical. He is supposed to have flourished in the 14th century A.D.[7] But in conformity with our view that Nimbārka did not flourish before the 13th century A.D., we are led to think that he must have flourished later.[8]

Tradition is that he thrice conquered all learned men of his time. Hence the epithet "dig-vijayī" is often prefixed before his name.[9]

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[1] M.R., p. 66. The five duties are: abhigamana, upādāna, ijyā, yoga, svādhyaya. See below under the ritualistic doctrine of Nimbārka.

[2] M.R., p. 6. [3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 67-68

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

[5] Maṅgala-pāṭha in T.P., verse 5, pp. 1-2.

[6] Maṅgala-pāṭha in V.K.P., and colophons therein. See under Mādhava Mukunda below.

[7] Preface to T.P., p. 1. [8] See above.

[9] Vide, e.g., colophon to V.K.P., p. 73, etc.

He got the epithet "kāśmīrī", so the tradition goes, after he had vanquished the Śaivas of Kāśmīra and lived there for some time.[1]

From his works it is evident that he was a great logician, an adept in the art of very subtle and hair-splitting reasoning.

(2) Works.

He composed an elaborate commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, styled "Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā", in elucidation of Śrīnivāsa's "Vedānta-kaustubha". He wrote a commentary on the Bhagavad-gītā, too, styled "Tattva-prakāśikā", and further composed an elaborate treatise on ritual styled "Krama-dīpikā". Besides these, we know of certain stotras or hymns by him, viz. "Śrī-govinda-saraṇāgati-stotram"[2]—a collection of twelve hymns in praise of the Lord, Whom he describes as Govinda, Gopāla, Gopīnātha, etc., and "Yamunā-stotram",[3] a collection of twenty-one stotras or hymns in praise of the river Yamunā, the banks of which were the scene of Kṛṣṇa's sports with the Gopīs.

Other works by him, preserved in manuscript forms, are "Tattva-prakāśikā", a commentary on Veda-stuti, a part of the Bhāgavata-purāṇa, tenth skandha,[4] "Brahmopaniṣaṭ-ṭīkā",[5] and "Viṣṇu-sahasra-nāma-ṭīkā".[6]

He composed a commentary on the Taittariya-upaniṣad, called "Taittirīya-prakāśikā",[7] not yet found. It is alleged that he wrote

[1] His first conquest consisted in vanquishing Vidyādharācārya, the head of the Śaiva sect in Kāśmīra. After vanquishing Vidyādharācārya, Keśava deputed him to preach the Vaiṣṇava religion in Kāśmīra. Formerly Keśava was called "Keśavabhāratī", but after his conquest, he lived in Kāśmīra for a time and thenceforward came to be known as "Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa". His second conquest consisted in driving away the Yavanas from Mathurā. After his second conquest, Keśavakāśmīrin set out on his third conquest, vanquishing the Śākta sect in Bengal, defeated all learned men in Navadvīpa and himself settled in Kāśmīra.

According to the Caitanya-caritāmṛta of Kṛṣṇadāsa, chap. XVI, 28–108, one Keśava Kāśmīrī was defeated by Nimāi Paṇḍita, later on universally known as Śrīcaitanya. It is, however, not definitely known whether these two Keśava Kāśmīrīs are identical.

[2] Given in S.R., pp. 70-71.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 73–76.

[4] Cat. Cat., p. 127, Part 1; Oudh MSS., 1878, p. 42.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 28, Part 3.

[6] *Op. cit.* Vide also the preface to T.P., pp. 3-4.

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 127, Part 1.

commentaries on twelve Upaniṣads as well, and many Bhāgavata-stotras.[1]

(3) Doctrine.

He accepts the usual doctrines of the sect—the trinity of reals—and a relation of svābhāvika-bhedābheda between them. His chief merit consists in his elaborate and scholarly criticism of the Advaita-vāda. Often he refers to Sundarabhaṭṭa[2] and to "previous teachers" who have criticised the Advaita view.[3] We shall notice below some original and striking ones of such criticisms.

Criticism of the Advaitavāda.

(i) *Criticism of the Advaita views of Brahman.*

A. Criticism of Nirviśeṣa-vāda.

Brahman cannot be absolutely devoid of all qualities and specifications. In the first place, such a Brahman cannot be an object of enquiry by Scripture. According to the Advaita view three alternatives are possible here—viz. the object of enquiry is either the pure Brahman, or Brahman as limited by māyā, or Īśvara, superimposed through ajñāna. Now, the first alternative is not possible, because according to the Advaitins, the pure Brahman is not an object (aviṣaya), otherwise we might argue very well: The pure Brahman is mithyā, because it is an object of enquiry, like pots and the rest. The second alternative, too, is not possible, because in that case we shall attain a knowledge of the māyā-limited Brahman alone and not of the pure and real Brahman, and hence no salvation will follow. The third alternative, too, is not possible, because it is this very adhyāsa (or false superimposition) which, according to the Advaitins, is set aside by Scripture. Hence the Brahman of the Advaitins cannot be an object established by Scripture, i.e. must be wholly unacceptable.[4]

In the second place, the Brahman of the Advaitins cannot be the creator of the world. Here too three alternatives are possible—viz. the creator of the world is pure or śuddha Brahman, i.e. pure con-

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[1] Preface to T.P., pp. 3-4.

[2] Vide, e.g., V.K.P., 1.1.1, p. 29; 2.1.16, p. 430; 4.4.7, p. 1322. That he had a great reverence for Sundarabhaṭṭa is evident from the fact that he makes obeisance to him in the Maṅgala-pāṭha, V.K.P., verse 4, p. 19.

[3] Vide, e.g., V.K.P., 1.1.1, p. 30; 2.1.14, p. 405, etc.

[4] V.K.P., 1.1.1, pp. 22-23.

sciousness; or māyā-limited or upahita Brahman; māyā-superimposed or adhyasta Brahman. Now the first alternative is not possible, because one who is devoid of all distinctions cannot possibly think and resolve to be many, as the creator of the world does in the beginning according to Scripture.[1] In fact, an object, free from all distinction, being beyond every proof, is but a non-entity.[2] The second alternative, too, is not possible. Here the question is whether the māyā-limited creator is of the form of the object reflected (bimba-rūpa) or of the form of the reflection (pratibimba-rūpa). Not the first, for in that case just as the face reflected on a mirror is outside the mirror and does not pervade it, so Brahman will be outside the individual soul and non-pervasive of it, and thereby cease to be the inner controller of all. Not the second, because in that case, since the qualities of the upādhi belong to the reflection (e.g. when the mirror—which is the upādhi—is dirty, any reflection on it is also so, and so on)—Brahman must be subject to all the faults, etc. due to avidyā (which is the upādhi here). The third alternative, too, is not possible, because the superimposition of avidyā on Brahman—which is by nature knowledge, is absurd, just as it is absurd to hold there is darkness in the sun.[3]

The Advaitins themselves describe Brahman as truth, knowledge and bliss. Now, they must either hold that these constitute the nature of Brahman, or the attributes of Brahman. Now if these be the nature of Brahman, then Brahman will have a three-fold nature, which will go against the Advaita view itself, and if these be the qualities of Brahman, that too will go against the Advaita view. Moreover, if it be said that they denote the nature of Brahman, then Brahman becomes an object (viṣaya) of words,—which is against the Advaita view. If it be said Brahman cannot be denoted by words, then Brahman becomes anirvacanīya and as such mithyā in accordance with the inferences: Brahman is mithyā, because it is anirvacanīya, for whatever is anirvacanīya, is mithyā, like māyā. Brahman is mithyā, because it is asat, for whatever is asat is mithyā, like the snake-rope.[4] Hence Nirguṇa-vāda and nirviśeṣa-vāda are full of self-contradiction and as such absolutely untenable.

[1] Vide Chānd., 6.2.2. [2] See above.

[3] V.K.P., 1.1.2, p. 48. See below under Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava for further criticisms on this point.

[4] V.K.P., 1.1.2, pp. 49-50.

(ii) *Criticism of the Advaita view of the jīva.*

A. Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda.

The individual soul cannot be a reflection of Brahman, because Brahman being formless and colourless, can have no reflection.[1] Further, the connection of the individual soul with the upādhi or the limiting adjunct (viz.. avidyā on which Brahman is reflected), can neither be natural or svābhāvika, since that will make salvation impossible—nor be due to upādhi or aupādhika, since that will lead to an infinite regress, for an upādhi will require another upādhi to be connected with the soul, that still another and so on. Further, we find in ordinary experience that the object reflected (bimba) and on which it is reflected (upādhi) belong to the same category. For example, the real sun is reflected on real water only, but never on the mirage. Hence Brahman and avidyā must belong to the same category, i.e. avidyā must be as real as Brahman. Also, an object can be reflected on something else, only when it is outside that something else. For example, an aquatic animal, plunged in a river, can never be reflected on the river. But avidyā is not admitted to be outside Brahman, who is all-pervading and hence there can be no reflection of Brahman on avidyā.[2]

B. Criticism of Avaccheda-vāda or Upādhi-vāda.

It is absurd to say that Brahman, who is by nature eternal and infinite knowledge, an abode of bliss and power, can ever come to be connected with avidyā and upādhi. Now, the upādhi must be either all-pervading, or atomic or of the middle size (i.e. of the size of the body). But it cannot be all-pervasive, because in that case, the entire Brahman will be veiled up. Nor can it be atomic, for then there being no motion of the all-pervading Brahman on the motion of the upādhi, there will result sudden bondage and release.[3] Nor can it, finally, be of the middle size, for that will go against the Advaita view that the individual soul is atomic owing to its connection with an atomic upādhi. Moreover, if the upādhi be real, then the doctrine of Non-dualism will fall to the ground—there being at least two

[1] Cf. V.R.M. See above.

[2] V.K.P., 1.1.1, p. 28. See below under Puruṣottamaprasāda for further criticisms.

[3] Cf. V.R.M. See above.

realities—Brahman and upādhi, and also no salvation will be possible, since knowledge cannot set at naught what is real. If, on the other hand, the upādhi be unreal, then to say that the upādhi binds the soul would be just as absurd as to say that a dream-fetter binds a man who is awake.[1]

C. Criticism of Eka-jīva-vāda.

If there be only one individual soul, then evidently, there will be an unwarrantable intermixture of the respective experiences of different individuals. It cannot be said that though there is no real difference between different individuals, yet there is the difference which is due to upādhis and as such there is no intermixture of experiences,—for, we point out that the difference, which is due to upādhis only, does not guarantee non-intermixture, for in spite of the differences of hands, feet, etc. (which are due to upādhi), the sensations in hands or feet, etc. are alike felt by the soul.[2]

D. Criticism of Akartṛtva-vāda.

The view that the soul is not really a kartā or an active agent, but only appears to be so through the false superimposition or adhyāsa of the kartṛtva of the antaḥkaraṇa on the soul, just as white crystal appears to be red through the superimposition of the redness of a red flower—is not tenable. In the case of the crystal and red flower, redness is perceived separately in the crystal and in the flower: 'The crystal is red'. 'The flower is red.' But in the case in hand we never have perceptions to the effect 'The mind is a kartā', 'The soul is a kartā' separately, but we always feel 'I am kartā' (and not my mind).[3]

(iii) *Criticism of the Advaita view of the jagat.*

A. Criticism of Vivarta-vāda.

To say that the world is but an illusory transformation of Brahman and not a real one is absurd. The Advaitins too admit Brahman to be the efficient and the material cause of the world. But if the world be false, then Brahman cannot be its efficient cause, for nobody can be the creator of what is false, e.g. nobody—neither the mistaken person himself nor others—can ever create a nacre-silver. It cannot

[1] V.K.P., 1.2.6, pp. 102-103.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 24.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.32, pp. 675ff.

be said that Brahman is the creator here in the sense as a magician is,—for the latter shows tricks to delude an audience, but there is none whom Brahman can delude by creating a false world.

Again, Brahman, the real, cannot be the material cause of the unreal world, for the cause and the effect must be of the same nature. If it be said that Brahman is the material cause in the sense of being the substratum of error,[1] then we point out that this definition is both too narrow, since clay, etc. which are not substrata of error are still the material causes of pots, etc., and too wide, since the nacre, e.g. which is the substratum of the silver-nacre illusion, is not the material cause of the illusory silver. If it be said that the world is the vivarta or illusory transformation of Brahman and the pariṇāma or real transformation of ajñāna, and hence not Brahman alone, but Brahman and ajñāna both are the material cause of the world,—then we reply: if a real object assumes the form of an unreal something, then it must have certain specific features which enables it to appear in that unreal form, e.g. any and every object does not appear to be a piece of silver, but only nacre, which possesses certain features (lustre, etc.) which appears in the form of silver to the unwary. But Brahman,—which according to the Advaitins is absolutely devoid of attributes, etc.,—can have no such qualities of appearing as the false world. If it be said that the material cause of an object is that which is not seen to be separate from the object itself, then we point out that in that case, Brahman (which according to the Advaitins is not separate from the individual soul) becomes the material cause of the individual soul and the individual soul as a result becomes real; the milk becomes the material cause of water, because it is never separated from water; and the calf becomes the material cause of "cowness", because it is never separated from "cowness". If it be said that māyā is the material cause, Īśvara the instrumental cause, and the pure Brahman the substratum or the adhiṣṭhāna, then we point out that this goes against the view that the material cause and the efficient cause of the universe are identical. The fact is that to say that Brahman is the substratum of the cosmic illusion is to give up practically the doctrine that Brahman is the material cause of the world, as held by the Advaitins themselves,—for the nacre, the substratum of the silver-nacre illusion, is never the material cause of the illusory silver. Thus, the Advaita view is full of self-contradictions, and fails to prove how

[1] Bhramādhiṣṭhāna.

Brahman can be the material and efficient cause of an illusory world, although it holds Brahman to be such.[1]

Moreover, as already hinted above, a substratum of an illusion must possess certain qualities. A nacre e.g. must have certain qualities in common with the silver, such as lustre, etc.—which bring about the illusion. And it must also have certain qualities of its own, as distinct from those of the silver, which when known bring about the end of the illusion. But the attributeless Brahman of the Advaitins can have no such qualities, and hence cannot be the substratum of the cosmic illusion. Hence no substratum of superimposition being possible, the superimposition itself is not possible and hence the world cannot be a vivarta or illusory superimposition of Brahman.[2]

Further to say that the world is neither real—for then it could not have been set aside by knowledge,—nor unreal—for then it could not have been perceived,—but is anirvacanīya and mithyā, does not stand to reason. For in the first place no definition and no proof of mithyātva and anirvacanīyatva are possible.[3] Further, it is not a fact that it is an unreal thing only which can be set aside; e.g. the real anterior ignorance[4] regarding an object by the knowledge of that object; the real knowledge of a pot by that of a piece of cloth; real past impressions by recognition; real affection, etc. for a person by his faults; the real sin of murdering a Brāhmaṇa by a visit to the Setubandha,[5] etc.

Moreover, it is found in the world that the denial of an object and the object denied (nivarttya) belong to the same category, and hence ajñāna, too, must be real like the denial of ajñāna; knowledge and the object known, the doṣa and the adhiṣṭhāna belong to the same category, and hence ajñāna, too, must be real like Brahman.[6]

According to the Advaitins, the world is false, but the question arises here—whether this falsity itself is false or not. If it be false, then evidently the world becomes real, if it is not false, then the doctrine of Non-dualism falls to the ground—there being at least two realities—Brahman and falsity.[7]

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[1] V.K.P., 1.4.23, pp. 350ff. See below under Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava for further criticisms.

[2] V.K.P., 1.1.1, p. 30.

[3] Here the author refers back to "former teachers", p. 405. But he himself also elaborately discusses the definition, etc. of mithyātva on pp. 412ff. For these, see below under Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava.

[4] Prāgabhāva.

[5] V.K.P., 2.1.14, pp. 405ff.

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 407.

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 412; 2.1.19, p. 446.

It may be urged that the notion of difference is not a logical category and does not stand to reason. Is it the very nature of a thing, or its attribute? It cannot be the nature of a thing, for in that case it becomes the synonym for that thing (which evidently it is not), just as the word "hasta" is a synonym of the word "kara". It cannot be also the attribute of a thing, for in that case, it must be different from the nature of the thing, that difference again must be different and so on to infinity. Moreover—there can be the apprehension of different objects only on the apprehension of the difference between them, and the apprehension of difference only on the apprehension of different objects,—this will lead to the logical fallacy of mutual dependence.[1]

To this we reply that the same difficulties confront the notion of non-difference too. Thus, is non-difference the nature of an object or its attribute? It cannot be the nature of an object, because in that case such perceptions as "This is a pot", "This is a piece of cloth" (instead of "This is non-different") come to be false. Also, if every perception had pure, non-differenced consciousness as its object, then a mere perception of a pot would have brought about the knowledge of identity (non-difference being the very nature of the pot must be perceived when the pot is perceived), and in that case, the Vedānta-discussions would be futile. Nor can non-difference be the quality of an object,—for that too will lead to the same difficulties as above,—to dualism and self-contradiction. The fact is that like class, non-difference is a special quality of an object, and is apprehended as soon as the object itself is.[2]

Thus, the Advaita view is wholly untenable.

(iv) *Criticism of the Advaita view of mokṣa.*

A. General criticism.

The Advaita view that the one Īśvara is reflected on many limiting adjuncts or internal organs, just as the one face is reflected on many mirrors around it, and that when the limiting adjunct is no more, the individual soul becomes Īśvara, just as when a mirror is broken or removed, the face reflected on it is no more, is not tenable.

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[1] That is, to know a cow, we must know it to be different from a horse, etc., all perception being assimilation and discrimination, yet to know the difference of the cow from the horse, we must know the cow first.

[2] V.K.P., 2.3.42, pp. 302-3. Cf. Śrī. B., 1.1.1.

Here two alternatives are possible: either the individual soul becomes Īśvara in nature or comes to possess Īśvara's attributes like omniscience and the rest. On the first alternative, the question is whether becoming Īśvara in nature means becoming non-separate from it (without losing one's individuality), or losing one's own nature. If the first, then there is nothing to object, this being our own view,—but it will go against the Advaita view itself. If the second, then mukti will imply the very destruction of the nature of the soul, while the fact is that Scripture explicitly states that the freed soul is manifested in its own form.[1] Further, the question is whether Īśvara, the object reflected, and the soul, the reflection, are real entities, or mithyā and anirvacanīya or tuccha like the hare's horn. They cannot evidently be real entities, for that will be giving up the Advaita view; nor can they be mithyā, etc., for then the very question of bondage and release will be meaningless, seeing that the non-differenced Reality is never subject to bondage and the bound soul is but an unreality. For that very reason, they cannot be tuccha.

On the second alternative also the question is—Do the souls come to possess qualities *similar to* omniscience, etc., i.e. become *similar to* Īśvara, or do they come to possess those very qualities, i.e. become equal to Īśvara? The first goes against the Advaita view itself, and the second is impossible and has no proof, and will lead to the view that there are many Īśvaras.[2]

B. Criticism of Jīvan-mukti-vāda.

The rule is that on the destruction of the cause, the effect must be invariably destroyed, e.g. when the threads are destroyed, the cloth is also destroyed simultaneously. But the Advaita view is that even when the pure and intuitive knowledge of Brahman arises, the works which have already begun to bear fruit continue to function, i.e. in spite of the destruction of avidyā (which is the cause), by knowledge, the mundane existence (which is the effect) continues. The question is whether knowledge destroys avidyā or not. If it does not, then it will lose its essential nature, the very nature of knowledge being to remove ignorance, and no salvation will ever be possible; and if it does, there can be no jīvan-mukti. It cannot be said that just as the strong smell of garlic persists, even when the garlic-pot

[1] Vide Chānd., 8.3.4. "Svena rūpeṇa abhiniṣpadyate."

[2] V.K.P., 4.4.7, pp. 1322ff.

has been thoroughly washed, so even when avidyā is destroyed by vidyā, the impressions or saṃskāras of avidyā still persist and cause the continuance of mundane existence,—for this too is open to the same objection as before. None but a fool will say that when the sun arises there can still be some trace of darkness. In the very same manner, there cannot be even the faintest trace of avidyā when vidyā arises. Nor can it be said that the jīvan-mukta is like a piece of burnt cloth (the texture of which is destroyed, but the shape persists),—for the burnt cloth crumbles off to ashes, at the slightest touch, and serves no practical purposes of covering, etc. as a real piece of cloth does, but a jīvan-mukta acts like any other man, and just as he himself did before. Further, what exactly is this cessation of avidyā or avidyā-nivṛtti which, according to the Advaitins, is salvation? Is it the very nature of the self or something else? If the first, then the self being eternal, the cessation of avidyā too must be so, and in that case knowledge (which has to bring it about) becomes futile. If the second, then the question is: Is it real, or unreal, or both or anirvacanīya? Not the first, for then the doctrine of Non-dualism falls to the ground; nor the second, for then it cannot be set aside by knowledge (what is *not*, cannot be set at naught, only an existent object can be set aside), and in that case knowledge would become futile like a lamp during the day; nor the third, reality and unreality being mutually opposed, a thing cannot be both real and unreal; nor finally, the fourth, for what is anirvacanīya is set aside by knowledge. Thus, we conclude that the Advaita doctrine of Jīvan-mukti does not stand to reason in any way, and to say that an embodied being, still under the control of (prārabdha) karmas and subject, as a consequence, to all the human frailties and passions, is freed, is just as absurd as to call a man born blind "lotus-eyed", or a street beggar the "lord of the goddess of fortune".[1]

VII. Śrībhaṭṭa.

He was the immediate disciple of Keśavakāśmīrin, and the thirtieth teacher after Nimbārka. We know of only one work by him, not of any philosophical interest, viz. "Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-saraṇāpatti-stotram",[2]—a collection of twenty-five hymns in praise of Kṛṣṇa, where he describes the Lord, the Moon of Vṛndāvana, of the clan of

[1] V.K.P., 4.4.7, pp. 1328–1330.

[2] Given in S.R., pp. 69-70.

Brajas and of the Rādhā-lotus (śloka 2), the Lord of the young cow-herdesses, beautiful like thousand cupids, enjoying sports with Rādhā (śloka 3), the delighter of the world, with eyes like lotus and dark blue in colour (śloka 4), dressed in yellow robes (śloka 5) and playing on the flute (śloka 6), etc.,—as his sole resort.

VIII. Harivyāsadeva.

(1) Life and date.

Harivyāsadeva was the immediate disciple of Śrībhaṭṭa and thirty-first after Nimbārka. Nothing is known about his life or date. He was a great Vaiṣṇava and a staunch supporter of the doctrine of non-violence.[1]

(2) Works.

He wrote a commentary, styled "Siddhānta-kusumāñjali", on Nimbārka's "Daśa-ślokī", and a commentary, styled "Prema-bhakti-vivardhinī", on Sadānandabhaṭṭa's "Śrī-Nimbārka-śata-nāma-stotram". Other works by him, preserved in manuscript forms, are "Artha-pañcaka",[2] and "Vedānta-siddhānta-ratnāñjali".[3]

(3) Doctrine.

Harivyāsadeva's doctrine has much in common with that of Baladeva.[4] It is probable that he was influenced by the school of Baladeva. In any case, in his doctrine we find many points of departure from the usually accepted tenets of the school of Nimbārka.

Like Baladeva, he admits five categories or tattvas, viz. Īśvara or the Lord; Jīva or the individual soul; Prakṛti or matter; Kāla or time; and Karma or work.[5] Of these, the first two are sentient,—different from each other by the fact that the former is all-pervasive, while the latter is atomic, and similar to each other by the possession of the eight-fold qualities, freedom from sins, etc.[6]—the last three are

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[1] B.M.G., pp. 310-311. The tradition is that he was so very pained at seeing the Goddess Mahāmāyā accept animal-sacrifice, that he induced the Goddess herself to be initiated in the Vaiṣṇava-mantra and to discourage animal-sacrifice among her devotees.

[2] Rep. Bh., 1894, p. 76. Vide also Rep. Katha., p. 29, where the name given is "Tattvārtha-pañcaka".

[3] Rep. Bh., 1894, p. 76.

[4] For Baladeva's doctrine see below in *loco*.

[5] Ś.K., pp. 4, 22.

[6] Vide Chānd., 8.7.1.

non-sentient. Again, the first four are eternal,—without beginning as well as without end, while the last, viz. karma, is without beginning, but has an end.[1]

Īśvara is the Controller, while the last four, viz. the soul, etc., are the controlled. Among these latter again, the soul is the enjoyer, matter is the object enjoyed, time is the efficient cause of enjoyment (since the soul enjoys material objects in time).[2]

It is strange that Harivyāsadeva, though belonging to the school of Nimbārka, does not speak of the *aprākṛta* as the fifth category,[3] as done by all the followers of Nimbārka, but substitutes karma in its place exactly after Baladeva.

(*a*) Brahman.

The Highest Reality or Brahman is, as usual, Lord Kṛṣṇa or Hari. He is called Hari because a mere remembrance of Him is enough to wash off all sins.[4]

The Lord is the abode of all auspicious qualities and free from the qualities of matter. But though the Lord appears to be both the attribute (guṇa) and the substratum of attributes (guṇin)—i.e. as both knowledge and knower, bliss and blissful, etc.—yet really there is no difference between the substratum, the Lord and His attributes. Similarly, though He appears to have a body, yet there is really no difference between the soul, the Lord (dehin) and His body (deha). Thus, the Lord is one whole with no differences in Him, identical with His attributes and identical with His body. But although there is no real difference between the Lord and His attributes and between the Lord and His body, yet there is a conventional or natural one (viśeṣa). The sense is that statements like "Be-ness exists" (Satā satī), "Distinction is difference" (Bhedo bhinnaḥ), "Time exists always" (Kālo sarvadā asti) are not useless tautologous statements, but they are natural and conventional, conveying a very good sense

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[1] Ś.K., p. 2. Cf. Baladeva, below. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

[3] In śloka 3 of D.S. Nimbārka speaks of the "aprākṛta" which is taken by all, except Harivyāsadeva, to mean "what is not derived from prakṛti", but from a luminous stuff, different from prakṛti. Harivyāsadeva takes it to mean the mūla-prakṛti, with the attributes of sattva and the rest non-manifest, as contrasted from prakṛti ("prākṛta-rūpam") with the attributes of sattva, etc. manifest. Ś.K., pp. 14-15.

[4] Ś.K., p. 19. See above.

just like the statements "A jar exists", etc. Here the distinction between "Be-ness" and "existence", "Distinction" and "difference", etc. is due to "viśeṣa" or conventional distinction and not to "bheda" or real distinction. In the very same manner, statements like "Knowledge (Brahman) is knower", etc. are very natural and yield a perfect sense and the difference between the Lord and His attributes, or between the Lord and His body, is a case of convention (viśeṣa) and not of real difference (bheda). Viśeṣa is not bheda, but rather a representative of bheda, so to speak, accomplishing the task of bheda, viz. differentiation, without bringing about real difference.[1]

This is a new point, not brought out by the previous writers of the sect, so far known. Here also Harivyāsadeva is in perfect concordance with Baladeva.[2]

Like Baladeva again, Harivyāsadeva emphasises the inconceivable powers (acintya-śakti) of the Lord. He points out that the Lord, though all-pervading, can yet abide within the heart of men, etc. through His inconceivable powers.[3]

(*b*) The cit.

(i) *Its nature, etc.*

The soul, he points out like others, is of the nature of knowledge and a knower, an Ego, an active agent, an enjoyer, a slave of the Lord, i.e. ever under His control, eternal, subject to bondage and release, atomic in size, and infinite in number.[4]

Unlike Baladeva, Harivyāsadeva extends his above doctrine of viśeṣa to the case of the soul as well, in order to show that there is no distinction between the soul and its qualities, as in the case of the Lord and His qualities. The distinction between the soul and its qualities is due to conventional difference or viśeṣa and not to real difference or bheda. Hence it is that the soul is both knowledge and a knower.[5]

Like others, he holds that there are broadly two kinds of souls—those in bondage and those that are free—with various sub-divisions.[6]

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[1] Ś.K., pp. 9, 20 and 21. "Viśeṣaśa bhedopratinidhiḥ na bhedaḥ", etc.

[2] Cf. Baladeva's doctrine of Viśeṣa and his consequent doctrine of the identity of the Lord and His attributes and body. See below.

[3] Ś.K., p. 7. Vide Baladeva, below.

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 5–8.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p.).

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 14. Cf. V.R.M. See above.

(ii) *Criticism of the Advaita doctrine of the jīva.*

A. Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda.

He criticises the Pratibimba-vāda exactly after Puruṣottama. He points out that the statement that the soul is a reflection of Brahman is to be understood as denoting figuratively that it is dependent on Brahman just as the reflection is dependent on the object reflected.[1]

B. Criticism of Avaccheda-vāda.

He here follows Devācārya exactly.[2]

(*c*) THE ACIT.

(i) *Its nature, etc.*

The acit, as pointed out above, is of three kinds, prakṛti or matter, kāla or time and karma or action.[3] He accepts the usual Sāṃkhya theory of creation.[4]

(ii) *Criticism of the Advaita view of the jagat.*

A. Criticism of Adhyāsa-vāda.

The doctrine that the world of plurality is falsely superimposed on Pure Consciousness or Brahman, just as blue colour is falsely superimposed on the sky and is set aside by knowledge—is not tenable. Nothing can be superimposed on what is not an object of knowledge. The blue colour can be attributed to the sky because the sky is an object of knowledge—but Brahman is never so, according to the Advaitins. Further, what kind of knowledge effects the negation here—pure knowledge (śuddha) or knowledge of particular objects (vṛtti-rūpa)? Not the first, because it being eternal, there will be an eternal negation of adhyāsa, i.e. there will be no cosmic illusion at all. Not the second, because if it be real, then Dualism must be admitted; if it be unreal, then it cannot effect the negation. Moreover, it can by no means be said that the cosmic illusion is due to ajñāna. Does this ajñāna inhere in Brahman or in the individual soul? Brahman, who is pure and eternal consciousness, cannot evidently be the substratum of ajñāna. Nor can the soul be the

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[1] Ś.K., pp. 5-6. Cf. V.R.M. See above.
[2] See above.
[3] Ś.K., p. 221.
[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 144ff.

substratum of ajñana, since it itself is due to the ajñāna.[1] Further, is ajñāna real or unreal? It cannot be real, for then it cannot be set aside, and it cannot be unreal, because that will contradict such feelings "I am ignorant", etc., which prove the existence of ajñāna. If it be said that ajñāna is neither real nor unreal, then we point out that there is no proof of such an object which is neither real nor unreal. A pot is real, a sky-flower is unreal, but we never know something which is both. Further, on the doctrine of strict dualism, there can be no teacher of that doctrine, for the teacher must either be aware of this truth or not. If he is aware of the truth that everything is Brahman, then evidently he cannot instruct his disciple who is identical with himself, and if he is not aware of this truth, he cannot evidently be a teacher.[2]

(*d*) Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.

Harivyāsadeva criticises, firstly, the Advaita view, as shown above. Secondly, he criticises also the Viśiṣṭādvaita view, viz. that the sentient and the non-sentient constitute the attributes and the body of the Lord, yet are different from Him, otherwise the defects of the latter will pertain to the former. He points out against this view that there can be no real difference between the Lord and His qualities and body—as shown above—and that it is after all unnecessary to take the sentient and the non-sentient to be the body of the Lord, since everything, being under His control and pervaded by Him, is of the form of Him.[3] Thirdly, he criticises the view that the Lord and the sentient and the non-sentient are non-different, yet different. He points out that if there be non-difference between Brahman and the universe, the former will be contaminated by all the faults and defects of the latter, and the latter will be endowed with all the supreme excellences of the former.[4] He concludes, therefore, that the real fact is that there is an essential difference between them, and takes Nimbārka as the representative of pure Dualism.[5] This, of course, is a strange assertion on the part

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[1] Cf. Śrī. B., 1.1.1. See below under Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava for further details.

[2] Ś.K., pp. 24ff. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 27. [4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 27ff.

[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 22ff. "Nimbārkasya śuddhaṃ dvaitam evābhimatam", p. 22. Vide also Śānti-pāṭha at the end of Ś.K., p. 39:—

"Brahma satyaṃ jagat satyaṃ satyaṃ bhedam api bruvan.
Nimbārko Bhagavān vidbhiḥ satyavādī nigadyate."

of a follower of Nimbārka, seeing that Nimbārka himself never supported *pure* Dualism, but a doctrine of natural difference-non-difference.[1]

This goes to show that Harivyāsadeva was deeply influenced by the Madhva and Caitanya schools of thought, as noted above also.

(*e*) Mokṣa.

Bondage consists in turning one's face away from the Lord (Bhagavad-bahir-mukha), while release consists in turning one's face towards the Lord (Bhagavat-sanmukha).[2] So long as the soul is averse to the Lord, it remains connected with matter, i.e. with two kinds of bodies—subtle and gross. The subtle body accompanies the soul from birth to birth, while the gross body is created anew at the beginning of each creation and destroyed again. But when the soul comes to have a real devotion for the Lord, it gets rid of both these kinds of bodies.[3]

There are two kinds of salvation—aisvaryyānanda-pradhānā and sevānanda-pradhānā. The former consists in enjoying the lordship, etc. given to the freed by the Lord, the latter consists in abiding in eternal bliss by serving the Lord alone. The former is desired by the devotees who desire to enjoy objects given by the Lord, the latter by those who desire the Lord and the Lord alone. To them the service of the Lord is the source of the most supreme bliss and not a source of pain, etc. as ordinary servitude is.[4]

Salvation may be, again, either gradual (krama-mukti) or immediate (sadyomukti). This also is a new point brought out. Harivyāsadeva points out that some devotees who perform actions in a pure and unselfish spirit, first attain heaven, the Svarga-loka, and successively higher and higher regions, till they reach the highest, viz. the Satya-loka, the world of Brahmā. There, when their fetters are completely broken, they, on the dissolution of that world, attain the Brahma-loka. This is krama-mukti. Some devotees, on the other hand, have their fetters broken at once through devotion, and the practice of hearing and the rest, and their subtle bodies are at once destroyed as a result and they go straight to the world of Brahman. This is sadyomukti. Both these kinds of devotees have to travel through the path of gods (Deva-yāna-panthā)[5] to reach the region of Brahman.[6]

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[1] See above. [2] Ś.K., pp. 7, 11. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 7.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 13. [5] See pp. 60-61 of the thesis, Part 1.
[6] Ś.K., p. 12. Cf. Baladeva, below.

(*f*) The sādhanas.

1. The first essential prerequisite of salvation is sat-saṅga or company of the good. By resorting to good and holy men, one desirous of salvation comes to realise the real nature of the human body and the soul.

2. This knowledge gives rise to a feeling of humbleness (dainya) in him and destroys his pride of knowledge, riches, etc.

3. Then there arises in him an intense reverence (śraddhā) for the Lord Kṛṣṇa, and he desires to dedicate himself completely to Him (prapatti).

4. This reverence for the Lord leads him to the śravaṇa, manana, etc.

5. Thereupon, the Lord being pleased with his humbleness and reverence, takes pity on him and generates the spirit of self-surrender in him.

6. Finally, the grace of the Lord generates a supreme devotion in him (bhakti), consisting in a special love for the Lord[1] and it leads to salvation.

Thus: Sat-saṅga→Dainya and Garva-hāni→Śraddhā and Prapatti-pravṛtti→Śravaṇa, etc.→Bhagavad-anugraha→Prapatti→Bhakti→Mukti.[2]

Self-surrender has six parts.[3] Devotion, too, is of two kinds—viz. prema-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇā,—which, as pointed out above, arises from the grace of the Lord, and is the best kind of devotion and the best means, and sādhana-rūpikā, which arises through resorting to the Good and the Holy, and through the practice of Śravaṇa and the rest. This second kind of devotion leads to the first and is of two kinds—viz. vidhi-bhakti and ruci-bhakti.[4] The first kind of devotion (viz. prema-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇā) has five different modes, viz. śānta, dāsya, sakhya, vātsalya and aujjvalya or mādhuryya, typical examples of which are, respectively, the devotions of Vāmadeva and others; Uddhava and others; Śrīdāma, Sudāma and Arjuna, etc.; Devakī, Vāsudeva, etc.; Rādhā and others.[5] This conception of the five-fold rasas or sentiments is a new point brought out, and distinctly borrowed from the Caitanya school of thought.

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[1] Cf. the meaning of the word "bhakti" in Nimbārka and Puruṣottama. See above.

[2] Ś.K., p. 37.

[3] Cf. V.R.M. See above.

[4] Cf. Baladeva. See below.

[5] Ś.K., p. 37.

There are certain things which prevent the attainment of the Lord, viz. the ten kinds of sins against the Name (nāmāparādha) and the thirty-two kinds of sins of Service (sevāparādha),[1] and all these are to be avoided with care by one who desires salvation.[2]

We conclude, therefore, Harivyāsadeva was deeply influenced by the Caitanya movement[3] and introduced many new ideas to his sect from that school of thought.

IX. Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava I.

(1) Life and date.

Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava is reputed to be Svabhūdevācārya, the immediate disciple of Harivyāsadeva and thirty-second after Nimbārka.[4] This seems to be supported by one of the opening verses in his work, where he says that he is making a collection of all scriptural truths in that work by means of the knowledge which he has gained through the grace of Harivyāsadeva.[5] This suggests that he was the immediate disciple of Harivyāsadeva and directly instructed by him.

Nothing, unfortunately, is known of his life and date. His work supplies evidence of his great scholarship.

(2) Works.

He wrote a copious commentary, styled "Śruty-anta-kalpa-vallī", on Nimbārka's "Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja".

(3) Doctrine.

The chief merit of Puruṣottamaprasāda is his very elaborate and scholarly criticism of the Advaita view, with which he seems to be concerned chiefly. One cannot but be amazed at his wonderful power of subtle argumentation. As regards his general doctrine, he

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[1] Cf. Baladeva. See below.

[2] Ś.K., p. 39.

[3] In our list of preceptors, Harivyāsadeva is second after Keśavakāśmīrin and hence must have flourished after Caitanya.

[4] Preface to Ś.K., p. 6.

[5] Ś.K., Maṅgala-pāṭha, Śloka 5, p. 1:—

"Śrī-Harivyāsadevācārya-karuṇā-labdha-buddhinā.
Viduṣāṃ kautukārthaṃ vai kriyate śāstra-saṃgrahaḥ."

accepts the usual tenets of the sect and often refers us back to Puruṣottama,[1] Devācārya,[2] and Sundarabhaṭṭa.[3]

(*a*) *Brahman.*

The Highest Reality—Brahman, Kṛṣṇa and Hari—is an abode of all auspicious qualities and free from all inauspicious and material ones.[4] The attributes and powers of the Lord are natural—parts and parcels of His very nature, and their denial, therefore, amounts to a denial of the very nature of the Lord. Qualities and powers may be of two kinds, natural and adventitious, e.g. the natural qualities of fire and water are heat and cold respectively, while their adventitious qualities are smoke and foam respectively. Now, we can say that fire is without smoke, or that water is without foam, but we can never say that fire is not hot, or water is not cold. The same is the case here.[5]

As for the rest of the characteristics of the Lord, Puruṣottama follows others exactly. He points out, exactly like Puruṣottama and others, that the Lord embodies Himself as various incarnations, yet Himself remains full.[6] The birth, work, quality, form and youth of the Lord are non-earthly.[7] His birth means His voluntary appearance on earth as the various incarnations throughout the various ages—viz. as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Nṛsiṃha, etc. His works consist in His creation, maintenance and destruction of the Universe, the protection of the good and the annihilation of the bad—the killing of Rāvaṇa, Śiśupāla, etc., the playful devices in Vṛndāvana, the stealing of cream, etc. His qualities are knowledge, etc. on the one hand and affection, etc. on the other. His forms are the various forms assumed by Him and His youth is His beauty, grace and charm.[8]

(*b*) *The cit and the acit.*

There is no special section regarding the nature, etc. of the soul and the universe in "Śruty-anta-kalpa-vallī". The main topic being the Lord—the soul and the universe are discussed here and there only in connection with the discussions of the Lord's nature, qualities, etc. He brings out no new point here, but exactly follows Puruṣottama.[9]

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[1] E.g., Ś.K., pp. 4, 16, 34, 128.
[2] E.g., *op. cit.*, p. 44.
[3] E.g., *op. cit.*, pp. 32, 42.
[4] Ś.K., pp. 13-14.
[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 15.
[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 4.
[7] Vide Gītā, 4.9; 11.5.
[8] Ś.K., p. 34.
[9] *Op. cit.*, pp. 31, 37-38, 41, etc. Cf. V.R.M. See above.

(*c*) *Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

Here, also, he follows Puruṣottama exactly.[1]

(*d*) *Mokṣa.*

Here, also, no new point is brought out.

(*e*) *The sādhanas.*

Like Puruṣottama he speaks of five sādhanas, work, knowledge, etc. and defines them exactly after him.[2] Like others he emphasises the grace of the Lord as the direct cause of salvation.[3] He points out that the manifestation of the Lord's grace is of two kinds—viz. sopādhika and nirupādhika. The first is the grace which descends on those who pray to the Lord for the sake of attaining relief from pain, etc. It is due to particular sādhanas resorted to by particular devotees wishing for particular ends, e.g. the manifestation of the Lord's grace to Draupadī, Dhruva, etc. The second kind of manifestation happens in the case of those devotees who do not pray to the Lord for any particular end. It is due to the will of the Lord, as in the case of Prahlāda, Uddhava and the rest. Hence it is that although a great many people see the Lord when He descends on earth as an incarnation, yet all of them do not become free, since they are not favoured by Him.[4]

(*f*) *The destiny of man.*

Here Puruṣottama follows Nimbārka exactly, viz.:—

1. The knowers go to the world of Brahman through the path of Gods, not to return.
2. The pious workers go to heaven, the world of the moon, through the path of Fathers, to return once more.
3. The sinners go to hell to suffer terrible sufferings.[5]

(*g*) *Epistemology.*

Here, also, he follows Puruṣottama exactly.[6]

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[1] Ś.K., pp. 27, 30–32, etc. Vide V.R.M. See above.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 119. Cf. V.R.M. See above.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 142.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 38.
[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 132, 141ff. See above.
[6] *Op. cit.*, pp. 91–94 Vide V.R.M. See above.

(*h*) *Criticism of rival theories.*

(i) *Criticism of rival theories regarding Brahman.*

(*A*) *Criticism of Nirviśeṣa-vāda.*

Brahman cannot be pure distinctionless knowledge, for there are numerous passages in Scripture which designate Brahman as possessed of attributes. It cannot be said that the texts which designate Him as attributes are of a greater force than those which do not, for then we have to admit that the text "Non-existence alone was in the beginning" (Tait., 2.7) is of a greater force than the text "Existence alone was in the beginning" (Chānd., 6.2.1). Moreover, the nirguṇa-texts do not conduce to salvation, e.g. the text "When the seer sees the Golden Person", etc. (Muṇḍ., 3.1.3) shows that the saguṇa-texts lead to salvation. The text "Sākṣī ceta kevala nirguṇa" (Śvet., 6.11) does not deny any and every quality to the Lord, but particular qualities only, viz. material and earthly qualities. If it be objected that the above text denies all qualities in general and not particular qualities only, then we point out that general statements are often modified by particular statements, e.g. the general statement "One should sacrifice animals" really means "One should sacrifice goats". So is the case here. And, if the text does really deny any and every quality to the Lord, then how are you to explain the term "sākṣī", for "sākṣī" means one who sees, i.e. one who is the substratum of the *quality* of knowledge and according to the Advaitins, Brahman is not so.[1]

Also why should Scripture first ascribe various qualities to Brahman with great care, and then deny any and every quality to Him, thereby contradicting itself and behaving like a mad man? Further, if Brahman be absolutely free from distinctions, He cannot be the object of Vedāntic discussions even, and this being so, Scripture becomes meaningless.[2]

Also, if the qualities of the not-self are to be falsely superimposed on the self, then the latter must of necessity be possessed of some qualities which leads it to be mistaken for the non-self, and some again which leads it to be recognised in its real character.[3]

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[1] Ś.K., pp. 53-54.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 54. See above for further details.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 55. See Keśavakāsmīrin above.

Finally, what is the proof of such a Brahman, devoid of all distinctions? Neither perception, nor inference, nor even word which expresses a quality or an action or a universal. So we conclude that Brahman cannot be devoid of distinctions.[1]

(*B*) *Criticism of Aprameya-vāda.*

Here he repeats the argument of Puruṣottama, viz.:—

Whatever is outside the sphere of all knowledge is tuccha, like the sky-flower,
Brahman is outside the sphere of all knowledge,
Therefore Brahman is tuccha.[2]

(*C*) *Criticism of Adhyāsa-vāda.*

The view that ajñāna is illusorily superimposed on Brahman is absolutely untenable, for the very existence of ajñāna is untenable.

Thus, first, what is the āśraya or substratum of ajñāna,—pure consciousness, i.e. Brahman; the omniscient, i.e. Īśvara; or the individual soul? It cannot be said that pure consciousness is the substratum of ajñāna, because just as light and darkness cannot co-exist, so knowledge and nescience, being mutually exclusive, cannot co-exist. Ajñāna is that which is put to an end by knowledge, but if the two may co-exist, then it cannot be said that knowledge contradicts ajñāna and this amounts to a denial of the very nature of knowledge. This difficulty is not removed if it be pointed out that ajñāna, though not contradicted by pure knowledge, is negatived by vṛtti-jñāna or knowledge of particular objects,—for according to the Advaitins, vṛtti-jñāna, because of being due to the antaḥkaraṇa, or the internal organ, is not real knowledge, but figurative, and what is aupacārika can never accomplish what the real object does, e.g. if we say "The sacrificial post is the sun", then evidently the sacrificial post, the figurative sun, can never remove darkness as the real sun can do. Also, if knowledge be not opposed to ajñāna, then it must cease to be jñāna and be non-sentient like pots, etc. The fact is that jñāna and ajñāna are mutually opposed and hence the latter can never inhere in the former.[3]

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[1] Ś.K., p. 55. See under Puruṣottama above for details.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 55. See V.R.M. See above.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 111.

It may be urged here that just as the owl is in complete darkness in spite of the sun's bright rays all around, there being no opposition between the sunlight which is real and the darkness experienced by the owl, which is unreal, so there is no opposition between the real jñāna and the unreal ajñāna so that the one may be the substratum of the other. To this we reply: Although the sunlight is not opposed to unreal darkness, yet there is *real* darkness too besides this unreal darkness and it is opposed to this real darkness. Hence although the sunlight may be the substratum of one kind of darkness, viz. unreal darkness, yet it is actually opposed to real darkness, and so its being the substratum of unreal darkness does not contradict its real nature as opposed to darkness. But in the case under hand there is no other real ajñāna, opposed to jñāna, and hence if jñāna be not opposed to this ajñāna, we have to say that jñāna is not opposed to ajñāna at all. Further, the Advaitins cannot say that ajñāna is unreal, for in that case the individual soul, which is really of the form of bliss, must be said to be subject to unreal miseries only, while the fact is that pains, miseries, etc. of the soul are very real, so long as its bondage continues. Further, perceptions like "I am ignorant"—which prove the existence of real ajñāna—must be regarded as false on this view. If it be urged that no harm is done if the perception "I am ignorant" be taken as false, since this perception, like other perceptions: "I am fat", etc. is after all nothing but a false perception, brought about by the false superimposition of the body on the soul or of the ahaṃkāra on the consciousness, the substratum of ajñāna,—then we point out that the very allegation of the falsity of the perception "I am ignorant" presupposes consciousness as the *substratum of ajñāna*,—the point we are disputing about. Also the perception "I am ignorant" cannot be false, being not due to doṣas (as any illusory perception is).[1]

Finally, is the ajñāna of the pure consciousness natural or due to limiting adjuncts? If the former, then like its other natural qualities of bliss, etc. it can never be negated. If the latter, then what is the limiting adjunct here? If the ajñāna be such an adjunct, then there will arise a logical fallacy, since ajñāna cannot itself be its own adjunct. If, again, something else be the limiting adjunct, then there will arise another logical fallacy or arguing in a circle, for this something else is due to ajñāna (all duality being due to ajñāna) and ajñāna itself is due to that something else (which is its limiting adjunct).[2]

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[1] Ś.K., p. 112.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

Hence, the view that pure consciousness is the substratum of ajñāna cannot be maintained in any way.

The omniscient Īśvara too cannot be the substratum of ajñāna. To say that the omniscient is the substratum of ajñāna is just as absurd as to say that the sun is the substratum of darkness. It may be argued that omniscience itself is due to avidyā, whether it means being a knower (pramātṛtva), since the self is never a knower, but pure knowledge; or it means knowing one's own nature (svarūpa-jñapti), since the real nature of the self which is absolutely unassociated can become an object of knowledge, only through avidyā. In answer, we point out that to say that the Omniscient Being is a product of ajñāna is to talk like a man without sense, since only one who is devoid of all avidyā can ever be an Omniscient Being. Also, the qualities of being a knower (pramātṛtva) and self-knowledge (savrūpa-jñapti) are never based on avidyā. To say that the self is unassociated simply means that it is not touched by any faults and not that it is never an object of knowledge.[1]

If it be said that even if there can be no connection of Īśvara with avidyā, yet there may very well be connection between Īśvara and Māyā, the latter being the lilopakaraṇa or an implement of sport of the former,—then we ask: What exactly is meant by the term 'māyā' here? Does it mean a particular kind of ajñāna, or a particular kind of power belonging to gods and the rest of creating fire, water and other real objects, without the aid of external implements, or the power of a magician to show non-existing objects? Not the first, because as ajñāna in general is not possible in Īśvara—as shown above,—no particular kind of ajñāna can be possible in Him, and ajñāna is never seen to be an implement of sport. Nor the second, for that goes against the Advaita view and supports ours. Nor the third, because there being no souls to be deluded, no deluding is possible. Further, if this power be true, then there will be no Non-dualism; if imagined by the soul, then it will cease to delude it; if imagined by Īśvara, then Īśvāra will be subject to ajñāna.[2]

Finally, the soul cannot be the substratum of ajñāna, because it itself is due to ajñāna.[3]

Hence, ajñāna has no āśraya or substratum.

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[1] Ś.K., p. 144.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 114.
[3] *Op. cit.*

Secondly, there is no viṣaya or object of ajñāna. It may be said that pure consciousness alone can be the object of ajñāna, since everything else is itself due to ajñāna and is non-sentient and as such non-manifest, so that it cannot again be veiled up by ajñāna, i.e. be its object. Here we ask: What exactly is meant by this veiling up of the pure consciousness? Does it mean the disappearance or lopa of the self-manifested nature of Brahman, or its non-origin or anutpatti? Neither,—because what is ever-existent can never have lopa or anutpatti. Also, if there be no manifestation of Brahman, there can be no manifestation of anything else. It cannot be said that this veiling up of Brahman means that Brahman, though having manifestation, is not connected with any object, for (according to the Advaitins) pure consciousness does not refer to any object. It cannot be said that this veiling up of Brahman means any hindrance to the act of manifestation, because (according to the Advaitins) there is nothing besides pure consciousness, so that there can be no obstacle. It cannot be said that the veiling up of Brahman means having such perceptions like "Brahman is not", "Brahman does not manifest Himself", because whether such perceptions be recognitions or mere affirmations, in either case, such percepts are the *result* of the veiling up of Brahman and cannot, therefore, be the *cause* of the veiling up of Brahman. On this view, since there is no perceptions, etc. during deep sleep, there must be absence of veiling during that period. It cannot be said that the veiling up of Brahman means the absence of such perceptions: "Brahman is", "Brahman manifests itself", etc., for if such perceptions be recognitions, then at present the individual soul has the recognition of its own nature and therefore the recognition of Brahman (the soul being identical with Brahman), and as such there can be no veiling up of Brahman during the state of mundane existence. On the other hand, there is no recognition of Brahman during the state of salvation (the soul being not a perceiver during salvation according to the Advaitins), and no withdrawal of the veil. If, again, such perceptions be simple affirmations, then also, the freed soul not being a perceiver, Brahman must continue to be veiled during salvation as well. It cannot be said that the veiling up of Brahman means such perceptions like "Brahman exists" and absence of such perceptions like "Brahman does not exist", for these perceptions themselves are the result of the veiling up of Brahman (since according to the Advaitins the soul is not really a perceiver, but appears to be so through illusory superimposition). It cannot be said that the manifestation of

Brahman is real, while His non-manifestation is non-real, being brought about by ajñāna which is mithyā and hence both manifestation and non-manifestation of Brahman are possible, there being no opposition between the true manifestation and the false non-manifestation,—for evidently the two are opposed, or the one (viz. manifestation) cannot negate the other (viz. non-manifestation). It cannot be said also that the self-manifested Being is one who, though not knowable, is yet perceived to be free from all contradictions, and that the veiling up of this self-manifested being means the prāgabhāva[1] of that freedom from contradiction,—for Brahman is free from all contradictions right from the very beginning and cannot therefore become so *after* the removal of any veil or ajñāna. Also, during the state of mundane existence there is only prāgabhāva of this manifestation or perception of Brahman as free from all contradictions, but during the state of salvation, there is an absolute destruction of it, since the freed soul is never a perceiver according to the Advaitins. But is it not absolutely absurd to say that there is no non-veiling of Brahman during salvation even? Also, the pot, inside which a lamp has been put, does not really destroy the light of the lamp, but simply covers it up *from some one else*. Similarly, the Advaita doctrine is that ajñāna does not *really* destroy the manifestation of Brahman, but simply veils it up for the time being. But to veil it up means to veil it up from some one else, and who is that some one from whom ajñāna veils Brahman? It cannot be the individual soul, for it itself is due to the veiling up of Brahman by ajñāna.

Thus we conclude that the notion of the veiling up of Brahman by ajñāna cannot be logically defined and hence that pure consciousness cannot be the object or viṣaya of ajñāna.[2]

Nor can the soul's distinction from the body, etc., the soul's not being an enjoyer, etc., and non-distinction of Brahman, absence of a second, or the soul which is one without a second, can be the viṣaya or object of ajñāna,—for if these be merely of the nature of the soul, then, as shown above, they can never be the object of ajñāna; if they be different from the soul, then there will be no Non-dualism, as held by the Advaitins; and if they be due to ajñāna, then there will arise the logical fallacy of mutual dependence. It cannot be said that although they are identical with the soul, the self-manifested, yet they

[1] The prāgabhāva of an object is its non-existence prior to its actual existence.
[2] Ś.K., pp. 116–118.

can remain veiled, due to their imaginary difference from it,—for as shown above, this imaginary difference itself is not possible without the prior veiling up of Brahman.[1]

Hence we conclude that ajñāna has no viṣaya or object.

Thirdly, it cannot be said that ajñāna is something imagined, for there is no one to imagine it. Thus, Brahman cannot be the imaginer here, because Brahman, according to the Advaitins, is inactive and therefore cannot do anything. Further, in that case, Brahman, the imaginer, being permanent, the imagination itself must be so, i.e. ajñāna must be permanent, so that no salvation would be ever possible. Nor can ajñāna itself be the imaginer here, for one cannot imagine one's own self. Further, ajñāna too is inactive like Brahman and therefore cannot be an imaginer. Nor can Brahman and ajñāna together be the imaginer here, because that will lead to the logical fallacy of mutual dependence. Nor can someone else be the imaginer here, for there is nothing else, according to the Advaitins, besides these two. And, if the existence of another ajñāna be admitted as the imaginer of ajñāna, then that ajñāna will need another ajñāna as its imaginer, and that another and so on to infinity. Thus, there can be no imagination of ajñāna and hence no existence of ajñāna.[2]

Fourthly, ajñāna cannot be said to be mithyā, for no logical definition of 'mithyātva' is possible. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is separated from the real or the sat,—for a real object itself is separated from a different real object and must become mithyā on this definition. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is not the locus of the quality of existence or sattvā,—for then, Brahman who, according to the Advaitins, is not the substratum of any quality, must become mithyā. It cannot be said that mithyā is what is not the object of any pramāṇa, or means of knowledge, for the mithyā silver is an object of knowledge, viz. "This is a nacre and *not a silver*". It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is never the direct object of any positive knowledge (and not of the negative roundabout knowledge as quoted above),—for the world, which is mithyā according to the Advaitins, is the object of positive knowledge. It cannot be said the mithyā is what is without existence, for what is without existence can never be perceived, as the mithyā world is. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is an object of error, for Brahman, as the locus of error, is the object of error. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is the

[1] Ś.K., p. 118.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

object of that knowledge which corrects an illusion (bādhaka-jñāna, viz. "This is a nacre and not a silver"),—for Brahman is the object of such a knowledge. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is capable of being negated by knowledge,—for a prior piece of knowledge may very well be set aside by a later piece of knowledge, but that does not mean that the former is mithyā. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is absolutely absent from the substratum to which it is (falsely) attributed,—for the absolute absence of an attributed, i.e. unreal, connection is different from that of a non-attributed, i.e. real one. Finally, it cannot be said that the mithyā is avidyā or an effect of avidyā, for the distinction between Brahman and the individual soul, for example, is mithyā, according to the Advaitins, yet is not an effect of avidyā, being beginningless or anādi.

Hence we conclude that no definition of mithyātva is possible.[1]

Also, what is the proof of mithyātva? Not perception, for one can perceive only what is present and near at hand and not what is negated in the past, present and future (as avidyā is according to the Advaitins). Nor inference, because inference is based on perception; nor, finally, Scripture, because none would admit that Scripture is concerned with establishing ajñāna.[2]

Thus, there is neither any definition nor any proof of mithyātva. Hence, ajñāna cannot be said to be mithyā.

Fifthly, what exactly is meant by the term "ajñāna"? What is the meaning of the prefix "nañ" here? There are six possible meanings of the prefix "nañ",—viz. tat-sādṛśya or similarity; tad-abhāva or absence; tadanyatva or otherness; tad-alpatā or littleness; aprāśastya or worthlessness; and virodha or contradiction. Now, it cannot be said that ajñāna is what is similar to knowledge. Two things are said to be similar, when though different, they possess many similar qualities, e.g. "Abrāhmaṇa Kṣatriya" means a Kṣatriya who is similar to a Brāhmaṇa in many qualities. But ajñāna does not possess any quality or property of jñana. It cannot be said that ajñāna is the absence of jñāna, for if ajñāna be something non-existence then evidently, it cannot be a cause. It cannot be said that ajñāna is other than jñāna, for that implies difference, just as the expression "Abrāhmaṇa Śudra" implies a Śudra who is different from a Brāhmana, and in that case there will be two realities—jñāna and ajñāna and no Non-dualism. It cannot be said that ajñāna is little knowledge, for

[1] Ś.K., p. 56.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

then it will fall under the category of jñāna, a little knowledge being knowledge all the same, just as the word "Anudarī kanyā" means a girl who has a belly, though a small one. It cannot be said that ajñāna means worthless knowledge, for then too it will fall under the category of jñāna, just as the word "apaṇḍita" means one who is a paṇḍita, though not a good one. Finally, it cannot be said that ajñāna is opposed to jñāna, for just as the word "asura" means one who is opposed to the Suras (or gods), so here too, jñāna and ajñāna must be on a par with each other and co-exist,—which is not admitted.

Thus we conclude that no etymological meaning of the term "ajñāna" is possible.[1]

Thus we find that no substratum, object, imaginer and etymological meaning of ajñāna are possible. Hence the very existence of ajñāna is not tenable.[2]

And if there can be an ajñāna, there can be no adhyāsa or superimposition of ajñāna on Brahman.[3]

Further, is that on which ajñāna is superimposed (i.e. the adhiṣṭhāna) of the nature of knowledge and opposed to ajñāna and not opposed to it? It cannot be opposed to ajñāna, for there can be no mutual superimposition or adhyāsa between two opposed things, e.g. a silver is falsely superimposed on a nacre, to which it is similar, and not on a rope to which it is opposed.[4] It also cannot be non-opposed to ajñāna, for then there can evidently be no cessation of ajñāna. Also to say that jñāna is not opposed to ajñāna is, as pointed out above, simply ridiculous. It cannot be said that although svarūpa-jñāna or knowledge of the self, is not opposed to ajñāna, yet pramāṇa-janyajñāna, i.e. vṛtti-jñāna or knowledge gained through perception, etc., is opposed to ajñāna and negates it, for then jñāna and ajñāna will come to be concerned with different objects. Thus, what is the object of this vṛtti-jñāna? Is it pure Brahman or qualified Brahman? Not the first, for the Advaitins do not admit that Brahman is ever the object of vṛtti-jñāna. Nor the second, for then, as pointed out above, jñāna and ajñāna will be concerned with different objects, and therefore the former will not be able to negate the latter. Thus, the ajñāna regarding a pillar cannot be removed by jñāna regarding a pot,

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[1] Ś.K., pp. 4-5.

[2] See below "Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda" for further criticisms, viz. that no definition and proof of ajñāna too are possible.

[3] Ś.K., p. 56.

[4] See above.

but only by jñāna regarding the pillar. Similarly, the jñāna regarding qualified Brahman cannot negate the ajñāna regarding pure Brahman. Thus we conclude that Brahman cannot be the substratum of the superimposition.[1]

Further, if ajñāna be superimposed on Brahman, then does it veil the very nature of Brahman or His qualities? Not the first, for then the entire universe will be dark; nor the second, because Brahman has no qualities according to the Advaitins. It cannot be said that although Brahman is devoid of qualities, yet ajñāna may very well veil the bliss-portion of Brahman, while the knowledge- and the existence-portions remain unveiled so that the world does not become dark,—for the Advaitins do not admit of any qualities, like bliss, etc. Nor can it be said that bliss, etc. are not qualities of Brahman, but portions of His very nature,—for Brahman, the formless, can have no parts. If He does, then He will be mithyā like pots and the rest who possess parts. Thus we conclude that there can be no superimposition of ajñāna on Brahman, i.e. Brahman cannot be the substratum of adhyāsa.[2]

Further, Brahman being absolutely devoid of qualities and distinctions cannot be the substratum of adhyāsa, for such a substratum, as shown above,[3] must have certain qualities which leads, on the one hand, to the superimposition and on the other, negates it, and Brahman, according to the Advaitins, is absolutely devoid of qualities.[4]

Further, is the nature of pure Brahman veiled by ajñāna or not? Not the first, for then Brahman cannot be the substratum; nor the second, for then there being the manifestation of the very nature of Brahman, there can be no adhyāsa.[5]

Thus we conclude that Brahman cannot be the substratum of adhyāsa. And hence there can be no substratum of adhyāsa at all, because, according to the Advaitins, there is nothing besides Brahman. Hence, there being no substratum of adhyāsa, the adhyāsa itself is not possible.

Finally, there is no one who can superimpose or falsely attribute ajñāna on Brahman. Attribution always implies one who attributes, but neither Brahman, nor ajñāna, nor someone else can do so. Hence there being no one to effect the adhyāsa, adhyāsa itself is not possible.[6]

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[1] Ś.K., p. 57. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 57. [3] See above.
[4] Ś.K., pp. 57-58. [5] *Op. cit.*, p. 58. [6] *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

Thus, we find that there can be no adhyāsa—or superimposition—of ajñāna on Brahman, because the very existence of ajñāna, which is superimposed, is not possible, because no substratum of the superimposition is possible, and because no effector of the superimposition is possible.

(*D*) *Criticism of the Advaita view that Brahman is the Upādāna-kāraṇa of the world.*

Our view is of course that Brahman is both the material and nimitta, efficient, cause of the world. But consistently with their views, the Advaitins cannot hold that Brahman is the material cause of the world,—for what exactly do they mean when they call Brahman the material cause? It may be said that just as two threads, twisted together, are the cause of a rope, so Brahman is the material cause of the world as qualified by māyā, or as possessed of the power of māyā, or as the substratum of māyā.[1] On the first view, just as two threads are the cause of the rope, so Brahman and māyā together are the material cause of the world, while Brahman Himself, not associated with māyā, is changeless. On the second view, Brahman is the cause through the contamination of māyā, while Brahman, not so contaminated, is changeless. On the third view, just as the fibre is the material cause of a piece of cloth through the thread, so Brahman is the material cause of the world through māyā, while Brahman without māyā is changeless.

To this we reply: The first view is untenable, for just as both the threads have to undergo transformation in order to produce the rope, so both Brahman and māyā must be transformed into the form of the world, so that Brahman cannot be said to be changeless. Also, if Brahman, the real, be the material cause of the world, the world too must be real, just as a piece of cloth, made of white and not white threads, is white. It cannot be said that the world may be argued to be real, only if its material cause is *solely* real, and not a mixture of the real (Brahman) and the unreal (māyā),—for in that case, the world which is anirvacanīya, according to the Advaitins, must have a solely anirvacanīya cause, but there is no such thing as an anirvacanīya material cause.

The second view also is untenable. If Brahman be the cause, when in contact with māyā, then He must be like clay, etc., which

[1] Māyā-viśiṣṭha, or māyā-śakti-vat, or māyāśraya.

are also causes. Also, if it be held that Brahman, as contaminated by māyā, undergoes a real transformation, then evidently the world cannot be said to be a vivarta or illusory transformation. If it be said that the world is a real transformation of Brahman, contaminated by māyā, while it is an illusory transformation of the pure Brahman, then we point out that in that case there must be attributed changes in the pure Brahman, and what is really changeless can have no attributed changes even.

The third view also is untenable. We find that the fibre is the material cause of the thread and the thread again is the material cause of the cloth, and in this way alone the fibre is the material cause of the cloth through the thread. But this does not evidently hold good in the case of Brahman and māyā, for Brahman is not the material cause of māyā, as the fibre is of the thread, so that it cannot be said that Brahman is the material cause of the world through māyā. It cannot be said that Brahman is the material cause of māyā in the sense of being the substratum of the cosmic illusion, for that Brahman cannot be such a substratum has already been shown,[1] and further, it is not possible to define a material cause as being the substratum of error, for clay, etc., which are material causes, are not so, while nacre, etc., which are so, are not material causes.[2]

The same arguments go to refute the view that vivarta means assuming another unreal form, pariṇāma means assuming another real form, while upādānatva (or being the material cause) means assuming another form (real or unreal) and hence Brahman can be the material cause in the sense of having illusory transformation, while ajñāna too is the material cause as having real transformation. The Advaitins themselves hold that what is mithyā must have a mithyā material cause, for if the cause be real, the effect must also be so, and hence the Advaitins themselves deny that the real can have any unreal form, since this would imply the discarding of the very nature of the real. Hence the conclusion cannot but be that the real Brahman can have no vivarta, or unreal form. Also, if Brahman were to assume an unreal form, then Brahman, as pointed out many times before,[3] must possess certain qualities which leads Him to assume (i.e. be mistaken as) that particular unreal form, instead of any other. But Brahman has no qualities according to the Advaitins. Hence the world cannot be an illusory transformation of Brahman. Nor is the world a real

[1] See above. [2] Ś.K., pp. 58-59. [3] See above.

transformation of ajñāna. Pariṇāma means a *real* transformation into a *real* object, as the pariṇāma of a lump of clay into a pot. But an unreal object (which the world is according to the Advaitins) does not imply any pariṇāma, e.g. an illusory silver does not.[1]

Thus we find that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world on the Advaita doctrine. The Advaitins cannot get out of the difficulty by pointing out that māyā is the material cause, Īśvara is the efficient cause and Brahman is the substratum, because according to the Advaitins also, the material cause and the efficient causes of the world are identical.[2] Here our author follows Keśavakāśmīrin.[3]

(*E*) *Criticism of the Advaita doctrine of Īśvara.*

It cannot be said that Īśvara is Brahman, limited by māyā,[4] for then Īśvara, being subject to ignorance and illusion, cannot be said to be omniscient. To say that one who is associated with māyā is omniscient is as absurd as to say that the blind is 'lotus-eyed'.[5]

Also, according to the Advaitins, Īśvara or māyā-limited consciousness is the creator of the world and not Brahman or pure consciousness. Now, in what exactly does Īśvara's creatorship consist? Is Īśvara a creator in the sense of being a locus, like a nacre; or in the sense of being the perceiver of the adhyāsa or false superimposition like a mistaken person; or in the sense of being a deluder, like a magician; or in the sense of acting with a definite intention to produce a definite effect by means of perceivable implements like a potter? Not the first, for evidently creatorship does not mean passively being a locus only, but the creator must essentially be active. Scripture bears testimony to the fact that the creator of names and forms resolves to be many[6]; but can one resolve to be something false? Hence, why should Īśvara voluntarily wish to be something false? Hence not the second, for why should Īśvara voluntarily wish to see an illusion? A person under an illusion does not *voluntarily* see the illusory object, because for the time being he is perfectly certain that what he is perceiving is true. Not the third, since there being at that time no individual soul to be deluded, Īśvara cannot be a deluder. Also, Scripture tells us, as pointed out above, that the creator, prior to creating the world, formed the resolve: "Let me evolve (i.e. *create*) names and forms" (Chānd., 6.3.2), but a magician never resolves

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[1] Ś.K., p. 59. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 60. [3] See above.
[4] Māyāvacchinna. [5] Ś.K., p. 60. [6] Vide Chānd., 6.2.1.

"Let me *create*", but only that "Let me *show* kings, etc.". Nor, finally, the fourth, for in that case the world cannot be false. A potter never creates an imaginary pot, but always a real one. An imaginary object can never be created, whether by a non-mistaken person, or by a mistaken.[1]

Thus, we conclude that the Advaita view of Īśvara is absolutely untenable.

(*F*) *Criticism of the Advaita interpretation of the text "Ekamevādvitīyam".*

In the celebrated text "Ekamevādvitīyam" (Chānd., 6.2.1), the word "eka" (= one) means that the Lord is absolutely independent, while the term "advitīya" (= without a second) means that the Lord has nothing equal to or superior to Himself, i.e. whatever there is besides the Lord is absolutely dependent on the Lord. Thus, even the qualities and powers, etc. of the Lord are not independent, but depend on the Lord, Who is their very essence.[2]

Or, an alternative explanation may be offered, viz.: The term "eka" denies that sentient beings (i.e. the souls) are independent; the term "advitīya" denies that non-sentient objects (i.e. the world, etc.) are independent; while the term "eva" denies that the own qualities of the Lord are independent. Thus, the text means that the cit, the acit and the svagata-dharmas of the Lord, being of the essence of the Lord, are non-distinct from Him. In this sense alone the Lord is one and without a second.[3]

According to the Advaitins, however, the above text denies three kinds of differences to Brahman, viz. sajātīya or difference from the sentient; vijātīya or difference from the non-sentient; and svagata or difference from His own qualities and powers. But this view is absolutely untenable. Here the term "eva" does not imply any discrimination from something else, e.g. the expression "Śaṅkhaṃ-pāṇḍu eva" means that the conch-shell is white and does not deny the connection of the conch-shell with anything else. Similarly the expression "Pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ" means that Pārtha is a warrior with bow in hands, but does not deny his connection with something else. Hence, the expression "Ekam *eva* advitīyam" [4]

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[1] Ś.K., pp. 60-61. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 16. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

[4] The whole passage is: "Sadeva saumya idamagra āsīt ekamevādvitīyam" (Chānd., 6.2.1).

means simply that the Sat is eka and advitīya and not that the Sat has no connection with anything else. Further, if the term "advitīya" implies the absence of a second, then the term "eka" becomes a mere superfluity. Hence it cannot be said that the term "agre" implies time and the term "dvitīya" implies an object, as according to the Advaitins nothing besides Brahman ever exists in the present, never did so in the past and will never do so in the future. That is, if Brahman be *always* without a second, then there is no sense in saying that He was so *in the beginning* (agre). Further, if the term "advitīya" does not deny the absence of a second, then there will be no Non-dualism (for then, there will be at least two realities—Brahman and this absence of a second), and if it does not, then too, there will be no Non-dualism.[1] Further, what exactly is meant by the term "sat" in the above text? It cannot mean the pure Brahman, for according to the Advaitins the pure Brahman cannot be expressed by any word or sentence. It cannot mean Brahman with the limiting adjunct of māyā, for then the Advaitins themselves have to admit difference, i.e. if māyā be different from Brahman whom it limits, then there can be no Non-dualism; if non-different, then Brahman Himself will become of the form of avidyā. Finally, it cannot mean the substratum of the adhyāsa of ajñāna, for, as shown above,[2] Brahman cannot be the substratum of ajñāna.[3]

(ii) *Criticism of rival theories regarding the jīva.*

(*A*) *Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda.*

It cannot be said that the individual soul is a reflection of Brahman on avidyā, for, in the first place, the very existence of avidyā is not possible, no definition and proof of avidyā being possible.[4] Thus, it cannot be said that avidyā is that which is without beginning and a positive entity, yet is negated by knowledge,[5] for the ajñāna regarding the illusory silver is by no means without a beginning, so that the above definition is too narrow. Again ajñāna cannot be a positive entity, for if ajñāna, a positive entity, were to give rise to an illusion which is not a positive entity, then we have to admit that a false something may arise from a real something. But this cannot be, for the cause and the effect must be of the same nature. Yet if the

[1] See above. [2] See above. [3] Ś.K., pp. 17-18.

[4] Vide above for other criticisms of this point.

[5] Anādi, bhāvarūpa and jñāna-nivartya.

illusion be not due to ajñāna, it cannot be put to an end by jñāna. Also, according to the Advaitins themselves, ajñāna is different from both existence and non-existence, so how can they hold again that it is a positive entity? Again, ajñāna cannot be always negated by knowledge, e.g. ajñāna persists in the jīvan-muktas in spite of their knowledge; also in spite of knowing perfectly well that the trees on the banks of a river are standing upright, we cannot help seeing them upside down on the surface of the river. Further, if ajñāna be negated by knowledge, then it cannot be without a beginning, for that which is simply due to the false imagination of one thing as another, that which is due to some or other defects, and that which has no existence beyond perception, can never be beginningless, e.g. the illusory silver which is due to the false imagination by a man of a nacre as a silver to some defects of eyesight, want of proper light, etc. and persists so long as the error persists, is not beginningless. Further, if ajñāna be a positive entity, then it cannot be negated by knowledge. Thus, the first part of the above definition of ajñāna (viz. that it is beginningless and a positive entity) comes into conflict with the last part (viz. that it is negated by knowledge). It may be said that the specific vyāpti, viz. "Ajñāna is negated by jñāna", is of a greater force than the general vyāpti "What is beginningless and a positive entity is not negated by knowledge" and ajñāna (according to us) is different not only from existence but also from non-existence, so that although being different from non-existence, it cannot ne negated, as the self cannot be, yet being different from existence, it can nevertheless be negated like prāgabhāva.[1] To this we reply that in that case, i.e. if a specific vyāpti be taken to be of a greater force than a general vyāpti, we may very well infer any and every thing, e.g. we may very well hold that the specific vyāpti "Whatever is a hill is without fire" contradicts the general vyāpti "Whatever smokes is on fire". Further, a specific vyāpti regarding ajñāna, as held by the Advaitins, is not possible, since vyāpti is a *general* statement regarding a *class* of things, but ajñāna, as held by the Advaitins—i.e. ajñāna which is beginningless, a positive entity and negated by knowledge, is without any parallel, as other kinds of ajñāna, viz. the ajñāna regarding a nacre, are neither beginningless nor positive entities, and hence ajñāna as held by the Advaitins, being the only one of its kind, cannot be the subject of any vyāpti. Further, if it be said that what is different from existence

[1] For explanation, see footnote above.

may be negated, then we have to say that atyantābhāva[1] too, which is different from existence, may be negated. Thus we find that the definition of avidyā as that which is beginningless, a positive entity and negated by knowledge, is not tenable.[2]

Avidyā cannot be defined also as the material cause of error, for, as shown above,[3] illusion being not a positive entity cannot have ajñāna, a positive entity, as its material cause. If again an illusion be taken to be a positive entity (for the sake of argument), still then it cannot have ajñāna, which is different from existence, for its material cause, since the cause and the effect must be of the same nature. An illusion is the *knowledge* of an object. Now, according to us, both the object of an illusion and the illusory knowledge are real,[4] and hence they can have a material cause. Of course, ajñāna is not their material cause, but the illusory object, viz. "silver", has real ingredients as its material cause, while the illusory knowledge, viz. "This is a piece of silver", has the mind as its material cause. But according to the Advaitins neither the illusory object nor the illusory knowledge is real, so how can they have material cause? Hence, it cannot be said that ajñāna is the material cause of illusion. Also, ajñāna cannot be a material cause, because it is not an existent something, according to the Advaitins. Otherwise we have to admit that prāgabhāva[5] too can be a material cause. Hence if ajñāna were to be a material cause, it must be an existent something. Further, the effect appears to be of the nature of the cause,—an earthen pot looks like clay, but neither

[1] Atyantābhāva is the absolute and eternal non-existence of one thing from another, e.g. heat from water.

[2] Ś.K., pp. 61-62. [3] See above.

[4] This is the doctrine of Sat-khyāti, viz. that all percepts are true, even the so-called illusory ones. Thus the doctrine is that because of the original process of Pañcīkaraṇa (see above), everything contains the element and ingredient of everything else. A nacre e.g. contains some subtle and ordinarily imperceptible elements of silver, and when owing to some defects in the eyesight, want of proper light, distance, etc., we perceive the silver-element only in the nacre, we mistake the nacre for the silver, although the silver we are perceiving is *real* silver contained in the nacre. This is the so-called false perception of silver in place of nacre and it is called *false*, because it fails to lead to *successful* practical reaction as a *real* silver does; e.g. when we stoop to pick it up under the impression that it is a piece of silver, we find that it is not so and cannot be sold as such. Thus, the distinction between *true* and *false* perception is really a question of practical utility (artha-kriyā). Vide Śrī B., 1.1.1.

[5] See footnote above.

the illusory silver nor its knowledge appears to be ajñāna,—the illusory silver appears to be real silver and the illusory knowledge as real knowledge for the time being. Finally, the definition of ajñāna as the material cause of illusion is both too narrow, because the ajñāna of the jīvan-muktas is not the material cause of error, they, according to the Advaitins, being not subject to any more error, though leading an earthly existence; and too wide, because clay, etc. which are material causes are not ajñāna.[1]

Thus, the definition of ajñāna as the material cause of illusion is not tenable, because illusion can have no material cause, because ajñāna cannot be a material cause, and because it is both too narrow and too wide.

Thus, no lakṣaṇa or definition of ajñāna is possible.

Nor is there any pramāṇa or proof of ajñāna. It may be argued: The existence of avidyā is proved directly through such perceptions like "I am ignorant", "I do not know others", etc. Its existence is proved by inference as well. The fact is that knowledge of a particular object is preceded by something which is other than the prāgabhāva [2] of knowledge, which was so long veiling up the object of knowledge, which is now negated by knowledge and which was so long inhering in knowledge itself, and this something is *ajñāna*; e.g. when a lamp is lit in a dark room, the lamp does three things—it puts its own prāgabhāva to an end; puts darkness to an end; and manifests objects. Now, this darkness is other than the prāgabhāva of the light, was so long veiling the objects of the light, is put to an end by the light, yet was so long inhering in the lamp. The same is the case here. Hence the following inference proves the existence of ajñāna: Whatever, coming into existence, manifests objects so long non-manifest, is preceded by something which other than its own prāgabhāva, which so long veiled its objects, which is now negated by it and which so long inhered in it, like a lamp lighted in a dark room.

Jñāna does so.

Therefore jñāna is preceded by something which is other than its own prāgabhāva, etc., i.e. by ajñāna.

The existence of ajñāna is proved by Scripture as well,—cf. texts like "Then there were neither non-Being nor Being" (Ṛg. V., 10.129.1), etc.[3]

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[1] Ś.K., pp. 62-63.

[2] See footnote above.

[3] Ś.K., p. 63. Cf. Śrī. B., 1.1.1.

To this, we reply: Perceptions like "I am ignorant", etc. do not establish ajñāna, for, according to the Advaitins, the "I" is not the substratum of ajñāna, which is a positive entity. Such perceptions prove simply the absence of knowledge and not any ajñāna which is a positive entity. Also, what does the "I" stand for in the expression: "I am ignorant"? It cannot mean the pure Brahman, for the Advaitins do not admit that; nor can it mean the ahaṃkāra, which is non-sentient; nor something else, because there is nothing else besides Brahman according to the Advaitins.

The above inference also is not correct, because it cannot be said that jñāna always negates ajñāna; e.g. the knowledge of happiness, etc. does not negate ajñāna, being of the form of a sākṣī. Further, the adjective "other than its own prāgabhāva" is futile, since prāgabhāva being that which is put to an end by the object in question, viz. jñāna, it is expressed by the adjective "negated by it".

Finally, the above text does not prove the existence of ajñāna, but it refers simply to prakṛti. The term "non-being" refers to the subtle mahat, etc., while the term "being" refers to the gross elements, while the term "darkness", tamas, refers to the primal prakṛti, the sense of the text being that in the beginning there were neither subtle elements nor gross elements, but only prakṛti, the primal cause.[1]

Thus, there is no pramāṇa or proof of avidyā.

Further, there can be no apprehension of avidyā or avidyā-pratīti. Thus, is avidyā perceived by the pure consciousness or by consciousness arising through one or other of the sources of knowledge? [2] Not the first, for if avidyā be perceived by the pure consciousness, then such a perception must be real and everlasting, and continue in salvation too. Nor the second, for then avidyā will be sometimes perceived and sometimes not. Also, avidyā cannot be grasped through any source of knowledge, as just shown above, and hence it cannot be said the apprehension of ajñāna is due to some source of knowledge. Further, according to the Advaitins, the knowledge arising from the ordinary sources of knowledge is itself due to avidyā and hence this will lead to arguing in a circle. Thus, there can be no apprehension of avidyā.[3]

We conclude, therefore, that there can be no definition, proof, and apprehension of avidyā; hence the very existence of avidyā is impossible.

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[1] Ś.K., pp. 63ff. [2] Śuddha-caitanya or vṛtti-caitanya. [3] Ś.K., p. 67.

And if there can be no avidyā, then evidently the individual soul can be a reflection of Brahman on avidyā.[1]

Next, Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava goes on to point out like Keśavakāśmīrin that if there is to be any reflection of Brahman on avidyā, then the latter must be outside the former[2]; that the object reflected and the reflection must be of the same status[3]; and that there can be no reflection of the formless and colourless Brahman:[4]

According to the Advaitins, the upādhi or the limiting adjunct pertains to the reflection and not to the object reflected, and that is why the individual soul is subject to mundane existence and not Brahman. But what does that precisely imply exactly? It cannot imply that the qualities of the upādhi pertain to the reflection, just as dirt on the mirror, the upādhi, makes the image of the face look dirty too,—for agency, etc. do not pertain to ajñāna, the limiting adjunct, yet the individual soul, the reflection, is an agent, etc. It cannot be said also that the upādhi pertains to the reflection in the sense that the functions of the former pertain to the latter, for the functions of the upādhi, such as distinguishing, etc. (i.e. avidyā distinguishes the soul from Brahman) pertain to the ether, which is an object reflected. Also, if the upādhi pertains to the reflection alone, then omniscience, etc., which pertain to Brahman, cannot be said to be due to upādhi. as held by the Advaitins. It cannot be said also that the upādhi pertains to the reflection in the sense that the qualities inhering in the functions of the upādhi pertain to the reflection, or that the upādhi veils its own object from the reflection, for such is never seen in the case of a mirror and a pot. Thus, we find that the upādhi cannot pertain to the reflection[5].

We conclude, therefore, that the Pratibimba-vāda is absolutely untenable because the very existence of avidyā is not possible; because Brahman cannot be the object reflected; because avidyā cannot be the upādhi; and because the upādhi cannot pertain to the reflection.

(*B*) *Criticism of Avaccheda-vāda or Upādhi-vāda.*

Here, the author exactly follows Devācārya.[6]

[1] Ś.K.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 67. See above.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 67. See above.
[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 11, 112. See above.
[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 113.
[6] See above.

(*C*) *Criticism of Adhyāsa-vāda.*

The theory that the course of mundane existence, is due to the illusory superimposition of the body, etc. on the soul is not tenable, for the fact is that it is really due to the want of discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, between the self and the not-self. In fact, the superimposition of the body, the sense-organs, etc. on the soul,—which is directly opposed to them, is quite impossible. It cannot be said that the perception 'I am a Brāhmaṇa' falsely attributes the qualities of a Brāhmaṇa to the self, for according to the Advaitins the 'I', the aham,—is not the self, the ātman, but is not-self, so what fault can the Advaitins possibly find with this identity between two things, both of which are not-selves? The fact is that the identity between the body and the soul is established by direct perception, and cannot be dismissed summarily as false. Of course, to say that the body and the soul are identified, is not to say that they are one and the same; they are different, yet are identified in all practical experiences, just as heat and iron, though different, are identified in a red-hot iron ball.

The Advaita view is full of contradictions from the very beginning to the end. Thus, according to the Advaitins, the *identification* of the body and the soul is due to adhyāsa or illusory superimposition, but in the same breath they declare that the *differentiation* between the body and the soul also is due to illusory superimposition,—there being the soul alone in reality. But how can possibly the difference and the non-difference between the body and the soul be both falsely superimposed? The unreal (mithyā) is absolutely different from the real (satya) and difference (bheda) is absolutely different from non-difference (abheda). Hence if the difference between the body and the soul be mithyā, the non-difference between them must of necessity be satya. It cannot be said that as the body itself is due to adhyāsa, there is neither difference nor non-difference between the body and the soul,—for the illusory silver, though due to adhyāsa, is yet *different* from the nacre.

The perception "I am a dehin" is just like the perception "I am a gehin"; i.e. just as the latter means "I *have* a house" and never "I *am* a house", so exactly the former means "I *have* a body" and never "I *am* a body". So how can it be said that the latter perception implies an *identity* between the body and the soul? In fact, our perceptions are always to the effect "*My* house", "My eyes", "My

hands", etc. so that there is always a difference between the "I", the soul, the possessor and the body, etc. the things possessed. Thus, the perceptions "I am a Brāhmaṇa", "I am a man" are true perceptions. The word "Brāhmaṇa" means a conscious *individual soul endowed with a particular body*, and not a *mere body*. If the word "Brāhmaṇa" were to mean a body only, then such injunctions as "A Brāhmaṇa should perform a sacrifice" become absurd, for a body, a non-sentient object, can never possibly perform a sacrifice, etc. In the very same manner, perceptions like "I am blind", etc. are true perceptions, for the blind is a conscious individual soul devoid of eyesight and so on. The perceptions "I am thin", "I am black" etc. are secondary ones like the perceptions "My son being thin, I am thin as well", "I, besmeared with mud, am black", etc. but there is no adhyāsa or illusory identity here, since "I" am clearly conscious of my *distinction* from my son and from the mud here. Moreover, perceptions like "(The same) I who made obeisance to my father in my childhood am now playing with my grandchildren in my old age", "I, who was a tiger in a dream, am now a man", etc. clearly prove that we *distinguish* between our *body* and our *soul*, and that we realise very well that the body may change and assume different forms, but the soul remains unchanged in the midst of all changes. So, the Advaitins cannot say that we mistakenly identify the body and the soul. Hence we conclude that there is no such thing as adhyāsa and that the individual souls are not due to adhyāsa, but to the beginningless karmas.[1]

Further, the Advaita view that the "I" is not the soul, because it does not persist under all states, viz. during deep sleep and release—is not at all tenable, for the "I" does persist during these states. That the "I" persists during the state of deep sleep is clear from the perception "So long I slept happily", etc.[2] Also, according to the Advaitins themselves, the ahaṃkāra is the vital-breath through its power of action, and mind through its power of understanding.[3] Now, if there be no ahaṃkāra during deep sleep, then why is there breathing which is the fuuction of the vital-breath? It may be said that if the ahaṃkāra and the vital-breath be different, then there is no harm if the former disappears during deep sleep; if they be non-different, then

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[1] Ś.K., pp. 69–71.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 100–102. See V.R.M., above.

[3] Kriyā-śakti and vijñāna-śakti.

we hold that the portion of the ahaṃkāra which, devoid of the vital-breath, disappears, while the vital-breath portion persists; to this we reply: This cannot be, for if the vital-breath only persists in deep sleep, then we cannot have perceptions to the effect "*I* slept happily", as the prāṇa never constitutes the "I".[1] Thus, we conclude that the "I" persists during deep sleep.

The "I" persists during release as well. We do not deny that the Lord is ever-free, but what we insist on is that the Lord is a knower, an "I". So the "I" persists always. This may be established by inferences as well, thus: The "I" persists in salvation, being the performer of the sādhanās which lead to salvation, like consciousness.

The "I" is non-different from the very nature of the soul, because it persists in salvation, like omniscience.[2]

Further, the Advaita view that the "I" is non-sentient, i.e. the internal organ and not the soul, is not tenable, for in that case, perceptions like "My mind" would mean "My mind's mind"— which is absurd; and also we should not have, in that case, felt any difference between the "I"— ourselves and our minds, which we undoubtedly do, e.g. the "I" persists even in the absence of the mind (attention). We never *feel* that the "I" is non-sentient, and if it be said to be *imagined*, then the soul too may very well be imagined to be non-sentient, as we can, of course, imagine any and every thing to be any and every thing. So we conclude that the "I" is not non-sentient.[3]

(*D*) *Criticism of Eka-jīva-vāda.*

There is absolutely no proof that there is only one soul. On the contrary, this view leads to absurd results. Thus, if there be only one soul, then there could not, evidently, be any preceptor-disciple relation and the Scriptures would become meaningless. If the preceptor be possessed of the knowledge of Non-dualism, then he cannot teach the disciple who is different from him, and if he be not possessed of the knowledge of Non-dualism, then he is nothing but an impostor and a cheat.[4]

[1] Ś.K., pp. 100–102.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 102–103.
[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

(iii) Criticism of rival theories regarding the jagat.

(A) Criticism of Māyā-vāda.

The Advaitins argue that the world is false or mithyā, as established by the following inference:—

The world is mithyā, because it is capable of being perceived (dṛśyatvāt), because it is non-sentient (jaḍatvāt) and because it is limited (paricchinnatvāt), like the nacre-silver.

To this we reply that the above inference is not correct, because the pakṣa or the minor term, the sādhya or the major term, the hetu or the reason, the middle term, and the udāharaṇa or the example, are all untenable.[1]

The pakṣa or the minor term is "the world" here. Now, is the world established by one or other of the sources of knowledge or not? Not the first, because what is so established cannot be negated. If it be said that the universe, though perceived, can yet be negated, since it is not the locus of existence, then we point out in reply that in that case, the pure Brahman too, not being the locus of existence, must be mithyā. The second alternative also is not possible, for in that case, the world must become tuccha or absolutely unreal, like the sky-flower, which too cannot be established by any source of knowledge.

The sādhya or the major term, viz. "falsity" or "mithyātva" too cannot be established. If this "mithyātva" be real, then Brahman cannot be said to be the sole reality, if it be unreal, then the world must be true.[2]

The three hetus or reasons quoted also are untenable. Thus, the first reason "dṛśyatva" does not prove the case. It cannot be said the world is false, because it is perceived, for then Brahman too, being directly intuited by the knowers, must be false. It cannot be said that Brahman so intuited is not pure Brahman, but māyā-limited Brahman, who is, of course, mithyā,— for unless the knower perceives the pure Brahman, his ajñāna regarding pure Brahman cannot be put to an end, and the pure Brahman, being in that case outside all sources of knowledge, must be non-established like the sky-flower, which too is outside all sources of knowledge. Also, texts which distinctly declare Brahman to be an object of direct intuition,[3] will come to be contradicted. Also, if Brahman who is to be enquired after be only māyā-limited Brahman and not pure Brahman, then

[1] Ś.K., pp. 4–10. [2] See above. [3] Vide e.g., Muṇḍ., 3.1.8.

evidently, the very enquiry becomes valueless and the scriptures concerned with such an enquiry become useless. Further, no attributes can either be attributed or denied to something which is unknown, so that this very denial of dṛśyatva to the Supreme Brahman implies that the Supreme Brahman is known.

The second reason "jaḍatva" also does not prove the case. Now what is "jaḍatva"? It cannot be said that the non-sentient is what is not a knower, for in the "I", which according to the Advaitins is a knower, must be sentient, while the pure Brahman, not a knower according to the Advaitins, must be non-sentient. Hence the inference: The pure Brahman is mithyā, because He is not a knower, like the Universe. The Advaitins cannot get out of the difficulty by saying that although pure Brahman is not really a knower, yet He is imagined to be so and hence Brahman is sentient,— for an imagined something cannot be the reason for anything—i.e. imagined knowership of Brahman cannot be a reason for His not being non-sentient; also, according to the Advaitins themselves, the internal organ is imagined to be a knower, and hence it must too be sentient like Brahman. It cannot be said that the non-sentient is what is not knowledge, for then the knowledge of particular objects through one or other of the sources of knowledge, being knowledge, must be sentient, while the soul, not being knowledge, must be non-sentient. Thus, has the knowledge of the real nature of the self an object or not? On the first alternative, the question arises: Is the soul itself the object here, or not. It cannot be itself its own object, for according to the Advaitins the self is never an object of the ordinary sources of knowledge. But, on the other hand, nothing else can be the object here, since in salvation there is no other object, yet there is knowledge about the real nature of the self, and what is present alone can be an object. Thus, the knowledge about the real nature of the self can have no object. But the second alternative also—viz. the knowledge about the real nature of the self, has no object—is not tenable, for knowledge cannot be without an object, i.e. it must manifest an object, otherwise the pot, etc. might very well be called knowledge. Further, is the knowledge about the real nature of the self-right knowledge or erroneous knowledge? It cannot be the first, because according to the Advaitins it is not generated through any source of knowledge; nor can it be the second, because it is not due to any defects. If it be said that it is neither, then we point out that in that case it cannot be knowledge at all. Thus we find that there can be

no knowledge of the real nature of the self, and hence the soul, not being knowledge, must be non-sentient. It cannot be said finally that jaḍatva is being the not-self, because that is not a Universal, there being only one soul and what is not a Universal cannot be the predicate of a definition, e.g. when we define a man as "A man is mortal", "Mortality" is a universal.

Thus, we conclude that the second hetu "jaḍatva" is not itself established.

The third and the final hetu, viz. "paricchinnatva" too does not prove the case. There are three kinds of limit—limit of space, limit of time, and limit by an object. Now, limitedness of space and time cannot be a cause of falsity, because the ether, though unlimited, is mithyā according to the Advaitins, while the illusory silver has no limitation of time (i.e. it never was, never is, never will be—no distinctions of time), yet it is mithyā. Avidyā, too, being the material cause of all space and time and connected with the all-pervading Brahman, is without any limitation of space and time, yet it is mithyā. Hence, it cannot be said that limitation of space and time is a criterion of falsity. Nor can it be said that limitation by an object is a criterion of falsity, because, according to the Advaitins, there is no object besides Brahman.

Thus, the three reasons adduced do not prove that the world is false.

Finally, the udāharaṇa or the example too is not possible, for according to the Advaitins there is no nacre at all, there being nothing besides Brahman. If it be said that Brahman may very well be cited as an example here (if we put the argument in the negative form: What is non-perceivable, non-sentient and non-limited is not false, like Brahman)—then we ask: Is the pure Brahman to be cited as an example here or the qualified Brahman? Not the first, for the pure Brahman is outside all sources of knowledge and can never be cited as an example; nor the second, for that does not prove the case and is opposed to the Advaita theory itself.

Thus we conclude that the above inference does not prove that the world is mithyā or false.

(*B*) *Criticism of Sattvā-traividhya-vāda.*

According to the Advaitins, there are three kinds of existence, pāramārthika or real, such as Brahman, vyavahārika or empirical such as the world, and prātibhāsika or illusory, such as the illusory

silver. But this distinction is absolutely untenable. First, on the Advaita maxim itself, there must be more than these three grades. Thus, according to the Advaitins, a dream is prātibhāsika and the illusory silver too is so, and hence the dreamt silver-nacre illusion must be one degree lower than the prātibhāsika, and put to an end by the prātibhāsika; while the dream of a dreamt silver-nacre illusion must be still another degree lower. On the other hand, there are objects higher than the vyavahārika. Hence, once the Advaitins begin to divide objects into grades of reality, they cannot stop at three only.[1]

Further, this division into three grades can neither be real, since Brahman is the sole reality, nor be unreal, since then the Advaitins contradict themselves. In the very same way the falsity of the world,[2] the distinctionlessness of Brahman, etc. inevitably lead to the horns of a dilemma.[3]

Further, how to distinguish between the pāramārthika and the apāramārthika? It cannot be said that the pāramārthika is the sat or the existent, and the apāramārthika is what is other than the sat, for what is not existent can never be perceived,[4] while the world, etc., are perceived. It cannot be said also that the pāramārthika is what is never negated while the apāramārthika is what is negated—because the real nature of a superimposed object may not be negated,[5] while Brahman may sometimes be an object of negation, as e.g. we say "This is the world and not Brahman". That is, if Brahman be possessed of attributes, etc. then those very attributes, etc. will be negated, but if He be attributeless, then He cannot be the remover of illusion, as shown above.[6] Thus, no valid distinction is possible between the pāramārthika and the apāramārthika.[7]

Further, how can we distinguish between the vyavahārika and the prātibhāsika too? It cannot be said that the vyavahārika is due to māyā, or cosmic nescience, while the prātibhāsika is due to avidyā or individual nescience,—for no hard and fast distinction can be made between māyā and avidyā, e.g. the magic of a juggler, who is māyika, is prātibhāsika, while the pains, etc. of the individual souls are

[1] Ś.K., p. 82. [2] See above. [3] Ś.K., pp. 82-83.

[4] *Cf.* the sat-khyāti-vāda, according to which even objects of illusory perceptions are real and existent. See footnote (1) above.

[5] The real nature of the silver is not negated, but only its existence then and there in the nacre.

[6] See above. [7] Ś.K., p. 83.

āvidyaka yet vyavahārika. It cannot be said also that the vyavahārika is what leads to successful practical reaction[1] while the prātibhāsika is what does not,—for in dreams, a dream-pitcher may serve the purpose of fetching dream-water, but none would say the dream-pitcher is vyavahārika. It cannot be said also that the vyavahārika is what is negated by the knowledge of Brahman, while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by the knowledge of something else,—for according to the Advaitins themselves, the prātibhāsika silver too is negated by the knowledge of Brahman, and also the knowledge of Brahman alone is correct knowledge according to them. It cannot be said also that the vyavahārika is what is negated by correct knowledge, while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by illusory knowledge, for as shown above the knowledge of Brahman negates that also which is negated by illusory knowledge, (i.e. the prātibhāsika negated by the vyavahārika). It cannot be said also that the vyavahārika is what is negated by the knowledge of pure Brahman while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by the knowledge of something else, for what is meant by the term "pure" here? It cannot stand for the substratum of the erroneous knowledge, for if there be a knowledge of pure Brahman there can be no error. As shown above again and again, the pure Brahman being essentially self-luminous, there can be no ajñāna veiling Him, i.e. jñāna and ajñāna being mutually contradictory and exclusive cannot possibly co-exist. Again, the term "pure" cannot stand for Brahman—without a second—yet not *known* as such, i.e. the upalakṣita Brahman, for if the knowledge of the śuddha Brahman is to stand for that of the upalakṣita Brahman, then the Vedānta-texts, concerned with the one, without any distinction, must be taken to be concerned with distinctions. The same argument goes to refute the view that the vyavahārika is what is negated by the knowledge of the great texts like "Thou art that" while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by the knowledge of something else,—for the great texts, being due to the Vedānta, concerned with a distinctionless object, must be free from distinctions, and as such cannot be negatory of the vyavahārika,[2] and if they refer to distinctions, then those distinctions must be real. Hence it cannot be said also that the vyavahārika is what is negated by knowledge which does not designate distinction, while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by knowledge which does so. Finally, it cannot be said that

[1] Artha-kriyā-kārin.

[2] See above.

the vyavahārika is what is negated by the pāramārthika, while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by the vyavahārika, for that is to assume the very thing to be explained.[1]

We conclude, therefore, that there is no way of distinguishing between the pāramārthika and the apāramārthika, and between the vyavahārika and the prātibhāsika, and hence the sattvā-traividhya-vāda falls to the ground.

(C) *Criticism of Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda.*

According to the doctrine of Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda, the entire universe is generated by perception only, i.e. a thing *is* so long as it is *perceived*, e.g. the body of Devadatta, who is sleeping, does not exist for him, though it exists for Yajñadatta who is awake and is perceiving it. According to this view recognition is simply an error, like the perception "This is that lamp", the fact being that the real lamp never persists for two consecutive moments.

This view is evidently absurd. According to the Advaitins themselves, there are six things which are beginningless—viz. Jīva, Īśvara, pure cit, the distinction between the jīva and Īśvara, avidyā, and the connection between the cit and avidyā. Hence, the universe being beginningless, must be permanent.[2]

Further, if the entire universe be due to perception, then the effect, being of the form of perception only, cannot be said to be due to its own particular cause, e.g. we have to say that a pot is due to the perception of one who is perceiving it at that moment, and not to clay. But if an effect be not due to its cause, then the scriptural injunctions regarding the performance of sacrifices, etc. leading to heaven, or of śravaṇa, etc. leading to salvation, are simply meaningless. And the Advaitins themselves ought not to take food for allaying hunger, or utter words for making others understand their thoughts.[3]

On this view, objects like pots, etc. have no existence beyond the particular perceptions of particular individuals, and this makes ordinary activity impossible. Further, on this view, illusion itself becomes impossible. Thus, if the nacre does not exist prior to being perceived, then when a man perceives "This is a piece of silver", there is generated only silver, and no nacre, and hence the perception cannot be said to be a false perception due to the super-imposition of the silver on the nacre. Also, the knowledge "This is a piece of

[1] Ś.K., pp. 83–84. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 105. [3] *Op. cit.*

silver" and the knowledge "This is not a piece of silver" are concerned with different objects (i.e. the object of the first piece of knowledge is "silver", because thing = perception, while the object of the second piece of knowledge is "not-silver"), and hence the latter cannot negate the former. Also, this very negation of the illusory silver being itself dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭa, the illusory silver must be true.[1]

Further, during deep sleep, universal dissolution, etc., the distinction between the soul and Brahman must be non-existent, there being no perceiver of it. Every day (i.e. after deep sleep) and after every dissolution, even the freed souls will be again involved in mundane existence. Also, there being no impressions of past karmas (these being not perceived), the same man who went to sleep may not arise again. Salvation itself being dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭa, must be false.[2]

Further, if a mere perception gives rise to a pot etc., that very perception, being dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭa, like everything else, must be itself due to another perception, that to another perception and so on to infinity. The very doctrine of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda being itself dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭa, must be false and hence things cannot be dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭa.[3]

This doctrine also fails to explain the fact of recognition, such as "This is that pot". The example of a candle is not to the point, for a candle is being consumed, i.e. changed, every moment, but not pots etc. Pots etc. are permanent, and so too the perceiving self and this makes recognition and memory possible. If everything be dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭa, then the knowledge of non-dualism must also be so, and hence it cannot be negatory of the knowledge of plurality.[4]

If it be said that the following inference proves that the entire universe is dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭa, viz.—The Universe is dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭa, because it is mithyā like dream-objects—then we reply that the example quoted is not correct, because dream-objects are not mithyā, being created by the Supreme Lord Himself.[5]

In the very same manner, the Universe too is real, being created by the Supreme Lord. The Universe also leads to successful practical reaction and hence it must be real. It cannot be objected that mere leading to successful practical reactions is not a sure criterion of reality, seeing that often what is merely superimposed—viz. the

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[1] Ś.K., p. 105.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 105.
[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 105-106.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 106.
[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 107–9. The arguments that the jīva is not the creator of dream-objects, are exactly similar to those of Nimbārka. See above.

illusory snake etc.—lead to successful practical reactions—for the very superimposition of a non-existent thing is not possible.[1]

The Universe is real because it is protected by the Lord. Thus, has the Lord a direct knowledge of the falsity of the world or not? If He has such a knowledge, then why should He have any inclination to protect it, and if He has not, then He cannot be held to be omniscient. If it be said that a magician protects false objects, why not the Lord? Then, we point out that the magician never does so—he simply shows *real* objects, which are past or in some other places, through the power of gems, mantras etc., but never knows them directly nor protects them. But the Lord being omniscient cannot wish to protect what is mithyā. Hence we conclude that the world is real, because it is created and protected by the Lord and leads to successful practical reactions, but is never dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭa, or generated by perception.[2]

(iv) *Criticism of rival theories regarding the relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

(*A*) *Criticism of Abheda-vāda.*

The view that the cit and the acit are absolutely identical with Brahman is absolutely untenable, and has already been criticised above. The fact is that the distinction between Brahman and the cit and the acit is a natural one and persists throughout.[3]

(*B*) *Criticism of Atyanta-bheda-vāda.*

The opposite extreme view too is not tenable, for this makes the abheda-texts false, while the fact is that Scripture as a whole is true, and no texts may be taken to be false.[4]

(*C*) *Criticism of Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda.*

Here the author follows Devācārya exactly.[5]

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[1] Ś.K., pp. 109–110. The arguments are exactly similar to Puruṣottama. See above.

[2] Ś.K., p. 110.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 97, 99.

[5] See above.

X. Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava II.

(1) His life and date.

Puruṣottamaprasāda is said to have been born in the city of Jagādharī in Kurukṣetra in the Vikrama era 1680, i.e. 1623 A.D. He was the only son of Nārāyaṇaprsāda, a Gauḍīya Brahmin, who was a follower of the creed of Svabhūdeva of the sect of Nimbārka. Being an only child, Puruṣottamaprasāda was spoilt by his father, and spent his time in idle pastimes, instead of in study, till he was nine years of age. Thereupon his father took him to his preceptor, Dharmadeva, and left him in his care. Dharmadeva initiated and instructed him with great care and taught him the holy mantra of the Lord Hayagrīva (= horse-necked).[1] He composed an elaborate commentary, styled "Śrutyanta-sura-druma", on Nimbārka's "Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja". He is said to have composed it in compliance with the request of his preceptor Dharmadeva.[2] He wrote also a commentary, styled "Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇī",[3] on Śrīnivāsa's

[1] Within a year, so the tradition goes, the Lord, being pleased with the boy, appeared to him in a dream and asked him to ask for a boon. The boy prayed that he might soon be well-versed in all the vedas and thereby fulfil the heart's desire of his father and teacher. He was granted the boon. He sent the information to his father who wanted him to stay on with his preceptor and continue his studies. He engaged himself to studies with whole-hearted devotion and learned everything within three years. At the age of thirteen he returned home, and is said to have defeated all the heretics and preached the Vaiṣṇava religion all around.

[2] Preface to Ś.S., p. 2.

The tradition is that the Lord appeared before him on his request and wrote on the book with His own hand.

[3] That this Puruṣottamaprasāda is not identical with Puruṣottamaprasāda I is evident from the following:

(*a*) The colophon to the 1st taraṅga of the "Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇī is as follows: "Iti Śrī-Hayagrīvānugrahāśritena Puruṣottamaprasādākhyena Vaiṣṇavena Viracitāyām Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇyāṃ pratyāgātmanirṇayo nāma prathama-taraṅgaḥ", p. 15. (The colophons to other six taraṅgas mention no name). The exactly similar colophon is found at the end of "Srutyanta-sura-druma" thus: Iti Śrī-Hayagrīvānugrahaikasevakena Śrī-Niyamānandānuyāyinā Śrī-Puruṣottamaprasādākhyena Vaiṣṇavena viracite Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-vyākhyāne Śrutyanta-sura-drume caramā śākhā", p. 246. (The same colophon is repeated at the end of each śākhā). This proves that these two works must be composed by the same Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava.

"Laghu-stava-rāja-stotram". A third work by him is "Mukunda-mahimā-stava", a collection of a hundred and one hymns in praise of Lord Kṛṣṇa.

He is said to have composed also a very learned book, called "Para-tattva-nirṇaya", but it has not yet been found as a whole.[1]

(3) His doctrine.

He accepts the usual tenets of the sect. His main concern is, like Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava I, to criticise the Advaita doctrine and in most places he repeats his arguments.[2] We notice here one original criticism by him.

(i) *Criticism of the Advaita view of Anirvacanīya-vāda.*

There is neither any lakṣaṇa or definition, nor any pramāṇa or proof, of anirvacanīyatva. It cannot be said that the anirvacanīya is what is different from the sat or the existent, for a hare's horn e.g. is different from the sat, but is taken to be not anirvacanīya, but tuccha. It cannot be said that it is what is different from the asat or the non-existent, because Brahman is different from the non-existent, yet He is not taken to be anirvacanīya. It cannot be said that it is what is different from both sat and the asat, for a thing must be either sat or asat. It cannot be said that the anirvacanīya is what is not the locus of either existence or non-existence, for in that case Brahman, who is not the locus of any quality, must be taken to be anirvacanīya. It cannot be said that the anirvacanīya is what cannot be depicted, for whatever cannot be depicted must be simply non-existent, also Brahman, who, according to the Advaitins cannot be

(*b*) The author of "Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇī" was a worshipper of the Lord Hayagrīva, as is evident from the colophon "Śrī-Hayagrīvānugrahāśritena". And Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava II was also a worshipper of Hayagrīva.

(*c*) The author of "Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇī" was a disciple of Dharmadeva, a descendent of Svabhūdeva, as is evident from the opening verse: "Śrī-Dharmadevapādābjaṃ Svabhū-vaṃśābdhi-sambhavam" etc., p. 1. And Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava II also was a disciple of Dharmadeva.

[1] Preface to Ś.S., p. 2.

[2] E.g., his criticism of the Advaita view that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world (pp. 11ff.), of Adhyāsa-vāda and dialectic on ajñāna (pp. 13ff.), etc.

depicted, must be anirvacanīya. It cannot be said that it is what is different from the existent, different from the non-existent and different from both the existent and the non-existent, for as shown above, the existent and the non-existent being mutually opposed cannot be denied simultaneously. For the same reason, it cannot be said that the anirvacanīya is what is devoid of existence, devoid of non-existence and devoid of both existence and non-existence. Also, what is meant by the terms "existence" and "non-existence" here? Firstly, it cannot be said that existence means a class and non-existence the absence of that, for in that case, Brahman who has no class becomes anirvacanīya, i.e. unreal, while the world which has a class becomes real. Secondly, it cannot be said that existence is what leads to successful practical reaction, while non-existence is what does not, for the very same reason, seeing that Brahman does not lead to any practical reaction, not being the basis of action at all, while the world does so. Thirdly, it cannot be said that existence is what is incapable of being negated, while non-existence is what is so capable, for according to the Advaitins, the anirvacanīya is capable of being negated, yet it is not the same as the non-existent. Fourthly, it cannot be said that existence is what is established by the sources of knowledge, while non-existence is what is not so established, for the anirvacanīya cannot be established by any source of knowledge, yet it is not non-existent. The pure Brahman too is not capable of being established by any source of knowledge yet He is sat. Fifthly, it cannot be said that existence is what is outside all sources of knowledge, for then the existent can have no specific marks of its own, like the sky-flower. Sixthly, it cannot be said that existence is what is free from nothingness, i.e. what is not a non-entity, for then the anirvacanīya, which is not a mere non-entity, like the sky-flower, according to the Advaitins, must be existent. Seventhly, it cannot be said that existence is what is free from Brahmanhood, i.e. what is not Brahman, for then the world must be existent. Eighthly, it cannot be said that existence is what exists at all times and in all places, while non-existence is what does not. Now, we accept this definition, but the Advaita theory itself contradicts it, for according to it, the world etc. which are capable of being depicted (i.e. is nirvacanīya), must be existent. Thus, as it is not clear what exactly is meant by the terms "existence" and "non-existence" here, it cannot be said that the anirvacanīya is what is devoid of existence and non-existence and different from both of these two.

Further, does the anirvacanīya exist (i.e. asti), or not (i.e. nāsti), or is it altogether false (i.e. asat)? [1] It cannot be said to exist, for whatever exists must have some mark by which it can be distinguished from others and depicted, e.g. when we say "The pot exists", the very existence of the pot means that it is something which is capable of being depicted by some mark or other. But the anirvacanīya cannot be depicted and hence cannot be distinguished from anything else and therefore cannot be known, as all knowledge implies assimilation and discrimination. But if the anirvacanīya cannot be known, it cannot be *denied* too, for just as knowledge (or affirmation) must be of a *definite* thing so denial too must be so. In fact, nothing at all can possibly be said of the anirvacanīya, as it is absolutely indefinite, indeterminable and indescribable. It can neither be affirmed, nor denied.

Thus, we conclude that no definition of the anirvacanīya is ever possible.[2]

It has also no pramāṇa or proof. It is not an object of direct perception, as alleged by the Advaitins, for when we mistake a nacre for a silver, what we see for the time being, is not any anirvacanīya silver, but the *real* silver-elements in the nacre.[3] Thus, the anirvacanīya is outside the sphere of all pramāṇas.[4]

XI. Mādhava Mukunda.

(1) Life and date.

Nothing is known definitely about his life and date. Keśava Kāśmīrī Bhaṭṭa, as we have seen, refers to one Mukunda as his guru. But we have no means of ascertaining whether he means Mādhava Mukunda or not.

(2) Works.

His only known treatise is Para-pakṣagiri-vajra, or Hārda-sañcaya, in which he severely criticises the various Advaita Vedānta tenets of Śaṃkara and his followers. His arguments are similar to

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[1] The difference between "nāstitva" and "asattvā" is that while the former applies to things which *are*, though are not here and now, as "the pot is not", the latter applies to what is never existent at all, as the sky-flower.

[2] Ś.S., pp. 18ff.

[3] Cf. the doctrine of Sat-khyāti. See footnote (1) below.

[4] Ś.S., pp. 20ff.

those of Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava I (in his Śrutyanta-kalpa-vallī) which have already been set forth in details.

XII. Vanamālī Miśra.

(1) Life and date.

He lived in a village called Triyaga, near Brindavan, and belonged to the Bharadvāja clan.

(2) Works.

He composed a treatise, called Vedānta-siddhānta-saṃgraha or Śruti-siddhānta-saṃgraha. It consists of seven chapters and is written in verse with a commentary in prose. It discusses the tenets of the Nimbārka School.

XIII. Anantarāma.

(1) Life and date.

Anantarāma was one of the later followers of Nimbārka. He was the son of Nārāyaṇaprasāda, a Gauḍīya Brāhmaṇa and was born in the village of Jagādharī in the Punjab in the 17th century A.D. He was a disciple of Dharmadāsa.[1] According to this view he must have been a brother of Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava II.

(2) Works.

He composed a number of treatises, developing the Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda of Nimbārka and subjecting the Advaita view to a thorough criticism. But he makes no original contributions and his criticisms of the Advaita view too are borrowed mostly from previous writers.[2]

His works are the following:—

(*a*) Vedānta-tattva-bodha. (Prose.)

(*b*) Vedānta-ratna-mālā. (A fairly elaborate treatise in verse, dealing with the three tattvas or categories and their relation.)

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[1] Preface to Vedānta-ratna-mālā.

[2] Cf. his criticism of Nirviśeṣa-vāda. Vedānta-tattva-bodha, pp. 5ff.—which is exactly similar to the arguments of Puruṣottama. Vide V.R.M. See above. Adhyāsa-vāda and dialectic on ajñāna—Vedānta-tattva-bodha, pp. 9ff.—exactly similar to the arguments of Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava I. See Ś.K. See above.

(*c*) Tattva-siddhānta-bindu. (Twenty-five verses.)
(*d*) Śruti-siddhānta-ratna-mālā.[1]
(*e*) Vedānta-sāra-padya-mālā.[2] (Twenty-five verses.).
(*f*) Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-caraṇa-bhūṣaṇa-stotram.[3] (Seventy-two verses.)
(*g*) Śrī-Mukunda-śaraṇāpatti-stotram.[4] (Seventeen verses.)
(*h*) Ācārya-carita.[5]

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[1] Preface to Vedāntaratna-mālā.
[2] Given in S.R., pp. 91–96.
[3] S.R., pp. 38–51.
[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 65–67.
[5] Preface to Ś.S., p. 2.

COMPARISON OF THE DOCTRINE OF NIMBĀRKA WITH SOME OTHER BHEDĀBHEDA DOCTRINES.

I. Nimbārka and Rāmānuja.

SVĀBHĀVIKA-BHEDĀBHEDA-VĀDA AND VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA-VĀDA.

Rāmānuja's theory is too well-known to be recounted at length. The Highest Reality, or Brahman, according to him, is Viṣṇu or Vāsudeva, a Personal God, endowed with every auspicious quality and free from all defects.[1] His conception is exactly similar to that of Nimbārka, except that, as we have seen, Nimbārka identifies Brahman with Kṛṣṇa. There is not a single mention of Rādhā or Kṛṣṇa in Rāmānuja's works.

Like Nimbārka, Rāmānuja holds that the individual soul is knowledge, yet a knower, an agent, and an enjoyer, atomic in size, and so on.[2] Here also, the two are in perfect agreement. But while according to Nimbārka, the individual souls are parts of the Lord in the sense of being His powers or śaktis, according to Rāmānuja they are so in the sense of being His attributes or modes or viśeṣaṇas.[3] The same remarks apply to the non-sentient substance too. Like Nimbārka, again, Rāmānuja speaks of three kinds of the non-sentient, viz. prakṛti or matter, kāla or time, and śuddha-tattva or pure matter,[4] this last corresponding to Nimbārka's aprākṛta.

Rāmānuja explains the relation between Brahman, the sentient and the non-sentient on the analogy of the soul-body, or substance-attribute relation, i.e. as a relation of non-separation (apṛthaktva). The soul and body, the substance and attribute are different from one another, yet they are inseparably connected, and form a whole. Exactly similar is the case with Brahman, and the sentient and non-

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[1] Śrī. B., 1.1.1, pp. 2, 63, chap. 1. Madras ed., etc.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.19, pp. 139–141; 2.3.20ff., pp. 141ff.; 2.3.33ff., pp. 151ff. etc. Cf. also V.D. and V.S. on the same sūtras. Vide also Y.M.D., pp. 31ff.

[3] Śrī. B., 1.1.1, pp. 61, 96, 101, chap. 1, etc.; 1.2.15, p. 42, chap. 2, etc. V.D., intro. pp. 3-4; etc. V.S., 1.1.1, p. 4, etc.

[4] Y.M.D., pp. 15ff.

sentient.[1] But Nimbārka takes his stand, as we have seen, on the cause-effect relation. With Rāmānuja the stress is more on the principle of non-difference than on that of difference, but not so with Nimbārka.[2]

Rāmānuja's view of salvation too is in perfect accord with that of Nimbārka.[3]

According to Rāmānuja, bhakti is the means to salvation. By bhakti he does not understand devotion or love, as Nimbārka does, but upāsanā or meditation.[4] This bhakti is based on knowledge, and arises from six essential pre-requisites, viz. discrimination of food (viveka), complete disregard for worldly objects (vimoka), continued practice (abhyāsa), performance of sacrifices (kriyā), virtuous conduct, like truthfulness and the rest (kalyāṇa) and freedom from dejection (anavasāda). Bhakti, thus, comprises all ethical virtues. Nimbārka too holds, as we have seen, that meditation, based on knowledge, is a means to salvation, and that mental purity, generated by the external performance of sacrifices and internal practice of self-control and the rest, is its essential pre-requisite.

Thus, from the point of view of philosophy, the main difference between Nimbārka and Rāmānuja consists in their views with regard to the relation between difference and non-difference, God on the one hand, men and the world on the other.

From the point of view of religion, too, there is a difference of spirit between their systems. While Rāmānuja's system, though admitting a personal relation between God and man, is more intellectual, Nimbārka's system is less so, and decidedly more devotional and religious. That is, in Rāmānuja's system, devotion is based on an intellectual apprehension of and the consequent reverence for the supreme majesty of the Lord, keeping the devotee somewhat apart from the Lord,[5] while in Nimbārka's system, the superseding element is a sweet relation of love and ecstasy, drawing the two nearer in a relation of utmost intimacy.[6]

[1] Śrī. B., 1.1.1, pp. 96, 101, etc., chap. 1; 2.1.15, p. 43, chap. 2, etc. V.D., intro. pp. 1–4. V.S., 1.1.1, p. 4, etc. Vide also S.A.M., pp. 5ff.

[2] See below under Śrīkaṇṭha.

[3] Śrī. B., 1.1.1, pp. 36, 39–72, etc., chap. 1.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, pp. 9ff., chap. 1. "Evam-rūpā dhruvānusmṛtir eva bhaktiśabdenābhidhīyate, upāsanāpara-paryyāyatvāt bhakti-śabdasya". See above.

[5] Aiśvarya-pradhānābhakti.

[6] Mādhurya-pradhānābhakti.

II. Nimbārka and Bhāskara.

SVĀBHĀVIKA-BHEDĀBHEDA-VĀDA AND AUPĀDHIKA-BHEDĀBHEDA-VĀDA.

(1) *Introduction.*

Bhāskara is said to have flourished during the reign of King Bhoja about 918–973 Śakābda, i.e. 996–1061 A.D.[1] He wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, developing a Bhedābheda view and criticising Advaita-vāda or Māyā-vāda.

Eggeling thought that Bhāskara was identical with Nimbārka.[2] But this view is absolutely untenable. It is clear beyond doubt from Nimbārka's Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha and other works and Bhāskara's commentary that Nimbārka and Bhāskara were two different persons, representing two different schools of thought.

(2) *Brahman.*

The first distinction which is at once evident from a cursory glance through the commentary of Bhāskara is that Bhāskara, unlike Nimbārka, throughout refers to the Highest Reality as Brahman,[3] and sometimes as Īśvara,[4] but not even once calls Him Puruṣottama or Kṛṣṇa, as is done by Nimbārka repeatedly. Bhāskara speaks of no consort of Brahman, as Nimbārka does of Rādhā, as ever accompanying Brahman, i.e. Kṛṣṇa.

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that Brahman is the Supreme Cause of the entire Universe, its creator, maintainer and destroyer,[5] its material and efficient cause.[6] He holds, like all the rest, that Brahman can be known through Scripture alone,[7] and that Scripture and not reasoning is our guide with regard to super-sensible objects.[8]

[1] Preface to Bh. B., p. 7.

[2] I.O.C. (Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS., Part IV, 1894, pp. 802, 803). The MSS. referred to by Eggeling are not Nimbārka's commentaries at all, but Bhāskara's, now published in the C.S.S. See Bibliography.

[3] Bh. B., 1.1.1, pp. 6, 7; 1.1.2, p. 8; 1.1.3, p. 9, etc. etc. from the beginning to the end.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 8; 1.1.12, p. 24; 1.2.6, p. 39; 1.2.9, p. 40, etc.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 8; 1.1.11, p. 24, etc.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 8; 1.4.22, p. 84; 1.4.26, p. 86, etc.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 8; 1.1.3, p. 9, etc.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, pp. 16, 19; 2.2.2, p. 110.

Reasoning, to be of any avail, must follow revelation and never supersede or transcend it.[1]

Brahman, according to Bhāskara, has two aspects (dvi-rūpa), viz. the kāraṇa-rūpa or the causal state and the kārya-rūpa or the effected state.[2] Brahman is one as cause and many as effects, just as gold is one as gold, but many as bracelets, ear-rings etc.[3] In other words, Brahman is bhinnā-bhinna-rūpa.[4]

But the abhinna and kāraṇa-rūpa is the real, original and natural form of Brahman, while the bhinna and kārya-rūpa is due to upādhi or limiting adjunct and is, as such, something adventitious,[5] though real.[6] By Himself, Brahman is originally without distinction, without form, one and without a second, a pure unity and a pure cause. Then, *afterwards*, He comes to manifest Himself voluntarily in various effects or forms, i.e. comes to have a form, through upādhi and plurality, i.e. the universe of souls and matter, follows.[7]

Bhāskara emphasizes this distinction between the transcendent and the immanent [8] aspects of Brahman again and again.[9] He points out that the universe has Brahman for its essence, but Brahman has not the universe for His essence.[10] That is the universe has no existence beyond Brahman but Brahman is never exhausted wholly in the universe, but has other aspects too beyond it. Bhāskara is, of course, careful to point out that the prapañca-rūpa and the bhinna-kārya-rūpa of Brahman is not less real simply because it is something adventitious, and not original, being due to limiting adjunct.[11] He, in fact, does not use the term "upādhi" in the Śaṃkarite sense, as we shall see later.[12]

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[1] Bh. B., 1.1.11, p. 24; 1.3.6, p. 90; 1.1.11, p. 92, etc.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 19; 1.1.11, p. 24, "Tat kāraṇātmanā kāryātmanā dvi-rūpeṇa avasthitam"; 1.2.23, p. 46.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 18.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 18, "Ato bhinnābhinna-svarūpaṃ Brahmeti sthitam".

[5] Āgantuka.

[6] Bh. B., 2.3.43, p. 141, "Sa ca bhinnābhinna-svarūpo' abhinna-svābhāvikam aupādhikam tu bhinna-rūpam"; cf. also 3.2.27 (written as 3.2.26 in order to be in conformity with the numbering of sūtras by Śaṃkara), p. 170; 4.1.3, p. 221; 4.4.4, p. 243. See below.

[7] Bh. B., 3.2.11, p. 165.

[8] Prapañca-vilakṣaṇa and prapañca-lakṣaṇa.

[9] Bh. B., 1.1.20, p. 29; 1.2.23, p. 46.

[10] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.11, p. 165; 3.2.13, p. 166; 3.2.23, p. 169; 3.4.8, p. 202.

[11] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.11, p. 165; 3.2.23, p. 168; etc. See below.

[12] See below.

Bhāskara points out that even when Brahman manifests Himself as effects, He never Himself actually *becomes* the Universe, but remains unchanged and unmodified in nature, as a spider remains unchanged, though weaving its web out of itself.[1] Creation means the manifestation of Brahman's power,[2] and Brahman's immanence in the created effects is not His actual transformation in the form of those effects, but is simply His abiding within the universe and within the hearts of men as their Inner Controller and Inner Soul,[3] Himself remaining in His pristine exalted condition, absolutely unaffected by their defects and miseries.[4]

Now, Nimbārka agrees with Bhāskara in holding that Brahman is both transcendent and immanent, i.e. both the transcendent creator and the immanent ruler; that He is never actually transformed into the form of the Universe and that transformation means nothing but projection of His power.[5]

But in Nimbārka we do not find any such sharp and emphatic distinction between the two forms of Brahman, His kāraṇa-rūpa and His kārya-rūpa. According to Nimbārka, Brahman, of course, has a kāraṇa-rūpa when He is a pure cause, without producing any effects, e.g. during the time of universal dissolution; but even in His causal state, Brahman is not absolutely non-differenced, or nirviśeṣa, a pure unity or a bare identity as Bhāskara holds. According to Bhāskara in His causal state, Brahman is free from all distinctions whatsoever, i.e. He has then no internal differences[6] even, i.e. His powers and qualities involve no difference in Him. During His causal state the sentient and the non-sentient — His two powers, remain completely merged in Him, like a grain of salt in the sea,[7] and His qualities, such as knowledge and the rest, are non-different from Him, just as heat, the quality of fire, is non-different from fire, and do not imply any difference of nature on His part.[8] In short, according to Bhāskara, Brahman is an *abstract Unity* in His causal state, with no internal

[1] Bh. B., 2.1.14, p. 96.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.25, p. 85; 2.1.14, pp. 96, 97; 2.1.27, p. 105.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.5-6, p. 39; 1.2.18, p. 44.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.17, p. 26; 1.2.8, p. 40; 1.3.7, pp. 52, 53; 1.4.21, p. 82; 2.1.22, p. 103.

[5] Śakti-vikṣepa.

[6] Cp. the three kinds of bhedas, sajātīya, vijātīya and svagata.

[7] See below.

[8] Bh. B., 3.2.23, p. 169; 4.4.7, p. 244.

differences, but becomes a concrete unity in His effected state, with the internal differences of the sentient and the non-sntient. But for Nimbārka, Brahman is always differenced or saviśeṣa, in the sense that He has always internal differences, i.e. is always a *concrete Unity* even during His causal state. The sentient and the non-sentient are *never* absolutely identical with Brahman, *never* absolutely merged and absorbed in Him like a grain of salt thrown into the sea, but always retain their own individuality and separateness even during salvation and dissolution, and as such, they always constitute the internal differences of Brahman. Thus, a pure, non-differenced unity is a thing unknown to Nimbārka. Nimbārka, in fact, does not think it necessary to note the kāraṇa-rūpa of Brahman separately from His kārya-rūpa for the evident reason that he thinks that there is no fundamental distinction between them to require special mention.

According to Bhāskara, as according to Nimbārka, Brahman is a qualified Being although, as noted above, the qualities of Brahman involve no difference in His own nature.[1] Brahman is pure existence and pure knowledge,[2] yet He is a knower or possesses knowledge as His quality.[3] He is omniscient and omnipotent.[4] He has many other qualities too, such as freedom from sins, freedom from fear, etc.[5]

It is curious that Bhāskara never directly refers to Brahman as possessed of innumerable qualities,[6] as Nimbārka repeatedly does.[7] He throughout emphasizes only one quality of Brahman, viz. Omniscience. Everywhere he refers to Brahman as Omniscient and Omnipotent.[8] Again and again, these two adjectives are coupled together and prefixed before the word "Brahman", whenever the word is mentioned[9]. In many other places, again, he speaks of Brahman

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[1] Bh. B., 3.2.23, p. 169 ("Na dharmadharmibhedena svarūpabhedaḥ"), 4.4.7 (p. 244).

[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.15, 16, p. 166; 3.2.17, p. 166; 3.2.19, p. 167; 3.2.23, pp. 168-169. Brahman is sal-lakṣaṇa and bodha-lakṣaṇa.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, etc.

[4] See below.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.20, p. 29; 1.2.8, p. 40; 1.2.18, p. 44, etc.

[6] Ananta-guṇa.

[7] Vide V.P.S., 1.1.1, p. 1 (page references are to the K.S.S. ed., throughout); 3.2.11, p. 279, etc. etc.; Ś.N.K.S., Śloka 1, etc.

[8] Sarvajña and sarva-śakti.

[9] Bh. B., 1.1.2, p. 8; 1.1.11, p. 24; 1.2.6, p. 39; 1.4.26, p. 83; 2.1.14, pp. 96, 97; 2.1.24, p. 104; 2.1.33, p. 107; 2.2.37 (printed as 2.2.40 in conformity with the numbering of Śaṃkara), p. 128, etc. etc.

as possessed of infinite and inconceivable powers.[1] With him, thus, the stress is throughout on the wonderful and innumerable *powers* (śakti), of Brahman, rather than on His wonderful and innumerable *qualities* (guṇa), as with Nimbārka. In fact, not once does he take the trouble of describing Brahman as an abode of all auspicious qualities etc., but rather takes it for granted that Brahman is possessed of various qualities, and speaks of some of them incidentally in connection with discussing the import of certain scriptural texts.[2] More particularly, he never refers to those softer qualities of the Lord which play so prominent a part in the system of Nimbārka and especially in that of his followers. He, of course, like all the rest, describes Brahman as blissful,[3] but not once does he speak of Brahman's beauty, loveliness or grace.

Bhāskara, in fact, does not regard Brahman as a personal and embodied being as Nimbārka does. According to Nimbārka, as we have seen, the Lord is the Highest Person or Puruṣottama, possessed of a celestial body, full of divine beauty and grace. But Bhāskara does not speak of the body of Brahman. He also makes no mention of incarnations as Nimbārka does and in his criticism of the Pāñcarātra system[4] he definitely rejects the theory of four vyūhas,—which is accepted by Nimbārka and his followers.

There is not a single mention of the grace of the Lord in Bhāskara's commentary,[5] and never does he call Brahman "bhaktavatsala", etc. which Nimbārka does so often. According to Bhāskara, Brahman is to be worshipped indeed, but not as a Personal God of love and grace, but as a formless and distinctionless entity, in whatever way that might be possible.[6] Thus, while according to Nimbārka, the Lord is to be known, *loved* and worshipped, according to Bhāskara, Brahman is to be known and worshipped, and not loved.

Bhāskara holds, in opposition to Śaṃkara, that Brahman, though not something to be produced, modified and purified, is yet something

[1] Bh. B., 1.4.25, p. 85; 2.1.14, pp. 97, 98; 2.1.30, p. 106; 2.2.2, p. 110; 2.4.4, p. 146; etc. Ananta-acintya-śakti.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.20; 1.2.8; etc.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.12–19, pp. 24–29.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 2.2.38–40 (printed as 2.2.41–44 in the book in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering of the sūtras), pp. 128-129.

[5] See below under "sādhanas".

[6] I.e. as nirākāra and nirviśeṣa. See below.

to be obtained.[1] He is to be approached by freed souls and to be obtained by them.[2]

Here Nimbārka agrees with Bhāskara.[3] This question is connected with the question whether salvation is a positive acquisition, or a mere negative removal of nescience (as held by Śaṃkara), which will be considered below.[4]

Thus, we conclude that although there is a general agreement between Nimbārka and Bhāskara with regard to the nature and qualities of Brahman, as the Universal Cause etc., yet there is a vital point of divergence between the two in that Nimbārka does not countenance the purely formless and distinctionless aspect of Brahman on which Bhāskara lays so great a stress.

(3) *The cit.*

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that the soul is knowledge by nature and a knower,[5] and an enjoyer,[6] and an active agent;[7] that in size, it is atomic[8] and that in number it is infinite.[9]

But the fundamental difference between Nimbārka and Bhāskara is that Bhāskara holds that although the soul is an enjoyer, etc. yet its state of being an enjoyer, an agent, atomic and innumerable[10] is neither original and natural, nor eternal, but due to limiting adjuncts and adventitious, lasting so long only as the limiting adjunct itself does.[11]

This follows from the peculiar doctrine of Bhāskara, that the individual soul is different-nondifferent from Brahman[12] during the

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[1] Bh. B., 1.1.4, p. 20. Contrast Ś.B., 1.1.4, pp. 161ff., i.e. according to Bhāskara, Brahman, though not upādya, vikārya and saṃskārya, is yet āpya.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.4, p. 38; 1.2.13, p. 41; 1.3.1, p. 52.

[3] See above Nimbārka's doctrine of salvation.

[4] See below under "Mokṣa".

[5] Bh. B., 2.3.18, p. 135.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.17, p. 26; 1.2.8, p. 40; 1.3.7, pp. 52-53; 2.1.22, p. 103.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.33–39, pp. 138-139.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.19–28, pp. 135–137.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.21, p. 52; 2.2.37 (printed as 2.2.40 in the book in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering), p. 128.

[10] Bhoktṛtva, kartṛtva, aṇutva and anantatva.

[11] I.e. not svābhāvika and nitya, but aupādhika, āgantuka and anitya.

[12] Bh. B., 1.1.17, p. 26; 1.2.6, p. 39; 1.2.20, p. 45; 1.4.21, p. 81; 2.1.22, p. 103; 2.3.43, p. 141; 3.2.6, p. 162; 3.2.28-29 (printed as 3.2.27-28 in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering), p. 170. See below.

state of mundane existence only, but originally, i.e. during the causal state of Brahman, it was non-different from Brahman and ultimately, i.e. during the states of dissolution and salvation, it will be non-different from Brahman.[1]

Thus, during the state of mundane existence, i.e. during the effected state of Brahman, the individual soul, as a part and an effect of Brahman and as abiding in and resting on Him, is non-different from Him, because the part is non-different from the whole, the effect from the cause, the support from the supported.[2] Yet at the same time, it is different from Brahman because of the upādhi or limiting adjunct which separates it from Brahman. Curiously enough, Bhāskara illustrates his theory by the examples used by both Pariṇāma-vādins and Vivarta-vādins. He says that the individual soul is a part of the Supreme Being, a part due to the limiting adjunct of beginningless avidyā and karma, just as a spark is of fire, or the ether within the ear (limited by the upādhi 'ear') is of the universal ether or the vital air within everybody (limited by the upādhi 'body') is of the universal air.[3] Thus, whenever Bhāskara speaks of the individual soul as a part of Brahman, he cites the example of spark and fire, but says at the same time that the individual soul is a part of Brahman *due to upādhis.*[4]

It is clear, therefore, that by the term "upādhi" Bhāskara does not understand something false or illusory, as Śaṃkara does, otherwise he would not have quoted the example of spark and fire, a spark being a *real* part of fire. As we have seen above, he says that the upādhis are beginningless avidyā and karma.[5] Again, in another place, he says that the upādhis are buddhi, the internal organ etc., and their qualities, viz. attachment etc., based on the sense of egoity.[6] What he means is that so long as the individual soul is under the clutches of avidyā[7] and regards itself as absolutely different from

[1] See below under "Relation between Brahman, cit and acit.

[2] Bh. B., 1.4.2, p. 72; 2.1.14, p. 93; 2.1.18, p. 101; 2.4.4, p. 145; 2.1.19, p. 102.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.21, p. 81.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.43, p. 140; 3.2.30 (printed as 3.2.29 in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering), p. 170. Vide also 3.2.19, p. 167 and 3.2.29, pp. 167-168.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.21, p. 81.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.29-30, p. 137.

[7] Avidyā is defined thus: "Śarīrādav-anātma-buddhiḥ". Bh. B., 1.1.4, p. 21; vide also p. 19.

Brahman[1], it is led on to perform kāmya-karmas etc.— i.e. act in a selfish spirit, and this leads it to be connected with matter, i.e. with the body, the senses, buddhi, internal organ etc., and matter serves as a limiting adjunct to differentiate it from Brahman.

Bhāskara admits, therefore, the *reality* of upādhis. He explicitly says that what is aupādhika is *not* apāramārthika.[2] The difference between what is svābhāvika or natural and what is aupādhika or unnatural is not a difference between what is real and what is unreal, but only a difference between what is original and *real* for *ever* (nitya) and what is adventitious and not real for ever, but *for a time being only* (anitya). Bhāskara points out that what is adventitious and not original is not necessarily false, e.g. a thing which has no heat within it, may become hot when in contact with fire (as an iron pot placed over fire), but this heat which is something adventitious is not something unreal.[3] Thus, according to Bhāskara, what is aupādhika is real, *very real*, so far as it goes, i.e. so long as the upādhi lasts, but ceases to be so as soon as the upādhi ceases. This sense of the 'aupādhika' is exactly opposed to the Śaṃkarite sense of it. According to Śaṃkara, what is aupādhika is *never* real, for if it be real, it could not be ever-negated. Śaṃkara thus identifies reality with *permanence*. According to him, what is existent or sat is true for all times. But according to Bhāskara, reality and permanence are not necessarily identical. A real thing may be non-permanent, i.e. be real *for a time only* and not all throughout. According to Bhāskara, therefore, the non-difference of the soul from Brahman is SVĀBHĀVIKA, i.e. REAL AND LASTING, being real always,— during the state of mundane existence as well as during the states of dissolution and salvation; while its difference from Brahman is *aupādhika*, i.e. *real, though not lasting*, being real during the state of mundane existence only.[4]

[1] Bh. B., 2.3.20, p. 137. "Yāvadayam ātmā kevalena dvaitadarśanena saṃsarati tāvat-kālabhāvī buddhyādyupādhi-yogaḥ."

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.40, p. 139. "Na caupādhikaṃ kartṛtvam apāramārthikam."

[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.40, p. 139.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.43, pp. 140-141; 3.2.6, p. 162; 3.2.26 (printed as 3.2.25 in conformity with the numbering of Śaṃkara), pp. 161-162; 4.1.3, p. 221; 4.4.4, p. 243. See below under "Relation between Brahman, cit and acit". It is interesting to compare the view of Bhāskara with that of Auḍulomi (as given by Bhāskara himself). According to Auḍulomi (Bhāskara points out) the soul is absolutely different, or atyanta-bhinna from Brahman during its state of bondage, but becomes different from Him during its state of release. (Bh. B., 1.4.20, p. 81). Bhāskara criticises this view in the next sūtra (*op. cit.*, 1.4.21,

When the upādhi is removed, then the soul becomes one with Brahman, just as when the pot is broken, the ether within the pot becomes one with the universal ether,[1] or just as a grain of salt when thrown into the sea becomes one with the salt water.[2] It attains the pure form of the Supreme Self [3] and becomes omniscient and omnipotent [4] and all-pervading [5] like Brahman, it becomes the Universal soul like Him.[6]

After having thus considered what exactly is the significance of the term "upādhi" in Bhāskara, we can now understand clearly why and in what sense Bhāskara calls the soul's state of being an agent, an enjoyer and atomic of the soul, *aupādhika* merely and not natural. He points out that if the soul were a natural agent, it would have continued to act *always*, but since where there is action there is enjoyment and where there is enjoyment there is mundane existence, the soul would have been subject to the mundane existence always and would have never been free.[7] The fact is that the soul is an agent so long as it has a body, senses, etc., so long as it is connected with the upādhis of matter, but it is no longer an agent when the upādhi is no more, just as a carpenter is an agent when he has his tools with him and not otherwise,[8] or just as fire produces smoke when it is in contact with fuel and not otherwise.[9] And this agency of the soul, though aupādhika, is not unreal,[10] i.e. the soul though not always an agent is a *real* one, so long as it remains as such, i.e. during its state of bondage. The (aupādhika) agency of the soul is dependent upon Brahman [11]—a point common with Nimbārka, according to whom also its agency is dependent on Him.

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p. 81) and points out that the soul can never be *absolutely different* from Brahman, for even during the state of mundane existence it is the Supreme Soul Himself who abides as the individual soul. Even the upādhi or matter cannot make the soul *absolutely different* from Brahman, just as the spark is not absolutely different from fire, or the ether within the ear-hole from the universal ether. Hence, even during the state of mundane existence the souls are not *atyanta-bhinna* from Brahman, but *bhinnābhinna* from Him.

[1] Bh. B., 4.4.4, p. 243.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 4.2.15, p. 231.
[3] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.2, p. 242.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.7, p. 244.
[5] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.15, p. 247.
[6] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.7, p. 244.
[7] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.4, p. 139. "Na svābhāvikaṃ kartṛtvam, anirmokṣa-prasaṅgāt".
[8] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.40, p. 139.
[9] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with the numbering of Śaṃkara), p. 210.
[10] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.40, p. 139.
[11] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.41, p.140.

The soul's state of being an agent too is similarly aupādhika, lasting so long only as karmas and their results, viz. the body etc., do.[1]

The atomicity of the soul too is aupādhika only, for it, as non-different from Brahman, is all-pervading by nature.[2]

Bhāskara does not say explicitly whether the soul's state of being innumerable too is aupādhika only; but in view of the fact that the freed souls merge absolutely into Brahman, as salt in the sea,[3] it is evident that it too is aupādhika, seeing that a grain of salt thrown into the sea and immediately dissolved in it cannot, of course, be distinguished from a thousand other grains so thrown.

Only the soul's state of being a knower is not aupādhika, but is natural, for the soul being Brahman Himself,—who is a knower—is always knowledge and a knower.[4]

Now, if we compare this view of Bhāskara with that of Nimbārka, we find how divergent are their opinions on some very fundamental points. Firstly, according to Nimbārka, the soul is a knower, an agent an enjoyer, atomic in size and infinite in number, all *throughout*, in bondage as in release, secondly, the soul is *always* different-non-different from Brahman, but can never become absolutely identical with Him. Hence while according to Nimbārka, the soul's state of being an agent, an enjoyer, atomic, innumerable and different-nondifferent from Brahman are svābhāvika, i.e. real and ever-lasting, according to Bhāskara they are aupādhika, i.e. real but temporary.

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that the souls and the world are powers of Brahman. Brahman has two powers—bhogya-śakti and bhoktṛ-śakti. The first is transformed into the non-sentient world, the second into sentient souls.

As regards the different states of the soul, viz. dream, deep sleep, etc. Bhāskara agrees generally with Nimbārka, only unlike Nimbārka, he holds that the dream-creations are not real and that they are created by the individual soul and not by the Lord.[5]

As regards the different destinies and paths of the soul, Bhāskara is in complete agreement with Nimbārka.

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[1] Bh. B., 3.4.25, (printed as 26 in conformity with the numbering of Śaṃkara), p. 210.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.29–32, pp. 137-138; 4.4.15, p. 247.

[3] See below.

[4] Bh. B. 2.3.18, p. 135. "Svābhāvikañ cāsya brahma-rūpam, aupādhikam itarat".

[5] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.27, p. 105.

(4) *The acit.*

Bhāskara agrees with Nimbārka generally as regards the process of creation and dissolution, etc.,[1] but he differs from him in holding that the universe, like the individual souls, is different-nondifferent from Brahman during His effected state, but non-different from Him during His causal state. It is different-nondifferent from Brahman during the state of mundane existence for the very same reasons the souls are so, as noted above [2]—i.e. non-different as a part and effect of Brahman [3] and different as matter. But during dissolution it becomes merged in Brahman and absolutely one with it, just as a lump of salt, thrown into the sea, becomes absolutely one with and non-distinguishable from it. And, just as everything thrown into a salt-lake becomes salt, so the non-sentient merged in the sentient becomes sentient indeed.[4]

But according to Nimbārka, as we have seen, the non-sentient matter can never discard its own nature and become sentient Brahman, and therefore the Universe is *always* different-nondifferent from Brahman, during creation as well as dissolution.

Bhāskara also does not speak of the three kinds of the non-sentient, aprākṛta, kāla, etc., but of the universe alone, which he points out—in opposition to Śaṃkara and in agreement with Nimbārka—is real [5] and eternal.[6]

(5) *The relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara recognises three eternal realities, Brahman, the sentient and the non-sentient.[7] The relation between

[1] Bh. B., 2.3.1–15, pp. 130ff. [2] See above.

[3] Bh. B., 2.4.4, pp. 145-146.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.17, pp. 166-167. "Cetane acetanaṃ kṣiptam abhedāt cetano bhavet.

Rūmāyāṃ vastu vinyastaṃ tat sarvaṃ lavaṇībhavet". Cf. also 2.1.9, p. 91.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, pp. 18, 20; 2.1.4, p. 93; 3.2.11, p. 165; 3.2.23, p. 168.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 2.4.4, p. 146.

When the universe disappears, i.e. is discovered into Brahman in dissolution, it does not become unreal, but only *indistinguishable from* Brahman, just as a grain of salt does not become unreal when dissolved in the sea. Hence the world is eternally true. The same is the case with the soul too.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.16, p. 134:—The jīva is nitya. *Op. cit.*, 2.4.4, p. 146:—The jagat is nitya.

them has already been noted. It is a relation of different-non-difference during the effected state of Brahman,—during creation and mundane existence, and a relation of non-difference (absolute identity) during the causal state of Brahman—during dissolution and salvation, and here, as we have seen, Bhāskara fundamentally differs from Nimbārka.

It will be interesting and instructive to consider the Bhedābheda-vāda of Bhāskara a little more in detail in order to find out wherein does it exactly differ from the Bhedābheda-vāda of Nimbārka.

Bhāskara begins with a severe criticism of the view of those who hold non-difference to be the only reality. No doubt he has here Śaṃkara in mind. He points out that difference is an indisputable fact of direct experience and hence can by no means be summarily rejected on the ground of mere logical subtleties, e.g. we find that a cow is different from a horse, a pot from a piece of cloth and so on.[1] All things thus, are mutually different and so how can we disbelieve this fact of direct experience? Knowledge of difference too is knowledge no less than knowledge of non-difference.[2] So, if we do not regard the one—viz. the latter, as false, what right have we to regard the former to be so?

Nor can it be objected that difference and non-difference are mutually contradictory and cannot, therefore, co-exist,—for this too is a fact of direct experience that the two *do* co-exist. In fact nothing is seen to be pure non-difference or pure difference in the world of experience. Everything is, really, different-non-different, different as effects and individuals, and non-different as springing from the same cause and belonging to the same genus, e.g., a cow is different from another cow as an individual cow, but non-different from it as belonging to the same genus 'cow'. Again, a cow is different from a horse as a cow, but non-different from it being an existent substance like it and so on.[3] Similarly, a gold ear-ring is different from a gold bracelet, but non-different from it as gold. Everything must be decided to be true or false on the basis of direct experience alone and direct experience guarantees us in believing that difference and non-difference do co-exist.[4]

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[1] Bh. B., 2.1.14, p. 99.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 19. "Bheda-jñānam api jñānam eva" 2.1.14, p. 94, line 13, 98.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, pp. 16-17.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, pp. 16-17.

Hence it is that there is no contradiction or mutual opposition between Brahman, the Unity, and Universe, the plurality, as between heat and cold. If there were any such contradiction, the Universe of souls and matter could not have arisen from Brahman, abode in Him, and been merged in him,—as declared by Scripture.[1] Hence, unity and plurality are both real and co-existent.[2]

After thus establishing the reality of difference and its co-existence with non-difference, Bhāskara goes on to declare that the former, though real, is not ever-lasting,—i.e. is not svābhāvika or original and ultimate but is *aupādhika* or adventitious and non-permanent. He emphasizes this point again and again.[3] We have seen above the peculiar sense in which Bhāskara uses the term 'aupādhika'—viz. what is real *so long as it lasts*, only it does not *last for ever* like what is svābhāvika does. Hence, according to Bhāskara, difference is *not less real* than non-difference, but only *less permanent*. It lasts, *as a reality*, so long as the upādhis—viz. avidyā, karma, matter, do but disappears when the upādhis are removed, just as the ether within the pot disappears when the pot is smashed,[4] or just as the stain on a piece of gold disappears when in contact with fire.[5]

Herein we find a definite point of divergence between Nimbārka and Bhāskara. According to Nimbārka, as we have seen, difference and non-difference are not only *equally real* but *also equally permanent*. Just as there can be no pure difference, so exactly there can be no pure non-difference *at any time*. According to Bhāskara, however, as we have seen, although there can be no pure difference and pure non-difference in the world of experience (i.e. during the effected state of Brahman), still there can be pure non-difference beyond the world of experience (i.e. during the causal state of Brahman).

However much Bhāskara may try to prove by his peculiar theory of upādhi that difference, though not ever-lasting like non-difference, is nevertheless equally real with it, yet we cannot but feel that the two do not hold exactly an equal place in his system, as they do in that of Nimbārka. If difference be neither original, nor ultimate, but only an intermediate passing phase, destined to come to an end, however real it may be during that period, it must of necessity be less

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[1] Vide e.g. Tait. 3.1. [2] Bh. B., 1.1.4, p. 17.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.43, p. 141; 3.2.6, p. 162; 3.2.12, p. 165; 3.2.27, (printed as 3.2.26 in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering), p. 170; 4.1.12, p. 221; 4.4.4, p. 243.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.4, p. 246. [5] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.3, p. 221.

important and less real than non-difference, which is there for ever and from all eternity. But in Nimbārka's system, as we have seen, difference and non-difference are precisely on the same level and of the same importance.

Bhāskara's theory may appropriately be called "Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda",[1] as distinguished from the "Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda" of Nimbārka.

(6) *Mokṣa*.

Bhāskara holds, like Nimbārka, that salvation is a state of supreme bliss, and not a state of pure consciousness only, which he points out, is no better than a state of unconsciousness.[2] Salvation is a positive state, a positive new acquisition, i.e. something new to be obtained, and not a mere negative removal of the veil of nescience.[3] The soul is ever free.[4] If salvation were ever-obtained, everyone would have been free.[5]

Like Nimbārka again, Bhāskara holds that salvation can be obtained only after the destruction of the earthly body. When the works, which have already begun to bear fruits, are all fully exhausted by retributive experience, and when the earthly body, as a consequence, comes to be dissolved, then and then alone can one attain final emancipation.[6] He severely criticises the Śaṃkarite conception of Jīvan-mukti.[7]

But the fundamental difference between Nimbārka and Bhāskara, as we have already seen, is that Bhāskara holds, unlike Nimbārka, that in salvation the individual soul becomes absolutely identical with Brahman.[8] This Nimbārka never maintains.

Another fundamental difference between the two is that while Bhāskara admits of two kinds of salvation—viz. sadyomukti or

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[1] Sundarabhaṭṭa, one of the followers of Nimbārka, does actually refer to Bhāskara as the upholder of the 'Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda'. Vide SJS., p. 30.

[2] Bh. B., 1.1.5, p. 21. He holds that it is better to be a jackal in the forest than to be a mukta in the Śaṃkarite sense. 1.3.9, p. 54; 4.4.7, p. 244.

[3] See above.

[4] Bh. B., 1.4.21, p. 18.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.5, p. 20.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering), p. 210; 4.1.14, p. 224; 4.1.18, p. 226.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering), p. 210.

[8] See above.

immediate release and krama-mukti or gradual release, Nimbārka does not. Bhāskara points out that in accordance with the rule 'As you meditate, so you become' (Chānd. 3. 14. 1), those who meditate on the Para Brahman or the Supreme Brahman, attain the Supreme Brahman and become free *at once*, i.e. they at once become identical with Brahman and as such, omniscient, omnipotent and all-pervading like Him. This is immediate release. But those who meditate on the Kārya Brahman or the effected Brahman, viz. Hiraṇyagarbha only, attain *at first* the effected Brahman only, and not the Supreme Brahman at once. Then, after having acquired supreme knowledge there in the world of Hiraṇyagarbha, they, on the dissolution of that world, attain the Supreme Brahman by and by, together with Hiraṇyagarbha.[1] This is gradual release, These latter kind of freed souls remain distinct from Brahman, so long as they have not attained the Supreme Brahman, and are as such not so long omnipotent like Him, but lack the power of creating, maintaining and destroying the Universe.[2] But when they at last attain the Supreme Brahman, they become omnipotent like the immediately freed souls.

But according to Nimbārka there is only one kind of salvation, viz. sadyo-mukti, and the freed souls *ever* lack the power of creation, etc. and are *ever* atomic in size.

(7) *The sādhanas.*

Bhāskara lays a very great stress on karma or action as a *direct* means to salvation. He begins by pointing out that the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken only after an enquiry into karma, for knowledge must essentially be combined with action in order to lead to salvation, and unless we first know the nature of actions, we cannot possibly decide which actions are to be so combined and which not.[3] Bhāskara insists on this 'combination of knowledge and action' (jñāna-karma-samuccaya) again and again all throughout.[4] He

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[1] Bh. B., 3.1.17, p. 157; 4.3.14, p. 240. See below.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.17–22, pp. 247–249. The sadyo-muktas are 'niravadhikaiśvarya', while the krama-muktas are "sāvadhikaiśvarya".

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 2.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 2. 'Atra hi jñāna-karma-samuccayāt mokṣa-prāptiḥ sūtrakārasya abhipretā'; 1.1.1., p. 4; 1.1.4, p. 16; 1.1.5, pp. 20, 21; 3.4.1, p. 201; 3.4.25 (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with the numbering of Śaṃkara), pp. 207, 209, 210; 4.1.6, p. 225.

points out that one who has studied the Vedas can claim only to have a knowledge of the meaning of the scriptural texts, but the real knowledge of Brahman depends on some other factors—viz. the proper and disinterested performance of the daily and occasional (nitya and naimittika) duties, and of sacrifices, etc., the practice of charity and penance, the cultivation of self-control and tranquillity, etc. and so on, as declared by Scripture.[1]

Mere action is of course of no avail, for the fruits of mere action are transitory and therefore worthless. But when combined with knowledge, it yields permanent results.[2]

On the other hand, mere knowledge is of no avail. Knowledge by itself does not lead to salvation unless combined with action and meditation.[3]

The next question is: In what relation do these two—viz. action and knowledge, stand to each other? Bhāskara points out that the former is *not* the cause of the origin of the latter, since knowledge arises from śravaṇa or hearing of scriptural texts etc.,[4] — but is an essential ingredient of it,[5] an essential ingredient that must accompany knowledge, already obtained from other sources, till the end, helping it to lead to final release. Thus, each of these two has its peculiar function:—the knowledge of identity removes all traces of avidyā and passion, attachment etc., while the proper performance of daily and occasional karmas removes all traces of past karmas.[6]

Then Bhāskara goes on to point out that this jñāna-karma-samuccaya is nothing but upāsanā-karma-samuccaya,[7] for knowledge cannot stop at itself, but must lead to meditation. Thus, first we acquire a knowledge of the Self and then after having thus determined what the Self is, we then afterwards meditate on it, just as we first *know* the king or the preceptor, and then worship him.[8] So long

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[1] Bh. B., 1.1.1, pp. 2–5. The passage referred to is Bṛh. 4.4.22.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 4 "Svataḥ kṣaṇikasyāpi karmaṇo jñāna-rasa-viddhasya akṣayaphalatvāt na kṣīyata iti ucyate".

[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.1, p. 201; 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering), p. 209.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26), p. 209; 4.4.1, p. 219.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26), p. 209.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 3; 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26), p. 209.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 3.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.1, p. 174.

as we do not practise meditation, we do not get rid of mundane existence.[1]

Thus, knowledge, leading to meditation, plus action is the cause of salvation.

Now, there are various kinds of meditations, viz. Parabrahma-upāsanā, Kāryabrahma-upāsanā and Pratīka-upāsanā. Of these, the Parabrahma-upāsanā or meditation on the Supreme Brahman is the best. Now, as we have seen,[2] the Supreme Brahman has two forms—viz. kāraṇa-rūpa or the causal form and kārya-rūpa or the effected form. The question is: Is He to be meditated on in both these forms? Bhāskara strongly repudiates this suggestion. The Supreme Brahman, he points out, is to be meditated on in His kāraṇa-rūpa alone, and never in His kārya-rūpa. Thus Brahman is to be meditated on in His pure causal form, as a pure Unity, devoid of all differences whatsoever, as formless, as different from the universe of souls and matter, as pure existence, as pure knowledge, and as one and without a second.[3] Such a Brahman is to be meditated on as identical with the self of the meditating devotee himself thus: "I am Brahman,"[4] or in the reciprocal form: "I am Brahman, Brahman is I".[5] This meditation on the identity between Brahman and the soul, removes all ajñāna,[6] and all differences which are but aupādhika, just as the stain on a lump of gold is removed when it is put to fire,[7] and the devotee attains identity with Brahman at once, i.e. immediate release.[8]

Beside this kind of meditation on the formless and attributeless Supreme Brahman, there are certain saguṇa upāsanās of Him—i.e. the upāsanās of Brahman under various aspects, and possessing various qualities, as designated in the Upaniṣads—viz. the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā,

[1] Bh. B., 3.4.25 (printed as 3.3.26 in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering), p. 209; cf. also 3.2.25-26 (printed as 3.2.24-25 in conformity with Saṃkara's numbering), pp. 169-170.

[2] See above.

[3] Bh. B., 3.2.11, pp. 164-165; 3.2.12, p. 165. That is, Brahman is to be meditated on in His śuddha-kāraṇa-rūpa, as abheda, nirākāra, prapañca-vilakṣaṇa, sal-lakṣaṇa, bodha-lokṣaṇa ekamevādvitīyam.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.15, p. 166.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.36, (printed as 3.3.37 in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering), p. 181.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 3.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.3, p. 221.


[8] *Op. cit.*, 4.3.14, p. 240.

the Madhu-vidyā and the rest.[1] These, too, lead to the Supreme Brahman, i.e. to salvation—any one of them.[2]

Secondly, there is upāsanā of the Kārya-brahma or Hiraṇya-garbha. Those who practise this sort of meditation, first attain Hiraṇyagarbha and then the Supreme Brahman, i.e. gradual release.[3]

Thirdly, there are meditations on symbols, such as names and the rest. Those who practise this sort of meditations do not attain Brahman, but only limited results.[4]

The following is a chart of the various kinds of Upāsanās:—



Thus, according to Bhāskara, knowledge of Brahman→Meditation on Brahman→salvation. Karma accompanies all these throughout and nowhere is there any giving up of karma.[5]

Now, if we compare this view of Bhāskara with Nimbārka's view of sādhanas, then we find that they differ in the following points:—

(*a*) According to Nimbārka also, karma has an important part to play in the attainment of salvation, but he does not give it so great an importance as Bhāskara does. According to Nimbārka, the function of karma is simply to purify the mind and thereby help the rise of knowledge, but here it ends. Karma thus is not a permanent accompaniment of jñāna, according to Nimbārka, nor a direct means to salvation, but only an indirect means. But this Bhāskara definitely denies. According to him, karma is *not* the cause of the rise of knowledge, but its essential

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[1] These are considered throughout the 3rd pāda of the 3rd chap.

[2] Bh. B. 3.3.58, (printed as 3.3.59 in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering), p. 198.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 4.3.14, p. 240.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 4.3.15, p. 241.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with Śaṃkara's numbering), pp. 208-209.

and *permanent* accompaniment and as such, a *direct* means to salvation.

(*b*) Nimbārka also recommends the meditation on the true self of the individual soul as identical with Brahman, but he does not speak of the nirguṇa-upāsanā of Brahman, but of the saguṇa-upāsanā only. According to him, the conjoint worship of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa is the best form of worship, but not a mention of this is found in Bhāskara.

(*c*) Nimbārka emphasises, all along, the grace of the Lord as the first essential pre-requisite of salvation, but in Bhāskara, there is not a single mention of grace.

(*d*) According to Nimbārka, prapatti and gurūpasatti, i.e. self-surrender to the Lord and to the preceptor, are independent means to salvation, but Bhāskara makes no mention of them at all.

(*e*) In Bhāskara there is no place for a sweet and personal relationship of love and living companionship between the Lord and his devotee as in Nimbārka.[1]

(8) *Conclusion.*

We conclude therefore, that Nimbārka and Bhāskara differ in many essential points with regard to their theories of Brahman, the sentient, the non-sentient, salvation and the means thereto. Hence we are justified in taking Nimbārka and Bhāskara to be two different persons, representing two different schools of thought, viz. Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda and Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda respectively.

Bhāskara, in fact, while so severely criticising Śaṃkara, could not be altogether free from Śaṃkara's influence. That is why he insists so much on the pure, non-different and attributeless form of Brahman and upon the fact that difference is due to upādhis, so also the soul's state of being an agent, and so on. He, in fact, tries to work out a sort of reconciliation between the Kevalādvaita-vāda and the Dvaitādvaita-vāda, standing, as it were, midway between Śaṃkara and Nimbārka.

From the point of view of religion, too, Nimbārka and Bhāskara are poles asunder. While Nimbārka's system is intensely religious, devotional and emotional, there is properly speaking no place of a

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[1] Mādhurya-pradhānā bhakti.

personal, emotional religion in the system of Bhāskara, though he speaks of meditation.

III. Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha.

Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda and Viśiṣṭa-Śivādvaita-vāda.

(1) *Introduction.*

Śrīkaṇṭha Śaivācārya belonged to the Śaiva sect, headed by Śvetācārya,[1] and flourished after Śaṃkara.[2] He wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, establishing the supremacy of Śiva and developing a theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita, similar to that of Rāmānuja.

(2) *Brahman.*

The Highest Reality or Brahman, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, is Śiva, otherwise called Bhava, Śarva, Paśupati, Mahādeva, Śaṁbhu, Rudra,[3] Nīlakaṇṭha,[4] Trilocana,[5] Umāpati,[6] etc. He is called "Bhava" because He exists everywhere at all times;[7] "Śarva" because He is the destroyer of everything;[8] "Paśupati" because He is the ruler of the jīvas (= paśus);[9] "Mahādeva" because He enjoys supreme bliss;[10] "Rudra" because He removes the miseries of the world,[11] and so on, and He is called "Śiva", because He is free from all taints, and is supremely auspicious.[12]

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[1] ŚK.B., Maṅgala-pāṭha, verse 4, p. 5, Part 1.

[2] Vide the sub-commentary called "Śivārkamaṇi-dīpikā"—on ŚK.B., p. 9, Part 1. That Śrīkaṇṭha flourished after Śaṃkara is evident from the fact that he, in his commentary, makes many references to the doctrine of Śaṃkara. Vide e.g. 2.3.19, p. 142, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.42, p. 158, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.49, p. 161, Parts 7 and 8; etc. The editor, Hālāsyanātha Śāstrin, however takes him to be prior to Śaṃkara vide his Sūtrārtha-candrikā-ṭīkā" on ŚK.B. Maṅgala-pāṭha, p. 99, Part 1.

[3] ŚK.B., 1.1.1, p. 71. Part 1.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.21, p. 257, Part 3; 1.4.29, p. 579, Part 6; 2.1.1., p. 1, Parts 7 and 8; 3.3.39, p. 353, Parts 10 and 11, etc.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.21, p. 255, Part 3; 3.2.31, p. 265, Part 9; 3.3.52, p. 371, parts 10 and 11, etc.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.22, p. 260, Part 2; 1.1.25, intro., p. 272, Part 2, etc.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 125, Part 2.

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 126, Part 2.

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 127, Part 2.

[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 128, Part 2.

[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 127, Part 2.

[12] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 189, Part 2.

Śiva is the supreme cause from which everything arises.[1] He is both the material and the efficient causes of the Universe.[2] He is the material cause of the Universe through His māyā or icchā-śakti,[3] when He is called Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu.[4] Nārāyaṇa thus is Śiva in the state or form of the upādāna or the material cause,[5] and is as such inferior to Śiva, though non-different from Him.[6] And inferior to Nārāyaṇa is Hiraṇyagarbha, or the aggregate of souls or effects.[7]

Śiva is essentially possessed of an infinite number of attributes and infinite inconceivable powers,[8] i.e. is possessed of distinctions and never without them.[9] On the one hand, He is an abode of all auspicious qualities and powers, and on the other, free from all defects and faults.[10] He has two aspects,—stern and soft. On the one hand, He is a mighty ruler, striking terror in the heart of all,[11] but on the other, He is an abode of infinite bliss,[12] and the cause of the

[1] ŚK.B., 1.1.12, pp. 203, 206, Part 3; 1.1.16, p. 230, Part 3; 1.1.17, pp. 236-7, Part 3, etc. etc.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 129, part 1; 1.1.5, p. 195, Part 1; 1.1.20, p. 246, Part 3; 1.2.9, pp. 340–41, Part 4; 1.4.23–28, pp. 558–572, Part 6.

Śrīkaṇṭha criticises the view of those Śaiva sects which take the Lord to be the efficient cause merely and not its material cause, vide ŚK.B. 2.2.35–38, pp. 106–113, Parts 7 and 8.

[3] ŚK.B., 1.2.9, pp. 341, 345, Part 4; 1.4.27, p. 570, Part 6.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.2, p. 318, Part 4; 1.3.12, p. 430, Part 5; 3.2.36, pp. 269-70, Part 9; 4.3.11, p. 476, Parts 10 and 11.

[5] *Op. cit.* 1.2.3, p. 318, Part 4; 1.3.4, p. 430, Part 5; 3.2.35, p. 269, Part 9; 4.3.11, p. 476; Parts 10 and 11.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.3.12, p. 430, Part 5. "Yato Viṣṇu-Śivayor upādāna-nimittayor avasthā-bhedam antareṇa svarūpa-bhedo nāsti".

[7] *Op. cit.*, 4.3.14, p. 478, Parts 10 and 11.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, pp. 71, 89, Part 1; 1.1.2, p. 121, Part 2; 1.1.24, p. 272, Part 3; 1.2.1, p. 302, Part 4; 1.2.9, p. 338, Part 4; 1.2.19, p. 371, Part 4; 1.3.22, p. 445, Part 5; 2.1.1, p. 1, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.25, p. 37, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.28, p. 39, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.30, p. 40, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.11, p. 245, Part 9; 3.2.13, p. 248, Part 9; 3.2.17, p. 248, Part 9; 3.2.29, p. 363, Part 9; 3.3.17, p. 310, Part 9; 4.4.22, p. 506, Parts 10 and 11.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 124, Part 2.

[10] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 89, Part 1; 1.1.2, pp. 121, 128, Part 2; 1.1.24, p. 272, Part 3; 1.2.9, p. 338, Part 4; 3.2.11, p. 245, Part 9; 3.2.17, p. 248, Part 9; 3.3.17, p. 310, Part 9; 4.4.22, p. 506, Parts 10 and 11.

[11] *Op. cit.*, 1.3.40, p. 496, Part 5.

[12] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.13–16, pp. 206–230, Part 3.

bliss of individual souls,[1] supremely merciful and gracious towards His devotees [2] and the giver of salvation [3] and other fruits.[4]

The sentient and the non-sentient are the powers of the Lord.[5] The cit-śakti consists in three factors, viz. knowledge, volition and action,[6] while the acit śakti consists in the five great elements, viz. earth, water, fire, air and ether.[7] Brahmā, Janārdana, Rudra, Īśvara, and Sadāśiva are the presiding deities of these five elements respectively.[8]

The sentient and the non-sentient, consisting of these eight forms, constitute the body of the Lord.[9] Or, they are the attributes of the Lord,[10] qualifying Him, as the body qualifies the soul, or as blueness qualifies lotus.[11] The Lord is thus qualified by the universe [12] and has the universe for His form or body.[13]

The Lord, qualified by the universe, has two forms,—viz. causal state and effected state.[14] During His causal state, the attributes

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[1] ŚK.B., 1.1.15, pp. 217-18, Part 3.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, pp. 71, 91-92, Part 1; 1.2.1, p. 302, Part 4; 1.2.9, p. 337, Part 4; 1.3.24, p. 452, Part 5; 2.1.1, p. 1, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.35, pp. 49, 50, Parts 7 and 8; 4.3.1, p. 468, Parts 10 and 11; 4.1.1, p. 482, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.22, p. 506, Parts 10 and 11.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, pp. 71, 91-92, Part 1; 1.1.17, p. 235, Part 3; 1.1.20, p. 246, Part 3; 2.1.35, pp. 49-50, Parts 7 and 8; 3.3.39, p. 355, Parts 10 and 11.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.40, p. 276, Part 9.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.9, p. 340, Part 4; 1.4.27, p. 566, Part 6; 2.1.18, p. 29, Parts 7 and 8.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.9, p. 345, Part 4. See also sub-commentary on the same page.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.14, p. 133, Parts 7 and 8.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.16, p. 228, Part 3. See also sub-commentary on the same page. 2.3.14, p. 133, Parts 7 and 8.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.1, pp. 303, 307, Part 4; 1.2.12, p. 352, Part 4; 1.3.8, p. 417, Part 5; 1.4.22, p. 551, Part 6; 1.4.27, p. 567, Part 6; 2.1.9, p. 14, Parts 7 and 8, 2.3.14, p. 133, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.28, p. 259, Part 9.

[10] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.52, p. 162, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.27, p. 259, Part 9.

[11] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8.

[12] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, pp. 71, 89, Part 1; 1.1.20, p. 246, Part 3; 1.2.1, p. 303, Part 4; 1.4.27, p. 571, Part 6; 2.1.14, p. 19, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.29, p. 259, Part 9. The Lord is prapañca-viśiṣṭa.

[13] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.9, p. 345, Part 4; 3.2.29, p. 263, Part 9. The Lord is prapañca-rūpa.

[14] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 135, Part 1; 1.4.27, pp. 567, 571, Part 6; 2.1.9, p. 14, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.27, p. 39, Parts 7 and 8.

and powers of the Lord, viz. the sentient and the non-sentient, exist in Him in a subtle form, while during His effected state, they are manifested in various names and forms. The Lord is thus, both the cause and the effect. The universe is nothing but the Lord Himself.[1]

The Lord is not pure knowledge, but a knower.[2] He is an enjoyer as well, though not of the fruits of karma like the soul, but of His own infinite bliss,[3] and finally He is an agent. His five actions are:—creation, maintenance and dissolution of the universe, favour, i.e. emancipating the soul, and concealment or concealing the essential nature of the soul i.e. causing its bondage.[4]

Finally, the Lord is possessed of a celestial, non-material body, which does not entitle Him to any karma.[5]

If we compare this view of Srīkaṇṭha with that of Nimbārka, we find that there is not much difference between the two doctrines, so far as the philosophical part goes, except that while Nimbārka identifies Brahman with Kṛṣṇa, Śrīkaṇṭha identifies Him with Śiva, and in his system Umā takes the place of Nimbārka's Rādhā. As a Śaiva teacher, Śrīkaṇṭha makes Viṣṇu subordinate to Śiva, which, of course, Nimbārka as a Vaiṣṇava teacher will not tolerate.

But as we have seen, Nimbārka too holds, like Śrīkaṇṭha, that Brahman is the sole supreme cause of the universe, both its material and efficient cause, that He is essentially possessed of attributes and powers, that He is an abode of supreme might and majesty on the one hand and infinite beauty, bliss and tenderness on the other, that the cit and the acit are śaktis of the Lord, that the Lord is a knower as omniscient, an enjoyer as enjoying celestial pleasures and a doer, as the creator, controller and giver of fruits, and possesses a celestial body.

The most important point of difference worth noticing is that Nimbārka does not admit that the sentient and the non-sentient are the viśeṣaṇas, attributes, of the Lord. This view has been severely criticised by the followers of Nimbārka.[6] They point out that they

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[1] ŚK.B. See below under "Relation between Brahman, cit and acit".

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.29, p. 147, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.16, pp. 247-8, Part 9.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, pp. 122, 124, Part 2; 1.2.11, p. 350, Part 4; 4.4.21, p. 500, Parts 10 and 11.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, pp. 109–115, Part 2. The kṛtya-pañcaka or the five actions are (1) Janma, (2) Sthiti, (3) Pralaya, (4) Anugraha, (5) Tirobhāva.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.21, pp. 251-252, Part 3; 1.2.8, p. 328, Part 4.

[6] S.J., pp. 43-44; S.S., p. 45. See above. Cf. also Anantarāma's "Vedāntatattva-bodha", pp. 27–32.

are powers and parts of the Lord, and do constitute His body, but are not His attributes by any means.

Another point of difference is that Śrīkaṇṭha rejects the vyūhas [1] accepted by Nimbārka and does not speak of avatāras or incarnations.

(3) *The cit.*

Śrīkaṇṭha's doctrine of the individual soul too is similar to that of Nimbārka. Like Nimbārka, he holds that the soul is an eternal and real substance,[2] a knower,[3] an enjoyer,[4] and an active agent,[5] and atomic in size,[6] and that its state of being a knower, an enjoyer, an agent and atomic are natural, pertaining to its very nature and are, as such, ever-lasting, in bondage as in release.

He is also in perfect agreement with Nimbārka with regard to the different states of the soul, viz. dream, deep sleep and the rest,—viz. that the dream-objects are created by the Lord,[7] that the Lord is the place of deep sleep and not the vein or the pericardium,[8] that the state of swoon is a distinct and peculiar state,[9] and so on, and also with regard to the various destinies and paths of the soul, viz. the path of Gods etc., and the way of the soul's going through them.[10]

There are, however, two points of difference:—

(*a*) First, as we have already seen, according to Śrīkaṇṭha the soul is an attribute of the Lord, which Nimbārka does not hold.

(*b*) Secondly, according to Nimbārka the very nature of the soul is to be controlled, while the very nature of the Lord is to control, and hence the soul is *ever* under the control of the Lord, in release too as in bondage. But according to Śrīkaṇṭha, although the soul is under the control of the Lord during the state of mundane

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[1] ŚK.B., 2.2.39–42, pp. 115–119, Parts 7 and 8.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.18, p. 140, Parts 7 and 8.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.19, p. 142, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.27–29, pp. 146-7, Parts 7 and 8.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.3.6, pp. 407-8, Part 4; 3.2.13, p. 246, Part 9; 4.4.19, pp. 497-98, parts 10 and 11.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.33–39, pp. 152–154, Parts 7 and 8.

[6] *Op. cit.*

[7] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.1–6, pp. 224–233, Part 9.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.7-8, pp. 235–239, Part 9.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.10, p. 242, Part 9.

[10] *Op. cit.*, 4.3.1–25, pp. 468–479, Parts 10 and 11.

existence,[1] yet when it becomes free and attains similarity with the Lord, it is no more under His control in the sense that it is no longer subject to scriptural injunctions and prohibitions which embody the very commands of the Lord Himself,[2] but becomes independent.[3]

(4) *The acit.*

Here too, Śrīkaṇṭha agrees with Nimbārka in holding that the world is real and eternal,[4] and a power of the Lord.[5] Śrīkaṇṭha, like Nimbārka, admits real transformation. According to him, the entire universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is an effect or real transformation of the Lord, just as the curd is of the milk.[6] The process of creation is as follows: During universal dissolution, there is nothing—no sun or moon, no day or night, no names or forms, no sentient or non-sentient objects, but everything is enveloped in deep darkness, and the Lord, with His sentient and non-sentient powers drawn forth, i.e. non-manifest, abides as a cause, absolute, one and without a second, self-luminous, a solitary perceiver. Then there arises in Him the supreme power of knowledge, removing the darkness around, and the Lord wishes to be 'many'. Thereupon He develops His own subtle powers of the sentient and the non-sentient, so long blended with Him, and the universe of names and forms arises. The Lord is thus both the cause and the effect.[7] But although the Lord is transformed into the universe, yet He Himself remains untransformed and full, just as the genus, though present in each species, is yet itself non-divided.[8]

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[1] ŚK.B., 2.3.40, p. 156, Parts 7 and 8; 2.4.14, p. 178, Parts 7 and 8.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.9, p. 487, Parts 10 and 11.

[3] *Op. cit.*

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.9-10, pp. 522–24, Part 6. Śrīkaṇṭha points out like Nimbārka, that no contradiction is involved in holding the world to be both unborn and an effect of the Lord. It is unborn in the sense it *ever* abides as a subtle power of the Lord, and it is an effect in the sense that during creation, it is developed in gross forms possessing various names and forms. Vide ŚK.B., 1.4.10, pp. 524, Part 6.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.9, p. 340, Part 4; 1.4.27, p. 566, Part 6; 2.1.18, p. 29, Parts 7 and 8.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.27, p. 565, Part 6.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.9, pp. 340-41, Part 4; 1.4.27, pp. 566-67, Part 6; 2.1.10, p. 29, Parts 7 and 8.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.27, p. 39, Parts 7 and 8.

Śrīkaṇṭha also agrees with Nimbārka with regard to the successive stages of creation, viz. the ether, the air, etc.[1]

But he differs from Nimbārka in two points, viz.:—

(*a*) First, he takes the world, as we have seen, to be an attribute of the Lord, which Nimbārka does not.

(*b*) Secondly, he does not speak of the aprākṛta and kāla as species of the non-sentient, as Nimbārka does.

(5) *Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

Thus, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, there are three real and eternal entities—viz. Śiva, the sentient and the non-sentient, just as according to Nimbārka, there are three real and eternal entities, viz. Kṛṣṇa, the sentient and the non-sentient. Now, what, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, is the exact relation between these three?

Śrīkaṇṭha points out, exactly like Nimbārka, that on the one hand there is an essential difference between Brahman, and the sentient-nonsentient. The Lord is by nature an abode of all auspiciousness, purity and perfection, and absolutely free from all faults and defects, but the souls and the universe are not so. The universe is non-intelligent and impure. The soul is intelligent, no doubt, yet it is never omniscient like the Lord, but possessed of but little and limited knowledge,[2] and is impure eternally subject to stains and defects.[3] Further, the Lord is the director, the souls and the world the directed.[4] The Lord is the Lord of the entire universe, but the soul is not.[5] The Lord is the object to be worshipped,[6] the end to be attained,[7] and independent,[8] while the soul is the worshipper, the attainer and dependent. Thus the Lord is by nature different from the sentient and the non-sentient.[9]

But the sentient and the non-sentient, though different from the Lord, are not yet absolutely different from Him, but are at the same time non-different from Him, for the Lord is the cause, and the cit and

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[1] ŚK.B., 2.3.1–14, pp. 122–133, Parts 7 and 8.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.11, p. 35, Part 4; 1.3.43, p. 505, Part 6; 2.1.23, p. 32, Parts 7 and 8.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.11, p. 351, Part 4.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.12, p. 352, Part 4.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.3.44, p. 506, Part 6.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.2, pp. 316-317, Part 4.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 1.3.21-22, pp. 444-445, Part 5.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.14, p. 21, Parts 7 and 8.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.45, pp. 159-60, Parts 7 and 8.

the acit His effects;[1] the Lord is one who pervades, the sentient and the non-sentient, the pervaded,[2] and the cause and the effect, what pervades and the pervaded are non-different.[3] Here also Śrīkaṇṭha perfectly agrees with Nimbārka.

But, next the vital question arises: Are we then to believe that there is both difference and non-difference between Brahman and the universe? This suggestion Śrīkaṇṭha repudiates at once. He points out that we must guard against three views, viz.:—

(*a*) Atyantabheda-vāda or the view that there is an absolute difference between Brahman and the universe, as between a pot and a piece of cloth, because that will be in conflict with scriptural texts designating difference between the two.

(*b*) Atyantābheda-vāda or the view that there is an absolute non-difference between them, as between the nacre and the illusory silver, because that too will go against the scriptural texts which designate a difference between them.

(*c*) Bhedābheda-vāda or the view that there is both difference and non-difference between them, because that will go against facts of direct experience, as difference and non-difference, being mutually contradictory, are never found to co-exist.

The correct view, Śrīkaṇṭha continues, is that the relation between Brahman and the universe is exactly analogous to that between the soul and the body, and between the substance and its attribute, and between the cause and its effect. The soul (śarīrī) and the body (śarīra) are non-different in the sense that the soul cannot exist without the body and vice-versa; the substance (guṇī or viśeṣya) and its attribute (guṇa or viśeṣaṇa) are non-different in the sense that the substance cannot exist with the attribute and *vice versa*; the cause (kāraṇa) and its effect (kārya) are non-different in the sense that the cause cannot exist without the effect, because the cause *always* possesses the power of producing the effect, i.e. the effect, even when not actually existent in that particular form, is *ever* existent in the cause

[1] ŚK.B., 2.3.42, p. 158, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.45, p. 159, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.52, p. 162, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.28, p. 259, Part 9.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.42, p. 159, Parts 7 and 8.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.15–21, pp. 21–30, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.42, p. 159, Parts 7 and 8.

in the form of its power,—and *vice versa*. Brahman and the universe are non-different in exactly the same sense, because Brahman cannot exist without the universe, which ever exists in Him as His power,—just as fire cannot exist without heat or a blue lotus without blueness, and the universe cannot exist without Brahman, just as an earthen pot cannot exist without clay. Thus, *non-difference* here means *essential and mutual interdependence*, i.e. the relation between two things none of which can exist without the other,[1] and not *actual* identity. And difference means *difference of nature*. Just as the soul, though non-different from the body, in the above sense, is yet different from it in nature and superior to it; just as the substance, though non-different from the attribute, in the above sense, is yet different from it in nature and superior to it; and just as the cause, though non-different from the effect in the above sense, is yet different from—so exactly Brahman, though non-different from the universe in the above sense, is yet different from it in nature and superior to it.[2]

It is this peculiar relation between Brahman and the universe which makes it possible for them to form *one whole* in spite of their difference. The soul and the body, though different, form one integral whole, because none can exist without the other. Similarly, Brahman and the universe, though different, form one *concrete whole*, because none can exist without the other.

Hence, Śrīkaṇṭha calls his doctrine "Viśiṣṭa-śivādvaita-vāda",[3] or the doctrine that Śiva, the Unity, is *qualified* by the sentient-non-sentient, the plurality, just as the soul is qualified by the body.

It will be interesting to note wherein exactly Śrīkaṇṭha's doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita differs from Nimbārka's doctrine of Svābhāvika-bhedābheda. According to Nimbārka also, when we say that the universe is *non-different* from Brahman, we do not mean thereby that it is *actually* identical with Him, but simply that it is *absolutely dependent* on Brahman and cannot exist without Him. Non-difference thus means *essential dependence* according to Nimbārka as well; and difference also means *difference of nature* according to him. Hence Nimbārka's doctrine is not open to the objection raised by Śrīkaṇṭha

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[1] "Prapañca-Brahmaṇor ananyatvaṃ nāma .... vinā-bhāva-rahitatvam" ŚK.B., 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.14, p. 19, Parts 7 and 8. Vide also 2.1.14, p. 20, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8.

against Bhedābheda-vāda, viz. that non-difference and difference being mutually exclusive, cannot co-exist.

Thus, according to both Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha, *non-difference and difference* are both true, and

Non-difference = essential dependence,
Difference = difference of nature.

But with Nimbārka, non-difference and difference are precisely on the same level, they co-exist and have the same importance. But according to Śrīkaṇṭha, non-difference and difference are both real and co-existent, no doubt, but non-difference is the principal, which is *qualified* by difference and in this sense difference is *subordinate* to non-difference, just as the body is subordinate to the soul which it qualifies. Thus, with Śrīkaṇṭha (as with Rāmānuja), the stress is more on the *principle of identity* than on that of difference.

(6) *Mokṣa.*

Salvation, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, consists in the severance of the bondage of the mundane existence,[1] and the consequent attaining of the state of Śiva.[2] It means becoming *similar* to Śiva in nature and qualities, i.e. becoming omniscient and independent like Him, possessed of all His infinite auspicious qualities and freed from all stains and defects.[3]

Thus, the released soul becomes only *similar to* the Lord, and never *identical* with Him.[4] Salvation means the full development of the self of the soul and not its absolute absorption in the Lord.[5] The freed soul is distinct from the Lord in this that it is atomic, while the Lord is all-pervasive,[6] and that it lacks the power of creating, main-

[1] ŚK.B., 1.1.1, pp. 91-92, 98, Part 1; 3.4.48, p. 414, Parts 10 and 11; 4.1.2, p. 428, Parts 10 and 11. That is, salvation means pāśa-viccheda and paśutva-nivṛtti.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.3, p. 428, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.9, p. 487, Parts 10 and 11.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.9, p. 487, Parts 10 and 11.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.3.8, p. 417, Part 5; 3.2.24, p. 257, Part 9; 3.3.40, p. 356, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.1, pp. 481-2, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.4, pp. 483-4, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.9, p. 487, Parts 10 and 11.

[5] "Paripūrṇam ahambhāvaṃ prakaṭam anubhavati." This ahaṃkāra or egoity of the freed soul, Śrīkaṇṭha points out, is not like the sāṃsārika or prākṛta ahaṃkāra, since it is not narrow (paricchinna), but universal (prapañcāvagāhin). Vide 4.4.19, p. 498, Parts 10 and 11.

[6] See above.

taining and destroying the universe—which power belongs exclusively to the Lord alone.[1]

The freed soul shares all the divine pleasures with the Lord.[2] It possesses pure, independent and non-material sense-organs and mind, by means of which it enjoys pleasures.[3] It is united with the Lord in blissful experience (samarasya)[4] and perceives always the ever-blissful form of the Lord.[5]

Salvation, thus, is a positive state of supreme and unsurpassed bliss,[6] and knowledge,[7] and not a state of mere unconsciousness, and it can be attained only after the destruction of the earthly body (videhan-mukti).[8]

Thus, we find that Śrīkaṇṭha's conception of salvation too tallies with that of Nimbārka, with the difference (which runs throughout between the two)—

(*a*) that while according to Nimbārka, salvation means attaining *Kṛṣṇatva* or the nature of Kṛṣṇa, according to Śrīkaṇṭha it means attaining *Śivatva* or the nature of Śiva; although, as we have seen, the natures of Kṛṣṇa and Śiva, as held by the two, are the same.

(*b*) There is another difference, viz. while according to Nimbārka, the freed soul is under the absolute control of the Lord, equally with the soul in bondage, according to Śrīkaṇṭha it is not so, as already noted above.[9]

(*c*) A third point of difference is that Śrīkaṇṭha, like Bhāskara, admits of two kinds of salvation, viz. immediate or sadyas, and gradual or krama. He points out that those who meditate on the Lord in His own nature go directly to the Lord and become free at once, but those who meditate on the Lord as sentient souls and as non-sentient objects, or on Nārāyaṇa,—who is but the

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[1] ŚK.B., 4.4.17-18, pp. 495–97, Parts 10 and 11.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.21, pp. 499–500, Parts 10 and 11.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.3.1, p. 417, Part 5; 4.4.14, p. 49, Parts 10, 11.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.19, p. 498, Parts 10 and 11.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.3.1, p. 417, Part 5; 4.4.14, p. 491, Parts 10 and 11.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.35, p. 49, Parts 7 and 8; 4.4.9, p. 488, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.14. p. 492, Parts 10 and 11.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 92, Part 1.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 4.2.8, p. 456, Parts 10 and 11; 4.2.18, p. 465, Parts 10 and 11.

[9] See above.

Lord in the form of the material cause of the Universe,[1] —first go to Nārāyaṇa, and thence to Śiva afterwards.[2] But Nimbārka, as we have seen, admits of one kind of salvation only, viz. immediate.

In other points, however, they are in perfect agreement.

(7) *The sādhanas.*

According to Śrīkaṇṭha, the study of Brahman must essentially be preceded by the study of religious duties, for Dharma is the sādhya, Brahman the sādhaka.[3] Dharma, i.e. the proper and disinterested performance of the daily and occasional duties, such as the performance of sacrifices, etc., and the practice of charity, penance, self-control and so on, purify the mind and thus help the rise of knowledge in it.[4] Thus, karma is a necessary element of knowledge.[5]

But the function of karma extends no further. Karma fulfils its task by helping the rise of knowledge, but does not itself lead to salvation. It is, therefore, only an *indirect* means to salvation, salvation being directly brought forth by knowledge alone.[6]

Now this knowledge is nothing but meditation.[7] Knowledge leads to meditation and meditation to salvation. One desirous of salvation should first *know* the Lord from Scripture, and then *meditate* on Him.[8]

There are various kinds of meditation leading to different results. There is, first, meditation of the Lord in His own nature (svarūpeṇa), which leads to Him directly and immediately. The Lord is to be meditated on in His own supreme nature as identical with the self

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[1] See above.

[2] ŚK.B., 1.1.32, p. 292, Part 3; 4.3.15, p. 479, Parts 10 and 11. See below.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1.

[4] ŚK. 1.1.1, pp. 37, 39, 42, 43, 68, 84, Part 1; 3.4.26-27, pp. 397-99, Parts 10 and 11; 4.1.16, p. 447, Parts 10 and 11; 4.1.17, p. 447, Parts 10 and 11.

[5] I.e. Karma is vidyāṅga and vidyā-sahakārin. Op. cit., 3.4.1, p. 384, Parts 10 and 11; 3.4.9, p. 387, Parts 10 and 11; 3.4.26, pp. 397-98, Parts 10 and 11.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.26, p. 395, Parts 10 and 11. "Sākṣāt jñānaphalam eva mokṣaḥ."

[7] ŚK.B., 1.1.4, p. 187, Part 2. "Ata upāsanārūpa-jñāna-mokṣaphalaṃ vidhīyate."

[8] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 189, Part 2; 3.4.51, p. 419, Parts 10 and 11; 4.1.1, pp. 422-25, Parts 10 and 11.

of the meditating devotee, which helps the removal of the *paśutva* of the soul and the consequent attainment of *Śivatva*.[1] There are also various parā-vidyās or meditations on the Supreme Being, depicted in the upaniṣads, which also lead to the Lord directly.[2]

There is, further, meditation on the Lord as Nārāyaṇa or the material cause, which leads to the attainment of Nārāyaṇa first, then to that of the Lord.[3] Then there is meditation on the Lord as sentient souls (bhoktṛ-rūpeṇa) and as non-sentient objects (bhogya-rūpeṇa), which also does not lead to the Lord directly but by and by.[4] Finally, there are certain symbolic meditations which do not lead to the Lord at all.[5]

The following is a chart of the various kinds of Upāsanās:—[6]

Upāsanā.

(1) Meditation on the Lord as He is in Himself. (Svarūpa-upāsanā or Kāraṇa-upāsanā.)	(2) Meditation on the Lord under various aspects. (Parā-vidyās of the upaniṣads.)	(3) Meditation on the Lord as Nārāyaṇa. (Upādāna-upāsanā.)	(4) Meditation on the Lord as souls and matter. (Bhoktṛ-bhogya-upāsanā or Kārya-upāsanā.)	(5) Meditation on symbols. (Pratīka-upāsanā.)
(Leads to the Lord.)	(Leads to the Lord.)	(Leads to Nārāyaṇa and thence to the Lord.)	(Leads to the Lord by and by.)	(Does not lead to the Lord.)

Śrīkaṇṭha points out that the grace of the Lord is an essential pre-requisite of salvation. The Lord is the giver of salvation, and unless He is pleased to favour us, we can never attain salvation.[7]

Thus, according to Śrīkaṇṭha: Karma→jñāna→upāsanā→Bhagavat-prasāda→mukti.

It will be clear from the above that here too Śrīkaṇṭha is in perfect agreement with Nimbārka. Nimbārka also holds like Śrī-

[1] ŚK.B., 4.1.3, pp. 427-8, Parts 10 and 11.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.57, p. 380, Parts 10 and 11.
[3] *Op. cit.*, 4.3.15, p. 479, Parts 10 and 11.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.32, p. 292, Part 3.
[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.58, p. 38, Parts 10 and 11.
[6] See above.
[7] ŚK.B., 1.1.1, pp. 71, 92, Part 1; 1.1.17, p. 235, Part 3; 4.2.16, p. 464. Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.1, p. 482, Parts 10 and 11.

kaṇṭha (and against Bhāskara) that karma, through generating mental purity, helps the rise of knowledge, and is as such only an *indirect* means to salvation; that knowledge and meditation are both direct means to salvation; and that the grace of the Lord plays an important part in the attainment of salvation. He, however, does not speak of the meditation on Nārāyaṇa as the material cause, although he recommends the Ahaṃgraha-upāsanā or the meditation on the Self of the devotee as identical with that of the Lord.[1] And Śrīkaṇṭha does not speak of prapatti and gurūpasatti, or self-surrender to the Lord and preceptor respectively, as independent means to salvation, as Nimbārka does. Further, Śrīkaṇṭha does not emphasise a sweet and intimate relation of love, as Nimbārka does, between the Lord and His devotee, but rather a more distant relationship of awe and reverence, like Rāmānuja.[2]

(8) *Conclusion.*

Thus, we find that from the point of view of philosophy, the main difference between the Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda of Nimbārka and the Viśiṣṭa-Śivādvaita-vāda of Śrīkaṇṭha lies in their conceptions of the relation between the one and the many, non-difference and difference. On other points, however, they agree on the whole.

From the point of view of religion, of course, there are sectarian differences between them, as natural. Śrīkaṇṭha, as a Śaiva teacher rejects the vyūhas, takes the Dahara-vidyā as the best of all the meditations [3] and so on, which Nimbārka, as a Vaiṣṇava teacher, does not. Further, there is a distinct difference of spirit too as noted above.[4]

From the point of view of ethics, Nimbārka is more liberal, and makes provisions even for those who are unable to reach salvation by their unaided efforts—which Śrīkaṇṭha does not.

[1] See above.

[2] Aiśvarya-pradhānā bhakti and not mādhurya-pradhānā bhakti.

[3] ŚK.B., 3.3.38, p. 351, Parts 10 and 11. Vide also the sub-commentary Śivārka-maṇi-dīpikā, p. 2, Part 1, "Daharavidyā-niṣṭhaḥ ayam ācārya" etc.

[4] Cf. Rāmānuja above.

IV. Nimbārka and Baladeva

SVĀBHĀVIKA-BHEDĀBHEDA-VĀDA AND ACINTYA-BHEDĀBHEDA-VĀDA.

(1) *Introduction.*

Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa was a follower of the school of Caitanya, and a disciple of Viśvanātha Cakravartin.[1] He wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, viz. "Govinda bhāṣya", so called because it was composed, so the tradition goes, under the command of Lord Govinda or Kṛṣṇa.[2]

Baladeva composed another treatise, called "Prameyaratnāvalī", which summarises the teachings of the school of Caitanya and is based on the doctrine of Madhva. It lays down nine prameyas or propositions, established by proper proofs, viz.:—

(*a*) The Lord is the Highest Reality.
(*b*) The Lord is known from Scripture alone.
(*c*) The Universe is real.
(*d*) The difference between the Lord and the individual souls is real.
(*e*) The individual souls are real and are servants of the Lord.
(*f*) The individual souls are different from one another, and there are various grades of souls.
(*g*) Release consists in the attainment of the Lord.
(*h*) Worship of the Lord is the sole cause of release.
(*i*) There are three sources of knowledge, viz.: perception, inference and Scripture, the last being the most reliable and authoritative.[3]

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[1] Preface to SD.R., p. 1; preface to P.R., p. 9.

[2] "Bhāṣyam etad viracitaṃ Baladevena dhīmatā, Śrī-Govinda-nideśena Govindākhyam agāt tataḥ."

Gloss on G.B., p. 1, chap. 1.

Preface to G.B., p. 2; preface to P.R., pp. 16-17.

The tradition is that when Baladeva was living in Vṛndāvana, once he entered into a great philosophical controversy with a very learned scholar of the Advaita school. The latter, being unable to meet Baladeva's arguments, asked him on what particular commentary his arguments were based. Baladeva replied that they were based on the commentary of the sect of Caitanya. Then the Advaita scholar wanted to see it. Thereupon, Baladeva in compliance with the command of Lord Kṛṣṇa composed the commentary in a month.

[3] P.R., introduc. verse 5, p. 11; and end verses 1 and 2, pp. 135-136, where Baladeva cites Madhva as authority. He makes obeisance to Ānandatīrtha (i.e. Madhva) in P.R., verse 3, introduc., p. 5.

A third philosophical work of Baladeva is "Siddhānta-ratna", elucidating his general doctrine.[1]

Baladeva admits of five tattvas or categories which are exactly similar to those admitted by Harivyāsadeva.[2]

(2) *Brahman.*

(*a*) *His essential nature, attributes and powers.*

According to Baladeva, the Highest Reality or Brahman is Kṛṣṇa,[3] Viṣṇu[4] or Hari,[5] a Personal God, possessed of infinite auspicious qualities[6] and inconceivable powers.[7] He is 'Nirguṇa' in the sense of being free from certain qualities which are included under the generic term "guṇa", viz. the three guṇas of prakṛti—sattva, rajas and tamas and He is 'saguṇa' in the sense of being a storehouse of all auspicious qualities.[8] His attributes are of two kinds—majestic and sweet. The former consists in His indomitable might and lordliness, the latter in His infinite bliss and loveliness.[9] One of the greatest and at the same time, sweetest attributes of the Lord is His

[1] For other alleged works of Baladeva, see preface to P.R., pp. 9-10.

[2] G.B., introduc., p. 12, chap. 1. "Tathā hi Īśvara-jīva-prakṛti-Kāla-karmāṇi pañca-tattvāni śrūyante."

[3] P.R., 1st prameya, p. 14; 7th prameya, verse 1, p. 106; 8th prameya, verse 4, p. 121; verse p. 9, 127.

[4] G.B., introduc.; 1.1.4; 1.2.25; 1.2.27; 1.3.8; 1.3.14; 1.3.16; 1.3.24; 1.4.1; etc. etc.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.3; 1.1.18; 1.1.19; 1.3.23; 1.3.30; 2.3.14; 3.2.32; 3.3.29; 3.3.38; 3.3.51; 3.4.1; 4.1.7; etc. etc.

P.R., 5th prameya, p. 86; 8th prameya, p. 116, verse 1, p. 117.

[6] G.B., 1.1.2; where he points out that the very word "Brahman" denotes the possession of unlimited and unsurpassed attributes, for the word means 'in whom all the attributes reach to infinity'; 1.1.3; 1.4., introduc.; 3.1, introduc.; 3.2.22; 3.3, introduc.; 3.3.12, etc.

P.R., 1st prameya, pp. 32–36, where the attributes of the Lord are enumerated as omniscience, bliss, lordliness, friendliness, teachership, saviourhood and beauty.

[7] G.B., 1.1.2; 1.2.7; 1.2.32; 1.4., introduc.; 2.1.37; 2.3.6; 2.3.18; 3.2.13; 3.2.27.

[8] G.B., 1.1.11, pp. 55-56, chap. 1.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.29, introduc. p. 157, chap. 3.

essential love and solicitude for His devotees. He is verily, a slave of His devotees and even gives His own Self to them.[1]

The attributes and powers of the Lord are by nature inconceivable (acintya) and mysterious.[2] Baladeva emphasises this point again and again. The Lord is all pervading yet atomic, or of the size of a span, dwelling actually within the heart of His devotees;[3] He is one, yet appears as many;[4] all-knowledge, yet appears as having a body;[5] essentially formless and colourless, yet possesses the most attractive form;[6] unmanifest, yet manifests Himself to His devotees;[7] He is just and impartial, yet shows special grace to His devotees;[8] He is the creator of all, their material cause, yet unmodified Himself;[9] without any parts, yet possessed of parts;[10] immeasurable, yet measured.[11]

All such paradoxical or apparently contradictory qualities co-exist in the Lord since everything is possible in His case.[12] We, of course, fail to conceive this, but we must believe it on the authority of Scripture, for in transcendental matters, Scripture, and not reasoning, is our only guide.[13]

The attributes of the Lord are not different or separate from the Lord, but are nothing except the Lord Himself. And, although there is no real distinction between the Lord and His attributes, yet for conventional purposes, a distinction is recognised and spoken of. Baladeva bases his theory of the identity of substance and attribute

[1] G.B., 3.3.31, p. 162, chap. 3. 3.3.51, p. 208, chap. 3; 3.4.1, p. 235, chap. 3: "vidyayā parituṣṭo Haris sva-bhaktāya ātmānaṃ dadāti"; 3.4.43, pp. 287-88, chap. 3.

[2] *Vide* footnote 3 below.

[3] G.B., 1.2.7; p. 115, chap. 1, "Vibhutve sati aṇutvādikam acintya-śakti-yogāt"; 1.2.32, p. 142, chap. 1.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.32, p. 142, chap. 1; 2.1.27, p. 60, chap. 2.

[5] *Op. cit.*

[6] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.37, p. 78, chap. 2.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.27, p. 82, chap. 3.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.37, see below under "The Sādhanas".

[9] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.27, p. 60, chap. 2.

[10] *Op. cit.*

[11] *Op. cit.*

[12] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.32, 2.1.27, 2.1.37, p. 78, chap. 2; 3.2.13, p. 58, chap. 3.

[13] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.11, p. 32, chap. 2; 2.1.27, p. 62, chap. 3; 2.3.17, p. 186, chap. 2; 3.2.17, p. 63, chap. 3; SD.R., 1st pāda, pp. 37, 42.

on the doctrine of viśeṣa, already explained.[1] Thus, just as the coil constitutes the serpent and is not separate from it, but is yet the attribute of the serpent, so the Lord, Who is essentially intelligence and bliss, possesses intelligent bliss as His attributes too;[2] or just as the sun is essentially light, yet the substratum of light, so the Lord, though essentially of the nature of knowledge, is yet the substratum of knowledge as well;[3] or just as time is one incessant duration and has neither priority, nor posteriority, so the Lord is both knowledge and knower, bliss and blissful, substance and attribute.[4]

The fact is that the Lord has no internal differences,[5] i.e. is not a concrete whole of different kinds of attributes, just as a tree is a concrete whole of roots, leaves, and flowers, etc.[6] But He is one essence throughout like a diamond, and every one of His attributes is identical with Him, and not a part, separate from Him, and as such every one of them is full, perfect and unchangeable.[7]

The Lord has three powers—viz., parā-śakti, aparā-śakti, and avidyā-śakti.[8] The first is called Viṣṇu-śakti or Svarūpa-śakti, the second kṣetrajña and the third karma,[9] and also māyā or tamas.[10] The parā-śakti is three-fold—viz. saṃvit or jñāna-śakti, i.e. the power of consciousness; saṁhidhi or bala-śakti, i.e. the existence-giving power, viz. that which brings about the union of atoms, etc.; and hlādinī or kriyā-śakti, i.e. the bliss-giving power.[11] Through the

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[1] See under Harivyāsadeva, *vide* G.B., 3.2.28, introduc., p. 84, chap. 3. "Atha svarūpād guṇānām abhedaḥ pratipadyate"; 3.2.31, see below.

P.R., 1st prameya, verse 11, p. 37.

For the doctrine of Viśeṣa, *vide* G.B., 3.2.31, pp. 87–89, chap. 3, "Viśeṣaśca bheda-pratinidhiḥ bhedābhāve api bhedakāryyasya dharma-dharmi-bhāvāder vyavahārasya nivarttakaḥ", etc.—exactly like Harivyāsadeva.

[2] G.B., 3.2.28, p. 85, chap. 3.

[3] G.B., 3.2.29, p. 86, chap. 3.

[4] G.B., 3.2.30, p. 86, chap. 3.

[5] G.B., 3.2.28, p. 85, chap. 3; 3.3.13, p. 136, chap. 3: "Svagata-bhedasyāp pratyākhyānāt", SD.R., 1st pāda, pp. 43-44.

[6] Cf. the three kinds of bheda, sajātīya, vijātīya and svagata.

[7] G.B., 3.3.13, p. 136, chap. 3.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, p. 266, chap. 1; 3.3.39, pp. 177-78, chap. 3.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, p. 266, chap. 1.
P.R., 1st prameya, p. 42:—

"Viṣṇu śaktiḥ parā proktā kṣetrajñākhyā tathāparā;
Avidyā-karma-saṃjñānyā tṛtīyā śaktirisyate."

[10] G.B., 1.4.10, pp. 224-25, chap. 1.

[11] P.R., 1st prameya, p. 44.

first the Lord, knowledge by nature, Himself knows,[1] and gives knowledge to the souls. Through the second the Lord, existent by nature, Himself exists,[2] and gives existence to space, time, matter, souls and karma. Through the third, the Lord, bliss by nature, Himself enjoys, and gives bliss to the souls.[3]

The aparā-śakti and the avidyā-śakti of the Lord consist respectively in the souls and matter.[4]

The Lord is thus both the efficient and material cause of the universe.[5] He is the efficient cause through His parā-śakti, and He is the material cause through His aparā and avidyā-śaktis.[6] When these latter two powers are manifested in gross forms, the Universe of souls and matter arises. As the operative cause, the Lord is Unchangeable or kūṭastha, as the material cause, He is subject to modification or pariṇāmin.[7] But though subject to modification, He remains modified in His own essential nature, which fact, though apparently contradictory, must be accepted on the authority of Scripture.[8]

Like the attributes, the powers of the Lord too are identical with the Lord, since the Lord has no internal differences.[9]

The parā-śakti of the Lord is identical with Śrī, the constant companion of the Lord, and as the parā-śakti of the Lord is identical with the Lord Himself, Śrī is identical with the Lord.[10] But though identical with the Lord, she cannot but love and be devoted to the Lord, Who is her very existence, just as the branch cannot but love the tree, or the moon-beam the moon,[11] and an erotic sentiment is possible between the Lord and Śrī.[12] The Lord is, thus, an enjoyer of objects of desire (viz. Śrī), not through lust, but through love. The intense bliss which the Lord enjoys from His contact with Śrī does

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[1] That is, jñāna becomes jñātā. [2] That is, sattvā becomes sat.

[3] SD.R., 1st pāda, p. 64. Ānanda becomes ānanda-maya.

[4] G.B., 2.1.14, p. 38, chap. 2.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.23–27, pp. 262–271, chap. 1.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, p. 266, chap. 1. "Tasya nimittatvam upādānatvañ cābhidhīyate. Tatrādyam parākhyā śaktimadrūpeṇa, dvitīyan tu tad-anya-śakti-dvayādvāraiva.".

[7] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, p. 267, chap. 1.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.10, pp. 50-51, chap. 2. [9] See above.

[10] G.B., 2.3.40, p. 182, chap. 3.
P.R., 1st prameya, verse 12, p. 40.

[11] G.B., 3.3.41. [12] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.42, p. 186, chap. 3.

not imply any want of perfect bliss, fulness and self-enjoyment on His own part, but it is like the joy which one feels on seeing one's own beauty in a mirror.[1]

The Lord is, of course, not an enjoyer in the sense the individual soul is, i.e. is never subject to actions and their results.[2]

The Lord is a knower too and not merely pure knowledge [3] and an agent, i.e. the creator, maintainer and destroyer,[4] the cause of bondage and release [5] the dispenser of justice, i.e. fruits of karmas.[6] Those acts which the Lord performs through His cit-śakti and svarūpa, viz. His acts as incarnations, viz. suckling the breasts of Yaśodā, playing with cowherds and cowherdesses, etc. are eternal, while those acts which the Lord performs through matter and time, viz. creating the world, etc.—are non-eternal.[7]

(*b*) *His form* (*vigraha*) *and manifestations* (*avatāras*).

The Lord is possessed of a celestial, non-material form or body.[8] The body of the Lord possesses the positive attributes of existence, intelligence and bliss, all-pervasiveness and the rest, as well as the negative attributes of not being coarse, nor fine, neither short, nor long, neither red, nor fluid, etc.[9]

The form of the Lord is unmanifest to the external senses.[10] But though the Lord is ordinarily imperceptible to the senses, yet in absorbed devotion, He becomes perceptible even to the senses of the devotee. A devotee who is full of love for Him and repeatedly practises meditation and the rest, has his senses saturated, as it were, with His essence through His grace. He then becomes fit for seeing Him and sees Him with his purified mind, just as he sees external objects.[11]

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[1] G.B.
SD.R., 1st pāda, pp. 76–83.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.2.8, pp. 115-16, chap. 1.

[3] See above.

[4] See above.

[5] G.B., 3.2.5, p. 45, chap. 3.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.29–42, pp. 100–104, chap. 3.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.11, pp. 128–133, chap. 3.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.31, pp. 68-69, chap. 2.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.32, introduc., pp. 76-77, chap. 3; 3.3.34, p. 169, chap. 3. *Vide* Bṛh., 3.8.8.

[10] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.23, p. 177, chap. 3.

[11] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.24–27, pp. 78-79, chap. 3.

The form or body of the Lord is not different from the Lord, but identical with Him,[1] just as the attributes and powers of the Lord are not different from, but identical with Him.[2] Hence the Lord is called formless, i.e. He *does not possess* the form or the body, but *is* the form or the body.[3] The body of the Lord being His very self[4] possesses all the attributes of the Lord, viz. all-pervasiveness, knowledge, etc.[5]

The Lord has a multitude of forms through which He manifests Himself as avatāras or incarnations. That is to say, the Lord is one indeed, so is His eternal consort Śrī, yet they become many, since they assume various forms through their essential power.[6]

Thus, just as in a crystalline gem there exist many hues and colours, though the gem is one, so in the own form of the Lord there exists an infinite number of forms, each eternal and perfect and mysterious, and the Lord, though one and not limited by them, is yet fully manifest through every one of them.[7]

The Lord incarnates Himself variously as Fish, Tortoise, etc. and again as Kṛṣṇa the Sweet, Rāma the Brave, Nṛsiṃha the Terrible, etc. These incarnations, viz. Fish and the rest, are not to be confused with the souls, in spite of the fact that they too, like the souls, are called parts of the Lord. Just as both the sun and the firefly are called light, yet are not the same, or just as both nectar and wine are called liquids, yet are not the same, so the incarnation and the soul, though both parts of the Lord, are not the same.[8] The soul is under the control of the Lord, and subject to injunctions and prohibitions, but not so the incarnation[9]; the soul is atomic and non-full, but the incarnation is not so.[10] In fact the term "part", applied to the incarnation means the Lord in His entirety.

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[1] G.B., 3.2.14, introduc., p. 58, chap. 3.

[2] See above.

[3] G.B., 3.2.14, p. 59, chap. 3. "Rūpam vigrahas tad-viśiṣṭam Brahma na bhavatīti arūpavad ity ucyate vigrahas tad ity arthaḥ."

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.16, p. 61, chap. 3. "Atra dehād bhinno dehīty evam bidheś-vara-vastuni nāsti, kintu deha eva dehīti labdham."

[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.14, p. 59, chap. 3.

[6] P.R., 1st prameya, verse 13, p. 45.

[7] G.B., 3.3, introduc., p. 106, chap. 3.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.44, pp. 223-24, chap. 2.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.46, p. 226, chap. 2.

[10] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.47, p. 227, chap. 2.

The fact is that the Lord may manifest all His powers in an incarnation, who is then called a full incarnation, or He may manifest only a portion of His powers, when the incarnation is called partial. But these partial incarnations are not parts of the Lord in the same sense the souls are. On the contrary, they represent various aspects of the same Lord, manifesting His different powers, just as the crystal shows different attributes or colours at different times. Or, to give another example, just as a learned teacher, though perfectly well-versed in all the scriptures, may not expound all of them, while addressing a lower class, but only some portions of them and may be called a partial teacher only in that sense, so the so-called partial manifestations of the Lord, though really identical with the Lord Himself, manifest only a portion of His attributes and powers and are hence called partial incarnations.[1]

Thus, in the Kṛṣṇa incarnation only, i.e. in the infant Kṛṣṇa, suckling the breasts of Yaśodā, all the six attributes of the Lord, viz. supreme love for all humanity, being an object of supreme love for all humanity, being the composer of supremely sweet heavenly music, possessing a most beautiful form and immeasurable compassion,—are fully manifested, while in other incarnations, fewer attributes and powers are manifested.[2]

The essential form of the Lord is, thus the form of Kṛṣṇa, the cowherd, with eyes like full-blown lotus, and body blue like cloud, wearing raiments like sparkling lightning, with two arms adorned with the symbol of silence, surrounded by cows, cowherds and cowherdesses and standing under the Heavenly Tree.[3]

Besides this essential form of blissful Kṛṣṇa (svayaṃrūpa) the Lord has His power or energy forms (or vilāsa-rūpa)—such as Nārāyaṇa, Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa and Aniruddha.[4]

[1] G.B., 2.3.45, pp. 224-25, chap. 2.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.45, pp. 224-25, chap. 2.
SD.R., 2nd pāda, p. 117.

[3] G.B., 3.2.16, p. 61, chap. 3; 3.3.6 (introduc.), 3.3.20; introduc., p. 117, chap. 3; 3.3.29, introduc., p. 156, chap. 3; 3.3.38, p. 176, chap. 3.
Cf. Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī:—
"Sapuṇḍarīka-nayanaṃ meghābhaṃ vaidyutāmbaram,
Dvibhujaṃ mauna-mudrāḍhyam vanamālinam Īśvaram", etc.

[4] G.B., 3.3.15, p. 138, chap. 3.

Just as the Lord manifests Himself in different incarnations so Śrī too, the eternal consort of the Lord, manifests herself in corresponding incarnations. Thus, when the Lord assumes the form Āditya, she becomes Kamalā; when He becomes Bhārgava, she becomes Dharaṇī; when He becomes Rāma, she becomes Sītā; when He becomes Kṛṣṇa, she becomes Rukmiṇī and so on. Thus, when He becomes a God, she becomes a goddess, when He becomes a man, she becomes a woman, and so on.[1]

Besides the full and partial incarnations, who are the Lord Himself, there are certain exalted souls like Sanatkumāra, Nārada, etc., through whom the Lord shines forth temporarily. These God-possessed souls are called 'āveśāvatāras'.[2] They too are to be venerated highly, but not to be worshipped like the Lord or His incarnations, for they do not possess all the attributes of the Lord.[3]

(c) *The City (or loka) of the Lord.*

The city of Brahman, called Vaikuṇṭha, Gokula, Saṃvyoma or Mahiman, is identical with the Lord Himself, and not different from Him,[4] just as the attributes and powers of the Lord and His body are identical with Him.[5]

Hence, like the Lord Himself, the city of the Lord too is possessed of the six celestial attributes [6] and free from the three attributes of matter, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas. It cannot be attained by the ungodly, but only by those who perform the five-fold duties [7] and are eternally perfect and devoted to the Lord. The divine city is full of marvellous palaces and courtyards, gardens and pools, and is refulgent with the light of myriads of suns.[8]

It is not to be wondered how the Lord can be both the dweller (the Lord) and the place dwelt in (the City), for everything is possible

[1] P.R., 1st prameya, p. 51.
[2] G.B., 3.3.21, introduc., p. 146, chap. 3.
[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.23, p. 148, chap. 3.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.37-38, pp. 176–178, chap. 3.
[5] See above.
[6] Viz. supreme love for humanity, etc. See above.
[7] Viz. abhigamana, upādāna, ijyā, adhyāna and samādhi. *Vide* 'Prabhātīkā' on P.R., p. 60. See below under "The Ritualistic Doctrine of the School of Nimbārka". Cf. also S.B., 2.2.42.
[8] P.R., 1st prameya, pp. 59-60.

in His case, possessed as He is of inconceivable powers.[1] But though the City of the Lord is nothing but the Lord Himself, yet it appears as a *material* city to the devotee, through the grace of the Lord.[2]

The Lord brings down on earth His City—which is His own self, and manifests Himself there. Hence, just as Kṛṣṇa is not to be regarded as an ordinary man, but as the Lord Himself, so Mathurā is not to be regarded as an ordinary earthly city, but as the Divine Abode.[3]

It will be seen now that Baladeva's doctrine of Brahman is similar to that of Nimbārka, so far as general philosophical principles go apart from sectarian details. According to both, Brahman or the Highest Reality is Kṛṣṇa, accompanied by Rādhā. Baladeva makes Śrī the constant consort of the Lord, but Śrī is nothing but Rādhā since, he points out, when Śrī or the parā-śakti of the Lord manifests herself as the giver of gladness, joy and expansion of consciousness, she is called Rādhā, the highest of all women.[4] Hence Rādhā is the parā-śakti or the hlādinī-śakti of the Lord and non-different from Him.[5] Again, according to both, the Lord is possessed of attributes and His attributes are majestic and awe-inspiring on the one hand, and sweet and lovable on the other, the Lord is both the material and efficient cause of the world, the Lord is possessed of a celestial body, dwells in a celestial city and manifests Himself in different incarnations and vyūhas, the Lord is both transcendent and immanent and so on. According to Baladeva, as we have seen, the aparā and avidyā śaktis of the Lord represent His immanent aspects, and the parā or svarūpa śakti is transcendent aspect.

Thus, there is on the whole perfect agreement between Nimbārka and Baladeva, although the peculiar view of Baladeva, viz. that there is identity between the Lord and His attributes, powers, body and city, is not found in Nimbārka. According to Baladeva, as we have seen, there is no internal difference in the Lord, in the sense that the Lord

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[1] G.B., 3.3.37, p. 175, chap. 3.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.36, p. 174, chap. 3.

[3] P.R., 1st prameya, verse 17, p. 162.

[4] G.B., 3.3.42, p. 187, chap. 3. "Hlādinī-sāra-samaveta-saṃ-vid-ātmaka-yuvatī-ratnatvena tu Rādhādi-Śrī-rūpā ca."

Vide also P.R., 1st prameya, p. 55.

[5] SD.R., 2nd pāda, pp. 118-19. "Yā bhagabad-abhinnābhihitā yā ca hlādinīty-ādinā viśeṣitā sā paraiva Rādhikeśvarīti."

is not a concrete whole of various attributes, but *is* each of these attributes. But according to Nimbārka, there is internal difference in the Lord in the sense that the sentient and the non-sentient which are parts and powers of the Lord are ever different from Him, though not outside or independent of Him. And Baladeva too should admit that there is internal difference in the Lord in this sense, for according to him also, the sentient and the non-sentient, though powers of the Lord, are different from Him.[1]

(3) *The Cit.*

Baladeva's doctrine of the individual soul too is similar to that of Nimbārka.

(*a*) Like Nimbārka, he holds that the individual soul is, by nature, eternal—without beginning and without end,[2] self luminous.[3] The soul is not knowledge merely, and though its form is that of knowledge, its nature is that of a knower.[4] It is also an enjoyer [5] and an active agent.[6] It is an agent in a two-fold sense, viz. it acts on the external world *indirectly* through the instrumentality of its sense-organs—e.g. it sees colour by means of its eyes, lifts objects by means of its hands and so on—, and it is also an agent in the act of *directly* controlling those sense-organs, just as a carpenter is an agent in the act of carpentary through the medium of his instruments, viz. axe, etc., i.e. constructs various objects by means of these tools, and he is also an agent in the act of directly holding and using those tools.[7]

But though the individual soul is an agent, it is not an independent agent like the Lord. In fact, every act of the soul involves five factors —viz. the soul, the body, the different sense-organs, various kinds of energies and the Lord, and he who thinks himself to be the sole agent is a mistaken fool.[8] The fact that the activity of the soul depends

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[1] See below under "Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit".

[2] G.B., 2.3.16, pp. 183–185, chap. 2.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.43, pp. 221-222, chap. 2.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.17, p. 186, chap. 2. "Jña evātmā jñāna-rūpatve sati jñātṛ-svarūpa eva."

[5] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.27, p. 198, chap. 2.
Op. cit., 1.2.8, pp. 115-116, chap. 1.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.31–38, pp. 203–212, chap. 2.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.38, p. 210, chap. 2.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.38, pp. 210-211, chap. 2. *Vide* Gītā, 18.14. *Vide* also G.B., 2.1.14, where it is said that the soul is an agent in the same sense that the cow

upon the Lord—which fact is declared by Scripture itself[1]—does not however, imply that the individual soul is a mere automaton, moved by the Lord, so that the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions, which presuppose free will on the part of the agent are useless, for the Lord causes the individual soul to act in a particular way, not arbitrarily, but out of regard for its tendencies, generated by its own past works. Thus, as the acts of the soul in the present life are determined by its acts in former lives, it itself is really responsible for its acts, though impelled by the Lord, just as the rain is the common cause of the growth of various kinds of plants, while the seed is the particular cause of the particular plant. Hence, the soul is an agent, though a secondary agent, while the Lord is the causative agent, because without His permission, the soul cannot act. But still, as the responsibility of the soul does not cease, the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions are not meaningless.[2]

The soul's state of being a knower, an enjoyer and an agent of the soul, Baladeva points out like Nimbārka, are natural, pertaining to it in bondage and in release.[3]

Like Nimbārka, again, Baladeva insists on the soul's eternal dependence on and servitude to the Lord.[4] The soul is ever under the control of the Lord in bondage,[5] as in release.[6]

Like Nimbārka, again, Baladeva holds that the soul is a part,[7]

is an agent in the act of producing milk. The cow has no power of her own to produce milk, but it is the vital energy (prāṇa-śakti) of the cow which is the primary agent in the production of the milk. Similarly, though the soul is observed to produce an effect, it is not independent in its acts, but the Lord is really the primary agent here.

[1] G.B., 2.3.39, p. 213, chap. 2; 2.3.46, pp. 226-227, chap. 2.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.40, pp. 214-215, chap. 2.

[3] See below under "Mokṣa".

[4] P.R., 5th prameya, pp. 65-66. "Jīvānāṃ bhagavad-dāsatvam."

[5] G.B., 2.3.46, pp. 226-227, chap. 2.

[6] See below under "Mokṣa".

[7] G.B., 2.3.41–43, pp. 217–222. Baladeva points out the soul is not a part of the Lord as a piece of stone cut off from the rock is of the rock, for Brahman is by nature indivisible. Hence the soul is said to be a part of Brahman in the sense of being a *subordinate* to Him, separate from Him, yet related to Him, as the created, the ruled, the supported, etc.

G.B., 2.3.41.

an effect [1] and a power [2] of the Lord, and is both different and non-different from Him.[3] So much for the nature of the soul.

(*b*) Next, the size of the soul. Here also, Baladeva agrees with Nimbārka in holding that it is atomic in size,[4] and that this atomicity of the soul, like its agency and the rest, is natural, i.e. the freed soul also remains atomic and does not become all-pervading like the Lord.

(*c*) Next, the number of souls. Here too Baladeva agrees with Nimbārka in holding that there is a plurality of souls.[5] He points out that the souls are not absolutely equal and similar. Although their essential nature is the same, i.e. although they have no distinctions among themselves, in so far as they are all intelligent by nature, all cognising subjects and agents and atomic in size, yet there are differences and gradations owing to their karmas and sādhanas.[6] Even the freed souls are different from one another on account of the difference of their devotion.[7]

(*d*) Finally, the kinds of souls. Like Nimbārka, Baladeva holds that there are broadly, three kinds of souls, viz. baddhas or the freed souls, i.e. the souls who were in bondage, but are free now, and nitya-

[1] 1.4.26, pp. 265-66, chap. 1; 2.1.14, pp 38–44, chap. 2; 2.3.16, pp. 184-185, chap. 2.

Baladeva points out exactly like Nimbārka that no contradiction is involved by holding the soul and the universe to be both eternal and products of the Lord. When the sentient and the non-sentient, the two powers of the Lord, lie latent in Him, they are said to be non-existent, but when they are manifested, the universe of souls and matter is said to *originate*. The difference between the souls and the pradhāna is, however, this: when the non-sentient objects like the pradhāna and the rest, originate from Brahman (i.e. are manifested), they undergo a change of essential nature—i.e. so long they were energy of Brahman, the sentient, but now they become non-sentient. But the souls do not undergo any such change of essential nature when they originate from Brahman. The only change in their case consists in the contraction and expansion of intelligence—i.e. during dissolution their intelligence is in a state of contraction, during creation it is in a state of expansion,—in either case, however, the soul does not undergo any essential change of a nature. (G.B., 2.3.16.)

[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.16, pp. 184-185, chap. 2; 2.3.41, p. 219, chap. 2.

[3] See below under "Relation between Brahman, cit and acit".

[4] G.B., 2.3.18–30, pp. 187–202, chap. 3.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.42, p. 220, chap. 2.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.49–51, pp. 229-230, chap. 2.
"Svarūpa-sāmye api tad-adṛṣṭānām aniyamāt nānā-vidhatvāt", 2.3.49.

[7] P.R., verses 2-3, pp. 103–105. See above.

muktas, or the ever-free souls, who are the eternal companions of the Lord.[1]

The souls in bondage, according to Baladeva, are again of two kinds, those who desire for salvation, and those who desire for heaven or other worldly objects. The first kind of devotees are again of two kinds—viz. svaniṣṭhas and the ekāntins. These latter, again are of two kinds—viz. pariniṣṭhas and nirapekṣas.[2]

Baladeva is also in perfect agreement with Nimbārka regarding the different states of the soul, viz. dream,[3] deep sleep, swoon, etc. and also regarding the destiny of the soul and its journey through the path of gods, etc.[4] There is only one slight point of difference. According to Nimbārka, the general rule is that the presiding deities of light, day, etc. (the successive stages in the path of gods) or the agents of the Lord lead the souls of knowers to the Lord.[5] But according to Baladeva, though this is the general rule, yet the Lord makes an exception in the case of the nirapekṣa devotees, who are His special favourites, and Himself comes down to fetch them to Him, being impatient of delay.[6]

(4) *The Acit.*

Baladeva's theory of the world too is very similar to that of Nimbārka. Like Nimbārka, he holds that the world is an effect, a development of prakṛti, which is a part, an effect and a power of the Lord.[7] Prakṛti is also called tamas, māyā or avidyā.[8] It is originally the equilibrium of the three guṇas, but it is fertilised, i.e. set to motion, by a glance of the Lord and gives rise to the Universe.[9]

Baladeva emphasises the reality of the world, and criticises the Śaṃkarite doctrine of Vivarta-vāda.[10] He points out that the omniscient Lord has created the world with His own power, thence the

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[1] G.B., introduc., 3.3.11, p. 131, chap. 3.

[2] For the peculiar duties, etc. and status of these three classes of devotees, see below under "Kinds of Bhaktas".

[3] G.B., 3.2.1–3, pp. 40–43, chap. 3.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 4th chap., 3-4 pādas.

[5] See above.

[6] G.B., 4.3.16, pp. 80-81, chap. 4.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, p. 266, chap. 1; 2.1.14, p. 38, chap. 2; 2.3.16, p. 184, chap. 2. See above footnote 1.

[8] *Op. cit.*, introduc., pp. 13-14, chap. 1.

[9] *Op. cit.*, introduc., pp. 13-14.

[10] *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, pp. 267–269, chap. 1.

world is bound to be real, for the real cannot produce what is unreal.[1] The statements that the soul alone existed in the beginning, etc., simply mean that during dissolution souls and matter remain merged indistinguishably from the Lord, like birds in a dark forest.[2]

Like Nimbārka, Baladeva admits kāla to be an eternal, non-intelligent substance. Time, according to him, consists in three states—viz., past, present and future and is conventionally denoted by such terms as "simultaneous", "slow", "quick", etc. It is measured by seconds, minutes, hours, days, etc.—up to parārdha. It is in constant motion, like a wheel and is involved in the creation and destruction of objects. It is a power of the Lord, and as such without beginning and end.[3]

But Baladeva does not speak of the aprākṛta as Nimbārka does. He speaks instead of karma as the fifth category, a non-intelligent substance, without beginning, but having an end.[4] Karma, too like matter and time, is an important factor in creation. The Lord, though omnipotent and independent, is not capricious, and hence He creates the world strictly in accordance with the karmas of the souls. These three substances, viz. matter, time and karma, are co-eternal with the Lord and subordinate to Him, though the Lord never disregards them in His act of creation.[5]

(5) *Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

Like Nimbārka, Baladeva holds that there are three eternal substances. Brahman, the sentient and the non-sentient. The vital question is—what is the relation between them?

Firstly, Baladeva points out, exactly like Nimbārka, that there is an essential difference of nature between Brahman, on the one hand, and the sentient and the non-sentient, on the other. The Lord is supremely pure and perfect, free from all sins and all karmas, while the soul is tainted by sins and fettered by karmas,[6] and the universe is impure and non-intelligent. The Lord is the ruler,[7] the creator

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[1] P.R., 3rd prameya, verse 1, p. 75, etc.

[2] *Op. cit.*, verse 2, p. 80.

[3] G.B., introduc., p. 14, chap. 1.

[4] *Op. cit.*, introduc., p. 15, chap. 1.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.35, pp. 74-75, chap. 2.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.20, pp. 83-84, chap. 1, 1.2.2, p. 111, chap. 1; 2.1.22, pp. 53-55, chap. 2.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.21, pp. 84-85, chap. 1.

and the supporter,[1] while the souls and the world are the ruled, created and supported. The Lord is the object to be attained,[2] the master and the beloved [3] and the worshipped [4] while the souls are the attainers, servants, lovers and the worshippers. Even the freed soul is different from the [5] Lord.

But on the other hand, the soul and the universe are non-different from the Lord, for they are effects of Brahman and the cause and the effect are non-different.[6] Further, the Lord is all-pervading and pervades the soul and the universe and in this sense too, the soul and the universe are said to be non-different from Him.[7] Hence we have two kinds of texts, declaring both the difference and non-difference of the Lord from the sentient and the non-sentient.

But how are we to reconcile both difference and non-difference? Baladeva frankly gives up the problem as incomprehensible. An incomprehensible difference—non-difference is the truth of things, and although we cannot conceive it by reason, we must accept it on the authority of revelation, for scripture is our sole guide in transcendental matters.[8] Baladeva emphasises, as we have seen, the inconceivable and mysterious powers of the Lord.[9] According to him, the problems *how* unity (Brahman) can become plurality (prapañca) without losing its unity and integrity,[10] *how* one can appear as many without being limited by its manifold forms [11] are beyond our grasp, although the facts that unity does become plurality, the one, many cannot but be believed and accepted. Similarly, the relation between unity and plurality, one and many is an insoluble and incomprehensible mystery, but as scripture teaches both difference and non-difference, we must accept both to be true.

Thus, like Nimbārka. Baladeva too accepts both difference and non-difference to be true. As a follower of Madhva, however, and

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[1] G.B., 1.1.17, pp. 173-174, chap. 1; 1.2.4, p. 112, chap. 1.

[2] *Op. cit.*

[3] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.41, pp. 217-218, chap. 2.
Baladeva points out that the phrase "Thou art that" (chānd. 6.8.7, etc.) means simply that "All thy functions are dependent on the Lord" (p. 219, chap. 2).

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.18 (introduc.) (p. 65, chap. 3).

[5] See below under "Mokṣa".

[6] G.B., 2.1.14–20 (pp. 38–51, chap. 2).

[7] *Op. cit.*, 2.1.14 (p. 38, chap. 2).

[8] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.17. See above, p. 63, chap. 3.

[9] See above.

[10] See above.

[11] See above.

also as mainly a religious teacher (religion requires difference between the Lord and His devotee), he lays a greater stress on difference than on non-difference between the Lord and the soul.[1] But he is also reluctant to admit an absolute difference between them as Madhva does, since the effect cannot be absolutely different from its cause—which would lead to Asat-kāryya-vāda—or the pervaded from one who pervades. Hence he ends by accepting both difference and non-difference and regarding them as incompatible and incomprehensible, though true.

Nimbārka, however, as we have seen—accepts both difference and non-difference to be equally true and compatible as well. The doctrine of Baladeva may, therefore, be called "Acintya-bhedā-bheda-vāda" as distinguished from the "Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda" of Nimbārka.

(6) *Mokṣa.*

Bondage, according to Baladeva, consists in turning one's face away from the Lord and the consequent obscuration of its own real nature and attributes, while salvation consists in turning one's face towards the Lord, when bondage falls off and the soul attains the form and attributes of the Lord.[2]

Thus, like Nimbārka, Baladeva too holds that the state of salvation involves two factors. On the one hand, it means the manifestation of the real nature of the self—the full development of its eight-fold superior attributes,[3] and on the other it means becoming similar to the Lord.[4] The difference between the Lord and the individual soul being eternal, this difference persists in the state of salvation too and the freed soul never becomes identical with the Lord. The freed soul is different from the Lord in two points as usual, viz. it is atomic,[5] while the Lord is all-pervading, and it lacks the power of creation

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[1] *Vide* P.R., where he devotes one entire prameya (4th prameya, pp. 81–94) in demonstrating the difference between Brahman and the souls, but it contains not a word about non-difference between them. And he makes obeisance to Madhva and quotes him as authority in the beginning and in the end. See footnote (1) above.

[2] G.B., introduc., p.13, chap. 1; 1.3.19, p. 167, chap. 1; 3.4.43, p. 288, chap. 3.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.1-2, pp. 84–88, chap. 4. The eight qualities are freedom from sins, etc., *vide* chānd, 8.7.1.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.16-17, pp. 71–74, chap. 1; 1.3.22-23, pp. 169-170, chap. 1; 1.3.43, p. 207, chap. 1.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.20, p. 116, chap. 4.

etc.—which power belongs exclusively to the Lord.[1] The freed soul is equal to the Lord in point of enjoyment, and not essentially and absolutely.[2]

In all these points, Baladeva is in perfect agreement with Nimbārka. Like Nimbārka, he emphasises the individuality and separate existence of the freed soul and holds that the freed soul too is a knower, an agent and an enjoyer like the soul in bondage. It is a knower in the sense that it directly knows or intuits Brahman and is omniscient like Him.[3] It is an agent in the sense that it roams and sports about in the world of Brahman,[4] possesses divine creative powers (satya-saṃkalpatva) [5] and creates the world of Fathers, etc. at will.[6] It is an enjoyer in the sense, that it shares, as noted above, the enjoyments of the Lord [7] and subsists in infinite and eternal bliss.[8]

According to Baladeva, therefore, as according to Nimbārka, salvation is a positive state and not a mere negative state of absence of pain.[9]

Baladeva, further, agrees with Nimbārka in holding that the freed soul is ever under the control of the Lord, but of none else.[10]

Baladeva points out that although the freed soul is under the control of the Lord, yet it is not obligatory for it to carry on meditation on the Lord any longer,[11] yet it is irresistibly drawn towards worshipping the Lord, who is so ravishingly beautiful, just as a person suffering from billiousness, though cured by eating sugar, continues to eat sugar, even after his complete cure, simply because sugar is so sweet.[12] But this worship of the Lord by the freed soul, is considered to be no action in the ordinary sense of the word, because it worships without any taint of the guṇas.[13]

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[1] G.B., 4.4.17-18, pp. 111–113, chap. 4.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.16, pp. 71-72, chap. 1; 4.4.21, pp. 117-118, chap. 4.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.15, introduc. and sūtra, pp. 108-109, chap. 4.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.32, p. 205, chap. 2.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.1, p. 41, chap. 3.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.8, p. 98, chap. 4.

[7] See footnote (2).

[8] G.B., 4.4.20, p. 116, chap. 4.

[9] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.1, p. 85, chap. 4.

[10] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.9, p. 100, chap. 4.

[11] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.27-28, pp. 153–158, chap. 3.

[12] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.12, p. 15, chap. 4. "Pittadagdhasya sitayā pittanāśe api sati, bhūyas tadāsvāda-vat."

[13] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.38, p. 211, chap. 2.

According to Baladeva, just as there are mutual differences among the souls in bondage, so there are mutual differences among the freed souls as well, owing to their difference of devotion.[1]

The freed souls, Baladeva points out, are colleagues of the Lord and hence possess the power of appearing in many forms,[2] e.g. when the Lord manifests Himself as Kṛṣṇa, the freed souls become His companions and so on.

The freed soul, Baladeva points out, is in threefold union with the Lord—viz. first, it is in the city of the Lord which is the Lord Himself;[3] secondly, the Lord is in it, so that it ever feels the presence of the Lord; and thirdly, it is in union with the external form of the Lord.[4] It is this separation from the external form of the Lord which generates the sentiment of viraha or separation in the freed soul, which sentiment it is said to undergo sometimes in spite of its intimate union with the Lord.[5]

Baladeva, like Nimbārka, accepts Videhan-mukti only and not Jīvan-mukti.[6]

Baladeva points out that Scripture speaks of four kinds of salvation, viz. sālokya, or residence in the same world with the Lord; sārṣṭi or possessing the same power and rank as the Lord; and sāmīpya or proximity to the Lord and sāyujya or intimate union with the Lord. But of these, sāyujya-mukti is the main and involves all the rest, because, when the soul is in union with the Lord, it resides in the same world as the Lord, attains His nature and attributes and is in proximity to Him.[7]

(7) *The Sādhanas.*

(*a*) *Bhakti, its nature and pre-requisites (viz. karma and jñāna).*

According to Baladeva, bhakti or devotion is the sole and direct cause of salvation.[8] He uses the term "bhakti" in the sense used

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[1] P.R., 6th prameya, verses 2-3, pp. 103, 105. See below under "Kinds of Upāsanā".

[2] G.B., 3.3.11, p. 131, chap. 3.

[3] See above.

[4] G.B., 4.4.4, pp. 91-92, chap. 4.

[5] *Op. cit.*

[6] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.33, p. 116, chap. 3; 3.3.53, pp. 211-12, chap. 3; 3.4.52, pp. 303-304; chap. 3, 4.1.15, pp. 21–23, chap. 4.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 4.4.4, pp. 91-92, chap. 4.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 3.2, introduc., p. 38, chap. 3; 3.3.48, p. 202, chap. 3; 3.3.54, pp. 214–217, chap. 3.

by Nimbārka, viz. 'prema' or intense love,[1] and not in the Rāmānujist sense of upāsanā or meditation.[2]

Bhakti, he points out, really involves two factors—viz., vairāgya or a strong disgust for any and every object other than Brahman, and prema or an equally strong yearning and love for Brahman. These two, vairāgya and prema, are the principal of all sādhanas. The former is generated by the knowledge of the imperfection and transitoriness of all worldly objects, as well as by the knowledge that attachment to worldly objects leads to endless rebirths; while the latter is generated by the knowledge of the Lord and His glorious attributes, omniscience, omnipotence, loveliness and the rest.[3]

It is clear, therefore, that devotion is not blind, irrational, but is rational and essentially based on knowledge. It is based on a two-fold knowledge, viz. knowledge of the individual self and the world and knowledge of the Lord.[4]

Baladeva distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge: vijñāna and prajñā. Vijñāna means intellectual knowledge, which is obtained from the study of scripture, while prajñā means intuitive knowledge which is nothing but devotion and meditation. The former is indirect, since it is only textual conception; the latter is direct, since it is intimate realisation. The former is the gateway to the latter and is of no avail by itself, for by merely mastering the meaning of words by merely studying the Vedas, one does not become a Brahma-vid or a real knower of Brahman. A real knower of Brahman is he who not only *knows* Brahman, but *intuits* or realises and feels Him directly. Just as the mere utterance of the words "Honey is sweet" will never give a man the taste of the sweetness of honey, but he must actually taste honey to realise how sweet is honey, so exactly is the case here.[5] In this way, knowledge leads to devotion and meditation and thereby to salvation.

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[1] For the definition of bhakti, see under Nimbārka.

[2] See in loco for Rāmānuja's definition. According to Baladeva, dhyāna is only one form of bhakti; the main characteristic of which is intense joy and love. See below under "Modes and kinds of Bhakti".

[3] G.B., 3.2, introduc., pp. 38-39, chap. 3; 3.2.42, p. 104, chap. 3.

For the knowledge which specially help the rise and growth of bhakti—see below.

[4] G.B., 1.1.2, p. 3P, chap. 1; 3.3.54, p. 217, chap. 3; SD.R., 1st pāda, p. 54. "Bhaktir api jñāna-viśeṣo bhavati", and p. 67 "jñāna-bhakti-rūpāyāḥ vidyāyāḥ tu sākṣāt tat-prāptau iti na kācit kṣatiḥ".

[5] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 30, chap. 1; 3.3.52, p. 209, chap. 3; 3.4.12, pp. 244–247.

Karma or action too, Baladeva points out like Nimbārka, has an important part to play in the attainment of salvation. The proper performance of the duties incumbent on one's own stage of life goes to refine and purify the mind and thereby help the rise of knowledge and devotion in it.[1] Like Nimbārka, again, he points out that the function of karma extends thus far only and no farther. Karma is a means to the rise of knowledge and devotion, but not a means to their fruit, viz. salvation. And, when once knowledge and devotion have arisen, karma is no longer necessary and hence is abandoned, just as a horse is necessary for accomplishing a journey, but no longer necessary when the journey is accomplished.[2]

Hence Baladeva definitely rejects the Vidyā-karma-samuccaya-vāda, or the doctrine that the combination of vidyā and karma leads to salvation. He points out that vidyā and vidyā alone (by which term he understands "devotion preceded by knowledge")[3] is the cause of salvation.[4]

Like Nimbārka, Baladeva emphasises the grace of the Lord as an essential pre-requisite of the attainment of salvation. A man's unaided effort, he points out, can be of no avail unless the Lord is pleased to choose and help him. Thus, choice by the Lord is the most important cause of salvation.[5]

This fact, however, does not contradict the statement, made above, that devotion is the *sole* cause of salvation, for the grace of the Lord and the consequent choice by Him are not arbitrary, but depends on the devotion of the souls themselves. The Lord does not choose any and every one, but only those who are whole-heartedly devoted to Him. Hence, ultimately devotion is the cause of salvation.[6]

[1] G.B., 1.1.1, p. 25, chap. 1; 3.4.8, pp. 236-37, chap. 3; 3.4.26, pp. 263-64, chap. 3; 3.4.33, pp. 271–273, chap. 3.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.8, pp. 236-37, chap. 3; 3.4.36, pp. 263-64, chap. 3; 3.4.33 pp. 271–273, chap. 3.

For the place of karma in the life of the three kinds of bhaktas, see below in loco.

[3] G.B., 3.3.48, p. 202, chap. 3. "Vidyā-śabdena jñānapūrvikā bhaktir ucyate."

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.48, p. 202, chap. 3; 3.3.50, p. 204, chap. 3; 3.4.35, p. 262, chap. 3.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.54, pp. 214–216, chap. 3.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 2.3.40, pp. 214-215, chap. 2; 3.3.54, pp. 214–217, chap. 3. SD.R., 1st pāda, p. 57.

The grace of the Lord leads to the direct intuition or vision of the Lord. Though the Lord is infinite and unmanifest, yet when He is pleased with His devotees, He manifests His own essential form to them through His mysterious power of grace.[1] This direct vision of the Lord means the perception of the Lord as an *external object*, i.e. perceiving the Lord in the very same way as one perceives an external object,[2] and this external vision of the Lord is absolutely necessary for unless there be such a vision, there can be no salvation.[3]

This direct vision of the Lord Himself is different from the vision of Him as an incarnation, when e.g. he descends on earth as Rāma or Kṛṣṇa and so on. The former is the vision of Him as free from māyā or contact with matter, the latter is the vision of Him as enveloped in māyā. The former can be gained only when the gross and the subtle bodies are destroyed through Brahma-vidyā, the latter can be gained in the present life through great merit. Hence, the former alone leads to final emancipation, the latter only to heavenly joys [4]

Thus, we conclude that the successive sādhanas are as follows:— The first thing is to keep company with good and righteous men and to serve them and to perform one's own duties in a purely disinterested spirit.[5] By such company and serving, there arises the knowledge of one's own self and of the supreme self. This two-fold knowledge produces vairāgya on the one hand, prema or bhakti on the other.

When bhakti becomes strong, the devotee becomes the beloved of the Lord and comes to be chosen by Him, and then finally, comes the direct vision of the Lord which is salvation.[6]

Thus:—Sat-saṅga and niṣkāma-karmas → jñāna → vairāgya and prema or bhakti → bhagavat-prasāda and varaṇa → sakṣātkāra and mukti.

There are certain auxiliaries which help the attainment of salvation, viz.:—

1. Guru-bhakti or worshipping the spiritual teacher as a God and Guru-prasāda or the consequent grace of the spiritual teacher. The Lord cannot be reached by the mere study of the Veda, but the kindly

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[1] G.B., 3.2.27.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.49, introduc., p. 203, chap. 3.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.48-49, pp. 202-203, chap. 3.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.53, pp. 211-212, chap. 3.

[5] See the exception in the case of the nirapekṣa bhaktas, under "Kinds of Bhaktas".

[6] G.B., 3.3.54, p. 217, chap. 3.

glance of the preceptor is absolutely necessary, for salvation depends upon the favour of the preceptor in imparting the means of reaching Brahman to the disciple.[1]

But although the grace of guru is absolutely necessary, yet one must not fall into the mistake of supposing that it is all-sufficient, for supreme devotion to the Lord, śravana, manana and the rest too are no less necessary.[2]

Thus, Baladeva definitely rejects gurūpasatti—which consists in relying on the preceptor and preceptor alone—as an independent and self-sufficient sādhana.

2. Worship of good and holy men as gods and the consequent grace of these Holy ones. If a man has the good fortune to obtain the grace of good and holy men, he obtains the grace of the Lord too.[3]

3. Visiting sacred places and not abusing the worshippers of the Lord and so on.[4]

Devotion, as we have seen, is generated by the knowledge of the supremely glorious attributes of the Lord.[5] The following kinds of knowledge more specially help the rise and growth of devotion :—

1. The knowledge that the Lord is possessed of inconceivable powers and is the substratum of all paradoxical and contradictory attributes,[6] instead of detracting from His greatness, strengthens the love of the devotee towards Him, and the devotion for the Lord is increased by such contemplation on His contradictory attributes.[7]

2. The knowledge of the great contrast and difference between the Lord and the individual soul helps the rise of devotion. Devotion for the Lord becomes natural and easy when we contemplate the greatness of His nature and attributes and our own insignificance.[8]

3. The knowledge that the Lord is the Inner self of all and not an external object, generates devotion for Him, for if He were as easily attainable as an external object like a jar and the rest, then there could have been no devotion for Him.[9]

[1] G.B., 3.3.44, p. 192, chap. 3.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 2.2.45, p. 193, chap. 3.
[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.51, pp. 206–208, chap. 3. P.R., 8th prameya, verse 1, p. 113.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.51, pp. 206-207, chap. 3.
[5] See above.
[6] See above.
[7] G.B., 3.2.13, p. 58, chap. 3.
[8] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.22, p. 76, chap. 3.
[9] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.23, introduc., p. 76, chap. 3.

4. The knowledge that the bliss of the Lord is the highest, naturally generates devotion for Him, for there could be no devotion, for one who is possessed of only limited and transitory bliss.[1]

5. The knowledge that the Lord is the Highest Being is an essential cause of devotion for Him, for there can be no devotion for a Lord from whom there is a still higher.[2]

6. The knowledge that the Lord, as all-pervading, is near the devotee, encourages devotion for Him, for if the Lord were not near, but a far-off Deity, the devotee would have naturally become discouraged and would have despaired of reaching Him, which would have resulted in a decrease of his devotion for Him.[3]

7. The knowledge that the Lord is the giver of fruits softens and encourages the devotee and helps the rise of devotion, for if the Lord did not give rewards of action, or gave inadequate rewards, He would have been considered as a cold, callous and unjust person, so that no devotion would have arisen for Him.[4]

(*b*) *Modes and kinds of bhakti.*

There are mainly nine modes of devotion:—

1. Listening to the recitation of the name of the Lord. (śravaṇa.)
2. Singing it to himself. (kīrtana.)
3. Remembering it always. (smaraṇa.)
4. Serving the Lord humbly. (pāda-sevana.)
5. Worshipping Him. (arcana.)
6. Saluting Him. (vandana.)
7. Treating Him as a Master. (dāsya.)
8. Treating Him as a Friend. (sakhya.)
9. Self-surrender. (ātma-nivedana.)

Every one of these nine modes has full efficacy and leads to salvation.[5]

[1] G.B., 3.2.32, introduc., p. 90, chap. 3.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.37, introduc., p. 95, chap. 3.
[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.38, introduc., 97, chap. 3.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.39, introduc., p. 100, chap. 3.
[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.32, pp. 164-165, chap. 3.
Cf. Bhāgavata-purāṇa, 7.5.23:—

"Śravaṇaṃ kīrtanaṃ Viṣṇoh smaraṇaṃ pāda-sevanam,
Arcanaṃ dāsyaṃ vandanaṃ sakhyaṃ ātma-nivedanam."

An objection may be raised here:—

Devotion has been defined as immediate intuition or realisation.[1] But only one form of devotion—viz. meditation, may be said to be such an immediate intuition, while the other forms, viz. worship, muttering of prayers, etc., cannot be said to be so, because they involve activities of the body, speech and so on.

The reply to this objection is as follows:—

Devotion is the consciousness of the bliss-giving power of the Lord (hlādinī-śakti),[2] i.e. it is the consciousness of intense joy. It leads the devotee to be united with the Lord through love. This being the case, even the physical activities of the devotee (who is united with the Lord), viz. his worship, etc., become sources of intense joy to Him, thence they also become immediate realisation of the Lord. That is, just as the body of the Lord, whose essence consists of pure bliss and intelligence is all-joy throughout, and every one of His limbs—His nails, His hair, etc.—is made up of bliss, so every activity of the devotee—physical or otherwise—is a direct perception of the Lord. And, we must not question how physical activities can be direct realisations, but we must accept it on the authority of Scripture.[3]

The attributes of the Lord, as we have seen, are of two kinds—viz. majestic and sweet. Now, corresponding to these two kinds, there are two different kinds of devotion, viz. vidhi-bhakti or devotion of fear and ruci-bhakti or devotion of love. The former is generated by the knowledge of His supreme might and majesty, the latter by that of His infinite beauty and sweetness and either of these leads to salvation.[4]

The nine modes of devotion, mentioned above, may be brought under either of these two kinds, i.e. there may be śravaṇa of the Lord as majestic or as sweet and so on.[5]

[1] See above.

[2] G.B., 3.4.12, p. 247, chap. 3. "Hlādinī-sāra-samavetasamvid-rūpā bhaktih." SD.R., 1st pāda, p. 60.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.12, p. 247, chap. 3.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.9, introduc., pp. 156–158, chap. 3.

For further accounts—see below for a detailed exposition, see SD.R., 2nd pāda, pp. 88–107.

[5] P.R., 8th prameya, verse 4, p. 121.

"Navadhā bhaktir vidhi-ruci-pūrvā dvividhā bhavet", etc.

(c) *Kinds of upāsanā.*

The Lord, as we have seen, has an infinite number of forms, thence there is an infinite number of ways of meditating on Him, and these meditations are different from one another.[1] Thus, the Lord may be meditated on as Kṛṣṇa, Rāma, Nṛsiṃha, Naranārāyaṇa, Fish, Tortoise and so on.[2]

The Svaniṣṭha devotees as we shall see,[3] try to meditate on *all* the forms of the Lord. But such a procedure is not to be encouraged for three main reasons, viz. first, because it is impossible, for none can possibly meditate on *all* the forms of the Lord, possessed as He is of infinite inconceivable forms;[4] secondly, because it involves an unnecessary distraction of thought and results in a general devotion for all form, but a deep devotion for none;[5] thirdly, because it is unnecessary, since meditation on any *one* form is sufficient to lead to salvation.[6]

Hence the correct procedure is the procedure of the ekāntin devotees, i.e. to choose one particular form only, and *stick to that form* throughout. And, this choice of one particular form is determined by one's preceptor and the order of good men with whom one is brought up.[7]

These nitya-pūjās, the sole object of which is the realisation of Brahman, differ from the kāmya-pūjās which aim at gaining, not Brahman, but some other particular fruit like fame or fortune, etc. With regard to these latter kinds of pūjās, one is at liberty to worship any form and change from one form to another as suits the case; e.g. the worshipper of the Nṛsiṃha-form may worship other forms for obtaining particular ends. But the nitya-pūjās must never be changed, as pointed out above but must remain the same and uniform throughout. Even when one who practices nitya-pūjā is in need of some lower kāmya objects, he must ask his own God for it, but never have recourse to the worship of any other form.[8]

There are two eternally perfect paths of meditation on the attributes of the Lord, viz. the path of vidhi-bhakti and the path of

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G.B., 3.3.60, p. 225, chap. 3.

Op. cit., 3.3, introduc., pp. 106–108, chap. 3.

See below under "Kinds of Bhaktas".

G.B., 3.3.9, p. 124, chap. 3.

Op. cit., 3.3.8, p. 123, chap. 3. See below under "Kinds of Bhaktas".

Op. cit., 3.3.61, p. 266, chap. 3.

Op. cit.

[8] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.62, pp. 227–230, chap. 3.

ruci-bhakti. From the highest companions of the Lord—viz. the eternally freed souls, down to the lowest mortal on earth, everyone must follow either of these two paths, i.e. meditate on either God, the Majestic, or on God, the Sweet. And as either of these leads to salvation, the devotee is at perfect liberty to follow any of them.[1]

But although both these ways of meditation lead to salvation, yet ruci-bhakti is superior to vidhi-bhakti, for the simple reason that the Lord being all love and all sweetness Himself, the devotion of love and sweetness is more pleasing to Him than the devotion of fear and majesty. Hence, the devotee following the path of ruci-bhakti by his steady and selfless devotion brings the Lord under his control, as it were; for when he, out of his infinite love for the Lord, surrenders and offers himself to Him, He in His turn, being pleased with him, gives Himself to him, manifests His own infinite sweetness to Him, and makes it possible for him to experience His sweetness fully. The Lord is, of course, conquered by any kind of devotion, yet devotees following the path of ruci-bhakti, conquer Him more easily and fully than the other kind. Hence ruci-bhakti is the highest of all kinds of devotion.[2]

The Lord is to be meditated on as accompanied by Śrī, His eternal consort.[3]

Besides meditating on the various attributes of the Lord, the devotee should meditate on the various limbs of the Lord, accompanied by appropriate gestures, i.e. on His smiling face, compassionate eyes, etc.[4]

The different forms of meditation lead to different forms of realisation. The universal rule is that as one meditates on the Lord, so he obtains or realises Him.[5] Hence the devotee sees or realises the Lord as possessed of those attributes only, with which he has so long invested Him in his meditations, and not as possessed of other qualities. Thus, he who meditates on the Lord as Sweet and Beautiful sees Him as such in salvation; while he who meditates on Him as Mighty and Majestic sees Him as such.[6] Hence, the visions of the Lord differ in accordance with the attitudes of the devotees, and the

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[1] G.B., 3.3.29-30, pp. 158–160, chap. 3.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.31, pp. 161–162, chap. 3.
SDR., 2nd pāda, pp. 104–42.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.42, p. 188, chap. 3.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.63–68, pp. 230–232, chap. 3.

[5] Cf. Chānd., 3.14.1.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 3.2.35-36, pp. 94-95, chap. 3; 3.3.56, p. 221, chap. 3.

same Lord appears in different aspects to different devotees, just as the same light of a lamp appears different when it falls on different parts of a temple, viz. on a crystalline surface, or on a wall embedded with rubies, etc.; or just as the same air passing through different musical instruments, viz. flute, conch-shell, etc. produce different sounds.[1] There is thus a difference in the state of salvation owing to the difference of devotion,[2] i.e. a difference among the freed themselves owing to their different sentiments.[3]

(*d*) *Kinds of bhaktas.*

There are, broadly, two kinds of devotees, viz. svaniṣṭha and ekāntin. The latter are, again of two kinds—viz. pari-niṣṭha and nirapekṣa. The svaniṣṭhas are Universalists, i.e. they meditate on *all* forms of the Lord and always coalesce in their meditations all the attributes of the Lord, found in every form. But the ekāntins, viz. the pari-niṣṭhas and the nirapekṣas, are exclusionists, i.e. they do not meditate on all forms of the Lord, although they know very well that the Lord has innumerable forms; but they choose *one* particular form only, and meditate on that alone. Thus, their love is not universal[4] but limited, e.g. the exclusive worshipper of the Kṛṣṇa-form does not combine, in his meditation, the form sacred to the worshipper of the Nṛsiṃha-form, viz. the flowing mane, the gaping jaw, the terrible teeth and so on; just as the exclusive worshipper of the Nṛsiṃha-form does not meditate on the lute and cane of Kṛṣṇa, nor on His beauty and sweetness, so dear to the devotee of Kṛṣṇa.[5] But the svaniṣṭhas meditate on these different attributes of the different forms,

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[1] G.B., 3.3.52, p. 209, chap. 3; 3.2.35, p. 94, chap. 3.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.52, p. 209, chap. 3.

[3] P.R., 6th prameya, verse 3, p. 105.

"Śāntādyā rati-paryyantā ye bhāvāḥ pañca kīrtitāḥ
Tair devaṃ smaratāṃ pumsāṃ tāratamyaṃ mitho matam."

The five sentiments are the five degrees of devotion, each a little higher than the preceding one: (1) Śānta or tranquil meditation on the Lord (Śrīkṛṣṇa-niṣṭha-buddhivṛttitā); (2) Dāsya, or active service of the Lord (sevā); (3) Sakhya, or a feeling of personal friendship with the Lord (niḥsambhramatā); (4) Vātsalya, or filial affection for the Lord (sneha); and (5) Mādhuryya or feeling of sweetness the highest stage of emotional development (ruci-bhakti) (asaṅga-saṅga-dānena sukhotpādanam). *Vide* "Prabhā" ṭīkā on P.R., p. 105.

Cf. Harivyāsadeva above.

[4] G.B., 3.3, introduc., pp. 108-109, chap. 3.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.8, p. 122, chap. 3.

in a succession of time, just as one sees different hues in the prism at different times.[1]

The ekāntin is superior to the svaniṣṭha, because his devotion, being exclusive, is deeper and more absorbing, and as such higher than that of the Svaniṣṭha. The ekāntin thus has a deep, one-pointed love and devotion for one particular form, while the svaniṣṭha has a general love for all forms, but a deep love for none.[2]

The respective duties of the three classes of devotees are as follows:—

1. The svaniṣṭhas belong to the order of householders. They faithfully discharge the duties incumbent on their own castes and stages of life with a view to attaining vidyā [3] since in their case, the rise of vidyā depends on two sets of qualifications, viz. physical or external, such as, the performance of sacrifices, the practice of charity, penance, etc.; and moral or internal, such as, self-control, dispassion, endurance, etc.[4]

But when the svaniṣṭhas, thus obtain vidyā through the proper performance of the duties incumbent on their castes and stages of life, they do not give up karma, but go on performing them in order to increase the already obtained vidyā.[5] The second object, which leads them to perform karmas even after the origin of vidyā, is their desire to go to heaven and experience its varieties.[6] But these karmas of the enlightened svaniṣṭhas are not to be confused with the ordinary kāmya-karmas of ordinary men, for the Svaniṣṭhas do not wish to enjoy heavenly pleasures, etc., but their going to heaven and experiencing its varieties are also to serve the Lord and study the works of the Lord as found there. The Svaniṣṭhas really go to the Lord, and it is only as an incident that they go to heaven, and see its objects. Heaven, thus, is no more than a halting stage in their continuous progress towards the world of Brahman. Just as a man, while going to a village,

[1] G.B., 3.3, introduc., p. 108, chap. 3; 3.3.7, p. 121, chap. 3.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.3.8, 9, pp. 123-124, chap. 3.

"Svaniṣṭha-bhakter ekānti-bhaktir gāḍhā-veśād valīyasī," 3.3.8, p. 123; 3.3.61.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 25, chap. 1; 3.4, introduc., p. 234, chap. 3. For the definition of "vidyā", see above.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.26-27, pp. 263–267, chap. 3.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.32-33, p. 271, chap. 3.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 3.4, introduc., p. 234, chap. 3; 3.4.33, pp. 271-272, chap. 3.

may casually touch the grass on the roadside, so the svaniṣṭhas, incidentally experience the joys of heaven, while going to the Lord.[1]

Thus, two factors co-operate in leading the svaniṣṭhas to heaven, viz.: (*a*) the merit of the works performed by them after the rise of vidyā, and (*b*) the works which have already begun to bear fruits before the rise of vidyā. Leaving these two sorts of works, vidyā burns up all other karmas of the svaniṣṭhas.[2]

The fact is that the power of vidyā being supreme, vidyā *can* burn to ashes *all* works whatsoever, even those which have begun to bear fruits, but does not do so in deference to the will of the Lord. The Lord wishes that the enlightened devotee should continue his earthly existence a little longer, so that he may be a living example to mankind, and spread His glory in the world. Hence, the devotee, who has harmonised his will to the will of the Lord, allows his prārabdha karmas to go on producing effects. That is, he allows vidyā to singe his prārabdha karmas, but not to reduce them to ashes. His prārabdha karmas are just like a piece of half-burnt cloth, which retains its texture and looks like a piece of cloth, but which falls to pieces at the slightest touch. Dressed in such prārabdha karmas, the devotee goes on carrying on his duties in accordance with the will of the Lord.[3]

2. The pariniṣṭhas too belong to the order of householders and they too perform, with equal faith and zeal all the duties incumbent on their castes and stages of life but not with a view to going to heaven in order to see the wonderful works of the Lord there, but simply for the sake of society and the good of humanity, i.e. for setting examples before others to follow.[4]

Besides the duties mentioned above, the pariniṣṭhas have to perform the bhāgavata-dharmas or duties of meditation, etc., out of love for the Lord.[5]

Of these two classes of duties, the bhāgavata-dharmas are by far the more important ones for the pariniṣṭhas. Their primary duty is to worship the Lord and this they can never omit. The other kinds

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[1] G.B., 3.4.33, pp. 272-273, chap. 3.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.33, pp. 272-273, chap. 3.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.16, pp. 251-252, chap. 3; 3.4.52, p. 304, chap. 3; 4.1.15, pp. 21-22, chap. 4.

Note the exception in the case of the nirapekṣas.

[4] G.B., 1.1.1, p. 25, chap. 1; 3.4, introduc., p. 234, chap. 3; 3.4.34, introduc., p. 274, chap. 3.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.34, introduc., p. 274, chap. 3.

of duties, on the other hand, are to be performed by them in their leisure moments after they have duly performed their bhāgavata-dharmas, and may even be altogether omitted. And this omission of these duties does not incur any sin on their part, since it is not due to any voluntary neglect of duty, but only to their being absorbed in the worship, etc., of the Lord.[1]

3. The nirapekṣas (such as Gārgī) do not belong to the order of householders, or to any order, but are sanyāsins or hermits. These dispassionate sages are ever immersed in meditation, uninfluenced by anything else and totally indifferent to worldly life.[2] They are not required to perform any duties incumbent on castes, etc., to gain vidyā because owing to their proper performance of all the duties like truth, austerity, prayer and the rest, they are born in this life with their minds already purified and fit for vidyā. The sense is: A man who has duly discharged the prescribed duties in his previous life dies before the actual origin of vidyā. Hence, in his next birth, his mind is already fit for vidyā and he is able to obtain full and perfect vidyā by simply coming into contact with holy men. Thus, the company of the good is all that is required for the rise of vidyā in the case of the nirapekṣas.[3]

The nirapekṣas, belonging to no stage of life, are superior to the svaniṣṭhas and the pariniṣṭhas, belonging to the stage of householders, for the condition of a non-householder is a better means of acquiring vidyā, and the nirapekṣas are devoted to the Lord, heart and soul, with no other distraction.[4]

The nirapekṣas are never in danger of falling off from their state of devotion and meditation, and be attracted by the life of a householder, because their senses are completely devoted to the Lord alone, so much so that they never feel attracted to anything else, and also because all desires are completely destroyed in them, except the desire for the Lord.[5] They desire only to worship the Lord, and faith is the only enjoyment they crave for just as a hungry man craves for food.[6]

Although the nirapekṣas perform no karmas, as the svaniṣṭhas do, yet vidyā by itself carries them to heaven for two purposes—viz. first, for testing whether they have a true vairāgya or disinterested

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[1] G.B., 3.4.34-35, pp. 274–276, chap. 3; 3.4.22, pp. 258-259, chap. 3.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.38-39, pp. 280–282, chap. 3.
[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.38-39, pp. 280–282, chap. 3.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.39, p. 281, chap. 3.
[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.40, pp. 283-284, chap. 3.
[6] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.42, p. 286, chap. 3.

spirit, or are fascinated by heavenly delights; and secondly, for proclaiming to all the inhabitants of heaven their unselfish love and devotion.[1] The nirapekṣas never desire for heavenly enjoyments, nor even the offices of world-rulers like Indra and the rest.[2]

The nirapekṣas are special favourites of the Lord. Through the special grace of the Lord, they obtain vidyā at once simply through sat-saṅga,[3] and through the grace of the Lord, they, though in the midst of the distractions of the world are yet outside its entanglements.[4] Further, they have to undergo no anxieties for their worldly wants, because the Lord Himself supplies their every want.[5]

It has been pointed out above that the prārabdha-karmas of the enlightened devotees continue to produce effects through the wish of the Lord, in order that they may teach mankind. But an exception is made in the case of some Nirapekṣas who become free as soon as they obtain vidyā, without having to undergo the consequences of their prārabdha-karmas.[6] Through the will of the Lord, who is impatient of their delay in coming to Him, yet wishes to uphold the strict principle of justice that the fruits of karmas must be always experienced, the good and bad prārabdha-karmas of those nirapekṣas go to their friends and foes respectively who experience their consequences.[7]

When the nirapekṣas thus obtain vidyā they discard their gross and subtle bodies and get a divine body called "prasāda-vapuṣ" by means of which they enjoy all pleasures along with the Lord.[8]

As a special concession to the nirapekṣas, the Lord Himself comes down to fetch them to Him, being impatient of delay, and does not leave the task to the troop of conducting divinities of light, day and the rest, as He does in the case of other devotees.[9]

Now, if we compare Baladeva's theory of sādhanas with that of Nimbārka, we find that both agree in holding that karma is but an *indirect* means to salvation, assisting only the rise of knowledge, but not directly bringing about its fruit, viz. salvation. They also agree in holding that knowledge and devotion mutually involve each other:

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[1] G.B., 3.4.33, p. 273, chap. 3.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.41, p. 285, chap. 3.
[3] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.38, p. 280, chap. 3.
[4] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.43, pp. 287-288, chap. 3.
[5] *Op. cit.*, 3.4.44, pp. 289-290, chap. 3.
[6] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.17, introduc., pp. 25-26, chap. 4; 4.1.17, pp. 26–28, chap. 4.
[7] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.17-18, pp. 27–29, chap. 4.
[8] *Op. cit.*, 4.1.19, p. 30, chap. 4.
[9] *Op. cit.*, 4.3.16, pp. 80-81, chap. 4.

the former leads to the latter, devotion is not blind, but based on knowledge. Further, Baladeva agrees with Nimbārka in taking self surrender too to be an independent sādhana, although he does not consider it in details and regards it as a mode of devotion.[1] But unlike Nimbārka, he rejects, as we have seen [2] surrender to a preceptor as an *independent* means, for he expressly points out that although devotion to the preceptor and the consequent grace of the guru are *absolutely necessary* elements in salvation, yet they are never the *sole* elements. Devotion to the Lord and one's own efforts consisting in śravaṇa, manana and the rest too are absolutely necessary,—devotion to the preceptor cannot by *itself* lead to salvation.

According to Nimbārka, each of the Upaniṣadic vidyās, viz. Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, Madhu-vidyā, Dahara-vidyā and the rest leads to salvation, but Baladeva does not mention any of these vidyās, but emphasises, instead, meditations on the different forms of the Lord, regarding which Nimbārka is silent.

Further, although Nimbārka holds that the Lord has two different aspects, viz. majestic and sweet, yet he does not speak of the two separate kinds of meditations on the Lord as the majestic and the Lord as the sweet, as Baladeva so emphatically and repeatedly does.

Although Baladeva holds that meditation on any form leads to salvation, yet he thinks that the Kṛṣṇa-form is the best of all, since Kṛṣṇa is the most perfect form of the Lord, and the Lord, he points out, is to be meditated on as accompanied by Srī (who in her highest manifestation is Rādhā). Here Baladeva agrees with Nimbārka, who also recommends the joint worship of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa as the best form of worship.

Both Nimbārka and Baladeva emphasise mādhuryya-pradhānā bhakti, i.e. a sweet and most intimate relation of love between the Lord and His devotees, and not a mere relation of awe.

While Baladeva takes the order of a non-householder (anāśramin) to be higher than that of householders (āśramins) and takes the non-householders (nirapekṣas) to be special favourites of the Lord, Nimbārka is of a different opinion, viz. that everyone should belong to one or other of the stages of life, otherwise one cannot be entitled to Brahma-vidyā.

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[1] See above "Ātma-nivedana" or self-surrender to the Lord is regarded as one of the nine modes of devotion and as leading to release by itself.

[2] See above.

Another peculiar point in Baladeva's system is that vidyā is taken to be capable of burning up all karmas, even those which have begun to bear fruits. But other commentators agree in holding that vidyā cannot destroy these prārabdha-karmas—which can be destroyed by retributive experience alone. Even the Advaitins are forced to admit it, although it has made their view open to much criticism—viz. how can the effect (viz. the body—the product of karmas) persist even when its cause (viz. ajñāna) is removed.

Nimbārka does not speak of the three kinds of devotees—Svaniṣṭha, etc., as Baladeva does.

(8) *Rituals.*[1]

The devotee must be purified by the Pañca-saṃskāras—which are exactly similar to those admitted by the school of Nimbārka.[2]

The devotee should live in places like Mathurā and the rest. He should fast on the Lord's Day, on the eleventh day of the moon (ekādaśī). If it does not commence on the break of dawn (aruṇodaya), he should observe it on the next day. Similarly, he should observe the birthday festival of the Lord on the eighth day of the moon (Janmāṣṭamī), but if the eighth day of the moon does not commence with sunrise (sūryyodaya) he should observe it on the next day.

Finally, the devotee should avoid with care the ten sorts of blasphemy or Nāma-aparādha, viz.:—

1. Censuring holy men.
2. Meditating on other deities like Śiva and the rest as independent deities, i.e. uttering their names in presence of Viṣṇu.
3. Showing contempt for one's preceptor or for other persons fit to be revered.
4. Speaking ill of Scripture and other works which are in conformity with it.
5. Disbelieving the efficacy of the sacred Name of the Lord in removing all sins.
6. Trying to explain the scriptural statements regarding the efficacy of the sacred Name by other methods, i.e. as mere eulogy.

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[1] P.R., 8th prameya, verses 1–8, pp. 117–125.

[2] For details, see "Prabhā" ṭīkā on P.R., p. 122. See below under "Ritualistic Doctrine of the School of Nimbarka".

7. Wilful commission of sins on the idea that the mere utterance of the sacred Name afterwards will be able to wash them off.
8. Thinking that any other good work, such as charity, etc., can be equal to the utterance of the Sacred Name.
9. Teaching the Name to a disbeliever.
10. Not loving the Name, even after hearing its glory.

Now, if we compare this doctrine with the ritualistic doctrine of the school of Nimbārka, we find that there is not much difference between the two. However, so far as the determination of the tithis for the observance of religious vows and festivals goes, Baladeva says, as we have seen if the ekādaśī-tithi does not begin with the *break of dawn* (aruṇodaya) one should not observe the ekādaśī-vrata on that day, but on the next day. But according to the followers of Nimbārka, if the tithi does not begin with *midnight*, one should observe the vow the next day. Again, according to Baladeva, if the aṣṭamī-tithi does not begin with *sunrise*, one should not observe the Janmāṣṭamī-vrata on that day, but according to the followers of Nimbārka, if the tithi does not begin with *midnight*, one should, as before, perform the Janmāṣṭamī on the next day.[1]

(9) *Conclusion.*

Thus, we find that from the point of view of philosophy, the main difference between Nimbārka and Baladeva lies in their conceptions of the reconcilableness or otherwise of difference and non-difference. While the system of Nimbārka is more philosophical, that of Baladeva is more religious. From the point of view of religion, however, there is not much difference between them, except the sectarian ones, since both are infused with the same spirit of emotion, ecstasy and intimate association between the Lord and the individual soul.

V. RÉSUMÉ.

(i) Points of dissimilarity between Nimbārka and Rāmānuja.

Rāmānuja.	*Nimbārka.*
(1) The Highest Reality is Viṣṇu. No mention of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā.	The Highest Reality is Kṛṣṇa, accompanied by Rādhā.

[1] See below under "Some of the religious observances and festivals of the sect of Nimbārka".

Rāmānuja.	*Nimbārka.*
(2) The sentient souls are attributes or modes of the Lord.	They are powers of the Lord, and not His attributes.
(3) The non-sentient substance is an attribute or mode of the Lord.	The non-sentient substance is a power of the Lord, and not His attribute.
(4) Difference qualifies non-difference and is as such subordinate to it. More emphasis on the principle of identity.	Difference and non-difference are precisely on the same level, none being subordinate to the other. Equal emphasis on both the principles.
(5) Bhakti means continuous meditation.	It means intense love.
(6) The relation between God and man is a distant relation of reverence.	The relation between them is an intimate relation of love.
(7) More intellectual.	More religious.

Points of similarity between Nimbārka and Rāmānuja.

(1) Brahman is a personal God, endowed with infinite auspicious attributes and powers and free from all defects, the one identical material and efficient cause of the universe.

(2) The souls are knowledge by nature, knowers, doers, enjoyers, atomic, innumerable, dependent and real in bondage as in release.

(3) The non-sentient substance is of three kinds, matter, pure matter and time; and is real and dependent on the Lord.

(4) Difference and non-difference are both real.

(5) Meditation, based on knowledge and accompanied by proper actions, is the means to salvation.

(6) Salvation is the full development of the nature of the individual soul, and its attaining similarity with the Lord. There is no jīvan-mukti.

(7) The grace of the Lord is an essential condition of salvation.

(ii) POINTS OF DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN NIMBĀRKA AND BHĀSKARA.

Bhāskara.	*Nimbārka.*
(1) The Highest Reality is Brahman or Īśvara, not a personal God of love and grace. No consort of Brahman mentioned.	The Highest Reality is Kṛṣṇa, a personal God of love and grace, accompanied by Rādhā.
(2) Emphasises the formless non-different causal state of Brahman,—with no internal differences even,—over and above His effected state as having a form and different-non-different from the universe.	Does not admit of such a purely non-different form of Brahman, who has *always* internal differences.
(3) Does not speak of incarnations and rejects the vyūhas.	Accepts incarnations and vyūhas.
(4) The soul is different-non-different from Brahman during mundane state, but non-different from Him during salvation.	The soul is *always* different-non-different from Brahman, in salvation too.
(5) The soul's state of being an agent, an enjoyer and atomic are not natural and everlasting, but due to limiting adjuncts and temporary.	It is natural and everlasting.
(6) Does not speak of the aprākṛta and time as species of the non-sentient substance.	Does so.
(7) The world is different-non-different from Brahman during creation, but non-different from Him during dissolution.	The world is *always* different—non-different from Brahman.

Bhāskara.	*Nimbārka.*
(8) Difference is due to limiting adjunct, non-difference is natural.	Difference and non-difference are equally natural.
(9) Action is a direct means to salvation.	It is but an indirect means to salvation.
(10) No grace of the Lord is required for salvation.	Grace of the Lord is an essential pre-requisite of salvation.
(11) No place for a relation of love and companionship.	Emphasises such a relation.
(12) Salvation means the absolute absorption of the soul in Brahman.	The soul retains its individuality even in salvation.
(13) Admits two kinds of salvation, viz. immediate and gradual.	Admits one kind of salvation, viz. immediate.

Points of similarity between Nimbārka and Bhāskara.

(1) Brahman is endowed with attributes and powers and is the one identical material and efficient cause of the universe.

(2) The souls and matter are the effects, parts and powers of the Lord, and are real and eternal.

(3) They are different-non-different from the Lord (during mundane existence).

(4) Both difference and non-difference are real (during mundane existence).

(5) Knowledge and meditation are direct means to salvation.

(6) Salvation is a posite acquisition, a positive state of bliss; and there is no jīvan-mukti.

(iii) POINTS OF DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN NIMBĀRKA AND ŚRĪKAṆṬHA,

Śrīkaṇṭha.	*Nimbārka.*
(1) The Highest Reality is Śiva, accompanied by Umā.	The Highest Reality is Kṛṣṇa, accompanied by Rādhā.
(2) Viṣṇu is subordinate to Śiva.	Not so.

Śrīkaṇṭha.	*Nimbārka.*
(3) Does not speak of incarnations and rejects the vyūhas.	Accepts incarnations and vyūhas.
(4) The souls and the world are attributes of the Lord.	They are powers and not attributes of the Lord.
(5) The freed soul is not under the control of the Lord.	The soul is *ever* under the control of the Lord, even when freed.
(6) Does not speak of the aprākṛta and time as species of the non-sentient substance.	Does so.
(7) Non-difference and difference are both real, yet difference qualifies non-difference and is as such subordinate to it.	Difference and non-difference are both real and on the same level.
(8) There are two kinds of salvation, viz. immediate and gradual.	There is one kind of salvation, viz. immediate.
(9) Emphasises a relation of awe and reverence between God and man.	Emphasises a relation of love and companionship.
(10) Does not recognise prapatti and gurūpasatti as independent sādhanas.	Does so.
(11) Recommends meditation on Nārāyaṇa as the material cause.	Does not do so.

Points of similarity between Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha.

(1) Brahman, a personal God, is endowed with all auspicious attributes and powers, and free from all faults, and is the one identical material and efficient cause of the Universe.

(2) The souls are knowledge by nature, knowers, agents, enjoyers, atomic and innumerable and real in bondage as in release.

(3) The non-sentient substance is real and dependent on the Lord.

(4) Difference and non-difference are both real.

(5) Salvation implies the full development of the real nature of the soul and its attaining similarity with the Lord. There is no jīvan-mukti.

(6) Action is an indirect means to salvation, while meditation based on knowledge is the direct means.

(7) The grace of the Lord is an essential pre-requisite of salvation.

(iv) POINTS OF DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN NIMBĀRKA AND BALADEVA.

Baladeva.	*Nimbārka.*
(1) The Lord is identical with His attributes, body and city.	Not so.
(2) The Lord has no internal differences.	The Lord has always internal differences.
(3) Does not speak of the aprākṛta as a species of the non-sentient, but substitutes karma.	Admits the aprākṛta and not karma to be a species of the non-sentient.
(4) Difference and non-difference are real yet irreconcilable.	They are both real and reconcilable.
(5) Gurūpasatti is not an independent sādhana.	It is so.
(6) The order of an anāśramin is higher than that of an āśramin.	The order of an āśramin is the best of all.
(7) Vidyā can destroy even prārabdha-karmas.	It cannot do so.
(8) Does not speak of the meditations mentioned in the Upaniṣads as means to salvation.	Does so.
(9) Speaks of two distinct kinds of meditations—viz. meditation on God, the Sweet and God, the Majestic.	Does not do so.

Baladeva.	*Nimbārka.*
(10) Speaks of three classes of disciples, viz. svaniṣṭha, pariniṣṭha and nirapekṣa.	Does not do so.
(11) More religious.	More intellectual.

Points of similarity between Nimbārka and Baladeva.

(1) Brahman is Kṛṣṇa, accompanied by Rādhā, and endowed with all auspicious qualities and free from all defects. He is the one identical material and efficient cause of the Universe and manifests Himself in incarnations and vyūhas.

(2) The souls are knowledge by nature, knowers, agents, innumerable, atomic, dependent and real in bondage and release.

(3) The world is real and dependent on the Lord.

(4) Time is an eternal non-sentient substance.

(5) Salvation means the full development of the real nature of the soul and its attaining similarity with the Lord. There is no jīvan-mukti.

(6) Action is an indirect means to salvation, while meditation, based on knowledge, is the direct means.

(7) Self-surrender to the Lord is a direct means to salvation.

(8) A most intimate relation of love and companionship between God and man is emphasised.

(9) The grace of the Lord is an essential factor in salvation.

(10) Ritualistic doctrine similar on the whole.

VI. RITUALISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SCHOOL OF NIMBĀRKA.

(1) Initiation to the Mantra of the Lord (Dīkṣā), etc.

A Vaiṣṇava [1] must be initiated by his preceptor to the mantra of his sect. There are two kinds of Vaiṣṇavas, viz. sāmpradāyikas and asāmpradāyikas. The former learn the great truth, taught by the Lord Himself, directly from a pious and learned preceptor, who in his

[1] For the marks of a Vaiṣṇava, see Sv.S., 11th taraṅga, pp. 117ff. See below.

turn, has learnt it from a previous preceptor and so on. The latter do not have recourse to a preceptor and therefore, do not learn the truth direct but simply imitate the manners and customs of the former kinds of Vaiṣṇavas. Evidently, the former are far superior to the latter, and they alone get the fruit, viz. salvation. Hence, everyone who desires to attain salvation should approach a preceptor and be properly initiated by him.[1]

He must be initiated to the Viṣṇu-mantra, and not to the mantra of Brahmā, Śiva, or any other deity, for Viṣṇu-mantra is the best and the only efficacious one.[2]

Now, there are various kinds of Viṣṇu-mantras, of which the Gopāla-mantra of eighteen syllables [3] is the best.[4] Hence the devotee should be first initiated by Mukundaśaraṇa-mantra and then by the Gopāla-mantra of eighteen syllables.[5]

Men of four castes are to be initiated to the Gopāla-mantra without distinction, although a Śūdra and a woman are entitled only to a curtailed mantra of the Lord consisting of ten syllables.[6]

The devotee should approach his preceptor for initiation in the following manner:—

Having first properly performed his daily duties, such as saṃdhyā,[7] meditation and so on, he should prepare the pañca-gavyas or a mixture of the five products of the cow, viz. milk, sour milk, butter, the liquid and the solid excreta. He should first of all put some liquid excreta of the cow in a pot, reciting the Gāyatrī-mantra; with the recitation of prescribed mantras successively put in it some solid excreta of the cow, milk, sour milk and butter and finally the washings of the kuśa-grass; mix them all and drink the mixture with the utterance of 'Om'. This will purify him and destroy his sins.[8]

Next, he is to put on a new sacred thread.[9] He should first wash the threads in clean water, then rinse his mouth, practise breath-exercises and make the resolve to wear a new thread in order that he may be entitled to the performance of works enjoined in Scripture. After that he should take the threads in his hands, recite the Gāyatrī-

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[1] D.P., pp. 7-8. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

[3] Viz. "Klīṃ Kṛṣṇāya Govindāya Gopījana-vallabhāya svāhā". See K.D., 2nd paṭala, pp. 32–55.

[4] K.D., 2nd paṭala, pp. 32ff.; D.P., pp. 14-15; Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 14ff.

[5] D.P., pp. 15, 27. [6] *Op. cit.*, K.D., 1st paṭala, p. 3.

[7] See below under "Practical mode of worshipping the Lord the idol".

[8] D.P., pp. 16–18. [9] Of course, excluding a śūdra or a woman.

mantra over them ten times, hold them separately in his right hand with the utterance of two mantras and put them on one by one, rinsing his mouth each time and reciting the Gāyatrī-mantra as best as he can. The old threads are to be taken out with the recitation of mantras, placed on a clean spot for the time being and thrown into a river afterwards.[1]

Purified thus by the proper performance of the daily duties, by the drinking of the Pañca-gavyas and by the putting on of a new sacred thread, the devotee should now approach a preceptor, and be initiated by him to the holy mantra of the Lord. The successive stages of the process of initiation, viz. goptṛtva-varaṇa, ātmasāt-karaṇa, etc., have already been considered in details.[2]

A Vaiṣṇava has two-fold marks, viz. internal and external. His internal marks are dhyāna or meditation, bhakti or devotion and yajña or performance of sacrifices, preceded by his initiation to the Gopāla-mantra,[3] as pointed out above. Meditation and devotion have been already considered.[4] So only the third remains to be considered.

There are five kinds of yajñas or sacrifices, viz. ātma-yajña, japa-yajña, dravya-yajña, jñāna-yajña and yoga-yajña.[5]

1. The method of performing the ātma-yajña is as follows: Having risen early in the morning, washed his hands and feet, rinsed his mouth and bowed down to his preceptors, the devotee should eulogise the Lord and recite appropriate mantras, and afterwards renounce his own self and everything belonging to himself to the Lord, choosing Him as His Master, Father, Husband, Friend and All, and asking Him to make him His own absolutely. The rule is that one belonging to the first three classes should renounce and dedicate one's self to the Lord with the utterance of the three mantras, viz. "Om. I am he", the Mukunda-mantras stated in the Pañca-rātra and the mantra taught by Śrīnivāsa, viz. "All is yours, nothing is mine. Svāhā"; while one belonging to the fourth caste is to renounce one's self by reciting two mantras only.[6]

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[1] D.P., pp. 21-22.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 22ff. See above under Gurūpasatti. For the month suitable of the dīkṣā, see Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 8ff.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

[4] See above in Loco.

[5] S.R., pp. 111–114. Also, D.P., pp. 2-3.

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 112. We are not told which two mantras.

(2) The japa-yajña is prescribed thus: The devotee should bathe in the river, offer oblations of water to the Lord; on his return, wash his hands and feet, place a seat as enjoined and sit down on it. Then he should make obeisance to the successive spiritual teachers; meditate on the Lord the Mantra-mūrti Śabda-Brahman, who though one, yet appears as having parts through sound, just as the one air assumes five-fold forms in every man; and pray to Him as his Saviour. Next he should worship the Lord mentally with five Upacāras, or ingredients [1] and externally place the Idol on the throne and worship it with pādya,[2] arghya [3] and so on; practice breath-exercises; recite the mantra of eighteen syllables; and perform japa or mutter mantras as best as he can. After the japa, he should once more make obeisance to the previous teachers of the sect, rinse his mouth, bow down to the Mantra-mūrti, place Him in his heart, place the external Idol in the basket and finish.

(3) Dravya-yajña means worshipping the Lord by means of various kinds of dravyas or upacāras, i.e. ingredients such as flower, sandal-paste, lamp perfume, ornaments and so on, in accordance with Scripture and the practice of the sect.[4]

(4) Jñāna-yajña means discussing the meaning of texts like "Thou art that", etc. as stated by the teachers of the sect, and studying and teaching the Upaniṣads, the Brahma-sūtras, the Bhagavad-gītā and the rest.

(5) Yoga-yajña means controlling the mind by means of breath-exercises meditating on the Lord and His qualities.

The proper performance of any one of these five kinds of yajñas leads one to release. Hence the followers of the sect should daily perform one or two or three or all of them, just as they perform saṃdhyā [5] and the rest. Although those who perform the Ātma-yajña, have no more duties to perform, since they have had complete resort to the Lord, yet they should perform other kinds of yajñas too in order to teach mankind and obey the mandates of their sect.

So far for the internal marks of a Vaiṣṇava. The external marks of a Vaiṣṇava consist in putting on a garland of tulasī-beads, stamping

[1] Viz. sandal-paste, flowers, incense, lamp and offering of food, etc. D.P., introduc., p. 2.

[2] i.e. water for the washing of feet. [3] i.e. offering of food, etc.

[4] See below under "Practical mode of worshipping the Lord: the idol".

[5] *Op. cit.*, for details.

the marks of conch-shell, disc, etc. on the body and putting on the caste-mark or tilak on the forehead. No vaiṣṇava should omit to put on a garland of tulasī-beads which purifies his whole being and destroys all his sins. It should be put on over the sacred thread at all times and under every circumstance.[1] It should not be taken out even when one is answering the call of nature, or bathing or eating. He who bathes with the garland of tulsī-beads on his neck gets all the fruits of bathing in holy rivers, even though he may be bathing in an ordinary pond; and he who eats with this garland hanging on his neck gets all the fruits of an Aśva-medha sacrifice.[2]

The garland of tulasī-beads is to be first consecrated by the pañca-gavyas,[3] and offered to the Lord with flowers and perfume, and then worn on the neck.[4] The process of purifying the garland [5] is as follows: First the garland is to be thoroughly washed with the pañca-gavyas, mixed with the washings of the kuśa-grass. After that it is to be placed on an Aśvattha-leaf, and fifty letters, beginning with om, hrīm, am, ām, etc. are to be mentally appropriated [6] to it; and is to be besmeared with sandal-paste, and perfumed with incense together with the recitation of proper mantras. Further every bead of the garland too is to be consecrated with mantras. Finally the garland should be worshipped with five ingredients [7] and the devotee is to meditate on the Lord, mutter the mantra learnt from his preceptor, perform breath-exercise and place the garland on his head.[8]

The last two, viz. putting the signs of conch-shell, etc. and putting the tilaka are considered below in connection with the pañca-saṃskāras.

The pañca-saṃskāras or the five-fold purificatory ceremonies which make one fit for the service, etc. of the Lord are—tāpa, puṇḍra, nāma, mantra, and yāga.[9]

(1) Tāpa means putting on the marks of Viṣṇu's conch-shell, disc, club, and lotus on the body, either branding them on the skin with red-hot iron, or stamping them with gopī-candana or white clay.[10] The

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[1] D.P., pp. 46ff.; Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 40ff.

[2] Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 40–43.

[3] See above.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3rd taraṅga, p. 43.

[5] Mālā-saṃskāra-vidhi.

[6] Nyāsa.

[7] Viz. sandal-paste, etc. See above, footnote 1, p. 258.

[8] D.P., pp. 18-19.

[9] Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, p. 24; S.R., p. 140; G.M., p. 34.

[10] Gopī-candana is a species of white clay said to be brought from Dvārakā. *Vide* Svadhar. MS., Fol. 1; Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 31-32; S.R., p. 141; G.M., p. 35.

former is called 'tapta-mudrā', the latter 'śītala-mudrā'. The former is to be adopted in four places, viz. Naimiṣa, Mathurā, Dvāravatī and Sudarśanāśrama, the latter in other places.[1]

(2) Puṇḍra or ūrdhva puṇḍra means putting the tilaka or caste-mark, i.e. drawing two perpendicular lines on the forehead, with a spot in the middle. The lines must be drawn from the tip of the nose right to the end of the forehead. They are said to represent the temple of Hari, and the spot the place of Hari accompanied by Lakṣmī. Hence one should never omit to put on the spot in the middle of the two lines, since just as a temple is worthless, unless the Lord be in it, so the lines are of no value unless there be the spot between them.[2]

The puṇḍra is to be drawn with gopī-candana. But if it be not available, then it may be drawn with the clay from the shores of the Ganges, or with the clay from the tulasī-pot.[3]

The puṇḍra may be drawn by any of the four fingers, except the little one, but with different results. If it be drawn by the forefinger, then one attains salvation; if by the middle finger, long life; if by the third finger, objects of desire; and if by the thumb, prosperity.[4]

The puṇḍra is to be worn during the period of worship and oblation, and daily during morning and evening prayers.[5] If a man performs sacrifices, oblations to gods and forefathers, daily prayers, etc., or practises charity and the rest or studies Scripture without putting on the puṇḍra not only does he fail to obtain any fruit from these, but goes to hell as well.[6]

A Brahmin should put on twelve puṇḍras, a Kṣatriya, four, a vaiśya two, and a śūdra and a woman, one.[7]

The method of putting on the twelve puṇḍras is as follows: The first puṇḍra is to be put on the forehead with the mantra "Om, obeisance to Keśava", the second on the belly with the mantra "Om, obeisance to Nārāyaṇa", and in this manner the puṇḍra is to be put successively, on the breast, cavity of the throat, right side of the

[1] Sv.S., 3rd taraṅgā, pp. 32–40; D.P., pp. 47–49; S.R., p. 140; G.M., p. 34.
It is claimed by the disciples of Nimbārka that he was the first to institute the ceremony of 'tapta-mudrā' in Dvārakā in the Kali-yuga. See S.R., p. 124; Ā.C., p. 84.

[2] Svadhar. MS., Fol. 1; Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 25–28; cf. also D.P., pp. 48-49; S.R., pp. 141-142; G.M., p. 35.

[3] Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 30-31; S.R., p. 142; G.M., p. 35.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 3rd taraṅga, p. 29.

[5] *Op. cit.*

[6] *Op. cit.*

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

belly, right arm, right neck, left side of the belly, left arm, left neck, back and throat, with the mantras "Om, obeisance to Mādhava, Govinda, Viṣṇu, Madhusūdana, Trivikrama, Vāmana, Śrīdhara, Hṛṣīkeśa, Padmanābha, and Dāmodara" respectively.[1]

One should not put on a puṇḍra which is circular, horizontal or curved, or without any spot in the middle,[2] and should never use sandal-paste or ash for drawing it.[3]

(3) Nāma consists in giving the names of the Lord such as "Haridāsa" (servant of Hari) and so on to one's self, to one's children and disciples.[4]

(4) Mantra means learning and teaching the Viṣṇu-mantra handed down by the teachers of the sect.

(5) Yāga means worshipping and teaching the worship of the Lord and His idols and the rest.[5] The idols of the Lord may be made of stone, wood, metals, such as gold or copper, clay, mind, i.e. mentally conjured by deep and earnest meditation, or be of the form of Śālagrāma or the black sacred stone.[6]

Every true Vaiṣṇava should be consecrated by these five saṃskāras.

He should also perform the five-fold duties, viz. cleaning the temple of the Lord; collecting flowers, offerings and the like for Him; worshipping Him by scent and so on; and studying the hymns, etc. of the sect as taught by the preceptor.[7]

The following are some of the further duties of a Vaiṣṇava.[8]

He should guard the Gopāla-mantra and keep it secret with the same care as he keeps his body covered; revere his preceptor and other Vaiṣṇavas and obey their commands; honour the garlands and the rest which he may find in the temple of the Lord, put them on with the greatest respect and afterwards throw them into a river; at once leave the place where the preceptor is being spoken ill of; and remember the mantra, taught by his preceptor more specially in the morning,

[1] Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 28-29; D.P., p. 24; G.P., given in S.R., p. 8.

[2] Svadhar. M.S., Fol. 1; Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, p. 28.

[3] *Op. cit.*

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 28; S.R., p. 142; G.M., p. 35.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 3rd taraṅga, p. 24; G.M., p. 38.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 7th taraṅga, pp. 82ff.

[7] *Op. cit.*, 10th taraṅga, p. 108; Ā.C., footnote 1, p. 108. The five duties are: abhigamana, upādāna, ijyā, yoga and svādhyāya.

[8] D.P., pp. 35ff. See further details there.

and when he is in a foreign country, or is about to begin a journey or is making a donation. Further, he should wear new and clean clothes offered to the Lord; besmear his body with sandal-paste, keep a tuft of hair on his head; eat the food and betel-leaves supposed to be eaten by the Lord and drink the washings of His feet; worship the tulasī-plant and eat its leaves; finally if he should happen to see some wonderful workings of the Lord in dreams, he is to reveal them to his preceptor only and to none else.

The following are some of the prohibitions to which a Vaiṣṇava must adhere.[1]

He should not sleep in the evening; rinse his mouth standing; seat on the seat of his preceptor; precede, but follow him; touch even his shadow with his feet or cross it; omit to take the daily bath and perform the daily worship of the Lord; forget to stand in presence of the Lord and the preceptor; attempt to show off his learning to his preceptor; rinse his mouth or put on the caste-mark without uttering suitable mantras; and wear a blue dress. Further, he should not take intoxicating liquors, fish, meat, lentil, spinach and gourd,[2] and should not eat from a brass plate or from the leaf of a banyan tree[3]; spit in the temple of the Lord and enter there with shoes[4]; practise magical rites like hypnotism and so on; worship the Lord from a wooden seat; conduct the ceremony frivolously; talk indecently while engaged in the ceremony; offer scentless flowers, unconsecrated objects and stale food to the Lord; make obeisance with one hand; see Him at a time not prescribed; let the proper time of worship pass and mutter mantras without counting, and so on.

He should also avoid with care thirty-two kinds of sins.[5]

The practical mode of worshipping the Lord: the Idol.[6]

I. (1) The devotee should rise very early in the morning, remember the name of his preceptor, and the names of the Swan, the Four Kumāras, Nārada, Nimbārka, and twelve preceptors like Śrīnivāsa and the rest, and after that Lord Kṛṣṇa, reciting prescribed verses. He should bow down to the earth goddess and ask her to forgive the touch of his feet on her, and get down from the bed.[7]

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[1] D.P., pp. 39–41. See further details there.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 39. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 36. [4] *Op. cit.*
[5] Sv. S., 10th taraṅga, p. 109.
[6] *Op. cit.*, 9th taraṅga, pp. 97ff. [7] This is utthāpana-vidhi.

(2) Then he should go out to answer the call of nature, uttering suitable mantras, as enjoined by Scripture.[1]

(3) Next, he should brush his teeth, with a stick of khādira, karañja, kadamba, vaṭa (i.e. banyan), āmra (i.e. mango) or nimba tree. He should take up the stick, praying to the tree to give him long life, strength, fame, energy and so on; first rinse his mouth sixteen times; then brush his teeth with the stick; and finally, rinse his mouth sixteen times once more.[2]

(4) Next, he should go to the river for bath; first wash his hands and feet and rinse his mouth; then besmear himself with mud from head to feet and plunge into the water. He should look at the sun and pray to it to make the water holy for him; make the aṃkuśa-mudrā,[3] and pray to the seven holy rivers[4] to meet together in the water of that particular river; utter the principal mantra[5]; make kumbha-mudrā; and sprinkle himself with water eleven times. Then he should put on the caste-mark with water; rinse his mouth; offer libations of water thrice to the Lord; and get up.[6]

(5) On reaching the shore, he should consecrate his clothes by uttering the principal mantra, make dhenu-mudrā[7] and put them on.[8]

(6) After that, he should put on twelve tilaks,[9] and perform the saṃdhyā ceremony as follows: He should take some water in his right palm, cover it over with his left, consecrate it by uttering principal mantra and drink it. Then he should rinse his mouth three times, and again take some water in his right palm, cover it over with the left, consecrate it as before, put that water in his left palm and sprinkle his head with it. For the third time, he should take some water as before in his right palm, cover it with the left and consecrate it as before, and smell it with his right nostril. He should imagine that by his act of smelling the water has gone down into his body through the right nostril, has washed off all sins therein, and has again come

[1] This is śauca-vidhi. Vide also Sv. S., 6th taraṅga, pp. 70ff.

[2] This is danta-prakṣālana-vidhi.

[3] A mudrā is the name of a particular position or intertwining of the fingers, commonly practised in religious worship and supposed to possess an occult meaning and religious efficacy.

For aṃkuśa-mudrā, see K.D., appendix, p. 1.

[4] Viz. Gaṅgā, Yamunā, Godāvarī, Sarasvatī, Narmadā, Sindhu, Kāverī.

[5] I.e. the Gopāla-mantra.

[6] This is snāna-vidhi.

[7] Vide K.D., appendix, p. 1.

[8] This is vastra-paridhāna-vidhi.

[9] Of course if he be a Brahmin and not otherwise. See above.

out in his hand through the left nostril in a blackened form. Imagining this, he should shake it with the astra-mantra and throw it off. Thereby, he should think himself thoroughly washed off and cleaned. This is the first part of the saṃdhyā-ceremony.

The second part consists in offering libations of water to the Lord three times with the recitation of the Gāyatrī-mantra as modified by the school[1]; making the kara-nyāsa, i.e. assigning the different parts of the palm, viz. the forefinger, etc. to the different parts of the Gāyatrī-mantra[2]; and finally, reciting the mantra twenty-eight or hundred and eight times. This is the Vaiṣṇavite process of performing the saṃdhyā ceremony, whether in the morning, midday or evening.[3]

(7) Next, he should draw a lotus with eight petals in water; offer libations of water to his preceptor, to other great preceptors, to Nārada and other divine sages, to previous holy ones and to the Bhāgavatas; meditate the Lord Kṛṣṇa in the seed-vessel of the lotus; utter the principal mantra; and offer libations of water to Kṛṣṇa twenty-eight times.[4]

(8) After that, he should return home, reciting verses or in silence.

So far his preliminary consecratory ceremonies. Next his duties in the temple of the Lord.

II. (1) Before entering the temple of the Lord, he should wash his hands and feet and rinse his mouth once more. Having entered there, he should spread a seat; make dhenu-mudrā[5]; pray to the earth goddess to purify his seat; touch the ground with the forefinger with the utterance of the prescribed mantra; strike the ground thrice with the small finger of his left foot; and seat himself facing the east or the north,[6] in a padmāsana or svastikā posture.[7]

(2) Then he should bow down to his preceptor and other previous teachers; and proceed to consecrate his hands by repeating the astra-

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[1] Oṃ. Gopālāya vidmahe Gopīvallabhāya dhīmahi tan naḥ Kṛṣṇaḥ pracodayāt.

[2] Thus: Oṃ. Gopālāya aṣṭāṅgābhyāṃ namaḥ, vidmahe tarjanībhyāṃ namaḥ, Gopīvallabhāya madhyamābhyāṃ namaḥ, etc.

[3] This is saṃdhyā-vidhi.

[4] This is tarpaṇa-vidhi.

[5] See K.D., appendix, p. 1.

[6] The rule is to face the east. But if that be not possible, e.g. during the night, one may face the north. See the commentary on K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 7, p. 6.

[7] For the explanation of these postures, see the commentary on K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 6, p. 5. This is āsana-vidhi.

mantra [1] eight times, by rubbing sandal-paste and flowers in his palms, by mentally assigning them to the Lord [2] and, finally, by clapping his hands three times repeating the same astra-mantra. Next, he should bind the ten quarters, as it were, by snapping his thumb and forefinger together and uttering the same astra-mantra, and surround himself, as it were, with a fire-rampart and water, with the same mantra.[3] That is, he should hereby regard himself as placed in a safe enclosure, where no harm can befall him, so long as he is engaged in the worship.[4]

(3) After that, he should proceed to purify his elemental, i.e. material, body, for a non-god should not worship God. The process is as follows: He should first connect his soul, situated within the heart-lotus, with the Lord, situated in the lotus with a thousand petals over the head, through the suṣumnā-nāḍī with the mantra "I am He", and regard the twenty-five principles—viz. the earth and the rest, as absorbed therein. After that, he should begin the actual process of purifying his body thus: He should first draw in air through his left nostril with the recitation of the black vāyu-bīja "yam" sixteen times, hold forth his breath, reciting the same sixty-four times, and exhale it out through his right nostril, uttering the same thirty-two times. Thereby he should consider his body dried up. Secondly, he should draw in air through the right nostril along with the utterance of the red agni-bīja "ram" sixteen times, hold forth his breath by uttering the same sixty-four times and emit it out through the left nostril, uttering the same thirty-two times. Thereby he should consider his earthly body destroyed. Thirdly, he should draw in air through the left nostril with the recitation of the white candra-bīja "ṭam" sixteen times, thereby taking it to the moon in the head,[5] and then recite the white varuṇa-bīja "vam" sixty-four times. Thereby he should consider himself endowed with an immortal body,—fit for conducting the worship of the Lord,—in place of the destroyed earthly one. Finally, he should emit the air through the right nostril, reciting the yellow prithvī-bīja "lam" thirty-two times. Thereby he should

[1] Viz. 'Astrāya phaṭ'.

[2] Kara-nyāsa.

[3] K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 7, p. 5; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 97; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 8-9.

[4] This is ātma-rakṣaṇa-vidhi.

[5] I.e. in the Brahma-randhrastha-candra.

regard the immortal body he has just got as easy to be seen as his former earthly one.[1]

(4) Thus, on getting a new immortal body, he should next bring down his soul, which he has previously sent up to the Brahma-randhra,[2] to the heart-lotus of this new body, by placing his hand on the heart and uttering the prescribed mantra,[3] and the praṇava sixteen times.[4]

That is, the whole process consists of three steps. First, he should take his soul out of his earthly body, and keep it in the Lord, abiding in the Brahma-randhra. Next, he should destroy his earthly body, and get a new immortal body. Finally, he should install his soul, left intact so long in the Lord in the Brahma-randhra, in this new immortal body. The soul is the same and is not to be destroyed,—but only the body is changed. Of course, as evident, the entire process if only mental, and the earthly body is not really destroyed, but is simply supposed to be so for the time being.

III. After having thus purified his body and made it fit for the worship of the Lord by means of the inhaling and exhaling of air with mantras, he should next proceed to purify it further by means of a series of nyāsas, i.e. should mentally assign the various parts, etc. of his body to deities, etc. with suitable mantras.

(1) Thus he should first perform the kevala-mātṛkā-nyāsa, or assign the different parts of the body to different letters, the forehead to the letter "a", the mouth to the letter "ā", the right eye to the letter "i", the left eye to the letter "ī" and so on.[5]

(2) Next, he should perform the Keśavādi-mātṛkā-nyāsa, exactly like the first, with the additions of couples of deities.[6]

[1] This is bhūta-śuddhi-vidhi. K.D., 1st paṭala, verses 8–10, pp. 6-7; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 97-98; G.P., given in S.R., p. 8.

[2] See above.

[3] Thus: "I am He. May my vital-breath, my sense-organs, my speech, mind, eyes, ears and nose come here and stay here for ever for the worship of the Lord. Svāhā."

[4] This is prāṇa-pratiṣṭhā. K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 10 and commentary, p. 7; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 98; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 8-9.

[5] Thus: Oṃ namaḥ lalāṭe, āṃ namaḥ mukha-vṛtte, and so on. K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 11, p. 8; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 98-99; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 10-11.

[6] Thus: Am namaḥ Keśava-kīrttai; āṃ namaḥ Nārāyaṇāya kāntai, and so on.

K.D., 1st paṭala, verses 14–24, pp. 9–11; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 99-100; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 12-13.

(3) Thirdly, he should perform the tattva-nyāsa, or assign his whole body, heart, etc. to the supreme souls of the jīva, prāṇa, etc.[1]

(4) Fourthly, he should perform the indriya-nyāsa, or assign his sense-organs to different deities, viz. his ears to the quarters, his eyes to the sun and so on.[2]

(5) Fifthly, he should perform the pīṭha-nyāsa, i.e. imagine his body to be a pedestal of worship.[3]

Next, he should perform the Śrī-Gopāla-mantra-nyāsa, i.e. mentally appropriate the mantra of eighteen syllables,[4] consisting of the following five nyāsas, viz.:—

(6) Ṛṣyādi-nyāsa, i.e. he should assign his head, etc. to the sage Nārada, etc.[5]

(7) Next, he should perform the kara-nyāsa, i.e. assign the fingers and the palm and back of the hand to the different words of the mantra of eighteen syllables.[6]

(8) After that he should perform the aṅga-nyāsa, i.e. assign the various parts of his body to different words of the mantra of eighteen syllables.[7]

(9) Next, he should perform the pada-nyāsa, i.e. assign various parts of his body to the different words of the mantra of eighteen syllables.[8]

(10) Finally, he should perform the varṇa-nyāsa, i.e. assign different parts of the body to different syllables of the mantra of eighteen syllables.[9]

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[1] Thus: Maṃ namaḥ parāya jīvātmane namaḥ; bhaṃ namaḥ parāya prāṇātmane namaḥ, iti dvayaṃ sakala-śarīre, etc. K.D., 1st paṭala, verses 28–31, pp. 13–15; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 101-102; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 13-14.

[2] G.P., given in S.R., p. 15.

[3] For details, see K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 41, p. 20; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga. pp. 102-103; G.P., given in S.R., p. 15.

[4] For details, see Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 103; G.P., given in S.R., p. 15; D.P., p. 43.

[5] Thus: Oṃ Nārada-ṛṣaye namaḥ śirasi, etc. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 104; G.P., given in S.R., p. 15; D.P., p. 43.

[6] Thus: Klīṃ aṅguṣṭhābhyāṃ namaḥ, Kṛṣṇāya tarjanībhyāṃ namaḥ, etc. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 104; G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., p. 43.

[7] Thus: Klīṃ hṛdayāya namaḥ, Kṛṣṇāya śirase svāhā, etc. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 104; G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., p. 43.

[8] Thus: Klīṃ namo mūrdhani, Kṛṣṇāya namo vaktre, etc. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 104-105; G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., p. 43.

[9] Thus: Klīṃ mūrdhani, kṛṃ bhāle, ṣṇaṃ bhruvoḥ, etc. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 105; G.P., given in S.R., p.16; D.P., p. 43. This is nyāsa-vidhi.

IV. After having thus purified his body, sense-organs, mind, etc. by the series of nyāsas, he should next practise prāṇāyāma or breath-control for finally purifying, adjusting and preparing them for the great task which he is about to commence, viz. the worship of the Lord.

Here is the procedure:

He should mutter klīṃ sixteen times, draw in air through his left nostril, hold his breath, muttering it sixty-four times, and emit the air muttering it thirty-two times.[1]

V. Being thus absolutely purified, he should begin the actual worship of the Lord. He should commence with the internal or mental worship. That is, he should meditate on the Lord as possessed of eyes like full-blown lotus, body blue like cloud, wearing a shining cloth, with two hands adorned with the symbol of silence, standing under the Heavenly Tree [2] and so on.

After that he should worship the Lord mentally with five objects.[3]

VI. He should now mutter prayers a thousand times or one hundred and eight times and dedicate them (i.e. the japas) to the Lord.[4]

VII. Next, he should begin the external worship of the Lord, i.e. worship the idol. This should consist of the following successive steps:—

(1) First he should properly arrange the necessary utensils, etc., placing the bowl for washing hands behind him, the pitcher of water on his left, sandal-paste, flowers, cloth and incense, etc. on his right, the pots near his left hand, the lamp of clarified butter on the right side of the Lord, and the lamp of oil on the left of the Lord.[5]

(2) Next, he should place and worship the conch-shell thus: He should draw round, triangular and quadrangular diagrams in his front on the left, worship these diagrams with sandal-paste and flowers; place a washed tripādikā flower there; and worship it with

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[1] This is prāṇāyāma-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., pp. 43-44.

[2] Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 105. Cf. Baladeva above.

There are many other modes of dhyāna. A long account is given in K.D., 3rd paṭala, verses 1ff., pp. 50ff. Cf. also G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., p. 44.

[3] See above, foot note 1, p. 258.

[4] This is japa-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 105; G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., p. 44.

[5] This is pātra-saṃsthāpana-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 105; G.P., given in S.R., p. 17.

sandal-paste, flowers and unhusked barley-corns; then he should proceed to worship the conch-shell with the prescribed mantra; fill it with pure water, uttering the principal mantra; and worship the water. He should next worship all the holy rivers, the Ganges and the rest; make dhenu-mudrā,[1] repeat the nectar-mantra thrice; and make the gadā, padma, garuḍa, and matsya mudrās[2] successively. After that, he should hold the conch-shell on both sides with his thumb and third finger, touch the water within it with a japā flower or a petal of the tulasī-flower by his forefinger and middle finger, and utter the mantra eight times. He should dip a flower in the water and put it into the pitcher, sprinkle it over himself and on all the articles of worship.

Next, he should meditate on the conch-shell—as springing from the ocean, supported by the navel of Viṣṇu, worshipped by all the gods, and so on.[3]

(3) After that, he should place the basin for washing the feet of the Lord[4] to the south of the conch-shell, and put śyāmaka grass, durvā grass and a lotus[5] in it. The vessel for the offering of flowers and grass[6] to the north of the conch-shell and put sandal-paste, flowers, unhusked barley-corns, the sharp point of the blade of kuśa-grass, sesamum, mustard and durvā grass[7] in it; the basin for rinsing the mouth[8] to the east of the conch-shell and put nutmeg, cloves and kaṅkola-plant[9] in it and the vessel for the offering of honey and milk[10] to the west of the conch-shell and put curd, honey and clarified butter in it. If the requisite objects be lacking, he should name a fragrant tulasī-flower for each object, and put it there in place of the actual object; he should fill up all the vessels with water from the pitcher; worship them with sandal-paste and flower; utter mantra over each of them; put some water from the conch-shell in them; make dhenu- and mahā-mudrās.[11]

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[1] See K.D., appendix, p. 1. [2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

[3] This is śaṅkha-pūjana-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 18. Cf. also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 202-203.

[4] Pādya-pātra.

[5] Sv. S. adds Viṣṇukrānta-plant. 9th taraṅga, p. 106.

[6] Arghya-pātra.

[7] Sv. S. adds piparī-plant. 9th taraṅga, p. 106.

[8] Ācamana-pātra.

[9] Sv. S. adds barley-corn. 9th taraṅga, p. 106.

[10] Madhuparka-pātra.

[11] This is pādyādi-pūjana-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 106; G.P., given in S.R., p. 19.

(4) Then he should draw a lotus with eight petals on the ground; put the throne of the Lord over it; offer flowers, uttering the Mahā-pīṭha-mantra and meditate the Lord therein.[1]

(5) After that he should awaken the Lord with the prescribed mantra "Arise, arise, O Govinda! Arise, O Madhu-sūdana! Arise, O Lord of Rādhā, the Saviour of the poor".[2]

(6) Next, he should place the idol of Kṛṣṇa in a copper vessel, offer flowers to Him, and make pañcāṅga-nyāsa, i.e. assign the different parts of his body to the Lord.[3]

(7) Then he should proceed to offer flowers, etc.,[4] water for washing the feet,[5] water for rinsing the mouth [6] and honey and milk [7] to the Lord successively, along with the utterance of the principal mantra. Thus, he should offer sandal-paste, flowers, unhusked barley-corn and kuśa grass, placing them over the head of the idol; the pure water of the Ganges for the washing of His feet, putting them at its feet; the same for the rinsing of His mouth, placing them in its mouth; and finally, honey and milk and butter, putting them in the same.[8]

(8) Next, he should once more offer rinsing water of the Ganges scented with camphor to the Lord, and bathe the idol with the water from the conch-shell with the utterance of suitable mantras.[9]

(9) After that he should proceed to dress and adorn the Lord. He should dress the idol in a fine yellow robe and adorn it with sandal-paste, garlands of fragrant flowers, sacred thread, and various costly ornaments like crown, ear-rings, necklace and anklets, reciting appropriate mantras each time.[10]

(10) Next, he should offer incense [11] and lamp [12] to the Lord, reciting mantras; and offer refreshment, consisting of milk and rice

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[1] This is pīṭha-pūjā-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 106; G.P., given in S.R., p. 19.

[2] This is utthāpana-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 19.

[3] Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 106; G.P., given in S.R., p. 19.

[4] Argha. [5] Pādya. [6] Ācamana. [7] Madhu-parka.

[8] This is pādyādi-arpaṇa-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 106-107; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 19-20. See also K.D., 4th paṭala, verse 25, p. 89.

[9] This is snāna-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 20. See also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 107; K.D., 4th paṭala, verse 26, p. 89.

[10] This is vastra-paridhāna-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 20. See also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 107; K.D., 4th paṭala, verse 26, p. 89.

[11] Dhūpa-dāna. See K.D., 4th paṭala, verse 50, p. 98 for details.

[12] Dīpa-dāna. See K.D., 4th paṭala, verse 51, p. 98 for details.

cooked together with pure white sugar.[1] He should, first, worship the refreshment with sandal-paste and flowers, etc.; then absorb up all its impurities by muttering the vāyu-bīja "yam" eight times, destroy all its impurities by muttering the agni-bīja "ram" eight times and, finally, make it nectar-like by muttering the varuṇa-bīja "vam" eight times. Then he should make dhenu-mudrā and mahā-mudrā, protect the refreshment from harm by making the cakra-mudrā and uttering the astra-mantra, and utter the mūla-mantra over it. After having thus rendered the refreshment completely free from impurities, etc., he should put a little water from the conch-shell in the plate, make grāsa-mudrā, and make offerings to the five prāṇas. After that he should offer the refreshment to the Lord, muttering prayers, and think that He has partaken of it.[2]

(11) Next, he should make the Lord rinse His mouth and offer betel-leaves to Him.[3]

(12) He should now wave the lamps around the Lord, four times round His feet, twice round His navel, once round His face, and seven times round His whole body.[4]

(13) Next, he should wave the water-filled conch-shell over the idol, and sprinkle everyone present and himself with that water.

(14) He should then ask the forgiveness of the Lord for his unintentional mistakes in serving Him.[5]

(15) Finally, he should worship the washings of the feet of Kṛṣṇa with sandal-paste and flowers, etc., uttering mantras; place the vessel containing the washings on his head; and put it on a prop and not on the ground. Then he should offer the washings of the feet of the Lord first to the stalwart Vaiṣṇava of ancient days like Vālī, Vibhīṣaṇa, Bhīṣma, Kapila, Nārada, Arjuna, Prahlāda and so on, and then to the Vaiṣṇavas present there. He should distribute among them also the sandal, flowers, etc. of the Lord and the remains of the refreshment offered to the Lord. Then, last of all, he himself should partake of the

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[1] Dīpa-dāna, verse 52, p. 98.

[2] This is naivedya-pradāna-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 107; G.P., given in S.R., p. 21; K.D., 4th paṭala, verses 53ff., pp. 99ff.

[3] This is tāmbūla-pradāna-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 22. See also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 107.

[4] This is nīrājana-vidhi. G.P., collected in S.R., p. 22. See also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 107.

[5] This is aparādha-kṣamāpaṇa-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 107-108; G.P., given in S.R., p. 22.

food taken by the Lord and drink the washings of his feet. Finally, he should mutter suitable prayers, recite verses, walk round the Lord and bow down to Him, with the final prayer to Him to accept out of compassion the leaves and flowers, fruits which have been offered to Him through devotion alone.[1]

Thus, the devotee has broadly seven-fold duties to perform, viz.:—

I. First, his daily duties—rising from the bed, brushing his teeth, bathing, performing oblations, and so on.

II. Next, purifying his earthly body and making it fit for the worship of the Lord, consisting in seating himself, protecting himself from harm and interruption, destroying his present earthly body and assuming a new heavenly one.

III. Next, purifying his body further by a series of nyāsas, like Kevala-mātṛkā-nyāsa and the rest.

IV. Next, purifying his body still further by prāṇāyāma.

V. Next, performing the internal worship of the Lord, viz. meditation.

VI. Next, performing japas.

VII. And finally, performing the external worship of the idol, consisting in arranging the necessary utensils and objects properly, worshipping the conch-shell and so on, awakening the Lord, bathing and feeding Him and so on.

(3) Some of the religious observances and festivals of the sect of Nimbārka.

(1) Ekādaśī-vrata. Every Vaiṣṇava should observe this vow, i.e. fast on the eleventh day of the moon, called the Lord's day (Harivāsara) during both the waning half and the waxing half.[2] This vrata is the best of all and the most favoured by the Lord and hence its proper and regular performance conduces to both worldly well-being and salvation.[3]

Now, the ekādaśī is to be observed in accordance with the kapāla-vedha method. The kapāla-vedha or ardha-rātrodaya doctrine is that every tithi or lunar day really commences with *midnight*. Hence if the

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[1] G.P. (collected in S.R.), pp. 22-23. Cf. also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 107-108.

[2] Sv. S., 13th taraṅga, pp. 148ff.; D.P., p. 10; Ś.N.V.N., pp.1ff.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 13th taraṅga, pp. 150ff.

ekādaśī does not commence with the midnight, but after that moment, this vow is not to be observed on that day, but on the following.[1]

This method of determining the actual tithi holds good not only in the case of the ekādaśī vow, but is a general rule to be followed in the case of all religious observances and festivals.[2]

The kapāla-vedha or ardha-rātrodaya system is a peculiar tenet of the school of Nimbārka. There are generally three methods of determining tithis—viz. sūryyodaya, aruṇodaya and ardha-rātrodaya (or kapāla-vedha). According to the first, a tithi begins with *sunrise*. It is followed by non-Vaiṣṇavas. According to the second, a tithi begins with the *break of dawn* (a few hours before sunrise). It is followed by Vaiṣṇavas of other sects.[3] And, according to the third, as pointed out above, a tithi commences with *midnight*.[4]

The following are the duties of a Vaiṣṇava on the ekādaśī tithi: He should get up early in the morning and brush his teeth. The prohibition with regard to the brushing of teeth when one is fasting does not apply to a Vaiṣṇava, since, in his case, the brushing of teeth is a daily obligatory duty and unless he does so, he is not fit to worship the Lord.

He should then take some water, consecrate it by uttering the Śrī-Gopāla-mantra of eighteen syllables thrice and drink it; resolve to fast on that day[5]; and make offerings of flowers to the Lord. He should fast the whole day and night; avoid chewing betel-leaves, sleeping by day, having sensual enjoyment, and doing forbidden deeds; and spend his time in muttering prayers, singing the name of the Lord, listening to His name, worshipping and meditating on Him. He should, further, keep awake the whole night, worshipping the Lord, and reading holy books and so on.[6]

Throughout the year, a number of ceremonies and festivals are to be observed every month. Thus, in the month of Vaiśākha, the first month of the year, a Vaiṣṇava

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[1] Sv. S., 13th taraṅga, pp. 156ff.; D.P., pp. 50ff.; preface to Ś.N.V.N., pp. 1ff.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 13th taraṅga, p. 161; preface to Ś.N.V.N., p. 3.

[3] E.g. the sect of Baladeva. See p. 422 of the thesis, Part 1.

[4] Sv. S., 13th taraṅga, pp. 151ff.; D.P., pp. 50ff; preface to Ś.N.V.N., pp. 1ff.

[5] Saṃkalpa-karaṇa.

[6] Sv. S., 13th taraṅga, pp. 203ff. For his duties on the Daśamī and Dvādaśī, see *op. cit.*, pp. 201–203, 218–221.

(2) should perform the Akṣayatṛtīyā-vrata, on the third day of the bright half of the moon.[1]

(3) He should further celebrate the birthday of Jāhnavī, the river Ganges, on the seventh day of the bright half of the moon,[2] and

(4) perform the Nṛsiṃha-jayantī-vrata on the fourteenth day of the bright half of the moon.[3]

(5) In the month of Jyeṣṭha, the second month, he should first perform the Jala-pūjā, i.e. worship the lord in water.[4]

(6) Then he should observe the ceremony of Daśaharā on the tenth day of the bright half of the moon. He should bathe Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa with cold water mingled with sandal-paste, camphor and saffron and offer them specially cold refreshment. This Vrata is called "Daśharā" because it removes ten kinds of sins, viz. three physical sins: theft, injuring others and violating the wife of another; four sins relating to speech: uttering harsh words, untruthfulness, backbiting and rambling; and three kinds of mental sins, viz.: hankering after the property of others, wishing them ill and attention towards improper objects.[5]

(7) In the month of Āṣāḍha, he should perform first the Kadamba-puṣpa-pūjā, i.e. worship the Lord with the kadamba-flower.[6]

(8) He should observe the festival of Rathotsava or the ceremony of putting the Lord on a chariot on the second day of the bright half of the moon [7]; and

(9) perform the festival of Śayanotsava or worship the Lord as lying on a snake on the ocean of milk [8] and so on.

(10) One of the chief festivals of the Vaiṣṇavas is the festival of Janmāṣṭamī or the birthday celebration of the Lord. It is held in the month of Bhādra, on the eighth day of the dark half of the moon. There are two kinds of Janmāṣṭamī, kevala and jayantī. The former is to be performed every year, the latter only when the aṣṭamī-tithi

[1] For details, see Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 263ff.
[2] For details, see Sv. S., 19th taraṅga, p. 265.
[3] For details, see Sv. S., 19th taraṅga, pp. 265ff.
[4] For details, see Sv. S., 20th taraṅga, pp. 272ff.
[5] Sv. S., 20th taraṅga, p. 275.
[6] For details, see Sv. S., 21st taraṅga, pp. 277ff.
[7] For details, see Sv. S., 21st taraṅga, p. 278.
[8] For details, see Sv. S., 21st taraṅga, pp. 279ff.

For other religious observances and festivals, see Sv. S., 22nd taraṅgas ff., pp. 293ff; Ś.N.V.N., pp. 1ff.

comes to be connected with the star Rohiṇī, which does not happen every year.[1] In accordance with the general rule, it is to be observed on the aṣṭamī-tithi provided the tithi commences with midnight and not later than that.[2] The process of performing the celebration is as follows: The devotee should rise early in the morning, brush his teeth, and resolve to fast throughout the day. Then in the midday having bathed in pure water of a river, he should set up a lying-in chamber (sūtikā-gṛha) and strive to make it, as best as he can, like the original lying-in chamber of Devakī where Kṛṣṇa was born. Within that chamber, he should place the eight kinds of idols of Kṛṣṇa, viz. made of wood, metals, stone, gold, etc. and so on. The image of Devakī should be placed on the bed, and the new-born child Kṛṣṇa should be represented as suckling her breasts. The images of Yaśodā and Vāsudeva too should be placed there. Then Nanda, the cowherd, the cowherdess Yaśodā and Devakī should be worshipped with sandal, flowers, unhusked barley-corns, fruits and so on; after that the incarnations should be meditated on, and Aditi, the Mother of gods, should be worshipped, and so on.[3]

CONCLUSION.

We have considered four Bhedābheda schools, viz.:—

(1) Svābhāvika bhedābheda-vāda of Nimbārka.
(2) Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda of Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha.
(3) Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda of Bhāskara.
(4) Acintya-bhedābheda-vāda of Baladeva.

There is a general agreement among these philosophers with regard to the nature and qualities of Brahman, the sentient and the non-sentient. But the difference among them consists in their views regarding the *relation* between these three entities. All of them admit both difference and non-difference to be equally real, but the vital question is here: How are we to *reconcile* difference and non-difference, plurality and Unity? Nimbārka accepts them both to be equally natural (svābhāvika) and perfectly compatible. Rāmānuja and

[1] Sv. S., 23rd taraṅga, p. 303.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 23rd taraṅga, pp. 307ff.
[3] *Op. cit.*, 23rd taraṅga, pp. 319–321.

Śrīkaṇṭha try to reconcile them on the analogy of soul and body, which, though different, yet form an integral whole. Bhāskara regards them to be equally real, but he takes difference to be non-lasting though real (aupādhika) and non-difference to be both lasting and real. Baladeva frankly gives up the problem as inconceivable (acintya) and engages himself with religion rather than philosophy. He seems to suggest that instead of wasting our time and energy in trying to think out problems which are really unthinkable, it will be far better for us to *accept* what Revelation tells us, and engage ourselves with what lies within our own powers—viz. devotion and worship.

The problem of the relation between the One and the many, God and the world, is an eternal one, and hundreds of views have been advanced on this point. On the one hand, we have strict Non-dualistic doctrines of the type of Śaṃkara's Advaita-vāda, which completely identify the One and the many (i.e. assert that the One denies the many), and on the other hand, we have strict Dualistic doctrines of the type of Madhva's Dvaita-vāda which completely differentiate the One from the many. And between these two extreme types, there are various kinds of grades of doctrines which try to reconcile the One with the many.

The questions how and why the One becomes many and in what relation does it precisely stand to the many, are questions which will perhaps be never satisfactorily answered. But considering all things, the explanation given by Nimbārka seems to be very reasonable. Nimbārka elucidates his point, as we have seen, by the analogy of the cause-effect relation. The effect (or the part) is *different from* the cause (or the whole), since it has a peculiar nature and some peculiar functions of its own. The earthen pot, for example, is different from a mere lump of clay, in the sense that it has a peculiar shape of its own which the lump lacks, it has some peculiar functions of its own, viz. fetching water and so on, which the mere lump cannot perform. But, on the other hand, the effect is *non-different* from the cause, since it, as a modification of the cause, is nothing but the cause; for example, the earthen pot is non-different from the lump of clay, because after all it is nothing but clay, and depends for its very existence upon it.

The cause, on its side, is *different* from the effect, because the effect is not the whole of it, i.e. because it has a peculiar nature of its own which is not exhausted in the effect, but is something over and above it. The lump of clay e.g. is different from the pot, because it is

not only the pot, but hundred other things, cups, pitchers and so on. But, again, the cause is *non-different* from the effect, because it *is* the effect, so far as it goes. The lump of clay e.g. is *non-different* from the pot, because it is clay like the pot.

Thus, the cause-effect (or whole-part) relation is a relation of difference-non-difference, both of which are equally true.

The very same is the case with Brahman and the universe. The universe is *different* from Brahman, because it has a peculiar nature of its own, possessing as it does certain qualities which Brahman lacks (like non-intelligence, grossness and so on), and not possessing certain qualities which Brahman possesses (like all-pervasiveness and so on); while it is *non-different* from Brahman, because it is after all nothing but Brahman, arising from, sustained by, and reabsorbed in Brahman. Brahman, on His side, is *different* from the universe, because He is not exhausted in it, but possesses a transcendental nature of His own; while He is *non-different* from the universe because He is immanent in it, which, as His effect, is nothing but Brahman. Thus, Brahman is different from the universe as *transcendent*, non-different from it as *immanent*.

If we understand difference and non-difference in this sense of transcendency and immanency, no contradiction will be involved in taking difference and non-difference to be equally real and compatible. Non-difference does not mean here "absolute identity", like that between one pea and another, but it simply means "essential dependence of the universe on Brahman and the immanence of Brahman in the universe", while difference means "difference of nature between the universe and Brahman and the transcendence of Brahman over the universe". Hence everything is reconciled.

The second question: *Why* the One should become the many, is not a less puzzling one. Nimbārka points out that the creation of the world is but a mere sport (līlā) on the part of Brahman, and does not arise from any want on His part, since He is ever-satisfied and has His desires eternally fulfilled. But this cosmic sport is not absolutely purposeless or arbitrary, but it serves the purpose of justice, although it serves no purpose of Brahman Himself. It is regulated by moral demands, and the universe which is created by Brahman in mere sport is really created in strict accordance with the karmas of individuals themselves.

This seems to be the only possible explanation, if the Creator be admitted to be both self-sufficient and just. Of course, this solution,

too, if logically pushed farther lands us in a dilemma: Who is responsible for the first karmas of individuals which are responsible for their varying lots? God cannot be held to be responsible, for then He becomes partial. Nimbārka (in common with others) tries to get out of the difficulty by pointing out that the karmas are beginningless, and so is the creation of the world, in accordance with the maxim of seed and shoot (vījāṅkura-nyāya). The seed gives rise to the shoot, the shoot to the seed, the seed to the shoot and so on to infinity. It cannot be said whether the seed is the prior or the shoot and hence both are taken to be beginningless. In the very same manner, the karmas give rise to the world, the world to the karmas and so on to infinity, hence they must be taken to be beginningless.

Strict logic may demur at this way of solving the question, but it is doubtful whether such questions can be answered on the ground of strict logic alone. In any case, Nimbārka's explanation is a rational and creditable attempt at solving one of the most difficult problems of life, though he might not have the last say on the subject.

The third question is: *How* does the One become the many. Nimbārka points out that the One becomes the many through the projection of its powers, without losing its own Unity, integrity and essential nature, just as the spider weaves its web out of itself, yet itself remains unmodified. This is indeed an ingenious solution.

We find, therefore, that the doctrine of Nimbārka is a valuable contribution to the history of thought from the point of view of philosophy, and honestly tries to answer some of the fundamental questions of human existence.

From the point of view of religion also, the doctrine of Nimbārka scored no small a triumph, as is evident from a large number of followers it has even now in North India and Bengal. Of the four systems considered above, Bhāskara has no place for a personal religion or bhakti, Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha emphasise aiśvaryya-pradhānā bhakti, or a distant relation of awe and reverence, while Nimbārka and Baladeva emphasise mādhuryya-pradhānā bhakti or an intimate relation of love and sweet comradeship. Although a man is at first overwhelmed by the grandeur and majesty of the Lord, yet he cannot remain at a distance from Him for long, but is irresistibly drawn nearer by a bond of mutual love and living companionship. Hence it is that the doctrine of Nimbārka has captured the hearts of thousands.

From the ethical point of view also, we find Nimbārka to be very broad-minded and rational. He insists not only on the external per-

formance of sacrifices and ceremonies, but equally on the inner purity and cultivation of the mind, and the ethical virtues of self-control, charity and the rest. He does not insist that in order to attain salvation one must give up society and one's stage of life or āśrama. He lays the greatest emphasis on the *spirit* with which one performs one's duties. A man who performs his duties in a disinterested and unselfish spirit is able to attain salvation, whether he be a householder or an ascetic.

We conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of Nimbārka has much to recommend itself from the points of view of philosophy, religion and ethics, as it tries to tackle the eternal problem of difference and non-difference from a new point of view, and encourages a relation of faith, love and intimacy between God and man.

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7. Jābāla-upaniṣad.
8. Kālāgni-rudra-upaniṣad.
9. Kaṇṭha-śruti-upaniṣad. See list B.
10. Kaṭha-upaniṣad.
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12. Kena-upaniṣad.
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Bloomfield, Maurice. See Vedic Concordance, A.

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1. Aitareya-brāhmaṇa.
2. Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa. (Also called Śāṃkhāyaṇa-brāhmaṇa.)
3. Pañca-viṃśa-brāhmaṇa. See Tāṇḍya-mahā-brāhmaṇa.
4. Śāṃkhāyana-brāhmaṇa. See Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa.
5. Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa.
6. Taittirīya-brāhmaṇa.
7. Tāṇḍya-mahā-brāhmaṇa. (Also called Pañca-viṃśa-brāhmaṇa.)

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2. Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Private Libraries of the North-West Provinces, A.
3. Catalogus Catalogorum.
4. List of Sanskrit Manuscripts discovered in Oudh during the year 1877.
5. Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency during the years 1884–87. By R. G. Bhandarkar.
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2. Vedic Concordance, A. See also Index.

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1. Laukika-nyāyāñjali.
2. Upaniṣad-vākya-koṣa.
Jaimini. See Mīmāṃsā-sūtras.

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Patañjali. See Yoga-sūtras.

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1. Bhāgavata-purāṇa.
2. Brahma-vaivarta-purāṇa.
3. Kūrma-purāṇa.
4. Viṣṇu-purāṇa.

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2. Ṛg-veda-saṃhitā.
3. Kāṭhaka-saṃhitā.
4. Maitrāyaṇī-saṃhitā.
5. Taittirīya-saṃhitā.
6. Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā.

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3. Gautama-smṛti. See Gautama-dharma-śāstra.
4. Manu-smṛti.
5. Vaśiṣṭha-smṛti. See Smṛtīnāṃ samuccayaḥ, pp. 187–235.
6. Yājñavalkya-smṛti. See Dharma-śāstras. Text, pp. 1–89.

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2. Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtras of Jaimini. See Mīmāṃsā-sūtras.
3. Sāṃkhya-sūtras of Kapila.
4. Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali.
5. Vaiśeṣika-sūtras of Kaṇāda.

Sūtras—Dharma. See Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra.

Sūtras—Gṛhya. See Āśvalāyana-gṛhya-sūtra.

Sūtras—Śrauta. See:

1. Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra.
2. Hiraṇyakeśi-śrauta-sūtra. See Satyāṣāḍha-śrauta-sūtra.
3. Satyāṣāḍha-śrauta-sūtra. (Also called Hiraṇyakeśi-śrauta-sūtra.)

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ABBREVIATIONS USED

A.C.	.. ..	Ācārya-carita.
A.K.	.. ..	Amara-koṣa.
A.S.	.. ..	Audumbara-saṃhitā.
A.S.T.	.. ..	Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇī.
A.Sm.	.. ..	Atri-smṛti.
Agni.	.. ..	Agni-purāṇa.
Ait.	.. ..	Aitareya-upaniṣad.
Ait.Ar.	.. ..	Aitareya-āraṇyaka.
Air.Br.	.. ..	Aitareya-brāhmaṇa.
Ap.D.S.	.. ..	Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra.
Ap.S.S.	.. ..	Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra.
As.G.S.	.. ..	Āśvalāyana-gṛhya-sūtra.
Athar.V.	.. ..	Atharva-veda-saṃhitā.
B.	.. ..	Quoted by Baladeva.
B.M.	.. ..	Bāla-manoramā.
B.M.C.	.. ..	British Museum Catalogue.
B.M.G.	.. ..	Bhakta-mālā.
Bh.	.. ..	Quoted by Bhāskara.
Bh.B.	.. ..	Bhāskara's Commentary on the Brahma-sūtras.
Bh.P.	.. ..	Bhaviṣya-purāṇa.
Bha.P.	.. ..	Bhāgavata-purāṇa.
Br.Su.	.. ..	Brahma-sūtra.
Br.V.P.	.. ..	Brahma-vaivarta-purāṇa.
Brahma B.	.. ..	Brahma-bindu-upaniṣad.
Brh.	.. ..	Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad.
C.M.B.	.. ..	Chandoga-mantra-brāhmaṇa.
C.S.S.	.. ..	Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.
C.U.	.. ..	A Concordance to the principal Upaniṣads and Bhagavad-gītā.
Cat.Cat.	.. ..	Catalogus Catalogorum.
Chand.	.. ..	Chāndogya-upaniṣad.
Cul.	.. ..	Cūlikā-upaniṣad.
D.P.	.. ..	Dīkṣā-tattva-prakāśa.
D.S.	.. ..	Daśa-ślokī.
D.Sm.	.. ..	Dakṣa-smṛti.
G.B.	.. ..	Govinda-bhāṣya.
G.D.S.	.. ..	Gautama-dharma-śāstra.
G.K.	.. ..	Gauḍapāda-kārikā.

G.M.	.. ..	Guru-bhakti-mandākinī.
G.P.	.. ..	Gopāla-paddhati.
G.P.T.	.. ..	Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī-upaniṣad.
Gita.	.. ..	Bhagavad-gītā.
Hari V.	.. ..	Hari-vaṃśa.
I.O.C.	.. ..	India Office Catalogue.
I.P.	.. ..	Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2.
Isa.	.. ..	Īśa-upaniṣad.
Jabala.	.. ..	Jābāla-upaniṣad.
K.D.	.. ..	Krama-dīpikā.
K.F.	.. ..	Kūrma-purāṇa.
K.R.	.. ..	Kālāgni-rudra-upaniṣad.
K.S.S.	.. ..	Kasi Sanskrit Series.
K.V.S.	.. ..	Kātyāyana-vārtika-sūtra.
Katha.	.. ..	Kaṭha-upaniṣad.
Kath. Sam.	.. ..	Kāṭhaka-saṃhitā.
Kaus.	.. ..	Kauṣītaki-upaniṣad.
Kena.	.. ..	Kena-upaniṣad.
L.M.	.. ..	Laghu-mañjūṣā.
L.N.	.. ..	Laukika-nyāyāñjali.
L.S.	.. ..	Laghu-stava-rāja-stotram.
L.S.V.	.. ..	Laghu-stavāvali.
M.R.	.. ..	Mantrārtha-rahasya.
M.R.S.	.. ..	Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī.
M.Sam.	.. ..	Maitrāyaṇī-saṃhitā.
M.W.	.. ..	Sanskrit-English Dictionary.
Maha.	.. ..	Mahābhārata, Asiatic Society edition.
Maha. Up.	.. ..	Mahā-upaniṣad.
Mahanar.	.. ..	Mahānārāyaṇa-upaniṣad.
Maitri.	.. ..	Maitrī-upaniṣad.
Mand.	.. ..	Māṇḍūkya-upaniṣad.
Manu.	.. ..	Manu-saṃhitā.
Mudg.	.. ..	Mudgala-upaniṣad.
Mukti.	.. ..	Muktika-upaniṣad.
Mund.	.. ..	Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad.
Nar.	.. ..	Nārāyaṇa-upaniṣad.
N.B.	.. ..	Number of sūtras according to Nimbārka's commentary.
Nr.Pur.	.. ..	Nṛsiṃha-pūrva-tāpanī-upaniṣad.
Nr.Ut.	.. ..	Nṛsiṃha-uttara-tāpanī-upaniṣad.

N.W.P.	.. ..	A Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Private Libraries of the North-West Provinces.
Oudh. Mss.	.. ..	List of Sanskrit Manuscripts discovered in Oudh.
P.K.	.. ..	Prapanna-kalpa-vallī.
P.R.	.. ..	Prameya-ratnāvalī.
P.S.M.	.. ..	Prapanna-sura-taru-mañjarī.
Pan.	.. ..	Pāṇini-sūtra.
Prasna.	.. ..	Praśna-upaniṣad.
Pu.Mi.Su.	.. ..	Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra.
R.	.. ..	Quoted by Rāmānuja.
Rep. Bh.	.. ..	Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency. (Bhandarkar.)
Rep. Kath.	.. ..	Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency. (Kathavate.)
Rg. V.	.. ..	Ṛg-veda-saṃhitā.
S.	.. ..	Quoted by Śaṃkara.
S.A.M.	.. ..	Śuklācārya-mata-saṃgraha.
S.B.	.. ..	Śaṃkara's commentary on the Brahma-sūtras. Kasi Sans. Series.
S.J.	.. ..	Siddhānta-jāhnavī.
S.K.	.. ..	Śruty-anta-kalpa-vallī.
S.N.	.. ..	Śrī-Nimbārkācāryas tan matañ ca.
S.N.K.S.	.. ..	Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja.
S.N.K.	.. ..	Śrī-Nimbārka-mahā-munīndra.
S.N.V.N.	.. ..	Śrī-Nimbārka-vratotsava-nirṇava.
S.R.	.. ..	Stotra-ratnāvalī.
S.S.	.. ..	Śruty-anta-sura-druma.
S.S.	.. ..	Siddhānta-setukā.
Sab. B.	.. ..	Śabara's commentary on the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra.
Sam. Ka.	.. ..	Sāṃkhya-kārikā.
Sam. Su.	.. ..	Sāṃkhya-sūtras.
Sat. Br.	.. ..	Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa.
Sat. S. S.	.. ..	Satyāṣāḍha-śrauta-sūtra.
Sd. K.	.. ..	Siddhānta-kaumudī.
Sd.R.	.. ..	Siddhānta-ratna. By Baladeva.
SK.	.. ..	Quoted by Śrīkaṇṭha.
SK. B.	.. ..	Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary on the Brahma-sūtras.
Skanda.	.. ..	Skanda-upaniṣad.
Sri. B.	.. ..	Śrī-bhāṣya. Madras edition.
Sv. S.	.. ..	Sva-dharmāmṛta-sindhu.
Svadhar. MS.	..	Sva-dharmādhva-bodha. Manuscript.
Svet.	.. ..	Svetāśvatara-upaniṣad.
Subala.	.. ..	Subāla-upaniṣad.

T.P.	..	Tattva-prakāśikā.
Tait.	..	Taittirīya-upaniṣad.
Tait. Ar.	..	Taittirīya-āraṇyaka.
Tait. Br.	..	Taittirīya-brāhmaṇa.
Tait. Sam.	..	Taittirīya-saṃhitā.
Tand. Br.	..	Tāṇḍya-mahā-brāhmaṇa.
V.C.	..	A Vedic Concordance.
V.D.	..	Vedānta-dīpa.
V.K.	..	Vedānta-kaustubha.
V.K.P.	..	Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā.
V.K.V.	..	Vedānta-kārikāvalī.
V.M.	..	Vedānta-ratna-mālā.
V.P.	..	Viṣṇu-purāṇa.
V.P.S.	..	Vedānta-pārijata-saurabha.
V.R.M.	..	Vedānta-ratna-mañjūṣā.
V.S.	..	Vedānta-sāra.
V.Sm.	..	Vaśiṣṭha-smṛti.
V.Su.	..	Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.
Vasu.	..	Vāsudeva-upaniṣad.
Ved. In.	..	Vedic Index of Names and Subjects.
Ved. Pari.	..	Vedānta-paribhāṣā.
Vj. S.	..	Vājasaneya-saṃhitā.
Y.S.	..	Yoga-sūtra.
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